Colloquy on "The European Security and Defense Identity" Madrid, 6 May 1998

Remarks by Adm. T. Joseph Lopez Commander-in-Chief, AFSOUTH It's a great pleasure for me to be here in Madrid to address this very distinguished group from Mediterranean and Western Alliance Countries. I thought I would make a few remarks to you today on how I see my role in NATO as the Commander-In-Chief of all our Allied Forces in the Southern Region. I will also briefly discuss the status of how the WEU has operated with NATO forces in the past in the Southern region and how it might operate in the future with NATO support in a Combined Joint Task Force role - CJTF - as part of the construction of European Security and Defence Identity - ESDI. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina Forced Europe and NATO to confront the end of the Cold War and a new kind of strategic challenge to the Western Alliance. The new enemy became instability. This instability thrust NATO's Southern Region into the forefront of the Alliance's emerging Strategic Concept. NATO's horizons began to broaden in Bosnia and now it's positive influence is felt throughout the periphery of Europe and beyond. NATO's operations in the Bosnia-Herzegovina theatre demonstrated our ability to work in concept, side by side, with non-NATO nations and with the WEU, which participated in Operation Sharp Guard. Bosnia also reaffirmed the importance of military alliances and coalitions in ensuring stability during an era which combines increasing tensions and military downsizing in the aftermath of the Cold War. Military downsizing is taking place almost everywhere, and that is a challenge that demands co-operation among nations if we are to have peace and promote stability. I believe that now, as our political and military leaders work to prepare for an expanded NATO, they are doing so with a growing consensus that Southern Region of Europe and its periphery has emerged from the Cold War as the area of NATO's most serious challenges. But before we can comprehend the challenges, I think we have to understand the environment. It is my view that the Southern Region is not only the largest and most complex in Europe, it may be the most difficult in the world. The difficulty lies in a combination of its geography, its culture, its political difficulties, its economic issues, and its military problems and more, which I will discuss in a moment. In the US Navy hat that I wear, I am responsible to support naval operations in Europe and Africa from the Baltic to South Africa, and from Gibraltar to the Black Sea. In NATO with its broadening horizons, this role as AFOSUTH expands to places that in my earlier life I had very little KNOWLEDGE; Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, the Caspian Sea Region. I think all those areas need to be influenced by Western Democracy and the Western system of liberal market economies. That's a problem for us. I don't think you can adequately "Reach out and touch or influence" all of these countries. There are more than forty nations in the surrounding areas of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean that we're expected to address at AFSOUTH. You can't do all that with declining budgets and a much smaller force structure. In the 1980's NATO's Southern region concerns extended to fewer than 15 countries, and that was during the Cold War when there was some stability and a clear focus. Now just 7 years after the end of the Cold War, we're somehow expected to deal with three times as many countries with a reduced force structure. This is an expected outgrowth of the demise of the Soviet Union, and of course many other factors, but principally the instability in a large measure and after math of the end of the Cold War. I might also add that the Cold War, in my view, was pretty easy. There was a clear focus, a well-defined threat, and you knew what you were going to have to do about the threat and where. It's not that easy anymore. I believe you know what the prime factors that lead to instability are, and, in fact, if you think about a country like Turkey and many of the countries that surround it. Almost all of them have elements of the characteristic of instability. There are political and economic factors tied up with regional conflicts in some of those countries, religious and political extremism, demographic issues such as high birth rates, refugee movements, and illegal immigration. There are factors of military capabilities and intentions including the availability of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles to carry them as far as dome European cities. Then there are the haves and the have-nots in Strategic resources, including the availability of oil and gas, and most importantly, something we don't ordinarily think about, water. I've become far more educated, if you will, on what happens in my region since I began living there. For example, Turkey and Syria could plunge into some kind of crisis, just over water. We currently have four "Hot Spots" in my region. First we have the Maghreb where Libya could possible produce chemical weapons of mass destruction. In the past Libya has also exported terrorism. This area is also where religious extremism in Algeria could adversely affect Tunisia and Morocco. The effects of that could be felt in Europe. There's