Press Release M-NAC- 2(2000)121 Report on Options for Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), Verification, Non-Prolife- ration, Arms Control and Disarmament December 2000

2. Developments over the Last Decade in the Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons Environment 2.3. Biological And Chemical Weapons The proliferation of biological and chemical weapons (BCW) is widely recognized as a growing international security problem, both for interstate conflict and as a potential dimension of terrorism. The 1925 Geneva Protocol bans the use of chemical and biological weapons. States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), which entered into force in 1975, agree not to develop, produce, stockpile or acquire biological agents and related equipment used for hostile purposes. Long considered a weakness is the fact that the BTWC contains no verification mechanisms, unlike similar arms control agreements. To enhance confidence in compliance with the BTWC, the 1986 Review Conference agreed on a set of confidence-building measures. In 1994 a Special Conference established an Ad Hoc Group of States Parties to the Convention to consider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention, as appropriate, in a legally binding Protocol. The fourth Review Conference in 1996 agreed that such a Protocol should be completed as soon as possible before the commencement of the fifth Review conference in 2001. During their meeting held in Florence on 24 May 2000, NATO Ministers reiterated the commitment of Allies "to efforts to achieve such an instrument as soon as possible before the 5th Review Conference of the BTWC in 2001". To ban chemical weapons and to prevent their proliferation, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament between 1980 and 1992, and entered into force in 1997. Each party agrees never to develop, produce, acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, not to use or prepare to use CW, and not to assist others in acting against the provisions of the Convention. The Convention also requires states-parties to destroy any CW in their possession, and to destroy their CW production facilities. The Organisation for the Prohibition of CW (OPCW), that was established in 1997, is responsible for addressing implementation issues. The world's declared stockpiles of 70.000 tons of chemical weapons and more than 8 million munitions have been inspected by OPCW inspectors; the four countries that have declared possession of chemical weapons are all actively engaged in their destruction, but one of them, Russia, is encountering problems. All of the 60 declared chemical weapons production facilities around the world have been inspected and sealed. Despite this positive progress there have been major difficulties in implementing the necessary chemical weapons destruction. In particular, Russia continues to have significant trouble in making available the necessary funding to destroy all of its chemical weapons by the Convention's deadline. The Australia Group (AG) was established in 1984 to ensure that the industries of participating countries did not assist, either intentionally or inadvertently, states seeking to acquire a BCW capability by supplying them with dual-use materials and equipment. The 32 countries that participate in the AG have instituted national export controls on all items on the AG control lists. These lists contain chemical precursors, biological toxins, pathogens and micro-organisms, and chemical and biological production equipment. Trade in items on the AG lists is not banned; rather AG participants agree to control exports of listed items to ensure they do not contribute to a BCW programme. AG participants share information on BCW proliferation trends and conduct outreach activities throughout the world to encourage non-participating countries to adopt effective export controls on dual-use chemical and biological items. All AG participants are State Parties to the CWC and the BTWC. They believe that national responsibility for export control is critical to achieving the object and purpose of the conventions to abolish BCW and to facilitate the use of chemical and biological technology for peaceful purposes by ensuring that dual-use items are not transferred for CBW-related purposes.