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The latest issue of the new-look NATO Review has again generated a large mailbag, including requests for a letters’ page. In response, this feature will be added in a future edition. This time, the central theme is peacekeeping, an area in which the Alliance has become increasingly involved in recent years. Espen Barth Eide, state secretary in the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, examines the evolution of peacekeeping since the Cold War. Christopher Bellamy, professor of military science and doctrine at Cranfield University, argues that peacekeeping is anything but an activity for wimps. And David Lightburn of the Pearson Peacekeeping Center compares how NATO and the United Nations are applying lessons learned in the Balkans. In the debate, Bill Nash, director of the Council on Foreign Relations’ Center for Preventive Action, and John Hillen, a security consultant to US President George W. Bush’s election campaign, discuss whether soldiers can be both peacekeepers and warriors. This subject is revisited in the interview, in which, among other subjects, General Sir Rupert Smith, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, gives his views on the appropriate tasks for soldiers in peacekeeping operations. In the book review, Jamie Shea, director of NATO’s Office of Information and Press, reviews five books which have already appeared on the Alliance’s Kosovo campaign. Elsewhere, Bronislaw Komorowski, Poland’s defence minister, explains his country’s military reform programme. And Carlo Scognamiglio-Pasini, a former Italian defence minister, explains Italy’s expanded role in Balkan peacekeeping operations. Finally, 25 years after the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces was formally recognised, Vicki Nielsen, NATO Review assistant editor, examines the extent to which women have been integrated in NATO armies. Statistics illustrating the numbers of women in NATO forces and peacekeeping operations round out the issue.

Christopher Bennett

Vacancies at NATO

Nationals of NATO countries may apply for all posts on NATO’s International Staff. Details of vacancies, procedures and application forms are available on the NATO web site at:

http://www.nato.int/structur/recruit/index.htm
On 20 June, NATO Ambassadors agreed in principle to a request by President Boris Trajkovski of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for NATO assistance to demilitarise ethnic Albanian extremists, on condition that the parties pursue political dialogue successfully and cease hostilities. Instructions were given for an Operational Plan to be drawn up on this basis.

NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson visited Skopje, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 14 June to meet President Boris Trajkovski and Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski and other key political figures for talks about how to end the insurgency of ethnic Albanian extremists.

**Bush visit**

The Committee on Women in the NATO Forces celebrated its 25th anniversary at a meeting from 10 to 15 June, which was exceptionally held in Rome, Italy, to mark the Italian Armed Forces’ first intake of female recruits last year.

Defence ministers from NATO member and Partner countries gathered in Brussels, Belgium, for their six-monthly meetings on 7 and 8 June. Key items of discussion were the development of EU-NATO relations, implementation of the Defence Capabilities Initiative, missile defence and the crisis in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Armenian President Robert Kocharian came to NATO on 6 June to meet Lord Robertson. They discussed Armenia’s continued partnership with NATO as well as the tension with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh.

Nearly 100 generals converged on Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) for the annual conference organised by Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Joseph W. Ralston on 5 and 6 June. Two key topics were NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept and its consequences for forces and capabilities, and an assessment of NATO’s Balkans operations.

Fourteen NATO member and Partner countries took part in Exercise Baltops 2001, a peace-support operation in the Baltic Sea from 1 to 18 June.

On 1 and 2 June, Lord Robertson visited Rome, Italy, to attend Italy’s annual military parade and to meet President Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, outgoing Defence Minister Sergio Mattarella and Prime Minister designate Silvio Berlusconi.

Ministers in Budapest Foreign ministers from NATO and Partner countries gathered for their regular spring meetings in Budapest, Hungary, on 29 and 30 May. Discussions focused on current tensions in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, development in the Balkans, EU-NATO cooperation and new challenges facing the Alliance, as well as strengthening NATO’s partnerships and the Alliance’s relations with Russia and Ukraine.

Lord Robertson visited Dubrovnik, Croatia, on 31 May to address a conference on Key steps for European integration: promoting peace and prosperity in South East Europe.

The question of NATO enlargement dominated discussions at the five-day spring meeting of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, held in Vilnius, Lithuania, between 27 and 31 May.

In a statement on 24 May, Lord Robertson strongly condemned recent actions by extremist groups in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, particularly their continued presence in several occupied villages and their attacks on government security forces.

Buffer zone opens

The phased return of Yugoslav and Serbian security forces to Sector B of the Ground Safety Zone, the buffer zone between Serbia and Kosovo, began on 24 May.

Lord Robertson met Albanian President Rexhep Meidani, Prime Minister Ilir Meta, Foreign Minister Paskal Milo and Defence Minister Ishmail Lleshi in Tirana, Albania, where they discussed developments in the region and defence reform.

Lord Robertson met Albanian Prime Minister Ivica Racan at NATO and addressed NATO Ambassadors on 16 May. They discussed Croatia’s contribution to regional stability as well as the year-old government’s programme of political reform.

Between 15 and 26 May, seven NATO nations provided forces for Damsel Fair 2001, an exercise in Kusadasi Bay, off the coast of Turkey, aimed at exercising all aspects of mine-warfare planning, execution and analysis.

NATO Chiefs of Staff held a series of meetings at NATO among themselves and with Partner country counterparts on 15 and 16 May. Key topics included Balkan peacekeeping, the situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, developing EU-NATO relations, NATO’s force structure review and discussions about the procurement of an airborne surveillance system.

Newly elected Moldovan Prime Minister Vasile Tarlev met Lord Robertson at NATO on 15 May. He expressed his country’s determination to broaden and extend cooperation with NATO, particularly in the field of peacekeeping.

Five NATO members and seven Partner countries participated in
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Cooperative Tide 2001, an exercise in naval coastal warfare procedures, in Newport News, Virginia, USA, from 14 to 23 May.

Between 14 and 16 May, six NATO members and six Partner countries took part in Cooperative Baltic Eye in the Baltic Sea, an exercise aimed at developing procedures for commanding, controlling and coordinating search-and-rescue resources.

During the night of 11 and 12 May, KFOR troops seized a large cache of heavy weapons, which were destined for ethnic Albanian armed groups operating in the Presevo Valley.

Lord Robertson visited Barcelona, Spain, on 10 and 11 May, where he addressed a security and defence conference, before travelling to Madrid for meetings with Prime Minister José Maria Aznar, Foreign Minister Josep Piqué and Defence Minister Federico Trillo-Figueroa.

In The Hague, the Netherlands, on 9 May, Lord Robertson gave a speech at the Centre for European Security Studies and later met Dutch Defence Minister Frank de Grave.

The first consultations on missile defence took place at NATO on 8 May, when a US delegation explained the new US administration's position to Lord Robertson and the North Atlantic Council (NAC).

EU-NATO double act

In the wake of repeated acts of violence by ethnic Albanian extremists against forces of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,* Lord Robertson travelled to Skopje on 7 May for meetings with President Boris Trajkovski and other key figures, which he attended together with European Union High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana.

The Conference of National Armaments Directors met in Brussels, Belgium, for their biannual meeting on 3 and 4 May to discuss NATO policy issues and projects, including the implementation of the Defence Capabilities Initiative and the Armaments Review.

Focus on Kosovo

The 2001 NATO Economics Colloquium took place in Bucharest, Romania, between 2 and 4 May and focused on the interrelationship between regional economic cooperation, security and stability, particularly in southeastern Europe, the southern Caucasus and Central Asia.

Lord Robertson condemned an attack by Albanian extremists on security forces in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* near the city of Tetovo, on 28 April.

Wars crimes suspect detained

SFOR troops detained Dragan Obrenovic, one of three Bosnian Serbs indicted for the Srebrenica massacre, on 15 April and transferred him to the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague.

Following a North Atlantic Council decision on 10 April, Sector D of the Ground Safety Zone separating Serbia and Kosovo, was handed over to Yugoslav forces on 14 April.

Lord Robertson condemned the deliberate targeting and killing of a Russian KFOR soldier in a shooting on 11 April in Kosovo.

Two British airmen died on 9 April in a helicopter crash in poor weather in a mountainous region of Kosovo near the border with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.* Air force personnel from six NATO countries participated in a logistics exercise, Ample Train 2001, in Greece from 2 to 6 April, to practise servicing and handling fighter aircraft.

KFOR command change

Norwegian General Thorstein Sklaker took command of KFOR on 6 April, succeeding Italian General Carlo Cabigioso.

On 6 April, Bulgaria’s parliament ratified an agreement with NATO, authorising the transit of Greek and Turkish NATO forces across Bulgarian territory to reinforce the NATO-led peacekeeping operation in Kosovo.

NAC goes south

Lord Robertson and the 19 NATO Ambassadors visited the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* and Kosovo on 3 and 4 April, stopping off on the way at the headquarters of Allied Forces Southern Europe in Naples, Italy, which has command authority for SFOR and KFOR.

SHAPE commemorated its 50th anniversary on 2 April in a ceremony presided over by SACEUR General Ralston and Lord Robertson.

Lord Robertson paid a two-day visit to Warsaw, Poland, on 29 and 30 March, where he met President Aleksander Kwasniewski, Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek, the foreign and defence ministers, and members of the upper and lower houses of parliament.

For more information, see NATO Update at www.nato.int/docu/update/index.htm.
Peacekeeping past and present

Espen Barth Eide examines the way in which peacekeeping has evolved since the end of the Cold War and the nature of the challenge today.

Peacekeeping is no longer what it used to be. The actors involved, the practices associated with it, even the concept itself have been transformed. In the process, it has become a more complex, comprehensive and dangerous activity. Moreover, the scale of the task, the resources involved and the skills required are such that all institutions involved, military and civilian, are seeking to adapt their working procedures to rise to the challenge. The change has been particularly prominent in Europe.

While peacekeeping has traditionally been carried out under the auspices of the United Nations, it is not explicitly referred to in the UN Charter. The concept was effectively invented in the United Nations during the Cold War by extending the interpretation of the powers in the Charter’s Chapter VI on the peaceful resolution of conflicts. To a large extent, it served as a creative way of overcoming the problem of superpower rivalry, which all too often left the Security Council deadlocked and prevented it from exercising its authority under Chapter VII on actions with respect to threats to the peace.

In the early years, peacekeeping was literally about keeping a specific peace. This was usually the result of international mediation in an armed conflict, where warring parties had signed a cease-fire or peace agreement and wanted it to last, but did not trust the other side to live up to its word. The United Nations would be called in to patrol and monitor the “buffer zone” between the two parties, who were reassured by the “neutral” and non-offensive nature of the organisation’s presence. While not all Cold War peacekeeping operations were equally successful, the presence of UN peacekeepers did help prevent a return to hostilities in some cases, where fighting might otherwise have broken out again.

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Cold War security thinking focused on stability. The best one could hope for was the maintenance of the status quo. On a macro level, this meant balance between the superpowers; on a micro level, that existing peace agreements were kept. In this connection, containment became a buzzword during this era. Given the alternative, an all-out breakdown in the balance of power system and superpower confrontation, it could hardly have been otherwise.

Today, security thinking has moved on. Rather than maintaining the status quo, the keywords now are transition, enlargement and integration — all dynamic rather than static concepts. The dynamics of change are affecting peacekeeping, too. The classical task of serving as a “neutral” buffer between consenting parties has evolved into operations geared towards managing political, economic and social change, often under difficult circumstances — a trend fuelled by the fact that most modern peacekeeping operations are responses to intra-state, rather than interstate, conflicts.

Operational planning and conflict-management strategies need to take into account the changing dynamics of peacekeeping. In many cases, it is neither possible nor desirable to seek to re-establish the situation that existed before the conflict. Instead, the parties need help to build a new society. Often, it is difficult to find clear, coherent and reliable partners with genuine control over their own forces. Frequently, the situation is complicated by the presence of warlords and conflict entrepreneurs, prepared to exploit myths and instigate violence to help seize or retain power. Political and financial motives overlap, sometimes blurring the lines between politics and organised crime. Moreover, the key issues at stake in many current conflicts concern the very nature of the state. Since such issues often remain unresolved at the end of open hostilities, the international community finds itself called upon to reform dysfunctional institutions, including the state administration, the legal system and even the local media.

