Text
of the Report of the Committee of Three on
Non-Military Cooperation in NATO
Brussels, 13 December 1956
CHAPTER
I
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1. The Committee on Non-Military Cooperation, set up by the North Atlantic
Council at its session of May 1956, was requested: "to advise the
Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO cooperation in non-military
fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community''.
2. The Committee has interpreted these terms of reference as requiring
it: to examine and re-define the objectives and needs of the Alliance,
especially in the light of current international develop ments; and to
make recommendations for strengthening its internal solidarity, cohesion
and unity.
3. The Committee hopes that the report and recommendations which it
now submits will make NATO's purely defensive and constructive purposes
better understood in non-NATO countries, thereby facilitating and encouraging
steps to lessen international tension. The events of the last few months
have increased this tension and reduced hopes, which had been raised since
Stalin's death, of finding a secure and honorable basis for competitive
and ultimately for cooperative co-existence with the Communist world.
The effort to this end, however, must go on.
4. Inter-Allied relations have also undergone severe strains. The substance
of this report was prepared by the Committee of Three in the course of
its meetings and inter-governmental consultations last September. Subsequent
events have reinforced the Committee's conviction that the Atlantic Community
can develop greater unity only by working constantly to achieve common
policies by full and timely consultation on issues of common concern.
Unless this is done, the very framework of cooperation in NATO, which
has contributed so greatly to the cause of freedom, and which is so vital
to its advancement in the future(1) , will be endangered.
5. The foundation of NATO, on which alone a strong superstructure can
be built, is the political obligation that its members have taken for
collective defence: to consider that an attack on one is an attack on
all which will be met by the collective action of all. There is a tendency
at times to overlook the far-reaching importance of this commitment, especially
during those periods when the danger of having to invoke it may seem to
recede.
6. With this political commitment for collective defence as the cornerstone
of the foreign and defence policies of its members, NATO has a solid basis
for existence. It is true, of course, that the ways and means by which
the obligation is to be discharged may alter as political or strategic
conditions alter, as the threat to peace changes its character or its
direction. However, any variations in plans and strategic policies which
may be required need not weaken NATO or the confidence of its members
in NATO and in each other; providing, and the proviso is decisive, that
each member retains its will and its capacity to play its full part in
discharging the political commitment for collective action against aggression
which it undertook when it signed the Pact; providing also - and recent
events have shown that this is equally important - that any changes in
national strategy or policy which affect the coalition are made only after
collective consideration.
7. The first essential, then, of a healthy and developing NATO lies
in the whole-hearted acceptance by all its members of the political commitment
for collective defence, and in the confidence which each has in the will
and ability of the others to honour that commitment if aggression should
take place.
8. This is our best present deterrent against military aggression, and
consequently the best assurance that the commitment undertaken will not
be engaged.
9. However, this deterrent role of NATO, based on solidarity and strength,
can be discharged only if the political and economic relations between
its members are cooperative and close. An Alliance in which the members
ignore each other's interests or engage in political or economic conflict,
or harbour suspicions of each other, cannot be effective either for deterrence
or defence. Recent experience makes this clearer than ever before.
10. It is useful, in searching for ways and means of strengthening NATO
unity and understanding, to recall the origin and the aims of the Organisation.
11. The Treaty which was signed in Washington in 1949 was a collective
response - we had learned that a purely national response was insufficient
for security - to the fear of military aggression by the forces of the
USSR and its allies. These forces were of overwhelming strength. The threat
to Greece, the capture of Czechoslovakia, the blockade of Berlin, and
the pressure against Yugoslavia showed that they were also aggressive.
12. While fear may have been the main urge for the creation of NATO,
there was also the realisation conscious or instinctive that in a shrinking
nuclear world it was wise and timely to bring about a closer association
of kindred Atlantic and Western European nations for other than defence
purposes alone; that a partial pooling of sovereignty for mutual protection
should also promote progress and cooperation generally. There was a feeling
among the government and peoples concerned that this close unity was both
natural and desirable; that the common cultural traditions, free institutions
and democratic concepts which were being challenged, and were marked for
destruction by those who challenged them, were things which should also
bring the NATO nations closer together, not only for their defence but
for their development. There was, in short, a sense of Atlantic Community,
alongside the realisation of an immediate common danger.
13. Any such feeling was certainly not the decisive, or even the main
impulse in the creation of NATO. Nevertheless, it gave birth to the hope
that NATO would grow beyond and above the emergency which brought it into
being.
14. The expression of this hope is found in the Preamble and in Articles
2 and 4 of the Treaty. These two Articles, limited in their terms but
with at least the promise of the grand design of an Atlantic Community,
were included because of this insistent feeling that NATO must become
more than a military alliance.
They reflected the very real anxiety that if NATO failed to meet this
test, it would disappear with the immediate crisis which produced it,
even though the need for it might be as great as ever.
15. From the very beginning of NATO, then, it was recognised that while
defence cooperation was the first and most urgent requirement, this was
not enough. It has also become increasingly realised since the Treaty
was signed that security is today far more than a military matter. The
strengthening of political consultation and economic cooperation, the
development of resources, progress in education and public understanding,
all these can be as important, or even more important, for the protection
of the security of a nation, or an alliance, as the building of a battleship
or the equipping of an army.
16. These two aspects of security - civil and military - can no longer
safely be considered in watertight compartments, either within or between
nations. Perhaps NATO has not yet fully recognised their essential interrelationship,
or done enough to bring about that close and continuous contact between
its civil and military sides which is essential if it is to be strong
and enduring.
