Colloquy on "The European Security and Defense Identity" Madrid, 5 May 1998

Speech by Mr. Rob de WIJK, Clingendael Institute Netherlands Always been a proponent of a strong ESDI/CFSP and consequently of the CJTFs as an operational concept for NATO and WEU operations. I have, however, become increasingly pessimistic whether we really can enhance European efforts in the fields of the defense co-operation. Actually, a CJTF is not much more than a multi-service operation in one operational framework executed by several countries' forces. The coalition that fought the Gulf war was a CJTF without knowing it. For the military it is not that difficult to organize a CJTF. For politicians it is much more difficult, because the subject has become a highly political one. The development of the CJTF concept shows the different political views of the major players in Europe. These divergent views are closely linked to the inability of Europe to effectively deal with crisis in e.g. Albania and Kosovo. I think it shows that merely paid lip service to stronger European defense co-operation. Before I present my views on the future of European defense co-operation, I will say a few words on the history of the CJTF concept. Aspin proposed the concept during an informal meeting in Travemunde, 19-21 October 1993. (Part of the preparation of the Brussels Summit, early 1994). concept had been developed in secret consultation with SACEUR. intended to carry out peacekeeping and other operations by NATO and WEU. basic assumption: NATO's integrated military structure was still completely geared to article 5 operations, but was flexible enough to carry out other missions. basic idea was that SACEUR would commission the Major Subordinate Commanders to form a central staff within their HQ to carry out these operations. In the moths following Travemunde many questions were raised. For obvious reasons, France had most difficulties: it was not yet clear what role the WEU could play France could not agree with CJTF unless there was a simultaneous decision to improve the political-military co-ordination of operations. Nevertheless, the Concept was approved during the Brussels summit on 10-11 January 1994. In Brussels it was also agreed that active support should be given to the development of a CFSP, which had been decided upon in Maastricht. Same initiatives: transfer dormant NATO forums to the WEU (EUROLONGTERM) joint meetings of the WEU/NATO councils Furthermore, in Brussels it was decided that: The ESDI would form the European pillar within NATO. That support would be given to the WEU as the embodiment of the European pillar within NATO. NATO would stand ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available for WEU operations in pursuit of the CFSP. The idea of separable but not separate capabilities was supported, as to avoid costly duplications of military capabilities within the WEU. Vital capabilities: strategic intelligence (satellites), mobile C2, strategic transport. Not much has been achieved in this field. Some politicians actively oppose the development of European capabilities. Too costly. This would signal intention of Europeans to carry out operations without the Americans. This could undermine NATO and the transatlantic link. Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, European defense initiatives, including the development of the CJTF-concept reflects the constant struggle between Europeanists and Atlanticists. Obstacle for co-operation between NATO and WEU. This became apparent when political guidelines for CJTF were developed. From the beginning of 1994 a Provisional Policy Co-operation Group (NATO) had made fruitless attempts to design a political framework for the development of CJTF. Issues: The French desire to be able to have access to collective NATO assets without the US. The US wished to retain control over assets, which had been put at the disposal of a non-NATO HQ. The difference between France and the US over the political control of deployed forces. In France this control is traditionally stronger than in the US where commanders have a greater freedom concerning the way, in which political objectives should be achieved. In particular controversy over a French proposal to have a planning cell at NATO HQ in Brussels for the benefit of the CJTF. Logical desire: France was outside the integrated military structure. Other members argued that it should be in SHAPE. Turkey demanded assurance that, although it is not a WEU member, it would be able to participate on a equal footing in WEU operations when use was made of NATO resources. Most problems were solved during and after Berlin NAC meeting 1996: NAC will steer the NATO CJTF operation politically. An operation could be led though the WEU HQ as well as a NATO HQ. HQs would be set up after approval of the Council. 1996: D-SACEUR would get a key function in European led operations. During a WEU operation the Major NATO commanders would monitor the deployment of ATO resources. A Capabilities Co-ordination Cell under the MC and within the IMS would steer the operation itself. Moreover the cell would develop strategic guidelines by the MC based on directives of the NAC, so that French involvement was guaranteed. A Combined Joint Planning staff at SHAPE got the task to perform centralized planning functions and co-ordination with HQ. Most complicated debate over CJTF HQ: The original concept was based on the forming of a HQ by combining suitable element from existing HQ in new HQs. The plan was based on the designation of multinational, multi-service 'parent HQs' of sufficient size and flexibility to contain a framework for a CJTF staff. Therefore a CJTF 'nucleus staff' should also already be present in the HQ. Depending on the kind of operation the framework could be supplemented by staff elements drawn from other HQs. Work on the CJTF HQs continues. Size of the nuclei. Direct link with NATO Command Structure discussion. Also work on: NATO-WEU