TRANSCAUCASUS AND THE CASPIAN REGION WITH PARTICULAR FOCUS ON ENERGY ISSUES

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Transcaucasus and the Caspian Region can be considered as a paradigm for the link between economics and security as well as for new rules determining the political game after the end of the antagonistic East-West conflict. The dissolution of the Soviet Union made the Caucasus visible as the region with the potentially highest density of conflicts worldwide - in an area of only a few hundred square kilometres. At the same time, the exploration of considerable energy resources in the Caspian region opens options for development and prosperity not only for producers but also for neighbouring countries. No other significant energy-producing region is as landlocked as Central Asia and the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the Caspian region. This forces these energy-producing countries to cooperate with neighbours, otherwise their energy wealth cannot be brought to the world market. These neighbours, however, all are uneasy due to the existing conflict constellation. If one takes the five Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) and the energy producing and ethnically Turkic Azerbaijan as a regional entity, one has a region is surrounded by six neighbours:

- **Georgia**, the only country of the Transcaucasus/Central Asia with access to the sea, a country with at least four different (potentially) violent conflicts (Abkhasia, South Ossetia, Ajaria, Dzhavakhetia) due to unsettled struggles for independence or more autonomy;
- **Russia**, the former dominating and in the 19th century colonial power with its conflicts in the strategically important border regions (Daghestan and Chechnya);
- **China**, a geographically remote neighbour also with a crisis region (Xinjiang) on the border with Central Asia;
- **Afghanistan**, with its 28 years of civil war and no internationally recognised government;
- **Iran**, a country at least partly isolated by US sanctions against any major economic cooperation project;

- **Armenia**, which has occupied approximately 20% of Azerbaijan since the war over Nagorno Karabakh (after 1994).

The choice among these neighbours is not attractive, but there are no other alternatives. Cooperation is indispensable but conflicts are the reality. It is quite clear that Transcaucasian Georgia, due to its geographic position (link to the Black Sea and to Turkey) and its political attractiveness (no ambitions to become a dominating power, a relative stable and predictable political system), acquired a preferred position in spite of its several potentially violent conflicts. The Northcaucasian parts of Russia are also to be integrated into a new infrastructure directed towards the world market rather than to the centre of the (Soviet) empire. The struggle for this new infrastructure might fuel existing conflicts, but it could also have a balancing and stabilising effect on the potential for conflict. There is, however, no doubt that a close link between economic development (most of all energy infrastructure) and security in this region is given.

The Economic Challenge: Energy Potential

Media reports often contain data emphasising the importance of the region that derive more from political interests and the desire for media attention than from a serious depiction of the situation. This includes the catchy phrase "the Gulf of the 21st Century" and the repeatedly mentioned 200 billion barrels of oil reserves.[1] However, in order to analyse and understand the interconnectedness of the political, economic and development interests, it is necessary to have as precise a knowledge as possible of both the facts and the expectations.

Resources

John Browne, the chairman of *British Petroleum*, which heads the consortium *Azerbaijan International Operating Company* (AIOC), called the Caspian region "the greatest unexplored and undeveloped oil province in the world".[2] Actually, there is still not much information about how large the oil resources of the region are. At any rate, the maximum and minimum estimates are far apart, as can be seen in **Table 1**.

If only the proven reserves were counted, the region would contain somewhat less oil than the North Sea (about 20 billion barrels). If all the possible reserves could be exploited, they would reach a magnitude of about the size of the proven reserves of Iran (93 billion barrels) and Kuwait (94 billion barrels) together. While this would far surpass Iraq's reserves (112 billion barrels), it would not come close to reaching those of Saudi Arabia (250 billion barrels), much less that of the entire Persian Gulf (600 billion barrels). The world's proven reserves come to about 1,040 billion barrels. Consequently, the Caspian

Table 1 - Estimates of the exploitable oil resources of the Caspian Basin
(in billion barrels)

	Proven Reserves	Possible Resources	Total Oil
Azerbaijan	3.6	27	30.6
Kazakhstan	10	85	95
Turkmenistan	1.5	32	33.5
Uzbekistan *	0.2	1	1.2
Russia *	0.2	5	5.2
Iran *	0	12	12
Total	**15.5**	**162**	**177.5**

