RENEWING THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP

Simon Serfaty

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FOREWORD

History tends to depersonalize its own creation. Historic developments of great significance do not simply occur as natural phenomena. They are the product of human imagination and interaction. The bedrock partnership of the Cold War that linked the advanced democracies in North America and Europe was the intentional creation of individual personalities. Yet, even as visionary leaders were indispensable in crafting an early institutional framework for transatlantic and intra-European cooperation, the details had to be filled in by hundreds of thousands of individuals who understood the relevance and importance of such a framework for their own lives and the lives of their children.

In a most fundamental way, the transatlantic partnership was a product of necessity. Both sides of the Atlantic feared the ominous threat posed by the hostile forces of international communism, backed up by the Red Army on the frontiers of Western Europe. But this was not an alliance of convenience for which history provides many antecedents. This was a deeper partnership, one grounded on fundamental questions on how man relates to society and on how society should be managed to insure the survival of nations and the prosperity of their citizens.

This early vision and collaboration worked. Bound together by necessity, we discovered together a larger and more valuable truth. Civil society can advance through peaceful means. Representative government is not limited to chosen peoples. Children can learn to embrace the visions of their parents and improve upon those dreams.

In recent months, this partnership has become strained, not by its failings but by its success. Inevitably, an alliance of democratic countries will be moved by differing perceptions of challenges and opportunities. We would have failed in our most basic task had we nurtured a partnership that could not disagree on important matters of priority and purpose. The differences have become significant, however, and the partnership is badly torn on a wide range of issues. Can we sustain this transatlantic community in the years ahead?

In the pages that follow, Simon Serfaty discusses this question with great insight. His essay concludes a series of events and discussions held since October 2002, as part of a project sponsored by the DaimlerChrysler Corporation Fund. I well recall the early days when Daimler and Chrysler agreed to merge. While controversial at the time, the move signaled the rich culmination of years of political commitment in the transatlantic partnership. DaimlerChrysler is paying dividends now on this political investment by helping us all to value the partnership that we too often take for granted.

John J. Hamre
President & CEO, CSIS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This essay grew out of a series of events hosted by the CSIS Europe Program in partnership with the DaimlerChrysler Corporation Fund. Organized in the context of a program on "Renewing the Transatlantic Partnership: The 2002 NATO-EU Summits and Beyond," these dialogues took place over the course of six months, beginning in October 2002. The goal of the program was to provide a forum for policymakers in the United States and Europe to discuss their evolving interests across a wide range of security, political, and trade issues. Meetings were held in both Washington, D.C., and Berlin and involved the participation of senior-level leaders from both sides of the Atlantic, including current and former members of the U.S. Congress, current and former cabinet-level national security officials from Europe and the United States, and senior corporate executives.

CSIS and DaimlerChrysler would like to thank the numerous individuals whose contributions shaped the quality of the various discussions. In particular, we wish to extend our appreciation to the distinguished Americans and Europeans who agreed to introduce the five dialogues held in the course of this program: former German minister of defense Volker Rühe, former U.S. ambassador to Germany Richard R. Burt, and Christoph Bertram, director of the Berlin-based Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Berlin, October 17, 2002); German ambassador to the United States Wolfgang Ischinger, former U.S. deputy secretary of the treasury Stuart E. Eizenstat, and *National Journal* columnist Bruce Stokes (Washington, D.C., October 28, 2002); EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana and former U.S. national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski (Washington, D.C., December 17, 2002); former U.S. deputy secretary of defense and current CSIS president and CEO John J. Hamre (Washington, D.C., January 13, 2003); and former U.S. secretary of state Madeleine K. Albright and French ambassador to the United States Jean-David Levitte (Washington, D.C., March 13, 2003).

We would also like to state our appreciation for the many speakers who agreed to lead the discussions at a conference held in Washington on December 3, 2002, including our keynote speakers, U.S. senator Richard G. Lugar and Jürgen E. Schrempp, chairman of the board of DaimlerChrysler, alongside such other distinguished speakers and panelists as then-U.S. deputy secretary of the treasury Kenneth W. Dam and Ambassadors Richard Fairbanks, Richard N. Haass, Robert M. Kimmit, Christopher Meyer, Hugo Paemen, and Elena Poptodorova. Together with the many individuals who attended each session—far too many to list individually—their contributions added immensely to our dialogues. Finally, we would also like to extend our thanks to Robert G. Liberatore, senior vice president for external affairs and public policy at DaimlerChrylser in Washington, D.C., who originated the idea for such a series of dialogues and provided steady support and encouragement throughout this program.

RENEWING THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP

Simon Serfaty

A Critical Juncture

Once again we have entered a defining moment in U.S. foreign policy and in the history of the United States' relations with Europe. Once again we are engaged in a major debate that is said to be separating us, Americans and Europeans. Once again we are debating the relevance of our alliance and the significance of our ties. Once again the transatlantic partnership is said to be in need of renewal as it comes dangerously close to exceeding the limits of legitimate discord.[1]

There have been many other such debates in the past. But with the Cold War a full decade behind, and with many years of the wars against terrorism looming ahead, the transatlantic juncture has rarely seemed to be so critical. Growing divisions within the Atlantic Alliance, it is argued, are marginalizing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). No less significantly, an apparent reappraisal of the terms of transatlantic solidarity is causing new ruptures within the European Union (EU), where a bitter and divisive quarrel between an allegedly "old" and a seemingly "new" Europe over the use of force in Iraq appeared to overwhelm the process of unification that had been entering its "final" phase. In short, this is a defining moment with lasting consequences, for the much better or the much worse.

Admittedly, at such moments no consensus can be expected to emerge quickly or be endorsed gracefully. After 1945, neither Americans nor Europeans agreed on the agenda that confronted them and on the most effective ways to address it. The bold ideas that shaped President Truman's policies for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of postwar Europe, including the defeated state, were dismissed by many on both sides of the Atlantic as naïve, and even dangerous. Rebuild and rearm Germany? Stay in and unite Europe?

1. This paper served as background for a Joint Declaration prepared for, and endorsed by, Madeleine K. Albright, Harold Brown, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Frank C. Carlucci, Warren Christopher, William S. Cohen, Robert Dole, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Stuart E. Eizenstat, Lee H. Hamilton, John J. Hamre, Carla A. Hills, Sam Nunn, Paul H. O'Neill, Charles S. Robb, William V. Roth Jr., and James R. Schlesinger.

Contain the USSR until such a time as communism would be toppled and Eastern Europe liberated? Americans, Europeans feared, would not have the endurance needed to lead the West. Europeans, Americans countered, would not have the resilience needed to master their own past and refashion their continent as a cohesive and stable whole.

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These concerns were misplaced. Periodic Atlantic (and European) crises stalled but never derailed the community of interests and values that progressively emerged between the United States and Europe, as well as within an expanding European Community (EC). What is, therefore, most unusual about today's transatlantic debate is not the debate itself but its participants. To engage it, instinctive Euro-skeptics and professional anti-Americans have been joined by confirmed Atlanticists who committed much of their public and professional lives to the development of Euro-Atlantic policies. "Maybe we don't" still need the alliance after all, said former U.S. secretary of state George Shultz, as a matter of fact though not as a matter of preference. Worse yet, it may not be possible to salvage the alliance, even if it is shown that it is still needed, because neither side of the Atlantic might be willing to do so anymore.[2]

A generation ago, it will be recalled, it was a perceived "decline" of U.S. power that was said to be causing an endangered Europe to rebel against an alleged U.S. "arrogance" in order to insulate the allies from the consequences of failed U.S. policies in Vietnam and elsewhere. By comparison, today's arguments respond to the same general goal—this time, however, aiming at the rise of U.S. power, especially military power. The goal, it is argued, is no longer to help Europe grow but to make U.S. power shrink by imposing upon the latter the same institutional discipline—at the United Nations and within NATO—that the countries of Europe accepted in the context of their union. In other words, Europe's fear now stems from an excess of U.S. power that is reportedly inviting a neo-interventionism *à l'américaine*, that is, *sans* the Europeans. Indeed, it is now argued in the United States, if the "old" alliance is fading for lack of followership, something "new" may have to be organized in its place—with new NATO members from Eastern and Southeastern Europe, which have not yet been corrupted by membership in the EU, or with late EU members like Britain and Spain, which have not succumbed to pressures from core members like France and Germany.[3]

