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I. Introduction
- The overriding objective of the Alliance is to preserve
peace in freedom, to prevent war, and to establish a just
and lasting peaceful order in Europe. The Allies' policy
to this end was set forth in the Harmel Report of 1967. It
remains valid. According to the Report, the North Atlantic
Alliance's "first function is to maintain adequate
military strength and political solidarity to deter
aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the
territory of member countries if aggression should occur".
On that basis, the Alliance can carry out "its second
function, to pursue the search for progress towards a more
stable relationship in which the underlying political
issues can be solved". As the Report observed, military
security and a policy aimed at reducing tensions are "not
contradictory, but complementary". Consistent with these
principles, Allied Heads of State and Government have
agreed that arms control is an integral part of the
Alliance's security policy.
- The possibilities for fruitful East-West dialogue have
significantly improved in recent years. More favorable
conditions now exist for progress towards the achievement
of the Alliance's objectives. The Allies are resolved to
grasp this opportunity. They will continue to address both
the symptoms and the causes of political tension in a
manner that respects the legitimate security interests of
all states concerned.
- The achievement of the lasting peaceful order which the
Allies seek will require that the unnatural division of
Europe, and particularly of Germany, be overcome, and
that, as stated in the Helsinki Final Act, the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of all states and the right of
peoples to self-determination be respected, and that the
rights of all individuals, including their right of
political choice, be protected. The members of the
Alliance accordingly attach central importance to further
progress in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE) process, which serves as a framework for the
promotion of peaceful evolution in Europe.
- The CSCE process provides a means to encourage stable
and constructive East-West relations by increasing
contacts between people, by seeking to ensure that basic
rights and freedoms are respected in law and practice, by
furthering political exchanges and mutually beneficial
cooperation across a broad range of endeavors, and by
enhancing security and openness in the military sphere.
The Allies will continue to demand full implementation of
all the principles and provisions of the Helsinki Final
Act, the Madrid Concluding Document, the Stockholm
Document, and the Concluding Document of the Vienna
Meeting. The last document marks a major advance in the
CSCE process and should stimulate further beneficial
changes in Europe.
- The basic goal of the Alliance's arms control policy is
to enhance security and stability at the lowest balanced
level of forces and armaments consistent with the
requirements of the strategy of deterrence. The Allies are
committed to achieving continuing progress towards all
their arms control objectives. The further development of
the Comprehensive Concept is designed to assist this by
ensuring an integrated approach covering both defense
policy and arms control policy: these are complementary
and interactive. This work also requires full
consideration of the interrelationship between arms
control objectives and defense requirements and how
various arms control measures, separately and in
conjunction with each other, can strengthen Alliance
security. The guiding principles and basic objectives
which have so far governed the arms control policy of the
Alliance remain valid. Progress in achieving these
objectives is, of course, affected by a number of factors.
These include the overall state of East-West relations,
the military requirements of the Allies, the progress of
existing and future arms control negotiations, and
developments in the CSCE process. The further development
and implementation of a comprehensive concept of arms
control and disarmament will take place against this
background.
II. East-West Relations and Arms Control
- The Alliance continues to seek a just and stable peace
in Europe in which all states can enjoy undiminished
security at the minimum necessary levels of forces and
armaments and all individuals can exercise their basic
rights and freedoms. Arms control alone cannot resolve
long-standing political differences between East and West
nor guarantee a stable peace. Nonetheless, achievement of
the Alliance's goal will require substantial advances in
arms control, as well as more fundamental changes in
political relations. Success in arms control, in addition
to enhancing military security, can encourage improvements
in the East-West political dialogue and thereby contribute
to the achievement of broader Alliance objectives.
- To increase security and stability in Europe, the
Alliance has consistently pursued every opportunity for
effective arms control. The Allies are committed to this
policy, independent of any changes that may occur in the
climate of East-West relations. Success in arms control,
however, continues to depend not on our own efforts alone,
but also on Eastern and particularly Soviet readiness to
work constructively towards mutually beneficial results.
