Colloquium 1996 Panel IV : Scenarios for Economic Development and Social Cohesion

On the Relationship Between Scientific Research, Development and Education and their Benefit to the Economy Alexander Kennaway Professor, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, United Kingdom

Enriching the Economy Through Science and Technology: Basic Model In the main advanced industrial countries (AIC) it is asserted that industrial development starts with scientific and engineering research. Only research and development can produce new products and advanced production processes, the only route to an industrially competitive economy; this is the familiar product cycle (birth, life, decline and eventual death). The product is continuously changed (and improved) in answer to market wants and needs and to competition. Its costs are driven down by process improvements. Product and process improvement is the key to excellence and to competitiveness. This depends on detailed professional engineering skills, especially design engineering, based on an understanding of commerce. Ultimately the process gives way to radically new products and services, sometimes based on novel science and technology. For this process leaders of industry and other economic sectors must understand how to apply science to their advantage. This is the competitive way in the rich AICs, such as Japan. Leading Japanese industrialists can spot promising research, even at its early stages, and see how to commercialise successful cases. Their readiness to finance it, and to wait as long as two decades for a return on their investment, are key components in their economic success. This concept integrates science, engineering, design and marketing under the entrepreneurial company and it has served the AICs very well. It is probably unrivalled and irreplaceable for firms involved in complex products (e.g. computing, information systems, genetic engineering) which can be called "Main equipment producers" (MEP). Once the industrial sectors of developing countries have reached a comparable advanced level, there is no other way for their MEP to retain their position. Although "science" and even engineering research are integrated into the firm's operations, success depends upon the ability to translate research into profitable goods and services. This requires a flexible management system, dynamic and highly professional, and able to respond to changes (technical, commercial, financial and social) that affect business. The firm's board must practice and instill into all its people the concept: "perfect first time and every time". Engineers with good ideas but indifferent to their implementation, to their educated users' desires, and to the rigour of details are not engineers, they are '"men with ideas" (1).

Dogmatic and Exaggerated Faith in the Value of "Fundamental" Science: A Second Model In the fSU, "science" and research were like religious faith, with ritual expenditure of money and people on a vast scale and often without consideration of benefits. The principle that "the more spent on scientists and researchers, the better the economy" , if repeated often enough, soon becomes an accepted tenet. People who advocate this policy overlook the simple fact that much more is needed to satisfy the needs of the economy. There is little correlation between expenditure on science and economic wealth, and further "correlation does not necessarily imply causation". Scientific effort alone will not automatically create wealth. The efforts of people who are devoted to the processes mentioned above are required. Both good science and good industrial performance depend on a common culture which allows them to interact. Once a certain level of wealth in an organisation or a nation is achieved then a corresponding level of expenditure on untargetted research can be afforded, as in Japan. Three years ago I asked the Scientific Adviser to the Prime Minister of Japan how they managed to persuade the electorate to pay for so much research into, for example, radio astronomy. He replied "We are now so rich that we can afford to treat pure science as an art form and as part of our contribution to world culture. The Japanese people are curious about the origins of the human race and of our world and they need no encouragement to vote money for such work." Other countries, especially the fSU, certainly cannot afford this policy. The illusion that its fundamental science is supreme, and a basic source of wealth, is not true (see Appendix). Much of the research in every country, especially that funded by governments, is economically unproductive because, unlike work done in private firms, the government systems do not evaluate the work which they fund.(2) In Russia and the fSU no one has had to account for the vast sums received. Pure research can be regarded as either a redistribution of resources or as a tax on the nation. The latter is the truer view if it makes no contribution to the life support system of the country. Government funding for research should, therefore, be properly accounted for and subject to professional and objective evaluation. Soviet fundamental science has not contributed much to the wealth and health of the nation. Russia's economy is run down and requires massive investment to bring it to a satisfactory condition. Drastic choices are required to invest limited resources into the most urgent projects. Support for a leisure class and prestige projects cannot be high on the agenda. Creating Wealth by Using Existing Knowledge: "Pilgrim's Progress" Model. There are