REPORT ON
OPTIONS FOR CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY
BUILDING MEASURES (CSBMs),
VERIFICATION, NON-PROLIFERATION,
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

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1. Introduction

1. NATO's policy of support for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation has played and will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives. NATO has a longstanding commitment in this area and continues to ensure that its overall objectives of defence, arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation remain in harmony.

2. At their Summit Meeting in Washington in April 1999, Allies decided to increase Alliance efforts against weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. The WMD Initiative has initiated a more vigorous and structured debate on WMD issues. The principal goal of the Alliance and its members remains to prevent proliferation from occurring or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means.

3. As stated in the Strategic Concept of 1999, the Alliance is committed to contribute actively to the development of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements as well as to confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs). The Allies are fully aware of their distinctive role in promoting a broader, more comprehensive and more verifiable international arms control and disarmament process. They consider confidence-building, arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation as important components of conflict prevention. NATO's partnership, co-operation and dialogue programmes offer a unique opportunity to promote these objectives. In this context, the Alliance's longstanding commitments and current activities in the area of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation are in and of themselves tangible contributions to the overall goal of creating meaningful CSBMs and a cooperative approach to international security.

4. At the Washington Summit, Allies agreed, in the light of overall strategic developments and the reduced salience of nuclear weapons, to consider options for CSBMs, verification, non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament. Since the Summit, the responsible NATO bodies have taken up an extensive and comprehensive evaluation of overall developments, have taken stock of Allies’ efforts in these fields, and have considered a number of options for the future.
2. Developments Over The Last Decade In The Nuclear, Chemical And Biological Weapons Environment

2.1. Risks posed by Weapons of Mass Destruction

5. The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery is a matter of serious concern for the Alliance. In spite of welcome progress in strengthening international non-proliferation regimes, major challenges with respect to proliferation remain. The Alliance recognises that proliferation can occur despite efforts to prevent it and can pose a direct military threat to the Allies’ populations, territory, and forces.

6. Some states, including some on NATO’s periphery and in other regions, sell or acquire or try to acquire NBC weapons and delivery means. Non-state actors have shown the potential to create and use some of these weapons.

7. NATO has greatly reduced its nuclear forces in the last decade. However, the existence of powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance constitutes a significant factor which the Alliance has to take into account if security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area are to be maintained. Russia still retains a large number of nuclear weapons of all types. China has continued to modernize its nuclear forces over the last decade. In addition, in 1998, India and Pakistan both carried out nuclear tests, seriously challenging the nuclear non-proliferation regime and increasing the dangers associated with regional conflict.
2.2. Nuclear Weapons

2.2.1. Bilateral and National Developments

2.2.1.1. U.S. – Russia

8. The United States and Russia are engaged in an important bilateral arms control process aimed at reducing significantly their strategic nuclear weapons.

9. The START I Treaty, which entered into force in 1994, was the first treaty to actually reduce strategic offensive weapons. Once fully implemented, it will have reduced U.S. and Russian deployed strategic weapons from well over 10,000 to 6,000 held by each side. Since 1988, the U.S. has dismantled more than 13,300 nuclear warheads and bombs, has eliminated more than a dozen different types of nuclear warheads, and has reduced its overall nuclear warhead stockpile by 59% - 80% of the U.S. non-strategic nuclear stockpile and 47% of the strategic stockpile. To date, the United States has eliminated over 900 strategic delivery vehicles. These delivery vehicles were attributed under the START Treaty with 4400 warheads. The delivery vehicle elimination total includes 478 ICBMs, 368 SLBMs, and 67 heavy bombers. In addition, approximately 234 delivery vehicles have been deactivated and await destruction by the Treaty’s reduction deadline of December 5, 2001. The U.S. and the republics of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) remain on track to complete all Treaty mandated reductions by the December 5, 2001 deadline.

10. The START II Treaty was signed in 1993 and ratified by the U.S. in 1996 and by Russia in 2000. Entry into force cannot occur until the U.S. ratifies the 1997 START II Protocol extending the Treaty’s implementation deadline from 2003 to 2007 and certain other conditions attached to the Russian resolution of ratification are resolved. START II builds upon the START I Treaty, further reducing each side’s deployed strategic weapons to between 3,000 and 3,500, and eliminating all land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying multiple warheads. Once START II has been implemented, the U.S. will have reduced its strategic nuclear forces by two thirds from peak Cold War levels.

11. U.S. nuclear-armed strategic bombers are no longer on alert and the U.S. targets no country with its strategic nuclear forces on a day-to-day basis. U.S. ground forces and surface ships no longer have a nuclear capability and U.S. sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles are no longer deployed on any naval vessels. No nuclear weapons test explosions have been conducted since September 1992, and the U.S. has terminated production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The U.S. has permanently removed approximately 226 tonnes of HEU and plutonium from its nuclear stockpile and is taking steps to ensure that the material can never again be used for weapons purposes. This material will be made available for IAEA verification as soon as practicable. The U.S. will also seek to identify additional amounts of fissile material for irreversible removal from weapons programmes. Moreover, the U.S. has allocated more than $5 billion to Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan since 1992 to facilitate nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
12. In March 1997 in Helsinki, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to begin negotiations on a START III treaty that, for the first time, would include measures related to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads. Once implemented, the START III treaty would reduce the number of deployed U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear warheads to a ceiling of 2,000 to 2,500 each, a U.S. reduction of approximately 80% from peak Cold War levels.

13. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972 and amended in 1974, permits each side to have one ABM system with 100 ABM launchers and 100 ABM interceptor missiles deployed at a single location on their respective territories. Russia currently maintains an operational ABM system armed with nuclear warheads around Moscow; the United States deactivated its ABM system in the mid-1970s and currently has no operational ABM system. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States initiated negotiations in 1993 to resolve the ABM Treaty succession issue and to distinguish between ABM systems and the Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) systems. In September 1997, the United States signed agreements with Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine providing for succession to the ABM Treaty by those four states, and clarifying the demarcation between ABM systems, which are limited by the Treaty, and TMD systems, which are not limited by the Treaty per se. These agreements have not yet entered into force.

14. In Cologne in June 1999, the Presidents of the United States and Russia affirmed their existing obligations under Article XIII of the ABM Treaty to consider possible changes in the strategic situation that have a bearing on the ABM Treaty and, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty. The United States has proposed changes to the ABM Treaty needed to permit deployment of a limited National Missile Defense system. Since August 1999, several rounds of high-level U.S.-Russian discussions on both the ABM Treaty and START III have been conducted. The United States has kept NATO Allies informed of these discussions.

15. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in December 1987 and entered into force in May 1988. It is of unlimited duration, providing for the elimination and permanent ban of an entire class of U.S. and Soviet intermediate- and shorter-range ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a range from 500 to 5,500 kilometers. Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, the 12 successor states became party to the Treaty, but only four of them – Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine – participate with the U.S. in the INF inspections regime which will end on 31 May 2001.
16. In the fall of 1991, U.S. President Bush and Soviet President Gorbachev announced two unilateral nuclear reduction initiatives. President Bush pledged, among other things, to destroy all U.S. nuclear artillery shells and short-range ballistic missile warheads and to withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from U.S. surface ships, attack submarines and land-based naval aircraft. Responding to the U.S. Presidential Nuclear Initiative (PNI), President Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would: eliminate all nuclear artillery munitions, nuclear warheads for tactical missiles, and nuclear mines; withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships, multipurpose submarines, and land-based naval aviation; eliminate a portion of the naval tactical nuclear weapons and store the rest in “central storage sites”; and withdraw nuclear warheads for air defence missiles, eliminate a portion of them, and concentrate the rest in “central bases”. In January 1992, Russian President Yeltsin reaffirmed and expanded on Gorbachev’s pledges.

