Header
Updated: 27-Oct-2000 Ministerial Communiqus

Defence
Planning
Committee

Brussels
4-5 Dec. 1986

Final Communiqué

Chairman: Lord Carrington


Synopsis

Basis for improved East-West relations Security through credible deterrence and defence - Continued validity of NATO's strategy of forward defence and flexible response - Maintaining effective nuclear deterrence - Rejection of unilateral disarmament - Efforts to improve conventional forces - Discussion of Annual Defence Review - Adoption of NATO Force Plan 1987-1991 - Progress towards more effective conventional posture Threat posed to NATO by Warsaw Pact tactical ballistic missiles - Improvements to Alliance planning procedures - Updating of Conceptual Military Framework and development of long term planning guidelines Allocation of resources - Challenge posed by target of 3% real increase in accordance with 1985 Ministerial Guidance - Effective use of resources - Armaments Cooperation Improvement Strategy - Principles for collaboration put forward by IEPG nations - Exploitation of emerging technologies - 1986 Defence Review - Assistance for Greece, Portugal and Turkey in strengthening conventional defences - Allied support for US efforts to seek arms control agreements Progress at Reykjavik towards agreement on 50% reductions in strategic offensive forces and LRINF - Progress on INF - Importance of effective verification - Allied support for US exploration of space and defence systems- Search for worldwide ban on chemical weapons - Significance and objectives of work on conventional arms control.


    The Defence Planning Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in Ministerial Session in Brussels on 4th and 5th December 1986, and agreed the following:

  1. NATO's aim is the prevention of war; therefore the Alliance must continue to ensure its security through the provision of adequate military capabilities and the parallel pursuit of a more stable East-West relationship. Credible deterrence and defence is an essential basis for improved relations between East and West.

  2. NATO's strategy of forward defence and flexible response, including the commitment to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent posture, has preserved peace for many years and remains fully valid. Against the background of existing Warsaw Pact strength and ongoing force improvements, this strategy continues to require effective nuclear deterrence, based on a mix of systems. Given the need for stable balance at all times, nuclear weapons cannot be considered in isolation. Reductions in nuclear weapons would increase the importance of eliminating the current imbalance in conventional forces. We reject unilateral disarmament, which would result in the abandonment by NATO of its deterrent strategy, and hence the basis for its security and stability. As in the past, Alliance solidarity and cohesion will be important in ensuring progress towards a more secure and stable environment.

  3. Our determination to avoid an undue reliance on the early use of nuclear weapons is reflected in our continuing efforts to improve conventional forces. The Conventional Defence Improvements actionplan has providedthe framework within which we can make progress towards securing this objective. In particular, it has identified those key deficiencies and priority areas where we all agree a special effort will bring the greatest return for our collective defence. Our discussion of the Annual Defence Review and the adoption of the NATO Force Plan 1987-1991 has reflected our determination to give these Alliance priority areas special emphasis in our national plans and programmes.

  4. Considerable progress has already been made towards a more effective conventional posture. We have seen positive developments in several areas including the substantial modernization programmes in almost all member countries and the improvements in the sustainability of our forces. These improvements and other actions contained in CDI will considerably enhance our capabilities and reduce the areas of deficiency. We are determined to sustain this momentum.

  5. Having noted the initial assessment of the developing threat posed to NATO by Warsaw Pact tactical ballistic missiles, we called for continued work on assessing the threat and possible ways to deal with it.

  6. Improvements to Alliance planning procedures are also now being put into effect. These include a more effective co-ordination of the various planning areas of the Alliance and the provision of more effective long term planning guidance on our military requirements through regular updating of the Conceptual Military Framework and the development of long term planning guidelines by our Military Authorities.

  7. All of this represents substantial progress and provides a solid foundation for achieving more effective conventional forces. However, the provision of adequate resources in accordance with the 1985 Ministerial Guidance which reaffirmed the aims of a 3 % real increase as a general guide, and the need for even better use of these resources will continue to be a serious challenge for all nations.

  8. Better armaments co-operation, standardization and sharing of technology between the European and North American and the developed and developing members of the Alliance are important for ensuring the most effective use of resources, as is the continued protection of militarily relevant technology.

  9. In the context of the current CDI effort, we agreed that improved armaments collaboration has an important role to play in the strengthening of conventional defences and that NATO's Armaments Co-operation Improvement Strategy, approved by Ministers in December 1985, is proving to be a useful political framework for promoting and co-ordinating initiatives in this field on both sides of the Atlantic. Several of the projects launched as a result of United States' legislation are reaching the stage when major programme decisions will be required. In the light of experience gained to date, the Independent European Programme Group nations have put forward a number of "Principles for Collaboration" related to programme management which have been welcomed by their North American Allies. We are continuing to give emphasis to the exploitation of emerging technologies in our defence equipment programmes, particularly in the long term.

  10. The 1986 Defence Review has shown again that despite commendable efforts by a few Allies, more support, and by more nations, is essential to assist Greece, Portugal and Turkey to strengthen their conventional defences, in order that they may more effectively fulfil their assigned roles in the collective defence of the Alliance. Various forms of assistance should continue to be examined, in particular and in the context of support for the development of the industrial and technological bases of these countries, arrangements to permit them to participate more fully as partners in NATO armaments co-operation programmes.

  11. Following Reykjavik we support the United States in seeking balanced, equitable and effectively verifiable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. We agreed that instead of simply codifying the existing levels of arsenals, agreements reached in Geneva should seek to achieve substantial reductions in offensive nuclear forces in ways that will enhance stability and minimise the risk of war. We therefore welcomed the progress at Reykjavik towards agreement on 50 % reductions in strategic offensive forces and on longer-range intermediate nuclear missiles. We fully endorse the United States' determination to negotiate detailed agreements on this basis as a matter of priority and urge the Soviet Union to join in this effort in Geneva. Progress on INF must not be held hostage to any other agreement; Soviet insistence on doing so would destroy the credibility of the assurances given at the highest level. Nor must such an INF agreement neglect the existing imbalances in shorter-range INF missiles for which constraints and equal rights must be provided, as well as subsequent negotiations on these missiles. In all cases, effective verification would be an essential condition. We will continue to assess and to consult closely on all these issues. We reiterated our support for the United States' exploration of space and defence systems, as is permitted by the ABM Treaty.

  12. We also confirmed our resolve to seek an early conclusion of a worldwide ban on chemical weapons. In this context we called upon the Soviet Union to take a constructive attitude towards effective verification provisions.

  13. We also emphasised the significance of the current work in the Alliance on conventional arms control. At every stage of this process the Alliance must have a position which protects the ability of its military commanders to carry out their assigned tasks. We shall be seeking to achieve increased openness and the establishment of a stable, comprehensive and verifiable balance of conventional forces at lower levels which would strengthen stability and security in the whole of Europe.


  • Greece recalls its position on nuclear matters and space system issues as expressed during previous NATO Ministerial meetings.

  • Denmark reserves its position on defence and space systems.


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