Letter from the Secretary General

Building a new NATO for a new Europe

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NATO has come out of the Madrid Summit stronger and with a new sense of purpose. We delivered on many aspects of a new NATO, and now have an extensive agenda for the months and years ahead:

- We have invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to start accession negotiations with the Alliance
- We have committed ourselves to a robust ‘open door’ policy concerning further accessions
- We have started a substantially enhanced Partnership for Peace programme
- We are intensifying consultations with our partners through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)
- We are opening a brand new chapter in NATO-Russia relations through the Founding Act signed in Paris in May
- We have signed a Charter with Ukraine on a distinct and effective partnership
- We have enhanced the dialogue with our Mediterranean neighbours
- We have made further progress in developing a European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance, and
- We have moved ahead on a radically reformed NATO command structure

So Madrid was not the end of the story. It was a key point in the continuing process of adaptation and renewal. We have important work still to do and momentous decisions to take in the months ahead. In this letter, let me offer my personal views on where NATO stands today.

Madrid has been a watershed for the Alliance. It brought the different strands of NATO’s adaptation together to form a coherent whole. The new NATO that emerged from the Summit is tailor-made to the new strategic environment. It is a NATO for an undivided Europe, as is evident by our decision to invite new members. Indeed, this decision alone demonstrates that the Alliance is determined to remove all vestiges of the past.

What many observers have yet to appreciate, however, is the significance of the totality of the Madrid decisions. They still tend to underestimate the huge importance of our partnership arrangements, and do not realise that the allies’ security is inseparably linked to that of our partners. Indeed, if one were to sum up the difference between the old and the new NATO, it is that the new NATO now reflects its commitment to wider Euro-Atlantic stability in the way it is organised - with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Partnership for Peace, Russian and Ukrainian meetings and now the Mediterranean dialogue firmly reflected within NATO’s own structures and procedures. The new NATO, in short, is much better geared to manage Europe’s long-term evolution.

This - managing Europe’s benign evolution - is after all NATO’s key role today. It requires the Alliance to make its contributions on various levels: to provide a collective defence insurance against the reversals of international politics; to help a European security and defence dimension take shape; to establish a lasting strategic partnership with Russia and Ukraine; to reach out to our Mediterranean neighbours, and last but not least to create new mechanisms for the effective prevention and management of crises - together with partners.

All these challenges are likely to remain on the transatlantic political agenda well into the next century. And all will require NATO to keep its eye on the ball.

But perhaps NATO’s most vital - and indeed perennial - task is to keep the transatlantic relationship healthy. Indeed, to reconcile the process of European integration with a transatlantic security framework, and to achieve a new sharing of responsibilities between European and North American allies may well become the most crucial challenge in the next decade. It can only be met if the Alliance remains responsive to the security interests on both sides of the Atlantic - politically and structurally.

This is why the Madrid Summit has been so important. It has provided a comprehensive action plan for the future. It has given us a NATO where the commitment to wider European security and stability is no longer just a policy, but is now firmly reflected in the way we do business. The decisions taken at the Summit demonstrate that we are on course towards our goal: building a new NATO for a new and undivided Europe.

Javier Solana
Accession of new members to the Alliance: What are the next steps?

Ambassador Gebhardt von Moltke
NATO’s Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs

In Madrid, NATO Heads of State and Government invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to start accession talks with the aim of joining the Alliance in 1999. They also confirmed that the Alliance remains open to other countries joining in the future. Between now and their entry into the Alliance, these three new democracies will be thoroughly prepared to meet the responsibilities and obligations of membership. In particular, they will undergo practical preparations to ensure their fullest participation in NATO's command and force structures. These procedures will ensure that the Alliance’s overall goal of strengthening security for all of Europe can be achieved.

NATO’s enlargement is a process, not an event. In Madrid, Alliance leaders decided on the most significant step so far: the invitation to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to start accession talks with the objective of joining NATO by 1999. At the same time, they made a firm commitment to continue the process, to lead to further accessions in the future.

In January 1994 at the NATO Summit in Brussels, allied leaders committed themselves to accept new members into the North Atlantic Alliance, as provided for in Article 10 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, on which NATO is based. The 1994 Brussels Declaration of NATO Heads of State and Government reaffirmed that the Alliance was open to membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Washington Treaty and to contribute to security in the North Atlantic Area. NATO, thus, set out its clear expectation that new democratic states would join. The Madrid Summit delivered on that promise. The opening of NATO to new member states has advanced, and will continue to proceed, in a steady, deliberate and transparent way.

NATO’s concept for broadening its membership, as the 1994 Brussels Declaration stated, involves “an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe”. The purpose of this process is to contribute to greater stability, in the broadest sense, in the whole of the Euro-Atlantic area. The opening of NATO to new members is one of a series of initiatives taken by the Alliance since the end of the Cold War to overcome the division of Europe during that era, and to develop instead a comprehensive and
### Facts and Figures on the States Invited to Start Accession Talks with the Alliance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1996 Indicators</th>
<th>Czech Republic</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Poland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>$52.4 billion</td>
<td>$44.0 billion</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP per capita**</td>
<td>$8,200</td>
<td>$6,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>10.4 million</td>
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<td>Defence Expenditure</td>
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<td>Defence Expenditure as % of GDP</td>
<td>2.13%</td>
<td>1.72%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Personnel</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>64,300</td>
<td>214,800</td>
</tr>
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Source: DPAO, NATO; all figures except GDP per capita are based on 1996 data as reported through the PfP Planning and Review Process

(1) GDP per capita are 1995 figures from The Military Balance 1996/97, IISS

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### Who’s Who in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland

#### The Czech Republic
- President: Václav Havel
- Prime Minister: Václav Klaus
- Foreign Minister: Josef Zímanec
- Defence Minister: Miloslav Vrabc
- Last parliamentary elections: May/June 1996
- Last presidential elections: January 1993**
- Next elections: President, 1998

#### Poland
- President: Aleksander Kwaśniewski
- Prime Minister: Władysław Cimoszewicz
- Foreign Minister: Dariusz Rosati
- Defence Minister: Stanisław Dobrzanski
- Last parliamentary elections: September 1993
- Last presidential elections: November 1995

#### Hungary
- President: Árpád Göncz
- Prime Minister: Gyula Horn
- Foreign Minister: László Kovács
- Defence Minister: György Keleti
- Last parliamentary elections: May 1994
- Last presidential elections: June 1995**

(2) The President is elected by Parliament
cooperative system of security to benefit all the countries in the area. Thus, broadening the membership of NATO is part of a much broader strategy to help create a peaceful, undivided and democratic Europe, an objective shared by NATO, the EU, WEU, OSCE and the Council of Europe.

Since 1989, there have been many elements in the evolution towards a more stable, cooperative Europe: German unification; the creation of a cooperative framework for addressing security issues; support for the democratic reform process in Russia, Ukraine and elsewhere; adaptation of the CFE Treaty; and the widening and strengthening of security and economic institutions. The broadening of NATO’s membership, and eventually that of the EU, are separate, autonomous, but complementary processes: both are important elements of a wider set of approaches to ensure a Europe which is peaceful, undivided and democratic. The opening of NATO also complements other essential initiatives taken by other key institutions such as the OSCE.

**NATO’s adaptation**

It is also important to remember that NATO is itself in the process of transformation — accepting new members is neither an end in itself nor NATO’s only contribution to security. The Alliance has been adapting to a radically changed security environment and has been taking on new missions. The ‘new NATO’ looks and acts quite differently from the old NATO. It will be larger. But its focus is changing. There is no major threat to deter, as in the past. Many of the new dangers are regional, or on the periphery of Europe and beyond. Alliance activities are therefore less concentrated on collective defence for its members in a narrow sense — although, of course, collective defence of its members’ territorial integrity in the event of any emergent threat in the future remains a core function of the Alliance. Now, the Alliance focuses more on developing the means to act with partners in defence of wider, common interests.

