

CHAPTER ONE

AMERICAN REFLECTIONS ON EUROPE'S FINALITY

Simon Serfaty

WHY THE 15 MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION WOULD HAVE CHOSEN the year 2000 to launch a debate over the future of their institutions is not clear, but then, little about the EU ever seems to be clear. Finland's prime minister, Paavo Lipponen, perhaps said it best when he presented his views on a question initially asked by German foreign minister Joschka Fischer and by then already dubbed the finality question. "A debate about the future," Lipponen said, "emerges when we do not seem to know what we want to do with the present."¹ In other words, the EU must address the question of its long-term finality to resolve at last the uncertainties surrounding its members' European finality.

Admittedly, such an approach is more fatalistic than it is visionary. To decide without choosing, as the French like to say (*la fuite en avant*), is to marvel that everything is in place when nothing is in order, as the Italians like to notice (*tutto è a posto, niente in ordine*). After five decades of decisions that repeatedly renewed their commitment to an ever closer union without ever defining it, the countries of Europe still seem to be lacking the common purpose that would help cement their remarkable achievements within a plausible institutional structure. This is why, now even more than ever before, the totality of the EU's agenda still fails to describe what kind of a union its members want. Even the idea of finality is misleading, because it is debated as if Europe's end point could be identified for

some specific moment in the predictable future—not only who does what but also when and on whose behalf?

HISTORY RECAST: A TERRITORIAL REVOLUTION

Coming after the dehumanizing brutality that shaped the collapse of Europe during the first half of the twentieth century, the reorganization of its political space that began after the end of World War II is historically awesome. Even Jean Monnet, who dared to challenge the course of history with bold plans for a European community more than five decades ago, would be astounded at the outcome. The small Common Market that was launched in 1958 has recast the history of its members.² Can these civil states be the great powers that sponsored the horrific deaths of tens of millions in the name of a mythical white man’s burdens, an elusive *mission civilisatrice*, a constrained *Kultur*, or self-appointed and barbaric commissars? Moving in an increasingly integrated space—peaceful, affluent, and democratic—Europe is completing its third territorial revolution in half a millennium: after the city-states and the nation-states, here come the member states—ill-defined political units that relinquish their national sovereignty to the ever more intrusive discipline of the unfinished union to which they belong or which they hope to join.

The so-called finality debate began in May 2000, when Germany’s foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, chose to share his “private” thoughts on the future of European integration. Up to that time, there had been little interest in discussing the impact of the EU on its members—except, predictably, on the part of countries (Britain and Denmark, for example) that continued to oppose membership long after they had welcomed it. Agreeing implicitly to be something more (meaning “European”) was somewhat easier than debating explicitly the need to become something less (meaning without national specificity). Yet that is precisely what Fischer seemed to do when he called for “a division of sovereignty between Europe and the nation-state” during an ill-defined “transition from a union of states to … a federation.” The German foreign minister hardly expected his “thoughts” to be the catalyst for the wide debate that followed throughout the year.³ Yet, as noted quickly by then-French foreign

minister Hubert Védrine, the lofty goal of a federation raised questions that begged any “improvised, careless or even ingenious answers.” Admittedly, the “delimitation” of competences between the union and its members would have to be made explicit to achieve “more clarity, simplicity, and readability.” But, pointedly warned Védrine, the time for such debate had not come yet, lest Europe be “heading for deadlock.”⁴

Concerns over the short-term political consequences of a public debate over Europe’s long-term transformation were not surprising. After 1945, when a few countries began to explore the terra incognita of territorial consolidation, debating the future was not a pressing issue. Rather, the quest for such consolidation was fueled by a widespread apprehension that continued fragmentation would perpetuate, and ultimately renew, the conflicts waged during the previous 50 years. In other words, Europe was not born out of a common vision of the future. Rather, it is the shared vision of a failed past that served as a flashlight to illuminate a bleak present and enter the darkness ahead. After that, no attempt was ever truly made to provide a credible sense of the end point to which the process might lead. Instead, an ill-defined logic *communautaire* seemed to unfold—mechanically at first, and state-driven thereafter—that called for deepening in order to widen, widening in order to deepen, and reforming in order to do both. If anything, that logic would save the nation-state from itself as well as from its neighbors, rather than bury it.⁵