17. On 6 September 2000, U.S. President Clinton and Russian President Putin agreed on a Strategic Stability Co-operation Initiative as a constructive basis for strengthening trust between the two sides, and for further development of agreed measures to enhance strategic stability and to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles and missile technologies world-wide. The United States and Russia have eliminated intermediate and shorter-range missiles mandated by the INF Treaty, and are close to completing the reductions required by December 2001 under the START I Treaty. They intend to seek early entry into force of the START II Treaty and its related Protocol, the 1997 agreements on ABM issues and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and to work towards the early realization of the 1997 Helsinki Joint Statement on Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces (START III). The U.S. and Russia are also prepared to resume and expand co-operation in the area of TMD.

18. Since 1995, the U.S. has signed the relevant protocols to the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. When combined with the Latin American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, this increases the number of Non-Nuclear Weapon States eligible for legally binding negative security assurances from all five nuclear weapon states to almost 100.

2.2.1.2. United Kingdom Reductions

19. In the last decade, the UK has made a large number of important nuclear force reductions and other steps. Since 1992, it has given up the nuclear Lance missile and artillery roles it undertook previously with U.S. nuclear weapons held under dual-key arrangements. It has completed the dismantling of its maritime tactical nuclear weapons, so that Royal Navy surface ships no longer have the capability to carry or deploy nuclear weapons. It has withdrawn from service and dismantled all of its air-launched nuclear weapons, and it is currently dismantling the Chevaline warheads from its old force of Polaris submarines.
20. In consequence, Trident is now the UK’s only nuclear weapon system. In its 1998 Strategic Defence Review, the UK announced that it would maintain a reduced stockpile of fewer than 200 operationally available warheads, a reduction of more than 70% in the UK deterrent’s potential explosive power since the end of the Cold War. Only one Trident submarine will be on patrol at a time, at a reduced state of readiness – routinely at a “notice to fire” measured in days rather than the few minutes sustained throughout the Cold War – and carrying 50% fewer warheads than the UK’s previously announced ceiling. All U.K. Trident missiles have been de-targeted since May 1994. Since 1995, the UK has signed and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, signed the Protocols to the Treaty of Pelindaba and signed and ratified the Protocols to the Treaty of Raratonga.

21. The U.K. announced in 1995 that it had ceased the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The UK has also declared the total size of its stocks of fissile material, placed fissile material no longer required for defence purposes under international safeguards; made all enrichment and reprocessing facilities in the UK liable to international inspection; and begun a national historic accounting for fissile material produced. The UK has begun a programme to develop its expertise in verifying the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. And the UK has provided 250 supercontainers and 20 heavy-duty trucks to assist in the safe and secure withdrawal of all the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons to the territory of the Russian Federation, as well as further nuclear safety, security and accountancy assistance to the States of the former Soviet Union.

22. The UK has made clear that, when satisfied with progress towards the global elimination of nuclear weapons, its nuclear weapons will be included in multilateral negotiations.
2.2.1.3. French Reductions

23. In order to adjust the format of its deterrent forces to the new context, France has chosen not to continue development of several programmes and has reduced its nuclear stockpile, as well as the expenditure allocated to the military nuclear sector.

24. The following steps were taken in 1991 and 1992:
- Abandonment of the strategic surface-to-surface S45 missile programme, which had been intended to replace the S3D missiles on the Plateau d'Albion,
- Early withdrawal of the Pluton short-range surface-to-surface missiles,
- Early withdrawal from service and dismantling of the AN 52 nuclear bombs carried by Jaguar and Mirage III aircraft,
- A reduction in the number of SSBNs in service from 6 to 5 and a longer production timetable for new generation SSBNs,
- A cut in the Hadès short-range surface-to-surface missile programme from 120 to 30 units, plus the decision to “mothball” rather than deploy this weapons system.

25. In 1996, the President of the French Republic placed a limit of 4 on the number of SSBNs making up the sea-based component, instead of the previous 5. Within that force, only three SSBNs are maintained in the operational cycle.

26. The decisions taken in 1996 have led to the withdrawal of Mirage IV strategic aircraft from nuclear missions. Only Mirage 2000N and Super-Étendard aircraft have retained their capability for carrying nuclear air-to-ground medium-range missiles (ASMP).

27. In 1996, the President of the French Republic announced the withdrawal from service of the surface-to-surface component on the Plateau d’Albion, the closure of this site and the final withdrawal of the Hadès weapon system, followed by the dismantling of its missiles.

28. The dismantling of the eighteen S3D strategic missiles with megaton warheads was completed in 1998 and that of the thirty Hadès short-range missiles in 1997. France is now the only nuclear-weapon State to have totally eliminated its formerly deployed surface-to-surface nuclear weapon systems.

29. The cuts made in 1996 came in addition to those of 1991 and 1992. France has therefore made substantial reductions in the number of its nuclear weapons systems since the end of the Cold War. Of the six systems deployed in 1990 (Mirage IV strategic aircraft, submarine-launched missiles, surface-to-surface strategic missiles on the Plateau d’Albion, surface-to-surface short-range missiles, Jaguar and Mirage III aircraft armed with nuclear air-to-ground bombs, Mirage 2000N and Super Étendard aircraft armed with medium-range air-to-surface missiles), only two now remain (submarine-launched ballistic missiles and aircraft armed with air-to-surface missiles).

30. Alongside this, the total number of delivery vehicles has been cut by over half. Similarly, the share of the defence budget allocated to nuclear expenditure has been reduced by 58% since 1990.
31. Following the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests decided in April 1992 and after a final series of tests, France on 29 January 1996, announced the cessation of all nuclear testing. This decision took practical shape in the complete dismantling of testing facilities in the Pacific which was announced as early as 22 February 1996 and completed by the end of July 1998.

32. France was the first State to reach and implement a decision to dismantle its facilities for the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. France suspended as early as 1992 all production of plutonium for defence needs (Marcoule Plant) and implemented a similar measure four years later with regard to highly enriched uranium (Pierrelatte uranium enrichment plant). The spent fuel reprocessing plant at Marcoule was closed down completely at the end of 1996. Operations to dismantle the facility are currently under way. The decision to order the final shutdown and dismantling of the Pierrelatte uranium enrichment plant was taken in 1996 and immediately implemented.


2.2.2. Multilateral Developments

2.2.2.1. NPT

34. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. The Treaty was extended indefinitely at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC). The 1995 NPTREC also took decisions that strengthened the review process for the Treaty, and adopted a set of “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” to guide the full realization and effective implementation of the Treaty.

35. Over the last decade the NPT has grown to be nearly universal in its membership, with only four states (Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan) remaining outside the regime. Significant new parties have acceded to the Treaty, including two nuclear-weapon States recognized by the Treaty, France and China, as well as South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Excluding Russia, all of the states of the former Soviet Union have renounced the possession of nuclear weapons and joined the NPT.