2. James Harding, "George Shultz Still Holds Sway in the Corridors of Power," *Financial Times*, November 21, 2001.

3. Jeff Gedmin, "The Alliance Is Doomed," *Washington Post*, May 20, 2002, p. A21.

How are we to account for the increasingly bitter tone of the transatlantic dialogue—if that is what it has been—since the emotional outbursts of complete solidarity and shared public grief that followed the dramatic events of September 11, 2001? References to persistent anti-American strains in Europe, and an unprecedented streak of hostility toward President George W. Bush, are not enough to explain the intensity of the moment. Some of that intensity is a matter of ideology—the lingering echoes of a European Left that resents the U.S. "belief in individualism, liberty and self-reliance," especially when these beliefs are attributed to Republican conservatives.[4] In early 2001 that passion could already be felt as issues that define the liberal-conservative cleavage in the United States spilled across the Atlantic—about such issues as the death penalty, the environment, gun control, and others. To make matters worse, differences over societal values were reinforced by dangerous divergences over national security issues that involved all aspects of strategic weapons and the management of rogue, defeated, and rising powers such as Iraq, Russia, and China respectively. Over these issues, too, forceful European fears were voiced over the unilateralist instincts of an administration that neglected, voided, or withdrew from international agreements, conventions, and treaties negotiated by its predecessors.

Yet beyond the repetitiveness of Europe's anti-Americanism, whatever its causes at any point in time, there should be little doubt that, more than the end of the Cold War, it is the events of September 11 and their aftermath that transformed Europe's visions of America and its role in the world, even as these same events were transforming the corresponding U.S. vision of the world and Europe's role within the alliance. Faced with the facts of the United States' preponderance of power, Europe portrays itself as an exercise in self-control—the new, Old World that called a timeout from its own history to enjoy the bliss of self-abnegation and multilateral discipline.

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Neither acts of war proper nor mere terrorist actions, the assaults of September 11, 2001, pointed to a novel approach to the use of force and, by implication, a novel kind of warfare. As a result, Americans, too, were dramatically exposed to a territorial vulnerability that had been thought to be limited to other countries. Now at last, the "over there" of yesteryear's wars have moved "over here" onto U.S. soil.

Coming soon after the sharp criticism that had greeted the arrival of the Bush administration earlier in the year, Europe's emotional response to these events and the war that

4. Will Hutton, *The World We're In* (London: Little Brown, 2002), p. 357.

followed was nevertheless extraordinary. It involved not only the unprecedented invocation of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, but also an equally impressive display of "total solidarity" from the 15 members of the EU, as well as the use of European influence to ensure swift and unanimous UN support for the United States. Indeed, even with the hindsight of the current quarrel, America's surprise in the face of the institutional triple play managed spontaneously by its closest allies was itself surprising: if not from Europe, from where? In the fall of 2001, like-minded countries on both sides of the Atlantic reaffirmed that the transatlantic community of values they had come to form over the previous 50 years could reason and act as one when these values were at risk.

That did not last long, however. For one, the dust in New York had barely settled when the allies in Europe began showing a growing ambivalence about the scope and goals of the U.S. reaction. With the history of the Old World serving as reference for the events that had transpired in the New World, many in Europe tended to minimize their significance and emphasize instead the normalcy of pain in interstate relations as they had known it over the years. After all, war is remembered as a way of life for the former European Great Powers, and terror is a recurring accident that can be defeated when it erupts and must be forgotten after it has been defeated. Moreover, Europeans could claim that fighting terrorism was nothing new within their own borders. Making September 11 look almost banal, by the standards set in Europe, foreclosed the case for a "new normalcy," argued on the basis of standards set in the United States.

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To be or not to be at war? The semantic contest that began almost at once across the Atlantic pointed to a strategic transatlantic gap that has since grown.[5] But for Americans who had lived the horrific events of September 11, that debate made little sense. Whatever word might be used to name this attack, and however well it might be said to fit the ways of history, it is not the "American way." Accordingly, President George W. Bush insisted that the threat that had been exposed on September 11 would have to be defeated without conditions, and even preempted without compassion—to the obvious satisfaction of a general public whose approval of President Bush remained accordingly high, but to the visible dismay of a European (and worldwide) public opinion whose opposition to U.S. policies kept rising even when local governments remained supportive.

5. See, for example, Michael Howard, "Mistake to Declare this a War?" *RUSI Journal* 146 (December 2001), pp. 1–4.

On January 29, 2002, the president's State of the Union message was a turning point in this split in public perceptions. What caused offense in Europe were its tone as well as its substance—what Bush said and how he said it, as well as what he might do and to what ends. Coming barely three months after Europe's display of solidarity within NATO, through the EU, and at the United Nations, most European countries found the president's failure to mention any of these three institutions astonishing. References to an "axis of evil" among Iran, Iraq, and North Korea left most of continental Europe also fearful of what might come next, whether in terms of other terrorist attacks that would be aimed at soft European targets, or in terms of U.S. reprisals likely to be aimed at targets near Europe. To make matters worse, the speech deepened the allies' apprehension that, as had been shown in Afghanistan, they were being moved to a secondary role even for the treatment of issues with which they were directly concerned and which they had explicitly committed to defeat in coordination with their senior partner across the Atlantic.

For Americans, there was also a not-so-small matter of European Bush-bashing. From the start, Europe's presentation of the new U.S. president as inexperienced and ill prepared for the world often crossed the boundaries of tolerable language. Even Americans who might have shared these concerns, and sometimes voiced them, found corresponding European characterizations of their president abusive and offensive. At best, President Bush was said to be a younger version of Ronald Reagan—a comparison that most Europeans did not mean to be flattering—and his "axis of evil" speech was promptly linked (forgetting the outcome and its benefits) to Reagan's battle with the "evil empire" a generation earlier, boosted by a puerile desire to attend to security matters left unfinished by his father during the first war in the Persian Gulf.

Yet, instead of echoing Ronald Reagan or his father, President Bush was rather emulating Harry S. Truman. In March 1947, it was also in a message to Congress that Truman had evoked the "new normalcy" shaped by the rise of the Soviet threat to America's security and way of life. To contain and ultimately roll back the new and elusive enemy that was feared as a central threat to the democratic way of life, a transatlantic coalition was formed—a single but multidimensional coalition within which the goals of economic reconstruction, political rehabilitation, and military security could be separated but were not separable. It took 10 years and one defense buildup to develop that coalition, and another 35-odd years (and at least two more defense buildups during the Kennedy and Reagan presidencies) to ensure its triumph with the peaceful reunification of Germany and the collapse of the Soviet empire.

To combat the new, post–9/11 security conditions, Bush planned to rely on military power to launch the many missions that would have to be assumed before victory could be achieved. Like Truman, Bush responded to a morality of convictions that presented the world in strictly messianic terms—"with us or against us" to exorcize a new "evil" and "bring him to justice … dead or alive."[6] Like Truman's, Bush's strategy was global—"wher-

ever they are"—and time consuming, as the president urged Americans to remain "steadfast and patient and persistent." Finally, and also like Truman, Bush drew the strength of his convictions from his memories of the past. Truman had been a product of an earlier World War (which he courageously fought) and of Munich (which he unequivocally deplored), and Bush was, as he claimed, "a product of the Vietnam era." As he later confided in explaining his post–9/11 mindset: "I remember presidents trying to wage wars that were very unpopular, and the nation split…. I had the job of making sure the American people understood … the severity of the attack."[7] In short, Bush concluded in early February 2002, "this nation won't rest until we have destroyed terrorism…. I can't tell you how passionate I feel on the subject…. There is no calendar, there is no deadline."[8]