Contemporary conflict management is complex. In addition to the military aspect, many other activities have become integral parts of a peace-building operation. Only a careful, well-planned and coordinated combination of civilian and military measures can create the conditions for long-term, self-sustaining stability and peace. This need for a new approach to peacekeeping has led to debate about the respective roles of the United Nations and regional organisations in crisis management. This is especially the case in Europe, where several regional and sub-regional organisations actively pursue different aspects of crisis management and the issues of cooperation and division of labour are particularly relevant.

The institutional strength and financial resources of Europe made it a logical place to begin the process of relieving the United Nations of some peacekeeping responsibilities. Europe is not inherently better at dealing with conflicts, nor have tried-and-tested models of peace-support operations been developed here that are easily transferable to other parts of the world. But Europe’s experience matters, not least because events in the Balkans and international responses to them have been central to the development of contemporary doctrine on post-Cold War peace-support operations. Indeed, the Balkans have, in many ways, become Europe’s security-policy testing ground. Nearly all issues dominating the European security debate today — transatlantic relations, the future of NATO, the role of the European Union and the United Nations, and relations with Russia — have a Balkan dimension.

The wars of Yugoslav dissolution and international responses to them highlighted the shortcomings of Europe’s security architecture at the end of the Cold War. In the absence of credible regional organisations ready or willing to rise to the task, the United Nations deployed the original UN Protection Force to Croatia in February 1992. Soon after, its mandate was extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) and later, in 1993, to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.* What was originally envisaged as a six-month deployment lasted for four years.

The United Nations was the principal institution attempting to broker an end to hostilities, keep the peace in regions where a cease-fire had been agreed and alleviate the suffering of non-combatants in conflict areas between 1992 and 1995. Over the years, NATO became more involved through its various air and sea-based support operations and a close partnership gradually developed between the two institutions. After the Dayton Agreement, the peace accord ending the Bosnian War, came into force on 20 December 1995, military responsibility transferred to the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR). This was the Alliance’s first military engagement on land and has contributed greatly to reshaping its identity. Indeed, in only a few years, NATO has transformed itself to take on an almost entirely new role and become an increasingly effective instrument for military and political crisis management.

This adaptation and learning process is evident in the way in which peacekeeping in Bosnia under IFOR and the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) has evolved and has fed into the approach adopted when the KFOR deployed in June 1999. Two remarkable trends can be seen. The first, is an expansion of the understanding of what constitutes the military’s mandate. In the early days of IFOR, the emphasis was on avoiding “mission creep”, or the tendency for a force to begin taking on tasks perceived as civilian. Eventually, however, it became increasingly clear that there could be no military success in isolation.

If the overall peace-building effort failed to produce conditions for a stable and lasting peace, this would be perceived as much as NATO’s failure as that of the civilian agencies. This helped forge closer links between the peacekeeping force and its many civilian counterparts.
Moreover, by the time KFOR deployed, the lesson had been learned and was reflected in the broad mandate given to the force from the outset and in the good and flexible relationship that rapidly developed between KFOR and the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo.

The second trend is the gradual Europeanisation of NATO’s peacekeeping operations. UNPROFOR was largely European in composition, but also included considerable numbers of soldiers from Third World countries. In the wake of the transition from UN to NATO control of the peacekeeping mission, troops from most Third World contributors left. Meanwhile, US soldiers arrived, making up one third of the 60,000-strong IFOR, a ratio that has steadily fallen in recent years. KFOR, on the other hand, was unmistakably European from the beginning. In stark contrast to the Kosovo air campaign, which was dominated by the United States, the ratio between European and US troops was 34,000 to 8,000, once the ground peacekeeping operation had fully deployed. Moreover, while the SFOR commander has always been an American, the KFOR commander has always been a European.

Security and stability in the Balkans is a paramount issue for Europeans. It is therefore natural that Europeans assume a major share of the responsibility for this operation. This meets US calls for greater burden-sharing within the Alliance and for Europe to take on more responsibility for its own security. But, while the US presence has been reduced, the continued commitment and active involvement of the United States to peace and stability in the region remains essential both for finding lasting solutions in the Balkans and for Europe’s long-term stability and security.

Just as NATO has come a long way in adapting to the challenges of contemporary peacekeeping, similar developments can be found elsewhere. Today, it is accepted that while military measures may be necessary to control violent conflicts, they have to be supplemented by and closely coordinated with civilian instruments, if a peace-making mission is to be successful. This would not have been so self-evident ten or even five years ago, when it went against the grain of both traditional military and humanitarian thinking. Then, traditionalists objected to soldiers carrying out civilian tasks, and many non-governmental organisations did not want to “sully” their hands by working with the military. The Balkan conflicts, however, have made it abundantly clear that purity of tasking in traditional peacekeeping operations is a thing of the past.

The European Union has been working to build a military crisis-management capability and to improve its civilian crisis-response structures in recent years. As a result, this institution may be in a position to take the lead more often in crisis management in the future. Indeed, Norway and other European countries that are not EU members have committed themselves to close collaboration with the European Union in managing complex crises because of the range of policy tools at the European Union’s disposal. In addition to its military and civilian assets, the European Union can, for example, use the promise of future membership, association and partnership agreements, and economic investment as leverage.

The United Nations has also begun an overhaul of its peacekeeping operations in the wake of the publication of the Brahimi report last year. This report aims to revitalise the way in which the United Nations becomes involved in and conducts peacekeeping operations. Moreover, the institutional evolution of the European Union and NATO and the increasingly close cooperation between the United Nations and regional organisations, both on the ground and at the political level, will no doubt contribute to the reform of UN peacekeeping triggered by Brahimi and help define the United Nations’ role in the world today, at least in institution-rich regions like Europe.

There are, of course, limits to the capacities of any individual organisation, be it the European Union, NATO or the United Nations. As a result, institutions will almost certainly have to continue working together and forging closer links with each other in response to future crises. Ongoing discussions between the European Union and NATO reflect this point. Here, solutions to the thorny issue of EU access to NATO assets may materialise on the ground, in response to the crisis in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* and the continued peace-building exercise in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Experience in the Balkans has shown that the prime task in securing peace today is to assist in the long-term and complex political and social transformation of war-shattered societies. Comprehensive peace-building needs to address not only the most immediate military and humanitarian concerns, but also the longer-term tasks of state-building, reforming the security sector, strengthening civil society and promoting social reintegration. While the regionalisation of peacekeeping has paid dividends, there is no universal model governing the relationship between regional organisations and the United Nations. Moreover, it would be wrong to assume that regional states and organisations are always the best placed to solve problems in their region. Rather, it is essential that peace-making around the world draws on accumulated experience, competence and resources, that lessons learned in Kosovo could perhaps be applied in East Timor and vice versa, and that global and regional organisations, humanitarian and development agencies, and governments and civil society in the countries in question pull in the same direction.
The term peace-support operations embraces a wide spectrum of tasks. They comprise traditional peacekeeping — where there is an agreed peace to keep; what the British used to call wider peacekeeping, where the environment is highly volatile; peace-building — reconstructing society after conflict and returning it to normality; and peace enforcement — the termination of a conflict by force.

Peace-support operations in complex emergency situations are joint — they involve all services; they are combined — they involve many countries; and they are something else, a new adjective, integrated — involving many different agencies. These include armed forces, police, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), aid agencies, international organisations, government development agencies, private industry and other companies, and the media.

All peace-support operations now take place under a media spotlight. This phenomenon is rather like the weather — its reactions can generally be predicted, but not entirely. Moreover, in addition to reporting problems, media can play an important role in contributing to their solutions. Media are one of the key checks and balances in any democratic, market-based society and it is just such societies that peace-building operations strive to create as the best guarantee of peace. Assisting the development of free and independent media must therefore be a key element of peace-building.

General Sir Mike Jackson, the British officer who led NATO forces into Kosovo in June 1999, recently likened this kind of multi-faceted operation to a piece of rope. The rope is made up of many strands, and its breaking strain is far greater than the sum of all those individual strands. The problem is weaving the strands together and ensuring that no one strand becomes notably thicker than the others which would distort the rope, create strains within it and damage anything it rubbed against.

The need for this integrated approach is recognised not only in the field, but also at the highest levels of government. The UK government has recently instituted the “cross-cutting initiative”, where three departments — the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development...
— all contribute to two budgets for conflict prevention one for Africa and one for the rest of the world, underlining the integrated nature of this task.

On the ground, meanwhile, one of the most intractable problems is the cultural difference between NGOs and military forces. Although ex-military people are well represented in many NGOs, some NGOs come from a religious, sometimes pacifist tradition and are naturally suspicious of the military. Conversely, some military personnel are wary of NGOs, sometimes seem exasperated by an apparent lack of coordination, and can be scathing — often unjustly — about the ability of NGO employees to live in the field.

The introduction of UN forces into Croatia and then Bosnia in 1992 provided one model for integrated peace-support operations. The operation in Kosovo since 1999 provides another, far more complicated one. The essential reason for this is that in Kosovo — unlike Bosnia — there is no effective local government. It is, in effect, an international protectorate. Furthermore, there is, at present, no long-term end-state. In effect, the “state” is the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Nevertheless, much good practice has evolved between the civil and military organisations operating in Kosovo and much can be learned from this for future integrated operations.

About 200 NGOs currently operate in Kosovo. Coordinating their activities could be likened to “herding cats”. Each has its own specific area of interest and expertise. Attempts by the military authorities to control and coordinate the work of NGOs are sometimes resented. Moreover, NGOs rely on their independence as a form of security. If they are seen to be too closely associated with an occupying military force, they risk becoming a target.

The first priority, therefore, is to break down the barriers to closer communication. In many cases, the use of different language and terminology further obscures understanding and this is compounded by different interpretations of the same terms of reference. In 1994, Norway hosted a conference involving some 45 countries and 25 NGOs, which developed guidelines for the use of military and civil-defence assets in disaster relief, the so-called “Oslo Guidelines”. Although designed for the slightly simpler world of natural-disaster relief, the guidelines have also been used by the United Nations in complex emergencies, notably East Timor and Kosovo. The “Oslo Guidelines” are now being reviewed by NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre to see if it is possible to create a similar document for the use of military and civil assets in complex humanitarian emergencies. NATO is also developing a civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) doctrine that could fulfil this purpose, although some NGOs might be suspicious of what might be considered a “NATO doctrine”.

Turning military Combined Joint Task Forces into Combined Integrated Joint Task Forces, with NGOs on board, is unlikely to be an acceptable solution, as it would merely increase NGO fears of military dominance. In any peacekeeping or peace-building operation the supreme authority is likely to be some form of “High Representative” authorised by the United Nations, and it is at that level that the work of the international military, civil, NGO and commercial actors and local authorities should be woven together.

The diversity of the many actors can be a strength rather than a weakness. Although people naturally look for institutional and doctrinal ways of coordinating organisations and avoiding duplication, it is often personal relationships between people on the ground that really matter. It is believed that there is a pool of about 1,000 people shifting between one emergency-response theatre and another. If these people could be identified and trained together, that might further help coordination.

Communication between the military, international organisations, NGOs, local authorities and the media is clearly crucial in running an integrated peace-support operation efficiently. In the age of the camcorder and the internet, there is a particular need for 24-hour information to prevent hostile governments and local interest groups from conducting propaganda. The humanitarian relief community in Kosovo is already coordinating information. The Humanitarian Coordination Information Centre (HCIC) was developed in Kosovo to feed information to all organisations and agencies. It provides a “who’s doing what, where, when” database, which is critical to efficient — and safe — operations. Military forces could become more involved in initiatives like the HCIC, perhaps through their CIMIC arm.

Identifying who is best for the job is also important. Military forces are often the first agency to be deployed and can do many things on their own. The construction of refugee camps in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* by British forces is a case in point. Some agencies in Kosovo have a clearly defined channel for communication with KFOR. However, immediately after the occupation of Kosovo, NATO was seen as a party to the conflict and this necessitated a clear division between military and humanitarian tasks.

The experience of operations over the past decade suggests that forces only intended for peacekeeping and similar duties — a gendarmerie — are not well respected by the people with whom they have to interact. The most effective are trained and equipped as professional soldiers, but nevertheless interact with the local population. The US forces, with their strong emphasis on force protection and intimidating appearance sometimes appear to go too far the other way, and their remoteness from the locals may reduce their effectiveness in the peacekeeping role.
An example of how the toughest professional troops also excel at peacekeeping is provided by the Royal Marines, who have participated in the construction of many children’s playgrounds as part of an attempt to rebuild children’s lives and normality. One of the playgrounds was in danger of being vandalised by older youths. It was impossible to mount a continuous guard on the playground. But the marines, thinking laterally, came up with the idea of putting in a “hot line”, so locals could call, anonymously, if trouble looked imminent. The manoeuvrist approach works in peacekeeping, as it does in war.