17. North Atlantic political and economic cooperation, however, let
alone unity, will not be brought about in a day or by a declaration, but
by creating over the years and through a whole series of national acts
and policies, the habits and traditions and precedents for such cooperation
and unity. The process will be a slow and gradual one at best; slower
than we might wish. We can be satisfied if it is steady and sure. This
will not be the case, however, unless the member governments - especially
the more powerful ones - are willing to work, to a much greater extent
than hitherto, with and through NATO for more than purposes of collective
military defence.
18. While the members of NATO have already developed various forms of
non-military cooperation between themselves and have been among the most
active and constructive participants in various international organisations,
NATO as such has been hesitant in entering this field, particularly in
regard to economic matters. Its members have been rightly concerned to
avoid duplication and to do, through other existing international organisations,
the things which can best be done in that way.
19. Recently, however, the members of NATO have been examining and re-examining
the purposes and the needs of the Organisation in the light of certain
changes in Soviet tactics and policies which have taken place since the
death of Stalin, and of the effect of the present turmoil in Eastern Europe
on this development.
20. These changes have not diminished the need for collective military
defence but they have faced NATO with an additional challenge in which
the emphasis is largely non-military in character. NATO must recognise
the real nature of the developments which have taken place. An important
aspect of the new Soviet policies of competitive co-existence is an attempt
to respond to positive initiatives of the Western nations aimed at improving,
in an atmosphere of freedom, the lot of the economically less-developed
countries, and at establishing a just and mutually beneficial trading
system in which all countries can prosper. The Soviet Union is now apparently
veering towards policies designed to ensnare these countries by economic
means and by political subversion, and to fasten on them the same shackles
of Communism from which certain members of the Soviet bloc are now striving
to release themselves. The members of NATO must maintain their vigilance
in dealing with this form of penetration.
21. Meanwhile some of the immediate fears of large-scale all-out military
aggression against Western Europe have lessened. This process has been
facilitated by evidence that the Soviet Government has realised that any
such all-out aggression would be met by a sure, swift and devastating
retaliation, and that there could be no victory in a war of this kind
with nuclear weapons on both sides. With an increased Soviet emphasis
on non-military or paramilitary methods, a review is needed of NATO's
ability to meet effectively the challenge of penetration under the guise
of coexistence, with its emphasis on conflict without catastrophe.
22. Certain questions now take on a new urgency. Have NATO's needs and
objectives changed, or should they be changed? Is the Organisation operating
satisfactorily in the altered circumstances of 1956? If not what can be
done about it ? There is the even more far-reaching question: "Can
a loose association of sovereign states hold together at all without the
common binding force of fear?''
23. The Committee has been examining these questions in the light of
its firm conviction that the objectives which governments had in mind
when the Pact was signed remain valid; that NATO is as important now to
its member states as it was at that time.
24. The first of these objectives - as has already been pointed out
- is security, based on collective action with adequate armed forces both
for deterrence and defence.
25. Certainly NATO unity and strength in the pursuit of this objective
remain as essential as they were in 1949. Soviet tactics may have changed;
but Soviet armed might and ultimate objectives remain unchanged. Moreover,
recent events in Eastern Europe show that the Soviet Union will not hesitate
in certain circumstances to use force and the threat of force.
Therefore the military strength of NATO must not be reduced, though its
character and capabilities should be constantly adapted to changing circumstances.
Strengthening the political and economic side of NATO is an essential
complement to - not a substitute for - continuous cooperation in defence.
26. In spite of these recent events Soviet leaders may place greater
emphasis on political, economic and propaganda action.
There is no evidence, however, that this will be permitted to prejudice
in any way the maintenance of a high level of military power in its most
modern form as a base for Soviet activity in these other fields.
27. We should welcome changes in Soviet policies if they were genuinely
designed to ease international tensions. But we must remember that the
weakening and eventual dissolution of NATO remains a major Communist goal.
We must therefore remain on guard so long as Soviet leaders persist in
their determination to maintain a preponderance of military power for
the achievement of their own political objectives and those of their allies.
28. This brings us again to the second and long-term aim of NATO: the
development of an Atlantic Community whose roots are deeper even than
the necessity for common defence. This implies nothing less than the permanent
association of the free Atlantic peoples for the promotion of their greater
unity and the protection and the advancement of the interests which, as
free democracies, they have in common.
29. If we are to secure this long-term aim, we must prevent the centrifugal
forces of opposition or indifference from weakening the Alliance. NATO
has not been destroyed, or even weakened, by the threats or attacks of
its enemies. It has faltered at times through the lethargy or complacency
of its members: through dissension or division between them; by putting
narrow national considerations above the collective interest. It could
be destroyed by these forces, if they were allowed to subsist. To combat
these tendencies, NATO must be used by its members, far more than it has
been used, for sincere and genuine consultation and cooperation on questions
of common concern. For this purpose, resolution is more important than
resolutions; will than words.
30. The problem, however, goes deeper than this. NATO countries are
faced by a political as well as a military threat. It comes from the revolutionary
doctrines of Communism which have by careful design of the Communist leaders
over many years been sowing seeds of falsehood concerning our free and
democratic way of life. The best answers to such falsehoods is a continuing
demonstration of the superiority of our own institutions over Communist
ones. We can show by word and deed that we welcome political progress,
economic advancement and orderly social change and that the real reactionaries
of this day are these Communist regimes which, adhering to an inflexible
pattern of economic and political doctrine, have been more successful
in destroying freedom than in promoting it.