Today, however, the inescapable evidence of the EU’s intrusiveness into the day-to-day lives of its member states and their citizens, as well as a growing awareness of the enormity of what is about to be done in the name of Europe, appears to make it imperative to raise questions about Europe’s final status. Granted that the union gives its members the added territorial dimension without which none might otherwise be able to survive, what will each of them keep as its sovereign domain—*qui fait quoi?* Now, earlier battles fought over a small Common Market in the 1950s, a modest increase in the authority of the European Commission in the 1960s, the European Monetary System in the 1970s, the Single Market in the 1980s, and

even the launch of the euro in the 1990s—these all look inconsequential. Now, too, completing the eurozone and moving on with economic union, enforcing “headline goals” toward a common security identity, nearly doubling membership, devising new rules of governance within the union, and even writing a constitution for its citizens—these all serve as benchmarks for Europe’s end game. But debating who would or might do what—particularly using ambiguous language—also threatens to restore a hierarchy among member states led by the select group of “pioneer states” imagined by French president Jacques Chirac, leading to the question of who does what, to be sure, but, no less significantly, with or without whom?

Adding to the anxiety caused by this end game is a transatlantic dimension of the European continent that can no longer be ignored either: even as history is recast, it should also be remembered. The postwar idea of Europe was an old European idea that was made plausible only after the United States had endorsed it with a series of bold economic, political, and military commitments. To this extent, the idea of Europe was a U.S.-inspired idea that challenged the history of both the United States and Europe. That challenge was designed to end the instabilities and conflicts that had forced U.S. participation in the three global wars fought in the twentieth century. For the Truman administration, however, it was also the evidence of past failures that served as a catalyst for decisions that made the United States seem more dedicated to the idea of European unity than Europeans themselves were. Indeed, it is difficult to recall any instance when a U.S. president or senior official still in office ever stated a preference for any ally in Europe—including (and especially) Britain—to stay away from Europe and its emerging community.⁶

Visions are whatever is remembered after everything has worked; an unintended consequence of the U.S. commitment was also to recast a history of U.S. separation from the continent against which the U.S. republic was born, and in isolation from which the United States matured for more than 150 years after that. Entering the twenty-first century, the United States has restored an intimacy with Europe that is no longer reversible. The United States is not a European power, but it is bound to remain a power in Europe—not only

on military grounds, but also, and perhaps above all, on economic, institutional, and even cultural grounds. In other words, the Cold War has achieved what neither world war could do: it created a web of U.S. interests and commonalities in Europe, and Europe's in the United States, that is too entangled to make separation either possible or meaningful for countries on either side of the Atlantic. This is not an invitation to debate U.S. membership in the European Union; the United States is not, and need not become, a member of the EU—no more, that is, than the other way around. But the reality of the United States as a nonmember member state of the EU is fraught with consequences, including the need for genuine U.S. involvement with anything that happens in, and is decided on behalf of, Europe—and, for that matter, the other way around as well.

In short, the finality debate for Europe cannot be final without a parallel debate over the future of Europe's relations with the United States. Now as before, the idea of Europe and the Atlantic idea are not only compatible but also complementary. The territorial revolution about to be completed in Europe is one that extends across the Atlantic within the responsive strategic community of values and interests that now links the United States and the states of Europe. This is the “vision thing”—nothing more than staying the course that was set two generations ago, because no other course is better for the next generation.

HISTORY DERAILED: IT'S AMERICA, STUPID!

The postwar history of Europe is often a history of treaty reforms, as such a history describes the rise and evolutions of European institutions from one treaty to the next—from Paris and Rome in 1951 and 1957 to Amsterdam and Nice in 1997 and 2000.⁷ What shaped the rise of these institutions, however, was a benign tolerance for denationalization that progressively denied the nation-states much of their sovereignty to the benefit of the institutions they created. That history is telling. Within these institutions, people lost their passions, previously sharpened on the Right by the need to save the nation from its foreign enemies, and on the Left by the urge to build more just societies at home. Absent these public passions, the countries

of Europe left their traditional moorings at extreme political poles to sail toward a new normalcy set at the center. Thus, Europe has been transformed into a political environment that is not based on ideologies, *à l'américaine*, with no more great systemic debates between socialism and capitalism and between authoritarianism and fascism and democracy, let alone the occasional explosions into civil wars and revolutions that were still raging, *à l'européenne*, a generation ago. In other words, “It’s America, stupid!”