- The immediate past has witnessed unprecedented progress
in the field of arms control. In 1986 the Stockholm
Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) agreement
created an innovative system of confidence and
security-building measures, designed to promote military
transparency and predictability. To date, these have been
satisfactorily implemented. The 1987 INF Treaty marked
another major step forward because it eliminated a whole
class of weapons, it established the principle of
asymmetrical reductions, and provided for a stringent
verification regime. Other achievements include the
establishment in the United States and the Soviet Union of
nuclear risk reduction centers, the US/Soviet agreement on
prior notification of ballistic missile launches, and the
conduct of the Joint Verification Experiment in connection
with continued US/Soviet negotiations on nuclear testing.
- In addition to agreements already reached, there has
been substantial progress in the START negotiations which
are intended to reduce radically strategic nuclear
arsenals and eliminate destabilising offensive
capabilities. The Paris Conference on the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons has reaffirmed the authority of the 1925
Geneva Protocol and given powerful political impetus to
the negotiations in Geneva for a global, comprehensive and
effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons. New
distinct negotiations within the framework of the CSCE
process have now begun in Vienna: one on conventional
armed forces in Europe between the 23 members of NATO and
the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and one on
confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) among
all 35 signatories of the Helsinki Final Act.
- There has also been substantial progress on other
matters important to the West. Soviet troops have left
Afghanistan. There has been movement toward the resolution
of some, although not all, of the remaining regional
conflicts in which the Soviet Union is involved. The
observance of human rights in the Soviet Union and in some
of the other WTO countries has significantly improved,
even if serious deficiencies remain. The recent Vienna
CSCE Follow-up meeting succeeded in setting new, higher
standards of conduct for participating states and should
stimulate further progress in the CSCE process. A new
intensity of dialogue, particularly at high level, between
East and West opens new opportunities and testifies to the
Allies' commitment to resolve the fundamental problems
that remain.
- The Alliance does not claim exclusive responsibility
for this favorable evolution in East-West relations. In
recent years, the East has become more responsive and
flexible. Nonetheless, the Alliance's contribution has
clearly been fundamental. Most of the achievements to
date, which have been described above, were inspired by
initiatives by the Alliance or its members. The Allies'
political solidarity, commitment to defense, patience and
creativity in negotiations overcame initial obstacles and
brought its efforts to fruition. It was the Alliance that
drew up the basic blueprints for East-West progress and
has since pushed them forward towards realization. In
particular, the concepts of stability, reasonable
sufficiency, asymmetrical reductions, concentration on the
most offensive equipment, rigorous verification,
transparency, a single zone from the Atlantic to the
Urals, and the balanced and comprehensive nature of the
CSCE process, are Western-inspired.
- Prospects are now brighter than ever before for
lasting, qualitative improvements in the East-West
relationship. There continue to be clear signs of change
in the internal and external policies of the Soviet Union
and of some of its Allies. The Soviet leadership has
stated that ideological competition should play no part in
inter-state relations. Soviet acknowledgment of serious
shortcomings in its past approaches to international as
well as domestic issues creates opportunities for progress
on fundamental political problems.
- At the same time, serious concerns remain. The
ambitious Soviet reform program, which the Allies welcome,
will take many years to complete. Its success cannot be
taken for granted given the magnitude of the problems it
faces and the resistance generated. In Eastern Europe,
progress in constructive reform is still uneven and the
extent of these reforms remains to be determined. Basic
human rights still need to be firmly anchored in law and
practice, though in some Warsaw Pact countries
improvements are under way. Although the WTO has recently
announced and begun unilateral reductions in some of its
forces, the Soviet Union continues to deploy military
forces and to maintain a pace of military production in
excess of legitimate defensive requirements. Moreover, the
geo-strategic realities favor the geographically
contiguous Soviet-dominated WTO as against the
geographically separated democracies of the North Atlantic
Alliance. It has long been an objective of the Soviet
Union to weaken the links between the European and North
American members of the Alliance.
- We face an immediate future that is promising but
still uncertain. The Allies and the East face both a
challenge and an opportunity to capitalize on present
conditions in order to increase mutual security. The
progress recently made in East-West relations has given
new impetus to the arms control process and has enhanced
the possibilities of achieving the Alliance's arms control
objectives, which complement the other elements of the
Alliance's security policy.
