Part III
Key Policy
Documents
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Declaration
on Peace and Cooperation issued by the Heads of State and Government participating
in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (including decisions leading
to the creation of the
North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC))
(``The Rome Declaration'')
Rome, 8 November 1991
1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the
North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Rome to open a new chapter in
the history of our Alliance. The far- reaching decisions we have taken
here mark an important stage in the transformation of NATO that we launched
in London last year.
2. The world has changed dramatically. The Alliance has made an essential
contribution. The peoples of North America and the whole of Europe can
now join in a community of shared values based on freedom, democracy,
human rights and the rule of law. As an agent of change, a source of stability
and the indispensable guarantor of its members' security, our Alliance
will continue to play a key role in building a new, lasting order of peace
in Europe: a Europe of cooperation and prosperity.
A new security
architecture
3. The challenges we will face in this new Europe cannot be comprehensively
addressed by one institution alone, but only in a framework of interlocking
institutions tying together the countries of Europe and North America.
Consequently, we are working toward a new European security architecture
in which NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, the WEU and the Council
of Europe complement each other. Regional frame- works of cooperation
will also be important. This interaction will be of the greatest significance
in preventing instability and divisions that could result from various
causes, such as economic disparities and violent nationalism.
The future
role of the Alliance: our new Strategic Concept
4. Yesterday, we published our new Strategic Concept. Our security has
substantially improved: we no longer face the old threat of a massive
attack. However, prudence requires us to maintain an overall strategic
balance and to remain ready to meet any potential risks to our security
which may arise from instability or tension. In an environment of uncertainty
and unpredictable challenges, our Alliance, which provides the essential
transatlantic link as demonstrated by the significant presence of North
American forces in Europe, retains its enduring value. Our new strategic
concept reaffirms NATO's core functions and allows us, within the radically
changed situation in Europe, to realise in full our broad approach to
stability and security encompassing political, economic, social and environmental
aspects, along with the indispensable defence dimension. Never has the
opportunity to achieve our Alliance's objectives by political means, in
keeping with Articles 2 and 4 of the Washington Treaty, been greater.
Consequently, our security policy can now be based on three mutually reinforcing
elements: dialogue; cooperation; and the maintenance of a collective defence
capability. The use, as appropriate, of these elements will be particularly
important to prevent or manage crises affecting our security.
5. The military dimension of our Alliance remains an essential factor;
but what is new is that, more than ever, it will serve a broad concept
of security. The Alliance will maintain its purely defensive purpose,
its collective arrangements based on an integrated military structure
as well as cooperation and coordination agreements, and for the foreseeable
future an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear forces. Our military
forces will adjust to their new tasks, becoming smaller and more flexible.
Thus, our conventional forces will be substantially reduced as will, in
many cases, their readiness. They will also be given increased mobility
to enable them to react to a wide range of contingencies, and will be
organised for flexible build-up, when necessary, for crisis management
as well as defence. Multinational formations will play a greater role
within the integrated military structure. Nuclear forces committed to
NATO will be greatly reduced: the current NATO stockpile of sub-strategic
weapons in Europe will be cut by roughly 80% in accordance with the decisions
taken by the Nuclear Planning Group in Taormina. The fundamental purpose
of the nuclear forces of the Allies remains political: to preserve peace,
and prevent war or any kind of coercion.
European security
identity and defence role
6. We reaffirm the consensus expressed by our Ministers of Foreign Affairs
in Copenhagen. The development of a European security identity and defence
role, reflected in the further strengthening of the European pillar within
the Alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic
Alliance. The enhancement of the role and responsibility of the European
members is an important basis for the transformation of the Alliance.
These two positive processes are mutually reinforcing. We are agreed,
in parallel with the emergence and development of a European security
identity and defence role, to enhance the essential transatlantic link
that the Alliance guarantees and fully to maintain the strategic unity
and indivisibility of security of all our members. The Alliance is the
essential forum for consulta- tion among its members and the venue for
agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments
of Allies under the Washington Treaty. Recognising that it is for the
European Allies concerned to decide what arrangements are needed for the
expression of a common European foreign and security policy and defence
role, we further agree that, as the two processes advance, we will develop
practical arrangements to ensure the necessary transparency and complementarity
between the European security and defence identity as it emerges in the
Twelve and the WEU, and the Alliance.
7. We welcome the spirit in which those Allies who are also members
of the Twelve and the WEU have kept the other members of the Alliance
informed about the progress of their ongoing discussions on the development
of the European identity and about other issues, such as their peace efforts
in Yugoslavia. Appropriate links and consultation procedures between the
Twelve and the WEU, and the Alliance will be developed in order to ensure
that the Allies that are not currently participating in the development
of a European identity in foreign and security policy and defence should
be adequately involved in decisions that may affect their security. The
Alliance's new Strategic Concept, being an agreed conceptual basis for
the forces of all Allies, should facilitate the necessary complementarity
between the Alliance and the emerging defence component of the European
integration process. As the transformation of the Alliance proceeds, we
intend to preserve the operational coherence we now have and on which
our defence depends. We welcome the perspective of a reinforcement of
the role of the WEU, both as the defence component of the process of European
unification and as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the
Alliance, bearing in mind the different nature of its relations with the
Alliance and with the European Political Union.
