North
Atlantic
Council
Brussels
3rd-4th
December
1970
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Alliance
Defence for the Seventies
The Allied countries participating in the integrated defence
efforts decided at a meeting of the Defence Planning Committee
in Permanent Session in May of this year to examine in depth
NATO defence problems for the next decade.
- The North Atlantic Alliance has made a practice over the years of periodically conducting major reviews and adapting its policies to accord with the changing circumstances of the times. A notable recent example was the study undertaken in 1967 which resulted in the Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance establishing defence and detente as complementary pillars of its activities. That Report stated that "collective defence is a stabilizing factor in world politics. It is the necessary condition for effective policies directed towards a greater relaxation of tensions". Against this background, governments earlier this year recognized the particular timeliness of a full and candid exchange of views among the Allies on their common defence over the next ten years. This examination of NATO's defence capability in the light of current and prospective military and political developments has now been completed.
- NATO's approach to security in the 1970s will continue to be
based on the twin concepts of defence and detente. Defence
problems cannot be seen in isolation but must be viewed in the
broader context of the Alliance's basic purpose of ensuring the
security of its members. There is a close inter-relationship
between the maintenance of adequate defensive strength and the
negotiation of settlements affecting the security of the member
states.
- The 1970s could develop into an era of successful
negotiations between members of the North Atlantic Alliance and
those of the Warsaw Pact. On Western initiative, there are now
negotiations under way between East and West which could lead to
a real relaxation of tensions. It is hoped that there will be
satisfactory progress in on-going talks on a limitation of
strategic nuclear weapons and on an improvement of the situation
in and around Berlin, and in other current negotiations between
individual members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Alliance
will continue to seek improved East-West relations, and in the
framework of this effort, one of its principal aims will be to
engage the Soviet Union and its allies in meaningful talks on
mutual and balanced force reductions and other disarmament
measures. Progress in this field would facilitate dealing with
the defence problems of the next decade. This period might also
see convened one or more conferences on European security and
co-operation.
- On the other hand, the Allies cannot ignore certain
disturbing features in the international situation. The evidence
thus far suggests that the USSR, intent on extending and
strengthening its political power, conducts its international
relations on the basis of concepts some of which are not
conducive to detente. In particular, its concept of sovereignty
is clearly inconsistent with United Nations' principles. At the
same time, Soviet military capabilities, besides guaranteeing
the USSR's security, continue to increase and provide formidable
backing for the wide-ranging assertion of Soviet influence and
presence, persistently raising questions regarding their
intentions. In real terms, there has been a continuous rise in
Soviet defence and defence-related expenditures between 1965 and
1969 of about 5 % to 6 % per year on average and the evidence is
that the USSR is continuing to strengthen its military
establishments still further. The contrast between these figures
and the corresponding information relating to the Alliance may
be seen from paragraph 10 below. Whether East-West relations can
in these circumstances be significantly improved will depend
mainly on the actions of the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies,
and on the attitudes they bring to negotiations now in progress
or in prospect.
- The position of the Alliance and its member countries during
this period of exploration and negotiation, with special
reference to European security and mutual force reductions,
would be weakened if NATO were to reduce its forces
unilaterally, especially those in the European area, and in
particular at a time when it is confronted with a steady growth
in Soviet military power, which manifests itself above all in
the strategic nuclear and maritime fields. NATO member states
must, therefore, maintain a sufficient level of conventional and
nuclear strength for defence as well as for deterrence, thus
furnishing a sound basis from which to negotiate and underlining
that negotiation is the only sensible road open. Progress
towards a meaningful detente in an era of negotiation will,
therefore, require the maintenance of a strong collective
defence posture.
- The present NATO defence strategy of deterrence and defence,
with its constituent concepts of flexibility in response and
forward defence, will remain valid. It will continue to require
an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces.
- It is to be hoped that success in strategic arms limitation
talks will be achieved. Allied strategic nuclear capability will
in any event remain a key element in the security of the West
during the 1970s. At the present time, adequate nuclear forces
exist and it will be essential to ensure that this capability,
which includes the continued commitment of theater nuclear
forces, is maintained.
- The situation in the field of conventional forces is less
satisfactory in view of certain imbalances between NATO and
Warsaw Pact capabilities. Careful attention needs to be paid to
priorities in improving NATO's conventional strength in the
1970s. In the allocation of resources, priority will be given to
measures most critical to a balanced Alliance defence posture in
terms of deterrent effect, ability to resist external political
pressure, and the prompt availability or rapid enhancement of
the forward defensive capability in a developing crisis. In
addition to a capability to deter and counter major deliberate
aggression, Allied forces should be so structured and organized
as to be capable of dealing also with aggressions and incursions
with more limited objectives associated with intimidation or the
creation of faits accomplish, or with those aggressions which
might be the result of accident or miscalculation. In short,
Allied forces should be so structured and organized as to deter
and counter any kind of aggression. Important areas in NATO's
conventional defence posture to which attention should be paid
in the next decade include: armor/anti-armor potential, the air
situation including aircraft protection; overall maritime
capabilities, with special reference to anti-submarine forces;
the situation on NATO's flanks; the peacetime deployment of
ground forces; further improvements in Allied mobilization and
reinforcement capabilities as well as in NATO communications,
for crisis management purposes.
- The Alliance possesses the basic resources for adequate
conventional strength. However, member countries are confronted
with diverging trends in the pattern of expenditures and costs.
On the other hand the cost of personnel and equipment continues
to mount and most NATO countries are faced with major reequipment programs; on the other, in many member countries the
share of GNP devoted to defence has declined and, even if
outlays in money terms have risen, outlays in real terms have
diminished owing to inflation. In marked contrast with the trend
in Warsaw Pact countries' military expenditure, defence
expenditures of the NATO European countries taken as a whole and
calculated in real terms went down by 4 % from 1964 to 1969.
- It is of paramount importance that there be close
collaboration among all member states to ensure the most
effective collective defence posture. It is equally important
that the burden of maintaining the necessary military strength
should be borne co-operatively with each member making an
appropriate contribution.
- The commitment of substantial North American forces deployed
in Europe is essential both politically and militarily for
effective deterrence and defence and to demonstrate the
solidarity of NATO. Their replacement by European forces would
be no substitute. At the same time their significance is closely
related to an effective and improved European defence effort.
Ten of the European countries have therefore consulted among
themselves to determine how it would be possible for them
individually and collectively to make a more substantial
contribution to the overall defence of the Treaty area.
- As a result the ten countries have decided to adopt a
special European Defence Improvement Program going well beyond
previously existing plans and designed to improve Alliance
capability in specific fields identified as of particular
importance in the current study. This Program will comprise:
- an additional collective contribution, in the order of $420
million over five years, to NATO common infrastructure to
accelerate work on the NATO integrated communications system and
on aircraft survival measures;
- numerous important additions and improvements to national
forces, costing at least $450-500 million over the next five
years plus very substantial further amounts thereafter; the
forces concerned will all be committed to NATO;
- other significant financial measures to improve collective
defence capability, costing $79 million over the next two years.
The United States and Canada have welcomed this Program, and
have reaffirmed their intention to maintain their forces in
Europe at substantially their current levels.
- After careful review of the proposals emerging from the
examination of defence problems in the Seventies, the Defence
Planning Committee in Ministerial Session on 2nd December, 1970,
adopted concrete proposals aimed at improving NATO's defence
capabilities.
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