* Only regions close to the Caspian Sea

Source: US Department of State, Caspian Region Energy Development Report, Washington, April 1997, p. 4.

region's reserves can be estimated at a magnitude of between 1.5% and 17% of the world's reserves. All the most recent findings indicate that the actual value is much closer to the lower estimate than to the higher one. In a survey article in February 1998, the Economist still assumed a relatively high level of resources (100 billion barrels).[3] Russian estimates, on the other hand, assume about 30 billion barrels.[4] In its study, the Baker Institute lists more recent Western estimates for the Caspian oil reserves at 15 to 31 billion barrels and just under 3% of world reserves.[5]

The natural gas resources were better explored and more thoroughly exploited during the Soviet era than the oil resources. Thus, the figures and estimates of proven and possible resources are closer to one another than in the case of oil, as **Table 2** demonstrates.

The proven natural gas reserves have a share of about 6% of the world's natural gas reserves at a total of 141 billion cubic meters. If all the possible natural gas resources were to be realised, the natural gas reserves would come to 12.5% of the proven world reserves. It is also very likely that the region's natural gas reserves are at least twice as large as its mineral oil reserves.

Production

The mineral oil production in the three newly independent states has declined steadily from the beginning of the 1980s to the present. In Kazakhstan, production reached a nadir in 1994 with a volume of 20.3 million tonnes. Thereafter, production rose continuously to 25.7 million tonnes (1997). Turkmenistan bottomed out in 1996 with a steady production of around 4 million tonnes. Azerbaijan reached its preliminary nadir in 1997 at 9.0 million tonnes. Due to the even

Table 2 - Estimates of the exploitable natural gas resources in the Caspian Basin
(in billion m^3)

	Proven Reserves	Possible Resources	Total natural gas
Azerbaijan	0.3	1.0	1.3
Kazakhstan	1.5	2.5	4.0
Turkmenistan	4.4	4.5	8.9
Uzbekistan *	2.1	1.0	3.1
Iran *	0	0.3	0.3
Total	**8.3**	**9.3**	**17.6**

* Only regions close to the Caspian Sea
Source: US Department of State, Caspian Region Energy Development Report, April 1997, p. 4

more drastic reduction in the domestic consumption in the first half of the 1990s, these three countries' net exports increased at that time from 0.3 million tonnes (1990) to 10.1 million tonnes (1995). However, these production levels are not large enough to attract international attention.

Table 3 demonstrates that given an average expected development, these three countries' exports could reach as much as 30 million tonnes in the year 2000, 93 million tonnes in 2010 and approx. 160 million tonnes in 2020. In view of the expected production decline in the North Sea and other areas, these are certainly relevant magnitudes. Presumably, these countries' production will amount to 3% to 4% of the world production in 2010 and possibly 5% to 6% in 2020.

While Kazakhstan will remain the region's largest mineral oil producer, its expected domestic consumption is so large that presumably Azerbaijan will catch up with Kazakhstan as an exporter in the long run because of its lower domestic consumption. If one credits the "high case" scenario propounded by the International Energy Agency, after the year 2010, Azerbaijan will be able to export considerably more mineral oil.[6]

Not only did the natural gas production of these countries sink drastically in the first half of the 1990s, as **Table 4** shows, but, unlike the case of mineral oil, net exports also declined. This was a result of the production decline in Turkmenistan which was forced upon the sector by the fact that the only system of transport for Turkmen gas, namely the Russian network of pipelines, was only made available to Turkmenistan at a reduced level.

Accordingly, the net export of these three countries, which was just below 60 billion m^3 in 1990 and had fallen to under 20 billion m^3 by 1995, should rise to 46 billion m^3 by the year 2000, to 75 billion m^3 by 2010 and to 115

Table 3 - Oil production, consumption and net export of the Caspian states
(in million tons)

	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2020
Kazakhstan						
Production	25.2	20.5	42.5	62.5	87.5	145.0
Consumption	27.2	10.4	17.8	29.0	38.5	68.0
net export	-2.0	10.1	24.7	33.5	49.0	77.0
Azerbaijan						
Production	12.3	9.2	14.0	27.5	57.5	105.0
Consumption	8.6	7.0	10.2	13.0	14.9	23.9
net export	3.7	2.2	3.8	14.5	42.6	81.1
Turkmenistan						
Production	3.4	3.5	8.0	8.7	9.5	11.0
Consumption	4.8	5.7	6.5	6.7	7.0	8.0
net export	-1.4	-2.2	1.5	2.0	2.5	3.0

* The given data are average values of the "high case" and the "low case" scenario.
Source: International Energy Agency, Caspian Oil and Gas 1998, p. 51.