There, however, ends the comparison. Having scared the hell out of the American people to "make sure they understood" the severity of the postwar challenge they faced, Truman often ignored his own doctrine—from the coup in Czechoslovakia to the Communist revolution in China—and kept wars limited where he waged them, including Korea. Moreover, the multilateral framework Truman built was a coalition of institutions that included an Atlantic Alliance built on U.S. power and leadership and a new Europe based on Franco-German reconciliation. In truth, if the United States was vulnerable to the new threat, which it was, that vulnerability was initially moral and political rather than physical and territorial. For Bush, however, the stakes were higher from the start: to lead the nation on a mission designed to restore America's territorial invulnerability and even "to save civilization itself." Given the "vitriolic hatred of America" that inspires the threat, the enemy would have to be "rounded up"—"dead or alive."[9]

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Ending this threat will not be easy: the warning may well be enough to rally the American people around their president, *à la* Truman. But it might also scare everybody else, including people in Europe, as was shown during the bitter debates that preceded the use of military force in Iraq. Now, U.S. leadership is expected to be followed, or at least not to be obstructed, by allies, friends, or bystanders. In a country that September 11 made vengeful and even apprehensive, there is fire in the ashes, and the use of U.S. force can either smother it or fan it to devastating flames. Now, the leadership is focused, the planning is bold, and the will is almost ruthless. The most complex weapons designed to deter

6. A full transcript of the news conference appeared in the *Washington Post*, October 12, 2001.
7. Bob Woodward, *Bush At War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), p. 96.
8. Remarks to the New York Police Department Command and Control Center Performance, New York, February 6, 2002.
9. Quoted in the *Washington Post*, January 27, 2002, p. A13.

powerful enemies are used for the most primitive ends: kill in order to not be killed, because the "Last Man, healthy, well fed, and pampered by technology" cannot afford to relinquish the future—his future—to the "First Man, condemned to a life that is poor, nasty, brutish, and short."[10] Europe's call for a return of "the better America … liberal, outward-looking and generous" falls, therefore, on deaf ears throughout much of the United States. And so do Europe's occasional reminders of the Founding Fathers' dictum that "ambition must be made to counteract ambition."[11]

I lead you, hear you, and like you—and neither do I. So goes America's dialogue with Europe, and Europe's dialogue with America, as indifference and even disdain are perceptibly giving way to resentment and even hostility. More than ever, this dialogue consists of two monologues that are misheard and misrepresented—a duet in mutual schizophrenia ("go home, but don't leave us") and paranoia ("why don't you love us?"). Should these continue, the rift that erupted in 2001 as an echo of past arguments, grew in 2002 as a preview of alleged intentions for future actions, and exploded at the UN Security Council in early 2003, could fashion an irreversible divide across the Atlantic and within Europe. To avoid this unwanted outcome, the United States will have to better justify what it does, and Europe will have to better explain what it wants—the former to convince more effectively that the assertive and even impatient leadership it affirms is not intended to dominate, and the latter to demonstrate more credibly that the questioning and even critical followership it accepts is meant to be constructive. In short, exasperated Americans should understand that U.S. interests in Europe are too significant to be left to apprehensive Europeans alone, but apprehensive Europeans should also understand that a continued U.S. interest in Europe is too important to be left to exasperated Americans alone

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In Defense of U.S. Policies

After World War II, the U.S. strategy for Europe envisioned a network of institutions that would tame the anarchy that had forced the United States out of the safe isolation it had enjoyed away from the European continent during the previous 160

10. Robert D. Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy* (New York: Random House, 2000), p. 24.
11. Hutton, *The World We're In*, pp. 368–369.

years. The hegemonic consequences of the U.S. concept were not intended, notwithstanding the global reach of Truman's discourse in the spring of 1947. Only after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 was the Atlantic Alliance given an organization (NATO) that ultimately helped to build a defense community that fulfilled all of its members' goals—to keep an expansionist Russia out, a divided Germany subdued, and a detached America engaged. Other alliances were concluded elsewhere, as many of the new allies were not opposed to linking their own interests to the forward deployment of U.S. forces in regions that the defeated imperial powers of Europe used to dominate.

Whatever its inspiration, multilateralism served the United States and its allies well. Indifference to the postwar world was no longer an option for either side of the Atlantic. In most European countries, the imperative of U.S. support for reconstruction, protection, and reconciliation limited any debate on their fading role in the world. Whatever doubts some of these countries harbored were overcome by U.S. policies that were all the more effective as they showed enough flexibility to respond to and alleviate these doubts.

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In the United States, Truman's decisions helped launch the nation's first "great debate" about the U.S. role in the postwar world, a confused debate that internationalists easily won over their isolationist interlocutors. Twenty-odd years later, however, the Vietnam War started another and more serious "great" debate over the facts and the form of the U.S. role in the world. By then isolationism had long lost the public appeal Truman had feared it might regain. Notwithstanding spreading calls to "come home," the debate over Vietnam was waged among internationalists who shared a commitment to sustaining the U.S. role in the world but disagreed profoundly over the ways in which that role ought to be exerted. As it was written at the time, "One must [not] be an isolationist to protest against an imperial destiny for America, particularly an imperial destiny that results in the kind of war we have waged in Vietnam."[12]

A new multilateral framework was needed—a framework that would demand less U.S. power (especially given a reduced national will to use it) and more power from the allies (who had restored a regional capacity to build up their capabilities). But a traumatic war in Vietnam, as well as the fiscal needs of the Great Society and the political weaknesses of the Nixon White House, seemed to stand in the way of public support for any such attempt to avoid doing less (meaning, no disengagement except from Vietnam) by doing things differently (including détente with the Soviet Union and normalization with China) and with

12. Robert W. Tucker, *Nation or Empire? The Debate Over American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), p. 6.

the orchestrated contributions of reconstructed allies and newly appointed regional viceroys. That was the Nixon doctrine: the plain recognition that the United States alone could no longer plan and enforce everything everywhere. A more fluid and complex world called for a more fluid and complex strategy that made good use of the many new centers of power at a time when the postwar surplus of U.S. power had been depleted.

Under such conditions, Henry Kissinger's "Year of Europe" sought a "fresh act of creation" for a new multilateralism. The 1973 call, which asked the states of Europe to review their role and the way they might like to assert it, was not heard. In any case it soon ran out of time when another war in the Middle East and the first oil crisis made the Kissinger call moot. Accordingly, the U.S. design for a new multilateralism was subsequently revised, first by the Carter administration because of Kissinger's alleged neglect of the "new influentials" in the Third World, and next by the Reagan administration because of Carter's alleged neglect of a "window of vulnerability" with the Soviet Union. However reasonable the charges addressed to each of these administrations might have been, the Nixon-Carter designs helped shape Reagan's endgame in the 1980s. For it is only after Nixon had been a rampart against a public temptation to "come home" that Carter could be an indispensable catalyst for a proud reaffirmation of American values. And it is only after Carter had reaffirmed the relevance of American values that Reagan could attack the Soviet "evil empire" with sufficient credibility at home as well as abroad.

Instinctively, Reagan understood that U.S. self-confidence, as well as the world's confidence in the United States, demanded a sound alignment of policy, principles, and capabilities. His commitment to transcending and defeating communism and its main state sponsor relied, therefore, on demonstrating the United States' "complete superiority" over its central adversary—not just militarily, but also ideologically, economically, and societally. The surprising dimension of his approach was not that it worked, but how well and how quickly—so quickly, indeed, that there was not enough time for Reagan to complete, let alone enforce, the new multilateralism that the two previous administrations had begun to develop during the previous decade.

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The end of the Cold War did not end this quest. In the absence of any definable threat and lacking any serious countervailing power, preponderance might now be easier to maintain, now that it had been achieved, and a strategy of preponderance might be easier to enforce, now that it could no longer be balanced. In January 1991, the demonstration of U.S. military power in the Gulf War was awesome. No less awesome was the display of U.S. diplomatic influence, as the Bush administration built an unprecedented world coalition of

disparate countries eager to follow the United States' leadership. After the war, the first President Bush therefore claimed a "new world order" that would be mainly based on U.S. global preponderance. That order would be sustained by the U.S. commitment to maintain the capabilities needed to retain the preeminent responsibility for addressing conditions that could seriously unsettle international relations. The new international order would also be sustained by the allies' followership, based on the demonstrable evidence that, on security matters, the United States could do for its allies what they could admittedly do for themselves but not as well and certainly not as cheaply. In short, the United States would rely on its dominant power but also on its reputation as a benign hegemon to supervise the world, keeping its alliances cohesive (even as they were soon to be enlarged), and at least delaying the emergence of new rivals. In early 1991, that grand strategy was written into an early draft of the Pentagon's Defense Planning Guidance, prepared for then-Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and with contributions of many of the now-leading members of the administration of Bush *fils*.

