NATO-Russia experts discuss nuclear doctrine and strategy

“A number of important milestones related to nuclear weapons doctrine and strategy have taken place since nuclear experts gathered in Oslo in 2009 under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Council. These milestones will form the background and the substance of our discussions and exchanges over the next two days,” declared Fred S. Frederickson, Director of Nuclear Policy at NATO and chairman of the seminar, in his opening remarks.

First, the US Nuclear Posture Review was published in April 2010. Secondly, in November 2010, France and the United Kingdom agreed to increase military cooperation, including nuclear technology and the building of a new joint facility.

A third milestone was NATO’s new Strategic Concept – adopted in November 2010 – which commits the Alliance to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons but reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance. Accordingly, NATO is currently conducting a Deterrence and Defence Posture Review to determine the appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities. In parallel, the Alliance continues to work on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.

Finally, the United States and Russia signed the New START Treaty in February 2011. Once the treaty has been ratified and entered into force, it will significantly limit numbers of strategic arms within seven years.

Seminar fosters mutual understanding

The event was part of the 2011 work programme of the NRC’s Defence Transparency, Strategy and Reform (DTSR) nuclear experts’ working group. It contributed to fostering mutual understanding and transparency by providing participants with the opportunity to exchange views and gain further insight into the role of nuclear forces in nuclear weapon states’ national doctrines and strategies as well as in NATO’s Strategic Concept. It also served as a forum to discuss emerging risks and threats, evolving security requirements and associated consequences for NATO and Russian security.

Mr Frederickson opened the seminar together with NATO School Commandant Colonel Mark Baines and Colonel Andrey Evgenievich Sterlin, Deputy Director of the Main Operational Department of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, who represented the Russian delegation.

Distinguished speakers gave presentations related to nuclear subjects. Professor Malcolm Chalmers, Director of Research and Director of UK Defence Policy at the Royal United Services Institute, outlined the strategic context for nuclear strategy and doctrine. US Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear and Strategic Policy Marcie Berman Ries briefed on progress made and next steps in arms control. Senior representatives of each of the four nuclear powers gave presentations on their national nuclear doctrines and strategy.

Around 50 participants from 19 NRC nations attended the seminar. They included senior staff members and experts dealing with nuclear weapons policy issues in ministries of defence and foreign affairs, as well as representatives of national delegations to NATO, the NATO Military Authorities and the NATO International Staff.

All participants agreed that such seminars, which promote collegial dialogue on nuclear weapons issues, should take place on regular basis. Several possible themes and topics were identified for follow-on seminars.

NATO-Russia cooperation on nuclear weapons issues

This was the third seminar to focus on nuclear doctrines and strategy – the first was held in Garmisch, Germany, in 2005 and the second took place in Oslo, Norway, in 2009.

Other seminars have focused on lessons learned from nuclear weapons incidents and accidents and potential responses to the detection of improvised nuclear or radiological devices. Experts have also developed a glossary of terms and definitions in the nuclear field.

A series of four nuclear-weapon-accident-response field exercises organised by the four NRC nuclear weapons states between 2004 and 2007 have served to increase transparency, develop common understanding of nuclear-weapon-accident-response procedures. Such exercises help build full confidence that the nuclear weapon states are fully capable to respond effectively to any emergency involving nuclear weapons.