Sometimes inter-agency cooperation does not work as it should, with interesting results. The NGO, War Child UK, specialises in, among other things, building playgrounds for children. One of the first was built at the school for the deaf in Prizren in Kosovo soon after the Allied forces’ arrival in 1999. Recently, the German component of KFOR decided to make a donation to the school and asked what the school needed. There seems to have been a breakdown in communication and the Germans arrived to build — a playground, on the other side of the school. A telephone call or two, or knowledge of what different NGOs did, might have prevented the duplication. So the school now has two playgrounds. That is very popular with the children but less so, perhaps, with the teachers who have to supervise two playgrounds on opposite sides of the school.

Peace-support and humanitarian operations are likely to be a principal task of NATO armed forces for the next generation. Indeed, past experience of post-conflict peace-building suggests that it will take at least a generation to create a sustainable end-state in Kosovo and other places. To ensure the success of existing peace-support operations, armed forces with the ethos and physique of war-fighting soldiers have to be recruited and trained. No-one else can be relied on if peacekeeping suddenly regresses into civil war, and studies have shown that no-one else gets the necessary respect from local people in the immediate aftermath of a bloody conflict. But such soldiers, well-disciplined — and that is the key — can be the best peacekeepers and take to that task enthusiastically. A partially trained gendarmerie, or an army trained only for peacekeeping-type duties, is unlikely to be effective. The warrior ethos must remain, but it must be imbued with flexibility and humanity, and a willingness to mix with the locals, even — as many great soldiers have done — to “go native”. It is possible to combine combat readiness with compassion, and that is the challenge for many armed forces in the first quarter of the 21st century.

But soldiers will have to compromise with aid agencies and other NGOs, international organisations and other government departments and local officials. The scope of officer and non-commissioned officer education must be widened to enable them to adapt to and cope with the eccentricities of other organisations. This is being done with staff courses, which are increasingly “joint”, routinely devoting time to integrated operations and the work of NGOs. However, other organisations find it harder to adapt. Few other government organisations, never mind NGOs, can afford to release staff for lengthy training and education courses as the military can. The priority for NGOs, rightly, where donors’ money is being used, is to get into the field and save or rebuild lives as quickly and efficiently as possible. It, therefore, falls to the military to be especially sensitive to NGO concerns and to develop the right relationship with them.
Lessons learned

David Lightburn reviews NATO’s peacekeeping experience and compares how the Alliance and the United Nations are applying lessons from the Balkans.

The early 1990s brought about dramatic change in the manner in which the international community perceived it should deal with security challenges. The demand for peacekeeping grew as the Cold War ended and a number of latent and internal ethnic, territorial and religious tensions boiled over into conflict. For the many regional and international organisations engaged in the Balkans in the 1990s, the experience has been akin to one large experimental laboratory. The two organisations most affected by their involvement in the Balkans have been NATO and the United Nations.

For the United Nations, the combination of difficult experiences in the Balkans and the challenges and realities of missions in Rwanda, Somalia and most recently East Timor led in 2000 to the creation of a panel under the commissioning of a report on the future of UN peacekeeping. For NATO, the Balkans produced many “firsts”: the first out-of-area deployment; the first shots fired in anger; the first significant cooperation with other international organisations; and the Alliance’s first peacekeeping operation.

In summer 1992, the UN Secretary-General released Agenda for Peace, a document that categorised the various phases of peacekeeping and generally recognised that traditional peacekeeping was becoming far more complex, engaging many more actors than in the past. Later, in 1995 following experiences in the Balkans, Cambodia, Rwanda and Somalia, the United Nations accepted that the situation was even more challenging and complex and issued an updated version of Agenda for Peace, increasing and adjusting the number of categories and accepting limitations for the organisation, especially where peace enforcement was concerned.

NATO had helped preserve peace in Europe during the Cold War and, beginning in late 1991, sought to pursue
security through dialogue, cooperation and partnership with former adversaries. The 1991 Strategic Concept made it clear that new security challenges would be multi-faceted in nature, multi-directional, and difficult to predict and assess. As this new strategy was being implemented, one of the steps agreed by Alliance foreign ministers in spring 1992 was to “support, on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE”. Later, in December 1992, following Allied intervention in support of UN objectives in the Adriatic, NATO foreign ministers agreed formally to extend the Alliance’s support in peacekeeping to the United Nations. Between 1992 and 1995, NATO became progressively engaged in the air and at sea in support of UN operations in the Balkans.

The Brahimi report, tabled in August 2000, acknowledges a major shift in the United Nations’ approach, from one of neutral observer of immediate post-conflict scenarios to one of involvement in conflicts that have not yet run their course. The report also notes that the United Nations has not altered its corporate culture or its ability to address new challenges. It calls for changes, including realistic and clear peacekeeping mandates, robust rules of engagement for military forces, unity of effort, a clear and unified chain of command, and a shift in policing from monitoring to more active engagement in restructuring the complete public security system. It also contains numerous recommendations concerning the United Nations’ ability to conceive, plan, mount and logistically support complex peace operations.

At NATO, beginning as early as 1996, a number of lessons-learned exercises have been undertaken. Overseeing implementation of the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) produced a number of fundamental political and military lessons that were, in the main, eventually applied in Kosovo almost four years later. There is a great deal of common ground between the fundamental lessons learned by NATO and the key thrusts of the Brahimi report, which merit further attention.

Tight linkage between mandate, mission and capabilities: In planning to oversee implementation of the Dayton Agreement, NATO benefited from the experience of the United Nations in Bosnia in the early 1990s, in particular the problems resulting from frequent changes in mandate, the lack of clear direction to UN military commanders, and the general lack of support by member states to the mandates that they had themselves agreed at UN headquarters in New York. Accordingly, NATO insisted on a tight linkage between the mandate set out in annex 1A, the military annex of the Dayton Agreement, the mission given by the North Atlantic Council to the Alliance military authorities and the capabilities of the Alliance and the commitment of specific forces and other resources to IFOR. Specifically, through key Allies, annex 1A was drafted to ensure that NATO had the capability to do what was being asked of an implementing military force. This included what is now known as a “silver bullet” clause, namely that the IFOR commander had the necessary and ultimate authority over the military forces of the parties to the conflict. The mission was crafted by the Alliance’s political authorities, based on sound and timely advice from NATO military authorities. The result was a clear focus on annex 1A to avoid problems encountered by previous UN forces and ensure that the force would not be pulled in many directions by civilian agencies all seeking support on the ground: no “mission creep”. Finally, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe organised a series of force-planning conferences to ensure that the requisite capabilities were in place.

Brahimi also made it clear that the United Nations’ mistakes of the 1990s with respect to changing mandates, missions and poorly resourced operations should not be repeated. Specifically, the report calls for “clear, credible and achievable mandates” and recommends that before the Security Council agrees to implement a cease-fire or peace accord, the agreement needs to meet certain threshold conditions such as consistency with international human rights standards and feasibility of specified tasks and timelines. The report also proposes that the Security Council leave any resolution in draft form until member states firmly commit troops and other critical mission-support elements, including peace-building resources. This makes the linkage between mandate and resources. The report goes on to propose fully engaging the UN secretariat by ensuring that the experts in the secretariat tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear, and to engage troop-contributors in the dialogue, with a view to getting the force commander’s mission right.

The need for unity of effort: Another fundamental lesson learned by NATO was the fact that the key to any exit strategy, a preoccupation of some in the early days of the Bosnian peace process, was the success of other key components of the Dayton Agreement. Following successful implementation of the military aspects of the peace accord, it was clear that maintaining a secure environment for civil implementation meant close cooperation with a wide range of other participants in the peace process, including the Office of the High Representative, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations. Accordingly, concerns over “mission creep” were gradually replaced by recognition that support to civil implementation was essential. The realisation of the need for such cooperation calls for a significantly greater understanding between the various military, civil, humanitarian and development organisations, understanding of each other’s cultures, policies, procedures, decision-making processes, resource bases, capabilities, strengths and limitations.

The Brahimi report also acknowledges the need for partnerships based on a better understanding of the various actors. While it focuses on the internal UN system and the
need for “integrated missions” with “integrated headquarters”, it addresses the need for cooperation, hence fundamental understanding, between those responsible for political analysis, military operations, civilian police, electoral assistance, human rights, development, humanitarian assistance, refugees and displaced persons, public information, logistics, finance and recruitment.

Harmonising objectives, concepts and plans: In October 1995, NATO attempted to understand the objectives, broad concepts and outline plans of other potential contributing organisations in regards to the then-emerging Dayton Agreement, through staff-level visits. Virtually no organisation was prepared for a timely deployment to Bosnia and, for most, the requirement was well beyond any previously encountered effort. Moreover, some, such as the United Nations itself, were not parties to the Dayton negotiations and therefore had no warning time. As a result, there was no exchange of concepts or outline plans and little real appreciation of objectives beyond the vagaries of the latter annexes of the Dayton Agreement.

Brahimi takes the concept of an integrated mission headquarters and proposes that members be seconded to such headquarters from all parts of the UN system. As one follow-up to this, the United Nations’ Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is currently developing a three-phase training programme for these headquarters, including mission-specific preparations.

The need for a robust capability: Much of what the NATO-led force is now doing in Bosnia could be considered classic peacekeeping, but with a robust force that is capable of dealing with emergencies. IFOR and its successor SFOR have provided humanitarian assistance and have, on occasion, had to use force. SFOR has supported implementation of a wide range of civil aspects of the peace agreement and is now examining ways to ensure durable, longer-term stability. In Kosovo, the Alliance was involved first in conflict prevention in cooperation with the OSCE, later in humanitarian assistance and then in imposing a peace settlement, peace enforcement and providing support to civil implementation. The principal lesson for Alliance planners is the need for a strong and flexible force, with robust rules of engagement, capable of dealing with a variety of contingencies and emergencies. NATO’s Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept has also been developed to strengthen the Alliance’s ability to respond to future emergencies.

The Brahimi report also draws conclusions on the need for national pools of civilian police officers before UN police had properly arrived, most contingents deployed with additional military or special police units deployed with additional military or special police capability and/or troops trained for the task.

Integrating troop-contributors appropriately: NATO has worked hard since IFOR’s deployment in Bosnia to find ways of progressively including troop-contributing Partners, both in the planning and the decision-making processes. In the early days, a balance had to be struck for security reasons between, on the one hand, consultations with Partners and, on the other, proper acknowledgement of the commitment of non-NATO troop-contributors. NATO also established a means of evaluating non-NATO offers of forces, to ensure an adequate degree of preparedness to meet the challenges of the Balkans.

Ensuring public security in peacekeeping operations: Public security remains a key challenge for the international community in both Bosnia and Kosovo. However, the situations are clearly different, since law and order is the responsibility of local police in Bosnia and of the United Nations in Kosovo. In Bosnia, the Alliance learned that, due to the inadequacies of local police, the NATO-led force needed a capability to react to breakdowns in law and order, since soldiers are not adequately trained to do police tasks. Accordingly, NATO created a multinational specialised unit of carabinieri, gendarmes and other special police, operating under military command. In Kosovo, recognising the pressing need for the military to undertake law-and-order responsibilities before UN police had properly arrived, most contingents deployed with additional military or special police capability and/or troops trained for the task.

The Brahimi report also concludes that this issue is critical, citing a need for national pools of civilian police officers to be available for deployment on UN missions. It urges regional training arrangements and encourages the creation of a standby pool of some 100 police to reinforce UN planning staffs at the time of an emerging crisis.

New crisis-management procedures and structures: Early in the planning process for IFOR, NATO realised that its existing crisis-management procedures could not be applied in their totality to the requirements of the Bosnian
peacekeeping situation. While fundamental aspects such as the development of military advice and political decision-making remained valid, the day-to-day support for the Secretary General and the North Atlantic Council was vested in a small multi-functional group of experts, the Bosnia Task Force, later renamed the Balkans Task Force. The group included political, military, humanitarian, legal, media and other experts as required. A special NATO political-military committee was also established to provide national input and consideration of the issues.

