The Committee of Three-Le comité des Trois Sages

Terms of Reference
Mandat

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Rapports

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Rapports des députés

Report of the Committee of Three
Rapport du comité des Trois Sages
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| CT-R/12    | 20/09/1956 | Report of the consultation with Portugal on 17 Sept 1956
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The Committee of Three:

- Mr Halvard Lange
- Prof. Gaetano Makino
- Mr L. B. Pearson
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The Committee of Three: from left to right, Mr Halvard Lange, Prof. Gaetano Makino, and Mr L. B. Pearson.
Summary Record of a meeting of the Council held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, XVIe., on Saturday, 5th May, 1956, at 3 p.m.

PRESENT
Chairman: H.E. Mr. K. Gudmundsson (Iceland)
Vice-Chairman and Secretary General: The Lord Ismay

BELGIUM
H.E. Mr. P.H. Spaak (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. A. de Staercke (Permanent Representative)

CANADA
The Hon. L.B. Pearson (Secretary of State for External Affairs)
H.E. Mr. L.D. Wilgess (Permanent Representative)

DENMARK
H.E. Mr. H.C. Hansen (Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. M.A. Wassard (Permanent Representative)

FRANCE
H.E. Mr. C. Pineau (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. A. Parodi (Permanent Representative)

GERMANY
H.E. Mr. H. von Brentano (Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. H. Blankenhorn (Permanent Representative)

GREECE
H.E. Mr. S. Theotoky (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. M. Melas (Permanent Representative)

ICELAND
H.E. Mr. H.G. Andersen (Permanent Representative)

ITALY
H.E. Mr. G. Martino (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. A. Alessandrini (Permanent Representative)
LUXEMBOURG
H.E. Mr. J. Bech (Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. N. Hommel (Permanent Representative)

NETHERLANDS
H.E. Mr. J.W. Beyen (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
Jonkheer A.W.L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer (Permanent Representative)

NORWAY
H.E. Mr. H. Lange (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. J. Boyesen (Permanent Representative)

PORTUGAL
Prof. Dr. P. Cunha (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
Count de Tovar (Permanent Representative)

TURKEY
H.E. Mr. Fuat Köprülü (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. Nuri Birgi (Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

UNITED KINGDOM
The Rt. Hon. Selwyn Lloyd (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)
Sir Christopher Steel (Permanent Representative)

UNITED STATES
H.E. Mr. J. Foster Dulles (Secretary of State)
H.E. Mr. G.W. Perkins (Permanent Representative)

INTERNATIONAL STAFF
Baron A. Bentinck (Deputy Secretary General)
Mr. G. Cosmelli (Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs)
Mr. F.D. Gregh (Assistant Secretary General for Economics and Finance)
Mr. J. Murray Mitchell (Assistant Secretary General for Production and Logistics)
The Lord Coleridge (Executive Secretary)

ALSO PRESENT
General D.H. Buchanan (Standing Group Liaison Office)
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I. CONTINUATION OF THE DISCUSSION ON THE SURVEY OF ARTICLE 2 ACTIVITIES

1. Mr. THEOTOKY (Greece) thought that the Council should concentrate its attention on three distinct fields. First, in the military field, it should be noted that Stalinist principles were still honoured in Russia and that the military threat therefore retained its absolute priority. Hence it was important to maintain the defence effort, even if it were supposed that a real change in Soviet policy was likely.

2. In the political field, the problems were of two types. First there was the problem of Atlantic policy towards the USSR. It was difficult to devise a procedure whereby a common Atlantic policy could be pursued, but it should be possible to concert the activities of NATO as far as Russia was concerned, and Russia should understand that she was dealing, not merely with a transient figure, but with an enduring concert of nations.

3. Then there was the problem of the policies of the members of the Alliance in regard to one another: where real or potential conflicts existed it was important to examine them either when they arose or, even better, in advance, so as to create harmony in the ranks of NATO. For this purpose it might be considerable to set up a co-ordinating body.

4. Finally, there was the problem of extending commitments under Article 2 of the Treaty. No doubt to meet the new trends in Soviet policy it would be desirable to contribute to the economic development of the less prosperous countries. It was also true that even in NATO there were underdeveloped countries which were already called on to make heavy sacrifices in the name of joint defence, and on which it was proposed to make further demands under Article 2.

5. He thought it would be undesirable to set up a new body to implement decisions taken under Article 2 when other international organizations already existed which were competent in matters of economic and technical aid. That said, it was up to NATO to draw up under Article 2 an order of priority whereby aid to the less prosperous NATO countries would take priority over that which should be given to other underdeveloped countries.

6. Mr. von BRENTANO (Germany) said that he could support the draft resolution submitted by the Italian Delegation. He proposed a drafting amendment which was accepted by the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

7. The COUNCIL:

took note of the statements by the Greek and German Foreign Ministers.
II. DISCUSSION OF THE SECOND DRAFT OF THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE PREPARED BY THE WORKING GROUP

Document: FC/2

8. There was discussion of the wording of the paragraph of the above document, dealing with ways of improving political consultation among members of NATO, and of the paragraph of the document dealing with methods of implementing Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

9. The COUNCIL:

invited the Working Group on the Final Communiqué to prepare a third draft in the light of the observations made by Ministers during the course of discussion.

III. NATO INFORMATION POLICY

Reference document: C-M(56)18

10. Mr. PEARSON (Canada) underlined the importance of information and propaganda within the general field of NATO's activities. The NATO countries had not yet succeeded in informing their public opinion, let alone that of the neutral or uncommitted nations, of the importance of the part played by NATO in preserving freedom. This was not an easy task for the best information could not be fully effective unless the policies and actions to which it related provided a sound foundation for it. He thought that most NATO governments had not yet recognised the part to be played by NATO as an international information agency. This was unfortunate because the efficiency of national information was impaired by lack of co-ordination on the international plane. NATO should therefore consider what further progress could be made with a view to co-ordinating or centralising to a greater degree information on all matters of common interest. Of primary significance in this field was the fact that the danger of military aggression had not yet disappeared. Stress should also be laid upon the interdependence of all NATO nations and that weakness within the smallest of these nations was a weakness in the entire Alliance. Co-ordination of information was also necessary in the case of disputes between NATO nations.

11. In conclusion, NATO's action in the field of information could be greatly improved if it devoted more resources to this end. If the desire to co-ordinate information activities and to encourage them were increased and if closer contact were maintained between the various national information agencies and NATO, much more could be achieved.

12. Mr. LANGE (Norway) suggested that public opinion might be able to familiarise itself better with what NATO did if, occasionally, a meeting of Foreign Ministers were held in a NATO capital other than Paris. In order to limit expenditure, such meetings might be held on a restricted basis as regards the size of delegations.
13. THE COUNCIL:
   (1) took note of document C-R(56)18;
   (2) took note of the statement by the Canadian Representative recorded in paragraphs 10 and 11 above;
   (3) invited the Permanent Council to consider the suggestion put forward by the Norwegian Representative recorded in paragraph 12 above.