III. Principles of Alliance Security
- Alliance security policy aims to preserve peace in
freedom by both political means and the maintenance of a
military capability sufficient to prevent war and to
provide for effective defense. The fact that the Alliance
has for forty years safeguarded peace in Europe bears
witness to the success of this policy.
- Improved political relations and the progressive
development of cooperative structures between Eastern and
Western countries are important components of Alliance
policy. They can enhance mutual confidence, reduce the
risk of misunderstanding, ensure that there are in place
reliable arrangements for crisis management so that
tensions can be defused, render the situation in Europe
more open and predictable, and encourage the development
of wider cooperation in all fields.
- In underlining the importance of these facts for the
formulation of Alliance policy, the Allies reaffirm that,
as stated in the Harmel Report, the search for
constructive dialogue and cooperation with the countries
of the East, including arms control and disarmament, is
based on political solidarity and adequate military
strength.
- Solidarity among the Alliance countries is a
fundamental principle of their security policy. It
reflects the indivisible nature of their security. It is
expressed by the willingness of each country to share
fairly the risks, burdens and responsibilities of the
common effort as well as its benefits. In particular, the
presence in Europe of the United States' conventional and
nuclear forces and of Canadian forces demonstrates that
North American and European security interests are
inseparably bound together.
- From its inception the Alliance of Western democracies
has been defensive in purpose. This will remain so. None
of our weapons will ever be used except in self-defense.
The Alliance does not seek military superiority nor will
it ever do so. Its aim has always been to prevent war and
any form of coercion and intimidation.
- Consistent with the Alliance's defensive character,
its strategy is one of deterrence. Its objective is to
convince a potential aggressor before he acts that he is
confronted with a risk that outweighs any gain--however
great--he might hope to secure from his aggression. The
purpose of this strategy defines the means needed for its
implementation.
- In order to fulfill its strategy, the Alliance must be
capable of responding appropriately to any aggression and
of meeting its commitment to the defense of the frontiers
of its members' territory. For the foreseeable future,
deterrence requires an appropriate mix of adequate and
effective nuclear and conventional forces which will
continue to be kept up to date where necessary; for it is
only by their evident and perceived capability for
effective use that such forces and weapons deter.
- Conventional forces make an essential contribution to
deterrence. The elimination of asymmetries between the
conventional forces of East and West in Europe would be a
major breakthrough, bringing significant benefits for
stability and security. Conventional defense alone cannot,
however, ensure deterrence. Only the nuclear element can
confront an aggressor with an unacceptable risk and thus
plays an indispensable role in our current strategy of war
prevention.
- The fundamental purpose of nuclear forces--both
strategic and sub-strategic--is political: to preserve the
peace and to prevent any kind of war. Such forces
contribute to deterrence by demonstrating that the Allies
have the military capability and the political will to use
them, if necessary, in response to aggression. Should
aggression occur, the aim would be to restore deterrence
by inducing the aggressor to reconsider his decision, to
terminate his attack and to withdraw and thereby to
restore the territorial integrity of the Alliance.
- Conventional and nuclear forces, therefore, perform
different but complementary and mutually reinforcing
roles. Any perceived inadequacy in either of these two
elements, or the impression that conventional forces could
be separated from nuclear, or sub-strategic from strategic
nuclear forces, might lead a potential adversary to
conclude that the risks of launching aggression might be
calculable and acceptable. No single element can,
therefore, be regarded as a substitute compensating for
deficiencies in any other.
- For the foreseeable future, there is no alternative
strategy for the prevention of war. The implementation of
this strategy will continue to ensure that the security
interests of all Alliance members are fully safeguarded.
The principles underlying the strategy of deterrence are
of enduring validity. Their practical expression in terms
of the size, structure and deployment of forces is bound
to change. As in the past, these elements will continue to
evolve in response to changing international
circumstances, technological progress and developments in
the scale of the threat--in particular, in the posture and
capabilities of the forces of the Warsaw Treaty
Organization.