One of the main thrusts of the Brahimi report is its conclusion that significant reorganisation of the UN system is needed, especially at its New York headquarters. Structural, procedural and resource issues are addressed, as is the matter of financial authority and accountability. In addition to proposals on mandates and the Security Council, the report proposes that peace-building be handled by the Political Affairs Department; an information and strategic analysis entity be created; mission leadership and an integrated staff be created early in the planning process; certain funding authority be given to those planning and implementing a mission; the military standby arrangements concept be extended to civilian police, judges, lawyers, human rights experts and other specialists; and staff levels be increased, especially in DPKO.

The importance of training, education and preparedness: Both NATO and the United Nations fully recognise the need for well-trained, informed and properly equipped civilian and military organisations and individual staff in the demanding security and humanitarian environments of the Balkans and similar complex missions. NATO-led military forces spent a great deal of time preparing for their deployment into both Balkan theatres and, as noted previously, in assessing additional contributions offered by non-NATO countries. The emphasis on peacekeeping in the Alliance’s Partnership for Peace programme paid early dividends as many Partners stepped forward and contributed forces. Alliance concepts, doctrine and procedures now take full account of the experience acquired in the Balkans, particularly concerning cooperating and coordinating with civilian organisations in the peace process.

Brahimi calls both for national efforts at better preparing groups, individual staff or specialists and for collective efforts under UN guidance. The report specifically focuses on preparations of an integrated mission headquarters, civilian police and other civilian specialists, and strongly recommends an evaluation mechanism.

For its part, NATO is already applying these lessons and capturing them in policy and doctrine in a number of ways: through the many years of its military forces training and operating together; by a focus on peacekeeping in the Partnership for Peace; in the Alliance’s special programmes of cooperation with Russia and Ukraine and in its Mediterranean Dialogue process; and in NATO’s developing relations with the various militaries in the Balkan region. The Alliance is addressing fundamental international cooperation through enhanced communication with the European Union, OSCE and UNHCR. It also has a permanent liaison officer at UN headquarters in New York and has occasionally deployed liaison officers to the UHCR in Geneva. NATO also maintains close relations with the heads of missions of international organisations in Bosnia and Kosovo, and NATO military doctrine now fully recognises the civilian dimensions of complex peacekeeping operations.

The Brahimi report has already served to draw official and public attention to the peacekeeping shortcomings of the 1990s in a constructive and effective manner. It addresses a range of practical issues such as decision-making, rapid deployment, planning and support. Additional issues are addressed concerning civilian implementation, which attempt to minimise the current ad hoc nature of some peacekeeping missions. Now it remains for member states to work together with the relevant UN officials to continue to enhance UN peacekeeping capabilities.

If one last conclusion can be extrapolated from both NATO and UN experiences, it is that the concept of robust peacekeeping needs to be extended to the civilian sector. It is clear from the experience in Bosnia and Kosovo, that the international community needs to establish early authority and credibility. This cannot be done by military forces alone. The principal international organisations need to move in far more quickly, with far greater efficiency and effectiveness, using all of the authority available within their respective mandates. Once this group of organisations is able to demonstrate a clearer sense of purpose and a greater unity of effort to local officials and public, it may be easier to achieve cooperation and support and, ultimately, a successful mission.

THE PEACEKEEPING CHALLENGE

The NATO Science Programme supports collaborative projects between scientists from Allied and Partner countries. The programme – which is not defence-related – aims to stimulate cooperation between scientists from different backgrounds, to create enduring links between researchers, and to help sustain scientific communities in Partner countries.

Full details can be found on the NATO web site: http://www.nato.int/science
Can soldiers be peacekeepers and warriors?

Yes:
Bill Nash is a retired US major general and director of the Council on Foreign Relations’ Center for Preventive Action, who was formerly UN regional administrator in northern Kosovo and commander of the first US division to deploy in the Balkans.

No:
John Hillen is the chief operating officer of Island ECN Inc and a former US Army officer who has published widely on international security and was a consultant to the Bush campaign during the last US presidential election.

Dear John,

We have needed this discussion about war-fighting and peacekeeping for some time and I am pleased we have finally found the time. I first had to come to grips with the relationship between peacekeeping, war-fighting readiness and associated issues as my division prepared to go to Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) in autumn 1995. The success we enjoyed in Bosnia and upon our return to Germany a year later convinced me that our approach to peacekeeping was largely responsible for not only mission success, but also for our rapid recovery to a priori war-fighting readiness standards. I have three major points.

As commander of the 1st Armoured Division, I was determined to ensure that my forces would not be compromised in the way that the UN force preceding us had been. We therefore, took on a war-fighter’s attitude as we approached the mission in Bosnia. The standard, as stated in the first sentence of my commander’s intent, was that we would, at all times, present ourselves as “tough, disciplined, competent, professional” soldiers. In the first 60 days of the mission, I must have used that expression 50 times a day on average. And I think it worked. This is the first key to maintaining a war-fighting capacity while on a peacekeeping mission.

With that appropriate mind-set, we then concentrated on “doing things right” and on integrating training into our day-to-day operations. By the former, I mean we instilled and enforced the routine field-craft skills and troop-leading procedures in everyday operations. Daily maintenance work, pre-combat checks and rehearsals were standard. Junior leaders became proficient in giving operations orders and in ensuring their outfit’s ability to execute the day’s mission. Staff coordination, horizontally and vertically, was carried out daily with painstaking attention to detail.

With respect to training, we established garrison-type training briefings and programming within 90 days of arriving in theatre. We built ranges and training facilities and fired all our weapons on a routine basis in Bosnia, and our tank and Bradley crews used Hungarian ranges on a rotation basis of one company a week. We even set up tank and Bradley proficiency courses for laser-training systems in conjunction with our observation points, which we used to monitor the military movements of local forces. We wanted them to see us practising for combat.

The third key was a re-deployment and post-deployment training plan for our return to Germany. How we got home and what we did in the immediate months after our return had a significant impact on how quickly we were ready to go again — for any mission. Our re-deployment plan called for spending four to six days in our intermediate staging base in Hungary. There, we did everything from issuing new uniforms and turning in excess equipment, parts and vehicles, through medical and dental checks, to firing exercises for our tank and infantry platoons. The time in Hungary saved our soldiers weeks of effort back at home station.

Our training plan after our return began with a well-deserved leave period for the soldiers. This invest-
We took on a war-fighter’s attitude as we approached the mission in Bosnia

BILL NASH

dgment of approximately 45 days per battalion directly contributed to an extremely positive attitude on the part of the soldiers and their families for the work that was ahead of us. This quality-of-life issue cannot be overlooked, as we seek ways to deal with the military requirements of today and tomorrow.

Our training plan focused on those skills we had not worked on in Bosnia, such as deep attack and counter-reconnaissance planning and execution. Overall, we found that the improvements gained in difficult battle staff and command skills while in Bosnia far outweighed any losses in specific war-fighting tasks while deployed for peacekeeping. Indeed, one senior commander commented after our Fort Leavenworth Battle Command Training Program exercise, which took place about 90 days after the division arrived home, that, in many ways, the 1st Armoured Division was better trained after Bosnia than some of the divisions returning from Desert Storm. Regardless, there is no doubt in my mind that we were a much more capable, fighting division after Bosnia than we were when we went there.

As we look to overall lessons from this experience, I must note two important facts. First, almost the entire division deployed together to Bosnia. We were therefore able to maintain unit integrity far more that any unit since the 1995 and 1996 period. The benefits of unit cohesion to long-term readiness are most significant, maybe critical. The second fact, sad to say, is that by the end of summer 1997, the division had experienced between 70 and 80 per cent turnover in generals, colonels and lieutenant-colonels to include all brigade commanders. That is no way to maintain readiness.

Well, John, I’m interested in your views and I’ve held back a little ammunition for the expected counter-attack.

Yours,

Bill

Dear Bill,

First of all, let me say I’m thrilled to debate these important issues with a man for whom I have so much respect – as a warrior, a diplomat and a thoughtful foreign-policy analyst.

I am no enemy of peacekeeping or other peace-support operations. In fact, in my book on the history of UN peacekeeping, I analysed almost 50 different missions and came to appreciate the enormous challenges of these endeavours as well as their contribution to international peace and security. And, like you, while in uniform I fought in wars and served in peacekeeping missions, so I’ve seen both sides of the coin.

Moreover, and it may surprise some, I think US forces should be involved in multinational peacekeeping. But for me, and for the work I did with the Bush presidential campaign, the question turns on the scale of the US commitment to peacekeeping operations and the opportunity costs inherent in those commitments.

My opposition is the long-term and protracted commitment of US combat troops to multinational peacekeeping. I think the United States should be involved over the long term with support troops or reservists, and I think front-line US combat forces can play a key role only for short periods of time. From my perspective, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice’s famous line about the illogic of 82nd Airborne paratroopers (one of my old units) taking schoolchildren to class is rooted in three broad arguments that I hope to examine in greater detail throughout this debate.

First, there is the geopolitical argument about what role the United States military should play — vis-à-vis its allies and partners — in international security affairs. My argument that “superpowers don’t do windows” recognises that since almost all international security missions in which the United States is involved are cooperative and “team-based”, an important role for the leader of the team is to match roles and responsibilities to interests and capabilities. Given the enormous gulf in military capabilities between the United States and its European Allies in particular, I believe that NATO best serves its many different security roles (not just peacekeeping in Europe) by playing to the core competencies of its members. For the United States — and the United States alone — that is large-scale war-fighting. For every other Ally, it is much smaller missions and mostly peace-support operations.

Second, there is the practical impact of protracted US peacekeeping efforts on the rest of US military strategy. Unlike most NATO Allies, the United States has demanding

My opposition is to the long-term, protracted commitment of US combat troops to multinational peacekeeping

JOHN HILLEN
security commitments throughout the world. While the United Kingdom commits war-fighting forces to allied missions such as the continued deterrence of Iraq, for the most part the United States is alone in guaranteeing that no hostile power can dominate East Asia or the Gulf region. Moreover, missions like these require highly trained combat troops and the full suite of American air, naval, and ground power — fully committed and trained around the clock for the stresses and challenges of war (which usually come with no notice!).

I would also offer that these are the missions in which the United States — and the Alliance — cannot afford to fail. As my book on UN peacekeeping showed, a great power can afford to muck up, muddle through, or even fail in a peacekeeping mission without a lasting impact on the international security system. However, if the United States and its Allies lose or even draw in a significant conflict (such as the Gulf War), the entire structure of the international arena can be shifted and changed for the worse. Even in this politically correct age, we must admit that some missions simply matter more than others.

Your initial comments mainly address the third factor, whether US soldiers can be trained to do peacekeeping and war-fighting equally well and almost interchangeably. My friend Professor Charles Moskos is noted for the line that: “Peacekeeping is not a soldier’s job, but only a soldier can do it.” That seems to capture the conundrum very well. There is no doubt that well-trained and disciplined soldiers can, with the right kind of transitional training, make very good peacekeepers. But I have my suspicions (and some evidence) about the ability of soldiers deeply involved in peacekeeping to then turn around with little or no notice and be at the top of their game in the complex and sophisticated business of three-dimensional war-fighting.

I will go into this in greater detail later in the debate, but the point I’d make now is that your absolutely heroic and admirable training efforts in Bosnia were geared towards this very phenomenon — one that is stretching US forces very thin. This is the need to have our peacekeepers ready at the drop of a hat to transition immediately to war-fighting. Studies on this have been done by various government agencies and research institutes and they all point to the fact that — simply because no institution can be equally good at two very different tasks — there is some degradation of combat capabilities among long-term peacekeepers.

The question for us here is: how much of the degradation risk is worth taking for the United States?

Yours,
John

Dear John,

I will address your three points in reverse order. I agree that there can be “some degradation of combat capabilities among long-term peacekeepers”. But the same unit does not stay long term. Tours are normally six to twelve months and that is not a particularly long time. Even with an additional three to six months of preparatory training, the effects are not overly debilitating. The key point is that what is gained in an operational environment more than compensates for the specific skill levels that may be degraded, and those skills are generally more easily and quickly recovered. The US military have far more readiness problems from other sources than from the relatively small impact resulting from peacekeeping missions.

But the long-term issues related to interventions that you raise need to be addressed. Here, we are talking not so much about peacekeeping as about peace-building. I believe this effort goes beyond the competencies of and proper role for military forces and enters the realm of civilian implementation in peace operations. The absence of civilian capabilities diverts the military and engages them in activities beyond what is appropriate. Until the civilian component of these peace operations receives the same relative priority in personnel and resource allocation as the military component, we will never achieve our foreign-policy goals. In my judgement, we spend far too much time talking about the military issues and too little analysing the political, economic, social and broader security problems that must be resolved to finish the task started by our intervention.