Table 4 - Natural gas production, consumption and net export of the Caspian states
(in billion cubic meters)

	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2020
Kazakhstan						
Production	7.0	5.9	8.9	13.5	22.0	27.0
Consumption	14.7	12.5	13.8	17.2	23.2	27.0
net export	-7.7	-6.6	-4.9	-3.7	-1.2	0
Azerbaijan						
Production	9.9	6.7	7.4	14.2	19.2	26.0
Consumption	13.6	7.3	7.4	9.2	11.0	17.9
Net export	-3.7	-0.6	0	5.0	8.2	8.1
Turkmenistan						
Production	84.3	35.6	39.8	55.1	80.8	123.7
Consumption	14.5	9.8	9.5	10.7	12.9	17.0
Net export	69.8	25.8	30.3	44.4	67.9	106.7

* The given data are average values of the "high case" and the "low case" scenario
Source: International Energy Agency, Caspian Oil and Gas, Paris 1998, p. 52

billion m^3 by 2020. This means that the net export level of 1990 will not be regained until sometime between 2005 and 2010. Nearly all of these exports will come from Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan will consume as much natural gas as it produces, and Azerbaijan can only hope to export about 10% of Turkmenistan's export potential.[7]

The region's natural gas production will presumably reach about 5% of worldwide gas production by 2010. The largest part of the natural gas earmarked for export will come from the part of the region east of the Caspian Sea. For that reason and due to the need for pipelines to transport gas, the problem of transporting the product to the consumer will be even more difficult than in the case of oil.

Transport

The neglect of the Caspian energy region by Soviet economic planners also affected the crumbling transport system, besides which, no pipelines led anywhere but to Russia. In Soviet times, the oil transport system consisted primarily of two structures. The first was an oil pipeline, desparately in need of repair, which led from Baku via Grozny in Chechnya to the Russian port of Novorossyisk on the Black Sea. The use of this pipeline was finally interrupted by the first war in Chechnya (1994-96). In accordance with a decision taken in October 1995 on the transport of "early oil" - in other words, the oil that will be produced in Azerbaijan until the Main Export Pipeline will be available after 2003 - the pipeline from Baku to Novorossyisk has been renovated. It has been in operation since November 1997 until the beginning of the second Chechnyan war in August 1999. However, even during this period, oil transport was interrupted due to illegal actions within Chechnya several times. Now a 200 km by-pass around Chechnya is under construction. It should be completed in 2001. The second link from Caspian oil fields to the Russian mainland was a connection to the Kazakh oil fields (among others, Tengiz) in the north-eastern region of the Caspian Sea. This pipeline, like the one to Novorossyisk, was not only in need of repair, it also did not have enough capacity to transport the renewed growth in production. A large diameter pipeline is now under construction from Tengiz to Novorossyisk. The decision of October 1995 on the "early oil" divided the expected annual amount of 10 million tonnes available in Baku until 2003 among two pipelines. Besides the pipeline to Novorossysik, another pipeline was partly renovated, but mostly constructed new: from Baku to the Georgian Black Sea terminal Supsa. Like the Russian pipeline, its capacity is about 5 million tonnes per year, but can be extended to 12 million tonnes.

In the case of natural gas, on the other hand, Turkmenistan was so tied to the Russian network that the then high capacities of over 80 billion m^3 could be piped directly into it. In the 1990s, Russia's gas monopoly *Gazprom* continuously reduced the amount of natural gas it allowed Turkmenistan to pipe into its

network for transport to the West. Since March 1997, this transport service has ceased altogether. The reason for this can be sought less in the technical inadequacies of the network than in *Gazprom's* desire to hamper potential competition. *Gazprom* is especially unwilling to allow Turkmenistan to deliver gas to the European market west of the CIS. On December 29 1997, a 200km pipeline from Turkmenistan to Iran was opened. Initially, this will have a capacity of 2 billion m^3 annually, but in the coming years this is to be increased to 8 billion m^3.