NATO’s opening is therefore one element of a broader set of measures taken by the

"Over the last six years, the [North Atlantic] Assembly has passed five resolutions endorsing NATO enlargement. However, that support is not unqualified and cannot be taken for granted. It must not only be sustained, but also expanded and strengthened. ... Parliamentary support will also be conditioned on the confidence that enlargement will be an open and ongoing process. The Alliance should make clear that no European democracy that seeks membership in the Alliance and is in a position to contribute to NATO’s overall security will be denied membership. To do so would violate the Alliance’s ethos and would perpetuate a zone of insecurity. Steps that reinforce the credibility of NATO’s commitment ‘to keep the door open’ will only further solidify public and parliamentary support for enlargement.”

Senator William Roth, President of the North Atlantic Assembly and Chairman of the US Senate’s NATO Observer Group

Madrid, 8 July 1997
Alliance to ensure that all our partners can develop close, effective, practical links with the Alliance, in accordance with their own wishes and interests. The desire to come closer to NATO reflects a recognition that NATO is an effective security organisation which is relevant to modern security challenges. NATO, for its part, recognises that to address the full range of security risks — regional crises and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction among them — the Alliance must have effective working arrangements and a close understanding with all its partners.

In short, therefore, as NATO has moved steadily and deliberately towards the acceptance of new members, other initiatives such as Partnership for Peace and, most recently, the inauguration of the new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, have ensured that progress towards a truly integrated, cooperative security space is maintained. By the same token, NATO has developed agreed specific individual partnership arrangements with Russia and Ukraine, both of which have major contributions to make to European security. This demonstrates that the accession of new members to NATO is part of an overall strategy to overcome the artificial divisions of the past.

The accession process

Following the decision in Madrid, accession talks will begin soon with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The objective of these talks will be to obtain formal confirmation from these countries of their commitment to the general obligations of NATO membership, i.e., to gain certainty in a formal way that each of them is able and willing to meet the requirements of membership, and accepts the full political and legal acquis of the Alliance. The talks will also be the forum for obtaining confirmation of each country’s intended relationship to NATO’s defence planning system and military structure. In addition, an appropriate undertaking or commitment will be sought not to block the accession of other future new members. The aim will be to complete these talks in the Autumn, with a view to having the necessary Accession Protocol for each of the three countries signed by NATO Foreign Ministers when they meet in Brussels in December 1997. Those Accession Protocols in effect constitute amendments to the North Atlantic Treaty, on which the Alliance is based, as well as

Joint press statement by leaders of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland

On behalf of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland we express our deepest satisfaction with the invitation extended here in Madrid by the 16 Heads of State and Government of NATO member states to our countries to begin talks on accession to the Alliance. This is a historic decision paving the way to a more stable and secure Europe.

We see the invitation extended to us in Madrid as recognition of the tremendous efforts undertaken by our societies following the changes in 1989/1990. We are indeed very proud that the transformations of our political systems and economies have made us eligible to be considered as an integral part of the Alliance.

It is on the basis of this continuing progress that we are looking confidently toward assuming all the rights, duties and responsibilities associated with membership in the Atlantic Alliance. We are resolved to take an active part in its collective efforts.

We are determined to intensify the political and military cooperation of our three countries.

We hope that the parliaments of the 16 NATO nations will complete the ratification procedures in time for our countries to join the Alliance by its 50th anniversary.

We see the invitation extended to our three states as the beginning of NATO’s enlargement process. On this very special day, we also think very much about other countries aspiring for membership in NATO. It is our firm belief that NATO will gradually invite other European democracies that wish to join it and meet the criteria for membership. It is our intention to assist in this process.

Czech President Václav Havel, Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn and Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski
Madrid, 8 July 1997
formal invitations for the three countries to accede to the Treaty. As such, the Protocols will be subject to necessary national ratification procedures in each of the 16 current NATO member states. Once those ratification procedures have been completed, the three prospective new member states will need to deposit the appropriate instruments of accession to the North Atlantic Treaty, in accordance with their own relevant national procedures, thereby becoming members of NATO. The NATO allies look forward to the completion of all these procedures by the 50th Anniversary of NATO in 1999.

**Practical preparations for membership**

Between now and the actual accession of the three countries, both they and present allies wish to ensure that each of those countries is best prepared to undertake the responsibilities and obligations of NATO membership upon its accession. To that end, the Alliance will involve the invited countries to the greatest extent possible, where appropriate, in Alliance activities prior to their actual accession, bearing in mind the need to respect the ratification process. Alliance Heads of State and Government have charged the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session to develop appropriate arrangements for this purpose.

In the event that all three countries confirm their already-expressed interest in participating fully in the Alliance’s defence planning system and military structure, it will be important, during the pre-accession period, to prepare for their earliest full participation in the command and force structures of the Alliance. Where appropriate, the practical preparations in defence and military fields will take place within Partnership for Peace. Prospective new members, however, will also be introduced to the defence planning disciplines of the Alliance, though without taking part in them.

Force planning, which is a key Alliance tool, aims to identify military and other requirements for the full range of NATO’s missions, including peace support operations. It also supports, within the Alliance, all European allies in planning for the conduct of WEU-led operations. The two principal elements are setting targets (through agreed Ministerial Guidance and NATO Force Goals) and evaluating performance (through the annual Defence Planning Questionnaire on which the Alliance’s regular Defence Review is based). The Alliance intends to help facilitate the future integration of the new members by: encouraging the early completion by them of the Defence Planning Questionnaire without commitment of forces; developing informal ‘target force goals’ for them similar to the force goals addressed to allies in the NATO force planning process; and, thereafter, offering discussions with the ultimate aim of finalising these target force goals.

An important task will be to assess the effect of the accession of new members on the force plans and defence requirements of an enlarged Alliance, including the resource implications. A significant factor in this work will be NATO’s publicly declared intention that, in the current and foreseeable security environment, it will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring, *inter alia*, a capability for reinforcement rather than by the additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces. The Alliance will therefore need, in particular, to examine the potential impact of a broader membership on its commonly-funded investment programme, in such fields as command and control, air defence and reception facilities for reinforcements.

In the pre-accession period, it will also be necessary to address a variety of practical issues, such as accommodation and technical support for the new national delegations, the new members’ representation in the NATO international staffs and other Alliance structures, and so forth.

The admission of new members to the Alliance will certainly entail resource implications. The Madrid Summit meeting directed the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session to complete the analysis of these. The NATO Heads of State and Government expressed
confidence that, in the present security climate, the costs to the Alliance associated with the inclusion of new members will be manageable and that the necessary resources will be provided.

Other ongoing work on adaptation of the Alliance will continue to take into account the requirements of a broader Alliance, in order to ensure that its effectiveness is maintained.

**The commitment to continued openness**

In Madrid, allies once again underlined that NATO remains open to new members under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty and that the Alliance will continue to welcome new members in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership. In the meantime, NATO will maintain an active relationship with those countries that have expressed an interest in NATO membership as well as those which may wish to seek membership in the future. Countries which have already expressed an interest in becoming NATO members but that were not invited in Madrid to begin accession talks will remain under consideration for future membership on the basis of the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement, regardless of their geographic location. No European democratic country whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration. Allies have agreed that further steps in the ongoing enlargement process of the Alliance should balance the security concerns of all allies, serve the overall interests of the Alliance and enhance overall European security and stability.

As part of this process, active participation by aspiring members in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace will further deepen their political and military involvement in the work of the Alliance. The Alliance will also continue intensified dialogues with countries aspiring to NATO membership or that otherwise wish to pursue a dialogue with NATO on membership questions. Such intensified dialogues will cover the full range of political, military, financial and security issues relating to possible NATO membership, without prejudice to any eventual Alliance decision. The dialogue process will include meeting within the EAPC framework as well as periodic meetings with the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session, the NATO international staffs and with other NATO bodies as appropriate. NATO Foreign Ministers will keep this process under continual review and NATO Heads of State and Government have undertaken to review the process at their next meeting in 1999.

