

DES(94)2- XIII

SECURITY DOCUMENTS, 1952-1958

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SECURITY DOCUMENTS, 1952-1958

A. Introduction

1. On 1st December 1949 the Standing Group (SG) proposed to the Defense Committee the establishment of a security system for NATO (D.C. 2/2 and D.C. 2/1). Appended to the proposal (Appendix A to D.C. 2/1) was a Security Agreement to be entered into "at a military level" by all NATO members. The Defense Committee approved the SG's report, provisionally, pending action by the North Atlantic Council.

2. At its third session on 6th January 1950 the Council approved the Security System proposal. A copy of the Security Agreement was sent to each of the twelve member countries where it was signed by the Chief of Staff (except for Iceland which did not have a Chief of Staff). The same agreement was signed subsequently by the Chiefs of Staff of Turkey and Greece (in 1951) and by the permanent representative of Germany (in 1955).

3. The security agreement committed the signatory nations to make every effort to ensure the maintenance of the security classification established by any other party to the agreement. The signatory countries agreed to safeguard the information and not to exploit such information for production for other than military purposes. Most importantly, they would not disclose such information to other nations without the consent of the originator. At the same time the recipient undertook to prevent any loss of patent rights in information introduced into their country by the exchange of classified information.¹

4. Experience in 1950 and 1951 with the security regulations and standard operating procedures in certain member countries and in central agencies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization showed the need for the revision of D.C. 2/1 and SGM-112-50.² The Security Coordinating Committee of the Standing Group reviewed the regulations and proposed revisions. The Military Representatives Committee (MRC) recommended their approval by the Defense Committee on 13th April 1951 (D.C. 2/7). The MRC report primarily introduced the new special security regulations necessitated by the introduction of the unique NATO marking, COSMIC.

5. The proposed revisions (D.C. 2/7) were submitted to the Defense Committee for approval on 27th April 1951. The reorganization of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on 2nd May 1951 united the Defense Committee with the Council. This reorganization required that the proposal be presented to the Council - or the North Atlantic Council Deputies on behalf of the Council - for consideration (MRM-11-51). The Council Deputies discussed the paper briefly at a meeting on 11th June 1951 and agreed to setup a working group to examine the document and to report back to

¹ The text of the signed agreement was circulated as Enclosure A to C-M(55)15(Final).

² SGM-112-50 was the original Standard Operating Procedure for handling COSMIC material. It was amended by paragraph 6e of SGM-295-50. Regulations governing the handling of cryptographic material provided for NATO was covered in SGM-201-50.

the Deputies (D-R(51)46).

B. Working Group on the Revised NATO Security System (AC/6)

1. The activities and records of the Working Group on the Revised NATO Security System (AC/6) are described in paragraphs 178 through 181 of DES(92)1. The 15 documents, 13 summary records of meetings and 1 notice are listed in Appendix III, I6 to that report and are on microfilm roll 56.

2. The AC/6 Working Group's proposed revisions to the MRC proposals were submitted in a report to the Deputies on 6th November 1951 (D-D(51)274). The Deputies agreed to make a final decision on the report only after receiving the comments of the Standing Group's Security Coordinating Committee (D-R(51)79(Final), Item VIII, meeting on 12.11.51). That Committee's comments, together with a text of the revised regulation showing the proposed changes, was forwarded to the Deputies on 5th January 1952 (SG 7/46 and SGM-36-52). The Deputies referred the outstanding differences back to the AC/6 Working Group for resolution (D-R(52)10(Final) meeting on 31.1.52). Action on an interim proposal (D-D(52)47 of 8.2.52) was postponed by the Deputies until after the Lisbon Ministerial Session and after the AC/6 Working Group had completed its consideration of those issues which were still in contention (D-R(52)21 meeting on 5.3.52). The further changes to D.C. 2/7 suggested by the Working Group were accepted by the SG's Security Coordinating Committee and recommended for approval by the Deputies (D-D(52)65 of 12.3.52). This was done on 19th March 1952 (D-R(52)23, Item V). The revised security system, D.C. 2/7(Final) was promulgated on 8th April 1952 and remained in effect until 1955.

3. The last remaining issue before the AC/6 Working Group was the structure of the NATO security organization. Two basic principles were agreed: (a) that there should exist a NATO Security Committee on which all member countries were represented, responsible for advising the Council on questions involving changes in NATO security policy; and (b) that there should be a Security Bureau to act under the authority of the Security Committee to examine all questions affecting NATO security and to devise methods to improve security. The Security Bureau would be responsible for ensuring the implementation of NATO security decisions and for the carrying out of periodic examinations of the NATO security system in national and international civil agencies. It was to keep the NATO Security Committee informed of the results of their activities thus enabling the Committee to recommend necessary changes in security policy to the Council (C-M(52)57 of 25.7.52 and Corrigendum of 23.8.52). Responsibility for the implementation and coordination of security within the North Atlantic Treaty military organization continued to rest with the Standing Group which was directed to submit recommendations concerning changes in security policy to the Council (*ibid.*, paragraph 6 of Annex A).

4. The Council approved the organizational proposals submitted by the Chairman of the AC/6 Working Group subject to acceptance by the Standing Group and invited delegations to nominate their representatives to the NATO Security Committee when the SG's approval was notified (C-R(52)18, Item IV, meeting on 20.8.52). The Standing Group proposed minor amendments (SGLP/249/52 of 16.9.52) which were circulated with a deadline for comments (RDC/348/52). When no substantive

comments were received the Security Committee was convened and the Security Bureau established (AC/35-D/1 of 16.10.52).

C. NATO Security Committee (AC/35)

1. The first meeting of the Security Committee was held on 10th March 1953. The Executive Secretary welcomed the delegates and informed them that the Secretariat had secured the services of Mr. J. Brunet, an Assistant Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police with extensive security service to be the first head of the Security Bureau (he took up his duties in April 1953). The Committee agreed that the Head of the Security Bureau should be a member of the Security Committee but that the Chairman should be elected from among its members. The Netherlands representative chaired the first meeting but the Committee agreed that Mr. Brunet thereafter would be the Chairman of the Committee (AC/35-R/1).

2. After that first meeting and a second meeting on 29th April 1953, the Chairman of the NATO Security Committee submitted a report to the Council recommending their endorsement of certain amendments to C-M(52)57 which had the approval of the Standing Group and of the NATO Security Committee (Annex A to C-M(53)69 of 19.5.53). He also requested approval of amendments to the terms of reference of the NATO Security Committee and the NATO Security Bureau (*ibid.*, Annex A and Annex B, amendments to D.C. 2/7(Final)). The Council modified the proposal to make very clear that the Security Bureau would be established under the International Secretariat and would be composed of members who were experienced in security matters both in the civilian and military spheres. The Bureau was to maintain close liaison with the Standing Group. *Inter alia*, it was to be responsible for carrying out periodic examinations of the NATO and COSMIC security systems in international civil agencies and the COSMIC system in national civil agencies(C-R(53)29 meeting on 10.6.53).