36. Iraq and North Korea were each found to be in non-compliance with the NPT and efforts are continuing to bring them into compliance. In 1993 North Korea provided notice of its intention to withdraw from the NPT, but remains in the Treaty although still in violation of its NPT safeguards agreement. The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998, which NATO Ministers condemned, were a blow to nuclear non-proliferation goals. Members of the Alliance continue to insist upon the full implementation of the NPT and the relevant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions.
37. The 2000 NPT Review Conference was held in New York between 24th April and 19th May 2000. The Conference was attended by 158 States-parties as well as by 11 international organizations and 141 non-governmental organizations.

38. The 2000 Review Conference was able to adopt a comprehensive, substantive final document, an accomplishment matched by only two of five previous Review Conferences. The conclusions of the final document note continued support for universal NPT adherence, strict compliance with the NPT’s provisions, strengthened International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, and future steps toward nuclear disarmament, including an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under NPT Article VI, and the reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of the states in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

2.2.2.2. CTBT

39. Achieving entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was the first of the 13 practical steps toward nuclear disarmament agreed in the Final Document of the NPT Review Conference. It is an important piece of unfinished business on the NPT Agenda. Negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) between 1994 and 1996 and opened for signature in 1996, the Treaty prohibits any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion anywhere in the world. The CTBT will enter into force after ratification by the 44 states named in Annex 2 of the Treaty. A total of 13 Annex 2 ratifications are still outstanding, including those of India, Pakistan, and North-Korea which have yet to sign the Treaty. France and the UK ratified the Treaty in 1998. The United States has signed but not ratified the Treaty. All other Allies have signed and ratified the Treaty. Allies are committed to working to secure the necessary signatures and ratifications to achieve an early entry into force of the CTBT.

2.2.2.3. Fissile Material

40. A treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices represents a logical follow-on to the CTBT and an important priority. In 1995, the Conference on Disarmament agreed to establish an ad hoc committee with a mandate to negotiate such a treaty. The Committee was convened for the first time in 1998, but no substantial negotiations have taken place, and since then the Committee has not been reconvened. The NPT 2000 Review Conference Final Document urged the CD to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.
41. The Allies view the lack of progress on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) with growing concern. For two years now, the CD – the only permanent forum of negotiation in the disarmament world – has not been able to adopt a work programme or commence work on any new disarmament issue, even after the successful conclusion of the NPT Review Conference in May 2000. We will continue our efforts with other members of the Conference to address both substantive and procedural issues in order to ensure that negotiations on the FMCT can resume expeditiously.

2.3. Biological And Chemical Weapons

42. The proliferation of biological and chemical weapons (BCW) is widely recognized as a growing international security problem, both for interstate conflict and as a potential dimension of terrorism.

43. The 1925 Geneva Protocol bans the use of chemical and biological weapons. States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), which entered into force in 1975, agree not to develop, produce, stockpile or acquire biological agents and related equipment used for hostile purposes. Long considered a weakness is the fact that the BTWC contains no verification mechanisms, unlike similar arms control agreements. To enhance confidence in compliance with the BTWC, the 1986 Review Conference agreed on a set of confidence-building measures. In 1994 a Special Conference established an Ad Hoc Group of States Parties to the Convention to consider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention, as appropriate, in a legally binding Protocol. The fourth Review Conference in 1996 agreed that such a Protocol should be completed as soon as possible before the commencement of the fifth Review conference in 2001. During their meeting held in Florence on 24 May 2000, NATO Ministers reiterated the commitment of Allies “to efforts to achieve such an instrument as soon as possible before the 5th Review Conference of the BTWC in 2001”.

44. To ban chemical weapons and to prevent their proliferation, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament between 1980 and 1992, and entered into force in 1997. Each party agrees never to develop, produce, acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, not to use or prepare to use CW, and not to assist others in acting against the provisions of the Convention. The Convention also requires states-parties to destroy any CW in their possession, and to destroy their CW production facilities. The Organisation for the Prohibition of CW (OPCW), that was established in 1997, is responsible for addressing implementation issues. The world’s declared stockpiles of 70,000 tons of chemical weapons and more than 8 million munitions have been inspected by OPCW inspectors; the four countries that have declared possession of chemical weapons are all actively engaged in their destruction, but one of them, Russia, is encountering problems. All of the 60 declared chemical weapons production facilities around the world have been inspected and sealed. Despite this positive progress there have been major difficulties in implementing the necessary chemical weapons destruction. In particular, Russia continues to have significant trouble in making available the necessary funding to destroy all of its chemical weapons by the Convention’s deadline.
45. The Australia Group (AG) was established in 1984 to ensure that the industries of participating countries did not assist, either intentionally or inadvertently, states seeking to acquire a BCW capability by supplying them with dual-use materials and equipment. The 32 countries that participate in the AG have instituted national export controls on all items on the AG control lists. These lists contain chemical precursors, biological toxins, pathogens and micro-organisms, and chemical and biological production equipment. Trade in items on the AG lists is not banned; rather AG participants agree to control exports of listed items to ensure they do not contribute to a BCW programme. AG participants share information on BCW proliferation trends and conduct outreach activities throughout the world to encourage non-participating countries to adopt effective export controls on dual-use chemical and biological items. All AG participants are State Parties to the CWC and the BTWC. They believe that national responsibility for export control is critical to achieving the object and purpose of the conventions to abolish BCW and to facilitate the use of chemical and biological technology for peaceful purposes by ensuring that dual-use items are not transferred for BCW-related purposes.

2.4. Missiles And Other Means Of Delivery

46. The proliferation of missile technology is an issue of significant concern. The ballistic missile has emerged as the weapon system of choice for several States, many of which are currently seeking to increase the range and accuracy of these delivery vehicles. Cruise missile technology is also being improved, and includes various models that have anti-ship or land attack missions. Technical improvements to the missiles would challenge traditional defences. Such technologies could allow for longer ranges and better accuracy, and may include countermeasures and signature reduction. Relatively inexpensive missiles are widely available now and represent a growing risk as potential delivery means for NBC warheads. Risks and threats of missile technology also include tactical air-to-surface missiles.

47. Established in 1987, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a regime of 32 states (including all 19 NATO members) that seeks to limit the proliferation of missiles and missile technology. The MTCR is not a treaty. The MTCR Partners control exports of a common list of controlled items (the MTCR Equipment and Technology Annex) according to a common export control policy (the MTCR Guidelines). The Guidelines and Annex are implemented according to each country’s own national laws and regulations. Outside the scope of membership in the Regime, the MTCR Guidelines and Annex are open to all nations to implement unilaterally. The MTCR members also exchange information on proliferation threats and trends and co-operate to halt specific shipments of proliferation concern. Member states are now evaluating approaches to deal with qualitatively new challenges, including the emergence of indigenous production and export of missiles and missile technology by non-members of the Regime. During the past year, the MTCR Partners also have focused increasingly on new ideas for addressing the ongoing global missile threat and responses to face the challenge posed by indigenous missile programmes and exports. At their October 2000 Plenary meeting in Helsinki, MTCR members continued their deliberations on a set of principles, commitments, confidence-building measures and incentives that could constitute a code of conduct against missile proliferation. They also decided to approach countries outside the Regime in order to engage them in a broader common effort to agree on a multilateral instrument open to all states.
3. Developments Over The Last Decade In The Conventional Arms Control And Disarmament Field

48. Over the course of the last several years, there have been a number of promising developments in the area of conventional arms control and related confidence and security building measures.