31. We must, however, realise that falsehoods concerning our institutions
have sometimes been accepted at face value and that there are those, even
in the non-Communist world, who under the systematic influence of Communist
propaganda do not accept our own analysis of NATO's aims and values. They
believe that while NATO may have served a useful defensive deterrent role
in the Stalinist era, it is no longer necessary even for the security
of its members; that it is tending now to become an agency for the pooling
of the strength and resources of the "colonial'' powers in defence
of imperial privileges, racial superiority, and Atlantic hegemony under
the leadership of the United States. The fact that we know these views
to be false and unjustified does not mean that NATO and its governments
should not do everything they can to correct and counteract them.
32. NATO should not forget that the influence and interests of its members
are not confined to the area covered by the Treaty, and that common interests
of the Atlantic Community can be seriously affected by developments outside
the Treaty area.
Therefore, while striving to improve their relations with each other,
and to strengthen and deepen their own unity, they should also be concerned
with harmonising their policies in relation to other areas, taking into
account the broader interests of the whole international community; particularly
in working through the United Nations and elsewhere for the maintenance
of international peace and security and for the solution of the problems
that now divide the world.
33. In following this course, NATO can show that it is more than a defence
organisation acting and reacting to the ebb and flow of the fears and
dangers arising out of Soviet policy. It can prove its desire to cooperate
fully with other members of the international community in bringing to
reality the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It can show
that it is not merely concerned with preventing the cold war from deteriorating
into a shooting one; or with defending itself if tragedy should take place,
but that it is even more concerned with seizing the political and moral
initiative to enable all countries to develop in freedom, and to bring
about a secure peace for all nations.
34. Our caution in accepting without question the pacific character
of any Soviet moves, our refusal to dismantle our defences before we are
convinced that conditions of international confidence have been restored,
will, particularly after the events in Hungary, be understood by all people
of sincerity and goodwill. What would not be understood is any unwillingness
on our part to seek ways and means of breaking down the barriers with
a view to establishing such confidence.
35. The coming together of the Atlantic nations for good and constructive
purposes - which is the basic principle and ideal underlying the NATO
concept - must rest on and grow from deeper and more permanent factors
than the divisions and dangers of the last ten years. It is a historical,
rather than a contemporary, development, and if it is to achieve its real
purpose, it must be considered in that light and the necessary conclusions
drawn. A short-range view will not suffice.
36. The fundamental historical tact underlying development is that the
nation state, by itself and relying exclusively on national policy and
national power, is inadequate for progress or even for survival in the
nuclear age. As the founders of the North Atlantic Treaty foresaw, the
growing interdependence of states, politically and economically as well
as militarily, calls for an everincreasing measure of international cohesion
and cooperation. Some states may be able to enjoy a degree of political
and economic independence when things are going well. No state, however
powerful, can guarantee its security and its welfare by national action
alone.
37. This basic fact underlies our report and the recommendations contained
therein which appear in the subsequent chapters.
38. It has not been difficult to make these recommendations. It will
be far more difficult for the member governments to carry them into effect.
This will require, on their part, the firm conviction that the transformation
of the Atlantic Community into a vital and vigorous political reality
is as important as any purely national purpose. It will require, above
all, the will to carry this conviction into the realm of practical governmental
policy.
CHAPTER
II
POLITICAL COOPERATION
I. Introduction
39. If there is to be vitality and growth in the concept of the Atlantic
Community, the relations between the members of NATO must rest on a solid
basis of confidence and understanding. Without this there cannot be constructive
or solid political cooperation.
40. The deepening and strengthening of this political cooperation does
not imply the weakening of the ties of NATO members with other friendly
countries or with other international associations, particularly the United
Nations. Adherence to NATO is not exclusive or restrictive. Nor should
the evolution of the Atlantic Community through NATO prevent the formation
of even closer relationships among some of its members, for instance within
groups of European countries. The moves toward Atlantic cooperation and
European unity should be parallel and complementary, not competitive or
conflicting.
41. Effective and constructive international cooperation requires a resolve
to work together for the solution of common problems. There are special
ties between NATO members, special incentives and security interests,
which should make this task easier than it otherwise would be. But its
successful accomplishment will depend largely on the extent to which member
governments, in their own policies and actions, take into consideration
the interests of the Alliance. This requires not only the acceptance of
the obligation of consultation and cooperation whenever necessary, but
also the development of practices by which the discharge of this obligation
becomes a normal part of governmental activity.
42. It is easy to profess devotion to the principle of political - or
economic - consultation in NATO. It is difficult and has in fact been
shown to be impossible, if the proper conviction is lacking, to convert
the profession into practice. Consultation within an alliance means more
than exchange of information, though that is necessary. It means more
than letting the NATO Council know about national decisions that have
already been taken; or trying to enlist support for those decisions. It
means the discussion of problems collectively, in the early stages of
policy formation, and before national positions become fixed. At best,
this will result in collective decisions on matters of common interest
affecting the Alliance. At the least, it will ensure that no action is
taken by one member without a knowledge of the views of the others.
II. Consultation on Foreign Policies
A. SCOPE AND CHARACTER OF POLITICAL CONSULTATION
43. The essential role of consultation in fostering political cooperation
was clearly defined by an earlier NATO Committee on the North Atlantic
Community in 1951: "... The achievement of a closer degree of coordination
of the foreign policies of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty, through
the development of the `habit of consultation' on matters of common concern,
would greatly strengthen the solidarity of the North Atlantic Community
and increase the individual and collective capacity of its members to
serve the peaceful purposes for which NATO was established... In the political
field, this means that while each North Atlantic government retains full
freedom of action and decision with respect to its own policy, the aim
should be to achieve, through exchanging information and views, as wide
an area of agreement as possible in the formulation of policies as a whole.''