"The mission determines the coalition," explained Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld 10 years later, in October 2001, when announcing his intention to build a "a number of flexible coalitions."[13] Having more than one coalition suggests that not all countries may be needed for each mission; but merging these various coalitions into an overarching framework also confirmed that the Bush administration could act outside the existing multilateral organizations, including the UN and NATO. More specifically, Rumsfeld's design for asserting U.S. preponderance in the wars against terror suggests a pyramidal architecture with a broad base, representing a large coalition of the willing and, for the most part, incapable, while the pyramid itself becomes increasingly narrow as the premium is placed on various kinds of capabilities and the will to use them. With missions defined at the top of the pyramid by the United States, smaller and smaller coalitions would emerge from the bottom up, with partners identified not only on grounds of capabilities, including but not exclusively military, but also on increasingly demanding grounds of relevance. That the United States would stand on top of the pyramid is *a droit de seigneur* for "a freedom-loving nation, a compassionate nation, a nation that understands the value of life," as President Bush argued on October 11, 2001. But it is also a Hobbesian right of self-defense, assumed by a nation whose military power is such as to marginalize offers of military support extended by other countries.

That the European allies were generally underused in Afghanistan is a recognized error that can be explained, in part, by the fact that the military campaign unfolded more quickly than had been anticipated. This had not been the case during the Kosovo war, which reaffirmed the need for allies to act in the context of a NATO that still stood as the security institution of choice for its members and the many European countries eager to join it.

13. News briefing by Secretary Rumsfeld and General Richard Myers, October 18, 2001. See also "The Coalition and the Mission," *Washington Post*, October 21, 2001, p. B6.

After Kosovo, it was agreed that the countries of Europe would have to do more if they were to maintain interoperability in the future—a conclusion that reinforced the broad goals outlined at the Anglo-French St. Malo summit of December 1998. But in Afghanistan, European allies that seemed to be irrelevant even when they were capable, especially when their military contributions could not justify the political problems they raised, pointed to a possible marginalization of the alliance.[14]

In short, over the past three decades, it is paradoxically a continued U.S. attempt to define a new multilateralism that has exacerbated Europe's concerns about the United States—relative to Europe's parallel concerns over U.S. isolationism and unilateralism. In turn, these European concerns, deemed unwarranted and even abusive, have exacerbated America's own questions about its allies' reliability—that is, their responsiveness to U.S. leadership and their ability to make effective contributions to the enforcement role of that leadership. In part, this false debate has to do with the inability to agree on what each of these terms entails—where each of them begins after one of them or both have ended. Depending on the issue at hand, every American has been, might be, or will become a "unilateralist" or a "multilateralist"—and every European will be, might become, or used to be fearful of the United States being either. Similarly, depending on the issue a 99 percent isolationist can be a 100 percent interventionist—but the same is true of a 99 percent interventionist waiting for the opportunity to be a 100 percent isolationist. America's selective identification with each of these terms means that the nation has matured as a Great Power that can balance interests and commitments, capabilities and purpose. But maturity begins with the acknowledgement of a transatlantic partnership that lies like a huge whale stranded on a beautiful beach. If left unattended, it would "die, stink, and pollute everything around it," within Europe where countries might suddenly return to their past fears and conflicts, as well as for the United States left alone in a dangerous world.[15]

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14. NATO secretary general George Robertson, an interview with *Der Spiegel*, February 26, 2002.
15. Theodore White, *In Search of History: A Personal Adventure* (New York: Warner Books, 1978), p. 275.

In Recognition of European Policies

To understand, wrote Isaiah Berlin, "is to perceive patterns."[16] The pattern that has grown out of Europe's history over the past 50 years is compelling: with nation-states reinventing themselves as member states of the union they form or which they hope to join, Europe is achieving a new *synthesis* that is making it whole at last. The single currency that was launched in January 2002, the EU enlargement to 10 new members that was announced in December 2002, the forthcoming constitutional convention, and the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) scheduled for 2004 are the identifiable plays of an endgame known as "finality." Criticism of Europe's policies must not overlook recognition of its dramatic territorial transformation away from the Westphalian system of nation-states to a more cohesive union of member states. There is nothing "old" in the "new" Europe that has emerged since the end of World War II. The EU is "the closest thing to an equal that the United States faces at the beginning of the twenty-first century," and by most standards other than military, the EU is already an equal.[17]

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The political consequences of this transformation may be cause for concern in the United States. After 1945, "Europe" was not born out of a single, or even common, vision of the future. Rather, it grew out of the shared vision of a failed past. Nor was there any attempt to provide a credible sense of the end point to which the process might lead. Instead, an ill-defined logic of integration seemed to unfold, mechanically at first, and state-driven next: deepen in order to widen, widen in order to deepen, and reform in order to do both.

Now, however, the constraints imposed by the EU on its members' national sovereignty, the intrusiveness of its institutions in the day-to-day lives of its citizens, and a growing public awareness of the enormity of what is about to be done have made it necessary to raise questions about Europe's final status. Granted that the union gives its members an added territorial dimension, but what can each of them keep as its sovereign domain? Debating who can do what in an ever-larger union also threatens to restore a hierarchy among member states—who does what and why, but also with or without whom.

16. Isaiah Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 52.
17. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 29.

That raises similar questions in a transatlantic context, including the form of U.S. relations with the EU, as well as the role of the EU relative to NATO.

The magnitude of Europe's transformation is daunting: not only who does what, but what and who is "we"? Nearing finality, therefore, Europe can be whole only by transcending the remnants of its divided past and, paradoxically, only by agreeing to become, well, more American. The experience is "oddly schizoid."[18] The more Europeans become like Americans, the more they complain about the United States. Fewer complaints from Europe might have permitted more satisfaction in the United States: the integration of Europe is a European idea that U.S. power and leadership helped launch more than 50 years ago, and actively sustained ever since. But in a deeper sense, the idea of a European Union is also the idea that shaped the birth of the American Republic. At last, Europeans are pursuing in their own habitat what other Europeans did on U.S. soil more than 200 years ago. The calendar is not the same—if only because the U.S. Civil War was fought long after a constitutional convention had been held—but the overall goal, which aims at territorial consolidation and cultural assimilation, is similar. What began as a mere timeout from European history—a reprieve from wars and conflicts—has evolved into something far more permanent—the end of a prolonged moment in Europe's history.

It is, of course, possible that obstacles will prove insurmountable even at this late time. Entering its endgame, Europe's political leaders often lack the vision and the convictions that characterized many of their postwar predecessors. In this environment, Europe and its institutions can be a readymade alibi for each national setback and domestic pain. Europe's next populist leaders will not make anti-Americanism their issue of choice, as Gerhard Schroeder seemed to do in summer 2002, because by that time the EU may prove to be an even better target. In short, on the eve of Europe's finality, neither the fading idea of the nation-state nor the institutions to which these nation-states have abandoned much of their sovereignty are ideas worth dying for—or, more modestly, ideas worth suffering and even voting for.

Fifty years into the process aimed at building an "ever closer" Europe, the EU is not only "over there" among the 25 member states it will comprise by 2004, but also "over here" across the Atlantic, because its presence and influence in Europe qualify the United States as a nonmember member state of the EU. While some might dispute this convergence because of differences over societal values and even geopolitical interests, there can be no debate over the common (though not single) economic space that both sides of the Atlantic now share more or less evenly.

The Euro-Atlantic economy is a central and irreversible reality of the world economy. Two-way trade (merchandise and services) totaled $557 billion in 2000, an estimated 40

18. Martin Walker, "What Europeans Think of America," *World Policy Journal* 17, No. 2 (Summer 2000), p. 26. Timothy Garton Ash, "The European Orchestra," *New York Review of Books*, May 17, 2001, p. 60.

percent of total world trade. As it has been shown repeatedly, any U.S.-EU agreement is likely to be translated into a global agreement within whatever round of trade negotiations is taking place at that time. That trade reflects "the mature closeness of an older couple" that permits only limited conflicts: in 2000, European and U.S. complaints about U.S. and European merchandise barriers concerned about 5 percent of trade over the decade.[19] These complaints—"trade disputes" rather than "trade wars"—should not be allowed to compromise the balance of commercial transactions between the two sides of the Atlantic, which are five times larger than trade relations alone.