Born out of the ideologies that betrayed them, the ideas that shaped Europe’s political life during the Cold War years amounted to little, if anything. Indeed, what is most remarkable about the rise and fall of communism in postwar Europe is how little it achieved during its decades of maximum influence, and how little was left behind after its collapse. Whether the Communist challenge to democracy is assessed in terms of the Soviet state, or of political parties as its agents, little has survived. The Soviet Union and its allies—the Communist parties, their disciples, and even the Socialists who made Moscow and communism their main adversaries—are all gone. Not the least striking feature of their near total disappearance is the rapidity with which it took place—almost instantaneously and without the least hint of anger or even regret.⁸ Nothing is left of the old Left, and even the space that it had sought at the center is moving to the right, from one election to the next, from Italy and France to Norway and Holland.

Actually, the most lasting influence of the recent ideological battles was to promote a successor generation of European political leaders who abandoned their idea of the revolution even before the revolution failed them. In their race to the top, political leaders also lost the convictions that used to give urgency to their actions and add poignancy to their discourse. There is more flexibility now, and the only urgency left is that of the coming election. As Stendhal had his most fin de siècle of men exclaim, “Why am I expected to be of the same opinion today as I was six weeks ago? That would mean I was the slave of my opinion.”⁹ Contemporary political slavery is chained to public opinion polls more than it is to ideas or ideologies. Being the slave of its opinions is hardly the fate of Europe’s new political

class, whose postmodernist approach to political accountability transforms reality into what it is said to be rather than what it is. Thus, with an implicit recognition that Europe leaves its members with no alternative to the policies in place, dissent turns out to be only a path to political power that is built with charismatic cement and rhetorical bricks.

François Mitterrand, who seemed to be thinking of a “rupture” with Europe when he first won the French presidency in May 1981, may have been the political godfather of these new leaders; however, his stubborn will to be all he could be was never fully translated into a reliable will to do all he should do. “He writes almost as well as the general,” it was said of Mitterrand in comparison to de Gaulle; but Mitterrand also forgot even more and more readily than the general ever had. Mitterrand moved everywhere and was everything, even in the context of the Socialist Party that he had adopted and conquered in 1971, because it “never followed dominant patterns nor corresponded to a single party type.”¹⁰ If de Gaulle bridged the gap in France between monarchy and democracy, as he liked to say, Mitterrand bridged the gap between the two French Lefts, Socialist and Communist, and the two French Rights, *orléaniste* and *bonapartiste*.

After Mitterrand, everything in France was merged into one big centrist blur, and so it was elsewhere in Europe, where the political spoils go to those who, like Mitterrand, can best forget the convictions they entertained during the heroic days of their youth. These convictions were designed to serve their ambitions—an avenue to power that moved left and right until it fell into the rhetorical shortcuts of a “third way.” Whether moving from left to right, like Spain’s Felipe Gonzalez (and gravitating back to the center, like his successor, José María Aznar), or from right to left, like Germany’s Helmut Kohl (and similarly back to the center, like his political opposite, Gerhard Schroeder), centrist republics were being conceived in Europe many years before the Cold War came to an end.¹¹

As the third way also reached a dead end, values and principles and morality and all the other past features of “the way we were” have become easy substitutes for current policy. As a result, Europe’s

leaders, as well as their critics, can now provide the rhetoric of a “feel good” conscience that contrasts with the “do nothing” institutions they wish to ignore or the “read my lips” political opponents they wish to mute. Single-minded ambitions rule over convictions that are kept accordingly flexible; every political leader can thus stand tall relative to his or her adversaries and be lucky in terms of enemies. Even political leaders who stand for nothing can claim an identity that is designed to contrast with that of their immediate predecessors or their current rivals—or repeat that of their more distant political ancestors, whatever their political lineage.¹² In this fashion, Tony Blair, who is no John Major, is said to sound Churchillian, while Chirac can adopt Gaullist tones when he defends the institutions against Jean-Marie Le Pen (or a “certain idea” of France against George W. Bush).

Yet this loss of political passions at a time of unprecedented democratic affluence throughout the European continent may be a tangible obstacle to finality, as every conceivable constituency fights to preserve the benefits to which it is accustomed but at the same time seems threatened by the current EU agenda—whether because of the euro and its emphasis on stability, because of enlargement and the redistribution of regional funds that adoption of the euro entails, or because of increasingly porous borders that facilitate further the entry of new citizens. Legislative bodies that represent a national mosaic of specialized interests respond to parochial pressures and defy integration, leading to a protracted stalemate, to bargains that defy coherence, or even to “the further development of a multi-speed Europe,” as opposed to a truly united one.¹³ Entering the twenty-first century, neither the fading ideas of the nation-state nor the emerging idea of the member state are ideas worth dying for. Indeed, they may not even be ideas worth living for—or, more modestly, ideas to vote for. This loss of passion about Europe is often viewed as its Achilles’ heel. Everywhere, rates of electoral participation are falling to levels that the United States takes for granted but that Europe used to view as aberrant. At best, such public indifference might produce a reflexive culture of consent, but it can just as easily produce a parochial culture of dissent.