"Special attention must be paid, as explicitly recognised in Article
4 of the Treaty, to matters of urgent and immediate importance to the
members of NATO, and to 'emergency' situations where it may be necessary
to consult closely on national lines of conduct affecting the interests
of members of NATO as a whole. There is a continuing need, however, for
effective consultation at an early stage on current problems, in order
that national policies may be developed and action taken on the basis
of a full awareness of the attitudes and interests of all the members
of NATO. While all members of NATO have a responsibility to consult with
their partners on appropriate matters, a large share of responsibility
for such consultation necessarily rests on the more powerful members of
the Community.''
44. These words were written five years ago. They hold true now more
than ever before. If we can say that they have not been ignored by NATO
we must also recognise that the practice of consulting has not so developed
in the NATO Council as to meet the demands of political changes and world
trends. The present need, therefore, is more than simply broadening the
scope and deepening the character of consultation. There is a pressing
requirement for all members to make consultation in NATO an integral part
of the making of national policy. Without this the very existence of the
North Atlantic Community may be in jeopardy.
45. It should, however, be remembered that collective discussion is
not an end in itself, but a means to the end of harmonising policies.
Where common interests of the Atlantic Community are at stake consultation
should always seek to arrive at timely agreement on common lines of policy
and action.
46. Such agreement, even with the closest possible cooperation and consultation,
is not easy to secure. But it is essential to the Atlantic Alliance that
a steady and continuous effort be made to bring it about. There cannot
be unity in defence and disunity in foreign policy.
47. There are, of course, certain practical limitations to consultation
in this field. They are sufficiently obvious in fact to make it unnecessary
to emphasise them in words. Indeed the danger is less that they will be
minimised or evaded than that they will be exaggerated and used to justify
practices which unnecessarily ignore the common interest.
48. One of these limitations is the hard fact that ultimate responsibility
for decision and action still rests on national governments. It is conceivable
that a situation of extreme emergency may arise where action must be taken
by one
government before consultation is possible with the others.
49. Another limitation is the difficulty, and indeed the unwisdom, of
trying to specify in advance all the subjects and all the situations where
consultation is necessary; to separate by area or by subject the matters
of NATO concern from those of purely national concern; to define in detail
the obligations and duties of consultation. These things have to work
themselves out in practice. In this process, experience is a better guide
than dogma.
50. The essential thing is that on all occasions and in all circumstances
member governments, before acting or even before pronouncing, should keep
the interest and the requirements of the Alliance in mind. If they have
not the desire and the will to do this, no resolutions or recommendations
or declarations by the Council or any Committee of the Council will be
of any great value.
51. On the assumption, however, that this will and this desire do exist,
the following principles and practices in the field of political consultation
are recommended:
- members should inform the Council of any development which significantly
affects the Alliance. They should do this, not merely as formality but
as a preliminary to effective political consultation;
- both individual member governments and the Secretary General should
have the right to raise for discussion in the Council any subject which
is of common NATO interest and not of a purely domestic character;
- a member government should not, without adequate advance consultation,
adopt firm policies or make major political pronouncements on matters
which significantly affect the Alliance or any of its members, unless
circumstances make such prior consultation obviously and demonstrably
impossible;
- in developing their national policies, members should take into consideration
the interest and views of other governments, particularly those most
directly concerned, as expressed in NATO consultation, even where no
community of views or consensus has been reached in the Council;
- where a consensus has been reached, it should be reflected in the
formation of national policies. When for national reasons the consensus
is not followed, the government concerned should offer an explanation
to the Council. It is even more important that where an agreed and formal
recommendation has emerged from the Council's discussions, governments
should give it full weight in any national actions or policies related
to the subject of that recommendation.
B. ANNUAL POLITICAL APPRAISAL
52. To strengthen the process of consultation, it is recommended that
Foreign Ministers, at each Spring meeting, should make an appraisal of
the political progress of the Alliance and consider the lines along which
it should advance.
53. To prepare for this discussion, the Secretary General should submit
an annual report:
- analysing the major political problems of the Alliance;
- reviewing the extent to which member governments have consulted and
cooperated on such problems;
- indicating the problems and possible developments which may require
future consultation, so that difficulties might be resolved and positive
and constructive initiative taken.
54. Member governments, through their Permanent Representatives, should
give the Secretary General such information and assistance, including
that of technical experts, as he may require in preparing his report.
C. PREPARATION FOR POLITICAL CONSULTATION
55. Effective consultation also requires careful planning and preparation
of the agenda for meetings of the Council both in Ministerial and permanent
session. Political questions coming up for discussion in the Council should
so far as practicable be previously reviewed and discussed; so that representatives
may have background information on the thinking both of their own and
of other governments. When appropriate, drafts of resolutions should be
prepared in advance as a basis for discussion. Additional preparatory
work will also be required for the annual political appraisal referred
to in the preceding section.
56. To assist the Permanent Representatives and the Secretary General
in discharging their responsibilities for political consultation, there
should be constituted under the Council a Committee of Political Advisers
from each delegation, aided when necessary by specialists from the capitals.
It would meet under the chairmanship of a member of the International
Staff appointed by the Secretary General, and would include among its
responsibilities current studies such as those on trends of Soviet policy.