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Although trade has remained steady over the years, trends in foreign direct investment (FDI) across the Atlantic reveal the strength and dynamism of the Euro-Atlantic economy. In the 1990s, European FDI in the United States grew from roughly $247 billion to almost $900 billion, while U.S. FDI in Europe rose from $215 billion to nearly $650 billion. The combined output of these Euro-Atlantic firms exceeds by more than half the combined gross domestic product of all 10 candidates for EU membership in 2004. In 2000, European and U.S. affiliates were responsible for about 7.7 million jobs, compared to 5.4 million in 1990. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions between the United States and Europe grew from $20.6 billion in value in 1990 to a total of $296 billion in 2000. In 2001, notwithstanding a substantial decline in FDI flows from the EU to extra-EU countries, the United States received close to one-half of all extra-EU investment from member states, while the United States supplied 55 percent of investment from nonmember countries in the EU. It is truly remarkable that over the most recent eight-year period U.S. investments in tiny Holland were 10 times larger than those in China and twice as large as those in Mexico.[20]

Charges of a societal drift are exaggerated; they neglect the dramatic convergences of the past decades.

The distinctiveness of the Euro-Atlantic couple is not only based on shared assets. It is also based on a shared approach to democratic governance and to comparable ways of translating that approach at the public and corporate levels. Charges of a societal drift are exaggerated; they neglect the dramatic convergences of the past decades. "The American

19. Gary Hufbauer and Frederic Neumann, "Conflict and Cooperation: The State of US-EU Trade and Investment Relations," SAIS Working Paper Series (WP/01/02), p. 4. Also, Eurostat news release 81/2002, July 4, 2002 (Brussels: Eurostat Press Office, 2002).

20. Joseph P. Quinlan, *Drifting Apart or Growing Together? The Primacy of the Transatlantic Economy* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2003), p. 3.

traveler … comes to a Europe which is more foreign to Americans today than it has ever been in all our history," wrote Theodore White shortly after World War II. Now, travelers who cross the ocean cannot believe they move not from one civilization to another, as might have been the case in 1945, but from one family residence to another.[21] Over there has moved over here.

The events of the past 10 years, including the attacks of September 11, 2001, have not changed the reality of an increasingly common Euro-Atlantic area that stands apart from any other region outside the northern part of the Western Hemisphere. If anything, these events have increased the need for a forceful and coordinated U.S.-EU action, not only on economic issues of trade and money, but also on questions of home and foreign security. The peace that the United States and its NATO allies have won and kept, for and among them, must now be won and kept elsewhere too. This fundamental principle is shared on both sides of the Atlantic, and it was in evidence at the November 2002 Prague summit where the EU was an invisible nonmember member of the new NATO contemplated by its 19 members and 7 applicants. But it was also understood at the December 2002 Copenhagen summit where all 15 EU members were fully aware of the U.S. presence across the Atlantic, where the United States stands as a nonmember, member state of the union. That is the case because both NATO and the EU are incomplete organizations that can contribute to some but not all fronts where the "first war of the twenty-first century" (in President Bush's words) will have to be fought: not only with military capabilities, but also with political, economic, social, financial, technological, and judicial means. Maintaining a proper balance between the areas where either institution has a comparative advantage will be a major challenge for its respective lead members.

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As was seen all too visibly during the UN debate over Iraq in early 2003, the challenge is especially complex because the EU is an unfinished political project that still lacks a clear and undisputed center of decision—a president, a parliament, an army. As written in 1454,

21. Theodore H. White, *Fire in the Ashes: Europe in the Mid-Century* (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1953), pp. 6–7.

one year after the fall of Constantinople to the Turks, "There is no reverence and no obedience; we look on pope and emperor as figureheads and empty titles. Every city state has its king and there are as many princes as there are households."[22] During the half-millennium that followed, attempts by any one country to achieve unity by force were met by a coalition bent on defeating it. As a result, hegemonies in Europe rose and fell, quickly exhausted by their bids for dominance—depopulated Spain, small Holland, disintegrating Austria, weary France, and defeated Germany. What defeated each bid was the ability to add to these coalitions more power available at the periphery of Europe and beyond—Britain, but also Russia and, ultimately, America.

What also made each hegemonic bid a precursor of the bid that followed was that the peripheral states called upon to restore Europe's balance might in turn impose their will on the continent after victory had been achieved. For more than 300 years, that often was the case for a Russian state that moved steadily eastward into the European system without ever becoming a part of that system.[23] After 1945, the Russian bid was renewed one last time, and it was contained one more time by the Anglo-Saxon island powers of the West who had little taste for territorial gains on the European continent.

After World War II, protected from Russia by the United States, and with little to fear from a burst of imperial energy from postwar Britain, Western Europe enjoyed a moment of unprecedented balance and homogeneity. Little remained of Germany, and even less was thought of trusting Germany with a leadership to which it could no longer aspire. (This, after all, was the country against which Europe's grand coalitions had been formed twice in slightly more than a generation.) In any case, the only free half of Germany was busy reinventing itself. As for France, it might still have had the attitude required for empire, but it no longer had the capabilities. (After the collapse of France's final bid for hegemony in Europe in 1815, France never won another European war alone.) Nor could France make a postwar bid for security with Russia: de Gaulle's alliance with Moscow had been a wartime relationship of convenience that both sides perceived of as fundamentally short-lived.

With no state in Western Europe thus able to assert leadership alone, the Cold War history of European unity has been shaped by the evolution of bilateral relations between France, Great Britain, and Germany . . . [Now] two countries alone are no longer sufficient to build Europe . . . .

22. Quoted in Myron P. Gilmore, *The World of Humanism, 1453–1517* (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1952), p. 1.

23. Robert Legvold, "Russia," in *A Century's Journey*, ed. Robert A. Pastor (New York: Basic Books, 1999), p. 141.

With no state in Western Europe thus able to assert leadership alone, the Cold War history of European unity has been shaped by the evolution of bilateral relations between France, Great Britain, and Germany—France and Britain against or without Germany, and France and Germany without or in spite of Britain. After 1945, Britain was France's partner of choice, from the 1947 Dunkirk Treaty to the aborted Anglo-French deal at Rambouillet in December 1962. That choreography was wrong, however. Unable to remain a great world power, Britain declined to become a great power in Europe at a time when the continent was ripe for Britain's leadership as an alternative to France's or as a counterweight to Germany's. As an option to Britain, France's focus on Germany grew out of progressively reassuring postwar conditions that included military occupation (including U.S. occupation) in addition to Germany's territorial amputation and division, which seemed irreversible. Entering the 1960s, the French Fifth Republic could also rely on an ascending economy, a stabilized political regime, and even a controlling *force de frappe.* Still, trust came slowly. Responding to a dutifully impressed Henry Kissinger who had asked him, in early 1969, "how [he] will keep Germany from dominating the Europe [he] had just described," de Gaulle, "seized by profound melancholy at so much obtuseness," responded "*par la guerre*" (through war).[24] For 30-odd years, the process of European integration evolved mainly around France and Germany.

Over the years, the United States has added complexity to these intra-European relations with special relationships or targeted initiatives that isolated France. In addition, French influence has been reduced with each enlargement of the European institutions. The "American Trojan horse" feared by de Gaulle when he vetoed Britain's bid for admission in 1963 is no longer alone. Now, it is a full stable of Trojan horses that a larger EU must accommodate after its enlargement to the East has been completed. This means that two countries alone are no longer sufficient to build Europe—whether France and either Germany or Britain, or even the United States with either Britain or Germany. Europe must now be built at three (with Britain), at five (with Italy and Spain), or at more (with Poland and others). But that, too, should reassure skeptics who fear a malign Europe that guides the EU at the expense of U.S. interests: there cannot be more Europe without more America in Europe, but more America in Europe need not mean less Europe.

