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Every mention in this publication of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is marked by an asterisk (*) referring to the following footnote: Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
Judging by readers’ letters, the new-look NATO Review seems to have struck a chord. This issue contains several more innovations, including an interview feature and a statistics page. Otherwise, the central theme is the transatlantic security relationship, the basis of the Atlantic Alliance, in the wake of the change of administration in the United States. Simon Serfaty, director of Washington DC’s Center for Strategic and International Studies, places the transatlantic relationship in its historical context. Ambassador James Dobbins, assistant secretary of state for European affairs, tells in an interview how, despite the changeover, he expects continuity in this key relationship. And Christoph Bertram, director of the Berlin-based Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, assesses European concerns and expectations. In the debate, François Heisbourg, director of Geneva’s Centre for Security Policy, and Rob de Wijk, professor of international relations at the Netherlands’ Royal Military Academy, explore the changing nature of the transatlantic security relationship. Features include articles on NATO’s Partnership for Peace Internship Programme and civil-military cooperation in Kosovo. In the interview, Ambassador Andras Simonyi, Hungary’s first permanent representative to NATO, talks of the impact of NATO membership on his country. In the book review, Michael Rühle, the head of speech-writing and policy planning in NATO’s political affairs division, considers some of the recent literature on NATO. Elsewhere, Andrei Zagorski of the EastWest Institute analyses recent developments in NATO-Russia relations. And Elinor Sloan of the Directorate of Strategic Analysis at Canada’s National Defence Headquarters examines NATO force mobility and deployability. Statistics illustrating NATO’s defence expenditure round out the issue.

Christopher Bennett

The NATO 2000 CD-ROM helps users familiarise themselves with the role and workings of NATO. It charts the evolution of the Alliance and describes the adaptation it has undergone to address the security challenges of the 21st century. Free copies are available on request from the Distribution Unit, Office of Information and Press, NATO, 1110-Brussels, Belgium.
NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson visited Skopje, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, on 26 March and met with President Boris Trajkovski and leaders of the country’s political parties. Lord Robertson reaffirmed support for the government in its struggle with ethnic Albanian rebels, but also urged restraint and appealed to the insurgents to lay down their arms.

Lord Robertson set out NATO’s priorities in southeastern Europe in the keynote speech of a conference examining security challenges in southeastern Europe and regional perspectives in Rome, Italy, on 26 March.

Lord Robertson unveiled a package of measures on 21 March designed to enhance stability in the southern Balkans and demonstrate support for the multi-ethnic government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.*

President of the International Committee of the Red Cross Jakob Kellenberger met with Lord Robertson at NATO on 21 March and addressed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

Bosnia briefing

High Representative Wolfgang Petrisch met Lord Robertson at NATO on 19 March and briefed a meeting of SFOR troop-contributing nations on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia).

On 14 March, Yugoslav troops entered the Ground Safety Zone, a five-kilometre strip of southern Serbia bordering Kosovo, for the first time since the Yugoslav Army’s withdrawal from Kosovo in June 1999.

Lord Robertson visited Athens, Greece, on 16 March, meeting President Constantinos Stephanopoulos and Prime Minister Costas Simitis, as well as the Greek foreign and defence ministers.

Submarine rescue and medical experts from 13 NATO countries participated in Phoenix 2001, an exercise to rehearse procedures for dealing with submarines in distress, held at the NATO headquarters at Northwood, England, from 13 to 15 March.

NATO mediators brokered a ceasefire between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and ethnic Albanians in southern Serbia on 12 March.

US trip

Lord Robertson visited the United States from 6 to 10 March. He met UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and attended an informal meeting of the UN Security Council before meeting US President George W. Bush and top officials in the new administration, as well as several senators and congressmen. He also addressed a symposium organised by the American Enterprise Institute on Capitol Hill.

On 8 March, Lord Robertson announced measures to restore stability in southern Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* and prevent ethnic Albanian extremists abusing the Ground Safety Zone.

NATO and Russian parliamentarians met at NATO on 5 and 6 March to discuss political, military, scientific and environmental cooperation and the need to reinforce dialogue.

Bulgarian President Petar Stoyanov discussed concerns over increasing violence in the neighbouring former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* with NATO Ambassadors on 5 March at NATO.

Exercise Cooperative Osprey 2001 took place at Canada’s Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Halifax, Nova Scotia, involving six NATO and 13 Partner countries from 1 to 9 March.

Newly appointed UN Special Representative Hans Haekkerup, the former Danish defence minister, visited NATO on 28 February to brief NATO Ambassadors on the situation in and around Kosovo.

Powell visit

US Secretary of State Colin Powell met Lord Robertson and Allied foreign ministers during a visit to NATO on 27 February. Secretary Powell stressed the new administration’s support for the development of a European Security and Defence Identity and its commitment to consult Allies on plans for a National Missile Defense.

EU, OSCE, NATO, UN and UNHCR officials met at NATO for the first time on 27 February to discuss how to address the problems of increasing violence along Kosovo’s boundaries.

Lord Robertson met President Václav Havel, Prime Minister Miloš Zeman, and the Czech foreign and defence ministers on 21 and 22 February in Prague, the Czech Republic.

New command arrangements

In line with new command arrangements unveiled last year, Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), a regional headquarters based in Naples, Italy, took over day-to-day command of the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) from Supreme Allied Headquarters Europe (SHAPE) on 20 February. The command of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) transferred to AFSOUTH on 18 January.

Moscow office

Lord Robertson inaugurated the NATO Information Office in Moscow on 20 February, a visible sign of improving relations with Russia.

NATO parliamentarians discussed NATO’s current agenda with the North Atlantic Council on 19 February.

New Hungarian ambassador

Ambassador János Herman succeeded Ambassador András Simonyi as permanent representative of Hungary to the North Atlantic Council on 19 February. A career diplomat, Ambassador Herman, 48, was formerly deputy state secretary for multilateral affairs.

More than 1,500 people from seven NATO nations trained in a disaster relief exercise, Relieve Discomfort 2001, on the Caribbean island of Curacao from 18 to 22 February.

Twelve NATO countries participated in the world’s largest annual anti-submarine warfare exercise, Dogfish 2001, which took place in the Ionian Sea east of Sicily, Italy from 15 to 28 February.
F O C U S  O N  N A T O

Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Nebojša Čović and Yugoslav Foreign Minister Goran Svilanović met Lord Robertson and NATO Ambassadors on 15 February at NATO to discuss proposals to resolve tensions in southern Serbia.

NATO’s annual crisis management exercise, CMX 2001, took place from 15 to 19 February at NATO, involving Partner countries for the first time.

Implementation of the treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was discussed by its 30 signatory countries at the NATO Verification Coordinating Committee’s annual seminar from 14 to 16 February at NATO.

Newly appointed UN High Commissioner for Refugees Ruud Lubbers met Lord Robertson at NATO on 6 February.

The first meeting of the EU Political and Security Committee and the North Atlantic Council under new permanent EU-NATO consultation arrangements took place on 5 February in Brussels, Belgium.

Lord Robertson outlined key items on NATO’s agenda at the annual International Security Policy Conference held in Munich, Germany, from 2 to 3 February, where he also met new US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.

Lord Robertson met Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg and Norwegian foreign and defence ministers on 1 and 2 February in Oslo, Norway.

On 2 February, NATO’s highest military authority, the Military Committee, visited Northwood, England, the headquarters of both the regional Allied East Atlantic command (EASTLANT) and the Allied Naval Forces North (NAVNORTH).

Lithuanian Prime Minister Rolandas Paksas met Lord Robertson at NATO on 31 January to discuss relations with Russia, peacekeeping in the Balkans and Lithuania’s preparations for NATO membership.

Kouchner Farewell

Marking the end of 18 months in office, former UN Special Representative to Kosovo Bernard Kouchner addressed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and representatives of other KFOR contributing countries on 30 January at NATO.

Lord Robertson met German Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping on 25 January in Berlin, Germany, where he also delivered this year’s Manfred Wörner Memorial Lecture.

Romanian Prime Minister Adrian Nastase met Lord Robertson at NATO on 24 January to discuss Romania’s preparations for NATO membership and its contribution to KFOR and SFOR.

Mongolian Prime Minister Nambaryn Enkhbayar met Lord Robertson at NATO on 22 January.

Depleted uranium

Set up in the wake of public concern about possible environmental health risks associated with the use of depleted uranium, the Committee on Depleted Uranium, made up of NATO officials and representatives of past and present SFOR and KFOR contributing nations, met for the first time on 16 January to discuss medical and scientific evidence. NATO’s senior medical advisory body, the Committee of the Chiefs of Military Medical Services met the day before to exchange information on the issue.

Lord Robertson visited Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan between 15 and 18 January, meeting heads of state and foreign and defence ministers.

On 11 January, Lord Robertson visited Sweden, which currently holds the EU presidency, for talks with Foreign Minister Anna Lindh and Defence Minister Björn von Sydow about establishing robust EU-NATO links in crisis management.

First Yugoslav visit

The first Yugoslav minister to visit NATO since the ouster of former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, Foreign Minister Goran Svilanovic, met Lord Robertson and NATO Ambassadors on 10 January.

New UK ambassador

Ambassador David Manning succeeded Ambassador Sir John Goulden as permanent representative of the United Kingdom to the North Atlantic Council on 8 January. A career diplomat, Ambassador Manning, 51, was formerly deputy under-secretary of state at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office between 1998 and 2000. Before that, he was UK ambassador to Israel (1995-1998).

On the fifth anniversary of NATO’s deployment in Bosnia, Lord Robertson visited SFOR troops and met Bosnian, Croat and Serb political leaders in Sarajevo, Bosnia, on 20 December.

Allied foreign ministers met in Brussels, Belgium, on 14 and 15 December and tentatively agreed an approach to permanent arrangements between the Alliance and the European Union but noted that practical arrangements still needed to be worked out. Ministers also held meetings with their counterparts from Russia and Ukraine, and other Partner countries.

Trajkovski visit

Boris Trajkovski, President of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, met Lord Robertson on 7 December at NATO to discuss security in southeastern Europe, relations with KFOR and preparations for possible future NATO membership.

New confidence-building measures between Greece and Turkey, were announced on 6 December, whereby each country will give the other advance notification of military exercises.

Allied defence ministers met in Brussels, Belgium, on 5 and 6 December and discussed, in particular, the Defence Capabilities Initiative and EU-NATO relations. Ministers also adopted a five-year force plan, reviewed the Allies’ national defence plans for the period 2001-2005 and approved new ministerial guidance for NATO and national defence planning up to 2008. Ministers also met with their counterparts from Russia and Ukraine, and other Partner countries. UN Special Envoy Carl Bildt briefed ministers in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council on recent developments in the Balkans and the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General Joseph Ralston, gave an update on the KFOR and SFOR operations.

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For more information see NATO Update at www.nato.int/docu/update/index.htm.
When future historians look back to the year 2001, they will likely be in awe of what was achieved in the second half of the previous century. What was a daring vision—and even, many warned, a dangerous illusion—gradually became an irreversible reality. History changed its ways, and geography moved, as the states of Europe developed an integrated personality à l’américaine while the United States was adopting a security identity à l’européenne.

The institutions formed in the wake of the Second World War, which were, in part, inspired by the “Europe first” policy of the administration of President Harry S. Truman, have contributed to the evolution of a responsible Euro-Atlantic community of interests and values, without which neither the United States nor Europe could live as well, as freely, and as safely as they do today. Moreover, even after the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union remain the institutional pillars of this community.

Despite the many accomplishments inspired by the transatlantic link, Americans and Europeans remain deeply sceptical about each other. Indeed, reported US ambivalence over Europe’s evolution towards a union of states and Europe’s alleged ambiguities over US leadership within NATO continue to generate concern about a rift in transatlantic relations. Predictably, apprehension among Europe’s nation-states is largely to do with the consequences of their transformation. In the United States, however, the apprehension has to do with the feared emergence of Europe as a counterweight that could act independently of, or even against, the United States. However exaggerated such apprehension may be, it cannot be ignored. Four times in
the 20th century – in 1917, 1941, 1949 and 1989 – US power and leadership helped save Europeans from themselves to the benefit of all, including the United States. Nevertheless, too many in Europe remain willing to question US leadership as intrusive, deceptive, ineffective and even dangerous.