so much interconnectivity, I didn't realize that Italy gets much of her natural gas out of Algeria, and much of the gas comes through Tunisia. Then there is Egypt with her Islamic fundamentalist difficulties, and, of course, the Suez Canal and its associated pipelines. There is the Levant, with which all of you are familiar. Israel and the Palestinians are on the front pages everyday. There is the Transcaucasus region with its instability and turmoil, which is where Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Armenia and Georgia are. When you add the factor of oil to that already unstable region, you have the potential for even more turmoil. Oil reserves in Azerbaijan and the other countries of the Caspian Sea region are estimated by some to be larger than those of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait combined. None of us wants that area to follow the path of instability which has plagued the Persian Gulf. Europe and the West, Russia, China and Iran are now all competing for influence in the region. Finally, you have the Balkans with Bosnia, and of course Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Kosovo. The bottom line is that NATO's Southern region is faced with significant instability to its south and east. NATO must therefore focus its attention and resources in that direction. To counterbalance instability, the new Europe has become a constantly evolving landscape of interconnected political, military and economic organizations and unions, such as the European Union, the Western European Union, the European Free Trade Association, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Organization for Security and Cooperation, the OSCE, and, of course, NATO. This makes it a very complicated organizational environment in which to operate. Overlapping economic, political, and security organizations are all meant to balance the region, but they don't always succeed, because there are so many destabilizing influences. I was in Germany recently and learned that many people have the same concerns I do. One German professor said that the average age in Western Europe in Europe in 2005 will be 43 years old. The average in North Africa will be less than 18. You can decide what sort of trouble that portends. Religious, political and economic extremisms are extremely attractive to the young and unemployed, a recipe for turmoil and future instability. I see three challenges for the Southern region. First, practical solutions have to be implemented in parallel with concept development. Second, we have to adapt internally without crippling our critical programs. And, third, the Southern region must adapt externally with initiatives in enlargement, PfP and formalized relations with Russia and Ukraine. NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) demonstrated in Bosnia that our partners are ready for expanded interaction. Fourteen Partnership for Peace and three Mediterranean dialogue countries, joined the NATO countries in IFOR and SFOR. Some of the lessons learned during the year long stabilization of that conflict led me to develop a vision for the future of the Southern region. AFSOUTH and its subordinate commands have to promote regional stability using every tool available. The key tool, and you will hear me say this a number of times, is forward engagement. You cannot influence events if you're not there. You can't prevent war unless you're there. You can't react to a crisis unless you're there. It's a very basic thesis, but it is absolutely central. Europe, the WEU, NATO and every ally must be proactive. We must stay forward engaged. You can't forget the fundamentals. You still have to maintain defensive capabilities for your are of responsibility, but you have to be proactive in the sense of adapting to the changing environment or mission, develop crisis management skills, and be ready for new kinds of missions like peace support operations. In November 1996, NATO Secretary General Solana spoke of "a new European Security architecture" building a set of political relationships where each state feels secure and at ease. This, not the antagonism of the past, is the context in which NATO's approach to the Mediterranean must be viewed. NATO must look to the south, as well as to the east. In January 1997, Secretary General Solana again spoke and emphasized the importance of cooperation and dialogue throughout the Southern Region. He said that security in Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean. He also expressed his belief that it was possible to create good, strong and friendly relations across the Mediterranean, just as we have done across Europe. Speaking again in November 1997 Secretary General Solana emphasized his view that security and stability in the Southern region are linked in a way that does not depend on military factors alone but requires a comprehensive strategy to be dealt with by European organizations in a complementary way. The Southern region has led NATO's work in its most nature stability-oriented program, Partnership for Peace. We continue to conduct high level and staff working visits, training, exercises, seminars and conferences, sponsored by AFSOUTH and our principle subordinate NATO commands. In our activities thus far we have involved 18 of 27 NATO partner nations, with some nations participating