3.1. The Successful Adaptation Of The CFE Treaty

49. The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty of 19 November 1990 imposed legally-binding limits on the five categories of treaty limited equipment (TLE), and included provisions for exceptionally comprehensive information exchange and notifications, as well as intrusive on-site inspection and verification arrangements. More than 3,000 inspections have taken place. This transparency in arms holdings is a unique feature in an arms control treaty. The Treaty brought about dramatic reductions in TLE within Europe. More than 50,000 pieces of equipment have been destroyed or removed. During the Treaty Review Conference in 1996, the States Parties recognised the need to adapt the CFE Treaty in order to allow it to continue to sustain its key role in European security arrangements in a changing environment.

50. Adaptation negotiations began in May 1996, reflecting the fact that fundamental changes had occurred since 1990, such as the reunification of Germany, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR, the emergence of new successor states which raised the Treaty’s membership from 22 to 30 States, democratisation in Central and Eastern Europe, and the end of bloc-to-bloc tension.

51. The adaptation process was completed with the signing of the legally-binding “Agreement on Adaptation” of the CFE Treaty at the Istanbul OSCE Summit in November 1999, which will enter into force following ratification by States Parties. In Istanbul, a “Final Act” was also adopted. This politically-binding text contains all of the undertakings of restraint and progressive reductions to equipment entitlements which States Parties have offered additionally in the context of Treaty Adaptation. In addition, Allies continue to be concerned that Russia’s commitment to return to adapted flank levels as soon as possible remains to be fulfilled.

52. Pending the completion of the ratification process, the full and continued implementation of the Treaty and its associated documents remains crucial.

53. The entry into force of the Adapted Treaty will ensure the continuing viability of the CFE Treaty as a cornerstone of European security and stability. The Adapted Treaty will enhance security throughout Europe, not least as it introduces a more constraining structure of National and Territorial Ceilings, while permitting sufficient flexibility for routine training purposes and effective crisis management. The Adapted Treaty will also permit accession by new States Parties and strengthen Treaty requirements concerning host nation consent to the presence of foreign forces.
3.2. Vienna Document

54. At the Istanbul Summit in November 1999, the Member States of the OSCE also adopted the 1999 Vienna Document, which enhances the Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) introduced by the Vienna Documents of 1990, 1992 and 1994. The 1999 Vienna Document improves the current CSBMs and emphasizes the importance of regional co-operation.

3.3. Open Skies

55. Another important element in creating greater openness in the military field is the March 1992 "Open Skies" Treaty, permitting overflights of national territory on a reciprocal basis.

56. The Treaty on Open Skies is intended to enhance confidence building, facilitate the monitoring of compliance with existing or future arms control agreements, and strengthen the capacity for the early recognition and subsequent management of crises by permitting reciprocal overflights of national territory.

57. A number of trial flights have taken place over the last eight years, but the complete regime of observation flights as set forth in the Treaty has not yet entered into force. Allies continue to support ratification of this Treaty, and urge the remaining non-ratifying signatories, Russia and Belarus, to ratify so that the Treaty can enter into force as soon as possible.

3.4. Small Arms and Light Weapons

58. The proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), through illicit and irresponsible transfers, fuels intra and intra-state conflicts in which increasingly civilians are both the targets and victims of the violence.

59. There has been an increasing international awareness over the last decade of the need to prevent and reduce destabilising accumulations and flows of SALW. The UN, EU, OSCE and other international organisations have undertaken a number of initiatives at the global, regional and local levels. The UN General Assembly has agreed to convene an international conference on the illicit arms trade in all its aspects in the year 2001. Since January 1999, the member states of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) have accomplished a great deal of practical work on this issue.

3.5. Anti-Personnel Mines

60. Over the last decade, the international community has become increasingly active to counter the humanitarian difficulties caused by anti-personnel mines. NATO nations have demonstrated their commitment to tackle this scourge.

62. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction was signed in Ottawa on 3 December 1997. It came into force on 1 March 1999 and has been ratified by over 100 States.
4. Alliance Policy Of Support For Arms Control, Disarmament And Non-Proliferation

4.1. The Contribution Of Arms Control, Disarmament And Non-Proliferation To Alliance Security

63. Efforts to bring about more stable international relations at lower levels of military forces and armaments, through effective and verifiable arms control agreements and confidence-building measures, have long been an integral part of NATO's security policy.

64. The Alliance’s policy of support for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance’s security objectives. It is a policy that constitutes a key component in NATO’s broad approach to security, which recognises the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension.

65. The Alliance provides an essential consultative forum for its members on all aspects of their defence and security, including arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. As such, the consultative function serves to further the achievement of Alliance objectives in these areas. This consultation enables Allies to consider, among themselves and with Partners as well as with Mediterranean Dialogue Countries, the significance of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation for Euro-Atlantic security and to consider ways to advance these activities. Consultation takes place in the full range of NATO bodies, but most particularly in the various proliferation groups within NATO as well as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council and the NATO-Ukraine Commission. In addition, NATO bodies regularly meet with experts on disarmament, notably prior to significant international meetings such as the NPT Review Conference, the UN First Committee and the Conference on Disarmament. Of particular note, in recent months, NATO has provided a valuable forum for consultations on the implications for Alliance security and global strategic stability of theatre missile defence options and weapons of mass destruction proliferation, as well as exchanging views on the proposed U.S. National Missile Defense.

66. The Allies have a distinctive role in promoting a broader, more comprehensive and more verifiable international arms control and disarmament process. These efforts contribute significantly to transatlantic security, while enhancing global security and stability.

67. It is important to ensure that the Alliance’s approach to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation contributes to the Alliance’s security. NATO nations share the common view that arms control and CSBMs should enhance the security of all Allies, while ensuring that the Allies’ strategy of deterrence remains credible and effective. Arms control measures should maintain the strategic unity and political cohesion of the Alliance, and should safeguard the principle of the indivisibility of Alliance security by avoiding the creation of areas of unequal security.
68. Arms control measures and non-proliferation should also enable the Alliance to contribute to effective conflict prevention and engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations. In this regard, arms control measures should be based on wide-ranging partnership, co-operation, and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area.

69. Effective and reliable verification is a fundamental requirement for arms control agreements. If an arms control regime is to be effective and to build confidence, the verifiability of proposed arms control measures must remain a central concern for the Alliance. Progress in arms control should also be measured against the record of compliance with existing agreements. Agreed arms control measures must ensure adequate safeguards against circumvention.

70. The overall objectives of Allies in this field are to promote stability and transatlantic well-being, by uniting their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. In order to accomplish this, the Alliance needs to react to potential threats by developing commensurate capabilities. Non-proliferation and disarmament treaties make an important contribution to reducing threats to the Alliance, and ensuring predictability and transparency of military activities and weapons inventories. Allies undertake to promote and strengthen such treaties, as an integral part of their overall response to the challenges which face the Alliance.

71. NATO nations are guided by a number of important considerations and principles which apply to support for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. The principles and objectives of the Alliance in this area have been reaffirmed in the Strategic Concept of 1999 and will be kept under review in the light of the evolving security environment.