With regard to aspiring members, the Alliance recognises the positive developments towards democracy and the rule of law in a number of south-eastern European countries, especially Romania and Slovenia, as well as the need for building greater stability, security and cooperation in the countries of that region, and for promoting their increasing integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. At the same time, the Alliance recognises the progress achieved towards greater stability and cooperation by the states in the Baltic region which are also aspiring members. As we look to the future of the Alliance, progress towards these objectives will be important for our overall goal of a free, prosperous and undivided Europe at peace.

**Pursuing a common cause**

NATO’s procedures for admitting new members will ensure that the Alliance’s overall goal of strengthening security for all of Europe will be achieved. The new members will be thoroughly prepared for the responsibilities and obligations of membership. In joining NATO they will join an Alliance not only firmly committed to cooperative relations, but also open to other democracies able and willing to pursue the common cause of security and stability in Europe.
Deepening partnership: The key to long-term stability in Europe

Ambassador Sergio Balanzino
Deputy Secretary General of NATO

NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme opened up huge opportunities for cooperation between the Alliance and non-NATO countries in Europe, far exceeding initial hopes. By strengthening PfP significantly, the Alliance now aims to engage partners fully at the military level while giving them greater say in the direction of the partnership. The new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) will provide a mechanism for deeper consultation among partners as well as a framework in which this enhanced PfP can develop. Both initiatives will deepen relations between NATO and the partners so they can meet the security challenges of the future.

The task of creating long-term stability extends beyond individual nations and institutions. It must be taken on by all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area. The bond between the Alliance and non-NATO countries has consistently grown and intensified. From the very first offer to establish diplomatic liaison back in 1990 all the way to the Enhanced Partnership for Peace (EAPC) today, allies and partners have evolved towards ever greater understanding and cooperation.

The unique coalition in Bosnia, where NATO and many partners are united in a common effort to keep the peace, underlines the real-world security benefit of NATO-partner cooperation; without NATO’s cooperation mechanisms, this demanding operation could not have been realised so swiftly and effectively.

Enhanced PfP

The Alliance has always viewed its cooperation as a dynamic process that would evolve progressively as NATO and partners drew closer. The success of PfP went beyond even the Alliance’s initial hopes. By actively practising cooperation, we, both allies and partners, discovered that there was a huge further potential still to be tapped. Thus, a year ago the Alliance set out to significantly enhance and strengthen PfP — to take the partnership to a new stage. Our goal was a new partnership that would develop with the new NATO; a partnership that would address the full range of the Alliance’s new missions and reflect the experience gained through our cooperation in the Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Bosnia underlined the importance of having a highly developed capacity for multinational military action which extended beyond the allies to include all those partners able and willing to contribute to the new peace support missions. We needed a partnership with a better focused operational role that would prepare us to act together in future crises. The enhanced partnership we envisaged would also have a stronger political dimension to complement its more robust defence and military cooperation. The role of partners in planning and decision-making in PfP would change fundamentally. In short, we wanted to forge a new relationship with partners which would engage them fully at the military level, but equally would give them a much greater say in the direction of the partnership.

The desire to enhance the Partnership for Peace led to the creation of the Senior Level Group (SLG), under my chairmanship. Established in September 1996, the SLG developed the elements of an enhanced
“The creation of the new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council gives participating countries access to a veritable NATO laboratory. Alongside the work carried out in Partnership for Peace on military standardisation, a new dimension of political-strategic harmonisation and decision-making has been ushered in ... which could eventually lead to the emergence of a common strategic culture.”

Romanian President Emil Constantinescu
Madrid, 9 July 1997

“The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council is one of the instruments that will help us to implement this shared vision [of eventual membership of NATO] and promote Latvia’s preparations for full integration. The political and practical cooperation for peace that we have had so far has already significantly contributed to our security.”

Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis
Madrid, 9 July 1997

The non-NATO troop contributing countries in SFOR


* PfP participating nations
Partnership. Its recommendations were then developed further by the Political-Military Steering Committee, the Senior NATO Committees and the NATO Military Authorities. Partners were directly involved at every stage of this process, playing an unprecedented role in shaping the recommendations of the SLG. The enhanced PfP — the partnership of the future — is now taking shape. What are its principal features and what do they portend for the future?

**Broadening and deepening PfP**

The initiatives to enhance PfP touch on almost every aspect of the partnership. They broaden and deepen PfP’s practical cooperation and introduce a new quality and character to the relationship that each partner can build with the Alliance. Several of the initiatives have ‘strategic’ significance and clearly set us on a new and fundamentally different course. These initiatives define the ‘new partnership’.

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**The PMSC/AHG on Cooperation in Peacekeeping**

The Political-Military Steering Committee/Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping (PMSC/AHG), which operates in the framework of the EAPC, serves as the main forum for consultations on political and conceptual issues related to peacekeeping, and for the exchange of experience and the discussion of practical measures for cooperation. The PMSC/AHG reports periodically to meetings of Foreign and Defence Ministers on these matters. All meetings of the PMSC/AHG include partners. Ireland, as an interested OSCE member state with specific experience in peacekeeping, also participates in the work of the group and actively contributes to it. A representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office regularly attends the meetings of the Group and, occasionally, a representative of the United Nations also participates.

**Firstly**, the military missions of PfP have been expanded to embrace the full range of the Alliance’s new missions, in particular peace support operations. The new PfP is now ‘welded’ to the new NATO which means that the partnership will evolve in step with the transformation of the Alliance itself.
On the practical side, the expanded military scope of enhanced PfP will have an impact throughout the partnership, for example:

- military cooperation — particularly exercises — will become more complex and robust;

- participation in such activities as armaments cooperation, crisis management exercises and civil emergency planning will expand to meet the new mission requirements, effectively bringing all of NATO’s committees into the PfP process; and

- our commonly-agreed planning targets will cover a broader range of more complex requirements.

Secondly, we will establish Partner Staff Elements (PSEs) at various levels of the military structure of the Alliance. Partner officers will work alongside their NATO counterparts in these PSEs, planning and implementing PfP activities. These officers, most significantly, will serve in international posts, not working for their countries but for the partnership itself. Partners will thus make a ‘collective investment’ in the partnership in the same way that allies do in the Alliance. Moreover, these PSEs will be the basis for involving partners in the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept, which will be the ‘operational arm’ of the Alliance for crisis management operations.

Thirdly, in the new PfP, the Planning and Review Process (PARP) will become more like NATO’s force planning process. Political guidance in the new PARP will be provided by Defence Ministers of Alliance and participating partner countries.
This will ensure that PARP is responsive to future military requirements and the demands of the expanded PfP missions. In the new PARP, interoperability objectives will become ‘partnership goals’, to indicate possible scope for their development beyond simply encouraging interoperability. They may seek specific forces and capabilities for PfP activities from those partners who wish to accept these goals. These procedures aim to better define types and quality of force contributions that partners might make to NATO-led PfP operations. They will greatly facilitate our ability to integrate partner forces into future operations.

Fourthly, we are providing partners with a greater role in decision-making, both in the normal peacetime work of the partnership as well as in crisis. The latter is particularly significant. It is not enough to prepare for peace support operations at the mili-
Finally, the Alliance has taken the significant step of extending the scope of the NATO Security Investment Programme, so that it can now also include partnership projects. The major NATO Commanders have been tasked to develop proposals, together with partners, for projects that meet the operational requirements of PfP. This represents a collective commitment on the part of the allies to ensure that PfP is an integral part of the European security architecture.

**Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council**

A stronger, more operational partnership also requires greater participation in decision-taking through new mechanisms for consultations and political guidance. The creation of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) is NATO’s answer to these requirements. The EAPC will be the vehicle through which NATO will carry its cooperation with its partners to a qualitatively new level. It represents a commitment to involving partners more closely in partnership activities than ever before.

The EAPC is designed specifically to provide an overarching framework under which NATO will conduct business with partners, encompassing an expanded political dimension of the partnership. The EAPC will have its own work plan, building on the North Atlantic Cooperation Council’s (NACC) Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation. While PfP remains a distinct element within this framework, PfP activities will come under the general purview of the EAPC. Political dialogue under the EAPC thus provides the backdrop to practical cooperation.