co-operation and consultation in peacetime and crises. Agreement for release monitoring and return of alliance assets and capabilities. Arrangements for information sharing. European command arrangements: how to harmonize NATO and WEU command structures. Guidelines for planning and exercising for WEU-led operations. Work on the CJTF-concept is now continuing for almost five year. Nevertheless, much progress has been made: The CJTF-concept has been developed, although some minor problems have to be solved. Trials late 1997 have shown that the concept works. Arrangements have been made between NATO and the WEU for the deployment of a CJTF. We know by now what a ESDI or European pillar looks like. On paper it is possible to use collective NATO assets under a European command. (Very important) the Amsterdam treaty contains all the institutional arrangements for an effective CFSP. The treaty even includes a modest form of decision making by qualified majority. But one of the most difficult questions had not been solved: the WEU plays a key role in both ESDI (NATO) and the CFSP (EU). The interrelationship is not yet clear. During a seminar on the modus operandi for the implementation of article J.4.2 of the Maastricht treaty (April 1997) an incredible complicated flow chart was produced on decision making procedures involving all three operations. It showed that the interrelationship was complicated and could not be solved easy. Two pieces of news: The good news is that on paper nothing prevents credible and effective European Led-operations. Some positive signs: we, the Europeans, decided already upon approximately 25 common positions and 35 joint actions, including some WEU operations. The bad news is that Europe could only agree on some relative easy cases, such as common positions regarding East Timor, Ruanda/Burundi and Angola, some small scale WEU operations, including the maritime blockade of Iraq (1990-1) and sanctions against Yugoslavia. Decisions on more demanding cases and larger scale operations were impossible. Europe could not agree on Albania and Kosovo. In Albania, the Italians took the lead in Operation Alba. In Kosovo the US took the lead. Some conclusions: In more demanding cases a superpower is needed to get things moving in Europe. The US has the lead in the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and took the lead in the dispute between Greece and Turkey. The US is also actively dealing with Cyprus. More worrying is that the European institutions (NATO, WEU, EU, OSCE) were put aside. The US used the Contact Group -an informal group- to deal with the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Does this mean that European institutions are only fair weather structures that cannot deal with acute crisis? Part of the explanation is that controversies between atlanticists and europeanists dominated the implementation of CFSP, the ESDI and consequently of the CJTF-concept. I believe that some politicians do not want a working CFSP and ESDI, because they fear: The costs of developing European capabilities. Doubt about the military effectiveness of a WEU-led operation. The undermining of NATO. The erosion of transatlantic relations. Some argue that that we need the US in Europe for large-scale operations. This may be true, but from a military perspective the Yugoslav crisis including Kosovo could be solved without US involvement. The real reason is that for some countries the US is useful for balance of power politics. So, in some circles there is a clear lack of political will to give a CFSP and European defence co-operation a boost. I see two options which will greatly influence the future of Euro-defense co-operation (implement Amsterdam). The first is to continue developing a credible CFSP. Try to overcome the struggle between transatlantists and Europeanists. Strong arguments: The EU an economic superpower needs an credible CFSP. Because its needs the capabilities to defend its vital interests. Because it needs the capabilities to execute PSO and humanitarian operations: only in a peaceful and stable old our economies can be developed. We cannot always count on the US E.g. due to geographic shift, its foreign policy orientation might shift Even if we can always count on the US, there may be cases when we have to act alone. The other option is to develop European security architecture of interlocking institutions, with NATO as the military backbone of a system of co-operative security. The basis of such a system is already in place in the form of the OSCE. And NATO found its new raison d'tre in PSO outside the treaty area. Some people involved in the debate on the review of NATO's Alliance Strategic Concept clearly favour such an options. E.G. the argue that NATO now should formally express its willingness to carry out all military operations within the OSCE area under its command. It would add to this that in this case that we should institutionalise the Contact Group as a "European Security Council": it includes the US/RF and the major European powers it is small, therefore it can act quickly and effective In this case the smaller countries should have a (rotating) seat. Round off by staying that this option would have tremendous consequences for the CFSP and the WEU: All military operations within the OSCE area would be carried out by NATO. This would place the WEU in a radically position. NATO as an 'armed arm' of the OSCE would clearly be a regional organization. EU countries could use the WEU for military operations outside the OSCE area. Within the OSCE area the CFSP would largely be limited to economic sanctions. Key question: will there ever be a European-led CJTF? I have my doubts whether it will take place in Europe (OSCE-area) Some countries will actively oppose it. If a co-operative security system of interlocking institutions will be developed, NATO will execute all operations within the OSCE area. Outside OSCE area: ad hoc coalitions (led by the US)