III. Peaceful Settlement of Inter-member Disputes
57. In the development of effective political cooperation in NATO, it
is of crucial importance to avoid serious inter-member disputes and to
settle them quickly and satisfactorily when they occur. The settlement
of such disputes is in the first place the direct responsibility of the
member governments concerned, under both the Charter of the United Nations
(Article XXXIII) and the North Atlantic Treaty (Article 1). To clarify
NATO's responsibilities in dealing with disputes which have not proved
capable of settlement directly and to enable NATO, if necessary, to help
in the settlement of such disputes, the Committee recommends that the
Council adopt a resolution under Article I of the Treaty on the following
lines:
- re-affirming the obligation of members to settle by peaceful means
any disputes between themselves;
- declaring their intention to submit any such disputes, which have
not proved capable of settlement directly, to good offices procedures
within the NATO framework before resorting to any other international
agency; except
for disputes of a legal character for submission to a judicial tribunal,
and those disputes of an economic character for which attempts at settlement
might best be made initially in the appropriate specialised economic
organisation;
- recognising the right and duty of member government and of the Secretary
General to bring to the attention of the Council matters which in their
opinion may threaten the solidarity or effectiveness of the Alliance;
- empowering the Secretary General to offer his good offices informally
at any time to the parties in dispute, and with their consent to initiate
or facilitate procedures of inquiry, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration,
and e. empowering the Secretary General, where he deems it appropriate
for the purpose outlined in d. above, to use the assistance of not more
than three Permanent Representatives chosen by him in each instance.
IV. Parliamentary Associations and the Parliamentary Conference
58. Among the best supporters of NATO and its purposes are those Members
of Parliament who have had a chance at first hand to see some of its activities
and to learn of its problems, and to exchange views with their colleagues
from other parliaments.
In particular, the formation of national Parliamentary Associations and
the activities of the Conference of Members of Parliament from NATO countries
have contributed to the development of public support for NATO and solidarity
among its members.
59. In order to maintain a close relationship of Parliamentarians with
NATO, the following arrangements are recommended:
- that the Secretary General continue to place the facilities of NATO
Headquarters at the disposal of Parliamentary Conferences and give all
possible help with arrangements for their meetings;
- that invited representatives of member governments and the Secretary
General and other senior NATO civil and military officers attend certain
of these meetings. In this way the Parliamentarians would be informed
on the state of the Alliance and the problems before it, and the value
of their discussions would be increased.
CHAPTER
III
ECONOMIC COOPERATION
I. Introduction
60. Political cooperation and economic conflict are not reconcilable.
Therefore, in the economic as well as in the political field there must
be a genuine desire among the members to work together and a readiness
to consult on questions of common concern based on the recognition of
common interests.
61. These common economic interests shared by the members of NATO call
for:
- cooperative and national action to achieve healthy and expanding
economies, both to promote the well- being and self-confidence of the
Atlantic peoples and to serve as the essential support for an adequate
defence effort;
- the greatest possible freedom in trade and payments and in the movement
of manpower and long-term capital;
- assistance to economically underdeveloped areas for reasons of enlightened
self-interest and to promote better relations among peoples; and
- policies which will demonstrate, under conditions of competitive
co-existence, the superiority of free institutions in promoting human
welfare and economic progress.
62. A recognition of these common NATO interests, and collective and
individual efforts to promote them, need not in any way prejudice close
economic relations with non-NATO countries. Economic, like political,
cooperation is and must remain wider than NATO. At the same time, the
NATO countries have an interest in any arrangements for especially close
economic cooperation among groups of European member nations. It should
be possible as it is desirable for such special arrangements to promote
rather than conflict with the wider objectives of Article 2 of our Treaty,
which are of basic importance to the stability and well-being, not only
of the North Atlantic area, but of the whole non-Communist world.
II. NATO and other Organisations
63. While the purposes and principles of Article 2 are of vital importance,
it is not necessary that member countries pursue them only through action
in NATO itself. It would not serve the interests of the Atlantic Community
for NATO to duplicate the operating functions of other international organisations
designed for various forms of economic cooperation. NATO members play
a major part in all these agencies, whose membership is generally well
adapted to the purposes they serve.
64. Nor do there now appear to be significant new areas for collective
economic action requiring execution by NATO itself. In fact, the common
economic concern of the member nations will often best be fostered by
continued and increased collaboration both bilateral and through organisations
other than NATO. This collaboration should be reinforced, however, by
NATO consultation whenever economic issues of special interest to the
Alliance are involved, particularly those which have political or defence
implications or affect the economic health of the Atlantic Community as
a whole. This, in turn, requires a substantial expansion of exchange of
information and views in NATO in the economic as well as in the political
field. Such economic consultation should seek to secure a common approach
on the part of member governments where the questions are clearly related
to the political and security interests of the Alliance. Action resulting
from such a common approach, however, should normally be taken by governments
either directly or through other international organisations.
65. NATO, as such, should not seek to establish formal relations with
these other organisations, and the harmonising of attitudes and actions
should be left to the representatives of the NATO governments therein.
Nor is it necessary or desirable for NATO members to form a "bloc''
in such organisations. This would only alienate other friendly governments.
There should, however, be consultation in NATO when economic issues of
special political or strategic importance to NATO arise in other organisations
and in particular before meetings at which there may be attempts to divide
or weaken the Atlantic Alliance, or prejudice its interests.
III. Conflicts in Economic Policies of NATO Countries
66. NATO has a positive interest in the resolution of economic disputes
which may have political or strategic repercussions damaging to the Alliance.
These are to be distinguished from disagreements on economic policy which
are normally dealt with through direct negotiations or by multilateral
discussions in other organisations. Nothing would be gained by merely
having repeated in NATO the same arguments made in other and more technically
qualified organisations. It should however, be open to any member or to
the Secretary General to raise in NATO issues on which they feel that
consideration elsewhere is not making adequate progress and that NATO
consultation might facilitate solutions contributing to the objectives
of the Atlantic Community. The procedures for peaceful settlement of political
disputes discussed in the previous chapter should also be available for
major disputes of an economic character which are appropriate for NATO
consideration.
