WEU Colloquy "European Defence and Security Identity" Madrid, 4 May 1998

Poland and the European Security and Defence Identity Remarks by Dr Przemyslaw Grudzinski Deputy Foreign Minister of Poland Ladies and Gentlemen, I am honoured to address this distinguished audience as a representative of a country which has just entered the decisive stage of its integration with the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. It is truly important for us to be involved in discussions on crucial questions which we will soon face as a member of the transatlantic community. The issue under discussion today - the European Security and Defence Identity - in many respects represents a synthesis of many of those questions. In the past, common concern for Western Europe's defence and security was always tightly linked to, and served as a catalyst of, its economic and political integration. Today, as the integration develops - both "horizontally" and "vertically" - in a radically transformed strategic context, the issue of European identity in the security field calls for a new examination. The new international environment necessitates an intellectual effort and political will to accordingly adapt the Euro-Atlantic security institutions and patterns of their interaction. In any discussion on the development of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Common Defence Policy (CDP) or the ESDI within NATO, it would be wrong to concentrate only on institutional matters, on the relationships between the EU, WEU and NATO. It is equally important to discuss the underlying question of what sort of role "Europe" should play as a unitary actor on the world stage? The Maastricht Treaty provides a list of regular, rather unexceptional objectives for the Union's CFSP: the safeguarding of common values; strengthening the unity of the Union; preserving peace and stability; promoting international cooperation; and developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (paragraph 2 of Article J1). The new Amsterdam Treaty has not added new objectives to this modest vision. All this does not give us a hint in what direction Member States would like to see the Union evolve: into a full "superpower"; a regional power; a civil power; or a rather complex entity with a mixed character. One could argue that the absence of visionary goals is prudent, since the ESDI will develop incrementally and is not subject to any long - term and systematic planning whatsoever. But one should also acknowledge that regardless of the sort of "Europe" Member States would like to work towards in the near as well as the more distant future, it should have an institutional framework and the operational military capabilities commensurate with its political mission. If Europe strives to become a "superpower" which adopts a global range of interests and which has the capabilities to pursue these interests world-wide, this would require a comprehensive CDP with common military structures, as well as efficient decision-making procedures where QMV would be the norm (in order to guarantee rapid action). Europe as a regional power would predominantly be engaged on its periphery, requiring limited instruments for crisis management and peacekeeping in neighbouring regions. As a civil power, Europe would promote democracy, human rights and economic cooperation, without developing European military capabilities beyond the potential which at the moment exists on the national level within the framework of NATO and WEU. Clearly, without well defined strategic ambitions and goals for the development of foreign, security and defence role of the EU/WEU, it will be difficult for European defence companies to make strategic decision on what sort of military project should be developed. For the moment, there is no indication that these conceptual questions are being addressed by EU Member States. Ladies and Gentlemen, Poland's foreign policy is a consistent and unequivocal expression of our belief in the need for continuing the process of European integration in its many dimensions, including in the field of foreign and security policy. We want our membership of NATO, EU, and the WEU to contribute to the development and strengthening of the European pillar of the transatlantic security system. We understand the need, and will support efforts, to develop Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy and Security and Defence Identity. We do believe that the Europeans should strengthen the mechanisms for expression and implementation of their common security goals and interests. The increasingly integrated Europe should find the right balance between its economic and politico-strategic dimensions. At the same time, we stress the necessity to maintain the transatlantic link, as a guarantee of effective defence of Europe and a key factor of security and stability in the whole Euro-Atlantic area. These two imperatives - more self-reliant Europe and America's unchanged commitment to Europe's security and defence - are not contradictory. Their harmonisation and balancing is both necessary and possible. In the wake of WW II, the integrating efforts of the Europeans helped anchor America in the Old World and attracted U.S. commitment to Europe's defence. Also today, the ESDI, while expressing the new sharing of responsibility and adding to the flexibility of the transatlantic community in reacting to new challenges - should strengthen the vitality of the transatlantic bonds. The ESDI should also help define the shape of Euro-American strategy of action toward the many challenges of the new century. This can be done only in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance and on the basis of the recognition of its enduring significance for America's and Europe's security and well-being. We have been pleased to observe in the recent years the crystallisation of the ESDI notion develop along these conceptual lines. The decisions taken in June 1996 in Berlin and last July in Madrid to build ESDI within NATO have laid the ground for a significant refinement and implementation of this idea. In this conceptual and political environment, also the role of the WEU has been better defined. We are pleased to see the notable progress in the development of WEU's operational capabilities, coupled with the clarification of its primary mission as a crisis management instrument. It seems that the past concerns with possible competition or overlapping of competence and mission between NATO and the WEU have been largely removed. We have followed with great interest the progress of works on the practical arrangements - both within NATO and WEU and between them - to implement the Berlin and Madrid decisions. We are glad to have been recently invited to take part in them. Our presence where the future of NATO-WEU relations is being forged, will greatly help us fully comprehend the notion of ESDI and prepare to contribute to it as a NATO and WEU member. Ladies and Gentlemen, With all this said, I have to add that we are aware that it is much too early to herald the triumph of the ESDI idea. It is perhaps still too early to even clearly define it. The Berlin and Madrid decisions have not answered all questions. The Amsterdam Conference answered only a few. Problems, both of