European anxieties were especially evident during the most recent presidential elections in the United States. Then, the language used in some European media to present the two main contenders, and especially the Republican candidate, bordered on the offensive. Much concern seemed to reflect a simplistic belief that changes in political majorities or presidential leadership would inevitably result in shifts in the country’s foreign and security policies. However, experience of the past 50 years suggests that policy changes during the life of an administration are often more profound than those from one to the next, as external events have frequently caused presidents to change directions. In this way, Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy effectively turned 180 degrees in January 1980, a year before his successor’s inauguration, in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution. Meanwhile, Ronald Reagan changed course as the “evil empire” he had battled earlier unravelled. And his successor’s defining interest for world leadership was relinquished in autumn 1991 when George Bush assumed that his re-election required a new presidential image. That image, however, suited Bill Clinton better until 1994 when, in the wake of the congressional elections of that year, he re-invented himself as a world leader and embarked upon many of the policies, whose consequences have now been inherited by his successor.

To think that in 2001 a new American president might, by design or inexperience, turn away from Europe is to presume a luxury of choice that ceases to exist once a political campaign is over. The US presence in Europe has become so complete as to end any prospect of disengagement. In short, the partition line carefully built across the Atlantic in the 19th century has been swept away by the repeated European storms of the 20th century. Although the United States is not a European power, either by vocation or by choice, it is a power in Europe, by position as well as by interests.

Early in the 21st century, both NATO and the European Union face a full and complex agenda. While the tasks and priorities differ from one institution to the other, the general principle remains the same: widen in order to deepen, deepen in order to widen, and reform in order to do both. Neither institution, however, can expect to address its agenda independently of the other. Each institutional agenda is separable from the other, but neither can be separated from the broader transatlantic agenda to which it belongs.

High on the transatlantic agenda are prospects of a National Missile Defense (NMD) and a European and Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which each side of the Atlantic is prone to present as a test of post-Cold War cohesion. The test, however, is hardly convincing as both NMD and ESDP continue to raise too many legitimate questions with too little evidence to offer enough credible answers. Can it work? Assuming it does work, is it affordable? Assuming it is affordable, is it cost-effective? Assuming it is cost-effective, is it necessary? Assuming it is necessary, will its impact exceed whatever gains it permits? And so it goes for both NMD and ESDP – a parallel debate over intentions that are so misrepresented on and about each side of the Atlantic as to risk consequences that neither side wants or can afford. Moreover, for the next several years such a debate will be premature, as Europe is no more likely to rely on its virtual ESDP to fight without the United States than the United States is likely to distance itself from Europe behind its virtual NMD. Instead, both ESDP and NMD will likely remain, above all, the source of debate among Europeans and Americans respectively, rather than between them.

In any case, ESDP is what every US administration since 1945 has expected of Europe – namely, an enhanced military capacity that would lighten the US burden by acting with or without, but not against or in spite of, the United States. Moreover, conversely, NMD is what Europe wants out of the United States – enhanced protection that would reduce the consequences of failure should a conflict, started accidentally or by design, spread to the United States, its allies and friends.

Rather than threatening to decouple the United States from Europe, launch another Cold War, accelerate a new arms race, and destabilise deterrence, as its critics have argued, NMD seeks to ensure continued US engagement, bury the Cold War, avoid military competition, and stabilise deterrence. The United States understands that today’s unipolar world is transitory, and that ascending powers and nuisance states will eventually challenge the post-Cold War order and, therefore, the interests of the United States and its allies. By choice (Alliance cohesion), necessity (radars in Greenland and England), and foresight (the rise of rogue states and other unspecified threats), the states of Europe would do well to reconsider their objections to NMD. Meanwhile, the United States would do well to expand the concept into that of a multilateral system that would cover Europe and others, instead of deploying a more limited system, in spite of allied opinion.

Improving EU-US and EU-NATO relations have been hidden features of both NATO and EU enlargement. Since the Washington and Rome Treaties were signed in 1949 and 1957 respectively, there has been an implicit assumption, in the United States as well as in Europe, that both institutions would be enlarged in a way that brought NATO members into the then European Community and EC members into NATO. The initial six EC countries
were all founding members of NATO, and four of the six countries that joined the European Community between 1973 and 1986 were already members of NATO (Denmark, Greece, Portugal and the United Kingdom), while a fifth late entrant (Spain) joined the Alliance in a matter of weeks. Indeed, by 1986, Ireland was the only EC country that was not a member of the then 16-member Atlantic Alliance, while Turkey, Norway and Iceland were the only European NATO members that were not part of the European Union of 12. Since the end of the Cold War, however, this gap has widened, with all three new EU countries in 1995 being non-NATO members (Austria, Finland, and Sweden) and all three new NATO countries in 1999 being non-EU members (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland).

Closing this membership gap between the two Western institutions would facilitate the institutional complementarity sought by both Europe and the United States. It could also serve as an implicit guideline for future enlargement – creating what the late Italian prime minister, Aldo Moro, would have called parallele convergente, with the point of convergence reached when all EU countries are also NATO members, and all European NATO countries are also EU members. By spring 2002, some applicant countries should have made enough progress to permit NATO and the European Union, meeting in separate or joint summits, to enforce their respective commitments to enlargement.

EU-NATO complementarity is not only a matter of membership. It is also a policy question. Since neither institution addresses all issues, both can attend to separate, though not separable, functions. In this way, NATO can protect its members from external aggression, while the European Union can attend to the soft-security issues that might otherwise disrupt the peace. In several primary areas of instability and even conflict – including southeastern Europe and the Aegean – better coordination between these two institutions and their members would be desirable. Arguably, some of the horror that plagued the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s could have been avoided had not only NATO but also the European Union been involved earlier, and hopes to escape further terror hinge decisively on a European involvement in a way that the United States has occasionally failed to recognise.

There is more to the transatlantic agenda, to be sure. Russia is a case in point – too close to ignore, too big to integrate, and too nuclear to offend. Russia can still be expected to try to exploit any opportunity to build a wedge between Europe and the United States – whether over NMD, NATO enlargement, ESDP or EU enlargement. Here, it is critical to convince Moscow that the expansion of the Euro-Atlantic neighbourhood also helps widen the area of NATO security and EU affluence to non-NATO and non-EU countries, including, above all, Russia. Outside Russia, Europe’s institutional orphans, countries outside both the European Union and NATO, which may have to learn to live on their own for a longer period of time should not be abandoned either. Enhanced cooperation is imperative, not only with members of a reinforced NATO Partnership for Peace, but also with bold and generous EU associate status.

The Greater Middle East, extending from North Africa through the Middle East and into the Gulf, is another area which would benefit from a coordinated transatlantic approach. Here, even though interests are not always common, whether within Europe or between Europe and the United States, goals are usually similar and policies, even when not common, can be compatible. Moreover, even though capabilities are uneven, they are sufficiently complementary for compatible policies to achieve common goals more effectively when the United States and the states of Europe act jointly, rather than separately.

Asia, too, is an area about which Americans and Europeans must learn to think in unison, if they are to act jointly or in a complementary fashion. This is especially the case with respect to China, a country which must feature in any discussion about NMD and the future of nuclear deterrence. But working in unison outside the Euro-Atlantic area requires enhanced mechanisms for transatlantic policy coordination and consultation.

This cooperative transatlantic agenda and the responsive dialogue it requires are not about new visions. Rather, the vision is the same as that which inspired those European and US statesmen who created NATO and the European Union and whose ideas served as a beacon to light up the post-war darkness. On both sides of the Atlantic, post-war leaders shared a comparable vision of a failed past and, accordingly, pursued similar ambitions to escape their respective histories and start anew. Under another set of post-war conditions, the beacon held by President Truman and others still illuminates the path forward, as President Bush and other political leaders complete their predecessors’ vision of a whole and free Europe moving as a counterpart of the United States within a strong and cohesive Euro-Atlantic community.
Steady as she goes

James Dobbins, US assistant secretary for European affairs, tells Review editor Christopher Bennett that he sees continuity in transatlantic relations.

CHRISTOPHER BENNETT: Every time there is a change in US administration, analysts on both sides of the Atlantic debate its significance for the transatlantic relationship. How much continuity and how much change should US Allies expect in coming years?

JD: Every time the administration changes in Washington there is indeed debate about the exact balance of continuity and change. As far as the Atlantic Alliance is concerned, the new administration is going to be unequivocally and strongly supportive. That is evident in everything that President George W. Bush, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and others have said on the subject. In terms of the Balkans, there will be a continued effort to review the scale of forces necessary to carry out NATO’s tasks. However, the review will take place within a NATO context. It is important to review commitments periodically and ensure that they are in line with developing circumstances. The commitment to work together in the Balkans is evident. Secretary of State Powell made that clear when he visited NATO in February and President Bush has similarly made it clear in the meetings he has had in Washington with NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and other NATO leaders.

JD: The administration recognises that the task that we have taken on jointly in the Balkans is a task to which both Europe and the United States are and should remain committed. I can’t rule out longer-term policy planning discussions of the type that you have suggested, although I haven’t seen any proposals to that effect as yet.

CB: As a result of comments made during the US electoral campaign, media have speculated that the new US administration is keen to explore the possibilities of a “new division of labour” with its Allies. In such a scenario, Europeans would likely concentrate on stabilising Europe and its periphery, leaving the United States to focus its energies on more strategic threats. How prevalent is such thinking in the new US administration and what considerations are likely to govern relations with Allies?

JD: The administration recognises that the peace processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) and Kosovo have seen a number of breakthroughs and conditions on the ground are improving. It is increasingly clear, however, that the international community will have to invest many years, massive resources and considerable political capital if it is to rebuild functioning societies in the Balkans. Given your experience of the region, what opportunities do you see for creating a self-sustaining peace? And how will the new US administration seek to re-energise the process?

JD: The most important developments of the past year and the most hopeful developments are the changes that have taken place in Zagreb and Belgrade. In the 1990s, much of the tension in the region, particularly as regards Bosnia, came from the centrifugal pressure that these two capitals put on Bosnian society, effectively tearing it apart. We now have an opportunity to see both Yugoslavia and Croatia playing a constructive role in helping to sustain and build a viable Bosnian state on a multi-ethnic basis in line with the Dayton Accords. The kind of cooperation which Zagreb has explicitly committed itself to and which we can look to and demand from Belgrade is the best hope for stability in Bosnia and the region as a whole. Clearly, southern Serbia remains volatile, but NATO is working effectively and interacting constructively with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,* with Serbia, and with moderate Albanian leaders in Kosovo to defuse the situation. Otherwise, the basic elements for building stability in the region are already in place. These are the Stability Pact, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 concerning Kosovo, which lays out a path towards substantial autonomy but postpones a decision on the province’s final status, and the Dayton Accords, their gradual implementation and the building of multi-ethnic structures in Bosnia that do not rely on the nationalist parties that were in power during the war. It’s less a question of new initiatives, than of continued commitment in all of these areas. The administration has indicated that it intends to continue to work on the Stability Pact, on the NATO-led peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo, and on the issue of NATO enlargement, which over the longer term offers a way of stabilising and integrating the Balkans as well as northeastern Europe. Here, Europe has an even more daunting task, as it moves towards integrating these societies in the European Union. We recognise that the European contribution is, in many ways, the most important one and we appreciate the efforts that the European Union and its members are making in this regard.

* The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)
CB: Many Allies and Partners have made it clear that they have reservations about the new administration’s plans for building a National Missile Defense. How does the new administration intend to take this project forward? And how will it reassure Allies and Partners that NMD is both in their interests and will help make the world a safer place?

JD: The administration has already begun the process of consulting its Allies on issues of missile defence and how missile defence fits into a policy of deterrence, which also integrates other aspects of defence as well as arms control and non-proliferation. Secretary of State Powell got a very good response from Allies on these issues when he visited NATO in February and he committed the United States to consult early and often on these issues, indeed, to consult before we make basic decisions about the architecture of a missile defence system. We have also made it clear that we want to work with the Allies on missile defence arrangements that protect them as well as the United States. And we have also made clear that we want to consult closely with others, including the Russians and the Chinese. Indeed, Secretary of State Powell has already discussed this subject, among other issues, with the Russian foreign minister.

CB: For a variety of reasons, the United States has failed to endorse several international agreements in recent years. These include the Land Mine Treaty, the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In addition, plans for NMD risk undermining the ABM Treaty. What approach will the new administration adopt towards these treaties?