“Will Europe never be Europe because it is becoming Europe?” asked Timothy Garton Ash.¹⁴ It might be more appropriate to ask: Will Europe never be Europe because it is becoming American, thus forming a circle that started with Europe as America’s past, and would end with America as Europe’s future? The experience is oddly “schizoid”: even while Europeans become more American each day, they spend more and more time looking for ways to complain about America.¹⁵ This, of course, is not a matter of facts but a matter of feelings that should not be allowed to become facts.

HISTORY DISFIGURED: WHO IS WE?

The question—Who is we?—is daunting. However phrased, the question involves the many definitions of what Europe is—a mosaic of nation-states, a geographic expression, a killing field—so many definitions, in fact, that in the end, it threatens to escape any. On its way to finality, Europe’s identity transcends its immediate past—Haider is no Hitler, and Berlusconi is no Mussolini. But the question does relate to a collective hope of asserting a political and cultural core that binds the nations of Europe together, and the answer will ultimately determine Europe’s final institutional content in the twenty-first century.

What appears to have been missing since the end of the Cold War is a credible and recognizable threat from a plausible “they,” whose leaders can be convincingly demonized and their followers lastingly dehumanized. Lacking that threat, it may be tempting to turn against the post-World War II idea of Europe as the source of whatever happens to be the paranoid flavor of the moment. “Our” new enemies are easy targets who define who or what “we” do not wish to be, or serve as reliable alibis to explain what “they” have made us become. Populist calls to arms follow—to close the borders, send the intruders back where they belong, protect the sacred patrimony, and altogether wage a cultural war against those forces that have derailed “our” common past and redirected it toward some unwanted future.

In other words, even though the American imports of modernity and Europeanness are attractive, many in Europe miss the narrowly

defined identity that used to give a personal dimension to the citizens' lives in their respective family and community environments. There is a new Cartesian logic that stands as an obstacle to Europe—not a matter of thinking but the reality of being. The concept of "I am, therefore I integrate" demands intimacy with one's core as a justification for a willingness to expand it. But can I integrate if I fail to understand who I am? Over the years, the nation-states learned, however painfully, to control the various and adversarial sentiments of large groups of people gathered within a single political unit. As the European Union erodes the authority of the nation-state, these tensions are exacerbated, and they release, out of each member state, the tepid odors of ethnic consciousness and nationalist xenophobia that seem to be spreading throughout the continent.¹⁶

The genealogy of Europe's cultural development is especially dense with regard to the continent's relations with Islam and the place Islam has gained within each EU member state. When Europeans were struggling to define themselves against the barbarians' *jihad*, there was one faith, and that was the Christian faith. As a result, Islam was a heresy for Christians, and they should show no mercy toward its adherents. Christians were not alone in holding this view, however; Muslims also "considered the Europeans' manners and habits to be loathsome" but also dismissed "their religion [as] superseded by Islam."¹⁷ In a sense, neither the Europeans' view of Islam in Europe nor Islam's view of its condition in Europe has changed. Tariq Ramadan has made a challenging attempt at reconciliation, with writing that has created a sort of intellectual cult among many Muslims in Europe who strive to become, and be accepted as, good European Muslims. As Ramadan puts it, as long as a "consistent number of Muslims do not reach an autonomous perception of their own identity in the West, it will be difficult for them, if not impossible, simply to believe that they have something to give to the society they live in."¹⁸ But that assessment, of course, is also true of Europeans, who neither seem ready to grant Muslims in Europe the needed "autonomy" nor find it possible to recognize what has already been received from, and will continue to be given by, these European Muslims.