The EAPC replaces the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. That forum, in the five years of its existence, had achieved an unprecedented level of dialogue and cooperation between NATO and non-NATO countries. The EAPC will pick up from where the NACC ended and provide a framework within which both political and military level only, we must also provide opportunities for partners to contribute to the provision of political guidance and oversight of NATO-led operations in which they participate. This has to some extent already been the case for IFOR and SFOR and we will be using the EAPC to provide an even greater degree of positive involvement at the political level during a crisis management exercise in February of next year.
consultations and practical activities under PfP could be taken forward. It combines the best elements of the NACC and PfP processes. Moreover, the EAPC provides for the inclusion of all partners — former NACC members and PfP participating countries automatically become members of the EAPC, if they so desire.

**Key facets of cooperation**

The EAPC will serve as a multilateral consultation forum, providing the overarching framework for consultations among its members on a broad range of political and security-related issues. In particular, the following three areas represent key facets of EAPC consultations and cooperation:

**Firstly**, the EAPC will allow partners, if they so wish, to develop a direct political relationship with the Alliance. New opportunities open to partners to hold consultations in a variety of formats should allow for more meaningful consultations and respond directly to the needs of individual EAPC members. The EAPC will therefore afford partners a great degree of flexibility, providing a complement to the scope that exists under PfP for individualised cooperation on the basis of self-differentiation.

**Secondly**, the EAPC will provide the framework to afford partner countries increased decision-making opportunities relating to activities in which they participate. It will facilitate consultation and cooperation between the Alliance and groups of partners who participate with NATO in a peace support operation, for example by putting into place a viable political framework to facilitate political guidance and oversight of the operation.

**Thirdly**, the EAPC will provide the forum for an increased range of subjects for consultations. These might include political and security-related matters; crisis management, regional matters, arms control, proliferation and defence issues, international terrorism, defence planning and budgets and defence policy and strategy, or security impacts of economic developments. There will also be scope for consultations and cooperation in areas such as civil emergency and disaster preparedness, arms cooperation, nuclear safety, defence related environmental questions, scientific cooperation, and issues related to peace support operations.

With an enhanced Partnership for Peace, firmly embedded in the new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, NATO has demonstrated its commitment to a truly cooperative approach to security. Both initiatives represent an enduring framework for building new relationships across the new Europe. They ensure that NATO, together with its partners, can meet the security challenges of the future.
The NATO-Russia Founding Act firmly establishes the basis for a permanent security partnership between the two sides, laying to rest the notion that they were forever destined to be adversaries. The signing of the Act, which took place in Paris on 27 May, does not mean that differences of policy or outlook will vanish overnight. But these differences can lessen over time through a process of broad, regular consultations on political and security matters within the newly-created Permanent Joint Council. The main task is to give life to the document by exploiting to the full the new opportunities.

In the new Europe and its fundamentally changed security environment, it is only natural that a new Russia and a new NATO have become partners. The NATO-Russia Founding Act reflects this fact. The document, signed in Paris on 27 May at the level of Heads of State and Government, firmly establishes a permanent and close security partnership between them. It puts to rest the notion that NATO and Russia are locked
intentions had to be overcome. The Founding Act is of far-reaching importance and represents a strategic gain for the whole of the European continent. The Act must now be implemented promptly.

The new NATO-Russia partnership did not start from scratch. Since the early 1990s NATO has repeatedly underscored the importance of Russia for European security and we have reached out to develop this relationship. For almost three years NATO and Russia have held a number of joint meetings at Ministerial and experts-level to consult on a range of security-related issues. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the forces of our countries are working together effectively under a NATO-led command to help implement the Dayton Peace Agreement and create conditions for successfully rebuilding this war-torn region. In the same context, a team of Russian officers has worked for almost two years at NATO’s Supreme Command in Belgium.

Negotiations on the Act were not easy. But the common commitment to building the new cooperative Europe prevailed. Misconceptions about NATO and its intentions had to be overcome. Solutions had to be found that preserved the integrity of both sides, their ability to take decisions and meet their responsibilities. Moreover, due to their intensity and frankness, these negotiations have helped to create mutual understanding and respect.

Secretary General Solana negotiated on behalf of the Alliance, supported by intensive consultation among the allies. Despite their complicated nature, the negotiations advanced fairly rapidly as both sides had a strong interest in achieving results. Russia, for her part, had concluded that constructive engagement with NATO presented a real opportunity for meaningful dialogue. Having joined the Council of Europe, developed close links with the European Union and the WEU, and participated at the meeting of the G-8, it was only natural that Russia should develop her links with NATO.

**The Joint Council**

The Joint Council

The signing of the Act does not, of course, mean that differences of policy or outlook between NATO and Russia will automatically disappear. This can only occur as the result of a developing process of broad and timely consultations. It is particularly significant that the Founding Act establishes a workable framework for consultation, cooperation and coordination through the NATO — Russia Permanent Joint

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**President Boris Yeltsin**

Paris, 27 May 1997

“The Founding Act will protect Europe and the world from a new confrontation and will become the foundation for a new, fair and stable partnership, a partnership which takes into account the security interests of each and every signatory to this document.”

Secretary General Javier Solana

Paris, 27 May 1997

“The task ahead is clear: to give life to this document by making full use of the newly-created opportunities. The Atlantic Alliance, for its part, is determined to embark on a far-reaching partnership that will help to leave behind the divisions of Europe for good. This is not just a vision. This will be a practical guide to our policy as we step across the threshold of the new century.”

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NATO review

July-August 1997
Council (PJC). This Joint Council will meet on a regular basis at Ambassadorial and Ministerial-level (it can also meet, when agreed, at a higher level); at the level of military representatives and of Chiefs of Defence/General Staff; and at experts-level. Its first organisational meeting at the level of Ambassadors was held at NATO headquarters on 18 July 1997.

Consultations in the PJC will cover a broad range of political or security-related matters. Based on these consultations, we will strive to develop joint initiatives on which NATO and Russia would agree to speak or act in parallel; and once consensus has been reached in the consultations we will be able to take joint decisions and joint actions which may include peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE.

"By signing the Founding Act of a new European security organisation, in which Russia will play her full role, we are turning the page on a half-century of misunderstanding, confrontation and division of our continent."

President Jacques Chirac
Paris, 27 May 1997

"We are determined to create a future in which European security is not a zero-sum game — where NATO’s gain is Russia’s loss, and Russia’s strength is our Alliance’s weakness. That is old thinking; these are new times. Together, we must build a new Europe in which every nation is free and every free nation joins in strengthening the peace and stability for all."

President Bill Clinton
Paris, 27 May 1997
The Founding Act contains a long, open-ended list of topics on which NATO and Russia can consult and cooperate. It includes preventing and settling conflicts, peacekeeping, preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, exchanging information on security and defence policies and forces, as well as conversion of defence industries, defence-related environmental issues, and civil emergency preparedness.

For Russia it was of particular importance to be reassured that the security environment in Central and Eastern Europe would not be changed to its detriment as a result of new members joining NATO. The Act makes it clear that NATO does not pose any threat to Russia — either today or in the future. NATO allies emphasised that they have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspects of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy — and they do not foresee any future need to do so. They have also reiterated that in the current and foreseeable security environment, NATO plans to carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.

The Act underscores the joint commitment to adapt with other partners the CFE Treaty to enhance its viability and effectiveness, taking into account the changing European security environment. To this effect, NATO countries submitted in February a detailed proposal on the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty adaptation in the negotiations in Vienna. They have also recently announced considerable reductions in ground-based Treaty-Limited Equipment.