4.2. Allies’ Support for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation since 1990

4.2.1. Reducing Nuclear Forces

72. The context of Alliance nuclear policy is set out in the 1999 Strategic Concept: "To protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary, although at a minimum sufficient level. Taking into account the diversity of risks with which the Alliance could be faced, it must maintain the forces necessary to ensure credible deterrence and to provide a wide range of conventional response options. But the Alliance's conventional forces alone cannot ensure credible deterrence. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace."
73. During the Cold War, NATO's nuclear forces played a prominent role in the Alliance strategy. They were integrated into the whole of NATO's force structure (ground, sea, and air), and the Alliance maintained a variety of targeting plans, which could be executed at short notice. This role entailed high readiness levels and quick-reaction alert postures for significant parts of NATO's nuclear forces.

74. In light of the end of the Cold War, since 1991 the Alliance has taken far-reaching steps to adapt its overall strategy, policy and force posture to take into account the improved security environment. NATO has radically reduced its reliance on nuclear forces. Its strategy remains one of war prevention but it is no longer dominated by the possibility of nuclear escalation. Its nuclear forces are no longer targeted against any country, and the circumstances in which their use might have to be contemplated are now considered to be extremely remote.

75. The types and numbers of NATO's sub-strategic forces have been dramatically reduced, and the number of land-based nuclear warheads in Europe has been reduced by over 85 percent. Additionally, sub-strategic warheads are no longer deployed under normal circumstances on surface vessels and attack submarines. Systems such as nuclear land mines, nuclear artillery, air-to-surface missiles, anti-submarine warfare depth bombs, surface-to-air missiles and short and intermediate-range surface-to-surface missiles were all removed from Europe, and a number of modernisation or replacement plans for follow-on systems were cancelled by the Alliance’s nuclear powers. In addition, NATO nuclear storage sites have also undergone a massive reduction of about 80 percent as weapon systems were eliminated and their number of stored weapons was reduced.

76. Today, the only land-based sub-strategic nuclear weapons available to NATO are U.S. nuclear bombs capable of being delivered by dual-capable aircraft (DCA). These remaining gravity bombs are stored safely in very few storage sites under highly secure conditions. In addition to the sub-strategic U.S. nuclear weapons, there are a small number of UK Trident SSBN weapons available for a sub-strategic role.

77. Due to the new security environment NATO has also taken a number of steps to decrease the number and readiness-levels of its dual-capable aircraft. At the height of the Cold War, quick-reaction alert capable of launching within minutes was maintained for a portion of these aircraft, whereas nuclear readiness is now measured in weeks and months. There are no longer any NATO sub-strategic nuclear forces in Europe on alert.
4.2.2. Alliance policy on WMD Proliferation

78. Recognising that proliferation of WMD constitutes a threat to international security, NATO Heads of State and Government directed the Alliance in 1994 to intensify and expand its efforts against proliferation. In June 1994 NATO Foreign Ministers issued the ‘Alliance Policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, a public document stating that the principal goal of the Alliance and its member states is to prevent proliferation from occurring or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means. The document also noted that proliferation might nevertheless occur despite international non-proliferation norms and agreements, and that WMD and their delivery means can pose a direct military threat to NATO territory, populations and forces. Since 1994, the Alliance has increasingly addressed the range of defence capabilities needed to devalue WMD proliferation and use. The defence posture against WMD risks must continue to be improved to further reduce operational vulnerabilities of NATO military forces – while maintaining their flexibility and effectiveness despite the presence, threat or use of NBC weapons.

4.2.3. The Alliance’s WMD Initiative

79. In order to respond to the risks to Alliance security posed by the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, the Alliance launched an Initiative in 1999 that builds upon work since the Brussels Summit to improve overall Alliance political and military efforts in this area. This WMD Initiative is ensuring a more vigorous, structured debate at NATO leading to strengthened common understanding among Allies on WMD issues and how to respond to them; improving the quality and quantity of intelligence and information-sharing; supporting the development of a public information strategy; enhancing existing Allied military readiness to operate in a WMD environment and to counter WMD threats; strengthening the process of information exchange about Allies’ national programmes of bilateral WMD destruction and assistance; enhancing the possibilities for Allies to assist one another in the protection of their civil populations; and has created a WMD Centre within the International Staff to support these efforts. As of May 2000, the WMD Centre has been established, and has produced a robust work programme for the future.

80. The three senior NATO groups that were created to deal with the Alliance’s political and defence efforts against WMD proliferation (the Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP) and the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation (DGP) to deal with the political and defence dimensions respectively of NATO’s response, and the Joint Committee on Proliferation (JCP) to co-ordinate and combine work on political and defence efforts) have engaged in reinvigorated discussion and debate on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation issues. The SGP considers a range of factors in the political, security and economic fields that may cause or influence proliferation and discusses political and economic means to prevent or respond to it. The DGP addresses the military capabilities needed to discourage WMD proliferation, to deter threats and use of such weapons, and to protect NATO populations, territory and forces.
4.2.4. Contributing to Progress on Conventional Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

81. The Adaptation of the CFE Treaty in 1999 was the culmination of many efforts and initiatives by Alliance members to ensure that this Treaty would continue to be a cornerstone of European security, and that it would effectively meet the new security realities. During the course of the negotiations in Vienna, the Alliance put forward a comprehensive series of detailed proposals dealing with all aspects of adaptation. These were designed to ensure continued predictability and transparency as well as a greater degree of stability in the European military environment, and a further lowering of holdings of Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) among the CFE States Parties, consistent with the requirement of conflict and crisis management. Throughout the negotiations and in the period pending entry into force, the Alliance also committed itself to, and continues to exercise, restraint in relation to levels and deployments of forces in all parts of the Treaty’s Area of Application. In addition, several Allies indicated in Vienna the intention to accept limits on national equipment entitlements that are more restrictive than under the current Treaty.

82. The Alliance’s High Level Task Force (HLTF) continues to be the primary forum for the development and co-ordination of Alliance policy in the field of conventional arms control. The HLTF also functions as an experts group to engage Partners on issues of mutual interest. The Verification Coordinating Committee (VCC) continues to co-ordinate the conventional arms control verification activities of the Allies and to monitor implementation issues. With the objective of enhancing the implementation of the CFE Treaty the VCC developed a programme of intensified co-operation which was offered to the CFE Partner States in 1993. The programme continues, and includes the establishment of joint multi-national inspection teams in which Allies and Partners participate, joint training of inspectors at the NATO School, and access to the NATO arms control database. The VCC also sponsors several seminars and workshops on an annual basis.

83. Until the Adapted Treaty is ratified and enters into force, the continued full implementation of the existing treaty and its associated documents will remain crucial. Allies are now engaged in preparing for the implementation of the Adapted Treaty. The Alliance advocates its entry into force at the earliest possible time, but this can only be envisaged in the context of compliance by all States Parties with the Treaty’s agreed levels of armaments and equipment.

84. All of these efforts by the Alliance have contributed to the achievement of stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic region. In effect, these efforts are, of themselves, confidence and security-building measures.
5. NATO’s Role In The Future: Options For CSBMs, Verification, Non-Proliferation, Arms Control And Disarmament

85. In light of overall strategic developments and the reduced salience of nuclear weapons, the Alliance has considered options for confidence and security building measures, verification, non-proliferation, and arms control and disarmament. The work that has been carried out within the Alliance has been brought together in a comprehensive and integrated approach. The result is focused on specific policy options for the future, which are summarized hereafter.