As to your first point, I would make a few observations. The comment about “windows” is clever, but
not helpful. Leaders must always share the deprivations and risks, political and physical, with their followers. Matching competencies with missions is logical, but consensus must be built rather than demanded. We must never forget the difference between leadership and autocracy.

Yours,
Bill

Dear Bill,

We seem to diverge not on principle but on subjective issues of scale. For instance, we agree that long-term peacekeeping by combat units necessarily degrades combat capabilities but disagree on where and when degradation becomes debilitating. Similarly, we agree that NATO Allies have different interests and capabilities but disagree on the extent to which the United States should replicate the capabilities of its Allies in smaller missions of collective security. Let me explain my position on both these fronts.

We never know when the degradation of combat capabilities is debilitating until it is too late. In May 1950, when the Korean peninsula was at peace, the fact that the combat training of US occupation forces in Japan and Korea was not razor-sharp did not seem debilitating. A month later, however, on 25 June, the North Korean invasion and the subsequent routing of US occupation forces changed attitudes in a hurry. Many events that could require a US force ready for combat could come as a surprise. There may not be time to recover from peacekeeping missions and train up for combat. Let us be frank. No Ally has the global responsibilities of the United States, which could be called on to respond immediately to serious security contingencies. It would be foolish to risk the lives of US soldiers due to diminished combat readiness and sacrifice the unique and decisive capabilities of the US military simply to replicate the talents of our Allies in peacekeeping missions that are ultimately less important to world security.

This leads us to the second point of disagreement: the role the United States should play as NATO’s leader in these smaller missions. Even in a diplomatic atmosphere that insists on the veneer of egalitarianism, the United States should not pretend that leadership is simply doing what everyone else is doing. It is true that leaders must share risks and burdens but, as our European Allies themselves lament, they are increasingly incapable of sharing the risks and burdens in missions that profoundly affect global security.

We have all grown very Balkan-centric these days but someone in NATO has to keep an eye on the rest of the globe. That someone is obviously the United States. Why use a combat unit that may have to respond within days to a situation like the invasion of Kuwait in 1990 (as the 82nd Airborne did) for jobs that any other Ally could do with paramilitary reservists? That might be good therapy for the Alliance but would be bad security for the world. The Alliance is not an end in itself, it is merely the means to greater security in Europe and elsewhere. We should therefore think twice before elevating short-term solidarity over long-term security.

I am all for US military participation in NATO-led peacekeeping missions but against the long-term and protracted deployment of US combat forces in such missions. History shows that we could all live to regret that.

Yours,
John

Dear John,

It would seem that we have indeed found convergence, if not agreement, on the question at hand: soldiers can be peacekeepers and warriors. You just don’t want US soldiers to do it for very long.

You are too much of an historian to use May 1950 as evidence that peacekeeping in 2001 is bad for American combat readiness. The two plus US Army divisions that were deployed early to Korea in June 1950 were the products of nearly five years of occupation duty in Japan where their manning, equipping and training were anything except combat focused. It was a different time, a different world and certainly a different US Army.

I accept reasonable debate on the degree to which US forces should be a part of long-term peacekeeping missions and, as I told you in my last letter, I think the real long-term concerns are more civilian in nature than military. The use of reserve forma
Leaders must always share the deprivations and risks with their followers

BILL NASH

The reserve force structure and “covenant” will need to be retooled as both were built for the Cold War.

I firmly believe, however, that peacekeeping should be a secondary competency for US combat troops. The example of Korea in 1950 is not meant to be an exact historical analogy but was used simply to point out a pattern in history: 1) Bad things happen to good nations; 2) It is usually a surprise; and 3) The situation is painful to turn around if some nation or group of nations is not prepared to combat aggression from day one. The First and Second World Wars, Korea, the Gulf, ... you name it, they fit the pattern.

These are the missions in which the United States simply cannot afford to fail. Failure in these sorts of situations has more serious and far-reaching consequences than in the protracted and largely unsolvable internecine conflicts that characterise peacekeeping missions today. A little geopolitical reality is needed. These contingencies for which the United States alone is prepared are not necessarily situations that threaten our survival. That is a caricature of the argument. They are, quite simply, security threats that require the deployment and possible use of a fair amount of combat forces with little or no notice.

Few remember Haiti or Somalia today, though we were obsessed with their importance in the early 1990s. Yet, we would be constantly reminded of Saddam Hussein today, if he were occupying Kuwait and had Saudi Arabia under his thrall. To say that peacekeeping matters more than those sorts of security threats is therapeutic, but deeply unrealistic.

Only one NATO Ally has the stealth technology, precision munitions, large aircraft carriers, strategic airlift, satellites, large-scale deployable logistics packages, etc. Yet, at the same time, there are many nations with experienced peacekeepers, paramilitary police, civilian reconstruction experts and the like. Why dull the one true sword by using it along with the other ploughs?

Once again, I am only referring to the long-term deployment of US combat troops in Allied peacekeeping operations. We all know that the United States needs to be heavily involved in almost every other aspect (intelligence, support, logistics, transportation, etc.) of any NATO mission, or it simply would not happen. US dominance of the 1999 Kosovo air campaign is a case in point. It is by default, not by choice, that the United States will find itself going it alone in other security missions of greater consequence. Other Allies have by their own admission failed to retool their forces for combat missions outside Europe.

Someone in the Alliance needs to be able to respond to contingencies with well-trained combat forces. It makes for poor leadership for the US military to be deployed as if it were simply a large constabulary force for the sake of Alliance solidarity. As leadership guru Peter Drucker reminds us, leaders lead because of their unique knowledge and competencies, they do not lead by simply trying to replicate the skills of their followers.

Yours,
John

* For a European perspective on peacekeeping, see also the views of General Sir Rupert Smith on pages 24 and 25.
Although the television images of NATO’s bombing missions and of thousands of refugees streaming across borders are more than two years old, the Kosovo conflict continues to generate interest, controversy and occasionally passion. Hardly a month goes by without the appearance of another history or memoir. Some, such as Wesley Clark’s recently published account, have been accompanied by a barrage of publicity in the leading news magazines. My records show that more than 200 books on Kosovo have already appeared in the English language alone. To my great surprise, even the most arcane aspects of the Kosovo conflict are being investigated by PhD students. Just last month I was visited by one graduate who was writing his thesis on the semiotic linguistic analysis of NATO’s press briefings. Several heavyweight actors in this saga, now retired from government, are rumoured to be working on their own accounts. So the battle for the ultimate historical verdict looks set to continue.

Why has such a short and limited conflict generated such a heated debate? Why have so many of the key players felt the need for post factum — and public — vindication? I believe there are two reasons. In the first place, it is the discrepancy in the eyes of many between ends and means. While few disputed the need for international pressure to relieve the plight of the Kosovo Albanians, many recoiled at the use of force on such a scale, particularly when it required air strikes against Yugoslavia as a whole. The belief continued in many quarters that the violence could have been stopped by giving diplomacy more time — a view which overlooks Slobodan Milosevic’s categorical rejection of the peace accords worked out at Rambouillet. Others felt that military force should have been threatened earlier and more energetically in order to avoid having ultimately to use it — an argument that too easily presumes Milosevic’s rationality in calculating risks and weighing outcomes. Every civilised individual would like means to be directly proportionate to ends. NATO itself tried to do this at the beginning of the air campaign, publicly ruling out ground forces and limiting itself to 50 strike aircraft and targets in or near Kosovo. Unfortunately, instead of stopping, the violence escalated, as Milosevic responded by displacing 1.3 million Kosovo Albanians of whom more than 800,000 were forced over the border. Only two months later, when Allied leaders had demonstrated their total determination to prevail by escalating the air campaign and grappling with the option of ground forces, did Milosevic finally throw in the towel.

The second reason for enduring interest in NATO’s Kosovo campaign lies in the voluntarist nature of modern conflict. The vital national interests or physical security of NATO’s 19 member states were not directly or immediately threatened by the ethnic violence in Kosovo, even if the possible spill-over of fighting did threaten to destabilise NATO’s Partner countries in the region. For all NATO’s 19 governments the decision to launch Allied Force was a close call, requiring difficult judgements. Would the price of intervention ultimately be less than that of abstention? Was the extent of the violence against civilians in Kosovo of a sufficient dimension to justify a full-scale air campaign? How could the need to ensure political support within NATO countries be squared with the need for maximum deterrence and, later, a quick, decisive air campaign? How could public support in an Alliance with 19 different governments and public opinions be maintained over the long haul, if the immediate use of force failed to bring Milosevic to heel? How could a convincing legal basis for the use of force be identified in the absence of a UN Security Council Resolution? And how could NATO ensure an improvement in the post-conflict situation and reach a political solution in Kosovo, which would vindicate the decision to use force and justify the inevitable destruction and disruption?

The jury is still out on the last of these questions. Given the legacy of hatred in Kosovo, we may have to wait some years before KFOR can leave the province, secure in the conviction that a multi-ethnic, democratic and prosperous society has been created. But it is the merit of the books listed in this review to have dealt authoritatively with most of the other bitter controversies that clung so doggedly to Allied Force at the time.

Tim Judah’s Kosovo: War and Revenge (Yale University Press, 2000) is excellent in analysing the origins of the conflict. Starting deep in history, Judah charts the recurrent
pattern of violence between ethnic Albanians and Serbs, with both sides enjoying the upper hand at various stages in this long, rather depressing history. Judah, the author of a previous, much-respected book on the Serbs, is a true Balkan specialist and unbeatable on the local factors. While being scrupulously fair to both sides, he charts in detail the splits and radicalisation among Kosovo Albanian leaders and the emergence in the 1990s of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). He has a clear grasp of the key factors that tipped the balance towards violence, in particular the disappointment of Kosovo Albanians that their cause was not taken up at the Dayton Peace Conference in 1995, and the near collapse of the Albanian state in 1997, which allowed the KLA to get its hands on thousands of weapons at bargain-basement prices.

Although Judah shows that the Kosovo Albanians were not angels, he clearly points the finger at Milosevic and Belgrade in consistently failing to address Kosovo Albanian grievances and exacerbating the situation through an increasingly wilful and indiscriminate use of force against the civilian population. It may be tragically typical of Milosevic that he had no clear strategy for dealing with Kosovo and that his spasmodic but brutal actions only succeeded in provoking the very NATO intervention and lengthy armed presence inside Yugoslavia that he wished to avoid.

From a NATO perspective, one of Judah’s most helpful observations is that Milosevic’s campaign of ethnic cleansing started well before the initiation of air strikes. He points out that in January 1999, two months before Allied Force, the Serb special forces had already forced 300,000 Kosovo Albanians from their homes. He also demonstrates that ethnic cleansing of the local civilian population was on an upward trend and would have increased whether NATO had acted or not. In doing so, he gives the lie to commentators who allege that NATO caused the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo by taking action and that its cure was worse than the disease.

Judah’s profound grasp of the psychology of the ethnic Albanian and Serb leaderships comes across clearly but also at the expense of a detailed account of the positions of the 19 Allied governments and their military establishments. In his book, the NATO air campaign is treated only briefly, if succinctly, towards the end. Those wishing to pursue this angle would be better advised to turn to Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo (Brookings Institution Press, 2000) by Ivo Daalder and Michael O’Hanlon, both prominent scholars at the Brookings Institution with previous administration experience. For a NATO insider, their account is heartening and sobering at the same time. It is heartening because the authors offer a number of fascinating and intellectually rigorous analyses into the possible alternatives to NATO’s approach. In doing so, they show that the alternatives much touted at the time, such as partitioning Kosovo, more vigorously clamping down on the KLA or offering Milosevic concessions to get his agreement to granting Kosovo full autonomy, would not have worked in the circumstances of the spring of 1999. The only way to prevent not only a humanitarian disaster, but the destabilisation of the entire southern Balkans (which would, incidentally, have inflicted lasting damage to NATO’s credibility) was, in the view of Daalder and O’Hanlon, for the Alliance to take military action. To paraphrase Winston Churchill on democracy, Allied Force was the worst outcome, except for all the others. But having vindicated Allied Force through an exposure of the fallacies of the alternatives, the authors of Winning Ugly are equally unrelenting in their assessment of NATO’s conduct of the conflict: hence the bittersweet title of their book. Napoleon once said: “God, if I have to fight, let it be against a coalition.” In a similar vein, the pitfalls of Alliance politics and conflict by committee are well analysed, even if the authors acknowledge that, as it is unlikely that nations will conduct humanitarian interventions alone in future, putting up with coalition politics will be de rigueur. Alliances may complicate military decision-making, but they also make it clear to an oppressor that he is up against the international community. Ultimately, this was a key factor in Milosevic’s isolation and failure.

