Press Release M-NAC- 2(2000)121 Report on Options for Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), Verification, Non-Prolife- ration, Arms Control and Disarmament December 2000

4. Alliance Policy of Support for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation 4.2. Allies' Support for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation since 1990 4.2.1. Reducing Nuclear Forces The context of Alliance nuclear policy is set out in the 1999 Strategic Concept: "To protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary, although at a minimum sufficient level. Taking into account the diversity of risks with which the Alliance could be faced, it must maintain the forces necessary to ensure credible deterrence and to provide a wide range of conventional response options. But the Alliance's conventional forces alone cannot ensure credible deterrence. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace." During the Cold War, NATO's nuclear forces played a prominent role in the Alliance strategy. They were integrated into the whole of NATO's force structure (ground, sea, and air), and the Alliance maintained a variety of targeting plans, which could be executed at short notice. This role entailed high readiness levels and quick-reaction alert postures for significant parts of NATO's nuclear forces. In light of the end of the Cold War, since 1991 the Alliance has taken far-reaching steps to adapt its overall strategy, policy and force posture to take into account the improved security environment. NATO has radically reduced its reliance on nuclear forces. Its strategy remains one of war prevention but it is no longer dominated by the possibility of nuclear escalation. Its nuclear forces are no longer targeted against any country, and the circumstances in which their use might have to be contemplated are now considered to be extremely remote. The types and numbers of NATO's sub-strategic forces have been dramatically reduced, and the number of land-based nuclear warheads in Europe has been reduced by over 85 percent. Additionally, sub-strategic warheads are no longer deployed under normal circumstances on surface vessels and attack submarines. Systems such as nuclear land mines, nuclear artillery, air-to-surface missiles, anti-submarine warfare depth bombs, surface-to-air missiles and short and intermediate-range surface-to-surface missiles were all removed from Europe, and a number of modernisation or replacement plans for follow-on systems were cancelled by the Alliance's nuclear powers. In addition, NATO nuclear storage sites have also undergone a massive reduction of about 80 percent as weapon systems were eliminated and their number of stored weapons was reduced. Today, the only land-based sub-strategic nuclear weapons available to NATO are U.S. nuclear bombs capable of being delivered by dual-capable aircraft (DCA). These remaining gravity bombs are stored safely in very few storage sites under highly secure conditions. In addition to the sub-strategic U.S. nuclear weapons, there are a small number of UK Trident SSBN weapons available for a sub-strategic role. Due to the new security environment NATO has also taken a number of steps to decrease the number and readiness-levels of its dual-capable aircraft. At the height of the Cold War, quick-reaction alert capable of launching within minutes was maintained for a portion of these aircraft, whereas nuclear readiness is now measured in weeks and months. There are no longer any NATO sub-strategic nuclear forces in Europe on alert.