JD: The United States has global responsibilities which are in some ways unique, reflecting our defence commitments in Korea, in the Gulf, in Europe and elsewhere. In addressing some of these issues, the United States has had concerns which some of our Allies have not felt or have not felt as keenly. We will continue to consult our Allies and work with them as regards the ABM treaty, which will also, obviously, be a major element of the discussions we have with Russia. Concerning the International Criminal Court, it’s important to recognise that President Clinton’s signature of the treaty was essentially a technical step, rather than an expression of an intent to submit the treaty to ratification. The Clinton administration indicated that it had problems with the treaty and that it did not believe that it would be able to bring it into force. Clinton’s signature was not intended to reverse his administration’s position on that point. It was intended rather as a technical step to include the United States in continued consideration of some aspects of the treaty’s administration. Even before coming into office, the new administration expressed concerns about this agreement which paralleled and were, if anything, even stronger than those of the Clinton administration. I expect therefore that it will continue to express such reservations and concerns in the future.

CB: Russia is an important Partner of the Alliance, but one that has at times in recent years been disgruntled. How does the new administration intend to engage Russia? How much potential does it see in the Permanent Joint Council? And how might that institution be developed?

JD: The administration intends to have a good working relationship with Russia. Already, Secretary of State Powell has had a preliminary meeting with the Russian foreign minister and President Bush has had a conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin and the relationship will be developed through the normal pattern of bilateral and multilateral meetings over the coming months. There are a number of issues to address in the relationship, but there are a number of points where cooperation can be reasonably anticipated. We certainly support NATO’s engagement with Russia as a complement to these bilateral consultations, including the Permanent Joint Council, and look forward to developing it further during the coming months.

CB: Successive US administrations have urged their European Allies to increase defence expenditure. As the European Union builds a crisis management capability, Europeans appear finally to be taking on a greater share of the burden for their own security. Despite this, many Americans now appear suspicious of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), even fearing that it might undermine NATO. What concerns does the new US administration have about this project and what must the Europeans do to overcome them?

The administration has made clear that it supports the development of a European security and defence policy that strengthens the Alliance, that contributes to overall capabilities and avoids duplicating existing Alliance planning structures. This is how ESDP is developing and the way in which we hope and expect that it will continue to develop. There are still unresolved issues, however, which have to be worked through in the coming months in the ongoing talks between NATO and the European Union. These unresolved issues include the mechanism by which force planning is carried out in the European Union and NATO. The relationship between the force-planning processes of the two organisations is therefore under discussion, as are arrangements for operational planning and the issue of whether NATO can assure the European Union access to NATO planning in all circumstances. Further discussion is also necessary to identify process-
es by which NATO assets could be made available to the European Union. And finally, the issue of the participation of non-EU Allies in EU activities and operations still has to be resolved.

CB: The nine countries taking part in NATO’s Membership Action Plan are all hoping to be invited to join the Alliance at its summit at the end of next year. Although Washington does not make unilateral decisions on NATO enlargement, the new US administration will have a large say on who is and who isn’t invited, or whether anybody is invited to join the Alliance. What factors will be taken into consideration in making this decision and how can aspiring members maximise their chances of admission?

JD: The key to future Alliance membership is the Membership Action Plan. All aspiring members have established Membership Action Plans, are currently working on implementing them and will be judged according to them, when the time comes. Countries’ readiness and the degree of effort that they have put into preparing themselves for NATO membership are certainly major criteria for decisions on future members. Otherwise, the degree to which countries have irreversibly established democratic institutions and the prospects for democratic stability are also important considerations.

James Dobbins (left) was sworn in as US assistant secretary for European affairs in January 2001, a post he had filled on an acting basis since May 2000. A 58-year-old diplomat, he has spent more than two decades working on European affairs during a career spanning more than 30 years at the State Department.

Prior to becoming assistant secretary for European affairs, between February 1999 and May 2000, Ambassador Dobbins served as special adviser to the president and secretary of state for Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this capacity, he had lead responsibility for managing the Balkans crisis throughout NATO’s Kosovo air campaign.

Earlier in his career, Ambassador Dobbins acted as the State Department’s senior manager for peace operations in Haiti, coordinating the diplomatic and civil aspects of the 1994-96 intervention, and Somalia, overseeing the disengagement of US forces in 1993-94. Between 1996 and 1999, Ambassador Dobbins was special adviser to the president and senior director on the National Security Council Staff responsible for Latin America.

In addition to his official posts, Ambassador Dobbins has held appointments as a senior fellow with the Rand Corporation in 1993 and with the Council on Foreign Relations in 1995-96. Prior to joining the State Department, Ambassador Dobbins served three years as an officer in the US Navy, including two tours of duty in the Vietnam theatre.
Starting over again

Christoph Bertram assesses European concerns and expectations at the change of tenant in the White House.

Whenever a new face moves into the White House, European governments hold their breath. The massive turnover of key individuals that accompanies all presidential changeovers means that many in the new administration are inevitably finding their feet in the early months. Moreover, while every US presidential candidate promises to outdo the incumbent in “strengthening relations with our allies”, Europeans have learned to be cautious. They have never had reason to doubt the good will of a new president, but have sometimes felt uneasy about the qualifications of some of the new team or suspi-
cious of the seemingly irrepressible urge to reassess the previous administration’s policies and develop new visions.

This time, however, things are different. President George W. Bush has assembled a foreign policy team that is largely the same as the one which left office with his father eight years ago. That administration was highly respected for its deft handling of German reunification, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. But familiarity with this team has failed to reassure Europe’s foreign policy community. It is not the competence of the new administration that causes concern, but its new agenda. Many Europeans fear they may face awkward choices on Euro-Atlantic issues like missile defence and NATO enlargement, as well as issues further afield, where the United States is adopting a tougher stance, such as policy towards Iraq and China, on Russia and on global warming.

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Such fears are largely unjustified when it comes to the more traditional Alliance issues. They appear divisive but should turn out to be perfectly manageable. The real problems lie beyond NATO’s agenda. On such wider security issues, no coordination exists between the United States and its European Allies and there is a genuine risk that the gap in transatlantic policy perceptions, which has opened in recent years, will widen.

Looking at the traditional security agenda, US plans for a National Missile Defense (NMD), one of the new president’s priorities, have generated the most controversy to date. Yet the issue is already waning, as European governments realise that they can do little about Washington’s decision to proceed. Many Allies had opposed NMD out of concern about the Russian reaction. However, with Russian President Vladimir Putin sending out signals of a possible deal, combining drastic cuts in Russian and US offensive strategic forces with an adjustment of the ABM Treaty, Europeans are beginning to recognise that NMD may actually offer new opportunities for strategic arms reductions. They are becoming aware, as are the Russians, that the proliferation of ballistic missiles will one day be a real threat to their own security. If the introduction of NMD is reconciled with a formal regime of restraint and accompanied by significant cuts in nuclear arsenals, the grounds for opposing it disappear. Even active participation in an Alliance-wide system becomes an attractive, if distant, prospect.

We are, of course, not there yet. Real negotiations with Russia on amending the ABM Treaty need to take place and suggestions for deep cuts in nuclear warheads are no more than tentative. But now, at least, there is an objective that Europeans can share. The NMD project, which still has to prove its viability, need not necessarily divide the Alliance as long as any decision on abandoning the ABM Treaty is delayed.

Many NMD supporters in the United States wonder why their European Allies attach such importance to a treaty, which they regard as an anachronism from a time when the Soviet Union existed and limitations on missile defences seemed a key element for the transparency of nuclear deterrence between the super powers. Europeans readily concede that the world has changed, but feel that the rules of nuclear competition are no less important in the new security environment. Formally, the ABM Treaty may be a bilateral agreement between Russia and the United States, but it shapes the calculations of existing and future nuclear powers and offers a measure of predictability in international nuclear competition. Europeans would, therefore, not object even to major revisions of the treaty, but would be deeply troubled by its demise. The United States should take this concern seriously, and can well afford to do so. The long lead-time for any realistic NMD system means that there is no hurry to quit the treaty. Since the Russian government appears inclined to consider some revision, European wishes could well be satisfied without hobbling US plans.

NATO’s second round of enlargement is another potential cause for transatlantic strain. A decision on which, if any, candidate countries to invite to join the Alliance is due at the next NATO Summit in Prague in 2002 and few European governments are pushing the issue. However, they realise that simply postponing the decision is not an option because of commitments made at the 1999 Washington Summit. Enlargement is on the Alliance agenda because all members have put it there, not just the United States.

While no clear line is as yet emerging, the contours of the debate are becoming clearer. But Allied leaders cannot wait until Prague to make up their minds. This is because the Baltic republics will inevitably be on the agenda, whether or not they are invited to join the Alliance in the next wave, as a result of Russia’s protests that their membership would pose an unacceptable affront to its own security. The decision to include or exclude them from the next membership round should, therefore, be communicated to Russia and to the Baltic republics well in advance of the Prague Summit and not sprung on them at the last minute. If the Baltic republics are admitted, Russia needs to be reassured about the absence of any hostile intent. If the Baltic republics are put on hold, they will need clear reassurances that this will not weaken their existing, more indirect security ties with the West. There is therefore not that much time to prepare the consensus needed within the Alliance, generate the necessary US domestic support, particularly in the Senate, and develop a common strategy to implement the decision.

Another potential candidate for transatlantic misgivings is the European Union’s intention to establish a rapid reaction force by 2003. Already circumspect under the Clinton administration, US support is likely to remain somewhat less than enthusiastic under the new leadership. The United States continues to see NATO as the central instrument of its European policy and does not want to see the organisation weakened by any separate European defence project. Nevertheless, within weeks of coming to power the new administration was picking up roughly where the previous one left off: no overwhelming welcome for the European initiative but no obstruction either. The only caveat is that whatever new European coordination structures are created should remain anchored to NATO.

The reasons for the Bush administration’s relatively relaxed attitude are those that guided its predecessor. If the European Allies strengthen their military effort, even under a European flag, this will serve the Alliance as a whole. Moreover, since the Europeans will continue to depend on US assets for any serious operation for the foreseeable future, the United States will retain a powerful veto. The advantages clearly outweigh the risks. President Bush’s declared position is now to give European governments the chance to live up to their word.
Ironically, the real risk to transatlantic relations may be the failure of the Europeans to meet their self-imposed target, rather than their success. The project will be judged not on the institutions it builds, but on the additional military punch it delivers. While new EU bodies dealing with security matters have been set up remarkably rapidly, the goal of a credible autonomous military capability remains elusive.

No one expects miracles by 2003. But to be credible, the European venture requires at least a measurable increase, matched by necessary funds, in force intervention capabilities. In their commitments to the future rapid reaction force, EU countries have largely drawn on the existing pool of forces. They have yet to increase the number of operational soldiers and devote real money to improving military mobility. Unless they do so in the next two years, their credibility in the United States and in Europe will surely suffer severely. The failure to meet targets, after all the promises made in NATO and EU communiqués, could lead to major transatlantic misgivings as well as to recriminations among European countries. The United States can afford to adopt a wait-and-see attitude. The Europeans cannot.

If the Europeans do produce something tangible by 2003, their success will add to the military options of the West in general. European governments may then feel encouraged to go further in pooling their military resources and policies and US apprehension about a NATO that is less US-centric may then gain some ground. But the challenge of adapting the Alliance to changing times and circumstances has to be met in any case. Indeed, a greater European contribution to crisis management on the continent would only help meet it more effectively. But these are matters that need not be addressed in President Bush’s first term.

While NATO’s current structures will thus prove, once again, capable of addressing and defusing any of the potentially divisive Euro-Atlantic issues on the horizon, the same is not true for security items outside NATO’s geographic remit. Two examples, those of Iraq and China, may illustrate the general problem.

On Iraq, frustration is common. Neither sanctions nor no-fly zones have succeeded in forcing Baghdad to drop its rearmament plans or to readmit UN inspectors. Meanwhile, support for Iraqi President Saddam Hussein is rising in the Arab world in the wake of the breakdown of the Middle East peace process, weakening the West’s influence in this petroleum-producing region. Neither the United States nor the European Allies have an answer to the problem. However, their instincts point in very different directions. Europeans prefer a “political solution” without being able to formulate it. The new US administration is leaning towards tougher military action. It is difficult to see how this gap could be bridged.