3. The NATO Security Committee held three meetings in July 1953. It examined the problem of leaks of information to the press concerning Council business and the legal status of NATO classified information (AC/35-D/6 discussed at AC/35-R/5), methods for transmission of NATO classified documents within the member countries (AC/35-R/4, paragraph 11(b)), industrial security regulations and practices in the nations (AC/35-R/4, paragraph 11(d)), security clauses in offshore procurement (OSP) contracts (*ibid.*), and national methods for policing and ensuring the maintenance of security standards during the execution of contracts (AC/35-R/5, paragraph 3). National delegations were asked to take appropriate action or to submit reports on all of these matters for analysis and consideration of appropriate further steps to be taken by the Committee (AC/35-D/20 of 29.7.53).³

4. The Committee Chairman and Head of the Security Bureau summarized the results of these national responses for further consideration by the Committee.

³ The Council Deputies had approved a "Directive on the employment of firms and companies in NATO countries on contracts involving the disclosure of classified information," DD(52)28(Final) of 9.2.52. This directive was the product of the Working Group on the Employment of Firms and Companies Involving Security (AC/13) described in DES(92)1, paragraphs 205-208.

(See, for example, AC/35-D/58 of 10.12.53 on the legal status of NATO information and the handling of leaks and also AC/35-D/62 of 17.12.53 on methods for transmission of NATO classified documents.)

5. In 1954 the Security Committee began examining the problems of security clearance of the International Staff (AC/35-D/63, D/65, D/73, D/74, D/77, D/88 and D/89),⁴ security of firms engaged in classified infrastructure projects (AC/35-R/7), the development and production of a security education film (AC/35-D/76 and D/78, further discussed at nearly every meeting until final production in 1957), rules for the personal carriage of NATO classified documents (AC/35-WP/3, R/10, D/79 and again in 1955 in AC/35-D/92 which led to the introduction of NATO seals in AC/35-D/99 and D/111), security considerations involving the attendance of experts at meetings of NATO committees (AC/35-D/75 and N/6 of 16.11.54), and the destruction of classified documents in case of emergency (AC/35-D/66 discussed at AC/35-R/8).

6. The Standing Group Security Committee (SGSC) provided the AC/35 Committee with an early draft of its proposals for further modification of the NATO security regulations (D.C. 2/7(Final)) in August 1954. The draft was circulated within the Committee as a working paper on 23rd August 1954(AC/35-WP/2). A few weeks later a notice was circulated to the effect that the working paper was canceled as the SGSC was considering additional major changes to NATO's security procedures (AC/35-N/5 of 6.9.54).

7. The Security Committee meeting on 24th through 28th January 1955 began consideration of a thorough revision of the NATO security system. The SGSC's expanded proposed revisions (SG 7/65) were circulated in December 1954 (AC/35-D/80). The Committee was urged to consider promptly the issues as a proposed agreement for cooperation regarding atomic information awaited approval of the revised regulations (AC/35-D/81). Numerous amendments were proposed by the delegations (AC/35-WP/4 of 21.1.55) and many of them were approved at the January sessions (AC/35-D/86 of 1.2.55) for inclusion in a revised regulation (AC/35-R/11).

8. The NATO Security Committee's proposed revised regulations were circulated to the Council for consideration on 3rd February 1955 as C-M(55)15. Further amendments were proposed by the Standing Group (C-M(55)19 of 15.2.55) and by the U.K. delegation (C-M(55)22 of 18.2.55). Editorial changes were presented by the Canadian representative at the meeting of the Council on 23rd February 1955 too late for circulation and consideration at that meeting (C-M(55)25 of 24.2.55). The Council invited the Secretary General to convene an ad hoc working group to consider the amendments proposed in the light of the discussion (C-R(55)7, Item IV).

9. When the Council considered the revisions to the security system at its meeting on 2nd March 1955 (C-R(55)8, Item III) the Norwegian representative informed the Council that his delegation had pressed for elimination of the NATO Restricted classification level at the Security Committee meetings held in January 1955. Their argument was that it was superfluous and its definition, as well as the rules governing

⁴ Simplified clearance certification procedures were considered again in 1958 (AC/35-D/219 of 3.1.58) and approved by the Committee on 20th February 1958 (AC/35-R/22). The revised procedures were circulated on 10th March 1958 (AC/35-D/237).

the safeguarding of documents graded Restricted, were so vague that they might lead to confusion instead of contributing to overall NATO security. Inasmuch as other delegations had opposed this motion his delegation had withdrawn it. But he informed the Council that his delegation reserved the right to reintroduce the motion if experience under the new regulations suggested reconsideration.

10. The Council approved three minor amendments without discussion - including a footnote which indicated that the Council had already approved Annex A to C-M(55)15 on 6th January 1955 as an annex to D.C. 2/7. The Council then proceeded to:

- (a) adopt the basic principles and minimum standards of security as set out in enclosure "B" to C-M(55)15 as amended by the ad hoc working group's proposals in C-M(55)26;
- (b) adopt the security procedures for the protection of information as set out in enclosure "C" of C-M(55)15 as amended by C-M(55)26;
- (c) agree that paragraph 3(d) of Section I of enclosure "C" to C-M(55)15 did not imply that the Security Bureau had an executive or other authority within national systems;
- (d) approve the proposal that all holders of COSMIC Secret, COSMIC Confidential and COSMIC Restricted documents should be authorized to remove all such documents from the COSMIC system and to replace the marking "COSMIC" with the marking "NATO." Implementation of this proposal was to await consideration at the next meeting of the Security Committee; and
- (e) agree that the new procedures should become effective on 2nd April 1955 at which date D.C. 2/7(Final) would become obsolete.

The enclosures to C-M(55)15 as amended and approved by the Council were issued as C-M(55)15(Final) on 8th March 1955.

11. The AC/35 Committee Chairman circulated a memorandum on the implication of the Council's decision to remove the COSMIC designation on documents graded below the level of Top Secret (AC/35-D/91 of 18.3.55). The Security Bureau prepared and circulated a memorandum proposing the essential principles to be applied in the handling of NATO Top Secret documents until they could be regraded.

12. The Security Committee determined to develop an instructional paper on security when conducting important meetings (draft is AC/35-WP/5 of 24.1.55) and also a NATO security manual (draft is AC/35-WP/6; the concept was approved at AC/35-R/12 in March 1955; see also AC/35-D/94). The draft chapter on security of important conferences was circulated on 9th June 1955 as a proposed separate chapter of the NATO security manual (AC/35-D/97, see also AC/35-D/100 of 30.8.55). The manual was circulated to governments for approval (AC/35-R/13), further amended and finally approved at the Committee's meeting on 27th September 1955 (AC/35-R/14).

13. In November 1955 the Security Bureau circulated a working paper suggesting procedures for obtaining security clearance certificates for representatives of firms receiving contracts for classified NATO projects (AC/35-WP/7). Responses from the national delegations received between December 1955 and May 1956 were circulated as AC/35 Committee documents.⁵ The Security Bureau compiled the responses and produced a note (based in part also on the discussion at the AC/35 Committee meeting on 12th April 1956, AC/35-R/16) on the unresolved questions. In the document the Security Bureau circulated a copy of a document prepared by the Infrastructure Committee's Working Group on Security covering the classification of infrastructure projects (AC/35-D/135 of 30.5.56).