5.1. Nuclear Policy Issues

5.1.1. Role of nuclear forces in NATO’s strategy

86. Notwithstanding positive developments in the strategic environment, the security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of risks, both military and non-military, which are multidirectional and often difficult to predict. As stated in the Strategic Concept of 1999, the existence of powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance constitutes a significant factor, which the Alliance has to take into account if stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area are to be maintained. NATO has radically reduced its reliance on nuclear forces, and undertook a dramatic reduction in its sub-strategic forces, a significant relaxation in the readiness criteria for nuclear-roled forces, and the termination of standing peacetime nuclear contingency plans.

87. The conclusions and recommendations relating to nuclear policy issues are based on the work carried out by the Allies concerned in the following main fields:

- Proposed CSBMs with Russia
- Transparency measures
- Nuclear Proliferation
Background on the concept of CSBMs

88. Confidence and security building measures are those intended to reduce the danger of armed conflict, to avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation of military activities, and thus to contribute to stability. CSBMs, particularly those dealing with conventional forces, have been implemented in Europe primarily in the context of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and have been primarily of a multilateral nature. Nuclear CSBMs, on the other hand, typically have been associated with arms control agreements and have been of a bilateral nature. Some nuclear CSBMs have also been unilateral in nature, such as the Bush-Gorbachev/Yeltsin Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) of 1991/1992. While unilateral in nature, the PNIs were clearly intended also to elicit a reciprocal response. The negative security assurances issued by the nuclear-weapons States are also a valuable form of CSBMs and are an important component of the non-proliferation regime.

Background on Negative Security Assurances

89. Negative Security Assurances (NSAs) are statements that each of NATO’s three nuclear-weapon States and Russia have issued, and reaffirmed, that they will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on themselves, their territories, their armed forces or other troops, their allies, or on a state towards which they have a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State. NSAs are a national responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States.

5.1.1.1. Confidence and security building measures with Russia

90. Given the extensive Russian nuclear arsenal, the NATO-Russia relationship constitutes an important focus for the consideration of options for nuclear confidence and security building measures (CSBMs). The NATO-Russia Founding Act established a mechanism, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), for consultation on a wide range of issues in order to develop, on the basis of reciprocity and transparency, a strong, stable and enduring partnership. Two of the issues listed in the Founding Act as areas for consultation and co-operation include conducting reciprocal exchanges on nuclear weapons issues, including doctrine and strategy, and consulting on nuclear safety issues across their full spectrum. NATO has agreed that consultations with Russia on future nuclear CSBMs are desirable, should build upon the provisions of the Founding Act, and should take place in the PJC. This is in keeping with the PJC Ministerial conclusion of 24 May 2000 that the Founding Act remains the basis for all NATO-Russia co-operation.
91. NATO intends to pursue with Russia four specific CSBM proposals to enhance mutual trust and to promote greater openness and transparency on nuclear weapons and safety issues:

   A. Enhance and deepen dialogue on matters related to nuclear forces,
   B. Exchange information regarding the readiness status of nuclear forces,
   C. Exchange information on safety provisions and safety features of nuclear weapons,
   D. Exchange data on U.S. and Russian sub-strategic nuclear forces.

A. Enhance and deepen dialogue on matters related to nuclear forces

92. It will be important to establish a more frequent in-depth exchange of views, assessments, and information on nuclear forces – thereby enabling a better understanding of intentions and activities in the nuclear sphere than has been the experience to date. With respect to the objective of promoting an enhanced and deepened dialogue, NATO will propose, through seminars, workshops and other expert-level meetings, a more frequent in-depth exchange of views, assessments and information on nuclear forces with Russia.

B. Exchange information regarding the readiness status of nuclear forces

93. Exchanging information on the readiness status of nuclear forces will demonstrate to Russia the unilateral measures taken by the Alliance to reduce the alert status and readiness of its forces, while increasing the Alliance’s understanding of the readiness status of Russia forces. This proposal would consist of two elements:

- A discussion of the unilateral measures already taken by NATO countries and Russia to reduce the alert status and readiness of their nuclear forces, such as those taken by the U.S. as part of the PNIs (removed all tactical/non-strategic nuclear weapons from ships in peacetime, removed strategic bombers from alert, earlier removal from alert of 450 Minuteman II missiles scheduled for elimination under START I), those taken by the UK as a result of its Strategic Defence Review (including significant reductions of warhead numbers and maintenance of only a single Trident submarine on deterrent patrol at reduced readiness), and earlier steps taken by NATO to de-alert dual-capable aircraft. Russia would be expected to present its measures taken as part of the PNIs.

- A generic description of the present state of alert for nuclear weapons of NATO countries and Russia.
C. Exchange information on safety provisions and safety features of nuclear weapons

94. This proposal involves exchanging on a reciprocal basis information on safety provisions for nuclear weapons storage and transport, as well as safety features and procedures to prevent theft and unauthorized use or to minimize the risk of accidents. The proposal could comprise any of the following elements:

Safety & Security Features of Nuclear Weapons

- Hold meetings to discuss on a reciprocal basis lessons learned by the nuclear weapons states on issues related to safety and security practices.

Share Personnel Reliability Programme Oversight Practices

- Exchange information on a reciprocal basis on personnel reliability programmes, two-person concept, or other methods for ensuring against unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.

Mutual Observation of Exercises

- Invite Russia on a reciprocal basis to observe a "nuclear accident response" exercise. The purpose would be to foster a better understanding of the procedures to be followed in responding to an accident, co-ordination required among civil and military organizations, etc.

Joint NATO-Russia accident exercise

- Invite Russia to participate in a "joint" nuclear accident response exercise. The purpose would be to enhance mutual co-operation and to improve accident response capability.

The following CSBM could also be pursued in the context of readiness measures:

"Shadow" exchange officer programme

- Establish an exchange officer programme between SHAPE and an equivalent Russian Federation Military Organization, similar to the exchange which exists between the Russian Military and the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM). The exchange could start at flag officer level and could eventually be extended down to the unit level.
D. Exchange data on U.S. and Russian sub-strategic nuclear forces

95. This proposal would involve conducting a reciprocal data exchange with Russia within the PJC context. The objective would be to enhance transparency and knowledge of the size of the U.S. and Russian stockpiles.

5.1.1.2. Transparency

96. NATO is committed to meaningful public outreach to interested individuals and groups, including discussion of the adaptations which the Alliance's force posture has undergone over the last decade in response to the changed security environment. NATO is equally committed to discussing the Alliance’s policy of support for nuclear arms control and disarmament. In this regard, the Alliance will continue to broaden its engagement with interested non-governmental organizations, academic institutions and the general public and will contribute actively to discussion and debate regarding nuclear weapons and nuclear arms control and disarmament issues.

97. As NATO has reacted to the changes of the past 10 years, it has developed a number of documents that set out the facts and rationale of the Alliance's nuclear posture. NATO's Strategic Concept of 1991 and its revision in 1999 are public documents. Additionally, communiqués from NATO foreign and defence ministerials have chronicled successive reductions in Alliance nuclear forces and other changes in Alliance posture. Several documents have been developed by the Allies concerned to address nuclear issues. These documents were designed primarily for use by Allied officials in responding publicly to questions. Basic Fact Sheets, as well as a recent paper on 'NATO's Nuclear Stance', are now available on NATO's internet website.