- Within this overall framework, strategic nuclear
forces provide the ultimate guarantee of deterrence for
the Allies. They must be capable of inflicting
unacceptable damage on an aggressor state even after it
has carried out a first strike. Their number, range,
survivability and penetration capability need to ensure
that a potential aggressor cannot count on limiting the
conflict or regarding his own territory as a sanctuary.
The strategic nuclear forces of the United States provide
the cornerstone of deterrence for the Alliance as a whole.
The independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and
France fulfill a deterrent role of their own and
contribute to the overall deterrence strategy of the
Alliance by complicating the planning and risk assessment
of a potential aggressor.
- Nuclear forces below the strategic level provide an
essential political and military linkage between
conventional and strategic forces and, together with the
presence of Canadian and United States forces in Europe,
between the European and North American members of the
Alliance. The Allies' sub-strategic nuclear forces are not
designed to compensate for conventional imbalances. The
levels of such forces in the integrated military structure
nevertheless must take into account the threat--both
conventional and nuclear--with which the Alliance is
faced. Their role is to ensure that there are no
circumstances in which a potential aggressor might
discount the prospect of nuclear retaliation in response
to military action. Nuclear forces below the strategic
level thus make an essential contribution to deterrence.
- The wide deployment of such forces among countries
participating in the integrated military structure of the
Alliance, as well as the arrangements for consultation in
the nuclear area among the Allies concerned, demonstrates
solidarity and willingness to share nuclear roles and
responsibilities. It thereby helps to reinforce
deterrence.
- Conventional forces contribute to deterrence by
demonstrating the Allies' will to defend themselves and by
minimizing the risk that a potential aggressor could
anticipate a quick and easy victory or limited territorial
gain achieved solely by conventional means.
- They must thus be able to respond appropriately and to
confront the aggressor immediately and as far forward as
possible with the necessary resistance to compel him to
end the conflict and to withdraw or face possible recourse
to the use of nuclear weapons by the Allies. The forces of
the Allies must be deployed and equipped so as to enable
them to fulfill this role at all times. Moreover, since
the Alliance depends on reinforcements from the North
American continent, it must be able to keep open sea and
air lines of communication between North America and
Europe.
- All member countries of the Alliance strongly favor a
comprehensive, effectively verifiable, global ban on the
development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical
weapons. Chemical weapons represent a particular case,
since the Alliance's overall strategy of war prevention,
as noted earlier, depends on an appropriate mix of nuclear
and conventional weapons. Pending the achievement of a
global ban on chemical weapons, the Alliance recognizes
the need to implement passive defense measures. A
retaliatory capability on a limited scale is retained in
view of the Soviet Union's overwhelming chemical weapons
capability.
- The Allies are committed to maintaining only the
minimum level of forces necessary for their strategy of
deterrence, taking into account the threat. There is,
however, a level of forces, both nuclear and conventional,
below which the credibility of deterrence cannot be
maintained. In particular, the Allies have always
recognized that the removal of all nuclear weapons from
Europe would critically undermine deterrence strategy and
impair the security of the Alliance.
- The Alliance's defense policy and its policy of arms
control and disarmament are complementary and have the
same goal: to maintain security at the lowest possible
level of forces. There is no contradiction between defense
policy and arms control policy. It is on the basis of this
fundamental consistency of principles and objectives that
the comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament
should be further developed and the appropriate
conclusions drawn in each of the areas of arms control.
IV. Arms Control and Disarmament: Principles and Objectives
- Our vision for Europe is that of an undivided
continent where military forces only exist to prevent war
and to ensure self-defence, as has always been the case
for the Allies, not for the purpose of initiating
aggression or for political or military intimidation. Arms
control can contribute to the realization of that vision
as an integral part of the Alliance's security policy and
of our overall approach to East-West relations.
- The goal of Alliance arms control policy is to enhance
security and stability. To this end, the Allies' arms
control initiatives seek a balance at a lower level of
forces and armaments through negotiated agreements and, as
appropriate, unilateral actions, recognizing that arms
control agreements are only possible where the negotiating
partners share an interest in achieving a mutually
satisfactory result. The Allies' arms control policy seeks
to remove destabilising asymmetries in forces or
equipment. It also pursues measures designed to build
mutual confidence and to reduce the risk of conflict by
promoting greater transparency and predictability in
military matters.