**Diplomatic and military representation**

To cement a close working relationship between NATO and Russia, a permanent Russian diplomatic and military representation at NATO is foreseen. It has also been agreed in principle that senior Russian military liaison officers will be attached to NATO’s major military command structures with reciprocal arrangements for NATO liaison officers in Russia, the details of which remain to be agreed.
We are looking forward to Russia being permanently represented at NATO Headquarters. This will allow her to be involved on a daily basis to make her points and to gain a fuller picture of what NATO is about. The real depth of the partnership will become apparent once Russian and NATO staffs start to work closely, even daily, together. The successful teamwork between our forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a good example of what close cooperation can achieve.

Some fear that NATO may lose its ability to act independently. NATO and Russia have agreed in the Founding Act that nothing in this document restricts or infringes upon the ability of either side to take independent decisions or actions. Nor does it provide NATO or Russia at any stage with a right of veto over the actions of the other. This in no way reduces the intention or commitment of both sides to work towards consensus and possible joint decisions. But at the same time the Joint Council will be careful not to interfere with or disadvantage the interests of other states.

The NATO-Russia Founding Act does not subordinate NATO to any other organisation, and it can in no way diminish the political or military effectiveness of the Alliance, including its ability to meet its security commitment to current and future members. NATO and Russia will work together on a broad spectrum of tasks in the Permanent Joint Council. But the Joint Council will remain clearly separate from the North Atlantic Council — NATO’s decision-making body.

**Maximising the potential**

The NATO-Russia Founding Act stands on its own merits, as a significant achievement between two major contributors to European security. It is not a means of ‘compensating’ Russia for NATO’s enlargement. The fact that NATO and Russia will meet regularly maximises the potential for cooperation in a crisis and minimises the possibility of new confrontations re-emerging. By establishing the patterns and habits of consultation and cooperation, the Act can remove sources of misunderstanding. Most significantly, the Act will allow the relationship to grow in the interest of the whole of Europe in the years and decades to come.

Clearly, a stable and enduring NATO-Russia partnership will not come into being merely by signing a document, no matter how detailed and forward-looking. The partnership will grow only by making the fullest use of the new mechanisms provided. The task ahead is clear: to give life to this document by making full use of the newly-created opportunities. The North Atlantic Alliance, for its part, is prepared and determined to embark on a far-reaching partnership for the benefit of our countries and of peace and security in Europe as a whole. ◆

**MAJOR MILESTONES IN NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 Dec 91</td>
<td>Russia becomes a founding member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 Jun 94</td>
<td>Russia signs the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Framework Document. Agreement is also reached on a “Summary of Conclusions” defining the main elements of an enhanced dialogue between NATO and Russia beyond NACC and PfP</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 May 95</td>
<td>Russia formally accepts the PfP Individual Partnership Programme (IPP) and the “Areas on pursuance of broad, enhanced NATO-Russia dialogue and cooperation”</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 Jan 96</td>
<td>Beginning of deployment of Russian troops in the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia</td>
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<tr>
<td>21 Mar 96</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding on Civil Emergency Cooperation between NATO and Russia is signed in Moscow</td>
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<tr>
<td>19-21 Jan 97</td>
<td>First round of talks between Secretary General Solana and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov on a NATO-Russia document in Moscow</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 Feb 97</td>
<td>Second round of talks in Brussels</td>
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<tr>
<td>9-10 Mar 97</td>
<td>Third round of talks in Moscow</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 Apr 97</td>
<td>Fourth round of talks in Moscow</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 May 97</td>
<td>Fifth round of talks between Secretary General Solana and Foreign Minister Primakov in Luxembourg</td>
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<tr>
<td>13-14 May 97</td>
<td>In final round of talks, Secretary General Solana and Foreign Minister Primakov reach agreement on a NATO-Russia document in Moscow</td>
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<td>16 May 97</td>
<td>The North Atlantic Council approves the NATO-Russia Founding Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 May 97</td>
<td>“The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation” is signed at the Paris Summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 July 97</td>
<td>First meeting of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) at Ambassadorial level in Brussels</td>
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The Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine, signed at the Madrid summit on 9 July, opens up new opportunities for the two sides to consult and cooperate on political and security issues. The Charter demonstrates the Alliance’s support for Ukraine as it regains its rightful place in Europe after a tragic past of foreign domination. But the new mechanisms provided by the Charter, in particular the NATO-Ukraine Commission which will meet periodically to find ways of pushing the relationship forward, must be put to full use if the partnership is to flourish.

The emergence of new democratic states is a feature of the new security order. Their ability to survive and flourish is a key test for all of the institutions and individual nations alike. In this sense, Ukraine occupies a crucial place in Europe. And it explains why all European institutions, including NATO, view an independent, stable and democratic Ukraine as being of strategic importance for the development of the continent as a whole.

At the Madrid Summit, this disposition was further strengthened. There, on 9 July 1997, NATO Heads of State and Government and Ukrainian President Kuchma signed the “Charter on a Distinctive Partnership Between NATO and Ukraine”. This document is a testimony to the Alliance’s recognition of the potential of Ukraine to play a strong role in European security and to develop a real, substantive cooperative relationship with NATO.
In the Charter, NATO allies reaffirm their support for Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, its territorial integrity and democratic development. They also state their firm belief that Ukraine’s economic prosperity and its status as a non-nuclear weapons state, as well as the principle of inviolability of frontiers, are key factors of stability and security in Europe.

The Charter lists a broad range of areas for consultation and cooperation. It envisages joint seminars, working groups and other cooperative programmes covering topics such as civil emergency planning and disaster preparedness, civil-military relations, and democratic control of the armed forces. Cooperation will also include defence planning, budgeting, policy, strategy and national security concepts, and defence conversion. Furthermore, we will discuss NATO-Ukraine military cooperation and interoperability, economic aspects of security, science and technology issues, environmental security issues, including nuclear safety, aerospace research and development, and civil-military coordination of air traffic management and control.

Other areas that we will explore together are armaments cooperation, military training, including PfP exercises on Ukrainian territory, and NATO support for the Polish-Ukrainian peacekeeping battalion. We will also discuss ways of promoting defence cooperation between Ukraine and its neighbours. Finally, a military liaison mission of Ukraine will be established as part of a Ukrainian mission to NATO in Brussels.

Foundations of a new relationship

A historian once remarked that while nature has been generous to Ukraine, history has not. Despite — or perhaps because of — its natural riches, Ukraine has suffered more devastation and foreign domination than most other countries in Europe.

With this tragic past now firmly behind it, Ukraine has embarked upon a long and demanding process of reform and adjustment. In so doing, it has made a number of key decisions that foreclose any return to the past. Ukraine’s decision to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state is one such decision. Resolving with Russia the difficult issues of the Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol is another. These decisions confirm
Ukraine’s determination to pursue an active cooperative approach to its security.

This cooperative approach has been extended beyond Ukraine’s immediate neighbours. In the Balkans, Ukrainian troops are serving alongside NATO’s as part of the international presence in Bosnia, helping to bring long-term peace to a volatile region. And through its membership in the Partnership for Peace and the new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), Ukraine contributes to the establishment of a broader security culture for the entire Euro-Atlantic area. In short, Ukraine has become an important player in European security. It is thus only natural that relations between Ukraine and NATO have been developing so fruitfully.

First steps in our cooperation

NATO’s relationship with Ukraine began soon after the country achieved independence in 1991. Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), thus demonstrating its commitment to a cooperative approach to its security. Ukraine also signed up to the Partnership for Peace programme in February 1994, determined to play an active role in it. A Ukrainian liaison officer now works in the Manfred Wörner wing at NATO Headquarters, and another officer has been stationed at the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) in Mons.

Ukraine has participated in several exercises in the Partnership for Peace framework and hosted a number of PfP exercises on its own territory. We have also cooperated extensively in the field of disaster relief and civil emergency planning. Exercise Cooperative Neighbour in July 1997 is an example of where Ukraine has joined other PfP countries, both allies and partners, to develop skills and capabilities that could be called upon in a humanitarian emergency.
Developing a NATO-Ukraine partnership

Given Ukraine’s active involvement in European security, it was only natural that its relationship with NATO would not remain static, but reflect the distinctive contribution and position of Ukraine. Accordingly, following President Kuchma’s visit to NATO in June 1995, work was undertaken to raise NATO-Ukraine relations to a qualitatively new level.