The growing presence of Islam in Europe is insufficiently understood in the United States, where Islam's most public manifestations are misrepresented as further evidence of a widening values gap between the two sides of the Atlantic. For the United States, too, the question of Europe's identity—Who is they?—is daunting, because the continent's “variable geography” leaves the United States with different mental maps of Europe's future.¹⁹ Indeed, “over here” in the United States, it is the pre-war memories of Europe—“over there”—that shape the exaggerated fears of the moment, whether a perceived revival of political extremism, or a reported resurrection of anti-Semitism, or, inevitably, another burst of anti-U.S. sentiment. In spring 2002, the French presidential elections were an outlet for many such exaggerations, as Jean-Marie Le Pen emerged as an alleged contender for the French presidency, while some of his compatriots reportedly attacked Jews or synagogues, and many more read books that took outrageous positions opposing the United States.²⁰ Other examples of political extremism can be found in such traditionally compassionate countries as the Netherlands and Denmark, and other instances of anti-Semitism have occurred in historically less benign countries like Germany and Austria. Taken together, these cases form the ghosts of Europe's past, much to the dismay of U.S. observers already aroused by the so-called petulance of allies whose “real problem is their irrelevance.”²¹ These incidents, in turn, reinforce the views of observers or even officials who continue to misread Europe and its union, perpetually renewing their warnings of an “alarmingly undemocratic drift” caused by EU institutions “that are more characteristic of the Age of Absolutism than of American-style republicanism.”²² In short, wrote Charles Krauthammer, a (mis)leading voice in this anti-European caucus, “What we are seeing is … the release … of a millennium-old urge that powerfully infected and shaped European history.”²³

This is not the place to argue with professional Euroskeptics, who never seem to be embarrassed by past errors in their analyses and forecasts or by their sheer ignorance of Europe's past and current conditions. Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn from the most recent, post-September 11 episodes must be dismissed as reflective neither

of the new Europe nor of the episodes themselves. Anti-Semitism is primarily the work of young European Muslims, mostly of North African descent, who have little to do with the sentiment that animated a European middle class that made an act of faith out of their hatred of Jews.²⁴ The irony is obvious: nearing finality, Europe stands more as the Middle Eastern power that it never wanted to become than as the power in the Middle East that it has often hoped to be again. However distasteful the xenophobic aura that surrounds Europe's far Right, voters' frustrations parallel much of what is often articulated by the candidates that populate primaries in the United States—politicians who run against Washington, for the country, and on behalf of societal values that would make Le Pen and Haider proud. What these extremist votes—representing about one-sixth of the votes cast—and these anti-Semitic incidents have in common is that their perpetrators are seething with rage against their own governments, which they hold responsible for the insufficiencies of their respective societies, rather than rage against foreign governments that suppress their co-religionists abroad. Europe is part of that rage, of course, and that is the true scar that is beginning to emerge on the disfigured face of Europe's history.

Such instances of U.S. apprehension over political trends in Europe have been frequent in the past, but this fact should not be cause for complacency. For one, the moment itself, with unprecedented security threats testing the relationship between the United States and Europe, makes it imperative that the relationship be reinforced rather than eroded. Moreover, even as the demonstration of Europe's drift encourages a growing sense of indifference toward Europe in the United States, whatever reality there is to that drift may weaken Europe's resolve to move on with its agenda and play out the end game that had been mapped by previous center-left governments. For Europe's finality to take shape, the countries of Europe need not only a measure of robust economic growth for the coming years but also the political stability that is associated with the soothing presence of centrist governments and the absence of ever deeper cleavages between political extremes. Finality also needs U.S. support—not only for the management of external instabilities

inside and outside of the European continent but also for reassurance to those EU countries that still rely on an external guarantee against both their bigger partners and their troublesome neighbors.

HISTORY RELAUNCHED: FALSE STARTS OR NEW BEGINNINGS?

Europe's genealogical tree also includes deeply rooted family ties with the United States of America—a fact of birth, with an American Republic that was founded in opposition to Europe but also with a European community whose launch owed much to the U.S. decision to return to the Old World. Working together with a generation of enlightened political leaders in Europe, the United States provided the leadership needed to recast past ambitions to achieve unity by force (and never fulfilled for long) into a bold process dedicated to the peaceful pursuit of unity. How far the process has gone is cause for satisfaction; how much further it must still go is cause for apprehension, as enthusiasm for European unity seems to be fading on both sides of the Atlantic.²⁵

The European Union is a very important U.S. interest not only because of the EU's vital importance to its member states but also because the EU has served, and continues to serve, U.S. interests exceptionally well. This view is hardly sentimental—it is the expression of old family ties that are now threatened by changing demographic trends in the United States. The United States and Europe form a *complete* relationship— involving economic, political, security, and cultural ties that are too close to be undone. Most generally—