Contracts have been signed or building has begun on the following pipelines:

- **Tengiz-Novorossyisk**. The *Caspian Pipeline Consortium* (CPC) was founded as early as 1992 to build this pipeline with a capacity of 67 million tonnes per annum. At that time, the participants were the states of Kazakhstan, Russia and Oman. For various reasons, foremost of which was Russian disinterest, there were repeated delays in the planning of the project. In 1996, the consortium was reconstituted (the final signing of the agreement took place on 16.5.1997), the shares of the three states were reduced and various oil companies such as *Chevron, Mobil, Lukoil* and *Rosneft* were accepted into the consortium. Since then, planning has progressed somewhat more rapidly, including the negotiations with the Russian transit regions regarding the transit routes and fees. Construction is expected to begin in 1999 and be completed in 2001.
- **Uzen-China**. On September 24 1997, a comprehensive accord regarding the tapping and transport of Kazakh oil was reached between the Chinese and the Kazakh governments. This accord contains an agreement on the construction of a 3,000-km pipeline from the Uzen field (east of the Caspian Sea) to Western China. This pipeline is scheduled to be completed by the year 2005. In 1999, however, the Chinese government stalled the preparations for the construction due to the high investment costs.
- **Turkmenistan-Pakistan**. The investor *Unocal* has withdrawn in 1999 from a contract signed in 1997 on the laying of a natural gas pipeline from Dauletabad (Turkmenistan) via Afghanistan to Multan (Pakistan) due to continuing political instability in the transit country of Afghanistan.

No contractual agreements have yet been reached on the other pipeline plans. This is especially true for the construction of the *Main Export Pipeline* (MEP), the transit route of which has been subject to a great deal of argument for many months. Four possible routes are favoured by four different states (Russia, Iran, Georgia and Turkey). The U.S. government, Turkey and Azerbaijan had already made great efforts to get a deal signed for a route from Baku to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan by October 1998. The investors, however, initially refused this option due to its comparatively high costs. During the OSCE summit in Istanbul on 18 November 1999, the presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey signed in the presence of President Clinton an agreement which expresses the intention to construct this pipeline and which includes a commitment by

the Turkish government to cover the costs of the pipeline on Turkish territory beyond the calculated $1.4 billion. Whether this is sufficient to make the investors provide the required oil quantities and to take over the remaining financial risk is still an open question.

Legal Status

The argument over the legal status of the Caspian Sea has calmed down somewhat in view of the fact that Russia has moved some distance toward the opposing position of Azerbaijan. Originally, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia, like Iran, wanted to impose a condominium solution, which would have resulted in a joint exploitation of the offshore oil fields. Both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan opposed this idea, since most of the offshore resources would have been located on their sovereign territory in the case of a sectoral division of the sea. The Russian government protested vehemently against the "Deal of the Century" signed in Baku on September 20, 1994, in which Azerbaijan claimed the offshore fields of Azeri, Chirag and Guneshli as its property and handed them over to a consortium for exploitation. However, the Russian government did not carry out its threat, expressed in a memorandum to the United Nations, to use force if necessary to restore the status quo ante. It did not even prevent the Russian company Lukoil from taking a 10% share in the "Deal of the Century".

In November 1996, a compromise was almost reached in the negotiations between the states which would have contained a clause that a 45 mile wide coastal zone and thus almost all the offshore oil fields would be attributed to the individual nations and only the centre would be administered in condominium.[8] Azerbaijan was the only country that did not accept this compromise. In the meantime, Azerbaijan seems to have succeeded in getting the whole of the resources in the Caspian Sea bed divided up sectorally. This is, at any rate, the implication of a bilateral agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan signed in Moscow on July 6 1998 which draws the border between the two countries in the Caspian Sea. The agreement awards Kazakhstan practically the entire Caspian Shelf with its considerable oil resources.

