Press Release M-NAC- 2(2000)121 Report on Options for Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), Verification, Non-Prolife- ration, Arms Control and Disarmament December 2000

5. NATO's Role In The Future : Options For CSBMs, Verification, Non-Proliferation, Arms Control And Disarmament 5.1. Nuclear Policy Issues 5.1.1. Role of nuclear forces in NATO's strategy Notwithstanding positive developments in the strategic environment, the security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of risks, both military and non-military, which are multidirectional and often difficult to predict. As stated in the Strategic Concept of 1999, the existence of powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance constitutes a significant factor, which the Alliance has to take into account if stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area are to be maintained. NATO has radically reduced its reliance on nuclear forces, and undertook a dramatic reduction in its sub-strategic forces, a significant relaxation in the readiness criteria for nuclear-roled forces, and the termination of standing peacetime nuclear contingency plans. The conclusions and recommendations relating to nuclear policy issues are based on the work carried out by the Allies concerned in the following main fields: Proposed CSBMs with Russia Transparency measures Nuclear Proliferation Background on the concept of CSBMs Confidence and security building measures are those intended to reduce the danger of armed conflict, to avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation of military activities, and thus to contribute to stability. CSBMs, particularly those dealing with conventional forces, have been implemented in Europe primarily in the context of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and have been primarily of a multilateral nature. Nuclear CSBMs, on the other hand, typically have been associated with arms control agreements and have been of a bilateral nature. Some nuclear CSBMs have also been unilateral in nature, such as the Bush-Gorbachev/Yeltsin Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) of 1991/1992. While unilateral in nature, the PNIs were clearly intended also to elicit a reciprocal response. The negative security assurances issued by the nuclear-weapons States are also a valuable form of CSBMs and are an important component of the non-proliferation regime. Background on Negative Security Assurances Negative Security Assurances (NSAs) are statements that each of NATO's three nuclear-weapon States and Russia have issued, and reaffirmed, that they will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on themselves, their territories, their armed forces or other troops, their allies, or on a state towards which they have a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State. NSAs are a national responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States.