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In short, what the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance need is more, not less integration. Among themselves, as a mutually shared right of first refusal, but also with new

24. Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 110.

associates and partners, the NATO and EU countries should be able to agree on some immediate priorities and key principles for multilateral action. As Samuel Huntington has stated, "the idea of integration" is "the successor idea to containment." More specifically, integration is about locking a group of countries into policies that address common concerns and produce mutually shared benefits, "and then building institutions that lock them in even more." The "halfway integration," which is the current condition of both the EU and the Atlantic community, cannot be sustained and must either move to a higher level of integration, including further levels of supranationality, or regretfully fall back to lower levels.[25]

Admittedly, a call for more integration (leaving aside the perennial debate over supranationality) will be heard with some wariness in Europe. But if not in the EU, where? If not with the United States, with whom? If not now, when? Better to set America's alarm clock at half before the EU—early enough, that is, for the United States to wake up to the institutional reality it helped launch after World War II. Better also to set Europe's watch at half past NATO—early enough, that is, for the countries of Europe to work toward the "finality" of their institutions without compromising the organization that brought them security during the Cold War. Some will ask, why the rush? As sudden and unpredictable events make history leap forward unexpectedly, as seen most recently on September 11, 2001, opportunities that are spurned may never reappear. The United States and Europe have ample and good reasons to be exasperated with, and even fearful of, their difficult partnership. But neither wants or can afford a separation, let alone a divorce, because both know that life without the other would be less affluent, less safe, and ultimately less satisfying.

The war in Iraq has been the catalyst for the most serious challenge to the institutional order built in Europe, as well as between Europe and the United States . . . . In coming months and years, both NATO and the EU will need the same kind of commitments that were unleashed when coordinated action was initiated to sustain solidarity between the United States and Europe, as well as unity within Europe.

The war in Iraq has been the catalyst for the most serious challenge to the institutional order built in Europe, as well as between Europe and the United States, since the debate over Germany's rearmament led to U.S. warnings of an "agonizing reappraisal" and nearly made of European unity a stillborn project. In coming months and years, both NATO and the EU will need the same kind of commitments that were unleashed when coordinated

25. Huntington as quoted by Nicholas Lemann, "The Next World Order," *New Yorker*, April 1, 2002, p. 46. Amitai Etzioni, *Political Unification Revisited: On Building Supranational Communities* (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2001), p. xxxi.

action was initiated to sustain solidarity between the United States and Europe, as well as unity within Europe. After the rejection of the European Defense Community in Paris in late August 1954 came the Treaty of Paris in October of that year, which set the stage for the enlargement of NATO to the Federal Republic of Germany in May 1955. A few weeks later, a conference in Messina, which included Britain's participation, prepared the launch of a small European Economic Community, without Britain, which was outlined in the Rome Treaties signed in March 1957. Thus was finalized the Euro-Atlantic architecture out of which the Cold War was waged and won—out of a crisis that threatened to unravel everything before anything had been put in place. In 2003 the same kind of steady leadership exerted on behalf of an equally bold vision may be needed to heal the scars left by a bitter debate within Europe and with the United States. Unless that same leadership is exerted for a renewal of both the alliance and the union, neither the United States nor any country in Europe, will be able to reap the extraordinary benefits of what has already been accomplished.

Power and Order

The infamous events of September 11, 2001, changed America's vision of the world, but they also changed the world's vision of America. As a consequence, these events are also transforming the U.S. role in the world, as well as U.S. relations with other countries, including countries in Europe.

Nor is this all: the world itself changed and was changed by these events. Forty years ago, Jean-Paul Sartre called upon Europeans to "listen [to] strangers gathered around a fire; for they are talking of the destiny they will mete out to your trading centers and to the hired soldiers who defend them." Their "suppressed fury" and "irrepressible violence," he added, "at times reviving old and terrible myths, at others binding themselves by scrupulous rites," would not be "the resurrection of savage instincts, nor even the effect of resentment: it is man recreating itself."[26] These words sound more credible now than when Sartre used them to reinforce Fritz Fanon's passionate plea on behalf of the "wretched of the earth" who populated the European empires at the time. In a narrow sense, September 11 confirmed the will of some extremists to mobilize Islam against the "distant enemy"—a cultural coalition of U.S.-led Western countries—that protects the "near enemy" at home. The ultimate goal of the "war" imagined by Osama bin Laden and his followers is to restore the purity of the Islamic man, a purity that ceased to exist in the thirteenth century when the rule of the Islamic clerics ended. In an even broader sense, these events point to the nihilistic anger

26. Fritz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, translated by Constance Farrington with a preface by Jean-Paul Sartre (New York: Grove Press, 1963), pp. 7–34.

that has been building up in vast areas of the world where the state does not exist or, when it does exist, fails to respond to its citizens' minimal expectations.

Thus, after three global wars and a near infinite number of regional and civil conflicts fought increasingly at the expense of civil populations, the twentieth century has given birth to a new generation of "wretched" people who inhabit the territorial corpses left behind by these wars—wars of territorial expansion, wars of national liberation, and even wars of ideological redemption. In most cases, these were wars that the United States did not fight—and in many cases, wars that long predate the American Republic—but they are nonetheless wars that U.S. power must now end. The war in Iraq is one of them: coming with the war in Afghanistan, it is not the only such war, nor alas, is it likely to be the last among them, notwithstanding the truly awesome and intimidating ways in which the war was waged and won. For there will be more such wars—as if August 1914 had started only with a bilateral clash in and over Serbia to settle the unresolved territorial issues inherited from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the unraveling of the Habsburg Empire, while escaping the world war that we now know erupted in the absence of their resolution.

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The United States is ill at ease in the world of September 11—a world in which a permanent threat of terror calls for an unprecedented reliance on the threat of military force to prevent or preempt it. People whose desperation makes them seek death as relief from life are relying on levels of primitive violence that invite more violence. When the use of absolute means takes precedence over the quest for plausible ends, perpetrators and victims stand as judge-penitents, to use Albert Camus's phrase. Even as we question the reasons that brought our adversaries to such a condition, the violence they use defines the beginning of a twisted morality—kill in order to not be killed. Traditional rules of war and peace no longer apply. Internal conflicts and international wars are waged on the same battleground, thereby voiding past distinctions between civilians and armed combatants. The paradox is that winning the war somewhere may require actions that will prolong it elsewhere. "Only the complete destruction of international terrorism and the regimes that sponsor it will spare America from further attack," warned Senator John McCain shortly after September 11.[27] But what will be left to rebuild after everything has been destroyed, including a cultural "mindset" that embodies far more than "we" can truly understand and is forced to absorb much more than "they" can forget? The mythical "day after"—when

27. John McCain, "There is No Substitute for Victory," *Wall Street Journal*, October 26, 2001.

winners attend to the losers for absolution of their respective sins—may prove to be long and dark. Memories of postwar Germany and Japan, and their subsequent fate, are used to reassure on the basis of assumptions that sound benign or naïve when describing the scope and nature of the conflicts ahead. Midway through 2003, the debate is no longer just about war and the benefits of liberation for the Iraqi people and their neighbors; it is also about all that will follow in Iraq—occupation, pacification, reconstruc-tion, and rehabilitation—and throughout the region. Or else, historians will later uncover that the analogy that was most apt was that of *revanchistes* enemies in 1919 rather than that of defeated countries in 1945.