alternatives to "science" to raise the performance of a firm or nation. BTR Industries (3) provides a concrete, easily understood example. BTR does no in-house long range research nor does it support any in universities. It is a highly successful holding company with about 1500 subsidiaries. It's 1995 turnover was $15 bn., profit $2.250 bn, and return on capital over the past 10 years averaged 30% and on sales 15%. BTR's activities, in making components and other contributions to manufacturers of major products, are not successful due to "science" (whether long-range, fundamental or curiosity-led). Rather the company searches for the factors (financial, commercial, technical product design and process evolution) that lead to profitable performance and steadily improves those factors to increase its hold on niche markets, performance and profitability. BTR aims at ensuring that technologies of process, production and product capabilities are equal to the best in the world. It spends on such development about 1-2% of its total sales income. Some subsidiaries have taken 14 years to achieve top rank performance. The people BTR employs are not so much scientific high flyers as professional people, capable of good team work, flexible thinking and dedication to incremental improvements in their work rather than dramatic "break-throughs". They provide a culture of "doing everything well" that the former communist countries of the fSU and Eastern Europe lack. This approach is also a characteristic of the industrial rise of newly emerging countries, including the "four dragons", South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. Others have followed: Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Republic of China itself. Until well after the Second World War these countries were in every way third world: a colonial past, years of devastation and military occupation, a low standard of living, cottage industries, poor education and health conditions. Coming late to industrial development, now they are vibrant economies, challenging Japan and supplying advanced and complex products. Science played only a small role when they were far down the road of industrial development. Their industrial development started as sub-contractors for the manufacture of components for foreign MEP firms. This helped them to understand the requirements of world class MEPs. Initially many firms had to import special components and materials. These firms learned from their partners modern product design, production processes and commercial skills, including overseas marketing. Simultaneously with industrial development, these countries developed an education system which provides a work force of almost 100% literacy, including competitive mathematicians, computer programmers, scientists and engineers. The local firms progressed from sub contractors to innovative performers on the world stage. Local firms both buy and sell licences and also invest in overseas acquisitions, especially in electronics. Exports are largely directed to USA, Western Europe and Japan. It is helpful in new fields to work with intelligent customers, from whom one can learn, but nowadays sales to less advanced countries offers big market opportunities. The best firms have the latest production equipment and factories are often run by people, from several nations, with an up to date commercial, technical and operational culture. This attracts investment from international and local sources. They are not only essential partners for the MEPs, but also a growing threat to the smaller and sub-contracting companies in AICs. Science in the fSU: The "Slough of Despond (4) and Ruin" Model Official figures show that over 70% of all qualified scientists and engineers and of total expenditure on R&D in the fSU was for military purposes. Some Soviet military hardware, especially in space technology, is highly rated, owing much to the German missiles of the Second World War. However, even conventional Soviet equipment suffers from severe weaknesses, and is considered hazardous sometimes to their own soldiers. The weakest aspects are those called in the fSU "high technology", namely electronics and electrical hardware. Soviet and Russian equipment cannot even meet modern standards of telecommunications systems or air navigation radar for civilian aviation. These are currently being provided from the West. The crudity of Soviet military control systems is a good example of the wastefulness and incompetence of the Soviet political-economic system. (5) Consumer electronics made in the radio technical factories of the MIC are less reliable, and more expensive, than those imported. The head of the Russian Privatisation Centre admits that it is almost impossible to rescue those factories as their products are not "high tech" but mere commodities in the AICs. They result from incremental improvement in product and process technologies, rather than from dramatic new science. The most serious problem is that excellent scientific and basic engineering concepts are translated very badly into actual hardware. This is the fault of the Soviet Command system, which dooms the best efforts of engineers with high ideals and intentions. The Military Industrial Complex (MIC) is the best of Soviet industry, but its weaknesses are not recognised by the present government. I can only mention the key points: analysis in detail takes a lot of paper. (6) Amongst these are: separation of functions and therefore of responsibility, excessive size of organisations, absence of proper industrial management even in production, poor