On 14 September 1995, Ukraine — represented by Foreign Minister Udovenko — and NATO issued a Joint Press Statement detailing their new relationship. In this document, the general principles of NATO-Ukraine relations, in Partnership for Peace and in other areas, were spelled out. An implementation paper was agreed in March 1996, and the first 16+1 consultation at the Political Committee-level took place one month later. High-level meetings have continued throughout 1996 and the beginning of 1997.

The cordial relationship between NATO and Ukraine was underlined by Secretary General Solana’s visit to Ukraine in April 1996. On his second visit in May 1997, he inaugurated the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv, the first of its kind in any partner country. The Centre is playing a crucial role in disseminating information on NATO’s policies, responding to an increasing thirst for information about the Alliance. This interest in information on NATO is also confirmed by the fact that the number of information-related events in Ukraine, as well as that of Ukrainian groups visiting NATO Headquarters, is increasing rapidly.

With the intensification of NATO-Ukraine ties came the idea of formalising that relationship. After several months of detailed discussion and exchange between senior NATO and Ukrainian officials, agreement was reached on a “Charter on a Distinctive Partnership Between NATO and Ukraine”, which has now been endorsed at the highest level by our respective countries.

The way forward

Like any agreement of its kind, the NATO-Ukraine Charter needs to be implemented. The partnership will grow by making the fullest use of the new mechanisms provided by the Charter. To ensure that this is the case, the North Atlantic Council will periodically meet with Ukraine as the NATO-Ukraine Commission. The NATO-Ukraine Commission will assess the implementation of the relationship and suggest ways to further develop our cooperation.

On the Parliamentary level, NATO and Ukraine will encourage expanded dialogue and cooperation between the North Atlantic Assembly and the Ukrainian Parliament, the Verkhovna Rada. A new Europe must be built from the ground up, and it is essential not to limit our dialogue to the military and civilian security experts and therefore to include parliamentary representatives of our respective nations.

The new NATO-Ukraine Charter is a major step forward. Like the other decisions and initiatives taken at the Madrid Summit, the Charter underlines NATO’s crucial role in contributing to new security relationships in the Euro-Atlantic area. It also underlines Ukraine’s increasing contribution to wider European security and stability. In the Ukrainian language, “Ukraine” means “borderland”. But Ukraine is no longer a borderland: it has ceased to be at the periphery of Europe. Today, our borders are defined by shared values rather than natural boundaries. A stable, democratic and independent Ukraine is rejoining the European mainstream. The new NATO-Ukraine Charter is evidence of the support the Atlantic Alliance is giving to Ukraine in regaining its rightful place.
Simple geography means there will always be a link between security in Europe and that of the Mediterranean. NATO's dialogue with six non-NATO countries of the Mediterranean region, launched in 1995, aims to dispel possible misconceptions about the Alliance and to build confidence through greater transparency, discussion and cooperation. An important part of the Alliance's policy of partnership and cooperation, the Mediterranean dialogue has been given new political impetus by the Madrid Summit. The Mediterranean Cooperation Group, established by NATO Heads of State and Government in Madrid, will involve allied member states directly in bilateral political discussions with partners.

The Madrid Summit has given a new political impetus to the Mediterranean dialogue and created the Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG). This decision reflects the Alliance’s view that security in Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean, and that the Mediterranean dimension is consequently one of the various components of the European security architecture. It marks a further step in the Alliance’s policy — following from the 1994 Brussels Summit — of enhancing in a progressive way Alliance relations with non-NATO Mediterranean countries through political dialogue and cooperation.

Why a Mediterranean dialogue?

The success of NATO’s policy of partnership, dialogue and cooperation with countries of Central and Eastern Europe is seldom questioned. But the idea of a dialogue with Mediterranean countries raises questions among some as to its necessity and/or underlying motive.

The answer is very simple, however. Several allies border the Mediterranean, and there is only 12 kilometres between Europe and the Maghreb across the Strait of Gibraltar and 150 kilometres between Italy and Tunisia. This fact of geography means that there will always be a link between security in Europe and that of the Mediterranean. The dialogue is a natural outcome of this fact, and should be seen in the context of the Alliance’s overall cooperative approach to security, especially towards neighbouring countries. The aim is to create good, strong and friendly relations across the Mediterranean — as has been achieved across Europe — as well as better mutual understanding.

Origins of the dialogue

At their Brussels Summit in January 1994, Allied Heads of State and Government declared that the positive developments then underway in the Middle East peace process had opened the way for NATO to “consider measures to promote dialogue, understanding and confidence-building between the countries in the region”. They also encouraged “all efforts conducive to strengthening regional stability”.

This was followed in December 1994 when NATO Foreign Ministers stated their readiness “to establish
contacts, on a case-by-case basis, between the Alliance and Mediterranean non-member countries with a view to contributing to the strengthening of regional stability”. They directed the Council in Permanent Session to develop the proposal further and to initiate appropriate preliminary contacts. As a result, on 8 February 1995, the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session invited Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia to participate in the initial round of the Mediterranean dialogue. In November 1995, Jordan was invited to join this dialogue too.

**Principles and modalities**

The successful launch of the Mediterranean dialogue and its subsequent development have been based upon several principles.

**First**, the dialogue is progressive in terms of participation and substance. Such flexibility has allowed the number of dialogue partners to grow, with the possibility of additional countries joining the dialogue in future, as appropriate. This has also allowed the content of the dialogue to evolve — something which has already occurred in the course of its relatively brief existence.

**Second**, the dialogue is bilateral in structure. This principle has proved extremely important for Mediterranean partners who do not form a group and wish to conduct the dialogue as individual sovereign states. It has consequently made the dialogue less vulnerable to disruption due to political developments ongoing elsewhere in the region. Despite the predominantly bilateral character, the dialogue nevertheless allows for multilateral meetings on a case-by-case basis.

**Third**, all Mediterranean partners are offered the same basis for cooperative activities and discussion with NATO. This non-discrimination is an essential feature of the dialogue and has been key to its successful establishment. Within this non-discriminatory framework, partners are free to choose the extent and intensity of their participation. What is offered to one dialogue partner is offered to all the others in the dialogue.

**Fourth**, the dialogue is meant to reinforce other international efforts to establish and enhance cooperation with Mediterranean countries. The European Union’s Barcelona process, the Middle East peace process, and efforts by institutions such as the Western European Union (WEU) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), are complementary to the Alliance’s dialogue. We are careful to avoid duplicating other cooperative efforts or creating a division of labour. Allies attach great importance to the strict application of the principle of complementarity and mutual reinforcement in developing the dialogue. This does not exclude, however, the possibility or scope for closer coordination among the various international organisations playing a role in the region. Partners have in fact pointed to the utility of a greater coordination of efforts by such organisations.

**Fifth**, activities within the dialogue take place on a self-funding basis, with the exception of certain information activities.

In terms of content, the Mediterranean dialogue consists of a political dialogue and participation in specific activities.

**Political dialogue**

The political dialogue consists of regular bilateral political discussions which provide the opportunity for extensive briefings on NATO’s activities, including the Alliance’s programmes of external outreach and partnership, internal adaptation and general approach to building cooperative security structures. In turn, Mediterranean partners...
are invited to share their views with NATO on issues relating to stability and security in the Mediterranean region.

Until recently, the Alliance’s Political Committee had the overall responsibility for the Mediterranean dialogue, while the discussions and exchanges of information with Mediterranean partners were carried out by the International Staff. At the Madrid Summit, however, it was decided to establish a new committee on the Mediterranean, the Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG). This Group now has the overall responsibility for the dialogue as well as for conducting the political discussions with individual partners in a ‘16+1’ format. As a rule, these discussions are to take place once a year, though additional meetings can be held on an ad hoc basis. In principle, the MCG will meet at the level of Political Advisers, although the possibility of ‘reinforced’ meetings with representatives from capitals is also foreseen.