Where Daalder and O’Hanlon drive home their argument is in pinpointing the gap between European and US military capabilities in Allied Force, which placed a disproportionate burden on the United States while frustrating European Allies, who felt excluded from the inner circle of decision-making. If coalition warfare is to function smoothly in such operations in future, military contributions within NATO will have to be more evenly matched. Daalder and O’Hanlon also take NATO to task for starting the air campaign too slowly and ruling out a ground option at the beginning, thereby depriving the Alliance’s strategy of the element of surprise, which would have kept Milosevic guessing. They have a point, but conflict is the art of the politically possible as well as the militarily desirable. NATO’s choice was not between the perfect campaign and the imperfect variant. Given the need to achieve consensus among the 19 NATO governments, it was a choice between an imperfect campaign and none at all. Better perhaps to win ugly than to lose beautifully. Nonetheless, Daalder and O’Hanlon’s criticisms cannot be ignored, particularly as they are convinced that: “This war will not be the last time that NATO governments use force to save lives.”
Those who suspect that behind every great event there is always a turbulent inside story will be fully served by *Waging Modern War* (Public Affairs, 2001), the memoir of the commander of *Allied Force*, the former SACEUR General Wesley Clark. All students of conflict know only too well that the stress of battle and the need for constant decisions often give rise to bureaucratic struggles and personality clashes. Confronting superiors can sometimes be as demanding as confronting adversaries. General Clark documents his frustrations with his Pentagon colleagues with candour. Even NATO officials who were at NATO headquarters during *Allied Force* will find on reading this book that they only knew half of what was going on behind the scenes. The insider nature of General Clark’s book, with its intensive diary-like narrative, makes it a treat for specialist officials and journalists but perhaps less for the general reader who is not familiar with the actors involved. Issues of bureaucratic turf and policy clashes frequently overshadow the author’s more general reflections on the nature of modern conflict, the principles of successful crisis management or the prospects for building peace in the Balkans. Books on famous events written by participants inevitably place the author centre stage. In the case of General Clark, this is hardly surprising and offers many valuable insights. But it also means that those who were not in Clark’s daily entourage feature only occasionally and fleetingly, even though they also played important roles. What we learn about the author himself is as important as what we learn about the event. General Clark is good at describing the constraints that politicians, the media, NGOs, colleagues and bosses impose on a commander trying to win a modern war, but to some extent most of these constraints have existed for a long time. They dominate the literature on Vietnam, for instance, as much as that on Bosnia or Kosovo.

What one would really have liked from Clark’s book is more conceptual analysis of how the new form of high-tech, media-spotlight warfare differs from the old. While sympathising with Clark’s predicament — trying to convince his Pentagon superiors and colleagues that, whatever the lessons of the Gulf War, overwhelming force is not a doctrine that can be applied to every type of conflict — one wonders at the end of *Waging Modern War*, what is new or significant about the word “modern”.

One stimulating attempt to answer this question comes from Michael Ignatieff in *Virtual War* (Chalto and Windus 2000). Stringing together contemporary interviews and essays, including one on Clark (“the virtual commander”), Ignatieff’s book is full of insights into the elusive modern quest for the perfect war, with zero casualties and impeccable moral and legal justification. Its most interesting discussion is the use of the selective image of reality, both to enhance support at home and to discredit the adversary’s cause in the eyes of his own public opinion. But even the best media manipulation, the most persuasive politicians and the most advanced technology cannot conceal the brutality and human suffering of armed conflict indefinitely, any more than it can avoid real casualties. Ultimately, the virtual war of the air waves comes face to face with the real war. Ignatieff, a veteran of the Balkans and most other ethnic conflicts of the past decade, is a real thinker on modern warfare. I can only hope that he will develop these interesting insights into a fuller, more comprehensive work in the future.

The Kosovo conflict witnessed a controversy surrounding NATO’s media operations and the daily press briefings from NATO headquarters and Alliance capitals. The public presentation of the conflict has been as hotly debated by journalists as the conduct of military operations themselves. Did NATO deliberately lie? Were there more spin doctors than spokesmen? What is the responsibility of governments and journalists in explaining modern conflicts to the public? An excellent account of NATO’s media operation is given by its military spokesman at the time, General Walter Jertz, in *Krieg der Worte, Macht der Bilder* (Bernard and Graefe, 2001). Jertz is honest in describing NATO’s failings as well as its successes in handling the massive international press corps that descended on NATO headquarters for the duration of the air campaign. He makes it clear that, in Clausewitz’s “log of war”, getting accurate information from the theatre in real time was never easy, but he demonstrates convincingly that NATO did not deliberately mislead and was often the victim of its own quest for transparency. Jertz highlights many valuable issues for future improvement. One can only hope his book will be published in other languages to give it a wider audience.

NATO has taken a good deal of stick over Kosovo, both at the time and since. There have been revisionists aplenty to seize on every piece of bad news to argue that NATO had no right to intervene militarily. But these books, all well worth the read, show that NATO has nothing to fear or to regret from an in-depth examination of the facts. The authors are all critical of what went wrong or could have been done better. But if *Allied Force* does not emerge from these histories as a more perfect operation than it really was, neither does the moral and strategic necessity of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo appear any less necessary and just.
NR: Should soldiers be deployed with the kind of mandate that the UN forces had during the Bosnian war, or should a more robust mandate be established before troops are deployed?

RS: You can deploy forces with such a mandate provided that is what you want them to do. What you must not do is to decide at a later stage that you want them to do something else, without equipping them and giving them sufficient rules of engagement to carry out that task. This was demonstrably the case with the “safe areas” in Bosnia, where the idea was to deter further incursions into those enclaves but the forces to achieve that were inadequate.

NR: What strategy will generate results in complex situations, such as Bosnia?

RS: If you wish to use force to help arrive at a resolution of a conflict, it must be employed in support of a political process. The prospect of the use of force and the political process must run in parallel, and not be treated as linear processes. The events of 1995 in Bosnia are a good example of a number of actors pulling in the same direction at the same time. Richard Holbrooke was pursuing a diplomatic solution, which led eventually to the Dayton Agreement, and force was being used to complement the negotiations, although this was more by seizing opportunities than by planning.

NR: What are appropriate activities for peacekeepers to be involved in?

RS: This depends upon the nature of the peace you are trying to keep, who is breaking the peace and the level of force you need to bring to bear to create the conditions you have been sent to create. If you are facing a fully armed enemy deploying a fully organised army, then you have to produce a similar capability. If you are facing the occasional armed man, then it is clearly inappropriate to be using more force than necessary to achieve your aims.

NR: What sort of force do you believe would have been appropriate to employ during the Bosnian war and do you feel that you were able to employ that force?

RS: The forces deployed by the United Nations were not there either to keep the peace, enforce the peace or be peacekeepers. They were there to protect the convoys of aid being delivered to non-combatants. In most cases, this aid was delivered successfully. When their mandate was expanded to protect what came to be known as the “safe areas”, they were less successful, though they still managed to get aid into those enclaves. However, when it came to deterring further attacks on the “safe areas”, without any potential use of force other than calling on NATO for air strikes, they failed and it took some time to gather together sufficient forces with the necessary capabilities to take more forceful measures.

NR: You have been involved in the Balkans in both a NATO and a UN capacity. How has this shaped your views about the respective roles of these two organisations?
RS: I don’t find it useful to compare the two because they are different organisations. NATO has a limited membership. It is regional. It is organised and equipped to do one thing, which is to fight. The nations which are members of NATO are on the whole confident of the North Atlantic Council’s political direction of their forces. On the other hand, the United Nations has all nations in it, or very nearly all. It has a global responsibility as opposed to a regional responsibility. It is the legal authority for much of what we do and it encompasses a wide range of difficult tasks other than that of fighting.

NR: What ingredients do you consider critical to the success of the NATO-led operations in the Balkans and to peacekeeping operations in general?
RS: NATO can only achieve success in peacekeeping operations on the most limited of scales because all NATO can do is provide the conditions in which success might be found. It is with the other agencies, those that build nations, reform institutions, rescue and rehabilitate peoples, and so forth, where success is to be found.

NR: What benchmarks should be in place for there to be a reduction in the size of the peacekeeping missions?
RS: Judgements have to be made about the prospects of fighting starting again as well as the state of other institutions, such as a well-developed police force and a judicial system, all of which must be trusted by the local population. In the wake of civil strife, the failure of internal government and the breakdown of trust between ethnic groups, the benchmarks to look at are the status and activities of the agencies which caused the fighting in the first place. Have they been neutralised by your presence? Have you either got rid of them or reformed them? Have you either rebuilt them to make them of value or have you replaced them and produced something else in their stead? As the risk of fighting breaking out again diminishes, you can reduce the deterrent presence on the ground. However, this is not a quick process.

NR: How can soldiers best be prepared for missions such as SFOR and KFOR? And where does the work of a soldier end and that of a policeman begin?
RS: I will start with the second question because it helps answer the first. The primary business of a soldier is to kill his opponent. That is why he is there and why we deploy him. The policeman’s primary purpose is to arrest the wrong-doer and see to a successful prosecution. Those are two very different functions. Of course, the soldier can help the policeman, by providing information, even by guarding the policeman so that he can carry out his functions. But in the end, he is not a policeman. In the same way, the policeman is not imposing his will or the law by force. He imposes the law by the deterrence of a successful prosecution. And there is the difference between the two. So in these circumstances, it is well to remember that difference because it tells you what you have to prepare your soldier for. He has, first and foremost, to be capable of using his weapons. But his next step is to be able to support that policeman in the circumstances of that community. So he has to understand that community. He has to be able to operate at a low level, making what are probably greater and more complex decisions than he would have to make in a conventional battle. Lastly, he must be in a position to gather the information that supports the policeman in his work. Otherwise, you do not grow the police force you need to replace your soldier.

NR: What are your lessons from your experience of the Bosnia and Kosovo missions? And how can civil-military relations best be coordinated?
RS: We use soldiers, particularly engineers, to carry out reconstruction tasks. Some of these tasks are appropriate for the military to do. For example, with the possible exception of one or two non-governmental organisations, we probably have the greatest expertise in areas such as mine clearance. That said, using military engineers to build schools is probably valid in the early stages of an operation. But, once matters have progressed, such reconstruction is taking the possibility of generating work away from the local population and is no way to build a new society. Some senior engineers may be needed to supervise local construction work to start with but, even then, they should not stay for long because their presence would be stopping the evolution of a society. Coordinating such work with the civil agencies charged with reconstruction requires some form of central civil administration, whether it’s the local government or some imposed administration such as is the case with the United Nations in Kosovo, and then it should be clear who is supporting whom in each particular case.

NR: How do you envisage a future European rapid reaction force operating? Under what circumstances might it act independently of NATO?
RS: I see a European rapid reaction force operating in much the same way as a NATO one. The countries providing the forces are in most cases the same and I don’t see any great difficulty. In the event of a crisis in the European region, a debate would have to take place between NATO and the European Union. The merits of who took what action would have to be discussed before deciding which institution should take the lead. The exact circumstances as to who would have the lead would vary according to the crisis.

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NR: Although you are a long way from the normal retirement age, you will leave the military early next year. What challenges do you anticipate taking up in your retirement?
RS: The challenges will find me. They always have.
Increasing Italy’s input

Carlo Scognamiglio-Pasini explains how and why Italy has expanded its role in the NATO-led Balkan peacekeeping operations.

In the five-and-a-half years since NATO troops first deployed in the Balkans, the number of Italians on the ground, both in absolute and proportional terms, has been steadily rising. Indeed, Italy is now contributing as many troops to the NATO-led peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) and Kosovo as France and the United Kingdom. This is the result of a conscious policy to take on a greater role in a region in which Rome considers its national interest to be at stake.