Because a world with only one major power is unlikely to remain permanent, the peerless nature of U.S. power does not foreclose the need for like-minded allies and capable friends. However overwhelming the United States' preponderance is, power never stays in one place, but irresistibly moves to ascending states or to counter-hegemonic coalitions of lesser states. Already, most nations, including (and perhaps especially) the United States, seem ambivalent about the desirability of the current unipolar moment, which means an ambivalence over the implications of what the United States is—the sole superpower. But they also seem seriously concerned over the best ways to prepare for the aftermath of that moment, which means a concern over the consequences of what the United States does—with and to others. This is what the debate over the use of U.S. force in Iraq was all about: an early test of the world's ability to rely on the United Nations to limit the seemingly unlimited ability of the United States to use force—to limit a superpower about which "people around the world" have become surprisingly and disturbingly "deeply suspicious and fearful."[28]

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To Americans of all political veins and all geographic origins, this condition can only be cause for dismay, exasperation, and even anger. As a matter of historical fact, the United States was not born into the world to become a European power, but to escape the powers

28. Fareed Zakaria, "The Arrogant Empire," *Newsweek*, March 17, 2003.

of Europe—to build in a New World the dream that the first waves of European immigrants had been denied to live in their own national habitat. Part of that dream was to end the cycle of violence that conditioned the Westphalian system of nation-states in constant search for balance. As we have seen, the Cold War modified the conditions of the nation's birth. Now, America is in Europe to stay; indeed, measured in economic, military, and even political terms, the totality of its actual presence within the EU exceeds that of most EU members—not as a European power but, at the very least, as a power in Europe. That status was no more an ambition for the nation than was its rise as a world power that might gain the allure of an empire. Nor, as a matter of national conviction, was the United States conceived to substitute for the empires of Europe, but to abolish the age of empires—to end one of them at first, and then the others as well. The events of September 11 are not about to transform this fundamental American conviction, but President Bush's claims that America neither has nor seeks an empire is a statement that Europeans hear but seemingly fail to heed.[29]

Nation or Empire? Although the question is hardly new, it has nonetheless reemerged in a way that is all the more troubling, as an imperial exercise of power might be viewed as the best protection for the nation. To argue, as is done with growing frequency, that containment is not sufficient to alleviate the existential risks raised by the new threats is hardly unreasonable. "As a matter of common sense and self-defense," argued President Bush in the various speeches that have been combined into a new national security strategy, "shadowy networks of individuals" and "failing" or "rogue" states intent on perpetrating "premeditated, politically motivated violence … against innocents" cannot be allowed "to strike first"—especially with "weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice." The strategy is not lacking in logic for the nation's security, but what follows from it may have imperial consequences that will lack logic for the nation and the global order to which it aspires. An occasional and extraordinary need for preemptive action waged because of a danger that is clear but not imminent cannot be worked into a "doctrine" applicable for the establish-

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29. See *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), including especially President Bush's opening letter, and his speeches at the National Cathedral, Washington, D.C. (September 14, 2001) and at West Point, New York (June 1, 2002).

ment of an international order aimed at a wide variety of unclear and distant risks. The United States' uniqueness as a nation among other nations has not been its passion for power but its passion for order. Nothing would be so disturbing, indeed repugnant, as to see the United States share the imperial fate of those great powers against which it was born.[30]

Contrary to what is occasionally assumed, Europe—its nation-states and their union—acknowledges the primacy of U.S. power and the need for U.S. leadership. Europeans also understand and appreciate the salutary role played by the United States to revive many of its nation-states after World War II and most of the others after the Cold War. Finally, all heads of state and government in Europe also comprehend and fear the dangers of a security environment characterized by the potential dissemination of weapons of mass destruction to revisionist states, or rogue groups within those states, or even loose individuals within those groups. Arguments to the contrary have little basis in fact.

Concomitantly, but also contrary to what many in Europe seem to believe, most Americans recognize Europe's remarkable transformation from a volatile mosaic of national sovereignties into a more cohesive, though still unfinished, union of states. It is understood, too, that this transformation has benefited not only Europe's but also America's interests in the context of a community of converging values within which the remaining transatlantic differences are lesser than U.S. differences with any other part of the world outside the Western Hemisphere. Finally, there is broad agreement that there is hardly any problem in the world that cannot be solved, or at least managed, if and when the United States and the EU are in agreement, thus arguing for an ever-closer cooperation between the two "unions"—the *United* States and the European *Union*—which together form an elusive community known as the West.

Thinking about the United States without the institutional access to Europe provided by the Atlantic Alliance, and reducing the transatlantic partnership to one "coalition" among others, with an occasional "mission" like any other, is to imagine an isolated America adrift in a hostile world—a power without peers but also without permanent allies. That is not a happy thought. Nor is it better to imagine an America that would escape isolation by returning to mixed patterns of relations with single European states or small coalitions of European countries—possibly at the expense of the EU. For thinking about Europe without the EU—like thinking about the EU without NATO—is to imagine the very kind of Europe that the United States has attempted to end over the past 50 years: less safe without its NATO blanket and astray without its EU anchor, older because it would be closer to resurrecting its past than to entering the future, and infinitely more dangerous because it would become more divided and less predictable.

30. Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, *The Imperial Temptation: The New World Order and America's Purpose* (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1992), p. 5.

A first conclusion is for the United States and the states of Europe to sustain their commitment to both NATO and the EU and continue to assert not only the compatibility but also the complementarity of these institutions. Neither would have been conceived without the other, each helped the other deliver on the high expectations that had given them birth, and both are needed for a whole and free Europe to emerge within a strong and cohesive transatlantic partnership. This conclusion is not self-evident in all instances. A good U.S. (or European) idea, especially about security, will not always seem equally good for those in Europe (or the United States) who will be asked to follow or accept it. Nevertheless, the logic of unity transcends the logic of cleavage, across the Atlantic as well as in Europe. Why would the United States accept that some institutional limits be placed by its European allies on its ideas and action? Because it is there, in Europe, that the United States learned during and after three global wars that the most lastingly powerful states and the most stable international orders are ultimately those that are sought and achieved multilaterally through institutions rather than unilaterally at the expense of these institutions.

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To this end, however, Europeans should do more to reassure Americans that the union they are completing will continue to make the United States feel welcome in Europe. Irrespective of Europe's intentions, no such effort has been apparent thus far. What the EU attempts and does is all too often presented as further evidence of Europe's will and ability to challenge the United States. More should be done by Europeans to emphasize how U.S. interests are served as the future of Europe continues to evolve toward its "finality." For example, members of the U.S. Congress should be invited to observe the final proceedings of the EU constitutional convention: not to be consulted and to influence, but to hear and to be influenced by their peers' debates, for relevant issues and at appropriate levels. Another way to strengthen EU-U.S. relations is to reinforce and institutionalize relations between the EU and NATO. As the enlargement of both institutions moves through its remaining steps, including ratification by the countries involved, a joint summit of all EU and NATO members should be planned for May 2004 as an explicit reminder that there need not remain any invisible line of separation between these two institutions. In short, it is time for the EU and its members to engage the United States constructively and build with its partner across the Atlantic the same sort of intimacy that the United States built with the states of Europe within NATO.

A related conclusion is for Americans and Europeans alike to return to the essence of what they wanted to achieve when, by mutual consent, they began to develop a grand Euro-Atlantic space based on the combined assets of an ever-closer and ever-larger European community and an ever more cohesive and powerful Atlantic defense community. Europe's longing for a U.S. strategy of restraint will also serve the United States well if it is based on a common Euro-Atlantic foreign and security policy that is enforced in common after common decisions have been made for the common good. To repeat, the United States was not born into the world to become a global European empire, or even, more modestly, an empire in parts of Europe. One of the limits of transatlantic discord should be most easily found in the area of Europe's exaggerated concerns over the United States' motivation and capacity for leadership. The Pavlovian character of Europe's anti-Americanism is now worse than boring because of its predictability, but dangerously destructive because of its self-fulfilling consequences. Yet, an even more significant risk today is not European anti-Americanism, which the United States can readily endure, but American anti-Europeanism, which has often been damaging to Europe and its drive for unity. "The greatest danger," wrote Thomas Friedman, "is if America is no longer ready to play America"—the outward-looking and generous United States that won World War II and constructed an institutional order that endured the end of the Cold War but seems threatened by the rise of the wars that have succeeded it.[31] For a nation at the peak of its power, the short-term satisfactions of unilateralism may prove more difficult to resist than the long-term obligations of compassionate multilateralism.