The ‘16+1’ format is key to improving the political visibility of the dialogue, as well as in facilitating the direct involvement of all allies with Mediterranean partners. We are hopeful that, as a result of such flexibility, the political discussion element of the Mediterranean dialogue will become more comprehensive and free flowing and thus increase its overall effectiveness.

**Specific activities**

In addition to the political dialogue, Mediterranean partners can, if they choose, participate in specific activities in such areas as science, information, civil emergency planning and courses at NATO schools.
In the field of science, Mediterranean partners can receive and disseminate information on NATO’s scientific activities and participate in meetings conducted under the auspices of the NATO Science Committee, including selected symposia and other special events.

In the field of information, partners can participate in seminars and conferences on topics of mutual interest, as well as visit NATO headquarters for briefings and discussions on the Alliance’s current agenda. Opinion-makers and academics as well as government officials from Mediterranean partner countries have taken up this offer to come to NATO headquarters in Brussels to meet with members of the International Staff with a view to exchanging information and increasing mutual understanding.

Several courses have been opened to participation by Mediterranean partners at the NATO School in Oberammergau, including courses on peacekeeping, civil emergency planning, arms control and verification, responsibility of military forces in environmental protection, and European security cooperation. A number of partners have also expressed interest in attending courses at the NATO Defense College in Rome — a result of contacts made between the College and corresponding institutions in Mediterranean partner countries.

In addition to courses on civil emergency planning (CEP), partners are also invited to participate in CEP activities related to disaster management. This invitation arose as a result of the strong interest shown in such activities by some partners. Future activities could include medical evacuation workshops and civil protection seminars. Activities in the field of civil emergency planning are growing in popularity with partners, particularly regarding civil-military cooperation in response to natural or man-made disasters.

The latest addition to the Mediterranean dialogue is cooperative activities in the military domain. Following the decision by Alliance Foreign Ministers in Sintra last May, certain military activities will in future be added to the content of the dialogue. At the moment, the NATO Military Committee is considering specific proposals in this regard. Again, it should be recalled that participation in any of the cooperative activities offered in the Mediterranean dialogue is at the discretion of partners. As far as military cooperation is concerned, it might be pointed out that three Mediterranean partners — Egypt, Jordan and Morocco — already cooperate militarily with the Alliance in Bosnia and Herzegovina through their participation in IFOR and now in SFOR.

**Future development**

The Mediterranean dialogue is an important component of the Alliance’s policy of outreach and cooperation. Through it, non-NATO Mediterranean partners can work with the Alliance in helping build new patterns of cooperative security in the Mediterranean region. Allies are fully aware that many of the prevailing problems in this region are of an economic and political, rather than military, nature and are therefore best addressed by ongoing cooperative endeavours such as the Barcelona process and by institutions such as the European Union. Nevertheless, it is felt that the Alliance can make a positive contribution to enhancing security and stability in the region by opening its doors to cooperation with its Mediterranean partners to help dispel possible misconceptions about NATO and to build confidence through greater transparency, dialogue and cooperation.

The Mediterranean dialogue has consistently evolved since it was launched in 1994. The Madrid Summit has added a new and more dynamic direction to it by establishing the Mediterranean Cooperation Group. By involving Allied member states directly in the political discussions with partners through the ‘16+1’ format, a forum now exists in which views can be exchanged on a range of issues relevant to the security situation in the Mediterranean as well as on the future development of the dialogue. And this can only be for the mutual benefit of allies and partners alike.
NATO’s new missions of peacekeeping and crisis management, and the opportunity to build a new security architecture in Europe, have made fundamental changes in its structure an imperative. The Madrid Summit has provided the catalyst for work to reshape the Alliance’s military posture towards smaller but more flexible and mobile forces, adapting the multinational command structure accordingly, and developing a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO. The new structure will also have to be flexible enough to cater for the accession of new members and deepening cooperation with partner nations. This transformation of the Alliance will enable NATO to respond to the challenges of the new century.

The momentous events of the end of the 1980s opened a new chapter in European security. NATO extended the hand of friendship to the fledgling democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. In doing so it also began the task of adjusting itself to the new realities brought about both by the promise of cooperation with former adversaries and the need to be able to respond to the less predictable risks to stability which were more likely to occur as a result of political, economic or ethnic instabilities than from calculated aggression.

Collective defence and a strong and enduring transatlantic link remain the cornerstone of Alliance solidarity. But the new missions of peacekeeping and crisis management, together with the opportunity to build a new security architecture in Europe, have called for fundamental changes in the structure of the Alliance to ensure that it is able to meet the challenges of the new security order in Europe.

The Madrid Summit

The Madrid Summit has provided the focus for drawing together a long and complex agenda into a coherent whole. This work has entailed:

- reinforcing the structures and procedures providing support to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to ensure the necessary close coordination of the political and military elements of the new NATO;
- reshaping the Alliance’s military posture towards smaller but more flexible and mobile forces with
NATO course on international security for Bosnian military and defence officials

In an effort to assist Bosnia to build confidence and mutual trust in the military sphere, NATO conducted a two-week course on international security for military and civilian defence officials from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The course was held from 23 June to 4 July at the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany. A total of 45 military officers and civilian officials participated from both the Federation and the Republika Srpska and from all three ethnic groups in Bosnia.

During the first week the Bosnian officials were provided with an introduction to European security structures, including NATO, the OSCE and the EU. Briefings and discussions also covered subjects such as ‘Military within a Democracy’ and peacekeeping principles and concepts. More than half of the first week was devoted to discussing in detail the roles, objectives and challenges of the international community in the peace consolidation process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Principal speakers included Ambassador Vigleik Eide, the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative in Bosnia, Ambassador Robert Frowick, the OSCE Head of Mission in Bosnia, Minister Michael Durkee, the International Affairs Advisor to SACEUR, and Lt. General Nicholas Kahoe, Deputy Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee. In the second week the Bosnians joined a regularly scheduled “Security Cooperation Course”, which included some 45 additional participants from 10 partner countries, 9 allies and Israel (the latter in the context of the Alliance’s Mediterranean dialogue).

Throughout the two weeks, the Bosnian officials took full advantage of the opportunity to learn, to challenge speakers, and to discuss mutual problems amongst themselves. The quality of classroom discussion and teamwork was superb. Dominant themes and issues included reconciliation, the challenges facing Bosnia, the NATO PfP programme and SFOR. For some Bosnians it was the first time in over five years that they had spoken to countrymen from opposing factions. A spirit of openness and cooperation prevailed and camaraderie grew stronger, to the point that genuine and potentially long-lasting friendships were developed.

The broad objective of the course, to provide an initial Alliance contribution to the process of reconciliation within the defence and military spheres, was therefore realised. This pilot course was deemed by all involved to have been an overwhelming success and, as a result, additional courses are planned for December 1997, and January and June 1998.

- developing a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance which recognises the determination of the European allies both to make a more effective contribution to the Alliance and to be able to act in support of peacekeeping and crisis management by the Western European Union (WEU);
- providing the necessary flexibility in the new structure to enable the accession of new members to the Alliance and for deepening cooperation with partner nations under the aegis of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and an enhanced Partnership for Peace (PfP);
- preparing the Alliance to deal with the risks associated with the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their associated delivery systems.

At Madrid, Heads of State and Government were able both to take stock of progress in this work and also to provide a political impulse for completion of the remaining elements.