Sharing the Adriatic Sea with Albania, Croatia, Montenegro and Slovenia, Italy is an obvious magnet for refugees, many of whom have grown up watching Italian television, dreaming of Italy and speaking Italian. These links are deep and enduring, and help explain why many ordinary Italian citizens have, in recent years, come forward as aid workers, helping provide humanitarian assistance during war and later helping rebuild shattered societies.

Italian peacekeepers first deployed on the ground in the Balkans with the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) to Bosnia in December 1995. They were not involved in UNPROFOR during the Bosnian war, since, at the time the mission was being set up in 1992, the United Nations was reluctant to employ peacekeepers from neighbouring countries with a history of military involvement in the former Yugoslavia. Between 1992 and 1995, therefore, Italy focused its efforts on relief work. When, in 1994, the European Union took over administration of the divided and war-ravaged town of Mostar in southern Bosnia, Italy dispatched 40 carabinieri to an international police force set up under the auspices of the Western European Union. And when NATO planes took off to attack Bosnian Serb targets, first for limited strikes to lift the siege of Sarajevo in 1994 and then in a sustained wave of attacks in August and September of 1995, they did so from Italian air bases.

Initially, some 3,200 Italian troops were deployed in IFOR in the French sector. At the time, IFOR numbered 60,000 soldiers. Today, some 1,800 Italian troops remain in a much-reduced Stabilisation Force (SFOR) of 20,000 and another 6,000 are currently deployed in the Kosovo Force (KFOR). These figures include carabinieri, police with military status, who have, since August 1998, been deployed in so-called Multinational Specialised Units (MSUs) to help maintain public order. Carabinieri have skills which are ideally suited to peacekeeping. As a result, they have been deployed throughout Bosnia and Kosovo to patrol sensitive areas, assist the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes, and intervene in the event of public disorder.

Carabinieri were also key to the success of Operation Alba in 1997, when Italy put together an eight-country, 7,000-strong intervention force to restore law and order to Albania in the wake of the collapse of a series of pyramid investment schemes. This “coalition of the willing” was authorised by the UN Security Council and coordinated by an ad hoc political steering committee. Lasting from April to August, it was also the first crisis-management mission conducted in Europe by a multinational military force composed exclusively of Europeans.

The turning-point in Italian attitudes occurred in the wake of NATO’s decision to station an extraction force in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.* This French-led force was deployed to support and, if necessary, assist the withdrawal of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s verification mission in Kosovo. In November 1998, the new government of Massimo D’Alema made a conscious decision to deploy 2,850 soldiers, the equivalent of a brigade, equipped with the much sought-after anti-tank A-129 helicopters.

The reason for this change in attitude is that Massimo D’Alema and I, then the defence minister, were concerned about the impact of events in Kosovo on the stability of Albania. That country had already descended into anarchy on three occasions in the preceding decade, leading directly to increases in smuggling and crime across the Adriatic Sea and forcing Rome to react in almost impossible conditions. We wanted to prevent a repetition by stabilising Albania, and I thought that the best way to achieve this would be to help Albanians feel secure at home. Moreover, I felt this might have been achieved, if NATO included Albania in its strategic security policy. At the time, however, the other NATO members opposed this proposal.

At the time, we were concerned about the way in which the Italian-Albanian relationship was beginning to resemble a protectorate, but our attempts to internationalise the issue had failed. However, I realised that something was

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wrong on our side, if the other Alliance members were not listening to us. The first step to drawing the attention of our Allies to our concerns required matching the troop contribution to NATO-led operations in the Balkans of France and the United Kingdom. The decisions that followed stemmed from that turning point.

When, on 24 March 1999, NATO launched air strikes against Yugoslav forces, Italy contributed 50 combat aircraft out of an overall force of 900 to the campaign. At the conclusion of the 78-day air campaign, the Yugoslav Army agreed to withdraw from Kosovo and the following day, Italian forces entered the province from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* to take charge of a sector in north-western Kosovo, around the city of Pec.

My records of the Kosovo campaign include two aspects that are little known about: the issue of the so-called “ground option” and the Albanian context. At the beginning of the conflict, Slobodan Milosevic’s strategy appeared to be one of seeking to endure air strikes until the coalition against him disintegrated, while destabilising the neighbouring countries of Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,* whose territory would have been a necessary staging post for NATO ground forces. One month into Operation Allied Force, the efficiency of a campaign based entirely on the use of air power came into question and NATO was under pressure to come up with another option to win the conflict. Although plans for a ground invasion of Kosovo were never drawn up, this matter was discussed at an informal meeting of defence ministers of the five largest NATO members on 27 May. Moreover, despite being considered the weakest link in the coalition, Italy pledged to supply unconditionally up to 10,000 men at that meeting, an event described in former SACEUR General Wesley Clark’s recent book.

The outcome of that meeting was a decision to reassemble on 15 June in order to muster the necessary forces to launch a ground offensive by no later than 15 September. In the event, however, the second meeting never took place because Milosevic decided to surrender and withdraw the Yugoslav Army from Kosovo on 9 June. However, I am persuaded that he was aware that his last chance to see the coalition break-up had disappeared and, consequently, any further resistance made no sense.

In Albania, we feared that Milosevic might attempt to destabilise the country by precipitating a mass exodus of refugees. Two approaches were required to counter this tactic: supplying Albanians with sufficient shelter and food to keep refugees close to the border for a possible return home; and giving them confidence that NATO would take care of them and, above all, that the Alliance would prevail. In January 1999, the Italian Army identified possible sites for refugee camps and began storing food and preparing shelters. When, soon after the beginning of the air campaign, Albania found itself deluged by close to a million refugees, it was possible rapidly to construct camps in the region of Kukes and elsewhere, thus maintaining hope among the population and alleviating the humanitarian catastrophe. Moreover, the deployment of more than 7,000 NATO soldiers, including a large Italian contingent, to Albania in Operation Allied Harbour on 15 April reinforced the message that the refugees would be going home.

Since, at the time, Italy only possessed a rapid reaction force of 20,000, we seriously risked overstretching our armed forces during the Kosovo campaign. In the wake of these operations, our government proposed a law, which has subsequently been passed by the parliament, ending the draft and transforming the army into a fully professional one. This should substantially increase the size of Italy’s rapid reaction forces to meet the needs of any future NATO peacekeeping operation.
Reforming Poland’s military

Bronislaw Komorowski explains the reasoning behind his country’s new programme to restructure and modernise its armed forces.

The Polish Armed Forces went through a turbulent period in the decade after 1989. As in other post-communist countries, successive governments found to their cost that the transformation of the defence establishment, as an essential component of the social, political and economic transformation of the country, was more difficult, more painful and slower than expected. These difficulties were compounded in the latter part of the decade by further reforms necessitated by Poland’s entry into NATO. As a result, the Polish Armed Forces today still have a long and difficult path of reform before them.

During the next five years, these reforms will change fundamentally not only the structure of the armed forces, their command, control, communication and intelligence systems, and operational procedures, but also the military education system and personnel structure. These changes will not only be extremely complex for the armed forces, but they will almost inevitably create social tensions and result in a different relationship between the military and society.

Today, the 350,000-strong armed forces of the 1980s have been reduced to about 200,000. However, this numerical change failed to generate similar improvements in quality. Although the reforms aimed at creating smaller but more effective armed forces, the increase in effectiveness was modest due to the inability to allocate the savings generated by reducing the size of the army to its technical modernisation. Those savings were returned to the state budget to meet Poland’s most immediate needs.

Poland’s participation as a NATO member in defence planning since 1999 has been a major spur to reform and the latest programme of reform is aimed at fulfilling Alliance objectives. At the time when Poland joined NATO, Alliance members adopted a new Strategic Concept and launched the Defence Capabilities Initiative. The resulting force goals, which are primarily concerned with the technical modernisation of the armed forces, the organisation of rapid reaction forces and improvement of operations, require substantial expenditure and the development of a better long-term financial planning framework, as well as a complete change of the philosophy of military reform. The Programme of Restructuring and Technical Modernisation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland 2001-2006 (the reform programme) is based on such principles.

The earlier reduction of manpower was not followed by a similar reduction in military hardware and assets. The armed forces have, for example, been using high-maintenance equipment and munitions of little military and training value, such as T-55 tanks and 100 mm shells. Moreover, obsolete equipment and stockpiles require active supervision, which is extremely costly. Disposing of surplus assets, including obsolete training grounds, many of which have some commercial value, should generate savings of between 200 and 250 million zloty (about $50 and $60 million). Further savings should come from the planned reductions in military personnel, money that will in future be retained within the defence budget, and by changing procurement procedures and contracting out services to the private sector.

These cost-cutting measures should allow the defence ministry to increase the proportion of its budget allocated to capital expenditure from the current 12 per cent to 23 per cent in five years. In practice, they should augment the defence ministry’s budget and provide necessary funding for long-term restructuring and modernisation. To achieve this, however, the defence budget will need to be maintained at 1.95 per cent of GDP throughout the implementation period of the reforms.

All projects related to Poland’s obligations to NATO, as well as to current requirements of Poland’s defence system, form part of the reform programme. In the process of restructuring Poland’s armed forces, one third of the military — rapid reaction and strategic covering forces — should become fully interoperable with other NATO militaries, adapting to NATO standards regarding armaments, equipment, mobility and the ability to operate in complex missions beyond Polish territory. The programme provides for the modernisation of intelligence, command and air defence systems, and for halting the further deterioration of armaments and military infrastructure in the remaining two thirds of the Polish Armed Forces.

Further plans include the creation of clear functional divisions between operational and support forces; changing the structure of military posts for professional soldiers to adapt it to NATO standards; and adapting logistics systems to those in NATO countries, improving the armed forces’ ability to cooperate with relevant NATO structures,
and increasing their mobility to enable them to take part in operations outside Poland.

In completing the design of the War Command System and ensuring its compatibility with NATO command systems, the most difficult task is likely to be reducing personnel according to a tight schedule. By the end of 2001, 26,000 more posts, that is 13 per cent of the total, should have gone, leaving 180,000, including 36,000 officers and 52,200 other professional soldiers. The number of conscript soldiers will be reduced to 91,800. By 2003, the overall numbers should be reduced further to 150,000 of whom 75,000 will be professionals.

Personnel reductions are directly linked to recruitment in military schools as well as the system of discharge. While graduates of Polish military academies boast a high level of education and military skills, the schooling process is excessively long and expensive in relation to the armed forces’ actual needs. The annual cost of educating a cadet comes to approximately 38,000 zloty, compared with 6,500 zloty for a university student. As a result, in the first instance, the number of places in military academies will be reduced. Following this reduction, the armed forces will begin recruiting regular university graduates for officer posts on a contract basis and introducing a system of continuous education. The social costs of these reductions are likely to be extremely high and this may cause unrest among those officers — colonels, lieutenant colonels and majors — who will bear the brunt of the cuts, many of whom will be discharged within three years.

The technical modernisation of the armed forces is likely to be less painful, but equally costly. The focal point of the modernisation programme will be the provision of High Operation Readiness Units (one third of all armed forces) with modern equipment. This will be achieved either by purchasing new equipment or modernising old, as well as by designating currently used armaments from other types of forces to High Operation Readiness Units. The process of technical modernisation is based on long-term programmes with guaranteed, statutory financing.

By 2006, the Polish Armed Forces should comprise the following units, equipped and trained to NATO standards: 11 combat units of the brigade-regiment type, 15 combat units of the battalion type, two units of the company type, five tactical air squadrons, 22 air-defence missile divisions, seven air bases, three radio-electronics units, 35 ships and two naval air squadrons. By that time, Polish units of the Danish-German-Polish Multinational Corps North-East based in Szczecin, Poland, will have attained the required NATO standards.

The process of technical modernisation, which will include purchasing armaments and military equipment, should generate opportunities for Poland’s military industry and related businesses. The reform programme has been drawn up on the basis of wide-ranging consultation with politicians of all persuasions and military experts. Implementation will be difficult and will require broad support. Critically, however, the planned reforms have been welcomed by all Poland’s major political parties, both those in government and those in opposition. This support led to the adoption, by a large majority, in parliament on 25 May, of a bill covering the reform programme.

For more details of the Programme of Restructuring and Technical Modernisation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland for 2001-2006, see www.wp.mil.pl.
Women in uniform

Vicki Nielsen examines how far women have been integrated in NATO forces.

Women in NATO forces have much to celebrate this year. It is the 40th anniversary of the first NATO Conference of Senior Service Women Officers and the 25th anniversary of the formal recognition of the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces by the Military Committee, NATO’s highest military authority.