14. The issues of security in infrastructure projects, classification of infrastructure related documents, offshore procurement, competitive bidding and subcontracting of classified projects, the security of the NATO pipeline system (AC/35-D/159), and the classification of infrastructure related documents were the subjects of three working papers (AC/35-WP/7, WP/8⁶ and WP/10), a further memorandum by the Committee's Working Group on Industrial Security⁷ (AC/35-D/179) and several documents originated by the Security Bureau (AC/35-D/83, D/90, D/147, D/238 and D/259). The national delegations submitted information on industrial security regulations and practices in their countries as well as comments on proposed amendments to the draft industrial security guidance (AC/35-WP/10) in numerous notes and memoranda.⁸ At the Committee's meeting on 17th and 18th October 1957 the Committee examined the working group's working paper (AC/35-WP/10) and accepted a number of amendments proposed by various delegations. The Security Bureau was requested to circulate a revised text. If no further objection was raised it was to be submitted to the Council as Enclosure "D" to C-M(55)15(Final) (AC/35-R/21, Item I).

15. Simultaneously, the working paper on security principles and rules in connection with infrastructure (AC/35-WP/8(3rd Revise) was forwarded to the Infrastructure Committee (where it was circulated as AC/4-D/791). The Infrastructure Committee's Working Group on International Competitive Bidding held several meetings and proposed a number of amendments to make the indispensable security rules compatible with the prevailing infrastructure practices. A new proposed text was then circulated to the NATO Security Committee for consideration (AC/35-N/35 of 28.1.58). As there was no objection to the revised text, the Chairman notified the

⁵ AC/35-D/101 [FR], D/103 [CA], D/104 [DE], D/105 [supplementary note by FR], D/106 and D/107 [IT], D/112 [GE], D/114 [TU], D/121 [BE], D/122 [US], D/125 [NO], D/127 [note by IT delegation on issuance of provisional work permits], D/130 [LU], D/132 [note by US delegation on issuance of provisional work permits in exceptional cases].

⁶ Prepared by a working group established by the AC/35 Committee at its meeting on 30th October 1956 (AC/35-R/18). It was chaired by the Head of the Security Bureau and made up of representatives of FR, NE, NO and the UK. It was tasked to prepare a draft general document on the security of infrastructure and industrial projects for consideration at the next meeting.

⁷ Established at Committee meeting on 27th-28th February 1957 (AC/35-R/19), it was chaired by the Head of Security Bureau, D.S. Stewart, with representatives of GE, IT, UK and US making up the Working Group. It was instructed to prepare a draft document setting out the basic principles and practices of industrial security to be observed in the national sphere in the execution of classified projects. The draft was to be prepared for incorporation into C-M(55)15(Final).

⁸ AC/35-D/108 [IT], D/133 and D/202 [GE], D/138, D/140, D/184 and D/203 [GR], D/141 and D/188 [TU], D/157, D/191 and D/212 [FR], D/183 [UK] and D/193 [NE].

Controller of Infrastructure that the new text was considered as final (AC/35-R/23, Item VIII, A). A copy of the draft final text was circulated to the Committee on 23rd July 1958 (AC/35-D/259) and amended on 2nd December 1958 (AC/35-D/285). The Committee's efforts in the field of industrial security were completed successfully when the Council approved the paper on "Security Principles and Practices in Connection with Industry" (C-M(58)24 of 14.2.58 at its meeting on 6th March 1958 (C-R(58)14, Item III). It subsequently was published as enclosure "D" to C-M(55)15 on 20th March 1958.

16. The NATO Security Committee circulated a memorandum in April 1957 requesting an exchange of information on the arrangement in NATO countries on security protection of classified patent information (AC/35-D/180 of 25.4.57). The matter was discussed and more specific questions developed at the Committee's meeting on 26th and 27th June 1957 (AC/35-R/20, Item IV). A U.K. paper originally furnished to the Working Group on the Protection of Technical Information on the screening of patent agents and attorneys was also circulated (AC/35-D/195). The responses were summarized by the Chairman in October and November 1957 (AC/35-D/198 of 4.10.57 and a revised text of 6.11.57). The resulting paper on patents and patent applications of defense significance requiring security protection (AC/35-D/236 of 10.3.58) was prepared following discussion by the Committee at its meeting on 20th February 1958 (AC/35-R/22, Item II) where amendments to the earlier draft were considered (see AC/35-D/214 through D/216).

17. The Security Committee considered a proposal in October 1956 by the new Head of the Security Bureau, D.L. Stewart, to modify its program of inspection. The revised program called for national security authorities to inspect secondary registries of NATO documents. The national authorities would report the results to the Security Bureau. The Security Bureau would visit the various countries for the purpose, not only of inspecting the main registries, but also to establish and maintain highly valuable links. The interval between Security Bureau inspections of the whole NATO area would be about two years. The proposal was immediately accepted as presented (AC/35-R/18, Item IV, meeting on 30.10.56). The Committee reaffirmed the requirement for annual inspections of COSMIC subregistries by national security authorities at its meeting in February 1957 (AC/35-R/19, Item IX). At the same time the Committee required national security authorities to inspect COSMIC central registries in the year between Security Bureau inspections. The Security Committee also agreed that when the COSMIC central registry in a member country was considered a military registry, the Security Bureau would inspect the principal subregistry on the civil side. At the same time the Security Bureau was invited to investigate with the Standing Group the possibility of joint inspections of all central registries (*Ibid.*). The Security Bureau met with representatives of the Standing Group Security Committee on 27th June 1958. The result was a note on the division of responsibility for inspection between the Standing Group Security Committee and the Security Bureau which was submitted to the Committee for consideration on 7th July 1958 (AC/35-D/255),⁹ too late for consideration at the Committee's meeting late that month (AC/35-R/23, Item VIII, B). The Committee accepted the note as a statement of policy but recognized that the U.S. Central Registry was an exception in that it was physically located in the Department of

⁹ Responses to the proposal were submitted by France (AC/35-D/260), Canada and Italy (AC/35-D/264), Denmark (AC/35-D/266), the Netherlands (AC/35-D/268), Germany (AC/35-D/276) and the U.K. (AC/35-D/278).

Defense and was run entirely by military personnel (AC/35-R/24, Item III).

18. The possibility of establishing both a civil and a military COSMIC central registry in member countries had been explored in 1954 (AC/35-R/9, AC/35-D/68 and D/72). It was reexamined in 1958 in a note by the Security Bureau (AC/35-D/252 of 9.6.58). During the discussion at the Committee meeting on 16th and 17th July 1958, it was decided that this document should be viewed as permitting the establishment of two central COSMIC registries (AC/35-R/23, Item V).

19. The accumulation of national holdings of NATO classified documents was seen as a security threat. The NATO Security Committee examined the problem of emergency destruction at its meetings in June and October 1956 (AC/35-R/17 paragraphs 51-59 and AC/35-R/18 paragraph 5). Responses from seven countries describing their procedures and test results¹⁰ were compiled by the Security Bureau staff into a single document (AC/35-D/167 of 5.2.57). It was approved by the Committee at its meeting on 27th and 28th February 1957 along with suggested revised language to replace that in the earlier version of C-M(55)15(Final) (AC/35-R/19, Item III).