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Does America need Europe and its alliance with the states of Europe? Does Europe need America now that the Cold War is over and the European wars have ended? But if not with each other, where and with whom? That these questions would have to be raised at all is cause enough for distress. "The mystic chords of memory," wrote Harvard professor Arthur Holcombe 50 years ago, "… bind native born Americans to their ancestral country" while "the strength of the pragmatic bonds of shared hope … tie the immigrant to the land of his adoption."[32] Over the years, these ties have become more, much more than emotional and mystic. Whether across the Atlantic or within Europe, loosening these ties would be to

31. Thomas L. Friedman, "They Hate Us! They Need Us," *New York Times*, June 15, 2001.

32. Arthur N. Holcombe, "An American View of European Union," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 47, no. 2 (1953): 418.

the disadvantage of all. These must on the contrary be tightened with new institutional mechanisms that can help coordinate U.S. and European, NATO and EU priorities, decisions, and needs.

One such mechanism would consist of a NATO-EU commitment to launch a process of transatlantic policy coordination, which might parallel the process of European Political Cooperation (EPC) that started prior to the first enlargement of the European Community, from six to nine members. The goal of such coordination would be to discuss and ultimately produce a first draft of allied policies for impending crises, including allocation of responsibilities before that crisis has actually exploded. This process would take its lead from President Bush's earlier determination, argued in Warsaw on June 15, 2001, "to erase the false lines" that separate the countries of Europe, depending on their institutional affiliations, as well as give "a greater role for the EU, for European security, integrated with NATO." Within the process, a NATO-EU action group could combine the United States and a few EU members, pending the development within the EU of a genuinely "common" foreign policy. To such a hard core could be added a few additional EU countries chosen on grounds of relevance and capabilities, thus gaining the needed flexibility without being encumbered by the expectation that every member in both institutions must participate fully in all decisions at all times and contribute capabilities for the enforcement of each of those decisions.

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The capabilities gap that stands in the way of a complete community of action between the states of Europe and the United States is not new. On various occasions, this gap complicated interstate relations within the alliance, but it never seriously threatened to derail it. Yet the transatlantic power gap comes in many forms and suggests different concerns. The argument presented by neoconservatives like Robert Kagan[33] is mainly about military power and defense spending. Given this limiting definition of power, the gap will not be bridged for the indefinite future. If anything, it is bound to grow before it begins to recede. Even when asserting their interest in becoming a "superpower like the United States," less than one-fourth of Europeans want to increase defense spending, while one-third want to cut it and over two-fifths find current levels sufficient. That is also true in France, arguably the only EU country (in addition to Britain) that is making a convincing attempt to boost its falling defense spending significantly. In any case, a few (or more) billions of dollars do

33. See, for example, Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America vs. Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Knopf, 2003).

not add up to real money when it comes to today's defense needs: even a substantial increase in defense spending will not be enough to bridge the gap for many years to come.

Although the United States is entitled to question Europe's commitment to defense, on grounds of inadequate spending and insufficient political will, its interlocutors are right to emphasize that there is more to power than force, and therefore, more to defense spending than the accumulation of military power, on grounds of stability. Military power wins wars, but it does not end them. For the latter goal, aid, peacekeeping, and institutional enlargement are vital tools that have a legitimate place in the security toolbox that NATO is seeking to expand and that the EU is able (and willing) to provide.[34] These are the invisible security transactions that must find their way in the balance sheet of the power contributed by either side of the Atlantic on behalf of the other. Without these, the use of force may be either insufficient or even irrelevant. In either case, it will have potentially damaging consequences irrespective of the short-term gains it might permit for those who choose to use it. Convincing evidence was presented in Afghanistan in 2002 and 2003; further evidence is awaited in and for Iraq in 2003 and 2004. In both cases, NATO as well as the EU have indispensable contributions to make—as will be the case, too, for the hypothetical enforcement of a road map for peace between Palestinians and Israelis. Another limit of transatlantic discord has to do, therefore, with the inescapable truth that even though it may not be possible for the United States and Europe to do everything together, it is imperative to make sure that taken together we do everything. In short, the Unites States' military power to impose a new world order should not be confused with the U.S. ability to manage all kinds of domestic orders and the will for, or desirability of, such a management.

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Complementarity of action, however, will not occur without a better understanding of the complementarity of interests that is found within the transatlantic partnership. At some point in the future—but no later than by the fiftieth anniversary of the Rome Treaties in 2007—there should also be an institutional mechanism that allows for more direct consultation between the United States and the EU. The issue is not one of U.S. membership in the union, but one of association, dialogue, and cooperation before decisions are reached. To put it bluntly, the United States is a nonmember member state of the European Union, and the institutional dimensions of that status still need to be developed as part of a Euro-

34. Andrew Moravcsik, "Europe, The Quiet Superpower is the equal of the US," *The Independent*, June 13, 2002.

Atlantic finality that is an intrinsic dimension of the European finality debate. Conversely, the United States should continue to elevate its political relations with the EU to a level comparable to that achieved in its bilateral relations with individual EU countries: the EU, too, is a virtual sixteenth or twenty-sixth member of the union.

To put it bluntly, the United States is a nonmember member state of the European Union, and the institutional dimensions of that status still need to be developed as part of a Euro-Atlantic finality that is an intrinsic dimension of the European finality debate.

August 1914, it can be readily agreed, was the defining month for the twentieth century. World War I was the event that permitted and conditioned all the events that followed—a century that had opened with hopes that it was a "good time to be alive," but unfolded instead as a century during which too many innocent victims found it to be a time when it was far too easy to be dead. What is remarkable, however, is that all the published cables of foreign ministers, sovereigns, ambassadors, and chancellors during the months leading to war do not unveil "a single European diplomat [who] had mentioned the United States, speculated on its strength, or wondered about its attitude."[35] This was Europe's time, not America's. As events came to show, it was not a good time for either. "What have we not seen, not suffered, not lived through?" wept Stefan Zweig in a book he wrote in exile in 1943, away from the Old World that had betrayed him.[36] Seemingly, for Zweig and his wife, there had been too much pain—and as had been the case for the continent they loved dearly; both committed suicide upon completing that final testament.

The spring of 1947 nonetheless gave the United States a second chance at paying the debt it owed history as a result of its past indifference and in return for its past obligations. For the decisions that were made then by the Truman administration—bold, generous, and visionary—helped Europe master its past and start anew in ways that seemed a challenge to imagination at the time. What is significant, however, is that these decisions for Europe were the responsibility of inexperienced Americans who were acting at the explicit invitation of Europeans who understood well that this was their last chance at resurrection. Although many European "foreign ministers, sovereigns, ambassadors and chancellors" as well as lower rank diplomats, intellectuals, and corporate leaders, were involved, this was, therefore, America's time, not Europe's. As events came to show, it proved to be a good time for both: had Zweig written his book after the Cold War rather than during World War II, he would have wanted to live. For where the wasted heroism of World War I produced a

35. White, *Fire in the Ashes*, p. 384.

36. Stefan Zweig, *The World of Yesterday: An Autobiography* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1964), p. xx.

peace to end all peaces, the wasteful brutality of World War II proved to be a war to end all wars.

Although most would agree that September 2001 stands as an event of lasting historic significance, there is little agreement yet on its actual meaning. What judgment will historians make of the decade that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, including the traumatic events of September 11? Will they be as distraught as we remain today, when reflecting on the murderous insanity of World War I and the 20-year descent to World War II that followed? Or will historians stand in awe of the order that was built during the second half of the century, out of the ruins left by earlier conflicts and away from the spiteful instincts that would otherwise make of the present another prelude to war? In an unusually pensive mood, Javier Solana shared his concerns and his hope for the future of the Atlantic partnership. "Let me tell you," he said, "I do not despair. Some of us profoundly disagree with Bush. But it may push the European Union to become much more of an actor in the world. We have an obligation to do so." It is not much of a conclusion to suggest that this obligation is more likely to be met with a cohesive and strong transatlantic partnership than without it.

Now more than ever before, questions about the future of the Atlantic Alliance are warranted . . . . Whatever the merits of our respective positions, Americans and Europeans alike owe it . . . to make the renewal of the transatlantic partnership a priority and an obligation.

Now more than ever before, questions about the future of the Atlantic Alliance are warranted. But now no less than ever before, the answer remains self evident, not because the absence of an alliance would deny the United States and Europe a future, but because in the absence of such an alliance the future would be less promising and even more dangerous. Whatever the merits of our respective positions, Americans and Europeans alike owe it—to themselves as well as to each other and the history they have conquered—to make the renewal of the transatlantic partnership a priority and an obligation.

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