However, this contract refers only to the seabed, not to the water. Citing ecological reasons, Russia would like to adhere to a condominium solution for the water in the Caspian Sea. Given the importance of fishing, especially for caviar production, there is substantial motivation for the states to agree upon an ecologically sound management of the water. However, it would not be necessary to accept the legal status of common ownership in order to achieve this goal. An agreement on common standards and possibly also a common management of water usage (shipping, polluting the sea via dirty river runoff, directly polluting the sea, oil pollution) within a regime of sectoral division could also be envisioned.

The assumption that Russia is striving for a condominium solution mainly in order to gain a veto position against the laying of a Transcaspian oil pipeline is probably correct and indicated by the head of the corresponding working group at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yuri Merzliakov.[9] Such an oil pipeline is definitely not in the Russian interest because it would present an alternative to transporting Kazakh oil through the CPC pipeline to Novorossyisk. The US, on the other hand, is pushing for the construction of a Transcaspian pipeline for both oil and gas. Firstly, in order to prevent Iran from participating in the transport of either East-Caspian oil or gas, and secondly, in order to have as much oil as possible on hand for a pipeline from Baku to the Turkish port Ceyhan. This would establish an infrastructure that would obviate almost all dependence upon Russia.

Iran, which until the Russian-Kazakh agreement of 6 July 1998 held a common position with Russia in favour of maintaining and administering the larger part of the Caspian Sea in condominium, considered this contract an affront by the Russians. In the meantime, Iran has taken the position that either the whole of the Caspian Sea should be held in condominium, including its mineral resources in the seabed, or it should be divided sectorally, but it is against a differentiation between water and seabed. Thus, Iran is now much closer to the position of the newly independent states, because a return to a general condominium solution is unthinkable, given the fact that offshore exploitation has already been contracted out and begun. Iran has begun to take measures to define its sector. In December 1998, Iran signed a contract with *Royal Dutch Shell* and the British company *LASMO* regarding geological and geographic studies of an offshore field, Iran's claim to which is being challenged by Azerbaijan.[10] However, at present none of the parties are exerting great pressure for a multilateral agreement on the legal status of the Caspian Sea because most of these countries can manage quite well with the current practice, at least for now. The US is less comfortable with the present situation, but it is not included in these negotiations. It is especially interested in having the Transcaspian pipeline perceived as a realistic option, in order to present viable alternatives to the Iranian route.

Stability and Security

It is obvious that - leaving aside, for the present, the numerous ethnic conflicts - economic and social stability in the region is linked to the efficient exploitation and transportation of energy resources. Furthermore, an adequate development of the energy sector in order to advance the overall economic development of the region - including an efficient distribution of income - is a precondition for economic and social stability. This, however, requires different measures of which the most important are:

- the observance of the rule of law in a region where traditionally the heads of clans, particularly the presidents of states, are acting as if they exist above

the law. An efficient economy, however, needs the rule of law to give (domestic and foreign) investors security for their cost/benefit calculations and to make sure that fair competition can be guaranteed, otherwise the inefficient actors might get an advantage. Without the rule of law, investment will be insufficient;

- cooperation between neighbouring states under agreements that are compatible to the international framework of business conditions that can in turn guarantee a reliable cost calculability and fair competition. The more neighbouring states that are included the better since this would enlarge the rather small markets of individual states whilst also creating alternative options so as to choose the most efficient one. As integration spaces like the EU show, more competition does not mean that there are winners and losers, but that all would benefit from the extended economic space;
- the states should take responsibility to ensure that economic actors can operate under conditions that also make them internationally competitive. In this sense, the states should protect economic activities against inadequate tax or infrastructural costs and against criminal activities; it is of special importance that the governments are enforcing laws and international agreements.

Even if this catalogue sounds a little idealistic in a region without a tradition in democracy and market economics, there is a strong force underlining these requirements that is the pressure of global competition. It is a matter of fact that investments are directed into this region only if private investors feel that the costs of producing the oil and natural gas and of transporting it to the consumer are lower than the fluctuating world market price. Access to energy sources is no longer an economic or political advantage in itself, at least not in the short- and medium-term (and definitely not in the long-term). Only energy that can be offered to the world market with profit creates jobs and prosperity.