While welcome, efforts to devise “smart sanctions”, which would target the regime rather than the Iraqi people, are unlikely to produce tangible results quickly. Other avenues will, therefore, have to be pursued. Here, the underlying European and US preferences are likely to cause friction, with the United States potentially blaming the failure of military action on the lack of European support, and the Europeans responding by blaming US unilateralism for frustrating their political approach.

China is another case in point. Here, the differences between the two sides of the Atlantic are less pronounced, largely because Europeans do not have much of a China policy; unless the pursuit of commercial interests and a general wish not to isolate China qualifies as one. The United States, on the other hand, is one of the pillars of stability in Asia and its relationship with China affects the region as a whole. The apparent toughening of the US approach to China under the Bush administration could have wide repercussions. Europe might see it as another example of US unilateralism, doubly resented because it highlights the absence of any real European strategy.

Areas of potential transatlantic discord in traditional Alliance issues, such as missile defence, enlargement and European defence integration, appear to be on the road to resolution. Together with its European Allies, the Bush administration will handle them no less effectively than previous administrations. However, Iraq and China underline the fact that security for the West has become a much wider brief than that addressed in existing Alliance structures, as well as the desirability of closer policy and crisis coordination between the United States and its European Allies beyond NATO’s geographic remit. Here, the United States has little practice of consulting Europe on its policies, and perhaps little inclination. But an increasingly confident European Union, which through its own enlargement process is being drawn closer to crisis regions further afield, will gradually develop a sense of its own responsibility for international order. And achieving such order will largely depend on the two major Western power units working together.

The Clinton administration seemed instinctively willing to begin thinking of evolving the relationship with Europe along those lines, even though it is far from clear how such cooperation could be organised. The Bush administration and its supporters in Congress have not revealed a similar disposition and seem both unprepared and unwilling to develop one. It is on these wider, global issues then, rather than the familiar Alliance themes, that the European-US relationship will face its greatest challenge.
Debate

Is the fundamental nature of the transatlantic security relationship changing?

Yes: François Heisbourg is director of Geneva’s Centre for Security Policy.

No: Rob de Wijk is professor of international relations at Leiden University, the Royal Military Academy and the Clingendael Institute.

Dear Rob

Given NATO’s success in proving its relevance and its worth vis-à-vis the challenges of the post-Cold War era in Europe, it may be tempting to draw the inference that the Atlantic Alliance need only adapt at the margin in the coming years. After all, it has successfully passed the test of war and peace in the Balkans. Were it so simple! NATO will have to undergo a major transformation, if it is to continue to ensure the strategic partnership between its North American and European members. The first and most obvious reason for advancing such a view, is the sudden and substantial emergence of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the framework of the European Union. From the standpoint of NATO, this is a revolutionary development. It is true that ESDP emerged not least because the United Kingdom decided in 1998 that this would be a good idea and London isn’t in the business of undermining NATO. Yet, ESDP is an agent of radical change if the European Union’s institutional and material targets are met, because it implies that the Atlantic Alliance will become a two-pillar organisation, with a collective EU political and military persona. Such a vision should not, in itself, pose a metaphysical problem for NATO in general and the United States in particular. After all, this would be the belated realisation of President John F. Kennedy’s vision of a two-pillar NATO formulated in 1962. The fact remains, however, that this will be a traumatic development, since NATO has never functioned on this basis.

The other source of potential upheaval flows from US choices. The National Missile Defense (NMD) comes most readily to mind. But this is not, in my view, the principal source of the United States’ challenge to the “old” NATO, even if it is the most visible and politically charged. NATO will be challenged more broadly by major and inevitable changes in US force structure and doctrine flowing from budgetary and strategic considerations. European governments, which are constantly reminded of the deficiencies in their defence spending by their US friends or by European analysts, such as you and I, will now have to come to terms with the consequences of US budget constraints. Not only has US defence spending dropped below 3 per cent of GDP in the current fiscal year, for the first time since the creation of NATO, but, more importantly in the coming decade, the US military will be faced with the block obsolescence of major weapon systems acquired during the Reagan era. The replacement of such systems on the basis of a steady-state US force structure and doctrine would imply an annual increase of defence spending by some $50 bil-
ESDP is an agent of radical change because it implies that the Atlantic Alliance will become a two-pillar organisation.

Francois Heisbourg

ESDP is an agent of radical change because it implies that the Atlantic Alliance will become a two-pillar organisation. This is unlikely to happen, particularly in the context of massive tax reductions. Force structure and doctrine will have to change. The fact that Andy Marshall, whose name is linked to the Revolution in Military Affairs, has been entrusted with a policy review, is a portent of deep changes.

At the strategic level, the forces of change are no less radical. The most serious risks of really major military confrontations involving US interests and partners are essentially in Asia, from the Middle East and the Gulf to Taiwan and Korea. Now that former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic has fallen from power in Serbia, the United States may find it reasonable to do away with the approximate parity which exists there. Milosevic's fall has paved the way for the execution of peace-support missions outside the NATO area. Moreover, this new mission took on a further dimension when Partners were invited to contribute to multinational coalitions led by NATO, such as SFOR and KFOR. The Planning and Review Process seeks to harmonise the defence planning of NATO member countries and Partners with the aim of improving interoperability for combined operations.

Yours,
Francois

Dear Francois,

You have argued that NATO will have to undergo a major transformation because of the rapid progress made in ESDP and US policy choices. I agree with most of your analysis, but do not share your conclusion. The “old” NATO you referred to no longer exists for the following reasons.

First, NATO has already undergone an impressive transformation. Since the Cold War, NATO has transformed itself from an alliance for collective defence and transatlantic consultation into an organisation with more emphasis on defence cooperation and cooperative security. In this way, NATO has launched new initiatives such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the predecessor of today's Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Permanent Joint NATO-Russia Council, the NATO-Ukraine dialogue and the Partnership for Peace. And the Alliance has taken in new members. In numerous communiqués, NATO leaders have argued that cooperative security requires close cooperation with Partners as a prerequisite for a peaceful, stable and undivided Europe.

Second, NATO has taken on new missions. The European revolution of 1989, the Gulf War and the wars of Yugoslav dissolution paved the way for the execution of peace-support missions and crisis-response operations outside the NATO area. Moreover, this new mission took on a further dimension when Partners were invited to contribute to multinational coalitions led by NATO, such as SFOR and KFOR. The Planning and Review Process seeks to harmonise the defence planning of NATO member countries and Partners with the aim of improving interoperability for combined operations.

Third, NATO has already embraced the idea of a European pillar. In the 1991 Alliance Strategic Concept, NATO's political strategy, it was agreed that within NATO “a European security identity” should be developed. The 1994 NATO summit endorsed concepts of “separable but not separate forces” and Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) that could be made available for European-led operations other than collective defence. In Berlin in 1996, NATO foreign ministers decided to build a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). During their 1998 St Malo meeting, French President Jacques Chirac and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair took the initiative to set up a capability for autonomous European action, which led to the European Union's Helsinki Headline Goal of creating a 60,000-strong rapid intervention force by 2003. During the 1999 Washington summit, Alliance leaders adopted the necessary arrangements to allow EU access to NATO collective assets and capabilities for crisis-response operations where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily. Moreover, it is important to remember that the United States fully supported these arrangements. In other words, NATO reached consensus on ESDI and its...
role in the development of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the ESDP.

I support your remarks on the potential upheaval stemming from US policy choices. Missile defence could create division within NATO. Moreover, the United States will undoubtedly put more emphasis on defending its interests in central Asia, especially in the oil-rich Caspian Sea basin. Indeed, the United States will have to invest in expeditionary armed forces for this purpose. But moving away from expensive mechanised units and platforms (aircraft and ships), which were highly relevant during the Cold War period, to smaller and more flexible units with substantial firepower and better mobility for power projection abroad could also save money. I expect Andy Marshall to put forward new ideas in this field. Nevertheless, I am optimistic about President Bush’s ability to convince Congress to increase the budget should Marshall come up with a new strategic vision.

The greatest source of upheaval is a different one. Until 1998, multilateralism was a dominant feature of US foreign policy. The United States took initiatives to strengthen cooperative security in Europe and to create a system of complementary and mutually reinforcing institutions. For various reasons, US foreign policy put less emphasis on the strengthening of cooperative security in 1998. Instead, more emphasis was put on the promotion of national interests. This has led to a more selective involvement in the rest of the world. Interventions in 1998 in Sudan, Afghanistan and Iraq, NMD and the Senate’s refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty underscore this change in US foreign policy. Moreover, NATO’s Kosovo air campaign made clear the extent of European dependency on the United States for large-scale military operations. In this way, the shift in US foreign policy and the technology gap have caused Europeans to fear the decoupling of US and European security and helped spur CFSP and ESDP.

In sum, the “old” NATO no longer exists, there is consensus on the way forward, including the development of a European defence identity, and the potential source of upheaval is the perception that the United States has embarked upon a policy of selective engagement that could lead to decoupling of US and Europe’s security. The real question, therefore, is how to keep the United States fully involved to ensure that NATO retains its relevance in the future.

Yours,
Rob

Dear Rob,

Your emphasis on NATO’s capability to adapt to new circumstances is one I share. However, there is a quality to these changes which is reminiscent of the sentence in Giuseppe Tomasi Di Lampedusa’s The Leopard: “Everything has to change so that nothing changes.” The challenges I am referring to will force the Alliance not simply to adapt, but to transform itself into a two-pillar organisation, in deeds and not only in words. ESDI could hardly become substantive as long as there was no European-wide policy to sustain it, and the absence of such a policy was not NATO’s fault. Now that ESDP is strategic, Washington will want to focus more on Asia – where the more serious military risks and strategic states are – and it will reduce its forward-based force structure for budget and RMA-related reasons. Missile defence will also act as an accelerator of these deep changes in the US force structure and doctrine, since defence budget increases will presumably be siphoned off into this area. Given these budgetary constraints and strategic shifts, Washington will have reason to press for more, not less, ESDP.

The primary variable in determining NATO’s ability to move from a one to a two-pillar construct is US policy. Of course, if, as you suggest, the United States was going strongly unilateral, then the prospects for a two-pillar NATO would indeed be poor. After all, Washington did not greatly enjoy the constraints imposed by the multilateral nature of NATO during the Kosovo air campaign. The “war within the war” between the NATO chain of command and that of the United States was illustrative of this. If a one-pillar NATO appears onerous to some in the United States, there would seem to be little chance of a two-pillar Alliance, with a European caucus, enjoying much support in Washington.

However, radical military change in the United States opens scope for a new modus operandi between the United States and Europe in NATO. Washington will want to focus more on Asia – where the more serious military risks and strategic states are – and it will reduce its forward-based force structure for budget and RMA-related reasons. Missile defence will also act as an accelerator of these deep changes in the US force structure and doctrine, since defence budget increases will presumably be siphoned off into this area. Given these budgetary constraints and strategic shifts, Washington will have reason to press for more, not less, ESDP.
The time has now come for the European Union to embark on a strategy review.

FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG

I may be too optimistic. Maybe the Bush administration will mark a unilateralist break with US strategic and military engagement on the international scene, and that would be truly bad news for NATO. But the composition of the new administration security and defence teams doesn’t point in that direction.

Yours,
François

Dear François,

You have correctly argued that when it comes to embracing reality rather than the idea, things are far from straightforward. I also agree that the United States is likely to put more emphasis on its security interests outside Europe. This shift would, indeed, require Washington to press for more, not less, ESDP.

I have argued that the acceleration of both CFSP and ESDP was, among other things, caused by European fears that shifts in US foreign policy and the technology gap would lead to a decoupling of European and US security. The further development of ESDP, however, no longer depends on US strategic choices. The reason is the process started in St Malo in 1998. The St Malo declaration has complemented the debate on institutional matters with decisions on capabilities. Since St Malo, several crucial steps have been taken to adapt Alliance structures to the new ESDI. During the 1999 Cologne European Council, it was decided to establish a permanent EU Political and Security Committee, an EU Military Committee and an EU military staff. The importance of these decisions can hardly be overstated.

The establishment of new permanent politico-military structures in Brussels will lead to the creation of a new bureaucracy. Indeed, the European Union’s military staff has already grown to more than 130 persons. This bureaucracy will inevitably develop policies, which, in turn, will create a momentum of their own. In other words, the establishment of new permanent EU structures, together with the catalogue of forces for EU-led operations agreed during last year’s Commitment Conference in Brussels, has created a momentum independent of US policies, with potentially far-reaching consequences for transatlantic relations.