98. The general aim of transparency is to contribute to confidence and security building and non-proliferation and to foster public and political support by explaining the rationale of NATO's nuclear policy and posture. The following policy issues are of particular importance:

The role of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War security environment.

- There is a clear rationale for a continued, though much reduced, presence of substrategic forces in Europe. This is consistent with the Alliance's fundamental guiding principle of common commitment, mutual co-operation and collective security, the burden and risks of providing the nuclear element of NATO's deterrent capability should not be borne by the nuclear powers alone.

NATO's force posture since the end of the Cold War.

- Drastic reductions and significant relaxation of readiness levels to Alliance nuclear forces have been implemented since the end of the Cold War.
Safety, security, and survivability of nuclear weapons.

- NATO is transparent to the maximum degree possible with respect to the safety, security, survivability, and storage conditions of U.S. nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons and procedures are designed to ensure that weapons are safely and securely stored and handled.

5.1.1.3. Nuclear Proliferation

99. Nuclear proliferation remains a concern for both governments and publics. It touches on aspects of nuclear policy, nuclear arms control and disarmament policy, and traditional non-proliferation policy as well. Allies concerned have explored -- in the broadest sense -- the reasons why nations may be attempting to acquire, or already have acquired, nuclear weapons despite the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

100. Allies concerned have concluded that the primary motivations for proliferants' pursuit and development of nuclear weapons remain "local" threat perceptions, regional ambitions, and global prestige. The idea that proliferant states would assess the broader military and security environment in deciding to develop weapons of mass destruction is only common-sense. However, no evidence was found that proliferant nations acquire nuclear capabilities based on the fact that NATO maintains nuclear weapons in Europe for ensuring the security of the Alliance. NATO's residual sub-strategic nuclear arsenal -- which has been dramatically reduced and its land-based forces de-alerted and de-mated -- is not responsible for nuclear proliferation.

101. NATO's nuclear posture has evolved constantly to suit the changing realities of Euro-Atlantic security. Indeed, in line with this approach, the Alliance has over the past decade continually reviewed its nuclear doctrine and posture. In concluding that the role of NATO's nuclear forces in today's environment is fundamentally political, the Alliance has greatly reduced the operational/military focus for these weapons. To support such changes, the size and readiness of the NATO nuclear stockpile and forces have been dramatically reduced, and the remaining land-based forces have been de-alerted and de-mated. These measures reflect the reduced role of nuclear weapons in the current security environment. They also support NATO's policy that the Alliance's nuclear weapons will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability. This enhances the security of the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond.
102. NATO countries have made firm commitments to realistic and practical measures toward arms control and disarmament in the area of nuclear weapons. To this end, NATO and its nuclear weapons states have taken unilateral steps, entered into bilateral agreements, undertaken CSBMs, and adhered to a range of multilateral agreements that support arms control and disarmament. It bears noting that all Allied governments are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and signatories to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. By contrast, proliferant states have shown little interest in pursuing similar measures -- either through adjustments to their own posture, or through measures to promote disarmament and arms control. The consequence of this has been that their nuclear programmes have diminished, not strengthened security and stability within their regions and beyond. Here again, despite statements that profess support for total disarmament, the actions of proliferant states suggest a very different approach.

5.2. Support By Alliance Members For The Non-Proliferation Treaty

103. As States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, all Allies are committed to and will continue to pursue vigorously the principles and objectives of the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.

104. Alliance nations have dramatically reduced nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and reaffirm their commitment under Article VI of the NPT to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

105. Allies have welcomed the decisions concerning the indefinite extension of the NPT and the “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” adopted by the 1995 NPT Review Conference. They have also welcomed the positive outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. The Conference agreed on the importance of universal adherence to and compliance with the NPT, and reaffirmed the commitment of all States Parties to disarmament, IAEA safeguards, and peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with the NPT. Allies confirm their commitments made at the NPT Review Conference and will contribute to carrying forward and implementing the conclusions reached there.

106. NATO members support the entire Final Document of the May 2000 NPT Review Conference, including all of the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament”:

- The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

- A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.
The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.

The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

- Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.
- Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.
- The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.
- Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.
- A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.
- The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

- Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes.

- Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

- Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”, and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

- The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

5.3. Arms Control Issues Relevant To Outer Space

107. Alliance member States support the view that it is particularly important for the international community to preserve and protect current economic and security benefits from the use of Outer Space while avoiding the creation of new and daunting military competitions in the future. There already exist a number of agreements for limiting the uses of Outer Space to those that are peaceful and for providing a framework for the legitimate military uses of Outer Space. Alliance nations share specific interests in, and have already expressed support for the following areas:

- efforts within the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).
- the establishment within the Conference on Disarmament (CD) of a subsidiary body to discuss issues relevant to Outer Space, in the context of a programme of work for the CD.

5.4. Building Confidence Through Consultations With Partners And Dialogue Countries

108. NATO's dialogue with partners plays a distinct role in the overall efforts of the Alliance to promote a broader, more comprehensive and more verifiable arms control and disarmament process, and in the achievement of the Alliance's non-proliferation goals.
109. NATO recognises that confidence and trust are necessary conditions for an irreversible disarmament process and for non-proliferation efforts to succeed, and that confidence and trust can only be achieved through openness and transparency. The Alliance has adopted a comprehensive approach to enhance openness and transparency in proliferation-related matters, including consultations with Partners on our ability to operate together under the threat of WMD use.

5.4.1. Consultations with Russia

110. The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) was established under the NATO-Russia Founding Act of May 1997. The Founding Act provides for regular meetings of the PJC at ambassadorial level as well as bi-annual meetings at the level of Foreign Ministers. Its purpose is to provide a venue for consultation, cooperation and consensus-building in discussions of political and security matters. In this context, it has been agreed that NATO member states and Russia will meet - at expert level - to discuss political and defence efforts against proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their delivery means, including discussion of current risks. It has also been agreed that experts will consult on defence-related questions, including information regarding threat perceptions, the development of common language and terminology on WMD proliferation topics, and defence responses to WMD proliferation threats.

111. NATO-Russia expert level consultations on proliferation have, to date, included very productive discussions on defence issues related to proliferation, as well as more in-depth consultations on specific proliferation risks. A longer term work programme for consultations is currently being developed with Russia; it is envisaged that this programme will include key questions on nuclear, biological, chemical weapons and delivery means.

5.4.2. Consultations with Ukraine

112. The NATO-Ukraine Commission was established under the terms of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine signed in July 1997. The Commission meets at least twice a year to review progress in the development of the relationship between NATO and Ukraine. Consultations with Ukraine on proliferation have included a general exchange of views on risks, the role and effectiveness of multi-national regimes, and questions regarding assistance with export controls. Ukraine has highlighted its own national contributions to global non-proliferation efforts: following its independence, it joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1994, renouncing the possession of nuclear weapons; Ukraine ratified the CTBT in November 2000; Ukraine is also active in international fora on non-proliferation, inter alia in the South Asia Task Force. Further consultations with Ukraine are actively being planned.

