First published
in the Armed
Forces Journal International
on 27 Nov. 2000
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Secretary
General's Guest Commentary in
"Armed Forces Journal International"
A little over a year ago operation "Allied Force"
ended. This air campaign was unique in many respects: militarily, politically,
legally. It was the most crucial test for this Alliance in its entire
50-year history. But NATO passed this test with flying colours. Allied
Force achieved all its objectives. At the end of the day, Serb forces
were out, KFOR was in, and the refugees were home. This is as good a definition
of victory as you can get.
Today, the situation in Kosovo is much better than it was.
For the first time in many years, Kosovar Albanians need not live in a
constant state of fear. The state-sponsored crimes of hatred committed
against Kosovar Albanians have been ended. Since KFOR deployed last year
1,3 million refugees and displaced persons have returned to their homes.
50,000 homes have been rebuilt. Last winter, no one had to be without
shelter. More than 1,000 schools have been cleared of mines and unexploded
ordnance. And, perhaps more significantly for the long-term, multiethnic
civilian organisations have been created to begin to govern Kosovo in
future.
The success of Allied Force and of KFOR is a resounding
vindication of the value of a strong transatlantic relationship. Together,
North America and Europe achieved something none of them could have achieved
alone: changing the course of Balkan history for the better, giving all
of South-Eastern Europe the perspective for a brighter tomorrow. And it
is not only the 19 NATO Allies who are engaged in this project: about
two dozen Partner countries from all corners of the compass are part of
the team as well, ready to make their contribution, and eager to associate
themselves more closely with our Alliance.
Bosnia and Kosovo demonstrate that the security interests
of the US, Canada and Europe remain linked. The end of the Cold War did
not change that. What need to change, however, are the ways in which these
common interests are being pursued. The end of the Cold War, the emergence
of new conflict scenarios, and the progress of European integration have
changed the parameters of the transatlantic relationship. NATO must reflect
these changes, if it is to remain relevant. In short, it needs to adapt.
We have already come a long way in this adaptation. Last
year, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined NATO as new members.
NATO has developed the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to help the nine aspirant
countries to improve their credibility as future members. NATO-Russia
relations are picking up momentum again after our Kosovo disagreements.
Croatia has just joined the Partnership for Peace - bringing the number
of Partners up to 26! NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue has just welcomed
Algeria as another participant. And we have just inaugurated a Centre
for Weapons of Mass Destruction in order to develop a coherent Allied
response to this challenge.
This is an impressive list. It brings home NATO's role as a catalyst for
change and a source of stability far beyond its borders. But the transformation
of NATO is not complete. Kosovo in particular has provided us with a clear
appreciation of the challenges that have yet to be addressed. These are
formidable challenges, to be sure, but they must be met if the Alliance
is to remain as effective in the 21st century as it was in the previous
one.
In my view, three challenges stand out:
First, we must improve our military capabilities. NATO's
credibility as a crisis manager rests on its military competence. To maintain
that competence, we need effective forces - forces with precision guided
munitions, modern command and control systems, and high mobility. Furthermore,
these capabilities must be shared across the Alliance, not just among
a few advanced members. The Defence Capabilities Initiative is the means
we chose to address these shortfalls. Fifty-eight specific improvements
of military capabilities were approved by NATO nations. Most of these
have meanwhile been translated into even more specific Force Proposals.
But let us be clear: improving NATO's military capabilities cannot be
done on the cheap. Yes, we can achieve a lot by spending more wisely:
reprioritisation, efficiency savings, multi-national cooperation, or making
greater use of civil assets. Still, the fact remains that more money will
be needed in many cases. Our Governments must know about the importance
of these improvements. In particular, we need to remind our Finance Ministries
of that.
Second, there is the challenge of a European Security and
Defence Identity (ESDI). For the Allies, Kosovo was a wake-up call. Not
only did it bring home the stark military asymmetry between the US and
the rest of the Allies, it also demonstrated the likely weakness of Europe
as a strategic actor in those future cases where US leadership may not
be available. That explains the rapid progress on developing a stronger
European crisis management capability since last year. The aim is ambitious:
By 2003, the EU wants to be able to deploy up to 60,000 troops within
60 days of notice, and sustain them for at least one year. To provide
the political and military leadership for such an EU-led operation, new
EU bodies are being set up. And new ideas are on the table to streamline
European development and procurement practices NATO is supporting these
developments - because a Europe that makes a more coherent contribution
is in the North American as well as European security interest. For this
reason, NATO, too, is moving at a high pace. NATO-EU relations are currently
being put on a concrete footing. Participation by non-EU Allies in EU-led
operations is being defined. In sum, the groundwork is being done to ensure
that ESDI becomes a win-win situation: more options added to our transatlantic
menu of crisis response; a stronger Europe, a fairer sharing of the transatlantic
burden, and, at the end of the day, a stronger NATO.
But, like DCI, ESDI will stand or fall on capabilities. We simply cannot
afford a situation in which the EU proclaims that it wishes to take the
lead in handling a security crisis - and then falls back on NATO and the
US, for lack of capabilities. For Europe to maintain its credibility on
this issue, and for the United States to keep supporting this project,
ESDI has to deliver real capabilities. Not just fine words, nice speeches
or new bureaucracies, but troops that can move.
I believe the EU and NATO have made real progress, very
quickly, in making stronger European capabilities a reality. But the hardest
nut to crack, once again, will be expenditures. In the real world, capability
costs. If the resources are made available - and I have every confidence
that this can be done - we will have a win-win situation: a stronger Europe,
a stronger NATO and a healthier transatlantic relationship, where burdens
and responsibilities are shared more fairly. And our ability to manage
crises will improve dramatically.
The third challenge also relates both to capabilities and
to the transatlantic relationship. I am referring to the issue of defence
industrial cooperation. The logic is dear: defence industrial cooperation
is a key part of the evolution of Euro-Atlantic security. Simply put,
our forces need the best equipment we can provide. The defence industry
on which we rely peeds to be as efficient and modern as possible, and
competition is at the heart of an efficient industry. We need competition,
but we must guard against monopoly as a result of successive competitions.
The size of the market and the investment in R+D for new technologies
argues for transatlantic cooperation, because the creation of national
"fortresses" when it comes to procurement will not serve to
improve optimally the capabilities of our forces.
Transatlantic cooperation is clearly in the interests of
both NATO and Europe. That is why our Governments must take courageous,
imaginative decisions to make our procurement and R & D regimes more
flexible. As part of this, we urgently need action on both sides of the
Atlantic to reform the mechanisms by which transatlantic agreements are
structured. Our aim should be to achieve a genuinely new pattern of reciprocal
transatlantic armaments cooperation, and to achieve it as soon as possible.
Governments on both sides of the Atlantic must do more
to make sure that such cooperation can proceed in a dynamic fashion. In
this regard, there are some encouraging signs, including, of course, the
recent decisions taken by the US administration to simplify and improve
the export licensing process for defence trade, which is an important
step towards improved transatlantic defence industrial relations. This
initiative, among the man others taking place here and in Europe, will
go along way to ensuring that NATO's forces have at their disposal the
most effective and the most affordable equipment - which, in turn, will
help support both DCI and ESDI.
DCI, ESDI and sound defence industrial cooperation: three major challenges,
but also three major opportunities. Because meeting these challenges will
have synergistic effects across the entire spectrum of Alliance activities.
I have no doubt that we will meet these challenges. Because security is
teamwork. And the transatlantic team is the best there is.
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