IV. TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE GROUP OF THREE MINISTERS

14. There was general agreement that certain paragraphs of a draft terms of reference for the "three wise men" could be incorporated in the final communiqué. It was also agreed that the points dealt with in the first two paragraphs of the draft were covered in the draft already submitted by the Working Group on the Final Communiqué.

15. Mr. LANGE (Norway) thought that the Council should reflect very seriously before deciding to appoint a Ministerial committee with such wide terms of reference. He suggested that the Council in Permanent Session should examine the problem and report back to a Ministerial Meeting which might be held in a couple of months' time.

16. A number of Ministers pointed out that there had been a leakage with regard to the provisional proposal to set up a committee of three Ministers, and that the hand of the Council was therefore in effect forced. Terms of reference of the Ministerial committee must be dealt with in the communiqué, since the decision to establish the Working Group was public property.

17. The COUNCIL:
   invited the Working Group on the Final Communiqué to work out a procedure for incorporating appropriate references to the Ministerial Working Group in the final communiqué.

V. DISCUSSION OF OTHER MATTERS OF COMMON CONCERN IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

A. North Africa

18. Mr. PINEAU (France) said that for three reasons the French Government was glad to see North Africa appearing on the Agenda of the present session. NATO, unlike UNO, was an Alliance within the close ranks of which it was normal for member governments to explain their national problems. Secondly, North Africa was so important for the security of the free nations that it was impossible for NATO to remain indifferent to the problems of security in that area. Lastly, the French Government had required NATO's assistance in view of the fact that it had removed troops stationed in Germany and sent them to North Africa.
19. The defence of the eastern frontiers was less seriously affected than might at first appear. There had been no change in two of the three points which constituted France's principal commitments—interceptor fighters and radar cover of the territory. On the third point, the commitment concerning ground forces in Germany, the reduction was about eight thousand men. It should be noted in this connection that the French Government had made a considerable effort, by calling up certain classes of reservists.

20. In the case of Morocco and Tunisia, the French Government wished to follow a very liberal policy and had granted independence to these two countries. They had only retained the notion of inter-dependence lest the political power of these countries should prove unable to exercise itself throughout their territories.

21. For various reasons the French Government did not consider it possible to make the same gesture in regard to Algeria.

22. The Algerian political situation had always been different from that of Morocco and of Tunisia. Quite apart from the legal argument of the division of Algeria into French departments, it should be noted that at no time in history had Algeria possessed national sovereignty, a national government or even a national administration. If therefore France were to relinquish its power in Algeria, she would leave an almost complete void.

23. Moreover, for France to be able to conclude a political agreement, there would have to be someone with whom to negotiate. In Morocco, France had negotiated with the Sovereign and the representatives of political parties such as the Istiqlal and the Democratic Independence Party, which were representative of a large proportion of the population. In Tunisia there had always been a legitimate Sovereign, the Bey, and France had also been able to negotiate with the representatives of an important political party, the Neo-Destour.

24. In Algeria on the other hand, the sovereignty belonged to France; there was no party representative of public opinion. The sole activity of the opposition elements which had emerged had been to set ambushes for French troops and to launch attacks against the Moslem and European civilian population. There was therefore no one with whom they could negotiate as they had done in Morocco and in Tunisia.

25. Another important factor was the existence of a large population of European origin (1,200,000) established in Algeria for over a century in some cases. This population, far from being of exclusively French origin, also included Algerians of Spanish, Italian or Maltese origin. Algeria was the homeland of these peoples and if they had to leave they would be unlikely to find in France the homeland, social
conditions and general background they required. These 1,200,000 Algerians of European origin were at present living in a state of extreme unrest; they were prepared to go to all ends and even resort to violent action, in order to avoid being driven out of the country. It was, moreover, in the interest of the French Government, for its part, to avoid the risk of a conflict between the two sections of the population which might degenerate into a desperate civil war.

26. In order to ensure the peaceful co-existence of the two sections of the population, various solutions might be considered. If the solution advocated by the National Army of Liberation were adopted, the result would be to create an independent Algeria based on the domination of the Moslem majority and on a minority of European origin. In order to avoid the inevitable bloodshed this would produce, the only solution (which was moreover already beginning to win some support both in Algeria and in France) would be to divide Algeria into two parts: the one, with the European population in the majority, would include large cities such as Algiers and Oran and the coastal region connecting them; the other, with the Moslem population in the majority, would cover the hinterland areas which were economically much poorer. This solution would produce a system very similar to the one adopted for Israel and would entail for North Africa conflicting factors of the same type as those now prevalent in the Middle East. This explained the French Government's strong objections to a solution which meant cutting the country in two.

27. The French Government was, therefore, in favour of a settlement which would not be dictated by France but which would be discussed with representative elements of the population which could emerge only from free elections. It would be very difficult to organize any such elections in the present state of unrest. It was this situation which had led up to the military action designed to diminish the state of unrest and to create a situation in which it would be possible to arrange for elections under a single electoral system. It would then be the French Government's intention to work out a status of co-existence. The French Government would doubtless envisage some kind of federal arrangement by which Algeria could acquire a status similar to that of the German Länder or of the American States. Some measure of autonomy would be assured for the Moslem population and relations would be established with France for the benefit of the population of French origin and in order to maintain order.

28. The French Government would let no opportunity pass of bringing about a peaceful settlement of the present problems. It was extremely anxious, both in the interests of France and in those of the rest of the free world, to put an end to this grievous and costly conflict.

29. The COUNCIL:

took note of the statement by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.
B. The Middle East

30. Mr. KÖPRÜLLÜ (Turkey) said that the political situation in the Middle East continued to be troubled, and dangerous to the stability of the free world. Local factors of discord and the susceptibility of certain countries which had recently acquired their independence, in addition to the fact that the entire area was underdeveloped, created a fertile field for subversive activities. Soviet Russia took full advantage of the situation by attempting to divide the Middle East countries. Moreover, certain countries, and in particular Egypt, pursued a policy which, although aiming at something different, ended by supporting Russian policy. Moscow was quite happy to leave the work to these countries.

31. The Baghdad Pact was at present the only instrument of defence against Russian penetration, and the only source of hope for those countries which desired the welfare and stability of the Middle East. It had therefore come under violent criticism not only by Moscow but also by the Egyptian leaders and those who followed in their steps in the name of neutralism. There could be no doubt, however, that those who opposed the Baghdad Pact by all the means in their power were only trying to create antagonism and to bring to a head conflict in that region. Those who criticised the Baghdad Pact as being responsible for tension in the Middle East should be reminded that it had come into being as a consequence of that tension and not as a cause. The second meeting of the Ministers of the Baghdad Pact, which had recently been held in Teheran, showed the remarkable results already achieved by that organization in the industrial, economic and military field as well as for the defence of that region.

32. He then spoke of the disquieting situation in Afghanistan where the Russians had succeeded in establishing means of penetrating that country through economic and political channels. The strained relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan constituted a danger to peace which Turkey was doing its best to eliminate. He would shortly accompany the Turkish Prime Minister in a visit to Afghanistan and he hoped that, although they might not be able to do much, they would at least succeed in arresting Russian infiltration in that country.