range and conformity to the paper specification of engineering materials and components, lack of concern for low cost production, and a lack of understanding of relations with civilian customers, i.e. "marketing". The last two defects are also common in the west. This is why so many redundant defence plants are simply closed, rather than adapted to civilian purposes. As a result the MIC is basically unprofitable and financially bankrupt. Its former "closed cities" are heavily polluted, destitute and very hard to reorient to useful activities. It is essential that the MIC regains its home market and begins to sell civilian products abroad. Russia cannot continue to survive by selling raw materials and some armaments. Basic, raw materials continue to account for 80% of all Russian exports and engineered products only for 3% (the latter accounts for about 30% of world trade). Through its focus only on fulfilling orders, regardless of the consequences, the MIC has contributed largely to the destruction of local ecology and has failed to meet real needs. It produced almost all the electronics and household equipment, but its poor quality, low reliability and poor "value for money" resulted in the fSU being flooded with foreign products. Its work force of around 4.5 million is underpaid, paid late and largely unemployed. Without retraining and a change of mentality it will remain largely unemployable. The Model of BTR and the Four Dragons: Polishing the Dull Stones Turns Them to Gold (7) A better performance in civilian, technical products requires, no "science" nor research, but instead purchase of licences for new science, rather than doing it themselves. It is better for the economy to buy licences than complete hardware and turn-key factories, as in the fSU. Improved industrial performance depends upon total market orientation: understanding requirements; better design attention to quality; good factory management, service for distributors, agents and customers; understanding the competitive market economy; improved profits for reinvestment in new developments. Russian factories should copy BTR and the Four Dragons, first by learning the above aspects of modern industry through work with top rank foreign firms. The fSU is limited generally to produce to other people's design and orders. As factories move toward making products with foreign brand names they will acquire specialists in quality, purchasing, costing, and marketing. They can then begin introduction of both foreign and Russian technical innovation. But even this promising path is not easy. The MIC is not a low cost producer: labour costs are high and due to inefficiency labour productivity is comparatively low (between 10-20% of comparable western factories). Education, training and directions of employment of scientists and engineers must be radically changed to achieve these benefits. Science and research has had little useful effect in the fSU and Russia. Research, largely directed to military and prestige projects, has not contributed to wealth creation or to the well-being of the nation. This well-known fact is now underlined by plaintive demands for foreign investment, equipment, and systems, all to be paid by government subsidy and foreign money. There just is not that much money in the world even if conditions in the fSU warranted foreign loans and investment. The fSU and its firms must learn to improve from its own financial resources. Today many Russians believe they can earn money by selling inventions, especially from military R & D. But experience shows that innovations, like men trying to enter the Kingdom of Heaven, 'many are called but few are chosen' (8). In Russia there is a strong interest in commercialising innovations, especially the backlog from military research. Undoubtedly a few are of interest to the West but experience shows that very little military technology finds application in civilian fields. Furthermore, the West is neither short of new technology nor eagerly awaiting declassified secrets of the MIC. Russians also seem to think that it is easy to sell their ideas, but everyone with something to sell, including innovators, must demonstrate that their idea is worth the time of a buyer, and that they have something "unique, the best in the world". Partly due to isolation, laziness and difficulty in checking the Russians mistakenly claim that so much is "unique". Some senior Russians genuinely believe that the West - and much lucrative business - is waiting around the next corner. Note: not one in a hundred of granted British patents is ever commercialised. The MIC has produced some good ideas and some are being licensed abroad. A good deal of "commercialising" advice has been given to the Ministry for Defence Industries. Strengths and Weaknesses in Russian/Soviet Education of Engineers and Scientists. Russian education has always been excellent, especially in theoretical aspects of science and mathematics. Engineering courses in the best VUZ are very similar to those given in Cambridge University. They place an emphasis on theoretical work; consequently a graduate is more of a mathematical analyst than an engineer. In the AICs he learns practical aspects at work. The Russian system was based on the German university one, practical training has been ignored. In Germany, as in England and Japan, there is a strong emphasis on providing practical training within industry, to teach how to work properly. This is provided by in-house courses and by example from competent, experienced seniors. Since most Russian industry is so badly managed