It is because of this that the United Kingdom has become the key player. Where France always favours speeding the process towards ESDP, Prime Minister Blair is hesitant because of the potential consequences for transatlantic relations. This underscores my earlier remark that the real challenge is how to keep the United States fully involved, to ensure that NATO retains its relevance. As a first step, the EU member states should agree a strategic concept, spelling out member states’ common interests, where they may be at risk and how they can be protected. This should serve as a basis for defence and operational planning.

This brings me to the issue of leadership. Probably the greatest obstacle to developing and deploying an autonomous European capability is the absence of a clear leader. Leadership is a prerequisite both for effective defence and operational planning. So far, the major players – France, Germany and the United Kingdom – are all playing the game by different rules. From a theoretical perspective, Javier Solana, the European Union’s foreign policy High Representative, should be leading the ESDP. But as long as the European Union pursues intergovernmental security and defence policies, this is unlikely. If the Europeans mismanage this process, a two-pillar NATO could emerge, consisting of a political forum for transatlantic consultation, with the much-praised integrated military structure divided between the North Americans and the European Union. This is not the NATO I wish to see. On the one hand, I am in favour of keeping the integrated military structure, so that unnecessary duplication can be avoided. On the other hand, I believe we should make it more flexible, so that EU-led CJTFs with “separable but not separate forces” and using collective NATO assets will be possible. For this, the Americans, and of course the Turks, have to feel at ease with the speed of the process leading towards ESDP.

Yours,
Rob

Dear Rob,

Although ESDP is intergovernmental in nature, it faithfully follows the “Jean Monnet” method of European integration: first one establishes a solidarité de fait – the new defence and security institutions and the headline force – and then, but only then, does one approach the issue of what it is for, the finalité stratégique as it were. The time has now come for the European Union – perhaps under the incoming Belgian presidency – to embark on a strategy review. This is crucial not only for the sake of ESDP per se but also for the transatlantic relationship. Both the European Union and the United States will have to make up their collective minds as to whether they wish to emphasise division of labour –
“The Europeans do Europe, the United States does the world” – or to underscore the sharing of risks inside and outside the NATO area. I would clearly prefer the latter, but there is no firm consensus on such a view as yet in either the United States or in the European Union.

Then there is the existential problem of leadership in the European Union. NATO has operated on a one-pillar basis, with the United States being more than a primus inter pares. This model is obviously not appropriate to the European Union, in which no single member can consistently bear alone the burden of leadership. ESDP’s new institutions, which resemble NATO’s institutions, cannot work like NATO’s. As a result, ESDP’s capability to function effectively as a second pillar of NATO will depend on the European Union’s institutional, and possibly constitutional, review which is slated for 2004, at a time when neither France, Germany nor the United Kingdom face the pressure of imminent general elections.

In the meantime, it is reassuring to see that NATO and the European Union are actually learning to operate together in a synergistic fashion in the face of the extraordinarily complex situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.* This development gives some hope that a two-pillar model can be achieved over time.

Yours,
François

Dear François,

I was happy to read that you favour a strategic concept for the European Union. I, too, believe that we do not need a division of labour between the Europeans and the Americans. What we need is a strategic concept which takes collective interests as a starting point. The prosperity of EU member states depends on a stable and secure global environment, which may be threatened by events in Asia or Africa. As a result, the European Union has no choice but to play an active role in world affairs with the aim of defending its interests and strengthening the international rule of law. A strategic concept should therefore define the European Union’s place in the global power distribution. If the European Union muddles on without a sense of direction, its influence will likely decline and a power vacuum could emerge.

I am not in favour of a division of labour, where “Europe does Europe and the United States does the rest of the world.” We, Europeans, need power-projection capabilities to defend our interests. These capabilities should also be used to project stability, that is to carry out peace-support operations. As a first step, European members of NATO should implement NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative, preferably through joint European ventures. Only through close cooperation will we be able to generate greater output for our money.

A strategic concept would help us define the so-called “Petersberg tasks”, which are incorporated in the Treaties on European Union: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making. Within the European Union there are still divergent political views. On the one hand, EU members with strong transatlantic leanings, such as my own country, the Netherlands, traditionally favour a limited interpretation of the Petersberg tasks. To ensure US participation in more demanding crises, they wish to take on only small-scale operations at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. On the other hand, EU members with a strong European orientation, such as your country, France, favour developing military capabilities to take on these tasks throughout the entire conflict spectrum.

Things are changing, however. The Dutch government is becoming more sympathetic to the idea of strengthening European defence. In my view, people like you and me should try to convince politicians that a European Union with global interests requires a maximalist interpretation of the Petersberg tasks. We should make clear that this will not undermine, but will strengthen NATO. Therefore, we should emphasise that unnecessary duplication should be avoided. A two-pillar NATO, with two bureaucracies dealing with similar tasks and ultimately two integrated military structures, would be regrettable.

I share your view that it is reassuring to see that NATO and the European Union are learning to operate in a synergistic fashion in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.* This is a critical test case. If NATO and the European Union fail to manage it properly, the potential for escalation is enormous. If they handle the situation skillfully, it will again demonstrate that NATO and the European Union are indispensable for peace and stability in Europe and can work together effectively.

Yours,
Rob

The European Union has no choice but to play an active role in world affairs

ROB DE WIJK

Spring 2001

FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG versus ROB DE WIJK

NATO review
New faces have appeared in NATO’s Brussels headquarters in recent years as Partner nationals have seized opportunities to witness Alliance decision-making and operations for themselves. Since 1999, more than 20 young civil servants from Partner countries have benefited from a Partnership for Peace (PfP) internship programme enabling them to work at the very heart of the Alliance.

The programme, which was unveiled at a meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in November 1998, has proved increasingly popular since the first Partner interns arrived at NATO headquarters immediately after the Alliance’s 1999 Washington Summit.

Eight positions on NATO’s International Staff have been created for the programme in divisions involved in PfP-related activities, two each in Defence Planning and Operations, Defence Support, Civil Emergency Planning and Political Affairs.

Costs of the internship programme are the responsibility of Partner countries. However, in order to ensure that individuals from all Partner countries have an equal opportunity to benefit from the programme, some NATO members have sponsored selected interns. A Ukrainian intern, who is just about to join, will, for example, be supported financially by the United Kingdom.

All PfP-designated posts are open to nationals of all Partner countries, but prospective interns are expected to have a good knowledge of one of the two NATO working languages. Moreover, parent divisions have the final say in appointments, which is based on prospective interns’ qualifications and a fair geographic distribution of posts. To provide interns with the most valuable experience and ensure regular rotation of posts, internships are offered for a period from a few months up to one year.

The terms under which Partner nationals work at NATO is governed by a special policy, which seeks to marry the intern’s need for information with NATO’s security regulations. Although many provisions were drawn from existing arrangements for interns from NATO member states, Partner nationals do not have access to classified information or even parts of NATO headquarters. As a result, “non-escorted visitor” passes were issued to Partner interns to enable them to move between their offices, located outside NATO’s secure areas, and their parent division. In addition, special arrangements have been put in place to give Partner interns sufficient access to restricted information to carry out their duties.

Eric de Labarthe, PfP internship programme coordinator, explained: “Special authorisations were issued to permit interns to attend meetings relevant to their daily work. Moreover, as a result of ongoing efforts towards the harmonisation of classification between NATO and PfP documents, interns already have access to a wide range of newly declassified information.”

In addition to hands-on training, interns are given the opportunity to make a personal contribution to Alliance operations. In agreement with their parent division, Partner civil servants are able to take on individual projects, from the production of NATO publications to the preparation of in-depth analyses and case studies on PfP-related subjects.

According to Marie Holmberg, a Swedish intern who studied Partner country involvement in NATO land armaments and safety-related activities for the Defence Support division, “These individual projects demonstrate the unique possibilities offered by the PfP Internship Programme.”

Experiencing cross-cultural cooperation and acquiring an in-depth understanding of the way in which NATO operates help dispel myths about the Alliance. Ms Holmberg said that she now views the Alliance in terms of “the nineteen nations behind it” and appreciates “the value of consensus in decision-making”.

With a maximum of eight Partner interns at any time, the PfP internship programme is modest in comparison with similar programmes in the military field. Nevertheless, the initiative has proved popular both among staff at NATO headquarters and Partner participants, with the result that it may be expanded. “The idea has been warmly welcomed, although further consideration is required for such an endeavour to be implemented”, Mr De Labarthe said.
CIMIC RECONSTRUCTION

Duge is a remote village in Kosovo’s Crnoljeva mountains lying near the crossroads between the towns of Urosevac and Prizren. It has a population of about 200, is largely cut off from the rest of the province in winter and, in common with much of Kosovo, suffered large-scale destruction during fighting in 1998 and 1999. Today, life is beginning to return to normal, in large part because of the efforts of a KFOR civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) team.

War damage to the main road out of Duge meant that villagers found it extremely difficult to get in and out, had no immediate access to health care, and were unable to take their children to school. Repairing the three-kilometre stretch of road linking Duge with the outside world was critical for the revitalisation of village life and one of some 1,000 reconstruction projects identified by a CIMIC team last year.

CIMIC is the process of cooperation and coordination between a NATO commander and the civilian populations and civilian organisations within his theatre of operations. The process involves the establishment of liaison mechanisms and the coordination of the needs of the military and civilian organisations. It can also lead, under exceptional circumstances, to military involvement in tasks that would normally fall under a civilian mandate.

CIMIC’s involvement in reconstruction was key to the strategy of KFOR’s second commander, Spanish General Juan Ortuño, who aimed to “provide a long-term economic perspective to the province” and to endow it with “a mechanism to facilitate the flow of international donor funding to regional and municipal levels”. Moreover, not only has this approach been welcomed by civilian organisations, international agencies and local authorities, but it has also helped build mutual understanding between them and the military.

Following a field assessment in March 2000, which identified that the international community lacked a Kosovo-wide capacity to assess reconstruction needs, planners at Supreme Headquarters Allies Powers Europe (SHAPE) set up the Kosovo Development Group. This was detached under the authority of the European Union’s Kosovo reconstruction department. Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Spain volunteered a staff of 18 trained officers, who have worked in teams of three in the province’s five sectors as well as in Pristina. Costs have been shared among the parties involved with participating nations covering salaries, KFOR providing lodging and workspace and the European Union ensuring transport, as well as stationery and supplementary expenses.

Starting in July 2000, Kosovo Development Group teams travelled throughout the province, identifying and prioritising reconstruction projects, like that in Duge, in cooperation with local authorities and the 120 or so non-governmental organisations operating in Kosovo. These projects, which cover all aspects of reconstruction, from repairing infrastructure to regenerating the economy, have now been allocated EU funding.

The Kosovo Development Group’s original staff left the province at the end of January as their tour of duty came to an end. Their successors will be overseeing projects until July of this year, by which time EU civilian structures should be ready to take over the task.

Since NATO-led peacekeepers arrived in the Balkans in December 1995, the range of activities which the military has become involved with has steadily expanded. Although the demands on soldiers and the skills they require have increased, CIMIC experience of reconstruction has proved extremely positive, helping improve relations both with the local population and other international agencies working in the field.

Based on experience in both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, SHAPE has prepared a policy document, laying down broad guidelines for CIMIC, defining the concept and setting out operating principles. Most importantly, it establishes the checks and balances to ensure that involvement in civilian tasks occurs only when there is no alternative. This document has already been agreed by NATO member states and should soon be endorsed by the North Atlantic Council.

In an effort to improve field coordination, SHAPE has also developed working relations with the key CIMIC-oriented international organisations and NGOs, such as the European Union, the International Committee of the Red Cross and UN agencies. Moreover, another, more comprehensive CIMIC doctrine document has been drafted, setting out in detail how CIMIC should operate in theatre. This paper is currently being circulated for agreement among member states.
Andras Simonyi: Hungarian herald

As Hungary’s ambassador to NATO from 1995 and his country’s first permanent representative to the Alliance from 1999, Andras Simonyi played a key role first in steering Hungary to NATO membership and then in overseeing the transition. Ambassador Simonyi, now 49, left Brussels in January after nine years to start a new career as a consultant, working to attract international investment to central and eastern Europe.