20. When the Security Committee met on 17th and 18th October 1957, the Chairman called attention again to the problem of the growing accumulation of highly classified documents. The Standing Group originally had called attention to one element of this same topic in May 1956 (AC/35-D/129 of 2.5.56) inviting downgrading of COSMIC documents. The suggestion had not been acted upon by the Committee. The Chairman proposed the establishment of a working group to address the entire problem. The working group was to be composed of representatives of Denmark, France, the U.K. and the U.S. The Committee agreed. The working group was asked to seek ways to reduce the accumulation of classified records and to seek the best method for allocation of the security grading to a document when it was created. It was to consider downgrading and destroying of superfluous copies, and also the microfilming and indexing of NATO documents to cut back on the accumulation in national registries. The Security Bureau was asked to prepare and circulate a questionnaire in order to collect information on member nations' policies and practices in these areas. The Security Bureau was also asked to draw up a list of subjects with suggested appropriate security grading to serve as an example to guide originators of documents when allocating grading (AC/35-R/21, Item VII, C).

21. In November 1957 the Chairman of the Committee circulated the questionnaire prepared by the Security Bureau on controlling and reducing the volume of classified information and documents (AC/35-D/201 of 5.11.57). National responses¹¹ were examined by the Working Group on the Control of the Volume of Classified Documents in NATO Agencies. Their report (AC/35-WP/13 of 13.1.58) was amended and approved by the Committee (at AC/35-R/22) and circulated on 6th March 1958 (AC/35-D/235).

22. At the Working Group's meeting the Danish delegation again urged the

¹⁰ AC/35-D/152 [DE], D/154 [FR], D/156 [IT], D/161 [GR], D/162 [PO], D/164 [CA] and D/165 [UK].

¹¹ AC/35-D/220 [FR], D/221 [GR], D/222 [GE] D/223 [US], D/224 [IT], D/225 [UK], D/226 [DE], D/228 [CA] and D/231 [NO].

suppression of the classification grading "Restricted" in NATO. When the Working Group's report was circulated the Chairman called attention to this suggestion and solicited comments (AC/35-WP/13). Most of the national responses opposed this suggestion. A second proposal calling for automatic downgrading of COSMIC Top Secret documents after three years was also opposed by most of the nations. When they commented on the Working Group's proposals these and additional suggestions by the U.S. (AC/35-D/281), Portugal (in AC/35-D/250), the Netherlands (in AC/35-D/256) and France (*re.* large scale destruction of unwanted documents) were discussed at the Committee's meeting on 16th and 17th July 1958 (AC/35-R/23, Item IV). The Committee concluded by noting the Chairman's commitment to recommend to the International Staff the various methods proposed and to encourage the use of the one best suited to its particular circumstance. The Committee requested the member countries adopt the proposals made in the documents and at the meeting which seemed to them the most practical. Finally, the member countries were invited to keep the Security Bureau informed of the results (*ibid.*, paragraph 34).

23. A Working Group on Security Education was established by the NATO Security Committee at its meeting on 27th and 28th February 1957. Representatives of Belgium, France, the U.K. and the U.S. were invited to send experts to examine the shooting script of the security training film which had been developed (AC/35-R/19, Item X). The amended shooting script the working group approved was circulated by the Chairman on 28th August 1957 (AC/35-D/190). The Security Education Working Group also prepared a general paper on security education practices (as directed at AC/35-R/20, paragraph 22) which was circulated to national capitals first as a working paper (AC/35-WP/9 of 26.7.57) and then as a final paper (AC/35-D/204 of 12.11.57) as amended and approved by the Committee (at AC/35-R/21, Item II) for guidance to national security authorities.

24. In June 1957 the NATO Security Committee set up a working group with the task of outlining the general shape and extent of the threat to security arising from the use of clandestine listening devices. The working group was to make proposals for defense against such devices. The first meeting of experts was called for early September (AC/35-R/20, paragraphs 32-34).

25. The Working Group on Clandestine Listening Devices (composed of experts from Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, the U.K. and the U.S. submitted a draft paper on the threat with proposed defensive measures on 7th September 1957 (AC/35-WP/11). The Security Committee considered the paper at its meeting on 17th and 18th October 1957 (AC/35-R/21) and approved it without amendment. The Committee also agreed that it should be classified at the NATO Secret level.¹²

26. The NATO Security Committee also considered the question of expanding the responsibility of the Security Bureau into nongovernmental entities at its meeting in July 1958 (AC/35-R/23, Item III). The U.S. representative had called attention to the issue of security policy and procedures in coordinated production and in scientific cooperation (AC/35-D/249 of 2.6.58). Following discussion the Committee concluded that the Security Bureau should be empowered to ask a member nation to arrange a

¹² The document was circulated as AC/35-D/203. The appended aide-memoire for nontechnical searching of premises for discovering eavesdropping devices was regraded NATO Restricted by AC/35-D/358 (DN/101).

visit to a factory or other establishment where NATO classified information was handled. The Security Bureau was tasked to prepare and submit for approval an aide memoir listing the points to be examined in the course of visits to such nongovernmental entities. It was distributed for comment on 19th August 1958 (AC/35-D/263) and approved without change at the Committee's meeting in October 1958 (AC/35-R/24, Item II).

27. The French delegation submitted a request in May 1958 for approval by the NATO Security Committee for opening a COSMIC registry in the French embassy in Moscow (AC/35-D/248). The request was considered by the Committee at its meeting on 16th and 17th July 1958 (AC/35-R/23, Item VI). The Committee concluded that the transmission of NATO documents behind the Iron Curtain was undesirable. The French representative amended his request to include transmittal of only NATO Secret and lower graded documents. But the Committee still was unable to reach agreement. Various approaches were considered, but the only agreement was on the conclusion that the rules and procedures in C-M(55)15(Final) were not sufficiently strict to meet the heightened threat. Consequently the Committee asked the delegations to provide the Security Bureau with a memorandum giving:

- (a) information on the practice of transmitting NATO classified documents to their ambassadors behind the Iron Curtain with information on the types of information usually sent;
- (b) an appraisal of the security dangers and risks incurred by transmitting classified information there;
- (c) a general description of the measures taken by their governments to ensure the protection of secrets in countries behind the Iron Curtain; and
- (d) their views on the whole question.

Their responses¹³ were considered at the Committee's final meeting in 1958.

28. The head of NATO's Political Division made a statement to the Security Committee at its meeting in October 1958 in support of developing a means for sending selected NATO classified documents to NATO missions in Soviet Bloc countries. The Committee accepted the argument and designated a working group (made up of representatives of Belgium, the Netherlands, U.K. and U.S.) to draft a note for submission to the Council describing the risks involved and setting out the supplementary security measures to be taken. The draft was to be prepared and circulated without delay for approval before the next meeting. It was hoped that the instruction would reach the Council by 15th December 1958 (AC/35-R/24, Item V).