- In enhancing security and stability, arms control can
also bring important additional benefits for the Alliance.
Given the dynamic aspects of the arms control process, the
principles and results embodied in one agreement may
facilitate other arms control steps. In this way arms
control can also make possible further reductions in the
level of Alliance forces and armaments, consistent with
the Alliance's strategy of war prevention. Furthermore, as
noted in Chapter 11, arms control can make a significant
contribution to the development of more constructive
East-West relations and of a framework for further
cooperation within a more stable and predictable
international environment. Progress in arms control can
also enhance public confidence in and promote support for
our overall security policy.
Guiding Principles for Arms Control
- The members of the Alliance will be guided by the
following principles:
- Security
- Arms control should enhance the security of
all Allies. Both during the implementation period and
following implementation, the Allies' strategy of
deterrence and their ability to defend
themselves, must remain credible and effective. Arms
control measures should maintain the strategic unity and
political cohesion of the Alliance, and should safeguard
the principle of the indivisibility of Alliance security
by avoiding the creation of areas of unequal security.
Arms control measures should respect the legitimate
security interests of all states and should not facilitate
the transfer or intensification of threats to third
party states or regions.
- Stability
- Arms control measures should yield
militarily significant results that enhance stability. To
promote stability, arms control measures should reduce or
eliminate those capabilities which are most threatening to
the Alliance. Stability can also be enhanced by steps
that promote greater transparency and predictability in
military matters. Military stability requires the
elimination of options for surprise attack and for
large-scale offensive action. Crisis stability requires
that no state has forces of a size and configuration
which, when compared with those of others, could enable it
to calculate that it might gain a decisive
advantage by being the first to resort to arms. Stability
also requires measures which discourage destabilising
attempts to re-establish military advantage through the
transfer of resources to other types of armament.
Agreements must lead to final results that are both
balanced and ensure equality of rights with respect to
security.
- Verifiability
- Effective and reliable verification is
a fundamental requirement for arms control agreements. If
arms control is to be effective and to build confidence,
the verifiability of proposed arms control measures must,
therefore, be of central concern for the Alliance.
Progress in arms control should be measured against the
record of compliance with existing agreements. Agreed arms
control measures should exclude opportunities for
circumvention.
Alliance Arms Control Objectives
- In accordance with the above principles, the Allies
are pursuing an ambitious arms control agenda for the
coming years in the nuclear, conventional and chemical
fields.
Nuclear Forces
- The INF Agreement represents a milestone in the
Allies' efforts to achieve a more secure peace at lower
levels of arms. By 1991, it will lead to the total
elimination of all United States and Soviet intermediate
range land-based missiles, thereby removing the threat
which such Soviet systems presented to the Alliance.
Implementation of the agreement, however, will affect only
a small proportion of the Soviet nuclear armory, and the
Alliance continues to face a substantial array of modern
and effective Soviet systems of all ranges. The full
realization of the Alliance agenda thus requires that
further steps be taken.
Strategic Nuclear Forces
- Soviet strategic systems continue to pose a major
threat to the whole of the Alliance. Deep cuts in such
systems are in the direct interests of the entire Western
Alliance, and therefore their achievement constitutes a
priority for the Alliance in the nuclear field.
- The Allies thus fully support the US objectives of
achieving, within the context of the Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks, fifty percent reductions in United States
and Soviet strategic nuclear arms. United States proposals
seek to enhance stability by placing specific restrictions
on the most destabilising elements of the threat--fast
flying ballistic missiles, throw-weight and, in
particular, Soviet heavy ICBMs. The proposals are based on
the need to maintain the deterrent credibility of the
remaining United States strategic forces which would
continue to provide the ultimate guarantee of security for
the Alliance as a whole; and therefore on the necessity to
keep such forces effective. Furthermore, the United States
is holding talks with the Soviet Union on defense and
space matters in order to ensure that strategic stability
is enhanced.