NATO review: What impact has Hungarian membership of NATO had on Hungary and how has the Hungarian public responded?

AS: The idea of Euro-Atlantic integration has had a huge impact on my country. Hungary inherited structures from communist times and a sick economy that had to be reformed. Ultimately, the best way to reform is to aim at integration into the two main institutions that stand for modernisation, namely NATO and the European Union. Preparing for NATO membership has therefore been of enormous help for us, since it has maintained maximum pressure on Hungarian institutions, on Hungarian society and on Hungarian politicians to ensure that they execute the necessary reforms so that Hungary can catch up and join the most modern, democratic nations of the world, many of which are NATO members. Membership has not come without a price tag. It has demanded many sacrifices both in human and in monetary terms. But in the end, Hungary has gained stability and Hungary has gained a great deal of influence in forming Euro-Atlantic policies. Hungary now has a place at the North Atlantic Council where the most important decisions on European security are made.

NR: How did Hungary and the Hungarian public respond to the Kosovo air campaign?

AS: After just over a week of joyful celebrations marking Hungarian membership of the Alliance on 12 March 1999, the NATO air campaign came as a huge shock. But what is important is that Hungary stood the test. Indeed, the way in which Hungary, and for that matter the other new members, performed during the air campaign demonstrated the wisdom of NATO expansion because our presence did not make the decision-making process more difficult. Here, it’s important to pay tribute to the Hungarian public because Hungary was actually the only member state whose population could see the impact of the air campaign directly. Indeed, those living on the Hungarian-Yugoslav border could see and hear the bombings and often had relatives on the other side of the border. Despite this, support for the campaign never fell below 50 per cent. The Hungarian public had a good understanding of what NATO stands for and why we launched the campaign.
new members come in as possible, with the proviso that they understand the importance of maintaining the efficiency, cohesion and solidarity of the Alliance. Concerning Russia, the Hungarian position has always been that NATO enlargement has nothing to do with fear of Russia. Rather, NATO is enlarging because we want to extend the zone of stability and security towards the East. Indeed, we think it is in the interests of Russia that it sees more stable countries emerging on its western borders. The past couple of years have proved that the zone of stability has in effect grown and the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are much more stable, their economies are growing much faster, and even those countries that are not yet members of the Alliance but are bordering the new members have benefited from a sense of security and stability.

NR: Have any problems proved more difficult to overcome than anticipated?

AS: As NATO enlarges, it must stay strong with proper capabilities. I have never been satisfied with the pace of military reform. This is an ongoing process, which will probably never be completed, but is critical to meeting the security challenges of the modern world. I regret that we did not have the tools at our disposal during the preparatory process, which are now available for aspiring Alliance members and the deep engagement, which Partners now have with NATO. I also wish that we had benefited from the deep sharing of information, which is now routinely available to candidate countries, because that might have eased the preparatory process. But the bottom line is that we will have to continue to reform because Hungary needs smaller, more effective, more mobile and more communicative armed forces, which are better able to serve both Hungarian and NATO interests.

NR: Are there any lessons to be learned from the timing and way in which Hungary joined the Alliance?

AS: The most important lesson we learned is that military reform should be fast and effective. Doing it slowly will not ease the pain, but will exacerbate it and make it last longer. It is important to concentrate efforts on priorities, which have to be identified at an early stage and restricted to a handful, which are then executed. The most important part of military reform is downsizing, and then restructuring, and here it’s critical to concentrate on the human element. Human resource management is the key to successful military reform. All the money in the world can be poured into an outdated system and the effect will be totally invisible. The way to reform militaries is to restructure, reorganise and prepare your manpower to be receptive to the process, before putting money in. We have had to learn the hard way that military reform should not be carried out because NATO demands it, but because it’s part and parcel of the democratic reform process, in which the public scrutinises government expenditure and makes the country more efficient.

NR: How is Hungary ensuring that its armed forces are equipped to meet the challenges of the 21st century?

AS: We’re downsizing. We’re reorganising. We’re putting the pyramid back on its feet, meaning that we want to have an army of fighting men, which is not over-burdened by an excessive number of officers and generals. Our military will also need better equipment, which, whether we like it or not, we will have to procure. But reform is not only about money. Ultimately, it’s about political leadership. It takes political will, devotion, and clarity of leadership from the government to achieve successful military reform. You can put huge sums of money into military reform, but, in the absence of a good concept, political will and political leadership, the process is always going to fail.

NR: Based on Hungary’s experience, what lessons for future NATO enlargement can be drawn both for the Alliance and for other aspiring members? What preconditions should NATO set and what steps should aspirants already be taking?

AS: The criteria for the three first new members were very clear. They were first, political democracy and stability; second, economic reform and the establishment of a full-fledged market economy; third, full respect for human rights and good neighbourly relations; and fourth, military reform and civilian control over the armed forces. These are the four crucial criteria that we have to stick to, whatever the country, because it’s important that, as NATO enlarges, the Alliance develops into a community of like-minded nations. When it comes to ranking these criteria, the most important criterion should always be that in which a country is weakest. My message to nations which wish to become members of the Alliance, therefore, is that they have to understand that entry criteria will be very tough, but that they are not on their own when it comes to meeting them. Partnership for Peace, the Membership Action Plan and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council offer so much more than was available to us during our preparatory process five years ago. In addition, Hungary is ready to share its experiences, both positive and negative, with any nation in order to help it meet the criteria.

NR: After the best part of a decade at NATO HQ, what lasting impressions do you take with you?

AS: NATO is about many things, but, above all, it’s about maintaining the transatlantic relationship. The Alliance is the key tool keeping the two sides of the Atlantic together, but promoting this link is not only a task for governments, but also for individuals. As a private citizen, I intend to make the greatest possible use of the experience I have gained at NATO, to promote the concept of North Atlantic cooperation and educate the public on the importance of the transatlantic relationship. When I left this Alliance a couple of months ago, I said in my farewell speech to the North Atlantic Council that this is a great Alliance, which must be kept strong.
Since the resumption of dialogue in May last year, relations between NATO and Russia have steadily improved. Solid progress and an expanding programme of cooperation activities were evident at the meetings of the Permanent Joint Council at NATO headquarters in December 2000, which brought together Allied defence and foreign ministers with their Russian counterparts, Marshal Igor Sergeyev and Igor Ivanov. But recent improvements mask underlying differences between the Allies and Russia in their perceptions of the evolution of Europe’s security architecture and of the nature of the NATO-Russia partnership. Moreover, since Russia’s relationship with the West is played out in many arenas, the prospects for the NATO-Russia dialogue may be influenced by external developments. As a result, there may only be a narrow window of opportunity to reconcile the interests of Moscow and Brussels and build a vigorous dialogue on security issues.

Having agreed a comprehensive work programme at the ministerial meeting of the Permanent Joint Council in Florence in May 2000, NATO-Russia relations underwent a lengthy process of rehabilitation, which was largely completed by the beginning of 2001. The work agenda has expanded to embrace a wide range of issues of mutual interest including ongoing cooperation in and consultation on peacekeeping in the Balkans, discussions of strategy and doctrine, and cooperation in arms control, proliferation, military infrastructure, nuclear issues and theatre missile defences, as well as the retraining of discharged military personnel and search and rescue at sea.
The practical experience of Russian and NATO soldiers working together in the NATO-led peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) and Kosovo has been particularly positive. Moreover, Russian officers have played an increasingly constructive role in the planning of joint operations at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. The opening of the NATO Information Office in Moscow in February 2001, after a year of tough negotiations, is another visible sign of improving relations.

Although Moscow generally seeks to avoid overtones in public statements, the spirit has changed notably in recent months. Foreign Minister Ivanov, known for his reticence, has publicly acknowledged that successes at the practical level are beginning to spin off in other areas and are improving the NATO-Russia relationship in general. Even Marshall Sergeyev has sounded more optimistic recently, praising, in particular, closer cooperation in the planning of joint operations. That said, he has also cautioned that the relationship has not yet been fully restored and that the page has yet to be turned on the sorry chapter in relations between Moscow and Brussels characterised by NATO’s Kosovo air campaign.

There are reasons for both optimism and caution. The 2001 Permanent Joint Council work programme is almost as broad as the one that existed at the end of 1998, during what appears to have been the honeymoon period in NATO-Russia relations. This, however, does not substantiate expectations of the beginning of true partnership, but seems rather to identify items on the agenda of a forthcoming bargaining process. A tough road lies ahead. Fixing even simple things takes months and years. The protracted negotiations that eventually led to the opening of the NATO Information Office and those still ongoing to establish a NATO Military Liaison Mission in Moscow reflect unresolved differences between both sides in their perceptions of how European security should be organised. Such differences have not been reconciled in the rapprochement since the Kosovo crisis. Indeed, they predate the crisis. This begs the question whether NATO and Russia have actually achieved enough in terms of confidence-building, which has been the centrepiece of activities over the past months, to lay the foundations for a true partnership.

When the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed in 1997 and the Permanent Joint Council was created, the Russian élite saw it as a damage-limitation exercise in the context of the first wave of the Alliance’s eastward enlargement. In the first instance, Moscow sought to prevent the eventual deployment of nuclear weapons, the extension of the Alliance’s military infrastructure and the stationing of NATO troops in the new central European member states. For their part, NATO member countries tended to regard the Founding Act as part of a deal to make NATO enlargement more palatable to Russia.

Yet, the Founding Act itself was more ambitious. The Permanent Joint Council was supposed to “provide a mechanism for consultation, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action with respect to security issues of common concern”. The declared “shared objective of NATO and Russia” was “to identify and pursue as many opportunities for joint action as possible”. Unfortunately, the envisaged joint decision-making process has failed to materialise. Dialogue has remained at the level of regular consultations and lost much of its initial purpose, after the launch of the Kosovo air campaign. Unwilling to share responsibility for an action it could not endorse yet was unable to prevent, Moscow found it better simply to withdraw.

Things have clearly changed for the better since then. The increased involvement of Russian officers in joint operations planning has improved significantly in recent months and there is greater consultation before NATO decisions are taken. Moscow has no power of veto, but its positions and concerns are given a fair hearing. However, while this mode of cooperation is working at the moment, it is not clear whether it would still work if more controversial issues were at stake, as in March 1999.

Lord Robertson’s first trip to Moscow as NATO Secretary General in February 2000 was aimed at re-energising the NATO-Russia relationship. He and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed that NATO and Russia should pursue a “vigorous dialogue on a wide range of security issues...to address the challenges that lie ahead and to make their mutual cooperation a cornerstone of European security”. However, the two sides continue to pursue notably different concepts of European security, which have become more divergent since the Kosovo crisis. Similarly, while the joint statement released at the ministerial meeting of the Permanent Joint Council in December 2000 welcomes progress achieved and reaffirms the “commitment to build, within the framework of the Permanent Joint Council, a strong, stable and equal partnership”, Brussels and Moscow still have different understandings as to the ends of such a partnership.

NATO member countries see the Alliance as the centrepiece and as the single most effective military arm of any European security system. They remain open to improving cooperation with Russia and with other Partner countries in ways which strengthen NATO’s unique role in cooperative security. In this context, the Permanent Joint Council is regarded, in the words of Lord Robertson, as “one of the most important new institutional arrangements that have emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War”.

Moscow, on the other hand, would like to see the development of a pan-European security architecture within which each country could feel equally secure and has consistently sought to boost the role of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The new Russian Foreign Policy Concept, signed by President Putin on 28 June 2000, emphasises the need to improve and deepen cooperation with the Alliance and recognises the important
role NATO plays in European security. But it is also unusually explicit about the problems Moscow has with NATO: “The current political and military postures of NATO do not coincide with the security interests of the Russian Federation, and sometimes even run contrary to them.” This basically refers to the provisions of NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept, which do not exclude coercive “out-of-area” operations with no explicit mandate from the UN Security Council, and to the possibility of a second wave of NATO enlargement, particularly if parts of the former Soviet Union are included.

Russia, therefore, does not want to see the Alliance as the centre of the European security dialogue, but as one of several partners for such dialogue. The Permanent Joint Council provides a forum where Russian positions on security issues can be voiced, but it does not give Moscow the power directly to influence events. For this reason, Foreign Minister Ivanov, even while praising recent progress in cooperation, has described the role of dialogue through the Permanent Joint Council as limited to “an important channel for exchange of information and for the exploration of certain issue areas”.