IV. Scientific and Technical Cooperation
67. One area of special importance to the Atlantic Community is that
of science and technology. During the last decade, it has become ever
clearer that progress in this field can be decisive in determining the
security of nations and their position in world affairs. Such progress
is also vital if the Western world is to play its proper role in relation
to economically underdeveloped areas.
68. Within the general field of science and technology, there is an
especially urgent need to improve the quality and to increase the supply
of scientists, engineers and technicians. Responsibility for recruitment,
training and utilisation of scientific and technical personnel is primarily
a national rather than an international matter. Nor is it a responsibility
solely of national governments. In the member countries with federal systems,
state and provincial governments play the major part, and many of the
universities and institutes of higher learning in the Atlantic area are
independent institutions free from detailed control by governments. At
the same time, properly designed measures of international cooperation
could stimulate individual member countries to adopt more positive policies
and, in some cases, help guide them in the most constructive directions.
69. Certain activities in this connection are already being carried out
by other organisations. Progress in this field, however, is so crucial
to the future of the Atlantic Community that NATO members should ensure
that every possibility of fruitful cooperation is examined. As a first
concrete step, therefore, it is recommended that a conference be convened
composed of one or at the most two outstanding authorities, private or
governmental, from each country in order:
- to exchange information and views concerning the most urgent
problems in the recruitment, training and utilisation of scientists,
engineers and technicians, and the best means, both long-term and short-term,
of solving those problems;
- to foster closer relations among the participants with a view to
continued interchange of experience and stimulation of constructive
work in member countries; and
- to propose specific measures for future international cooperation
in this field, through NATO or other international organisations.
V. Consultation on Economic Problems
70. It is agreed that the Atlantic Community has a positive concern
with healthy and accelerated development in economically underdeveloped
areas, both inside and outside the NATO area. The Committee feels, however,
that NATO is not an appropriate agency for administering programs of assistance
for economic development, or even for systematically concerning the relevant
policies of member nations. What member countries can and should do is
to keep each other and the Organisation informed of their programs and
policies in this field. When required, NATO should review the adequacy
of existing action in relation to the interests of the Alliance.
71. The economic interests of the Atlantic Community cannot be considered
in isolation from the activities and policies of the Soviet bloc. The
Soviets are resorting all too often to the use of economic measures designed
to weaken the Western Alliance, or to create in other areas a high degree
of dependence on the Soviet world. In this situation it is more than ever
important that NATO countries actively develop their own constructive
commercial and financial policies. In particular, they should avoid creating
situations of which the Soviet bloc countries might take advantage to
the detriment of the Atlantic Community and of other non-Communist countries.
In this whole field of competitive economic co-existence member countries
should consult together more fully in order to determine their course
deliberately and with the fullest possible knowledge.
72. There has been a considerable evolution in NATO's arrangements for
regular economic consultation. In addition, a number of economic matters
have been brought before the Council for consideration on an ad hoc basis.
No substantial new machinery in this field is called for. However, in
view of the extended range of topics for regular exchange of information
and consultation described above, there should be established under the
Council a Committee of Economic Advisers. This group should be entrusted
with preliminary discussion, on a systematic basis, of the matters outlined
above, together with such tasks as many be assigned by the Council or
approved by
the Council at the Committee's request. It would absorb any continuing
function of the Committee of Technical Advisers.
Since its duties would not be full-time, member governments could be represented
normally by officials mainly concerned with the work of other international
economic organisations.
Membership, however, should be flexible, the Committee being composed,
when appropriate, of specialists from the capitals on particular topics
under consideration.
CHAPTER
IV
CULTURAL COOPERATION
73. A sense of community must bind the people as well as the institutions
of the Atlantic nations. This will exist only to the extent that there
is a realisation of their common cultural heritage and of the values of
their free way of life and thought. it is important, therefore, for the
NATO countries to promote cultural cooperation among their peoples by
all practical means in order to strengthen their unity and develop maximum
support for the Alliance. It is particularly important that this cultural
cooperation should be wider than continental. This, however, does not
preclude particular governments from acting on a more limited multilateral
or even bilateral basis to strengthen their own cultural relations within
the broader Atlantic framework The Committee welcomes the measures for
cultural cooperation within the Atlantic Community which have been initiated
by private individuals and non-governmental groups. These should be encouraged
and increased.
74. To further cultural collaboration, the Committee suggests that member
governments be guided by the following general principles:
- government activities in this field should not duplicate
but should support and supplement private efforts;
- member governments should give priority to those projects which require
joint NATO action, and thus contribute to a developing sense of community;
- in developing new activities in the cultural field, NATO can most
fruitfully place the main emphasis on inspiring and promoting transatlantic
contacts;
- there should be a realistic appreciation of the financial implications
of cultural projects.
75. In order to develop public awareness and understanding of NATO and
the Atlantic Community, the Council should work out arrangements for NATO
courses and seminars for teachers.
76. NATO and its member governments should broaden their support of
other educational and related activities such as the NATO Fellowship and
Scholarship Program; creation of university chairs of Atlantic studies;
visiting professorships; government-sponsored programs for the exchange
of persons, especially on a transatlantic basis; use of NATO information
materials in schools; and establishment of special NATO awards for students.
77. Governments should actively promote closer relations between NATO
and youth organisations and a specialist should be added to the International
Staff in this connection.
Conferences under NATO auspices of representatives of youth organisations
such as that of July, 1956, should be held from time to time.