the young graduate can learn only how to do things as badly as his seniors, Russian industrial performance (as well as that of its agriculture) and its infrastructure will continue to be inadequate and uncompetitive. Why does this demand for unconditional support for science, without visible benefit, continue? Since a rational person would admit the failure of Russian science as a basis for a flourishing economy, one has to seek non-rational reasons. A little speculation, a normal pursuit of intellectuals, leads us to the most obvious: it is a continuation of a strong habit which has become instinct. Faced with a situation they often mis-apply past practice in new circumstances. Then we have the lobby by the system's beneficiaries, (e.g. scientists, researchers) who are used to unquestioning support. They use every argument for continued support. But without resources for development of practical things and systems, the economy will collapse completely. Russia will have to learn to "cut its coat according to one's cloth". The fundamentalists continue to demand subsidies without adequate return to the economy. They argue that if enough is not funded young scientists will not be adequately trained. One further, might ask, "trained for what?". The experience of people doing good theoretical, experimental applied work is no less rigorous, demanding or intellectual than fundamental, work. More factors must be taken into account and one cannot ignore inconvenient facts or make simplifications and approximations to suit a lovely theory. The ultimate test is in the experience of the user. One may spend days devising a new move in chess but playing it across the board against a Grandmaster is the real test. Furthermore, applied work is more interesting and satisfying to many people, often creating the wealth to do other things. The fundamentalist argument amongst "intellectuals" in the fSU is so exaggerated that it would be folly to base practical policies upon it. However this argument ("fundamentalists" versus "appliers") is actually a smoke-screen to hide a fight to continue work on theoretical concepts for potential advanced weaponry. Small republics neither need nor have the industrial capability to produce such weapons. Fundamentalists are regrettably winning the argument against those who see that basic intelligence and scientific ability must be harnessed to the needs of the economy, or Russia will collapse totally. The "Academician" types will only be able to realise their ambitions if Russia provides funds for advanced weaponry on the previous scale. The chances are that Russia will keep its scarce funds to support, however wastefully, its own fundamentalists. When Apparent Strength is Weakness and Apparent Weakness is Economic Strength (9) Another familiar Russian assertion is that "our high science and technology is our national wealth". But its only contribution has been to military and space activities, both inefficiently provided. To such people, especially to the Generals, a large, visible armed force, with a plethora of expensive modern weapons, is an essential part of being a "Great Power", commanding the respect (or at least fear) of the world. But that policy led to poverty for the people, the last arms race, to the containment of Soviet expansion and to its final bankruptcy. Today, threats to national security arise not just in terms of massive armed attack, nor can security be obtained or measured only in terms of armed force (10). To become a Great Power, too many Russians seem ready to abandon all that is required for Russia to become a Great Country. The west lived with an over-militarised Soviet Union: the Soviet Union died! There is no underlying reason to retain Russia's scientific-technical potential, in its present form and size, to serve the military. This would run contrary to the Russian Military Doctrine (November 1993) and to the concept of the future battlefield. It appears that the Russian General Staff share western views on future armed conflicts. The latter are forecast to be of two types: either local, regional conflicts mainly concerned with putting down insurrections or tribal revolts and dealing with their consequences (such conflicts are unlikely to involve the massive losses of major assets); or short-duration (weeks or months) international conflicts between states armed with sophisticated weaponry. In such cases, there will be not time to replace lost major items of military equipment (even missiles take months to produce, modern aircraft, warships and tanks more than a year or two). Based on the erroneous military assessment of the future needs of the country, senior Russian strategists appear to support the preservation of the present structures and size of the Military Industrial Complex as a long-term insurance to replace losses in war. Senior officers in the MOD and general staff of some of the countries that belonged to the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, have indicated in discussions an inclination to share the thinking of the old Soviet High Command of the WTO. Some raised our (western) policies for retaining what (in 1938-39) the British called "Shadow factories", but this is not the current policy in Great Britain. Surely the Russians accept that future wars are unlikely to involve years of conflict, which alone would justify such an insurance policy? Even a war with China is not likely within a decade or two: in the meanwhile the Russians are busy supplying China with weapons and production technology (11). But a challenge along those lines, especially from