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113. The Alliance dialogue with Russia and with Ukraine on proliferation-related issues are tangible contributions to the overall goal of establishing CSBMs. The Alliance will work for the enhancement and deepening of the established broad dialogue with Russia on a reciprocal basis within the framework of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. Furthermore, the Alliance will pursue its broad dialogue with Ukraine on matters related to WMD proliferation, including defence-related consultations aimed to promote increased cooperation eventually leading to interoperability in defence efforts against the risks posed by WMD. It is recommended that these consultations be continued and improved.

5.4.3. Consultations with EAPC Partners and Mediterranean Dialogue Countries

114. Allies recognize the importance of consultations at an appropriate stage on WMD proliferation issues with other Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) Partners and with Mediterranean Dialogue countries, in accordance with the Washington Summit’s Initiative on Weapons of Mass Destruction. It is recommended that the Alliance proceed with defining the nature and scope of consultations with EAPC Partners and Mediterranean Dialogue countries, and that the Alliance undertake such consultations, with a view to increasing common understanding and information-sharing on proliferation-related issues. Such consultations constitute a useful contribution to confidence-building activities.

5.5. Information On The Activities Of Other International Bodies Involved In Non-Proliferation Activities

115. As part of the Alliance’s broad approach to security, NATO member States actively support arms control and disarmament, as well as non-proliferation efforts in the field of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means. The Alliance has undertaken activities in this field that complement those of relevant international organizations, while ensuring that NATO’s efforts do not duplicate the work of others. One of the objectives of the Alliance’s WMD Initiative is to ensure a more vigorous, structured debate within NATO-leading to strengthened common understanding among Allies on WMD issues and how to respond to them. In this context, a more vigorous, structured debate can very usefully draw upon a clear understanding of the objectives and ongoing activities of other international organisations involved in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. It is therefore quite important for NATO Allies to maintain and reinvigorate the flow of information with and about relevant international bodies in this field.
5.6. Conventional Arms Control

5.6.1. The CFE process

116. The CFE process, begun in 1990, has achieved a significant reduction in the holdings of conventional armaments and equipment of the States Parties to the Treaty and has established a new pattern of security relations among them. However, there are continuing implementation issues, which must be addressed as we approach the next CFE Review Conference in 2001. The Agreement on the Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), signed at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul on 19 November 1999, will ensure the continuing role of the CFE Treaty as a cornerstone of European security and stability. The successful completion of this negotiation is an important contribution to the overall process of enhancing security and stability in Europe. It also demonstrates the common commitment of Allies to cooperative security relations.

117. Maintaining the effectiveness and credibility of the CFE Treaty will also represent a significant contribution to the overall process of enhancing arms control. In this regard, NATO Ministers at Florence have stated that the Alliance advocates “entry into force at the earliest possible time but this can only be envisaged in the context of compliance by all States Parties with the Treaty's agreed levels of armaments and equipment, consistent with the commitments contained in the CFE Final Act. We look for early and effective implementation of Russia’s commitments to reduce and withdraw its forces from Moldova and Georgia.” But we remain concerned about the continued high levels of Russian Treaty limited equipment in relation to the Treaty’s Article V (“Flank”) limits. These levels must be brought into line with treaty limits in a manner consistent with agreed counting rules and procedures. It is on this basis that Allies will continue to work towards bringing the Adapted Treaty into force. Pending the completion of this process, the full and continued implementation of the Treaty and its associated documents remains crucial.

118. NATO nations have begun work on tasks related to the implementation of the Adapted CFE Treaty. This work will include the development and/or updating of procedures for co-ordination among Allies for the implementation of the Adapted CFE Treaty and consideration of procedures for enhanced co-operation with CFE Partners.

119. The accession provisions of the Adapted CFE Treaty provide for increasing the number of States Parties and extending the CFE pattern of new security relations based on peaceful co-operation beyond the current 30 States Parties. In accordance with those provisions, addition on a case-by-case basis of new States Parties to the Adapted CFE Treaty can contribute to transparency, predictability, and stability within the Euro-Atlantic region.

120. The Alliance views conventional arms control to be both an important tool of conflict prevention and an integral part of crisis response. There may be scope for including specific reference to arms control provisions in Alliance planning documents dealing with crisis management.
5.6.2. The Way Ahead on Conventional Arms Control

121. The negotiation of Vienna Document 1999 demonstrated that the current Document sets a high substantive standard for new pan-European CSBMs. Allies agree that the future challenges in the conventional arms control/CSBM arena are likely to focus on regional and sub-regional issues.

122. In the Euro-Atlantic region a comprehensive regime of conventional arms control has been developed. This may serve as an example for other regions of the world. In this context Allies and the Alliance will continue to have expertise to offer and a contribution to make to discussions on regional agreements.

123. There may be scope for encouraging the development, within the appropriate fora, of discussions on stabilising measures in certain regions of tension.

124. Upon entry into force of the Adapted CFE Treaty, OSCE participating States with territory in the area between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains may apply for accession to the Adapted Treaty, thereby providing an important additional contribution to European stability and security. The Alliance is pleased that the Adapted Treaty will permit accession by new States Parties, and stands ready to provide relevant information to accession candidates regarding the rights and responsibilities of States Parties.

125. The Alliance will continue to engage Russia, Ukraine and other EAPC Partners in discussion of conventional arms control issues, as opportunities arise.

5.7. NATO and EAPC Contribution On Small Arms And Light Weapons

126. NATO, along with the UN, EU, OSCE and other international organizations have undertaken a number of initiatives at the global, regional and local levels. Alliance members have engaged in a dialogue with NATO Partners in the EAPC on practical steps that can be taken to deal with the challenge of small arms. The EAPC Ad Hoc Working Group on Small Arms and Light Weapons has addressed stockpile management and security, national export controls and enforcement mechanisms, and weapons collection and destruction in the context of peacekeeping operations. Individual Allies and Partners have co-sponsored a number of seminars and workshops addressing a number of these issues. NATO and Partner countries including through SFOR and KFOR, have made substantial contributions to the control, seizure and destruction of small arms in the Balkans, and will continue these efforts. It is recommended that NATO members build upon the fruitful co-operation that has taken place within the EAPC, and identify further means to address the challenge of SALW. In this context, Alliance members look forward to participating actively in the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects.
5.8. NATO and Anti-Personnel Landmines

127. Landmines can take a disproportionate toll on civilian populations in conflict, can stall reconstruction especially in rural areas in post-conflict situations, and can pose a significant risk to NATO forces in peace support operations. NATO nations have demonstrated their commitment to tackle this scourge.

128. NATO has been actively engaged on the landmines issues through the work of the EAPC Ad Hoc Working Group on Global Humanitarian Mine Action, and through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Partnership Work Programme. Specific initiatives have included the creation of a PfP Trust Fund for Anti-Personnel Landmine Destruction, as well as seminars and workshops.

129. NATO and non-NATO troops involved in Peace Support Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (SFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR) conduct daily operational mine-clearing in support of military operations, to ensure their own security, the freedom of movement and the completion of assigned tasks.

130. De-mining to humanitarian standards, which provides a guarantee that the area is almost totally clear of mines (more than 99% clear), is under the responsibility of the United Nations Mine Action Services (UNMAS). However, IFOR/SFOR, and more recently KFOR have provided and are still providing assistance to International Organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations, and local organizations in humanitarian de-mining efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.
# 6. Index of Abbreviations

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<td>Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine</td>
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