33. Mr. FOSTER DULLES (United States) explained the policy followed by the United States in respect of the tension between Israel and its Arab neighbours. The United States was running the risk of being drawn into a "prestige" conflict in support of Israel against Egypt, backed by the USSR. There were, in fact, certain elements in the United States who wished to give the maximum aid to Israel who was a potential enemy of Egypt - a tool of the Communists. It was clear, however, that such a development would cause extreme danger to world peace and, although it was difficult to hold the scales even in the United States during an electoral year, his Government was most anxious to avoid any action which might involve it in any kind of prestige contest. Although it fully understood that Israel should not be left denuded of adequate strength to repel an invasion, it did not feel it right to provide that strength and to fight the USSR by proxy.
34. Mr. SELWYN LLOYD (United Kingdom) agreed with Mr. Dulles that the situation in Palestine was extremely dangerous. The United Kingdom Government had done its best to convince the Russian leaders during their visit to Great Britain that every effort should be made to avoid war. At the same time, the Secretary General of the United Nations had done a very good job on the spot, and seemed to have achieved temporary success. This was not enough however and, with the support which the Soviet leaders had promised to give to the United Nations in this respect, the Western countries should consult Mr. Hammarskjöld as to what should be the best method of dispelling the threat of war in the Middle East.

35. He then described the policy followed for the past years by the United Kingdom Government regarding the supply of arms to the Middle East countries. This policy consisted in supplying a "trickle" of weapons to both sides with a view to maintaining the balance between their military power and preventing them from becoming sufficiently equipped for war. The considerable supply of weapons by the Communist bloc had disturbed the balance, but the United Kingdom Government believed that its policy was still the best.

36. He then referred to the Baghdad Pact which the United Kingdom considered as a vital part of the screen against Communist infiltration, not only in the military but also in the economic field. The final communiqué of the recent Teheran Meeting mentioned the many achievements reached by the Baghdad Pact since its recent creation. The United Kingdom was determined to make a success of the Baghdad Pact and considered that, in providing a shield against Russian penetration of that area, it found ample justification for its existence.

37. Mr. PINHEAU (France) said that his Government's position on the question of the supply of arms to the Middle East was a difficult one. In view of the situation in Algeria France was anxious to avoid further cause of friction with the Arab world. Yet each shipment of French arms to Israel caused violent reaction in Cairo.

38. For some months, France had been alone in supplying Israel with much needed weapons but the point had been reached where, politically speaking, it would be unable to continue these supplies alone. The French Government therefore considered that the time had come for other countries to join in the effort of maintaining Israel's ability to defend itself. The establishment of a common policy on this question was much desired.

39. Mr. PEARSON (Canada) said that his Government was also concerned in this problem since it was under considerable pressure from both sides to supply arms. He felt that a peaceful settlement would not be helped by accepting a flow of armaments to one side and a trickle to the other. He fully
appreciated the arguments put forward by Mr. Dulles, but warned the Council that Israel was in a state of real fear. A genuine political settlement was the only solution, and he thought that the Secretary General of UNO had given a good lead by what he had accomplished in recent weeks. Through UNO a solution might be imposed on the two antagonists.

40. Mr. THEOTOKY (Greece) referred to an acute problem which had faced his Government in recent months owing to requests for facilities, in Greek territory, for aircraft, presumably transporting arms to one or other of the two parties. Was the Greek Government to refuse facilities to either of the two parties, or was it to grant equal facilities to both? This was a question for which he asked a direct reply from the Council.

41. Mr. SPAAK (Belgium) thought that the policy in the Middle East being followed by certain members was dangerous, in that there was a tendency to supply arms to both sides. Now that relations with the USSR seemed to be somewhat better, would it not be possible to try to solve the problem by disarmament, rather than by an armaments race.

42. Mr. SELWYN LLOYD (United Kingdom) appreciated the point made by the Belgian Foreign Minister. As he saw it, the first essential was to prevent war breaking out in the Middle East; and in this connection, the visit by the Secretary General of UNO had brought about good results. This, however, was only a first stage. The second stage must be a political settlement, which could only be achieved, in his opinion, through UNO.

43. Mr. THEOTOKY (Greece) said that he had had no answer to the concrete question he had put. Unless he received guidance from the Council on this matter, the Greek Government would be obliged to take the action it felt appropriate to meet requests put to it, and would feel no responsibility to NATO for any decisions it might take.

44. The CHAIRMAN suggested that this was a question which the Permanent Council might consider as a matter of urgency.

45. The COUNCIL:

(1) took note of the statements made in the discussion on problems in the Middle East;

(2) agreed that the Council in Permanent Session should examine, as a matter of urgency, the problem raised by the Greek Foreign Minister.

C. The Far East

46. Mr. FOSTER DULLES (United States) said that he had visited certain areas which were perhaps not Far Eastern countries properly speaking: Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. The situation there was disturbing, in that Afghanistan seemed to be in danger of becoming a Communist satellite and Pakistan was
concerned at this development. Pakistan's determination to defend itself against this possibility, in its turn, was alarming to India. The Russian leaders, on their recent visit to the Indian continent, had played on these fears; and had encouraged India by stating that Kashmir was in fact theirs.

47. With regard to the position in Viet-Nam, the Phillipines, Taiwan and Japan, he believed that there was real anxiety as to the possibility of their being overrun by the Communists, and a fear that Western policies might increase the danger by building up, inadvertently, the prestige of Communist China. If these important areas were lost, it would mean a real change in the balance of power in the Far East. The countries he had mentioned were holding on, backed by the hope of support from the West, and above all from the United States. At the same time, he was far from happy with regard to the position in this part of the world. Finally, there was no sign that Chinese Communism was developing a milder tone, along the lines of Russian Communism. They still relied on military strength and on force.

48. Mr. BEYEN (Netherlands) said that he would like to refer briefly to Indonesia in this context. The position there represented at present no threat to peace, but he felt that the NATO Council should be aware of certain facts concerning Indonesia. He did not believe that there were any serious national antipathies in the feeling that had developed in the past ten years in this area, though there might be a general hostility to the white race. The Netherlands Government had given independence to Indonesia, but that had left no legacy of gratitude: on the contrary, the Indonesian people were disappointed, and to some extent resentful. They seemed hardly able to realise that they were independent. Further, they were trying to create the legend that independence had been won by their efforts rather than by the good will of the Netherlands Government. All this created an overall atmosphere of discontent which the Communists were trying to exploit; and he wished his colleagues to understand the real reasons for the malaise in that area.

49. The COUNCIL:

took note of the statements by the United States and Netherlands Foreign Ministers.

D. Germany

50. Mr. von BRENTANO (Germany) pointed out that no change in the intentions of the USSR with regard to Germany had become apparent since the last Geneva Conference. As previously, the Government of the Federal Republic was being periodically invited to enter into negotiations with the Pankow Government. Furthermore, the London talks with Bulganin and Krushchev showed that the Soviets were still pursuing the same relentless policy. In this context, Mr. von Brentano thanked the United Kingdom Government for having tried to obtain some easing of the Soviet attitude to the German problem. He also thanked the French and Italian Governments for their recent declarations.
in Paris, attesting their continuing support of the Federal Government. The Federal Government, for its part, had frequently reiterated its unchanging views with regard to matters such as the importance of disassociating the problem of free elections throughout Germany from the question of security and disarmament. It went without saying that all problems concerning the relations of the Federal Republic with the USSR would continue to be examined in close collaboration with the members of the Atlantic Alliance.