8. We note the gradual convergence of views in the discussions concerning
the developing European security identity and defence role compatible
with the common defence policy we already have in our Alliance. We feel
confident that in line with the consensus in Copenhagen, the result will
contribute to a strong new transatlantic partnership by strengthening
the European component in a transformed Alliance. We will help move this
development forward.
Relations
with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe:
A qualitative step forward
9. We have consistently encouraged the development of democracy in the
Soviet Union and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We
therefore applaud the commitment of these countries to political and economic
reform following the rejection of totalitarian communist rule by their
peoples. We salute the newly recovered independence of the Baltic States.
We will support all steps in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
towards reform and will give practical assistance to help them succeed
in this difficult transition. This is based on our conviction that our
own security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe.
10. The Alliance can aid in fostering a sense of security and confidence
in these countries, thereby strengthening their ability to fulfil their
CSCE commitments and make democratic change irrevocable. Wishing to enhance
its contribution to the emergence of a Europe whole and free, our Alliance
at its London Summit extended to the Central and Eastern European countries
the hand of friendship and established regular diplomatic liaison. Together
we signed the Paris Joint Declaration. In Copenhagen last June, the Alliance
took further initiatives to develop partnership with these countries.
Our extensive programme of high level visits, exchanges of views on security
and other related issues, intensified military contacts, and exchanges
of expertise in various fields has demonstrated its value and contributed
greatly to building a new relationship between NATO and these countries.
This is a dynamic process: the growth of democratic institutions throughout
Central and Eastern Europe and encouraging cooperative experiences, as
well as the desire of these countries for closer ties, now call for our
relations to be broadened, intensified and raised to a qualitatively new
level.
11. Therefore, as the next step, we intend to develop a more institutional
relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security
issues. We invite, at this stage of the process, the Foreign Ministers
of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the
Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Latvia,
the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Romania,
and the Soviet Union to join our Foreign Ministers in December 1991 in
Brussels to issue a joint political declaration to launch this new era
of partnership and to define further the modalities and content of this
process. In particular, we propose the following activities:
- annual meetings with the North Atlantic Council at Ministerial level
in what might be called a North Atlantic Cooperation Council;
- periodic meetings with the North Atlantic Council at Ambassadorial
level;
- additional meetings with the North Atlantic Council at Ministerial
or Ambassadorial level as circumstances warrant;
- regular meetings, at intervals to be mutually agreed, with:
- NATO subordinate committees, including the Poli- tical and Economic
Committees;
- the Military Committee and under its direction other NATO Military
Authorities.
This process will contribute to the achievement of the objectives of
the CSCE without prejudice to its competence and mechanisms. It will be
carried out in accordance with the core functions of the Alliance.
12. Our consultations and cooperation will focus on security and related
issues where Allies can offer their experience and expertise, such as
defence planning, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations,
civil-military coordination of air traffic management, and the conversion
of defence production to civilian purposes. Our new initiative will enhance
participation of our partners in the ``Third Dimension'' of scientific
and environmental programmes of our Alliance. It will also allow the widest
possible dissemination of information about NATO in the Central and Eastern
European countries, inter alia through diplomatic liaison channels and
our embassies. We will provide the appropriate resources to support our
liaison activities.
The conference
on security and cooperation in Europe
13. We remain deeply committed to strengthening the CSCE process, which
has a vital role to play in promoting stability and democracy in Europe
in a period of historic change. We will intensify our efforts to enhance
the CSCE's role, in the first instance by working with the other participating
CSCE states to ensure that the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting in 1992 will
be another major step towards building a new Europe. The CSCE has the
outstanding advantage of being the only forum that brings together all
countries of Europe and Canada and the United States under a common code
of human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy, rule of law, security,
and economic liberty. The new CSCE institutions and structures, which
we proposed at our London Summit and which were created at the Paris Summit,
must be consolidated and further developed so as to provide CSCE with
the means to help ensure full implementation of the Helsinki Final Act,
the Charter of Paris, and other relevant CSCE documents and thus permit
the CSCE to meet the new challenges which Europe will have to face. Our
consultations within the Alliance continue to be a source of initiatives
for strengthening the CSCE.