Sub-Strategic Nuclear Forces
- The Allies are committed to maintaining only the
minimum number of nuclear weapons necessary to support
their strategy of deterrence. In line with this
commitment, the members of the integrated military
structure have already made major unilateral cuts in their
sub-strategic nuclear armory. The number of land-based
warheads in Western Europe has been reduced by over
one-third since 1979 to its lowest level in over 20 years.
Updating where necessary of their sub-strategic systems
would result in further reductions.
- The Allies continue to face the direct threat posed to
Europe by the large numbers of shorter-range nuclear
missiles deployed on Warsaw Pact territory and which have
been substantially upgraded in recent years. Major
reductions in Warsaw Pact systems would be of overall
value to Alliance security. One of the ways to achieve
this aim would be by tangible and verifiable reductions of
American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of
shorter range leading to equal ceilings at lower levels.
- But the sub-strategic nuclear forces deployed by
member countries of the Alliance are not principally a
counter to similar systems operated by members of the WTO.
As is explained in Chapter lll, sub-strategic nuclear
forces fulfill an essential role in overall Alliance
deterrence strategy by ensuring that there are no
circumstances in which a potential aggressor might
discount nuclear retaliation in response to his military
action.
- The Alliance reaffirms its position that for the
foreseeable future there is no alternative to the
Alliance's strategy for the prevention of war, which is a
strategy of deterrence based upon an appropriate mix of
adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces
which will continue to be kept up to date where necessary.
Where nuclear forces are concerned, land-, sea-, and
air-based systems, including ground based missiles, in the
present circumstances and as far as can be foreseen will
be needed in Europe.
- In view of the huge superiority of the Warsaw Pact in
terms of short-range nuclear missiles, the Alliance calls
upon the Soviet Union to reduce unilaterally its
short-range missile systems to the current levels within
the integrated military structure.
- The Alliance reaffirms that at the negotiations on
conventional stability it pursues the objectives of :
- the establishment of a secure and stable balance of
conventional forces at lower levels;
- the elimination of disparities prejudicial to
stability and security; and
- the elimination as a matter of high priority of the
capability for launching surprise attack and for
initiating large-scale offensive action.
- In keeping with its arms control objectives formulated in Reykjavik in 1987 and reaffirmed in Brussels in 1988, the Alliance states that one of its highest priorities in negotiations with the East is reaching an agreement on conventional force reductions which would achieve the objectives above. In this spirit, the Allies will make every effort, as evidenced by the outcome of the May 1989 Summit, to bring these conventional negotiations to an early and satisfactory conclusion. The United States has expressed the hope that this could be achieved within six to twelve months. Once implementation of such an agreement is under way, the United States, in consultation with the Allies concerned, is prepared to enter into negotiations to achieve a partial reduction of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile forces of shorter range to equal and verifiable levels. With special reference to the Western proposals on CFE tabled in Vienna, enhanced by the proposals by the United States at the May 1989 Summit, the Allies concerned proceed on the understanding that negotiated reductions leading to a level below the existing level of their SNF missiles will not be carried out until the results of these negotiations have been implemented. Reductions of Warsaw Pact SNF systems should be carried out before that date.
- As regards the sub-strategic nuclear forces of the
members of the integrated military structure, their level
and characteristics must be such that they can perform
their deterrent role in a credible way across the required
spectrum of ranges, taking into account the threat--both
conventional and nuclear--with which the Alliance is
faced. The question concerning the introduction and
deployment of a follow-on system for the Lance will be
dealt with in 1992 in the light of overall security
developments. While a decision for national authorities,
the Allies concerned recognize the value of the continued
funding by the United States of research and development
of a follow-on for the existing Lance short-range missile,
in order to preserve their options in this respect.