These different perspectives lead Russia and the Alliance to pursue different agendas for the NATO-Russia dialogue. During the past year, Moscow has pushed for the exchange of views on issues such as military doctrines, military infrastructure development and theatre missile defence, and for cooperation in science and technology. For its part, the Alliance has emphasised the importance of practical cooperation in areas such as military reform and has sought to motivate Russia to take a more active part in Partnership for Peace activities. These different agendas are not irreconcilable. The 2001 Permanent Joint Council work programme covers all these areas, as well as a number of others. However, unless underlying differences are reconciled, it will be more difficult and less likely to achieve substantial progress on any of the more controversial issues.

In the meantime, progress can be achieved in less controversial areas. In addition to the successful cooperation that has developed between KFOR and SFOR troops on the ground in Kosovo and Bosnia (the rationale of which is nevertheless questioned in Russia each time things appear to go wrong in the Balkans), other success stories can be identified in areas such as search and rescue at sea and the retraining of discharged officers. The importance of even modest practical collaboration or the significance of opening a NATO Information Office or seeking to establish a NATO Military Liaison Mission in Moscow should not, however, be underestimated. Real partnership, if ever possible, can only grow out of such projects.

However, as recent history has revealed, the up-and-down cycles in NATO-Russia relations may prove to be short and could easily fall victim to worsening mutual relations resulting from developments in areas outside the Permanent Joint Council framework. Practical cooperation through joint ventures may not have sufficient time to mature and yield spin-off effects. A brief look at Russia’s principal concerns helps understand how difficult it may be to reconcile the interests of Moscow and Brussels.

The fundamental concern, which was brought into sharp focus as a result of the Kosovo crisis, is the shape of the future world order and Russia’s position within it. With NATO seemingly challenging the authority of the UN Security Council, in which Russia enjoys the status of a permanent member and a veto, and with it proving difficult to develop the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe into an effective regional collective security organisation, Moscow faces a difficult choice. Either give in to closer cooperation with NATO, or risk the further erosion of Russia’s status as a great power, albeit one inherited from the previous bi-polar world and no longer backed up by real capabilities, apart from its nuclear arsenal. Upcoming decisions on NATO enlargement and on National Missile Defense (NMD) are likely to produce disturbances in Russia’s relationship with both NATO and the United States because they will be seen as further challenges to Russia’s status in the world order.

With regard to enlargement, Russian officials repeatedly confirm Moscow’s opposition, particularly to possible NATO membership for the Baltic states. Military considerations are probably of less concern than the fact that a future NATO with an almost Europe-wide membership and links that stretch into the Caucasus and Central Asia through the Partnership for Peace would undermine the chances for developing an increased pan-European security role for any other institution. Moscow would be left with little alternative to closer cooperation with NATO.

On missile defence, Russia is concerned that its status as a global nuclear power would be threatened should the United States be unwilling or unable to find a compromise on the modalities of its NMD project and on the future of the ABM Treaty. Such concerns are magnified by Moscow’s expectation that US foreign policy under the Bush administration will become increasingly unilateral. This, Moscow fears, could undermine the role of the United Nations and also impact on US cooperation with Russia, which might in turn limit Russia’s possibilities for bargaining within the framework of the NATO-Russia dialogue.
So far, Moscow seems to be adopting a more unilateral policy approach and expressing a determination to maintain its freedom of choice and action. At the same time, Russia is showing its readiness to pursue ad hoc cooperation with both NATO and the United States in areas where there is no conflict of interest, while repeatedly stressing the supremacy of the United Nations and the rule of international law. Should Russia prove unable actively to oppose developments that it believes would undermine its great power status, it is likely to fall back to a more absentee stand in international politics.

The key decisions on enlargement and on NMD, which could potentially have a major impact on the NATO-Russia relationship, are likely to be taken sooner rather than later. This leaves little time for the development of the “vigorous dialogue” agreed between President Putin and Lord Robertson. Both sides have a long tradition of tough bargaining with each other. If no results are achieved in the near future and no progress is made in reconciling fundamental differences, the dialogue between Moscow and Brussels risks stagnation and the future direction of NATO-Russia relations could be held hostage to external developments.

NATO Information Office

NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson inaugurated a NATO Information Office in central Moscow on 20 February.

The office will provide Russians with information about the Alliance and its missions and reinforce cooperation between NATO and Russia. It will be staffed by two senior NATO employees with local support.

Its opening is a reflection of the improvement in relations between NATO and Russia since the 1999 Kosovo air campaign.

The agreement to open such an office was reached at the December 2000 ministerial meeting of the Permanent Joint Council, after a year of tough negotiations, and was followed by an exchange of letters between Lord Robertson and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov.

“More than ten years after the end of the Cold War, at the start of the 21st century, NATO-Russia relations must evolve into a true strategic partnership,” Lord Robertson said at the inauguration ceremony.
Understanding NATO

Michael Rühle reviews some of the best and the worst recent literature on the Alliance.

Monographs on the post-Cold War Atlantic Alliance are a challenging task. They attempt to pin down a moving target. However, compared to edited volumes, which often are just hastily assembled conference papers of uneven length and quality, monographs should at least offer consistency and clarity of argument. With only one author in charge, the problem of too many cooks should not arise.

But what if the cook has no recipe? Such is the case with the monograph by Peter Duignan, a scholar at the Hoover Institution in Stanford, California. His NATO: Its Past, Present, and Future (Hoover Institution Press, 2000) brings to mind the immortal words of Ambrose Bierce: “The covers of this book are too far apart.” Indeed, the covers of Duignan’s 150-page book are too far apart by about 150 pages. Already as early as page 9, we learn that NATO’s famous Lisbon force goals of 1952 were apparently agreed in Boston. We learn that: “The NATO powers agreed on enlargement in 1998” (page 61), apparently one year after the 1997 Madrid Summit. The 1945 “Yalta sell-out” has been moved to 1946 (page 71). A map on page 78 dates NATO’s creation three years ahead of its time, to 1946, and we also learn that Slovenia, Romania and Austria are likely to be the next members in an alleged “2003 tranche” (pages 115 and 118).

In discussing NATO’s post-Cold War adaptation Duignan displays appallingly poor knowledge. For example, based on sources from 1990 (!) he opines that the WEU will have an expanded role to play in European security — blissfully unaware that the WEU has, to all intents and purposes, been dismantled. He also seems to believe that ESDI is an institution rather than a policy. And so he offers some sweeping policy advice: “The WEU, therefore, should be encouraged to take on more of NATO’s responsibilities and to work with the ESDI for a Europe-wide defense system backed up by NATO. Let the WEU, the Anglo-French “Euro force”, OSCE, and ESDI handle most of the peacekeeping and conflict resolution functions of NATO in Europe. Activities outside Europe should also be shared if the EU wants to participate” (page 119).

This travesty continues across the entire spectrum of NATO’s activities. Perhaps the author may be forgiven for not knowing exactly what NATO’s Combined Joint Task Forces Concept (CJTF) is. Yet, to mistake CJTF for the worldwide US Military Assistance Program requires a special effort in getting things wrong. The same holds true for turning the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council into the “NATO Russia Forum”, or for his claim that the Soviets were hiding SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear missiles in East Germany. His discussion of NATO’s Balkan engagement does not fare better: Ibrahim Rugova, a symbol of Kosovo’s peaceful road to independence if ever there was one, would surely be surprised to learn that he was in favour of Kosovo’s autonomy within Yugoslavia.

In getting all his facts wrong, Duignan shows at least some consistency. In his political judgements, however, not even a modicum of consistency remains. While Duignan takes NATO enlargement critics to task and argues that enlargement was the right thing to do, he changes his mind later in the book, warning the reader that “diluting” NATO might jeopardise its decision-making process (page 115). In a similar vein, he argues that Lord Ismay’s famous characterisation of NATO as an instrument to “keep the Germans down” was still applicable today, yet as the book proceeds, he again changes his mind, arguing that “leadership of NATO ... should pass from the Americans to the Europeans early in the twenty-first century” and that “Germany is a logical choice to take over from the United States” (page 119).

This intellectual rollercoaster is further aggravated by the absence of a structure (for example, the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society is discussed under the heading of NATO enlargement). Instead, the narrative flip-flops between the past and the present, between facts cobbledd together from the NATO Handbook and personal musings, all of it carrying the ring of someone who doesn’t really know what he wants to say. Indeed, “say” is the appropriate word here, because much of the book reads like it was spoken straight into a dictaphone.

Bad books are legion, and yet there is a sense of tragedy here. After all, Duignan is a pro-NATO Atlanticist. Apparently, he wanted to write a defence of the US engagement in Europe. That he failed so spectacularly in crusading for such a laudable cause is saddening.

That the case for NATO’s undiminished relevance can indeed be cogently argued is demonstrated by David Yost’s NATO Transformed (United States Institute of Peace Press,
Although published nearly three years ago, i.e. before the Kosovo air campaign, it still ranks among the finest monographs on the subject. Painstakingly researched, Yost’s book takes the reader through NATO’s Cold War history before examining NATO’s post-Cold War adaptation — an adaptation marked by a shift from collective defence only towards a mix of collective defence and collective security.

Yost leaves no doubt as to where he sees trouble brewing. He is concerned that NATO’s venturing into collective security might risk undermining both the capabilities as well as the cohesion needed to provide for its core function of collective defence. Hence, his rather elaborate treatment of the idea of collective security and its pitfalls. Indeed, given the difficulties of sustaining NATO’s current military engagement in the Balkans, Yost’s warnings are to be taken seriously.

The well-known difficulties of NATO’s Kosovo campaign may even add more credibility to Yost’s warnings about NATO embarking on the slippery slope towards over-extension. Still, it is really so important to achieve conceptual clarity as to what NATO “is”? Should we not be more concerned with what NATO “does” — and does right? Collective defence may be a less challenging concept than collective security, but can NATO really afford to fiddle while the Balkans are burning? Indeed, Yost himself acknowledges that the Allies have little choice but to follow a dual strategy of pursuing collective security aspirations to the extent that this is feasible and prudent, while maintaining their collective defence posture and orientation. Thus, one cannot help but suspect that his lengthy treatment of collective security may be something of a straw man. However, Yost employs it in such an effective and enlightening manner that it is highly worthwhile. Those not deterred by the book’s hefty 430 pages will learn more about the NATO of today than from any other book on the subject.

One of the victims of NATO’s Kosovo campaign was the Alliance’s 50th anniversary. The Balkan tragedy that unfolded in spring 1999 did not leave much time for reflection on NATO’s first half-century. That the Alliance ultimately prevailed in Kosovo was certainly worth the cancellation of this or that commemorative event. For those who are nevertheless interested in NATO’s history, Lawrence S. Kaplan’s The Long Entanglement: NATO’s First Fifty Years (Praeger, 1999), will be a treasure chest. It is not a monograph, but a collection of 12 essays written over almost two decades. Yet it remains highly consistent, and the few inevitable overlaps and repetitions do not matter much.

Kaplan is a historian. The reader should therefore not expect too much on NATO’s present or future. Indeed, whenever Kaplan tackles current issues he becomes vague and evasive. Moreover, as the title implies, Kaplan’s focus is very much on US foreign policy. But none of this diminishes the value of this collection. Indeed, his focus on the past is a healthy antidote to those “experts” who believe that the world began with the end of the Cold War in 1989.

Kaplan also proves wrong those who believe that history must always be boring. For example, his essay NATO: A Counterfactual History offers a thought-provoking speculation about the path Europe might have taken had NATO never been created. Even if the reader may not always agree with Kaplan’s extrapolations of “what would have happened if . . .”, this chapter alone is worth the price of the entire book.

Yost and Kaplan offer good, solid writing on NATO and transatlantic relations. But these are books for the NATO aficionado, not for the average reader. The NATO “primer” has yet to be written. The student of international relations who is looking for a readable monograph of modest length still has to wait.
Speeding deployment

Elinor Sloan examines NATO force mobility and deployability, as well as the impact of programmes aimed at improving capabilities.

For much of the past decade, military and security literature has been filled with discussion of the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs. This notion immediately conjures up visions of high-tech warfare filled with advanced sensing, communications and computing capabilities, stealth technology and precision-guided weapons. However, what is often lost in the debate is the fact that there will be no revolution until such time as technological wizardry is combined with dramatic doctrinal and organisational change. Central to NATO’s ability to respond effectively to the challenges of the new international security environment, is the increased deployability and mobility of its forces. Not surprisingly, NATO’s Strategic Concept calls deployability and mobility an “essential operational capability” of Alliance forces, and the Defence Capabilities Initiative, NATO’s high-level initiative to improve and update military capabilities, includes the deployability and mobility of NATO forces as a key area of focus for transformation.