in multiple events and exercises. Last year, Romania hosted the largest Partnership for Peace exercise ever, with 17 nations participating. NATO's Mediterranean initiative holds promise for North Africa and the Levant. Non-NATO Mediterranean countries, Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan, have now become dialogue partners. NATO ministers stated here in Madrid last July that they attached particular importance to the progress of our Mediterranean dialogue, with a view to contributing to stability in the region. All these activities are designed to provide focused engagement in order to influence sources of instability at the strategic level. They are designed to build strong and visible coalitions, promote consistent security assistance policy and achieve high level military interaction. As our forces - and these forces could be NATO or WEU- engage with non-NATO countries, they not only shape the environment, but they also receive valuable training in the perishable skills of warfighting. The Roman adage, "se vis pacem para bellum," remains valid today. If you want peace, you must be ready to fight. Practice and preparation are best done on the playing field. And the best way to influence events in distant foreign lands, in fact, the only way to influence events, is to be there. We have recently made considerable progress in developing a distinct European security and defense identity within NATO. NATO's Military Committee, backed by political deliberations in the North Atlantic Council, is developing the concrete procedures whereby a WEU Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) could operate with the support and backing of NATO in a crisis. We have just concluded an exercise of a CJTF in the Southern Region, with participation of 8 NATO nations, including Spain. This exercise was the first to fully activate the CJTF HQs both ashore and afloat. It was the first to be tailored for out-of-area pace support operations. WEU observers have been present at a number of key NATO exercises in the last year or so to familiarize themselves with NATO procedures in order to enhance our mutual interoperability. As you know, a senior NATO officer, the Deputy SACEUR, has been designated as the probably commander of such a WEU CJTF, and the complex arrangements which would govern his operations and interface with NATO are in the process of being developed. As the WEU develops into an organization fully capable of conducting large scale CJTF operations in its own right, the need for close NATO/WEU co-operation will become paramount. A common understanding of each other's tactics, techniques and procedures is critical. Possibly even more important will be compatible command, control and communications. This will be vital for interaction, co-ordination, synchronization, and eventually, synergism. Because the WEU and NATO have developed close links, the process for co-ordination and basic understanding between US should be fairly uncomplicated, but there is still much to do. The WEU and NATO objectives and charters must be made perfectly clear to all concerned in order to prevent confusion and avoid the pitfalls normally associated with an ongoing willingness to work on the these issues, we will be able to provide support to a WEU CJTF operations whenever we receive political guidance. Indeed, to a certain extent this has already happened in my Southern Region. The maritime operations Sharp Guard which successfully carried out the arms embargo on the Belligerent parties in the Bosnia conflict was an operation which combined two previously separate NATO and WEU naval operations into one combined operation. Of course, we can't claim that Sharp Guard involved a true CJTF, since it was very largely naval forces with a few aircraft in support. Nevertheless, it was a combined naval task force operation which substantially inhibited the arms trade with the Belligerent parties and warring factions in the Bosnia war. It also demonstrated that NATO and WEU military units can operate successfully together in real military operations, not just an exercise. I am therefore confident that the current ongoing NATO effort to forge an effective operational bond with the WEU will contribute not only to building real ESDI in the Alliance but also helping ensure our common goal of providing an environment of stability, democracy, free enterprise and prosperity for the vast European region into the coming century. If we can do that, the new enemy - instability - will in the end prove to be ineffective against the united will of our allied democratic peoples and governments. In conclusion, we are closer to the 21st century than the end of the cold war. We must take advantages of the opportunity we have in order to help ensure an environment of stability, democracy, free enterprise and prosperity in the coming century. The Southern region, once a flank of the cold war, now comprises a new centre, a centre not of confrontation but of change and adaptation. Our strategy of shaping the environment through forward presence and forward engagement, positions our forces so they are best prepared to meet any challenge. It would be nave to think that there will not be future conflicts, but we can act to prevent or minimize many of them. We can only do that through forward presence and engagement.