29. The working group's draft was submitted first on 5th November 1958 (AC/35-WP/15). A final version approved by the Committee as a report to the Council was not ready until 16th February 1959 (AC/35-WP/15(2nd Revise)).

¹³ AC/35-D/265 [FR], D/267 [DE], D/269 [US], D/270 [IT], D/271 [NE], D/272 [GE] and D/279 [UK].

30. The plethora of amendments and changes to the language of C-M(55)15(Final) caused the NATO Security Committee to direct the Security Bureau to prepare and issue a complete new revised text of the NATO security regulations (AC/35-R/22, Item III). It was published on 31st October 1958 as C-M(55)15(Final Revised).

31. The NATO Security Committee created 289 documents between 1952 and 1958. They are listed in Annex XIII, 1/1 to this report. The rolls of microfilm containing each document is indicated in that annex. Only nine of these documents were downgraded to Unclassified in 1964 (DN/182 and DN/204). The Committee also published a single memorandum (AC/35-M/1 of 28.11.58) on the procedure to be used when withdrawing the security clearance of an International Staff person. It has been listed at the end of Annex XIII, 1/1.

32. Thirty-nine notices were circulated by the Security Committee between 1953 and 1958. Most concerned the dates of meetings. A few concerned other business before the Committee. All but 3 of the AC/35 Committee notices were regraded Unclassified in 1964 (DN/182) and 1973 (DN/472). The declassification and release of the 3 remaining notices (relating to security of infrastructure programs) can be determined by the action taken on the document and subject concerned.

33. Summary records of the 24 meetings held by the NATO Security Committee between March 1953 and October 1958 are listed in Annex XIII, 1/2. A number of important documents were annexed to the meeting records. They also are identified in that listing.

34. The 15 working papers prepared by the Security Bureau, the Standing Group Security Committee and the various working groups established by the NATO Security Committee are listed in Annex XIII, 1/3. Two of the working papers were issued as Unclassified (AC/35-WP/2 and WP/14). Six others were regraded Unclassified in 1974 (AC/35-WP/1, WP/3, WP/4, WP/5, WP/6 and WP/9, authorized by DN(74)3 of 24.1.74).

35. The NATO Security Committee should review all of the documents described in this subpart. The Consultants recommend that all those which remain classified be regraded Unclassified and that they all be released without reservation.

D. Working Group on Cooperation against Subversive Activities (AC/32)

1. The reorganized North Atlantic Treaty Council was considering the establishment of a Security Committee and an Information Policy Committee in May 1952. The Danish delegation submitted a memorandum proposing the extension of cooperation in the security field between the NATO countries beyond those being considered at that time (C-M(52)21 of 23.5.52). The Greek delegation introduced a memorandum on counterpropaganda and action against subversive activities on 13th June 1952 (C-M(52)32). A few days later the Belgian representative submitted a memorandum proposing the establishment of a "Special Committee on Information" to assume the role previously performed by a committee of the same name operating under the Brussels Treaty. The Belgian proposal envisioned three regional groups with

representation on a central body reporting to the Council but with a high degree of freedom to choose the problems with which it decides to deal (C-M(52)34 of 16.6.52).

2. The Secretariat prepared a note - submitted by the Deputy Secretary General on 6th September 1952 - calling the Council's attention to the need to consider appropriate action by NATO to counteract the danger to the common defense effort posed by communist subversive activities. The three varied proposals led to the Secretariat's suggestion that the Council begin by considering four principles which might guide NATO action in this field (C-M(52)72).

3. The Council considered the principles proposed at a meeting on 10th September 1952 at which the U.K. representative stressed that any measures to coordinate efforts within NATO should not prejudice existing bilateral or regional arrangements. The Canadian representative expressed his pleasure that counterpropaganda had been excluded from the principles being considered. He also urged that the pooling of information not be done on a regional basis. He proposed that the Council not commit itself too far in the matter of coordination or organization in advance of any preliminary meeting of experts. The Netherlands representative voiced his opposition to the suggestion of a plurality of committees and expressed his preference for a single committee composed of all member countries. The Council Chairman proposed that since it was the general desire to coordinate activities under NATO that a meeting of experts be convened within the succeeding two months to examine the principles discussed by the Council and to propose the machinery to be set up and the procedures to be followed. It was agreed also by the Council that the principles under discussion would be regarded as guidance rather than as firm policy. The Secretariat was instructed to revise the previous document (C-M(52)72) in accordance with the views discussed (C-R(52)20, Item IV).

4. The revised statement of principles to guide the cooperation against subversive activities was circulated to the Council by the Secretary General on 26th September 1952. The guidance clearly stated that the committee (or committees) should deal with action against subversive activities only and that questions connected with counter-propaganda or political issues should be dealt with by other appropriate NATO agencies. Activities were to be practical - arranging for exchanges of information and providing a forum for discussion of principles and methods to prevent and counteract international subversive activities. It was expected that these efforts would increase the effectiveness of national services without interfering with their operations. The committee (or committees) would report to the Council which would provide general direction. A meeting of the expert working group was called for 20th October 1952 (C-M(52)84).

5. Experts from 12 nations met in Paris on 20th October 1952 under the chairmanship of Mr. G. Walravens (Belgium). The previous documents were commented upon briefly. It was agreed quickly that for the time being the aim should be to exchange general information on the methods used by hostile forces in their efforts to infiltrate, to obtain information to be used in a manner detrimental to NATO's purposes, and in general to carry out subversive activities. It was agreed also that information on concrete cases normally could be handled best on a bilateral or regional basis and that NATO-wide cooperation should be aimed initially at an exchange of views and

information on more general questions. The majority felt that only one central committee should be established although the possibility of later creating similar subcommittees to examine questions of regional interest should not be excluded. The AC/32 Working Group considered and rejected a proposal to establish a permanent subcommittee of experts to carry out day-to-day business and to prepare the meetings of the main committee. The majority felt that general cooperation had to be developed before a more permanent body could be organized. No recommendation was made concerning the idea of creating a small secretariat staffed with specialists from national services as it was felt that it was too early to consider this approach (AC/32-R/1, Items II and III).

6. A first draft of the report by the Working Group on Cooperation against Subversive Activities was circulated for comment on 21st October 1952 (AC/32-D/1). A revised report incorporating amendments suggested by delegations was circulated on 4th November 1952 (AC/32-D/1(Revised)). Without further amendment it was published as a Council document on 27th November 1952 (C-M(52)110).

7. The Working Group recommended that the new committee proposed for Council approval should be called the "NATO Special Information Committee." It felt that this noncommittal name avoided any reference to the special task of the Committee (paragraph 10 of C-M(52)110). The draft terms of reference stated that the Committee was to serve as a forum for the exchange of information between member governments on experiences in their efforts to counteract subversive activities and to discuss and exchange information on ways and means of counteracting and uncovering such activities. It was expected that the Committee would meet twice yearly or whenever business required special sessions be held. The Committee was to report to the Council on the progress of its work. It was to make recommendations about steps in furtherance of its objectives either to the Council or by national delegations directly to their respective governments (*Ibid.*, Annex).