78. In the interests of promoting easier and more frequent contacts
among the NATO peoples, governments should review and, if possible, revise
their foreign exchange and other policies which restrict travel.
79. In view of the importance of promoting better understanding and
goodwill between NATO service personnel, it would be desirable, in cooperation
with the military authorities, to extend exchanges of such personnel beyond
the limits of normal training programs. Such exchanges might, at first
step, be developed by governments on a bilateral basis. In addition, member
governments should seek the assistance of the Atlantic Treaty Association
and other voluntary organisations in the further development of such exchanges.
80. Cultural projects which have a common benefit should be commonly
financed. Agreed cultural projects initiated by a single member government
or a private organisation, such as the recent seminar held at Oxford or
the Study conference sponsored by the Atlantic Treaty Association on "The
Role of the School in the Atlantic Community'', should receive financial
support from NATO where that is necessary to supplement national resources.
CHAPTER
V
COOPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD
81. The people of the member countries must know about NATO if they
are to support it. Therefore they must be informed not only of NATO's
aspirations, but of its achievements. There must be substance for an effective
NATO information programme and resources to carry it out. The public should
be informed to the greatest possible extent of significant results achieved
through NATO consultation.
82. NATO information activities should be directed primarily to public
opinion in the NATO area. At the same time an understanding outside the
NATO area of the objectives and accomplishments of the Organisation is
necessary if it is to be viewed sympathetically, and if its activities
are not to be misinterpreted.
83. The important task of explaining and reporting NATO activities rests
primarily on national information services. They cannot discharge this
task if member governments do not make adequate provisions in their national
programmes for that purpose. It is essential, therefore, that such provision
be made. NATO can and should assist national governments in this work.
The promotion of information about, and public understanding of NATO and
the Atlantic Community should, in fact, be a joint endeavor by the Organisation
and its members.
84. One of NATO's functions should be to coordinate the work of national
information services in fields of common interest. Governments should
pool their experiences and views in NATO to avoid differences in evaluation
and emphasis. This is particularly important in the dissemination of information
about NATO to other countries. Coordinated policy should underline the
defensive character of our Alliance and the importance of its non-military
aspects. It should cover also replies to anti-NATO propaganda and the
analysis of Communist moves and statements which affect NATO.
85. In its turn, the NATO Information Division must be given the resources
by governments as well as their support, without which it could not discharge
these new tasks - and should not be asked to do so.
86. In order to facilitate cooperation between the NATO Information
Division and national information services, the following specific measures
are recommended:
- an Officer should be designated by each national information
service to maintain liaison with NATO and to be responsible for the
dissemination of NATO information material;
- governments should submit to NATO the relevant information programmes
which they plan to implement, for discussion in the Committee on Information
and Cultural Relations. Representatives of national information services
should take part in these discussions;
- within the NATO Information Division budget, provision should be
made for a translation fund so that NATO information material can be
translated into the non- official languages of the Alliance, according
to reasonable requirements of the member governments;
- NATO should, on request, provide national services with special studies
on matters of common interest.
87. The journalists' tours sponsored by NATO should be broadened to
include others in a position to influence public opinion, such as trade
and youth leaders, teachers and lecturers. Closer relations between private
organisations supporting NATO and the NATO Information Division should
also be encouraged.
CHAPTER
VI
ORGANISATION AND FUNCTIONS
88. The Committee considers that NATO in its present form is capable
of discharging the non-military functions required of it. Structural changes
are not needed. The machine is basically satisfactory. It is for governments
to make use of it.
89. At the same time, certain improvements in the procedures and functioning
of the Organisation will be required if the recommendations of this report
are to be fully implemented. The proposals in this Chapter are submitted
for this purpose.
A. MEETINGS OF THE COUNCIL
90. More time should be allowed for Ministerial Meetings. Experience
has shown that, without more time, important issues on the agenda cannot
be adequately considered. Decisions concerning some of them will not be
reached at all, or will be reached only in an unclear form.
91. Efforts should be made to encourage discussion rather than simply
declarations of policy prepared in advance. Arrangements for meetings
should be made with this aim in view. For most sessions, the numbers present
should be sharply restricted.
In order to facilitate free discussion, when Ministers wish to speak in
a language other than French or English, consecutive translation into
one of these official languages should be provided by interpreters from
their own delegations.
92. Meetings of Foreign Ministers should be held whenever required,
and occasionally in locations other than NATO Headquarters. Ministers
might also participate more frequently in regular Council meetings, even
though not all of them may find it possible to attend such meetings at
the same time. The Council of Permanent Representatives has powers of
effective decision: in other words, the authority of the Council as such
is the same whether governments are represented by Ministers or by their
Permanent Representatives. Thus there should be no firm or formal line
between Ministerial and other meetings of the Council.
B. STRENGTHENING THE LINKS BETWEEN THE COUNCIL AND MEMBER GOVERNMENTS
93. It is indispensable to the kind of consultations envisaged in this
report that Permanent Representatives should be in a position to speak
authoritatively and to reflect the current thinking of their governments.
Differences in location and in constitutional organisation make impossible
any uniform arrangements in all member governments. In some cases it might
be desirable to designate a high official in the national capital to be
concerned primarily with NATO affairs. The purpose would be to help both
in fostering NATO consultations whenever national policies impinge on
the common interest of the Atlantic Community, and in translating the
results of such consultation into effective action within the national
governments.
94. To ensure the closest possible connection between current thinking
in the governments and consultations in the Council, there might be occasional
Council Meetings with the participation of specially designated officials
or the permanent heads of foreign ministries.