51. He went on to say how gratified he was to find that the Soviet Government was now being compelled to take more account of the Russian people's desire for peace. He was not however, by any means convinced that this new policy sprang from any true love of peace. It arose rather from the wish to consolidate and extend the Soviet sphere of influence by more subtle methods. It was essential, in the view of the Federal Government, to keep to the agreed NATO defence programme. In accordance with these plans, the build-up of forces was proceeding and some 95,000 men would have been called up by the end of the year. Finally, the necessary statutory provisions for the introduction of compulsory military service had now reached the stage at which the relevant laws could be voted before the next parliamentary recess.

52. The COUNCIL:

  took note of the statement by the German Foreign Minister.

E. Disarmament

Document: C-M(56)57(Revised)

53. Mr. Lester PEARSON (Canada) regretted that little time was left to discuss the very important subject of disarmament. The Sub-Committee on Disarmament, which had been meeting in London since 19th March, had postponed its work the day before the present meeting and would shortly report to the United Nations. Its work had not met with the success that had been anticipated when the Russians made the proposals which had led to the convening of the Sub-Committee. The Soviet Government had refused to move from their position as put to the Sub-Committee on 27th March. Document C-M(56)57(Revised) explained in detail the reasons for the failure to reach agreement; it also expressed the view of the four NATO nations on the Sub-Committee that the work should not be abandoned and that further efforts should be made to reach agreement. These four nations had emphasised their readiness and determination to do all they could in this field. It was his opinion that the world should know the position of the Western Allies so that they should not be held responsible in the case of final failure to reach agreement.
54. Nevertheless, the London talks had served a useful purpose in that they had given the Allied powers an insight into Russian policy and tactics on a most important matter and at a significant period in the evolution of the Soviet bloc.

55. Mr. LANGE (Norway) believed that the problem of disarmament should remain on NATO's agenda. He therefore proposed that document C-M(56)57(Revised) be referred to the Permanent Council and, if necessary, to the various member governments. He agreed with the Canadian Representative that the psychological aspect of this problem was most important. The problem with which the free world was confronted was to determine the best way of presenting its position so that the world would know on which side lay the responsibility for failure.

56. Mr. SELWYN LLOYD (United Kingdom) thought that the Soviet propaganda machine would try to make out that the Soviets had accepted the original offer made by the Western Powers but that the latter had subsequently withdrawn from their position, thus rendering agreement impossible. Their argument would be that the United States Government had refused to reduce its forces below the 2½ million mark, whereas the United Kingdom and French Governments had originally proposed a level of 1½ million. The truth was that the United States were proposing a reduction to 2½ million as a first phase in the disarmament process whilst the Soviets were proposing a figure of 1½ million as being the final figure. Above all, the Soviets gave no indication that they would accept anything but an artificial system of control. They would merely be empowered to report to the Security Council where the USSR had the power of veto. The Soviets also held that the entire process of disarmament should be carried out without previous settlement of outstanding political differences. This was a most unrealistic approach to the problem. They also excluded any consideration of the question of control over automatic weapons.

57. It could therefore be said that the position of the Western Powers was absolutely sound but they would have to think very carefully about the method of presenting it to the world. In this context the proposal made by the Norwegian Representative would certainly prove extremely useful.

58. Mr. FOSTER DULLES (United States) said that his Government believed that the soundest foundation for disarmament should be a combination of the best form of inspection and of a settlement of the acute political problems which still threatened peace. He knew it was unnecessary for him to reiterate the assurance that the United States were anxious to shed part of the burden of their defence effort. At the same time, they did not want to disarm for a third time under conditions that would not promote peace, as would be the case if disarmament were not accompanied by a settlement of political differences.
59. The United States had world-wide responsibilities which involved maintaining large numbers of troops overseas and an even larger number of supporting forces at home. They could not accept, therefore, to reduce their total forces below the level of 2½ million during the first phase of disarmament.

60. More important than this question of force levels, however, was the question of the system of controls. In this respect, the United States wished to avoid a repetition of the fraudulent tactics which had enabled North Korea to rearm thanks to the lack of power of the control teams. In the absence of political solutions, the United States would insist on having at least an entirely dependable system of control. The United States had made many attempts to solve the disarmament problem and their failure was solely due to the unwillingness of the Soviets to meet the political problems and to accept an efficient system of control. They were therefore compelled to maintain the military strength necessary for their protection and that of their Allies.

61. The COUNCIL:

agreed to refer document C-R(56)57(Revised) to the Permanent Council for further consideration.

(The Council adjourned until 10.30 p.m.)

62. The Council then had before it the text of a draft communique, on the basis of which they took certain decisions of substance. These were as follows.

VI. EXTENSION OF NON-MILITARY CO-OPERATION BETWEEN NATO COUNTRIES

A. Appointment of a Committee of Three Ministers

63. The COUNCIL considered it timely and useful for the members of the Atlantic Community to examine actively further measures which might be taken at this time to advance more effectively their common interests.

64. In order to enable the Council better to perform these tasks, they agreed:

(1) to appoint a Committee of Three Ministers to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community;

(2) invited Mr. Lester B. Pearson, Mr. G. Martino and Mr. H. Lange to serve as the three members of this Committee;
(3) invited the Committee to submit its report as soon as possible this year.

B. Action by the Council

65. In the meantime, the COUNCIL agreed:

(1) to undertake periodical examinations of the political aspects of economic problems;

(2) to strengthen economic co-operation between member countries, to seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and to promote conditions of stability and well-being;

(3) to instruct the Permanent Representatives of the Council to examine economic problems in the light of the ideas set out above, and of the plan put forward by Mr. Pineau, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, calling upon the services of a committee of technical advisers working under their authority.

VII. FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ

66. The COUNCIL agreed on the text of a final communiqué for immediate issue (see Press Release).
Procès-verbal de la séance du Conseil tenue au Palais de Chaillot, Paris XVIe, le samedi 5 mai 1956 à 15 heures

PRESENTS

Président : S.E. M. K. Gudmundsson (Islande)
Vice-Président
Secrétaire Général : The Lord Ismay

ALLEMAGNE

S.E. M. H. von Brentano (Ministre Fédéral des Affaires Étrangères)
S.E. M. H. Blankenhorn (Représentant Permanent)

BELGIQUE

S.E. M. P. H. Spaak (Ministre des Affaires Étrangères)
S.E. M. A. de Staercke (Représentant Permanent)

CANADA

The Hon. L. B. Pearson (Secrétaire d’Etat aux Affaires Étrangères)
S.E. M. L. D. Wilgress (Représentant Permanent)

DANEMARK

S.E. M. H. C. Hansen (Président du Gouvernement et Ministre des Affaires Étrangères)
S.E. M. M. A. Wassard (Représentant Permanent)

ETATS-UNIS

S.E. M. J. Foster Dulles (Secrétaire d’Etat)
S.E. M. G. W. Perkins (Représentant Permanent)