Force deployability and mobility can be seen as a function of the readiness of forces, their training, organisational structure and equipment. Legal hurdles to deploying conscript forces outside national boundaries, combined with the requirement for highly skilled and therefore longer-serving troops mean that force deployability is more easily achieved by professional armies. Many NATO nations, such as Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, have always had a professional force, or at least have had one for several decades. But others have traditionally had conscript forces and here the past few years have seen significant changes.

Perhaps most notably, in 1996 French President Jacques Chirac made the dramatic decision, after more than 200 years, to eliminate conscription and in this way to professionalize the French armed forces. France had for its impetus the Gulf War and the rapid reaction force that went into Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) in 1995. In both cases, it could only provide a force contribution by “skimming off” professional soldiers from many disparate units. The professionalization process is now well underway and is to be completed by 2002, by which time more than 90 per cent of the French military will be careerists, as compared to less than 60 per cent in 1996.

By contrast, in the first post-Cold War decade successive German governments steered clear of any talk of reducing or eliminating conscription, arguing that national service is an important part of German defence culture that effectively binds the military and civilian society together. This viewpoint has only recently softened. In May 2000, in the wake of glaring evidence provided by Operation Allied Force, NATO’s Kosovo campaign, that a conscript force was ill-suited to today’s international security environment, the government-mandated Commission for Common Security and the Future of the Bundeswehr (the Commission) recommended significant changes to the conscript system. As a result, the number of German conscripts is to be reduced to 80,000 per year, much less than the previous level of 135,000, though still significantly more than the Commission’s recommendation of 30,000.

Over the past decade, several other NATO nations have changed the composition of their militaries by increasing the proportion of professional forces. Belgium and the Netherlands have eliminated conscription altogether, while Italy, Portugal and Spain have plans to do so over the next few years. The Czech Republic and Hungary plan to eliminate or reduce conscription once they are in a financial position to do so, and Poland recently announced its intention to reduce and professionalize half its forces by 2003.

Changes in the heavy force structures of the Cold War era are also central to enhancing the deployability and mobility of NATO forces. Part of this involves the reduction in size of large Cold War armies. The French armed forces are being reduced from a 1996 level of 500,000 to 357,000 personnel by 2002, while Germany’s force levels will be reduced from the current 320,000 to about 275,000 over the next three or four years. Other NATO nations, such as Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, carried out similar force reductions of the order of 25 to 30 per cent in the early to mid-1990s.

More important is the organisational restructuring of the remaining forces into more rapidly deployable units, which are still highly lethal. Here again, there have been significant developments over the past few years. The United Kingdom’s 1998 Strategic Defence Review set in train a

shift from a continental European strategy to one of expeditionary forces for power projection during a crisis. The British Army has been reorganised into two deployable divisions, each made up of three flexible, mobile brigades. The United Kingdom is also creating a Joint Rapid Reaction Force, a pool of “powerful and versatile” units from all three services set to become fully operational this year.

In accordance with its 1996 Military Programme Law, France is restructuring its army into 51 manoeuvre regiments, supported by 15 logistics regiments and 19 specialised support regiments, all grouped into 11 combat brigades. The regiments represent the basic modular units that can be brought together in varying combinations depending on the nature of the crisis to which they are responding. France also aims to have in place, by 2002, a Rapid Reaction Force of between 50,000 and 60,000 troops to be quickly deployable to areas around the world. Meanwhile, Germany has created its own Crisis Reaction Force, comprised of six fully equipped brigades, 18 squadrons and roughly 40 per cent of the navy’s ships at any one time. Made up entirely of professional troops, in accordance with the Commission’s recommendations, this force of 50,000 is to be transformed into a 150,000-strong

Readiness Force in which sailors, soldiers and airmen will be available in three 50,000-man rotations.

Meanwhile, the US Army, stung by its inability to deploy rapidly its Apache helicopters into Albania during Operation Allied Force, has undertaken its own dramatic overhaul of force structure. To round out its heavy and light components, the service is creating a medium-weight strike force to be comprised of at least five rapid-response brigade combat teams by the end of this decade. In addition, the US Air Force has completely reorganised its combat forces into ten Air Expeditionary Forces that are designed to be able to deploy rapidly anywhere in the world. Several other NATO nations, including Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Turkey, have also restructured their forces over the past decade to increase deployability and mobility.

NATO as a whole has undertaken initiatives to adapt its force structure to the post-Cold War security environment. In the early 1990s, NATO established the Allied Command Europe’s Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), a mobile headquarters of some 1,000 multinational military personnel. In addition, since 1994 the Alliance has been working to implement the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept. This entails
the development of mobile command and control headquarters that can be detached from the Alliance’s permanent, standing command structure, and will allow units from different services and nations to be brought together and tailored to a specific contingency. NATO’s standing command structure itself has been significantly modified, with the transition to a new command structure well underway.

While the CJTF concept is proceeding, it has yet to be fully implemented. Moreover, there is a growing recognition that the ARRC — which was deployed to both Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 — needs to be augmented by at least a second such mobile corps headquarters. Admiral Guido Venturoni, chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, has argued that the figure may be closer to three land corps headquarters and forces at high readiness, and six such headquarters at lower readiness for sustainment operations. Comparable forces and headquarters are needed for the navy and air elements. Member countries have already offered a dozen headquarters that would have to become multinational (or more multinational) to operate at Alliance level, among them the five-nation Eurocorps and the German-Dutch corps. Decisions on these issues will no doubt figure in the conclusions and recommendations of NATO’s current force structure review. In this way, a number of national and Alliance measures are underway to address the organisational and restructuring demands of a rapid reaction capability.

In terms of equipment, two elements are central to increasing the deployability and mobility of military forces. First, there is the requirement for more mobile army platforms that are still highly lethal and do not reduce troop protection. Many NATO nations have equipped or plan to equip their crisis reaction forces with light armoured vehicles, such as the LAV III (Canada and the United States), the future armoured infantry combat vehicle (France) and the All-Protected Carrier Vehicle (Germany). These wheeled platforms are much lighter than a tracked main battle tank, can be deployed by plane in greater numbers and are more versatile once on the ground. Yet, they do not offer the same levels of troop protection and firepower as a main battle tank. As a result, NATO nations continue to upgrade and/or field new tanks, such as the Leclerc, Leopard 2, Challenger 2, and M1 Abrams.

Projects are underway to develop light combat vehicles designed to suit the transport requirements for rapid deployment. They include Canada’s Armoured Combat Vehicle, Germany’s New Armoured Platform, and America’s Future Combat System. But these systems will not be operational for at least a decade. The United States is most inclined to the shift from a heavy to lighter, more mobile and deployable ground force, as a result of its geostrategic position and global security interests. It has therefore significantly cut its Abrams upgrade and Crusader self-propelled howitzer programmes, and channelled these funds into its Future Combat System. By contrast, European investment programmes continue to maintain heavier armoured vehicles, such as tanks, self-propelled howitzers and artillery.

Even more important for increasing deployability and mobility is strategic air and sealift. Here, Canada and European NATO members lag far behind the United States. Although several countries have fleets of C-130 and C-160 transport aircraft, these are considered more of a tactical than a strategic platform. Moreover, many larger transport aircraft, like the French and German C-160s, are old and due for replacement. With no equivalent to the US C-17 or C-15 heavy transport aircraft, NATO nations are almost completely dependent on the United States for the long-range air transport of their troops and “outsie” equipment.

Measures are being taken to address this problem. Several European members of NATO — including Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom — have signed on to buy about 200 Airbus Industries A400M heavy lift air transporters, otherwise known as the Future Large Aircraft. But the aircraft is not expected to be in service before about 2007 and current design specifications indicate it will not be built to transport “outsie” equipment. To fill this strategic airlift gap, the United Kingdom has undertaken to lease four C-17 aircraft, with the first due for delivery to the Royal Air Force later this year. To meet short to medium-term requirements, France and Germany may also lease some C-17 aircraft, or perhaps the Russian-Ukrainian AN-70 airlifter, though a decision has yet to be taken. Canada is also exploring options to improve its airlift capability. In 1999, France backed a German initiative to form a European Military Airlift Command to pool across national boundaries airlift resources such as strategic transport and air-to-air refuelling tankers. This initiative is being considered in the European Air Group, which as a first step is establishing an Airlift Coordination Cell.

To increase sealift capabilities, the United Kingdom is planning to build two new, larger, aircraft carriers by about 2015 and is increasing the number of its roll-on/roll-off container vessels from two to six. France has cut back its carriers to just one, the Charles de Gaulle, but has plans to
acquire more roll-on/roll-off ships and has agreed with the Netherlands to pool shipping capacity to move heavy equipment to trouble spots by sea. Canada is progressing with its Afloat Logistics and Sealift Capability project, which is designing a multi-role ship geared in part to strategic lift for the army. Germany is focusing not so much on strategic lift but rather on building a flexible naval force, with new frigates, U-2 boats and supply ships on the way.

For those countries that are members of both the European Union and NATO, a major incentive to increase the deployability and mobility of their military forces is the European Union’s Headline Goal of creating a 60,000-strong rapid intervention force by 2003. The force is to be mobile, militarily self-sustaining and deployable to a far-off crisis within 60 days. Whereas NATO’s responsibilities range across the full spectrum of conflict, the EU force will likely focus on peace-support operations and crisis-management missions. The differing tasks make it conceivable that the EU initiative could divert EU members of NATO from improving their military capabilities in those areas that are more relevant to high-end collective security operations, like precision engagement and suppression of enemy fire. However, whether responding to war or conflicts of an intensity less than war, EU members of NATO will want to be able to get their troops to the crisis quickly and to be mobile once in theatre. Indeed, the primary incentive for France and Germany to lease heavy-lift assets in the next few years would be their EU commitments, without which the 2003 deadline will not be met.

The impact of the EU initiative on developing a lighter, yet still highly lethal, ground force is more difficult to gauge. The European Union’s focus on lower-end tasks may speed up the acquisition of wheeled armoured platforms that, by virtue of their greater battlefield mobility, are better suited to peace-support operations. But by the same token, it may slow the development of systems akin to the Future Combat System.

Much of what happens will depend on defence budgets and particularly on the proportion allocated to equipment acquisition. The defence budgets of all NATO nations fell dramatically during the 1990s, a trend that has only recently been reversed. Canada, the United Kingdom and especially the United States have registered real increases in their defence budgets over the past couple of years. By contrast, Germany’s has continued to fall, while the French defence budget has remained essentially static. Eleven other European members of NATO have indicated that they plan real increases in defence spending in 2001, but the increases will be small and it will be some time before they can be translated into concrete capabilities. As armies professionalize, more money will presumably be freed up for defence acquisitions. However, this is also a long-term proposition. France, for example, has found that the professionalization of its army is costing a lot more than originally expected.

A pragmatic examination of the deployability and mobility of NATO forces reveals a mixed picture. In some countries, significant progress has been made in the professionalization and restructuring of national forces, while transformation has been much slower in others. This is true, too, of NATO’s force structure. Armies are being made lighter and more mobile, but there continues to be a strong emphasis on preparing for heavy armoured warfare. Generally speaking, the EU initiative can be expected to boost the deployability and mobility of NATO forces. Moreover, there are several important projects on the books. But the fact remains that, to date, Canada and European members of NATO have made little progress towards equipping their militaries with the means of moving their armies swiftly into place by air and sea. It will be some time before planned defence budget increases can be translated into concrete capabilities. Even the United States, hampered by the costs of current operations and readiness, could be constrained in its army transformation efforts. The revolution, while underway, is still many years from fruition.

The NATO Science Programme supports collaborative projects between scientists from Allied and Partner countries.

The programme - which is not defence-related - aims to stimulate cooperation between scientists from different backgrounds, to create enduring links between researchers, and to help sustain scientific communities in Partner countries.

Full details can be found on the NATO web site:

http://www.nato.int/science
Defence expenditures as % of gross domestic product

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The complete financial and economic data relating to NATO defence can be found at www.nato.int/docu/pr/2000/p00-107e.htm.
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