8. The Council discussed the AC/32 Working Group report and its recommendations at a meeting on 3rd December 1952. The U.K. representative urged the use of another name for the Committee since the term "Information" was misleading. The Council decided that the Committee's name should be changed to "Special Committee." The other recommendations were approved without change (C-R(52)31, Item III).

9. The two documents (AC/32-D/1 and D/1(Revised)) and the summary record of the only meeting held by the Working Group on Cooperation against Subversive Activities (on microfilm roll 58) should be reviewed for declassification (they are classified as NATO Confidential) and release by the NATO Special Committee which should advise the Council of its determination. The Consultants recommend their release without reservation.

F. Working Group on the Handling of Military Shipments in International Trade Statistics (AC/81)

1. The United States delegation submitted a 12-page memorandum on the handling of military shipments in international trade statistics which was circulated as Council document C-M(54)45 on 14th May 1954. It was considered briefly by the

Council at its meeting on 19th May 1954 (C-R(54)22, Item III) and further at its meeting on 2nd June 1954 (C-R(54)24, Item II). The Secretariat was charged with the responsibility for organizing a meeting of experts to examine the problems identified in the U.S. memorandum. The Secretariat called for a meeting on 21st June 1954 and at the same time circulated a copy of the U.S. memorandum to the delegates (AC/51-D/1 of 15.6.54).

2. The U.S. memorandum called attention to the fact that to some extent the public release of foreign trade statistics revealed information that should be concealed on security grounds. Most countries were imposing certain restraints on the publication of such information but the application of these ad hoc security measures was uncoordinated and consequently ineffective and almost always reduced the value of the trade statistics. The problem was to devise methods of publishing international trade statistics in such a manner that strategic information relating to the shipment of military goods was adequately concealed and that at the same time the usefulness and comparability of trade statistics was not unnecessarily impaired (AC/81-D/1, paragraphs 1-3).

3. The possible solutions identified in the U.S. memorandum included:
- (a) omission from all countries' statistics of selected agreed-upon lists of military end-items;
 - (b) omission from the statistics of all shipments under particular programs; and
 - (c) adjusting the present procedures to meet security as well as statistical needs (AC/81-D/1, paragraphs 36-40).

4. The AC/81 Working Group met in Paris for three days in June 1954. Mr. J.S. Orme of the International Staff served as the Chairman. Representatives from 11 countries attended as did a representative from the Standing Group Liaison Office. The Group examined the U.S. memorandum in detail and readily agreed on several principles and approaches. The International Staff under the direction of the Chairman developed a draft report to the Council which was considered and twice revised¹⁴ during the course of the meeting. The only meeting of the AC/81 Working Group concluded by agreeing on an amended text to the second revised draft and instructed the International Staff, when the Chairman's report had been approved by the Council, to send a letter to delegations clarifying certain implementing details such as the number of copies to be provided by each country and the date when this should be done (AC/81-R/1, paragraphs 44-47).

5. The amended report by the Chairman of the AC/81 Working Group was presented to the Council as C-M(54)54 on 25th June 1954. The Council approved its recommendations at its meeting on 16th July 1954 (C-R(54)28, Item III).

6. The International Staff prepared and circulated a questionnaire in the

¹⁴ AC/81-WP/1 of 21.6.54, WP/1(1st Revise) of 22.6.54, and WP/1(2nd Revise) of 23.6.54.

name of the AC/81 Working Group which was intended to ensure an element of comparability in the presentation of statistics on trade in military commodities which also assured the safeguarding of NATO's security interests. The member countries were invited to prepare statements of statistics made available to the public on their trade in 1953 in items where the reporting countries considered that questions of security arise or might arise. Since one of the purposes of these statements was to assist member countries in determining whether information that should be withheld for security reasons could be derived by comparison with the statistics of their trading partners, they needed to be presented in a common pattern. A suggested format was submitted for possible use or to ensure that any statement furnished included the items of information indicated on it. The countries also were asked to include a short memorandum explaining the general principles on which their statistical information was prepared and particularly to indicate the methods of concealment employed and the commodities which had been omitted for security reasons (AC/81-D/2 of 20.10.54).

7. Reports were submitted by 9 countries. They ranged in details from simple statements (2 pages from Turkey) to long and detailed tables (37 pages from the U.S.).¹⁵ It was left to each country to initiate discussions with any other NATO country or countries concerned whenever it appeared that security might be compromised owing to any discrepancy in procedure for the presentation of trade statistics (C-M(54)54, paragraph 5 (iii)).

8. The NATO Security Committee (AC/35) should review for declassification and release the 11 documents, 2 notices, the summary record of the single meeting and the 3 working papers created by the Working Group on the Handling of Military Shipments in International Trade Statistics (AC/81). These documents have never been reviewed for downgrading purposes. About half are classified as NATO Confidential and the remainder as NATO Restricted. All 17 are listed in Annex XIII, 3 to this report and are on microfilm roll 136.

9. The Security Committee should notify the Council of its determination as to the declassification and release of the AC/81 Working Group records. The Consultants recommend that they all be released without reservation.

G. Working Group on Security Arrangements in Connection with the Paris Steering Group on the Results of the London Conference (AC/84)

1. The nonratification of the EDC Treaty by the French Parliament in September 1954 caused the North Atlantic Council to consider convening a ministerial level meeting of the Council as soon as possible to consider the steps necessary to assure a German contribution to the defense of the West. Such a meeting, however, had to await developments of the preparatory work which was to be carried out by the London Conference of the Nine Powers which opened on 28th September.¹⁶

¹⁵ AC/81-D/3 through D/11. All are listed in Annex XIII, 3. The reporting countries were BE, CA, DE, IT, NE, NO, TU, UK and US.

¹⁶ C-R(54)31, Item I (meeting on 7.9.54), GR(54)32, Annex (meeting on 9.9.54) and CR(54)34, Item II (meeting on 16.9.54).

2. The Nine Power Conference in London concluded its work on 3rd October 1954. In its Final Act (NPC(54)59 of 3.10.54), the Conference agreed that representatives of the governments concerned should work out urgently the texts of detailed agreements to give effect to the principles laid down at the London Conference. These were to be submitted to the North Atlantic Council and to the four Governments directly concerned with the future status of the Federal Republic, that is, by the three occupying powers and the government of the Federal Republic (Article VI of the Final Act).

3. Sir Christopher Steel, U.K. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, was appointed by the Chairman of the London Conference to chair the Steering Group in Paris to work out the detailed proposals for approval by the Council for a German defense contribution and also arrangements to be applied to SACEUR's forces on the Continent. Sir Christopher briefed the Council on the tasks and the proposed schedule at a meeting on 5th October 1954. It was agreed that the Paris Steering Group would consist of the nine powers represented at the London Conference and the other six NATO member countries with advisers from the civilian and military agencies of NATO. The Council also agreed that the work would be performed in the Palais de Chaillot and the Group would be served by the Secretariat of NATO. The U.S. representative at that meeting suggested that at their next meeting the following day, the question of security of the information that could be released to the German representatives on the Steering Group would have to be examined (Annex to C-R(54)36, paragraphs 4 and 6).