The political dimension

As the 1990 London Declaration on the transformation of the Alliance underlined, NATO must continue to provide for the common defence of its members but at the same time must become more than ever the agent of change. The Declaration made clear that the Alliance had the opportunity to help build a more united continent with the strength of a shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Thus the search for security and stability does not lie solely in the military dimension of the Alliance but in a broader approach involving an enhancement of its political component. The NAC has been the focus for this work, and has created new structures for the purpose of turning into practice the determination of NATO Heads of State and Government to adapt the Alliance to the new political realities of cooperation and partnership as well as of defence. This will be given additional impetus by the EAPC which was endorsed by the Summit.

particular reference to developing the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept as a key means of responding quickly and effectively to a wide range of eventualities;

- pursuing step by step the adaptation of the Alliance’s extensive multinational command structure, hitherto predominantly static, towards a more flexible and deployable structure which takes full account of modern technology;
Mechanisms have also been set in place to provide the necessary political direction to the Alliance’s new missions of peace support operations and crisis management. NATO’s involvement in the crisis in former Yugoslavia required the NAC:

- to provide political guidance for the support of a UN peacekeeping force operating in accordance with a range of complex UN Security Council resolutions;
- to make careful and selective use of military force to achieve the aims of protecting UN safe areas and bringing the warring parties to the conference table;
- to establish mechanisms to cooperate with the WEU in enforcing UN sanctions in the Adriatic;
- to provide the political framework for the despatch of a 60,000-strong military Implementation Force (IFOR) involving participation by the 16 NATO allies and 17 non-NATO members;
- to supervise the politically sensitive enforcement of the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement while also providing guidance for close cooperation with agencies involved in its civil aspects, including the High Representative, UN agencies and the OSCE.

These tasks required the creation of means to ensure the close coordination of political and military aspects of this and any similar contingencies, notably a new Policy Coordination Group responsible to the NAC, and arrangements for consultations with EAPC participants and others contributing to the Implementation Force and its successor the Stabilisation Force. These arrangements are now well established as part of the internal adaptation of the Alliance and we are committed to draw on our experience in order to develop still closer forms of consultation in any future NATO-led operation involving EAPC nations.

Much has therefore been done. But we need to ensure that our principal aims and objectives are fully consistent with the new security situation and challenges faced by Europe today and in the foreseeable future. In Madrid, Heads of State and Government therefore decided to examine and update as necessary the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, adopted at the Rome Summit in 1991, whilst confirming our commitment to the core functions of collective defence and the transatlantic link.

### The military dimension

Since its inception, the Alliance’s purpose has been purely defensive. Security and stability have greatly improved and Europe no longer faces the threat of general war which confronted it for over 40 years. As a major part of the Alliance’s restructuring, therefore, its military forces are being substantially reduced and reorganised. Ground forces committed by nations to the
Alliance, for example, have been cut by 35 per cent, major naval combatants by over 30 per cent and air force combat squadrons by some 40 per cent. Those remaining are in many cases being given increased mobility to enable them to react swiftly to a wide range of contingencies and are being reorganised to facilitate flexible build-up, when necessary, for crisis-management as well as general defence.

There have been major reductions in the numbers of forces held at high states of readiness. Forces have also been redeployed away from the old lines of confrontation. US forces in Europe, for example, have been cut by about two-thirds and the majority of allied forces once stationed in Germany have now left. Nuclear forces committed to NATO have been greatly reduced, with sub-strategic weapons based in Europe cut by 80 per cent. In sum, Europe is a safer place but NATO’s adaptation must ensure that it remains able collectively to preserve peace and also to act decisively, especially in the fields of crisis management, peacekeeping and conflict prevention.

The Madrid Summit reaffirmed NATO’s commitment to address risks in the field of nuclear biological and chemical (NBC) defence as an integral part of the Alliance’s adaptation to the new security environment. Alliance defence planning is now devoting increased attention to the capabilities and concepts needed to deter and, if necessary, respond to, the use of NBC weapons, with particular emphasis on enhancing protection for deployed forces and improving protection against biological weapons. Policy guidelines are now in place for military operations in an NBC environment which are aimed at enabling NATO forces to accomplish their required missions despite the presence, threat, or use of NBC weapons.

A new command structure

The Alliance’s command structure is steadily being adapted to the demands of the new security situation with the aim of securing:

- a single multinational structure which is able to undertake the full range of Alliance missions under the political direction of the NAC;
- a structure which is more deployable and mobile;
- a structure which provides for the development of ESDI within NATO;
- the requisite flexibility to provide for increased participation of EAPC nations and also to permit the ready assimilation of new members of the Alliance into the structure;
- cost-effective arrangements which respond to military and political requirements.

An initial step has already been implemented following the decision to disband one of the three Major NATO commands, Commander in Chief, Channel, and to reorganise and streamline the subordinate commands in the Northern (now North-Western) and Central Regions of Allied Command Europe. A substantial further rationalisation is in prospect which, when agreed, is likely to entail the removal of an entire layer of command and a major restructuring of the remaining headquarters. A small but important number of issues still remain to be resolved, but the overall structure is expected to consist of two Strategic Commanders (SACEUR and SA CLANT) supported by a small number of Regional Commanders and a range of subregional commanders some with single-service responsibilities, others with tri-service responsibilities. This structure will also take account of the developing CJTF concept. Heads of State and Government at Madrid welcomed progress to date and urged completion of this important element of the Alliance’s restructuring by the 1997 December Ministerial meetings.
Combined Joint Task Forces

As the Madrid Summit recognised, much progress has been made on the CJTF concept as a means of improving the Alliance’s ability to deploy at short notice forces matched to the requirements of a particular military operation. The concept builds on NATO’s well established practice of multinational, multiservice operations. A CJTF is a deployable multinational, multiservice formation generated and tailored for specific military operations which could involve not only humanitarian relief, peacekeeping or peace enforcement but also collective defence.

This great variety of employment modes and circumstances foreseen for CJTFs will put considerable demands on the arrangements for commanding and controlling the task forces. The role of the headquarters for a CJTF is therefore crucial. The core elements of a relatively small number of CJTF headquarters will be established within selected parent headquarters of NATO’s command structure. The personnel comprising these so-called CJTF ‘nuclei’ would provide the core of a CJTF headquarters which would be brought to full strength in an emergency.

The actual military implementation of the CJTF concept began last year and is now well under way. Three headquarters (Striking Fleet Atlantic in Norfolk, AFCENT in Brunssum and AFSOUTH in Naples) have been initially designated as parent headquarters for CJTF nuclei, and trials are scheduled for this year and next. Many of the features of the CJTF concept have already been put into practice in the context of the operations of the NATO-led peace forces, IFOR and SFOR, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The lessons learned will also contribute to the further development of CJTF.

European Security and Defence Identity

A major element of the transformation of the Alliance has been the steady strengthening of its links with the WEU and the search for practical means to enable NATO to support WEU-led operations in the fields defined in the WEU’s June 1992 Petersberg Declaration, such as conflict prevention, crisis management, and humanitarian operations. At the same time, the European allies have underlined their commitment to strengthening the effectiveness of the contribution which they bring to the Alliance as an expression of shared responsibilities and in order to strengthen the transatlantic link. ESDI is, therefore, being developed within NATO to enable the European allies to support a WEU-led operation by drawing, with...
the agreement of the NAC, on NATO’s command structures, planning capability and military assets, thereby avoiding duplication, while at the same time enhancing political solidarity.

The Madrid Summit welcomed the major steps which have been taken on the implementation of the important political decisions made by Foreign and Defence Ministers last year on the development of ESDI within the Alliance. Much progress has been made and we have defined arrangements as part of the adaptation of the Alliance which, once the details are finalised, will provide for all aspects of NATO support for a WEU-led operation, including provision for the WEU’s requirements in NATO’s planning for future forces and capabilities, arrangements for identifying NATO assets on which the WEU might draw with NAC agreement, elements of the NATO command structure which might be used to lead and support an operation under the political control of the WEU, and consultation and information-sharing arrangements.

The challenges ahead

The transformation of the Alliance began at the London Summit almost exactly seven years ago. The Rome Summit of November 1991 and the Brussels Summit of January 1994 were key stages along the road towards the conclusions reached at Madrid. The major part of the internal adaptation mandated at these meetings and amplified by meetings of Foreign and Defence Ministers, particularly in Berlin and Brussels last year, has been achieved. Work still remains to be completed on some aspects but the Alliance is now well placed to respond fully and effectively to the challenges of the new century.