14. Consequently, we will actively support the development of the CSCE
to enhance its capacity as the organ for consultation and cooperation
among all participating States, capable of effective action in line with
its new and increased responsibil- ities, in particular on the questions
of human rights and security including arms control and disarmament, and
for effective crisis management and peaceful settlement of disputes, consistent
with international law and CSCE principles. To this end, we suggest:
- that the CSCE Council, the central forum for political consultations,
continue to take decisions on questions relating to the CSCE and the
functions and structures of the CSCE institutions;
- that the Committee of Senior Officials serve as the coordination
and management body between Council sessions and that it acquire a greater
operational capacity and meet more frequently, with a view to ensuring
the implementation of decisions;
- that the CSCE's conflict prevention and crisis manage- ment capabilities
be improved: as one contribution, in addition to the functions entrusted
to it by the Paris Charter, the means available to the Conflict Prevention
Centre should be strengthened and made more flexible to enable it to
fulfil the specific tasks assigned to it by the CSCE Council and the
Committee of Senior Officials;
- that specific tasks based on a precise mandate by the CSCE Council
or the Committee of Senior Officials might be entrusted to ad hoc groups;
- that the decisions taken at the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting ensure
complementarity among CSCE activities in the security field including,
inter alia, conflict prevention, arms control and consultations on security;
- that consideration should be given within the CSCE to develop further
the CSCE's capability to safeguard, through peaceful means, human rights,
democracy and the rule of law in cases of clear, gross and uncorrected
violations of relevant CSCE commitments, if necessary in the absence
of the consent of the state concerned;
- that the Office for Free Elections be transformed into a broadly
focused Office of Democratic Institutions to promote cooperation in
the fields of human rights, democracy and the rule of law;
- that the monitoring and promotion of progress on human dimension
issues be continued in the form of periodic meetings of short duration
on clearly defined issues;
- that further political impetus be given to economic, scientific and
environmental cooperation so as to promote the basis of prosperity for
stable, democratic development.
Arms Control
15. We strongly support President Bush's initiative of 27 September 1991
which has opened new prospects for nuclear arms reduction. We also welcome
President Gorbachev's response. We particularly applaud the decision of
both sides to eliminate their nuclear warheads for ground-launched short-
range weapons systems. The Allies concerned, through their consultations,
have played a central role in President Bush's decision which fulfilled
the SNF arms control objectives of the London Declaration. They will continue
close consultations on the process of the elimination of ground-based
SNF warheads until its completion. We will continue to work for security
at minimum levels of nuclear arms sufficient to preserve peace and stability.
We look forward to the early ratification of the recently signed START
agreement.
16. We note with satisfaction the recent achievements in the fields of
conventional arms control and disarmament. We reiterate the paramount
importance we attach to the CFE Treaty and call upon all CFE signatories
to move forward promptly with its ratification and implementation. We
urge our negotiating partners to work with us to reach substantial agreements
in the CFE IA and CSBM negotiations, and remain dedicated to achieving
concrete results by the time of the CSCE Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting. We
welcome the resumption of the Open Skies negotiations; we look forward
to agreement on an Open Skies regime by the time of the Helsinki Meeting
as an important new element in greater openness and confidence- building
in the military field.
17. The Helsinki Meeting will mark a turning point in the arms control
and disarmament process in Europe, now with the participation of all CSCE
states. This will offer a unique opportunity to move this process energetically
forward. Our goal will be to shape a new cooperative order, in which no
country needs to harbour fears for its security, by:
- strengthening security and stability at lower levels of armed forces
to the extent possible and commensurate with individual legitimate security
needs both inside and outside of Europe;
- conducting an intensified security dialogue within a permanent framework
and fostering a new quality of transparency and cooperation about armed
forces and defence policies; and
- promoting effective mechanisms and instruments for conflict prevention.
18. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their means
of delivery undermines international security. Transfers of conventional
armaments beyond legitimate defen- sive needs to regions of tension make
the peaceful settlement of disputes less likely. We support the establishment
by the United Nations of a universal non-discriminatory register of conven-
tional arms transfers. We support steps undertaken to address other aspects
of proliferation and other initiatives designed to build confidence and
underpin international security. We also deem it essential to complete
a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons
next year. We welcome the positive results of the Third Review Conference
of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, in particular the decision
to explore the feasibility of verification.
Broader Challenges
19. Our Strategic Concept underlines that Alliance security must take
account of the global context. It points out risks of a wider nature,
including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of
the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage, which
can affect Alliance security interests. We reaffirm the importance of
arrangements existing in the Alliance for consultation among the Allies
under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, coordination
of our efforts including our responses to such risks. We will continue
to address broader challenges in our consultations and in the appropriate
multilateral forums in the widest possible cooperation with other states.
20. The North Atlantic Alliance was founded with two purposes: the defence
of the territory of its members, and the safeguarding and promotion of
the values they share. In a still uncertain world, the need for defence
remains. But in a world where the values which we uphold are shared ever
more widely, we gladly seize the opportunity to adapt our defences accord-
ingly; to cooperate and consult with our new partners; to help consolidate
a now undivided continent of Europe; and to make our Alliance's contribution
to a new age of confidence, stability and peace.
21. We express our deep appreciation for the gracious hospital- ity extended
to us by the Government of the Italian Republic.
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