In the course of the past four decades, the status, conditions and numbers of women in NATO armed forces have changed almost beyond recognition. According to statistics from the Office on Women in the NATO Forces, the number of females in NATO uniforms, all volunteers, has jumped from 30,000 in 1961 to 288,000 today. But each military has its own history, traditions and culture and the degree of integration of women varies from one to another. Although women have served in armed forces for many years, the debate about the feminisation of the military continues, even in countries that are farther down the road of integration than others: about how and where women should serve and train, about the extent to which women should be integrated, and even about whether the process has already gone too far.

Since the integration of women takes place at different levels and in different ways, it is difficult to draw up a precise league table among NATO countries. A brief look at some Allies with longer histories of servicewomen, often dating back to the Second if not the First World War, illustrates the point.

Norway and Denmark are in some respects the most progressive countries, where female soldiers are concerned. Norway was the first NATO country to allow women to serve on submarines and women have been allowed into all other combat functions since 1985. Denmark opened all functions and units in the armed forces to women in 1988 after trials conducted in combat arms in 1985 and 1987. Danish and Norwegian servicewomen serve or have served in almost all operational functions in the armed forces, except for the para-rangers and marine commandos, since to date no woman has met entry requirements. No Danish woman has yet served as a fighter pilot, either. In both countries, female soldiers train, work and are deployed on equal terms with men. They can also enrol for national service on a voluntary basis, an opportunity that allows them to gain insight into the armed forces and might encourage them to pursue a military career. There has even been recent debate in Norway about introducing compulsory...
military service for women as a means to boosting female representation and promoting gender equality.

However, at five per cent of total strength in Denmark and only three per cent in Norway, representation of women is low relative to some other Allies. Norway aims to boost the proportion of female soldiers to seven per cent by 2005. But despite the appointment of the country’s first female defence minister in March 1999, few Norwegian servicewomen have advanced to senior ranks. The first female colonel was only appointed in November 1999. One reason is that many female officers change from operational to administrative service after maternity leave, reducing their chances of being selected to study at military academies. Few women have reached the senior ranks of the Danish Armed Forces either, where recruitment and retention of female soldiers is also problematic. In 1999 and 2000, military academies there saw the lowest intake of women in recent years.

The highest representation of women in the armed forces on active duty is found in the United States (14 per cent) and Canada (11.4 per cent). The breakthrough for US servicewomen came with the creation of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973. At the time, disillusionment with the military in the wake of the Vietnam War meant that fewer men were willing to serve so female recruits were welcome. Today, 8.6 per cent of US troops deployed worldwide are women. More than 11,200 female soldiers have supported NATO peacekeeping operations and 37,000 served in the Gulf during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. US servicewomen are also making inroads into the highest ranks. To date, four have risen to the three-star equivalent rank of lieutenant general/vice admiral.

Not all posts are open to women in the US forces, however. In theory, only posts involving direct ground combat remain closed but, in practice, current assignment policy rules mean that several other positions are effectively male-only, so that 80 per cent of jobs are open to females. Canadian servicewomen, on the other hand, have been able to serve in almost all functions and environments since 1989. The only exception was on board submarines and even that restriction was lifted in March this year. The first women are expected to start submarine training in the autumn. Nevertheless, most women in the Canadian Armed Forces remain concentrated in more traditional areas and there has been little success integrating them into the combat arms occupations — infantry, artillery, field engineer and armour — where representation remains low at 1.9 per cent.

The armed forces of France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom also have long histories of recruiting female soldiers and women represent more than eight per cent of personnel. Generally, few female soldiers have risen to the senior ranks. Women remained segregated in women’s corps in both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

### The debate continues

Not everyone welcomes the growing influx of women in the military. Some traditionalists continue to argue that there is no place for women in the services. In an exchange in the Millenium journal last year, an ardent proponent of this view, Martin Van Creveld of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, argued that feminisation is part symptom, part cause, of the decline of the advanced military. In their replies, both Christopher Coker of the London School of Economics and Jean Bethke Elshtain of the University of Chicago, challenged the view that the military is in decline. They argued instead that it is undergoing a process of change, which reflects developments in the social, technological and international security contexts, which require the military to be more responsive to certain public pressures concerning civil values and place new demands on the armed forces in terms of skills, particularly for peacekeeping activities.

Caroline Kennedy-Pipe of Sheffield University echoed these views in an article, which appeared in the Journal of Strategic Studies last December. Pointing to the definition of the future warrior offered by Christopher Bellamy in Knights in White Armour, she argued that technological innovations have changed the nature of contemporary warfare, making old-fashioned close combat less likely and leaving the role of the modern warrior more gender neutral than ever. As a result, few good military reasons remain for denying physically and mentally competent women positions in the armed forces. Moreover, she proposed that the debate move beyond whether women should be fully integrated in the military and instead address “how and where they can best serve in the new wars that require new warriors”.

From make-up to camouflage: debates about the feminisation of the military revolve around the suitability, fitness and appropriateness of the female for war.
Spain started recruiting women in 1988 and Portugal in 2001. Representation is about four per cent. Female pilot cadet is expected to enter the Air Force. The first Greek women served at sea in 2000 and the first closed until 1990 and access to military education remains limited. Greece admitted female non-commissioned officers some were already employing women in the medical services. Most Mediterranean countries started opening their armed forces to women in the 1980s and 1990s, though some were already employing women in the medical services. Greece admitted female non-commissioned officers to support functions in 1979. Military academies remained closed until 1990 and access to military education remains restricted. Women are still excluded from combat tasks but the first Greek women served at sea in 2000 and the first female pilot cadet is expected to enter the Air Force Academy in 2001. Representation is about four per cent. Spain started recruiting women in 1988 and Portugal in 1992 and female soldiers now make up around six per cent of total strength in both countries. Most functions including combat positions are now open to women in the Spanish Armed Forces, though restrictions remain in some specialities, and over half of Spanish servicewomen are employed in administrative posts. Portuguese servicewomen can in theory apply for all posts, though in practice the marines and combat specialities remain closed.

In Turkey, women were accepted into military academies in the late 1950s, but a drastic change in policy in 1960 meant that they were not admitted into military education again until 1982 and no female cadets were allowed in military schools until ten years later. Turkish servicewomen, who make up only 0.1 per cent of total strength, can only serve as officers and are restricted from serving in armour and infantry branches as well as submarines.

In the new NATO member countries, preparations for EU accession helped spur the introduction of equal opportunities in the military in the 1990s, which also saw the opening up of military education to women in all three countries. Today, servicewomen represent 3.7 per cent of the total force in the Czech Republic and over nine per cent in Hungary, but they tend to remain in traditional roles and few have risen to higher ranks. In the Polish Armed Forces, representation is low at 0.1 per cent and is likely to remain so due to current restructuring. Practically all women serve in medical posts.

Germany’s Bundeswehr restricted the employment of women to military bands and the medical services until recently. As a result, female representation remains low at 2.8 per cent. But thanks to the lonely struggle of a woman wanting to serve in a maintenance-support team and a ruling of the European Court of Justice in January 2000, all posts are now open to female soldiers. A year later, the first women were recruited into the lower ranks and as non-commissioned officers, to be followed by the first officers in July 2001. To date, the integration of women has proceeded smoothly and women in all career groups are already serving in the NATO-led operations in the Balkans.

Italy was the last NATO member to exclude women from the military. But in September 1999, the Italian parliament passed a bill allowing women to serve in the armed forces following years of campaigning by La Associazone Nazionale Aspiranti Donne Soldato (the association of aspiring women soldiers), which won wide popular support and the backing of Admiral Guido Venturoni, chairman of NATO’s Military Committee. To celebrate this landmark decision and the first intake of female recruits in 2000, the annual meeting of the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces in June 2001 was, at Italy’s request, exceptionally held in Rome, instead of a city in the Netherlands, the country holding the chair at the time. Italy is adopting a gradual approach, focusing initially on integrating women into general support rather than operational positions and
Forty years ago, in June 1961, delegates from Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States gathered in Copenhagen, Denmark, for the first NATO Conference of Senior Service Women Officers, which was organised by the Danish Atlantic Association. They expressed the desire to meet regularly and the hope that the appropriate NATO and national authorities would consider employing women more widely in the armed services.

But it was not until 1976, 15 years later, that a Committee on Women in the NATO Forces, was formally recognised by NATO’s Military Committee. The number of NATO countries sending delegates or observers to Committee meetings rose gradually over the years. There are now 18 delegates from all NATO countries except Iceland, which has no armed forces. Canada holds the chair for the next two years.

An Office for Women in the NATO Forces was given permanent status on the International Military Staff at NATO headquarters at the end of 2000. It supports the work of the Committee and its three sub-committees in the areas of training and development, recruitment and employment, and quality of life. The Office also seeks to act as a repository for information and research on such issues and to promote awareness of the effective employment of women in the military among NATO and Partner countries.

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More information on women in NATO forces can be found at www.nato.int/docu/facts/cwinf.htm.
Women in NATO forces and peacekeeping operations

### Selected current United Nations peacekeeping operations

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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO United Nations Truce Supervision (Middle East)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>4,922</td>
<td>3,118</td>
<td>147</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINURSO United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMIG United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>12,439</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC United Nations Organisation Mission in DRDC</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
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### Selected current non-United Nations peacekeeping operations

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MFO Multinational Force and Observers (Egypt)</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1,844</td>
<td>1,385</td>
<td>51</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFOR NATO-led Stabilisation Force (Bosnia)</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>22,800</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>2,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belisi Peace Monitoring Group in Bougainville</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR NATO-led Kosovo Force</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
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### Selected past United Nations peacekeeping operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Dates of operation</th>
<th>Personnel strength</th>
<th>Cost US$m</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNIF I First United Nations Emergency Force</td>
<td>1956-67</td>
<td>6,073</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOGIL United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUC United Nations Operation in the Congo</td>
<td>1960-64</td>
<td>19,828</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNUOM United Nations Yemen Observer Mission</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIIF II Second United Nations Emergency Force</td>
<td>1973-79</td>
<td>6,973</td>
<td>446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIMOG United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group</td>
<td>1989-91</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAG United Nations Transition Assistance Group</td>
<td>1989-90</td>
<td>5,993</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUGA United Nations Observer Group in Central Africa</td>
<td>1989-92</td>
<td>1,098</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
<td>1992-93</td>
<td>19,159</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ United Nations Operations in Mozambique</td>
<td>1992-94</td>
<td>8,125</td>
<td>471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force</td>
<td>1992-95</td>
<td>30,869</td>
<td>4,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIR United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
<td>1993-96</td>
<td>5,344</td>
<td>559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIH United Nations Mission in Haiti</td>
<td>1993-96</td>
<td>1,549</td>
<td>516</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPREDPEF United Nations Preventive Deployment Force</td>
<td>1995-99</td>
<td>1,110</td>
<td>176</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAES United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia</td>
<td>1998-98</td>
<td>5,244</td>
<td>594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUGUA United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala</td>
<td>1999-00</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMA United Nations Observer Mission in Angola</td>
<td>1997-99</td>
<td>1,156</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURCA United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic</td>
<td>1998-00</td>
<td>1,252</td>
<td>86</td>
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### Selected past non-United Nations peacekeeping operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Dates of operation</th>
<th>Personnel strength</th>
<th>Cost US$m</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG ECONAS Military Observer Group (Liberia)</td>
<td>1990-98</td>
<td>12,400</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAF United Task Force in Somalia</td>
<td>1992-93</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOR NATO-led Implementation Force (Bosnia)</td>
<td>1995-96</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALBA Multinational Protection Force (Albania)</td>
<td>1997-98</td>
<td>6,294</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISAB Mission Interarménale de Surveillance des Accords de Bangui</td>
<td>1997-98</td>
<td>1,576</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFOR NATO Albania Force</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERFET International Force in East Timor</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>11,310</td>
<td>421</td>
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CD-Rom charting the evolution of the Alliance and describing the adaptation it has undergone to address the security challenges of the 21st century

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Information sheet describing practical cooperation on the ground between NATO and Russian peacekeepers in the Balkans

KOSOVO - ONE YEAR ON - Achievement and Challenge
Report by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson

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Compilation of all official texts and declarations issued at NATO's summit in Washington in April 1999, including background information on Alliance programmes and activities

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