- Prosperity in a united Europe keeps the United States affluent.
- Stability in a democratic Europe strengthens U.S. institutions.
- Security in a peaceful Europe protects the United States from the recast normalcy of European wars.
- The reality of shared values counters the isolation that Americans might otherwise feel and ultimately resent.²⁶

Moreover, because some EU countries still look up to their transatlantic links as a political and security priority, U.S. policies

continue to influence the construction of Europe, although differently than was the case when the process was launched. Accordingly, decisions that reinforce the fact or even the perception of the U.S. commitment to European unity are desirable; conversely, demonstrations of hostility or even ambivalence must be avoided. The latter can cause tensions within Europe, which in turn have an impact on the construction of Europe. Yet, however much the completion of Europe is in the interest of the United States, it is not a U.S. responsibility—nor, for that matter, should failure to achieve European unity be made the responsibility of the United States. Rather, success or failure in any and all areas of the European construction are, and will remain, the responsibility of EU members.

How, and how well, the EU countries will fulfill these responsibilities is a matter to be decided by Europeans themselves in cooperation with EU applicants and neighbors. There is no national perspective on such questions in the United States, and one is not needed, even though there can be, and are, obvious preferences. U.S. preferences must be stated cautiously, however, in order not to transform the choices of the full union into the perceived obligations of those among its members or applicants that are deemed to be, or aspire to become, closest to the United States.²⁷ Nevertheless, because these preferences do exist, any sort of Europe will not be acceptable, and this fact limits U.S. support for a Europe that is—and remains—

- economically open and resistant to protectionist pressures for selected industrial and growth sectors;
- politically democratic and compatible with social values and policies that prevail in the United States;
- institutionally responsive to the need for enlargement in the East and compassion in the South; and
- able to assume a larger share of defense with the United States and within NATO as the sole security institution common to both the United States and the states of Europe.

There is, therefore, a need for a broad U.S. perspective on what is to become of its like-minded partners in Europe, and how—and

how best—the EU might continue to satisfy U.S. interests. Yet, when dealing with Europe and its union, the need for such a perspective is often hampered by a U.S. tendency to fragment space and isolate time—that is, a tendency to address Europe one country and one issue at a time, and from time to time. Such a tendency reinforces the crisis of the moment and denies Europe the institutional credibility it has gained. Instead of dealing with the EU as an entity of its own—a virtual member state to which an unprecedented level of sovereignty has been delegated by the other 15 members—the United States tends to dismiss the EU as an artificial scaffolding that will surely collapse under the weight of its undemocratic and unwanted policies and practices. In sum, even now, taking Europe seriously does not come easily to those in the United States who remain baffled by the process, unaware of the enormity of what Europeans have achieved thus far, and seemingly indifferent to the complexity of their agenda. In short, the United States, like Europe, must also come to terms with the finality of Europe, not as a part-time associate but as a full-time partner.²⁸

This decision is not one-sided, however, lest it proves to be a false start rather than a new beginning. Equally significant is the need for Europe to come to terms with the finality of its transatlantic dimension—the end point, that is, not only of the European Union but also of the Euro-Atlantic community that has also emerged over the years. In other words, once “Europe” ceases to be neglected as a counterfeit power and beyond ill-stated fears of an emergent Europe as a counterweight of U.S. power,²⁹ the goal of Europe as the U.S. counterpart for the promotion of common values and shared interests still stands. As previously argued, the postwar idea of a European Community (EC) and the Atlantic idea of an entangling alliance between the United States and the countries of Europe were linked. The former needed a U.S. commitment to get started, and Europe’s commitment to unity was a precondition for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Throughout, these two institutional tracks remained separate, but the two parallel paths they drew remained inseparable. Neither could work without the other, and both were designed to reinforce each other. While NATO provided its members

with collective defense against an external threat, the EC provided its members with a setting within which they could settle their historic disputes with one another. As NATO expanded its reach in Cold War Europe, three times between 1949 and 1986, so did the European Community—three times as well, and in ways that asserted the progressive convergence of European membership in both institutions.