the West, raises Russian cries of intent to destroy the military capability of Russia, and hence its role as a Great Power. On the contrary, the West, in my view, considers the greatest danger in the fSU as coming from failure to establish a thriving economy, and the ensuing social chaos. This would inevitably have a terrible impact within the fSU and also upon its immediate neighbours. It is easy for Russians to raise the myth of the West, once again, as the legendary Amazonian Queen, Baba Yaga, riding in her mortar and pestle at the head of her cavalry in the sky, with which to frighten children. (12) But Russian children will surely die if Russia pursues its past and present policies. Fortunately, there are presently no counterparts in the West who call for a return to the certainties of the Cold War. But as Isaac Newton wrote "to every action there is an equal and opposite reaction". British Policies on Education, Science and Technology This comparison with British industrial and technical history and policies is inserted, not because the author thinks they are the best "model" to follow, but because through extensive experience he knows this scene better than that of other countries. British engineering (especially in mechanical engineering and in ship building) was, often, between 1945-70, in the hands of poor management, and, as a result, such firms either went bankrupt and disappeared or they were improved by better management, often foreign. This process continues: all large scale, car producers are now owned by foreign firms. After the 1960s, managers began to demand a fundamental change in university courses in order to graduate people with wider capabilities, better integrated with industrial requirements. Many engineering courses now include practical design, projects which require students to consider all practical aspects, (financial, market needs, safety, aesthetics, ergonomics, ease of operation and maintenance, and cost studies). Industrial engineers work with academics in tutoring the students, often in very small groups. As a result young British engineers, in spite of much shorter courses, are considered by major multi-national firms as at least the equal of their Continental colleagues. Short courses are provided to working engineers and scientists in order to "enhance their qualifications" and to improve their ability to work. Additionally, university engineering graduates in their early career are required to perform specific tasks under the supervision of a registered professional engineer. The Engineering Council, an umbrella body whose membership consists of the leading specialist engineering institutions, sets these requirements. Only after being examined by a small group of examiners, and passing, may a student call himself a Chartered Engineer. The Engineering Council also examines and accredits the university courses. The examining Board of engineers working in other universities and in industry looks for high standards in theoretical and applied courses, with special emphasis on design and project work. It seems to us that Russians talk far too much of their "highly qualified scientists, engineers and work force". Those people are suited only to work in old soviet styles. They require radical retraining to assist in developing a competitive, world-class industry. Many factory directors also still do not appreciate that training in obsolete manual craft skills is now insufficient for factory workers. With the changes in modern production techniques, the skilled worker must now become more of a supervisor of computer-controlled systems, able to diagnose and correct faults. The chemical and process industries have worked this way for decades, as have modern warships and power stations. It took the Japanese to see how to apply such methods successfully to manufacturing engineering. The skilled worker must also understand the basis of commercial success and how his technology and skills contribute to that success. This requires a very different, broader and more flexible education in the final years of school and in the period between 16 and 21- 22. These changes have been taking place in Japanese engineering schools and industry and also, more slowly, in western Europe, America and developing countries of the Pacific Rim. Finally, both for workers and university graduates, these abilities will not be measured mainly by paper qualifications and by certificates of good attendance on courses. In the AICs employers are much less interested in paper qualifications of employees than they are in their ability to work to the benefit of the firm. In Britain we have faced, and still face, similar problems and we have also to be much clearer about retraining the manual and semi-skilled workers of the present. But we are tackling those issues and not ignoring them by pretending that all is well. We also start from a higher level of competence to work in a competitive market economy. Conclusions The future of Russia requires that she embraces a world civilisation, rather than remaining within a narrow Asiatic-Russian culture. The paper demonstrates that: Russian education based as it is on purely theoretical lines does not provide its graduates with the motivation or basis for identifying and solving economically useful problems. this emphasis on theory is reinforced by Marxist-Leninist dogma which also results in a misapplication and misdirection of graduates away from commercial applications needed to create and strengthen a wealth creating economy. The soviet structure and mentality, which still hold