FRANCE

S.E. M. C. Pineau (Ministre des Affaires Étrangères)
S.E. M. A. Parodi (Représentant Permanent)

GRECE

S.E. M. S. Theotokis (Ministre des Affaires Étrangères)
S.E. M. M. Melas (Représentant Permanent)

ISLANDE

S.E. M. H. G. Andersen (Représentant Permanent)
ITALIE
S.E. M. G. Martino (Ministre des Affaires Etrangères)
S.E. M. A. Alessandrini (Représentant Permanent)

LUXEMBOURG
S.E. M. J. Bech (Président du Gouvernement, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères)
S.E. M. N. Hommel (Représentant Permanent)

NORVEGE
S.E. M. H. Lange (Ministre des Affaires Etrangères)
S.E. M. J. Boyesen (Représentant Permanent)

PAYS-BAS
S.E. M. J.W. Beyen (Ministre des Affaires Etrangères)
Jenkheer A.W.L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer (Représentant Permanent)

PORTUGAL
Prof. Dr. P. Cunha (Ministre des Affaires Etrangères)
Comte de Tovar (Représentant Permanent)

ROYAUME-UNI
The Rt. Hon. Selwyn Lloyd (Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires Etrangères)
Sir Christopher Steel (Représentant Permanent)

TURQUIE
S.E. M. Fuat Köprülü (Ministre des Affaires Etrangères)
S.E. M. Nuri Birgi (Secrétaire Général, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères)

SECRETARIAT INTERNATIONAL
Baron A. Bentinck (Secrétaire Général Délégué)
M. G. Cosmelli (Secrétaire Général Adjoint pour les Affaires Politiques)
M. F.D. Gregh (Secrétaire Général Adjoint pour les Affaires Economiques et Financières)
M. J. Murray Mitchell (Secrétaire Général Adjoint pour la Production et la Logistique)
The Lord Coleridge (Secrétaire Exécutif)

ÉGALEMENT PRÉSENT
Général D.H. Buchanan (Bureau de Liaison du Groupe Permanent)
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I. ETUDE DE L'APPLICATION DONNEE A L'ARTICLE 2 DU TRAITE (Suite)

1. M. THEOTOKY (Grèce) estime que l'attention du Conseil devrait se concentrer présentement sur trois domaines distincts. Sur le plan militaire d'abord, il convient d'observer que les principes staliniens restent à l'ordre du jour en URSS et que le danger militaire conserve donc la priorité absolue. Il importe donc de maintenir l'effort de défense même si l'on suppose qu'un véritable changement de la politique soviétique est probable.

2. Sur le plan politique, les problèmes sont de deux ordres. Il y a d'abord le problème de la politique atlantique à l'égard de l'URSS. Il est difficile de concevoir une procédure dont l'application permette l'exercice d'une politique atlantique commune mais l'action de l'OTAN vis-à-vis de l'URSS doit pouvoir être concertée et il convient que l'URSS comprenne qu'elle a affaire non plus exclusivement à l'interlocuteur du moment mais à un concert de nations.

3. En ce qui concerne les problèmes que pose la politique des membres de l'Alliance les uns vis-à-vis des autres, dans la mesure où des conflits existent soit en fait, soit en puissance, il importe de les examiner soit lorsqu'ils se posent, soit par anticipation de façon à créer une harmonie au sein de l'OTAN. Il y aura lieu peut-être d'envisager à cet effet un organisme de coordination.

4. Enfin, en ce qui concerne l'extension des obligations dégoulant de l'application de l'Article 2 du Traité, sans doute pour répondre aux nouvelles tendances de la politique soviétique il y aura lieu de contribuer au développement économique des pays défavorisés. Il n'en reste pas moins qu'au sein même de l'OTAN il existe des rapports décisifs auxquelles d'ailleurs on demande déjà de sacrifier au titre de la défense commune alors que dans le même temps on se propose de leur en demander de nouveaux au titre de l'Article 2.

5. De l'avis de M. Thotoky, il serait inopportun de créer un nouvel organisme chargé d'exécuter les décisions prises au titre de l'Article 2 alors qu'il existe d'autres organisations internationales compétentes en matière d'aide économique et technique. Ceci dit, il appartient à l'OTAN d'établir dans le cadre de l'Article 2 un ordre de priorité suivant lequel l'aide aux pays défavorisés de l'OTAN prendrait le pas sur ceux qu'il importe de donner aux autres pays sous-développés.

6. M. von BRENTANO (Allemagne) déclare être en mesure d'appuyer le Projet de résolution présenté par la délégation de l'Italie. Toutefois, il propose un amendement de rédaction qui est accepté par le Ministre des affaires étrangères de l'Italie.

7. Le CONSEIL:

prend note des déclarations des Ministres de la Grèce et de la République fédérale.

II. EXAMEN DU DEUXIEME PROJET DE COMMUNIQUE FINAL PREPARE PAR LE GROUPE DE TRAVAIL

Document: FC/2

8. Le Conseil examine le texte du paragraphe 4 du deuxième projet de Communiqué, qui concerne les moyens propres à améliorer le processus des consultations politiques entre les membres de
l'OTAN, ainsi que celui du paragraphe relatif aux méthodes à suivre pour mettre en œuvre l'Article 2 du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord.

9. **Le CONSEIL:**

invite le Groupe de travail sur le Communiqué Final à préparer un troisième projet en fonction des observations formulées par les Ministres au cours des débats.

**III. POLITIQUE D'INFORMATION DE L'OTAN**

Référence: Document C-M(56)18

10. M. PEARSON (Canada) souligne l'importance de l'information et de la propagande dans le cadre général des activités de l'OTAN. Or, les pays de l'OTAN ne sont pas encore parvenus à informer leur opinion publique, sans parler de celle des pays neutres ou non engagés, de l'importance du rôle joué par l'Organisation dans la défense de la liberté. Cette tâche n'est pas facile, car l'information aussi bien conçue soit-elle, ne peut porter de fruits que si elle repose sur une base solide de politique et d'action. M. Pearson croit que le plupart des gouvernements OTAN n'ont pas encore pris conscience du rôle que l'Organisation doit jouer en tant qu'organe international d'information. C'est regrettable, car l'efficacité des services nationaux d'information souffre d'un manque de coordination à l'échelon international. Aussi l'OTAN doit-elle examiner les mesures à prendre en vue de mieux coordonner ou centraliser l'information sur toutes les questions d'un intérêt commun. A cet égard, il convient de souligner en particulier que le risque d'agression militaire n'a pas encore disparu. Il faut également mettre l'accent sur l'interdépendance de tous les pays OTAN et souligner que toute faiblesse chez le plus petit d'entre eux affaiblit l'Alliance tout entière. La coordination de l'information est également nécessaire en cas de différend entre pays membres.

11. En conclusion, l'action de l'OTAN dans le domaine de l'information peut être grandement améliorée si l'Organisation consacre à cette fin une plus grande part de ses ressources. Si l'on se préoccupe davantage de coordonner et d'encourager les activités dans le domaine de l'information et si l'on établit des contacts plus étroits entre les divers services nationaux d'information et l'OTAN, des progrès considérables seront possibles.