The institutional complementarity that was envisioned between 1949 and 1957, and confirmed throughout the Cold War, continues to prevail now, in the midst of the “wars of 9/11” started in the aftermath of the tragic events of September 11.³⁰ Neither the EU nor NATO is a full-service institution. Even as the EU remains the vehicle of choice for soft security issues and NATO the institution of choice for hard security issues, past distinctions between these issues no longer apply. Soft security issues that remain unattended for too long threaten to escalate into hard security problems; hard security issues that are merely fought with military power can be defeated, but they cannot be resolved without addressing the nonmilitary dimensions of these issues. The new multidimensional agenda of traditional and new security issues that looms ahead makes such complementarity more imperative now than ever before. Enlargement, aid, and peacekeeping are the instruments that the European Union’s civilian power can effectively use to attend to the interests and values it shares with the United States, the military power par excellence.³¹

In sum, finality is not about Europe alone; it is also about Europe’s relations with the United States in the context of a community of action defined by both the EU and NATO and aimed at managing the vast range of interests and values shared, though not always evenly, by nations on both sides of the Atlantic. “To understand,” wrote Isaiah Berlin, “is to perceive patterns.”³² Having moved from the known of a murderous past to the unknown of community living, Europe has come a long way, ending the repetitive boredom of its own history. But so has the United States, which has also moved from the isolation it relished to the entanglement it feared. These parallel roads are now converging even as the obstacles that remain in their way are causes for growing impatience, skepticism, and even

apprehension. Before World War II, the main obstacle to a better future was not a scarcity of U.S. involvement but a surplus of Europe's; today the main problem is the reverse—not an excess of U.S. input but a scarcity of Europe's. As the finality debate unfolds among the countries of Europe in the coming years, there will be a need not only for more European influence but also for more from the United States, because only to the extent that both are available will it be possible to avoid an excess of either.

Notes

¹ Paavo Lipponen, Speech at the College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium, November 10, 2000.

² Jean Monnet, *Memoirs* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1978), pp. 403 and 524; see also François Fontaine, "Forward with Jean Monnet," in *Jean Monnet and the Path to European Unity*, ed. Douglas Brinkley and Clifford Hackett (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), p. 55.

³ Joschka Fischer, "From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration," Speech at Humboldt University, Berlin, May 12, 2000.

⁴ "Future of Europe," Letter from Hubert Védrine to Joschka Fischer, June 8, 2000. However, in the weeks that followed, most heads of state or government stated their views on the issue, possibly to anticipate their countries' ambivalence about the sheer idea of finality for Europe; see, in this volume, Philippe Moreau Defarges, "The View from France: Steadfast and Changing"; see also Christian Joerges, Yves Meny and J.H.H. Weiler, eds., *What Kind of Constitution for What Kind of Polity: Responses to Joschka Fischer* (Florence: European University Institute, 2000) (available at www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/00/symp.html).

⁵ Alan Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); see also Simon Serfaty, "Europe 2007: From Nation-States to Member States," *The Washington Quarterly* 23, no. 4 (Autumn 2000): 15–29.

⁶ See, in this volume, David Allen, "Britain and the Future of the European Union: Not Quite There Yet." This is not meant to deny that U.S. administrations occasionally sought, more or less effectively, to redirect a European initiative when that initiative did not seem to coincide with U.S. preferences, but that it was never done to an extent that would threaten to derail the process.

⁷ See, in this volume, Desmond Dinan, "The Convention and the Intergovernmental Conference"; and Fraser Cameron, "The Finality Debate: A Commission Perspective."

⁸ François Furet, *The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. x.

⁹ Cited in Nathan Leites, *The Rules of the Game in Paris* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 13.

¹⁰ Alistair Cole, “The Political Leader and His Heritage,” in *The Mitterrand Years: Legacy and Evaluation*, ed. Mairi MacLean (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), p. 248. “I don’t ask for anything more than what I already have,” Mitterrand told Ronald Tiersky, as quoted in Ronald Tiersky, *François Mitterrand: The Last French President* (New York: St. Martin’s Press 2000), p. xv.

¹¹ Still, the relative shift in ideological preferences among Europe’s political leaders has been more evident in some EU countries than in others; see, in this volume, Carlos Closa Montero, “The Debate in Spain: Explaining Absences, Revealing Presences”; and Wolfgang Wessels, “The German Debate: Visions and Missions.”

¹² Thus, Silvio Berlusconi can emphasize his government’s difference from his center-left predecessors by criticizing their “dogmatic” attitudes as “born-again believers” in Brussels and its institutions; see, in this volume, Gianni Bonvicini, “The Italian Debate: Still the Fear of Exclusion?”

¹³ See Cameron, “A Perspective from the Commission.”