sway, artificially separates roles of science and engineering, with few exceptions, into vertical relationships which prevent the normal interplay between R&D, design, attention to market needs and the culture of professional management in manufacturing, product and process improvement that is responsible for economic success in advanced industrial countries. as a result, Russia and the fSU have experienced 80 wasted years of a widened and deepened education. The big battalions, much loved by soviet dogma, of "scientists" are shown to be ineffective and inefficient even in the areas that receive most self congratulatory tributes, namely "fundamental" science and even in weaponry. The state of the infra-structure, agriculture, industry and consumer goods in the fSU is generally poor and shows little, if any, benefit from the attentions of "scientists" who are usually too remote from reality to be useful. The R & D laboratories need to be integrated with the manufacturing and commercial enterprises. It is really saddening for those who wish to see Russia develop into a successful economy, in which its people may live happily and with hope for the future of their children, to read Zyuganov's comment that for him "the road of industrial development of the AICs is a dead end which we will not follow. Our road is a post-industrial road". (13) His career as a school teacher and worker in the "agitation" & "ideology" departments of the Communist Party hardly provides a background that occasions respect for that opinion. Until some basic changes occur in Russian engineering education, training and direction of employment, there is little to be expected from the next generation. However, many Russians of all ages do learn very rapidly the best practices from close contact with overseas partners. Like Britain, Russia can benefit from the establishment by world-class foreign firms of commercial companies, based on manufacturing, and with their own R & D and commercial departments. Russian industry and the economy will improve only when the exaggerated respect for "our scientific,technical potential" and for "our high qualifications" gives way to a respect for practical performance, which of course must be linked to good theoretical preparation and university research. It is also essential that the government put in place a system of coherent, stable, sensible laws and a financial framework to allow good professional work to be carried out. Experience of recent years suggests that better progress is possible within enterprises than within the organs of government. For these reasons a "bottom-up" restructuring is more likely to succeed than grandiose, "top-down" reforms driven by capricious Ukaz: practice is better than protocol! Competent industrialists can provide instructive lessons to politicians, to theoretical economists and to other bystanders, who observe events but have failed to improve them. They will need the help of the many intelligent Russian scientists and engineers who, in turn, need to harness their intellect to the identification and solution of economically useful problems. This will entail a basic restructuring of the education and training system and curricula. We are dealing with a long standing culture of a nation, as well as of 80 years of the Soviet system. Experience in other countries shows that traditional attitudes last even for centuries but that, given the will, significant, practical improvements can result in less than twenty years. Investment in new thinking and structures is needed, rather than vast investments in money and imported hardware.

Appendix The Real Condition of Actual Technology in the fSU In the fSU the extraction industries, and the air, rail and pipeline transport systems are inefficient and often dangerous. A comparison between the Soviet and Alaskan oil pipelines is instructive. Soviet specification for steel pipes are the same as Western, but losses of oil through breakages is many times higher. This is due to: use of inappropriate welding techniques which work well in ideal, factory conditions but not in the field; inadequate internal and external anti-corrosion and other protection coatings and coverings; and, careless, totally inadequate support systems for pipes, especially in areas subject to shifting soil and earthquakes. The demands for speed and the separation of responsibilities, typical of soviet-type command managements, bear a heavy responsibility for the losses. Lada cars provide another instructive lesson. The basic design and factory are Italian. Two things limit sales in the West - failure to keep up with competitive designs and its low quality, careless manufacture. Lada UK stated in December 1995 that the carburetors usually contain metal residues from cutting operations, and a British specialist firm must bring them to an operational standard. Also the paintwork often contains foreign bodies mixed with the paint, and many cars have to be repainted. Regularly, nonessential components fall off the car. One sees no contribution of decades of Soviet research in the design and performance of vehicles. This is in spite of the many research papers that claim to solve advanced problems, in the "ride" and suspension system and in multi-wheel steering. Such papers are irrelevant when compared with the poor basic performance and manufactured quality of existing vehicles. The fuel efficiency of engines in current production for cars and airplanes is also far below that of the foreign competition. Soviet aero engines have a much shorter life between major overhauls because they do not