4. At the Council's meeting on 6th October 1954, the U.S. representative made proposals in connection with the security arrangements to cover those documents which it might be necessary to give to the German Federal authorities in connection with the Paris Steering Group and its Working Parties in the Palais de Chaillot. The Council agreed that a working group, with a member of the International Staff in the Chair should meet later that same day to consider the point raised by the U.S. representative. The working group was to be composed of representatives of delegations interested in the problem and representatives of SACEUR and the Standing Group (Annex to C-R(54)37, Item II).

5. The AC/84 Working Group on Security Arrangements in Connection with the Paris Steering Group on the Results of the London Conference met just once - on 6th October 1954. The Executive Secretary, R.D. Coleridge, chaired the meeting. Representatives from 8 countries and also from the Standing Group Liaison Office and SHAPE participated. The Head of Security Bureau, J. Brunet, also attended.

6. The Chairman introduced a draft procedure of a provisional nature which was intended to enable NATO classified material to be passed - on a need-to-know basis - to the authorities of the Federal Republic of Germany. SACEUR's proposed amendments to the draft were considered also. The AC/84 Working Group concluded its business by endorsing the proposed procedures together with the draft of a letter from the Chairman of the Steering Group to the head of the German delegation requesting his formal acceptance of the procedures. Unless a delegation raised an objection by 9 a.m. the following day, the letter was to be dispatched and the provisions to become effective upon receiving an affirmative response from the German

delegation (AC/84-R/1, Interim security arrangements, paragraphs 1-3; see also RDC/522/54 of 6.10.54).

7. The procedures to be employed were laid out in the "Report by the Chairman" and again in the "Draft Letter." Both documents were annexed to the summary record of the meeting (AC/84-R/1). This document was circulated to the Council on 8th October 1954 as "Procedure for the Release of NATO Classified Information to the Paris Steering Group" under a covering note from the Secretary General. In his note the Secretary General called attention to the AC/84 Working Group's recommendation that these provisions remain in effect until after the Ministerial meeting later that month. After that meeting the Council would be invited to instruct the Security Committee to examine the long-term problem of providing NATO information to the Federal Republic of Germany and the desirability of an inspection of German security arrangements (C-M(54)77, paragraph 4). The letter from the head of the German delegation giving the requested assurance regarding the observance of the security rules was annexed to this paper (Annex C to C-M(54)77).

8. The Council noted the arrangement at its meeting on 13th October 1954 and agreed that after the ministerial meeting the Security Committee should examine the long-term problems involved (C-R(54)38, Item II).

9. The summary record of the AC/84 Working Group meeting on 6th October 1954 with its annexes is on microfilm roll 136. It is classified as NATO Secret. The NATO Security Committee should review this document for declassification and release and inform the Council of its determination. The Consultants recommend its release without reservation.

H. Working Group on Proposed Agreement for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information (AC/88)

1. The Deputy Secretary General circulated a letter on 2nd December 1954 from the U.S. Permanent Representative together with a proposed agreement for cooperation regarding the sharing of information on the military uses of atomic materials (C-M(54)113). The document was considered at a restricted meeting of the Council the following day. The U.S. representative introduced the document and expressed the hope that an agreement for cooperation on the lines of the draft he had submitted could be prepared and initialed by the Ministers at the ministerial meetings scheduled for 17th and 18th December 1954. He stated the intention, after initialling, that the agreement should be declassified. He also stated the intention of asking that certain parts of the record of the Council at which this subject was discussed also be declassified (C-R(54)46, paragraph 1).

2. The implementation of such an agreement faced the Alliance with new security problems. The NATO Security Committee and the Standing Group were considering then a revision of the security regulations to meet the new requirements. The U.S. view was that implementation of the agreement could not take place until the revised security regulations had been approved by the Council (*Ibid.*, paragraph 2).

3. The Council agreed to appoint a working group to discuss the draft

agreement and to report to the Council as early as possible and in any event, before the ministerial meeting. The working group was directed to hold its first meeting the following week under a chairman to be nominated by the Secretary General. The Secretary General subsequently nominated Mr. V. Chapin, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs (*ibid.*, paragraph 5).

4. The first meeting of the AC/88 Working Group on Proposed Agreement for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information on 9th December 1954 identified a number of problems relating to the form in which it was presented. The U.S. representative was invited to examine with his authorities the comments and suggestions which had been made by several delegations (AC/88-R/1).

5. When the Council met on 17th December 1954, the U.S. representative informed the Council that it was clear from the discussion held at the first meeting of the AC/88 Working Group that it would not be possible to prepare an agreement in time for initialling at the ministerial meeting (C-R(54)49, Item X).

6. A revised version of the draft agreement was presented to the AC/88 Working Group by the U.S. delegation on 18th January 1955. This revised version took into account the comments of the other delegations. Among other changes, this version deleted any reference to an Annex. Instead, the Annex would be presented for signature concurrently with the Agreement and would remain Secret. A revised version of this secret Annex was also attached (AC/88-WP/1, Note by the US delegation covering revised draft Agreement).

7. The U.S. delegation proposed that when the Working Group reached agreement, the Council should by formal resolution note the text with approval and propose the Agreement to the U.S. authorities so that they might take the necessary preliminary steps under the U.S. Atomic Energy Act which would enable the President to sign the Agreement. The final validating action by other countries whether by signature or ratification, could not take place under the Act until after a period of thirty days during which period the Agreement would rest before the Joint Atomic Energy Committee of the U.S. Congress (*ibid.*, paragraph 3).

8. The revised text of the Agreement (AC/88-WP/1) was considered in detail at a meeting of the Working Group on 21st January 1955. Several amendments were suggested and the U.S. representative undertook to communicate them to his authorities (AC/88-R/2, paragraph 17). During the discussion the Working Group was informed that the Security Committee was meeting the following week to consider the revised NATO Security Regulations as approved by the Standing Group and the Military Representatives Committee (which resulted in C-M(55)15(Final) described in section . of this Part). In response to a question on the transmission of atomic information to the NATO, the U.S. representative pointed out that the "need-to-know" rule would govern the transmission of information to clearly identified recipients (*ibid.*, paragraphs 8-18).

9. The Italian delegation and others foresaw legislative difficulties arising if the final text cited NATO as a party to the Agreement inasmuch as its proposed text gave the Organization an international juridical personality which some legal authorities felt it did not possess. The U.S. representative's response was that under the

agreement NATO would be assuming obligations for its constituent civil and military bodies and that in fact NATO was a juridical entity with power to accept such obligations (*Ibid.*, paragraphs 13 and 14).

10. The AC/88 Working Group met again on 2nd February 1955. The U.S. representative proposed a revised version of the preamble previously proposed by the Netherlands delegation. Other amendments were discussed also and accepted, and additional suggestions and problems were raised. Finally, the U.S. representative tabled a provisional text of a draft resolution for approval by the Council. The delegations would have to seek instructions before the procedures could be agreed. The Secretariat was invited to circulate a revised text of the agreement incorporating the changes which had been agreed (AC/88-R/3). A second revise of the draft text of the agreement was circulated promptly as AC/88-WP/2 (the English version of 3.2.55, while the French version was circulated on 8.2.55). The Secretariat also drafted a report by the Chairman of the Working Group to the Council (AC/88-WP/3 of 7.2.55) for consideration by the Working Group at its next meeting (AC/88-R/3).