¹⁴ Timothy Garton Ash, “The European Orchestra,” *New York Review of Books*, May 17, 2001, p. 60.

¹⁵ Martin Walker, “What Europeans Think of America,” *World Policy Journal* 17, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 26.

¹⁶ David Pryce-Jones, “European Union: Disaster in the Making,” *Commentary* 13, no. 6 (June 1997): 37.

¹⁷ Richard Fletcher, *The Barbarian Conversion: From Paganism to Christianity* (New York: Henry Holt, 1998), p. 304; and Jane Smith, “Islam and Christiandom: Historical, Cultural, and Religious Interaction from the Seventh to the Fifteenth Centuries,” in *The Oxford History of Islam*, ed. John L. Esposito (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 329.

¹⁸ Tariq Ramadan, *To Be a European Muslim* (Leicester, England: Islamic Foundation, 1999), p. 81; see also Tariq Ramadan, “Europeanization of Islam or Islamization of Europe,” in *Islam: Europe’s Second Religion*, ed. Shireen T. Hunter (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2002), pp. 207–218.

¹⁹ Martin Walker, “Variable Geography: America’s Mental Maps of a Greater Europe,” *International Affairs* 76, no. 3 (July 2000): 459–474.

²⁰ The spread of anti-U.S. literature and the escalation of anti-U.S. coverage in the media had been in evidence since the 2000 presidential campaign, when

Europe's reactions to presidential candidate George W. Bush were often offensive; see Max Berley, "Plot Development," *The New Republic*, April 22, 2002, pp. 16–17. One of the more disturbing examples of this coverage is Philippe Labro, "Chronique de l'Amérique en Campagne," *Le Monde*, October 18, 2000, pp. 16–17.

²¹ Charles Krauthammer, "The Axis of Petulance," *Washington Post*, March 1, 2002.

²² Lee A. Casey and David B. Rivkin, Jr., "Europe in the Balance: The Alarmingly Undemocratic Drift of the European Union," *Policy Review*, no. 107 (June-July 2001), p. 42.

²³ Charles Krauthammer, "Europe and 'Those People,'" *Washington Post*, April 26, 2002.

²⁴ "How Sick is Europe?" *The Economist*, May 9, 2002. This, of course, is not designed to minimize or banalize the outrageousness of any anti-Semitic act or ethnic slur everywhere and in all circumstances.

²⁵ As Jacques Delors warned when he was interviewed by Arnaud Leparmentier recently, "Throughout our continent, there is no longer the same enthusiasm for the European construction," *Le Monde*, May 3, 2002.

²⁶ See Simon Serfaty, *Stay the Course* (Washington, D.C.: Praeger Publishers and CSIS Press, 1997); and Simon Serfaty, *Memories of Europe's Future: Farewell to Yesteryear* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2000).

²⁷ Poland's confidence in its ability to serve as a full constructive member within an enlarged and reformed Europe is shared by other aspirant countries, albeit the greater size of the former adds to its greater weight relative to many of the latter; see, in this volume, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, "Poland: The View from a Candidate Country."

²⁸ In 1886, Friedrich Nietzsche wrote along these lines in *Jenseits von Gut und Bösen* (Beyond Good and Evil): "Nowadays the most obvious signs are not read, or even willfully misinterpreted, which show that *Europe will be one*. In all people who, during this century, have looked beyond the surface, this has been the real direction their soul, in its mystical work, has been taking: to prepare the way towards that new *synthesis*" (quoted in Peter Rietbergen, *Europe: A Cultural History* [New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1998], p. 407). Such a "synthesis" of the nation-states has certainly not developed as Nietzsche might have anticipated and certainly not as quickly as he had envisioned, but it is now coming.

²⁹ For examples of this view, see Peter Rodman, *Drifting Apart? Trends in U.S.-European Relations* (Washington, D.C.: The Nixon Center, 1999); and John Bolton, "European Common Foreign, Security, and Defense Policies: Implications for the United States and the Atlantic Alliance," Testimony to the

House Committee on International Relations, 106th Congress, First Session, November 10, 1999, pp. 65–78.

³⁰ See Simon Serfaty, “The Wars of 911,” *The International Spectator* 36, no. 4 (October–December 2001): 5–11; and Simon Serfaty, “The New Normalcy,” *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 209–219.

³¹ Andrew Moravcsik, “Europe, the Quiet Superpower is the Equal of the United States,” *The Independent*, June 13, 2002.

³² Isaiah Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 52.