employ the right metals with long life performance. For all the use they have been, one might as well close the sectoral research institutes. Observation of "clean rooms" in weapons' electronics factories of the fSU shows that they are rarely up to the required standard (not only technically but in personnel routines). This lack contributes to the high rejection rate of components, such as printed circuit boards (between 27% and 10% of first pass production). In Japan the rate is about 80 parts per million. Toshiba report that every 1% of reworked rejects costs the equivalent of 5% of net profit. Their reject rates of TV sets in Britain is now about 2%, while in the fSU factories the figures are about an order of magnitude higher. Western agricultural specialists report that Soviet seed, farming methods, and equipment do not accord with conditions on the farms that they have examined and, in some cases, operated. With British seed, equipment and husbandry, the output per hectare has risen by more than 3 times in two seasons. The output per hectare of Soviet agriculture is generally about a fifth of that in comparable crops and climates in N. America. Labour productivity is less than one tenth of British figures. What were the famed Soviet Institutes of biology, agricultural machinery and agronomy doing all those years? Lysenko spent it writing papers that were fundamentally wrong. Khrushchev's grandiose dream of harvests from the Virgin Lands turned into a desert. Vavilov, in the 1920s, complained that the best scientists were being hounded, or emigrating, and that their replacements were but party hacks and mediocrities. He correctly predicted the decline of Soviet science. Experience elsewhere shows the superiority of working in very small groups in order to achieve creative results. The standards of building, furniture, household and office equipment for ordinary people, (in contrast to that for the verhushka and foreigners), of the telephone system, toilets and basic utilities are not those of an advanced country. This reflects under investment in these areas for decades, due to over investment in the military, but also in other prestige areas, such as "science", the arts and the space program. But they also fail to demonstrate any contribution from "science" and research. They remain at a low standard. To bring them up to West European standards requires not science but the devoted attention of good engineers and craftsmen, led by good managers with sensible directives. Experience in Britain after 1945 suggests that the job may take a very long time. British science was then, as it is now, of world class but much of its manufacturing industry was uncompetitive for very similar reasons that we observe in Russia today. These are largely those of organisation and mentality of management and work force, rather than of equipment and investment. Footnotes Russian readers may find my book useful "Engineering in a market economy". Russian title "Inzhener v Rynochnoi Ekonomike". Edited by Professor N.Dimitrichenko. Published by the Kiev International Civil Aviation University. May 1996. Even the Lord God evaluated his own work, so why should not mere mortals? Genesis ch.1.v.4. "And God saw the light, that it was good." I was for many years the director on the main Board responsible for technology "Pilgrim's progress." John Bunyan. 1678 Another basic example of the failure of the planned economy is to be found in the most basic need of the people-bread. It is reported (Finansovie Izvestiya 14th May 1996) that the baking industry is in danger of failing to produce enough bread. Primarily because 1500, 63% , of continuous ovens need replacing in the next two years. The annual Russian output is 49. See for example my paper "rehabilitation of a Russian military factory". CSRC. Perhaps this is a Buddhist and Confucian concept of humility and dedication to detail. The Holy Bible, New Testament. Gospel according to St. Matthew. 22.14. San Tsu, the master of the Art of War was an exponent of the idea of using force economically to turn the enemy's strength against himself. This is also an element of Judo. However the Russian version elevates this art form to a higher plane because it defeats itself without the assistance of outside opposition. Gorbachev understood this very well. See Zhizn I Reformi. Which the Chinese are busy setting up factories to make these for themselves and sell on the world market. They are already a significant seller of weapons. They will also improve them. See "Russia before Christ". Victor M.Gobarev. Moscow 1996. Epic legends, mixed with a skeleton of fact, dressed up as pre-history. In Russian. Zyuganov's speeches and book "Veru v Rossiu" 1995. References "Engineering in a market economy" in Russian. A.Kennaway. Kyiv. International Civil Aviation University. May 1996 "Lord and Peasant in Russia, from 9th-19th Century". Jerome Blum.Princeton University Press. 1961 "Soviet Science". Zhores Medvedev. Oxford University Press. 1979 "Some notes on the history of Soviet science." A.Kennaway. CRSC. 1995. "Industry in USSR and its Tsarist predecessors". A.Kennaway. CSRC. 1990. "Toward a rational philosophy for Soviet Science". A.Kennaway. CSRC. 1994. "Rehabilitation of a Russian Military Factory". A.Kennaway. CSRC 1994 "How the Japanese learn to work" R.P.Dore & Mari Sako. Routledge. London & NY. 1989 "Technology Foresight" HMSO London 1995 " Soviet genetics and world science. Lysenko and the meaning of heredity." Julian Huxley FRS. 1949, Chatto and Windus . "Zhizn I Reformi", M. S. Gorbachev, Book 1.p 124-135. Moscov 1995.