This is the message of globalisation which has certainly not yet entered into the consciousness of those who still dream geopolitical games or feel rich just because of the presumed resources under their own soil. There is, however, some evidence of a growing consciousness of these facts. Nevertheless, it is not an easy task to step from an understanding of the need to apply the rule of law and international cooperation to its actual implementation. Traditions, lack of education and individual interests, especially amongst those who became rich from monopoly profits, are major obstacles in this regard.

The change of Russian policy in the region concerning the legal status of the Caspian Sea and the acceptance of competition concerning the pipeline infrastructure happened not under the pressure of any state but because of the eventual realisation that Russian policy can only block activities. It cannot create an economically advantageous situation by disregarding international economic competition.

In this context, the strong political impact of US policy on economic issues does not seem to be successful in the long run. Zbigniew Brzezinski argues in a way that reminds one of the pre-globalisation era:

> *"American foreign policy must remain concerned with the geopolitical dimension and must employ its influence in Eurasia in a manner that creates a stable continental equilibrium, with the United States as the political arbiter"*[11]

If this doctrine is applied, the result might be just the opposite of a stable equilibrium. Isolating Iran, containing Russia and promoting Turkey may lead to a monopoly situation which is inefficient in the sense of being globally competitive, and unbalanced because it prevents the use of alternative solutions. In addition it would produce losers in the sense of a zero sum game and thus provoke suspicion instead of cooperation under conditions of fair competition.

Whether integrated and competitive economies have a positive impact on the many mostly ethnic conflicts in the region is an open question. As we know from other regions in the world, ethnic conflicts can be so deeply rooted that the carrot of an incremental improvement of the economic situation has no sufficient attraction to settle the conflict.[12] It makes, however, a significant difference as to whether or not a country is excluded from building a regional network of infrastructure due to an unsettled conflict, such as with Armenia. If there is any leverage to move Armenia towards a fair compromise on Nagorno Karabakh, it is the choice between economic isolation and being integrated into the growing network of regional cooperation. Armenia must be aware that the infrastructure is designed now, and sometimes an infrastructure - such as the Silk Road - lasts for centuries.

The Caspian energy resources provide a unique chance for a region undergoing transformation to develop. It has already attracted more foreign capital than Russia and the European CIS countries together. "Norway or Nigeria" are the extreme options. If the region recognises that prosperity can only be reached on the basis of integration, cooperation, fair competition and peaceful settlement of conflicts, the region is better equipped for a stable development and regional security than other regions of the post-Soviet space and Asia. The risk is high, however, that deficiencies in applying the rule of law, the ethnic conflict potential and the forces in favour of criminal distortions of these economies will prevail. In this case, the economic dynamics will not protect the region against instability and insecurity.

Notes

1 See for example, Caspar Weinberger and Peter Schweizer in: Caspian Access Is Crucial for the West, *International Herald Tribune*, May 10, 1997, p. 6.
2 Turkistan-Newsletter of February 26, 1998.
3 "On a cautiously optimistic estimate, the Caspian Basin contains at least 100 billion barrels of oil", *The Economist*, 7. February 1998, Survey, p.6.
4 Aleksey Gromyko, Novaya "velikaya igra", *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, August 20, 1998, p.8.
5 "Proven oil reserves are pegged at between 15 billion and 31 billion barrels, about 2.7 percent of total world proven oil reserves." Baker Institute Study, *Unlocking the Assets: Energy and the Future of Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No. 6, April 1998, p.1.
6 International Energy Agency, Caspian Oil and Gas, Paris 1998, p. 33.
7 International Energy Agency, Caspian Oil and Gas, Paris 1998, p.33.
8 OMRI Daily Digest, Part I, No. 219 from 12.11.1996.
9 Iurii Merzliakov, Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, International Affairs, Moscow, Vol. 45, No. 1, 1999, (pp. 33-40), p.38.
10 Turkistan-Newsletter, Vol. 98 No. 204, 15.12.1998.
11 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, New York: Basic Books, 1997, p.xiv.
12 S. Neil MacFarlane, A role for the EU in Preventing Ethnic Conflict, in Reinhardt Rummel, Claude Zullo (eds.), Rethinking the European Union Relations with the Caucasus, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden (1999), pp.57-78.