12. M. LANGE (Norvège) pense que l'opinion publique pourrait acquérir une connaissance plus intime des travaux de l'OTAN si, de temps à autre, les Ministres des Affaires étrangères se réunissent dans une capitale OTAN autre que Paris. Afin de limiter les dépenses, ces réunions pourraient être organisées sur une base restreinte en ce qui concerne l'importance des délégations.

13. **Le CONSEIL:**

- prend note du document C-M(56)18;
- prend note de la déclaration du Représentant du Canada consignée aux paragraphes 10 et 11 ci-dessus;
- invite le Conseil Permanent à examiner la suggestion du Représentant de la Norvège consignée au paragraphe 12 ci-dessus.
IV. **MANDAT DU GROUPE DES TROIS MINISTRES**

14. Les ministres s'accordent à estimer que certains paragraphes du projet de mandat du "Comité des Sages" pourront être incorporés dans le communiqué final. Il est également reconnu que les points visés dans les deux premiers paragraphes du projet sont couverts par le texte déjà présenté par le Groupe de travail sur le Communiqué Final.

15. M. LANGE (Norvège) pense que le Conseil doit réfléchir très sérieusement avant de créer un comité ministériel doté d'un mandat aussi large. Il suggère que le Conseil en session permanente examine le problème et fasse rapport aux ministres au cours d'une session qui pourrait se tenir dans deux mois environ.

16. Plusieurs ministres font observer qu'il y a eu des fuites en ce qui concerne la proposition provisoire de création d'un comité de trois ministres et qu'en conséquence le Conseil a eu pratiquement la main forcée sur ce point. Il faut que le mandat du comité ministériel soit mentionné dans le communiqué, puisque la décision de création du groupe de travail est désormais du domaine public.

17. Le CONSEIL:

invite le Groupe de travail sur le Communiqué Final à mettre au point une procédure permettant d'incorporer dans le communiqué final les parties du projet de mandat du groupe de travail ministériel qu'il jugera utile de mentionner.

V. **EXAMEN DES AUTRES QUESTIONS D'INTERET COMMUN SOULEVEES PAR LA SITUATION INTERNATIONALE**

A. **Afrique du Nord**

18. M. PINEAU (France) précise que pour trois raisons principales, le Gouvernement français est heureux de voir figurer à l'Ordre du jour de cette session les problèmes d'Afrique du Nord. En effet, à la différence de l'ONU, l'OTAN est une alliance au sein de laquelle il est normal que des gouvernements membres, solidaires les uns des autres, viennent exposer leurs problèmes nationaux. D'autre part, sur le plan de la sécurité des nations libres, l'Afrique du Nord revêt une importance telle qu'il est impossible à l'OTAN de ne pas se préoccuper des problèmes de sécurité qui se posent dans cette région. Enfin, le Gouvernement français a demandé aide à l'OTAN étant donné le fait qu'il a prélevé des troupes stationnées en Allemagne pour les envoyer en Afrique du Nord.

19. La défense des frontières de l'Est est moins gravement compromise qu'il ne paraît d'abord. C'est ainsi que rien n'a été modifié sur deux des trois points qui font l'objet des principaux engagements de la France; la chasse d'interception et la couverture radar du territoire. Sur le troisième point, l'engagement relatif aux troupes terrestres en Allemagne, la diminution est de l'ordre de 8,000 hommes. A ce sujet, il faut noter que le Gouvernement français a fait un effort considérable ainsi qu'en témoigne le rappel de certaines classes de réservistes.
20. En ce qui concerne le Maroc et la Tunisie, le Gouvernement français a voulu se montrer très libéral et a accordé l'indépendance à ces deux pays. Si on a voulu maintenir en outre la notion de l'indépendance, c'est par crainte que le pouvoir politique de ces pays ne soit pas à même de s'exercer sur tous les points du territoire.

21. Pour plusieurs raisons, le Gouvernement français a estimé impossible de faire le même geste à l'égard de l'Algérie.

22. La situation politique de l'Algérie a toujours été profondément différente de celle du Maroc et de celle de la Tunisie. Sans même faire appel à l'argument juridique de la division de l'Algérie en départements français, il faut observer qu'à aucun moment de l'histoire il n'y a eu en Algérie de souveraineté, de gouvernement ou même d'administration nationales. Si donc la France abandonnait ses pouvoirs à l'Algérie, elle y laisserait un vide presque absolu.

23. D'autre part pour que la France puisse passer un accord politique, il lui faut un interlocuteur. Au Maroc, la France avait pour interlocuteurs le Souverain et les représentants de partis politiques tels que l'Istiglal, le Parti démocratique de l'Indépendance qui représentent une large fraction de l'opinion. En Tunisie, il existe depuis toujours un souverain légitime, le Bey, et la France a pu négocier en outre avec les délégués d'un grand parti politique, le Néo-Destour.

24. Au contraire, en Algérie, la souveraineté appartient à la France; il n'y existe pas de parti représentatif de l'opinion. Les éléments d'opposition qui se sont dégagés ont eu pour seule activité concrète d'effectuer des embuscades contre les troupes françaises et des attentats contre la population civile musulmane et européenne. On n'y trouve donc pas d'interlocuteur au même titre qu'au Maroc et en Tunisie.

25. Un autre fait important est l'existence d'une importante population d'origine européenne (1,200,000 hommes) établie en Algérie depuis plus de cent ans, dans certains cas. Cette population, loin d'être tout entière d'origine française, se compose également d'Algériens d'origine espagnole, italienne, maltaise. Cette population a pour patrie l'Algérie et si on l'obligeait à quitter ce pays, elle ne retrouverait pas sans doute en France une patrie, une famille et des conditions de vie satisfaisantes pour elle. Ces 1,200,000 Algériens d'origine européenne vivent actuellement dans un état d'évegènèse très particulier; ils sont prêts à éviter par tous les moyens, y compris la violence, d'être chassés du pays. De son côté, le Gouvernement français a le plus grand intérêt à éviter entre les deux groupes de population un conflit qui dégénérerait en une sanglante guerre civile.

26. Pour assurer la coexistence pacifique des deux groupes de population, diverses solutions peuvent se présenter à l'esprit. Si l'on adopte la solution préconisée par l'Armée de libération nationale, on arriverait à créer une Algérie indépendante fondée sur la domination de la majorité musulmane et sur une minorité d'origine européenne. Pour éviter dans ces conditions un conflit sanglant, on aboutit à une solution (qui trouve d'ailleurs déjà des échos et en Algérie et en France) qui consiste à diviser l'Algérie en deux parties : l'une, celle où la population européenne est prédominante qui comprend de grandes villes comme Alger et Oran et la région côtière qui les sépare; l'autre, où prédomine la population...
musulmane, région de l’arrière pays très défavorisée économiquement par rapport à la première. L’adoption de cette solution revient à constituer un système très voisin de ce qui a été fait pour Israël et on recréerait en Afrique du Nord des conditions de conflit du même type qu’au Moyen-Orient. C’est ainsi que le gouvernement français est vivement opposé à la solution du partage.