Conventional Forces
- As set out in the March 1988 Summit statement and in the Alliance's November 1988 data initiative, the Soviet Union's military presence in Europe, at a level far in excess of its needs for self-defense, directly challenges our security as well as our aspirations for a peaceful order in Europe. Such excessive force levels create the risk of political intimidation or threatened aggression. As long as they exist, they present an obstacle to better political relations between all states of Europe. The challenge to security is, moreover, not only a matter of the numerical superiority of WTO forces. WTO tanks, artillery and armored troop carriers are concentrated in large formations and deployed in such a way as to give the WTO a capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action. Despite the recent welcome publication by the WTO of its assessment of the military balance in Europe, there is still considerable secrecy and uncertainty about its actual capabilities and intentions.
- In addressing these concerns, the Allies' primary objectives are to establish a secure and stable balance of conventional forces in Europe at lower levels, while at the same time creating greater openness about military organization and activities in Europe.
- In the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks
between the 23 members of the two alliances, the Western
Allies are proposing :
- reductions to an overall limit on the total holdings
of armaments in Europe, concentrating on the most
threatening systems, i.e. those capable of seizing and
holding territory;
- a limit on the proportion of these total holdings
belonging to any one country in Europe (since the security
and stability of Europe require that no state exceed its
legitimate needs for self-defense);
- a limit on stationed forces (thus restricting the
forward deployment and concentration of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe); and,
- appropriate numerical sub-limits on forces which will apply simultaneously throughout the Atlantic to the Urals
area.
These measures, taken together, will necessitate deep cuts in the WTO conventional forces which most threaten the Alliance. The resulting reductions will have to take place in such a way as to prevent circumvention, e.g. by ensuring that the armaments reduced are destroyed or otherwise disposed of. Verification measures will be required to ensure that all states have confidence that entitlements are not exceeded.
- These measures alone, however, will not guarantee
stability. The regime of reductions will have to be backed
up by additional measures which should include measures of
transparency, notification and constraint applied to the
deployment, storage, movement and levels of readiness and
availability of conventional forces.
- In the CSBM negotiations, the Allies aim to maintain the momentum created by the successful implementation of the Stockholm Document by proposing a comprehensive package of measures to improve :
- transparency about military organization,
- transparency and predictability of military activities,
- contacts and communication, and have also proposed an exchange of views on military doctrine in a seminar setting.
- The implementation of the Allies' proposals in the CFE
negotiations and of their proposals for further confidence
and security-building measures would achieve a quantum
improvement in European security. This would have
important and positive consequences for Alliance policy
both in the field of defense and arms control. The outcome
of the CFE negotiations would provide a framework for
determining the future Alliance force structure required
to perform its fundamental task of preserving peace in
freedom. In addition, the Allies would be willing to
contemplate further steps to enhance stability and
security if the immediate CFE objectives are achieved--for
example, further reductions or limitations of conventional
armaments and equipment, or the restructuring of armed
forces to enhance defensive capabilities and further
reduce offensive capabilities.
- The Allies welcome the declared readiness of the
Soviet Union and other WTO members to reduce their forces
and adjust them towards a defensive posture and await
implementation of these measures. This would be a step in
the direction of redressing the imbalance in force levels
existing in Europe and towards reducing the WTO capability
for surprise attack. The announced reductions demonstrate
the recognition by the Soviet Union and other WTO members
of the conventional imbalance, long highlighted by the
Allies as a key problem of European security.
Chemical Weapons
- The Soviet Union's chemical weapons stockpile poses a
massive threat. The Allies are committed to conclude, at
the earliest date, a worldwide, comprehensive and
effectively verifiable ban on all chemical weapons.
- All Alliance states subscribe to the prohibitions
contained in the Geneva Protocol for the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. The Paris Conference
on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons reaffirmed the
importance of the commitments made under the Geneva
Protocol and expressed the unanimous will of the
international community to eliminate chemical weapons
completely at an early date and thereby to prevent any
recourse to their use.
- The Allies wish to prohibit not only the use of these
abhorrent weapons, but also their development, production,
stockpiling and transfer, and to achieve the destruction
of existing chemical weapons and production facilities in
such a way as to ensure the undiminished security of all
participants at each stage in the process. Those
objectives are being pursued in the Geneva Conference on
Disarmament. Pending agreement on a global ban, the Allies
will enforce stringent controls on the export of
commodities related to chemical weapons production. They
will also attempt to stimulate more openness among states
about chemical weapons capabilities in order to promote
greater confidence in the effectiveness of a global ban.