11. The fourth meeting of the AC/88 Working Group was held on 9th February 1955. The revised text was considered and approved subject to a reservation and the U.S. authorities' acceptance of two other changes to meet juridical questions (a third revised draft text of the agreement was circulated as AC/88-WP/4 of 11.2.55). The Working Group also adopted the draft resolution as amended in the discussion (the revised version was circulated as AC/88-WP/5 on 11.2.55) and the draft report to the Council as amended in the discussion (the revised version was circulated as AC/88-WP/6 of 11.2.55).

12. When the AC/88 Working Group met on 18th February 1955 it was agreed that the draft report to the Council including the draft resolution and the text of the draft Agreement, the secret Annex and an Annex incorporating key definitions of terms drawn from the U.S.A. Atomic Energy Act, should be submitted to the Council for consideration at its next meeting. The understanding was that the Council would give prior approval to the revised security regulations before the report was considered (AC/88-R/5, paragraph 3). At the same meeting the Working Group agreed that the summary records of its meetings would remain Secret inasmuch as the U.S. delegation had withdrawn its request (at the preceding meeting) to prepare a version for use in presenting the Agreement to the Congress (*Ibid.*, paragraphs 4 and 7).

13. The report was presented to the Council as C-M(55)21 on 18th February 1955. On 23rd February 1955 the Chairman of the Working Group circulated an unnumbered memorandum to the Working Group. The memorandum noted that as a result of a comprehensive review in Washington of the final text of the draft "Agreement for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information," the U.S. delegation proposed three changes in the language of the text. A meeting was scheduled to consider these proposals and to permit the U.S. delegation to raise other questions orally. When the Council met on 23rd February 1955, the U.S. representative informed his colleagues that certain amendments to the Agreement were to be considered further by the Working Group and the matter was deferred to the next meeting of the Council (C-R(55)7, Item V).

14. At the AC/88 Working Group's last meeting on 25th February 1955, the U.S. representative explained that his authorities felt it was imperative to include specific references to Article 144 b of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act in the Agreement. The representatives of the other governments were prepared to accept the amendments submitted. The U.S. delegation also requested reconsideration of the procedure for public release of the text of the Agreement. Several minor amendments were inserted into the French text of the draft Agreement at the request of the French and Luxembourg representatives. The Working Group concluded its business by asking the Secretariat to produce a revised version of C-M(55)21 as agreed in their discussion (AC/88-R/6).

15. The revised text was circulated on 26th February 1955 (C-M(55)21(Revised) with a corrigendum of 1.3.55). The Council considered the report and its revised annexes at its meeting on 2nd March 1955 (C-R(55)8, Item IV). The draft resolution was adopted. The Council agreed to declassify the text of the Agreement and of the Resolution at a date to be decided later by the Council. The annex on the types of atomic information which might be transferred by the U.S. Government was to remain Secret. Each country was asked to inform the Secretariat as soon as it was ready to sign under the terms of its constitutional requirement (*Ibid.*, paragraph 21). These conclusions were restated in C-M(55)31 on 10th March 1955 along with the final version of the Resolution, the Agreement, a separate text of the Annex to the Agreement and the extracts from the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

16. The Council agreed on the timetable for public release of the text of the Agreement at its meeting on 23rd March 1955 (C-R(55)10, Item III). The Secretaries of delegations were informed of the release to the press on 13th April 1955 by the Executive Secretary on 7th April 1955 (RDC/175/55; the NATO Information Division release is Press Release(55)6). The German representative - who had not participated in the development of the Agreement - was invited to sign it along with the others (RDC/235/55 of 9.5.55). The agreement was signed by the representatives of all the member countries at the end of their meeting on 22nd June 1955.¹⁷

17. Under the terms of the Agreement the Government of the United States stipulated the procedures for the transfer of U.S. Atomic Information to NATO and for reporting on the uses made of that information. These procedures were circulated to the Council on 10th September 1955 (C-M(55)78). The Council took note of the document on 21st September 1955 (C-R(55)38).

18. By the end of November 1955 the governments of Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Luxembourg and United Kingdom informed the U.S. Government that they had taken the action necessary to bind themselves by the terms of the Agreement (C-R(55)53, Item IV). By mid-January all except Iceland and Turkey had taken the necessary steps. On 11th April 1956 the Council recorded the fact that the NATO Agreement for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information had entered into force on 29th March 1956 when Turkey notified the U.S. of its adherence, and that all NATO nations and agencies, both civil and military, were bound by its terms (C-R(56)14, Item V, meeting on 11.4.56). The final text of the release to the press of the entering into

¹⁷ C-R(55)26, Item III, meeting on 15.6.55, set out the plan for the signing ceremony. The signing is recorded in the summary record of the meeting held on 22.6.55, C-R(55)26, Item III.

force of the Agreement was agreed by the Council at its meeting on 25th January 1956 (C-R(56)3, Item IV). The NATO press release was issued on 10th April 1956 (RDC/155/56).

19. Primary attention was given to the effective strategic deterrent inherent in the U.S. superiority in nuclear weapons. It was this broad category of information which was shared within the NATO military commands under the 1955 Agreement. (A great variety of information on the effects of nuclear explosions which was not of the "Restricted Data" category, was released to NATO civil agencies for use in emergency planning.) By 1957, however, the strategic situation changed as the Soviet Union developed a large nuclear striking force. At the same time U.S. scientists developed smaller tactical nuclear weapons. The availability of such weapons meant that the Alliance could obtain an additional direct deterrent to Soviet attack upon European territory. The President and Secretary of State expounded on this "shield" effect at the NATO Council meetings in December 1957.

20. The U.S. recognized that there could not be nuclear-capable NATO forces nor the necessary military planning for their use without the furnishing of the NATO allies with more nuclear know-how than was then possible under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The U.S. Congress was asked to amend the law to enable the U.S. to exchange information and to supply certain nuclear materials which would enhance the common defense planning in NATO and permit training of NATO forces so that in the event of hostilities those forces could effectively use nuclear weapons. On 29th January 1958 the U.S. representative informed the Council that proposals for certain amendments to the Atomic Energy Act had been submitted and were being studied by a Senate Subcommittee (C-R(58)6, Item IV). The amendments were approved.

21. The Anglo-American Agreement for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes was signed on 3rd July 1958. By mid-1959 the U.S. had entered into bilateral agreements - in accordance with the amendments to section 144 b of the Atomic Energy Act - on the exchange of atomic information and training with Canada, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Greece and Turkey.

22. The 6 summary records of meetings and 6 working papers created by the AC/88 Working Group were classified originally at the Secret level. All were downgraded to NATO Confidential by DN/297 of 30.10.67 which downgraded AC/88-R/1, or DN/287 of 30.6.67 which downgraded all of the remaining records and working papers. All are on microfilm roll 136.

23. The NATO Security Committee should review the records created by the AC/88 Working Group for declassification and release. The Committee should inform the Council of its determination. The Consultants recommend their release without reservation.