27. Ce que préconise le Gouvernement français, c’est une solution qui ne soit pas imposée par lui, mais discutée avec des éléments représentatifs de la population que seules peuvent dégager des élections libres. Celles-ci sont très difficiles à organiser dans l’état d’insécurité actuelle. C’est cette situation qui a déterminé l’effort militaire destiné à diminuer l’insécurité et à créer des zones où puissent être organisées des élections au collège unique. Dans l’esprit du Gouvernement français il y aura lieu ensuite de discuter d’un statut de coexistence. Le Gouvernement français envisagera sans doute une solution de caractère fédéral dans le cadre de laquelle l’Algérie pourrait avoir un statut analogue à celui d’un land allemand ou d’un état américain. Une certaine autonomie musulmane serait réservée et des relations seraient établies avec la France à l’intention des populations d’origine française et pour assurer la sécurité.


29. Le CONSEIL:

prend acte de la déclaration du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de la France.

B. Moyen-Orient

30. M. KöPRÜLÜ (Turquie) déclare que la situation politique au Moyen-Orient continue d’être extrêmement troublée et dangereuse pour la stabilité du monde libre. Des éléments de discorde locaux et la susceptibilité de certains pays qui ont récemment acquis leur indépendance, joints au fait que le Moyen-Orient tout entier est insuffisamment développé, créent un climat favorable aux activités subversives. La Russie soviétique profite largement de la situation pour chercher à semer la discorde entre les pays du Moyen-Orient. En outre, certains pays, et en particulier l’Égypte, poursuivent une politique qui, si ses objectifs sont différents, finit par servir directement les intérêts russes, et Moscou est heureux de laisser ces pays accompagner eux-mêmes cette mission de désagrégation.

31. Le Pacte de Bagdad constitue actuellement le seul instrument de défense contre la pénétration russe et la seule source d’espoir pour les pays qui souhaitent le bien-être et la stabilité du Moyen-Orient. Aussi ce Pacte est-il toujours violemment critiqué, non seulement par Moscou mais également par les dirigeants égyptiens, et ceux qui les suivent au nom du neutralisme. Toutefois, il n’y a aucun doute que les pays qui l’ont opposé au Pacte de Bagdad par tous les moyens en leur pouvoir s’efforcent uniquement de créer un antagonisme et de faire naître un conflit dans cette région.
convient de rappeler à ceux qui critiquent le Pacte de Bagdad comme
étant responsable de la tension qui règne au Moyen-Orient qu’il
n’est pas la cause, mais bien la conséquence de cette tension. La
deuxième réunion des Ministres du Pacte de Bagdad, qui s’est
récemment tenue à Téhéran, a montré les résultats remarquables que
ces pays de l’Occident s’efforcent d’en tirer. Il accompagnera prochainement le Premier
Ministre de la Turquie qui va effectuer une visite officielle en
Afghanistan et espère que, même s’ils n’y parviennent pas à obtenir
des résultats importants, ils réussiront du moins à faire obstacle
à l’infiltration russe dans ce pays.

32. M. Koprulu parle ensuite de la situation inquiétante qui règne
en Afghanistan, où les Russes ont réussi à s’infiltrer par des voies
economiques et politiques. La tension qui existe entre l’Afghanistan
et le Pakistan constitue pour la paix un danger que la Turquie
s’efforce d’éliminer. Il accompagnera prochainement le Premier
Ministre de la Turquie qui va effectuer une visite officielle en
Afghanistan et espère que, même s’ils n’y parviennent pas à obtenir
des résultats importants, ils réussiront du moins à faire obstacle
à l’infiltration russe dans ce pays.

33. M. FOSTER DULLES (Etats-Unis) expose la politique suivie
par les Etats-Unis au sujet de la tension qui règne entre Israël
et ses voisins arabes. Les Etats-Unis courent le risque d’être
entraînés dans une lutte de "prestige" en soutenant l’Israël contre
une Egypte appuyée par l’URSS. En fait, aux Etats-Unis, certains
milleux désirent accorder le maximum d’aide à Israël — en même
eventuel de l’Egypte — qui n’est qu’un outil aux mains des commu-
nistes. Il est toutefois évident qu’un geste de cet ordre mettrait
gagné en péril la paix du monde, et bien qu’il soit difficile
de maintenir l’équilibre aux Etats-Unis en période électorale, le
Gouvernement des Etats-Unis est extrêmement désireux d’éviter toute
décision qui pourrait l’entraîner dans une lutte de prestige. Le
Gouvernement des Etats-Unis reconnaît parfaitement qu’il ne faut pas
qu’Israël demeure démuni des moyens nécessaires pour repousser une
invasion, mais estime qu’il ne serait pas justifié de lui fournir
ces moyens et de combattre ainsi avec l’URSS par procuration.

34. M. SELWYN LLOYD (Royaume-Uni) pense comme M. Dulles que
la situation qui règne en Palestine est extrêmement dangereuse. Le
Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni s’est efforcé de convaincre les dirigeants
russe au cours de leur visite en Grande-Bretagne, que tous les
moyens doivent être mis en œuvre pour éviter la guerre. En même
temps, le Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies a fait œuvre très
utilile sur place et semble avoir remporté un succès provisoire. Ce
n’est pas assez toutefois, et avec l’aide que les chefs soviétiques
ont promis d’apporter aux Nations Unies à cet égard, les Puissances
Occidentales devront consulter M. Hammarskjold quant au meilleur
moyen de dissiper la menace de guerre au Moyen-Orient.

35. Selwyn Lloyd décrit ensuite la politique suivie au
coeur des dernières années par le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni en
ce qui concerne les livraisons d’armes aux pays du Moyen-Orient.
Cette politique consiste à fournir des armes par très petites quan-
tités aux deux adversaires de façon à maintenir l’équilibre entre
leur puissance militaire sans leur donner des moyens suffisants pour
engager une guerre. La grande quantité d’armes fournie par le bloc
communiste a maintenant rompu l’équilibre, mais le Gouvernement du
Royaume-Uni estime que sa politique reste la meilleure.
36. Le Représentant du Royaume-Uni parle ensuite du Pacte de Bagdad, que le Royaume-Uni considère comme un élément essentiel du barrage contre l'infiltration communiste, non seulement dans le domaine militaire mais également dans le domaine économique. Le communiqué final de la réunion qui s’est tenue dernièrement à Téhéran mentionne les nombreux résultats obtenus par le Pacte de Bagdad depuis sa création récente. Le Royaume-Uni est déterminé à assurer le succès du Pacte de Bagdad, et estime que le barrage qu’oppose ce pacte à la pénétration russe dans cette zone en justifie amplement l’existence.

37. M. PINEAU (France) déclare que son Gouvernement se trouve dans une position délicate au sujet de la livraison d’armes au Moyen-Orient. Etant donné la situation en Algérie, la France désire éviter toute nouvelle cause de friction avec le monde arabe. Or tout envoi d’armes de France en Israël provoque des réactions violentes au Caire.