conceptual and practical nature remain to be addressed and solved. Some of them have already been identified here; more will probably be pointed at. The operational development of the WEU, the progressive implementation of the CJTF concept, and the corresponding arrangements in NATO's command structure, provide only an instrument of action available to the Europeans. Whether, when, where, and how to use it, remain questions with no universal answers. The ESDI still needs a better developed institutional framework. NATO and the WEU are its natural elements. However, the inclusion of the Petersberg missions into the Amsterdam Treaty means that the ESDI will also be implemented in the framework of the European Union. The ensuing complex institutional web of NATO-EU-WEU relations has not yet been satisfactorily structured and organised. The Europeans themselves have not been yet able to determine the nature and future of the EU-WEU relationship. Furthermore, the development of ESDI requires not only organisational but also political efforts. Even a perfect institutional framework, coupled with adequate operational capabilities, will be of use only if supported by a European consensus on security policy goals and interests and a common definition of risks and ways to respond to them. Amsterdam demonstrated the difficulty in reaching a consensus on this crucial matter. We still do not know what exactly is the role and responsibility of the Europeans for defence and security of our continent. The problem is further complicated by the imminent enlargement of European institutions -- if the notion of identity is difficult to define, so is the word European. Should the identity, whatever it means, be that of the EU in its current or future composition, or perhaps that of the WEU family - and then of which category of its members? Will the ESDI become another factor differentiating the "ins" and - hopefully temporary - "outs" of the integration process, or rather an instrument of early reaching to the aspirant countries and involving them in works on EU's foreign and security policy before they are able to meet the economic criteria of membership? In our view, there is a clear political, symbolic and also likely operational need to involve partner countries in the development and possible execution of the ESDI. If so, what should be their role in the related decision-making processes? Answers to those and other questions will probably not come easy and early. Although progress toward ESDI is evident, it has been of an incremental nature. It is likely to be so in the future. Most probably, pragmatism rather than any grand design will guide the development of the concept. ESDI is and will be in a foreseeable future a process rather than a clearly defined entity. In this process, the organisational preparation of NATO and the development of WEU's ability to undertake a mission have already acquired considerable dynamics. Defining the EU's political ability to act on the basis of common security interest will probably be more problematic. It should be clearly recognised that for the future of European security the next few years will be crucial. Former European Parliament President Hnsch argued (in a somewhat dramatic tone) that "the next few years to the new millennium will either transform Union or break it (...) We must enlarge Union or see the system of solidarity break down (...) We must introduce the single currency or we lose all credibility in the financial markets and, more importantly, with our people." Bundeskanzler Kohl's remark that "if we suffer a setback now on the road to Europe (...) this will not only lead to standstill but also retrogression," also illustrates that there is a concern that a failure to build a political Europe will negatively affect the achievements in other areas of European integration. The strongest argument for this axiom is that only a more politically coherent Europe will be able to cope with the inevitable strains and centrifugal tendencies generated by the global world economy and the new post Cold-War strategic environment. An important role will be played by Europe's key security institutions in managing this coming era of strategic change. Institutions such as the EU and NATO will continue to adapt themselves to new tasks and new policy areas, but will also enlarge towards Central Europe, absorbing new members and thereby widening the European "security community." In this process, the EU is bound to play the most central role. The European Union should be regarded as a typical "modern" security organisation, which is building cooperation on a high level of economic interconnectedness, if not interdependence. Although NATO is gradually transforming itself from a purely military into a politico-military organisation, the basic focus of the Alliance remains, and should remain, military in nature. The shift in emphasis in NATO's mission from collective defence to peacekeeping tasks does not alter this fact. Looking at the EU, on the other hand, one could argue that the EU does not have a "sphere of influence," but a "Sphere of Affluence." This is more than just a play of words: it underscores the importance of economics and trade as the current basis for stability and democratic development; it also indicates that countries themselves want to join that "sphere of affluence" and are not, as it used to be in the "Bad Old Days," being forced into an imperialistic "sphere of influence." In this respect it is illustrative that Russia does not feel itself threatened by the process of EU enlargement, but regards NATO enlargement an encroachment towards what it considers as its "legitimate sphere of interest." It is certainly not first and foremost the level of economic development that determines the chances of Central European applicant countries to join the EU; the Union's criteria for membership clearly also refer to other factors that deal with the political maturity of the future members. Europe's efforts to build a "Sphere of Affluence" also imply that the prospect of economic prosperity through close cooperation and integration is an important driving force in building the commensurate political Europe. The West's "logic of enlargement" is clearly based on this assumption. In this respect, Europe's "Sphere of Affluence" has a very important political and security component: Even though the EU itself does not have an Article 5 security guarantee, the Union is certainly the strongest "security community" in the world. The development of the EMU and the introduction of the Euro will only add to this process. Ladies and Gentlemen, Let me please be a bad diplomat and openly admit that we in Poland do not yet have a developed position on many issues discussed at this forum. Their complexity escapes easy answers even by nations with much richer experience in the politics of European integration. Poland is still a freshman in the "European College." Our full integration with NATO, EU and the WEU will for some time also be a learning process. There is no doubt however, that Poland will be an increasingly important factor in the transatlantic equation. I can assure you, that you will also find in us an increasingly valuable, and always a constructive partner in all discussions and actions.