C. PREPARATION FOR COUNCIL MEETINGS
95. Items on the agenda of Ministerial Meetings should be thoroughly
examined by Permanent Representatives and relevant proposals prepared
before Ministers meet. For this purpose it may be found desirable for
governments to send senior experts to consult on agenda items before the
meetings take place.
96. The preparation of questions for discussion in the Council should
be assisted by appropriate use of the Council's Committees of Political
and Economic Advisers. (Recommendations on the establishment of these
Committees are set forth in Chapter II, paragraph 56, and Chapter III,
paragraph 72.)
97. In the case of consultations on special subjects, more use should
be made of senior experts from national capitals to assist permanent delegations
by calling them, on an ad hoc basis, to do preparatory work. Informal
discussions among specialists with corresponding responsibilities are
a particularly valuable means of concerning governmental attitudes in
the early stages of policy formation.
98. Member governments should make available to one another through NATO
"basic position material'' for background information. This would
help the Alliance as a whole in the consideration of problems of common
concern and would assist individual governments to understand more fully
the reasons for the position adopted by any member country on a particular
issue which might be its special concern, but which might also affect
in varying degrees other members of NATO.
D. THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF
99. To enable the Organisation to make its full contribution, the role
of the Secretary General and the International Staff needs to be enhanced.
100. It is recommended that the Secretary General preside over meetings
of the Council in Ministerial session, as he does now in other sessions.
Such a change with respect to the conduct of the Council's business would
follow naturally from the new responsibilities of the Secretary General,
arising out of the recommendations of this report. It is also warranted
by the Secretary General's unique opportunities for becoming familiar
with the problems and the activities of the Alliance as a whole.
101. It would, however, still be desirable to have one Minister chosen
each year as President of the Council in accordance with the present practice
of alphabetical rotation. This Minister, as President, would continue
to have especially close contact with the Secretary General during and
between Ministerial Meetings, and would, as at present, act as the spokesman
of the Council on all formal occasions. He would also preside at the formal
opening and closing of Ministerial sessions of the Council.
102. In addition:
- the Secretary General should be encouraged to propose items
for NATO consultation in the fields covered by this report and should
be responsible for promoting and directing the process of consultation;
- in view of these responsibilities member governments should undertake
to keep the Secretary General fully and currently informed through their
permanent delegations of their governments' thinking on questions of
common concern to the Alliance;
- attention is also called to the additional responsibilities of the
Secretary General, recommended in connection with the annual political
appraisal (Chapter II, paragraph 52), and the peaceful settlement of
disputes (Chapter II, paragraph 57).
103. The effective functioning of NATO depends in large measure on the
efficiency, devotion and morale of its Secretariat. Acceptance of the
recommendations in this report would impose on the Secretariat new duties
and responsibilities. Governments must, therefore, be prepared to give
the International Staff all necessary support, both in finance and personnel.
If this is not done, the recommendations of the report, even if accepted
by governments, will not be satisfactorily carried out.
ANNEX
COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
1. Resolution on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes and Differences
between Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Whereas the
parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, under Article I of that treaty,
have undertaken "to settle any international disputes in which they
may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international
peace and security and justice are not endangered'';
Whereas the parties have further undertaken to seek to eliminate conflicts
in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration
between any or all of them;
Whereas NATO unity and strength in the pursuit of these objectives remain
essential for continuous cooperation in military and non-military fields;
The North Atlantic Council:
Reaffirms the obligations of all its members, under Article I of the Treaty,
to settle by peaceful means any dispute between themselves;
Decides that such disputes which have not proved capable of settlement
directly be submitted to good offices procedures within the NATO framework
before member governments resort to any other international agency except
for disputes of a legal character appropriate for submission to a judicial
tribunal and those disputes of an economic character for which attempts
at settlement might best be made initially in the appropriate specialised
economic organisations;
Recognises the right and duty of member governments and of the Secretary
General to bring to its attention matters which in their opinion may threaten
the solidarity or effectiveness of the Alliance;
Empowers the Secretary General to offer his good offices informally at
any time to member governments involved in a dispute and with their consent
to initiate or facilitate procedures of inquiry, mediation, conciliation,
or arbitration;
Authorises the Secretary General where he deems it appropriate for the
purpose outlined in the preceding paragraph to use the assistance of not
more than three permanent representatives chosen by him in each instance.
2. Resolution on the Report of the Committee of Three on Non- Military
Cooperation in NATO
Whereas the North Atlantic Council at its meeting in Paris on May 5 established
a Committee composed of the Foreign Ministers of Italy, Canada and Norway
to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO cooperation
in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic
Community;
Whereas the Committee of Three has now reported on the task assigned to
it and has submitted to the Council a number of recommendations on such
ways and means to improve and extend NATO cooperation in non-military
fields;
The North Atlantic Council:
Takes note of the Report of the Committee of Three; and
Approves its recommendations; and
Invites the Council in Permanent Session to implement in the light of
the comments made by governments the principles and recommendations contained
in the Report; and Invites the Secretary General to draw up for consideration
by the Council such further specific proposals as may be required for
the implementation of these recommendations and to report periodically
on the compliance with these recommendations by governments.
Authorises the Committee of Three to publish their report.
Footnote:
The outstanding instances are the Organisation
for European Cooperation and Development (OECD) (which includes all NATO
countries and four others); the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT); the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); the International Finance Corporation
(IFC); and the various other United Nations agencies including the Economic
Commission for Europe. Several NATO members participate actively in the
Colombo Plan for promoting economic development in Asia. Most members
are taking an active part in technical assistance programmes and are also
participating in discussions of proposals for the creation of a Special
United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED).
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