V. Conclusions
Arms Control and Defense Interrelationships
- The Alliance is committed to pursuing a comprehensive
approach to security, embracing both arms control and
disarmament, and defense. It is important, therefore, to
ensure that interrelationships between arms control issues
and defense requirements and amongst the various arms
control areas are fully considered. Proposals in any one
area of arms control must take account of the implications
for Alliance interests in general and for other
negotiations. This is a continuing process.
- It is essential that defense and arms control
objectives remain in harmony in order to ensure their
complementary contribution to the goal of maintaining
security at the lowest balanced level of forces consistent
with the requirements of the Alliance strategy of war
prevention, acknowledging that changes in the threat, new
technologies, and new political opportunities affect
options in both fields. Decisions on arms control matters
must fully reflect the requirements of the Allies'
strategy of deterrence. Equally, progress in arms control
is relevant to military plans, which will have to be
developed in the full knowledge of the objectives pursued
in arms control negotiations and to reflect, as necessary,
the results achieved therein.
- In each area of arms control, the Alliance seeks to
enhance stability and security. The current negotiations
concerning strategic nuclear systems, conventional forces
and chemical weapons are, however, independent of one
another: the outcome of any one of these negotiations is
not contingent on progress in others. However, they can
influence one another: criteria established and agreements
achieved in one area of arms control may be relevant in
other areas and hence facilitate overall progress. These
could affect both arms control possibilities and the
forces needed to fulfill Alliance strategy, as well as
help to contribute generally to a more predictable
military environment.
- The Allies seek to manage the interaction among
different arms control elements by ensuring that the
development, pursuit and realization of their arms control
objectives in individual areas are fully consistent both
with each other and with the Alliance's guiding principles
for effective arms control. For example, the way in which
START limits and sub-limits are applied in detail could
affect the future flexibility of the sub-strategic nuclear
forces of members of the integrated military structure. A
CFE agreement would by itself make a major contribution to
stability. This would be significantly further enhanced by
the achievement of a global chemical weapons ban. The
development of confidence and security-building measures
could influence the stabilizing measures being considered
in connection with the Conventional Forces in Europe
negotiations and vice versa. The removal of the imbalance
in conventional forces would provide scope for further
reductions in the sub-strategic nuclear forces of members
of the integrated military structure, though it would not
obviate the need for such forces. Similarly, this might
make possible further arms control steps in the
conventional field
- This report establishes the overall conceptual
framework within which the Allies will be seeking progress
in each area of arms control. In so doing, their
fundamental aim will be enhanced security at lower levels
of forces and armaments. Taken as a whole, the Allies'
arms control agenda constitutes a coherent and
comprehensive approach to the enhancement of security and
stability. It is ambitious, but we are confident
that--with a constructive response from the WTO states--it
can be fully achieved in the coming years. In pursuing
this goal, the Alliance recognizes that it cannot afford
to build its security upon arms control results expected
in the future. The Allies will be prepared, however, to
draw appropriate consequences for their own military
posture as they make concrete progress through arms
control towards a significant reduction in the scale and
quality of the military threat they face. Accomplishment
of the Allies' arms control agenda would not only bring great benefits in itself, but could also lead to the
expansion of cooperation with the East in other areas. The
arms control process itself is, moreover, dynamic; as and
when the Alliance reaches agreement in each of the areas
set out above, so further prospects for arms control may
be opened up and further progress made possible.
- As noted earlier, the Allies' vision for Europe is
that of an undivided continent where military forces only
exist to prevent war and to ensure self-defense; a
continent which no longer lives in the shadow of
overwhelming military forces and from which the threat of
war has been removed; a continent where the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of all states are respected and
the rights of all individuals, including their right of
political choice, are protected. This goal can only be
reached by stages: it will require patient and creative
endeavor. The Allies are resolved to continue working
towards its attainment. The achievement of the Alliance's
arms control objectives would be a major contribution
towards the realization of its vision.
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