38. Depuis quelques mois, la France a été seule à fournir à Israël les armes dont ce pays a grand besoin, mais le moment est arrivé où, du point de vue politique, elle ne peut plus assurer seule ces livraisons. Le Gouvernement français estime donc que le moment est venu où d’autres pays doivent se joindre à la France pour aider Israël à rester capable de se défendre. L’élaboration d’une politique commune à cet égard est extrêmement souhaitable.

39. M. PEARSON (Canada) déclare que son Gouvernement est également intéressé à la solution de ce problème, car il reçoit des deux parties des demandes pressantes d’armes. Il estime qu’on ne facilitera pas un règlement pacifique en décidant de fournir une grande quantité d’armes à l’une des parties et une quantité insignifiante à l’autre. Il apprécie à toute leur valeur les arguments exposés par M. Dulles, mais croit bon d’avertir le Conseil qu’Israël vit réellement dans l’angoisse. Un véritable règlement politique constitue la seule solution, et M. Pearson pense que le Secrétaire Général de l’ONU s’est engagé dans la bonne voie au cours des dernières semaines. Il semble qu’une solution pourroit être imposée aux deux antagonistes par l’intermédiaire de l’ONU.

40. M. THEOTOKY (Grèce) parle du problème délicat qui s’est posé à son Gouvernement au cours des derniers mois, en raison des demandes qui lui ont été soumises en vue de l’utilisation d’installations situées en territoire hellénique par des avions qui transportent probablement des armes destinées à l’une ou l’autre des deux parties. Le Gouvernement hellénique doit-il refuser ces facilités à l’une et l’autre des deux parties, ou les accorder également aux deux? Il demande au Conseil de lui donner une réponse directe sur ce point.

41. M. SPAAK (Belgique) estime que la politique suivie au Moyen-Orient par certains membres est dangereuse, en ce sens qu’elle tend à fournir des armes aux deux parties. Maintenant que les relations avec l’URSS semblent s’être légèrement améliorées, ne serait-il pas possible de chercher à résoudre le problème au moyen du désarmement, plutôt que par une course aux armements?
42. M. SEIWYN LLOYD (Royaume-Uni) reconnaît la valeur des observations formulées par le Ministre des Affaires étrangères de la Belgique. Selon lui, l’essentiel est d’abord d’empêcher la guerre à l’éclater au Moyen-Orient; à cet égard, la visite du Secrétaire Général de l’ONU a eu de bons résultats. Ce n’est toutefois qu’une première étape. La deuxième doit être un règlement politique, qui n’est possible, à son avis, que dans le cadre de l’ONU.

43. M. THEOTOKY (Grèce) déclare que la question concrète qu’il a posée est restée sans réponse. Si le Gouvernement hellénique ne reçoit pas de directives du Conseil à cet égard, il se verra contraint de prendre les mesures qu’il jugera appropriées en réponse aux demandes qu’il a reçues, et ne s’estimera responsable envers l’OTAN d’aucune des décisions qu’il pourra être amené à prendre.

44. Le PRESIDENT déclare qu’il s’agit d’une question que le Conseil en session permanente pourrait examiner d’urgence.

45. Le CONSEIL:

(1) prend note des déclarations prononcées au cours de l’examen des problèmes qui se posent au Moyen-Orient;

(2) décide que le Conseil en session permanente examinera d’urgence le problème soulevé par le Ministre des Affaires étrangères de la Grèce.

C. Extrême-Orient

46. M. FOSTER DULLES (Etats-Unis) s’est rendu dans certains pays qui ne font peut-être pas partie de l’Extrême-Orient proprement dit: l’Afghanistan, le Pakistan et l’Inde. La situation y est alarmante, car l’Afghanistan semble menacé de devenir un satellite communiste, ce qui inquiète le Pakistan. La détermination du Pakistan à se défendre contre cette éventualité alarme à son tour l’Inde. Les dirigeants russes, au cours de leur récent voyage en Inde, ont expliqué ces craintes et ont encouragé l’Inde à déclarer que le Cachemire lui appartenait.

47. En ce qui concerne la situation au Viet-Nam, aux Philippines, à Formose et au Japon, M. Dulles croit que ces pays redoutent vraiment la possibilité de tomber sous la domination communiste, et craignent que la politique suivie par les puissances occidentales n’aggravent le danger en augmentant sans s’en rendre compte le prestige de la Chine communiste. La perte de ces régions importantes bouleverserait véritablement l’équilibre des forces en Extrême-Orient. Les pays qu’il a mentionnés résistent, soutenus par l’espoir que l’Ouest, et surtout les États-Unis, les soutiendront. Toutefois, la situation dans cette région du monde est loin d’être satisfaisante. Enfin rien ne donne à penser que le communisme chinois adopte un ton plus conciliant, comme le communisme russe. Les Chinois continuent à ne compter que sur la puissance militaire et la force.

48. M. BEYEN (Pays-Bas) voudrait dire à ce propos quelques mots sur l’Indonésie. La situation dans cette région ne fait peser à l’heure actuelle aucun danger sur la paix, mais le Conseil
l'OTAN doit connaître certains faits relatifs à l'Indonésie. M. Beyen ne croit pas qu'une véritable antipathie nationaliste se soit développée au cours des dix dernières années dans cette région, en dépit peut-être d'une hostilité générale vis-à-vis de la race blanche. Le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas a accordé son indépendance à l'Indonésie mais celle-ci ne lui en a su aucun gré. Au contraire, le peuple indonésien est en proie à la déception, et dans une cer-
taine mesure au ressentiment. Il semble à peine capable de se ren-
dre compte qu'il est indépendant. De plus, on s'efforce de lui faire
croire qu'il doit son indépendance à ses efforts et non à la bonne
volonté du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas. Tout ceci crée une atmosphère
générale de mécontentement que les communistes essaient d'exploiter,
et M. Beyen souhaite que ses collègues comprennent les raisons véritables du malaise dont souffre cette région.

49. Le CONSEIL:

prend note des déclarations des Ministres des Affai-
res étrangères des Etats-Unis et des Pays-Bas.

D. Allemagne

50. M. von BRENTANO (Allemagne) souligne qu'aucune modifica-
tion des intentions de l'URSS à l'égard de l'Allemagne ne s'est ma-
ifestée depuis la dernière conférence de Genève. Comme auparavant,
le Gouvernement de la République fédérale est périodiquement invité
e à entrer en pourparlers avec le Gouvernement de Pankow. De plus, les
entretiens qui ont eu lieu à Londres avec Boulangine et Khrouchtchev
montrent que les Soviets pratiquent une politique toujours aussi
intransigeante. A ce propos, M. von Brentano remercie le Gouvernement
du Royaume-Uni d'avoir essayé de provoquer un assouplissement de
l'attitude des Soviets à l'égard du problème allemand. Il remercie
e également les Gouvernements de la France et de l'Italie des déclara-
tions faites il y a quelques jours à Paris et qui témoignent de leur
solidarité vis-à-vis du Gouvernement fédéral. Le Gouvernement fédéral,
pour sa part, a fréquemment renouvelé des déclarations qui expriment
un point de vue inchangé, notamment en ce qui concerne l'insépara-
bilité du problème des élections libres dans toute l'Allemagne par rap-
port à celui de la sécurité et du désarmement. Il va sans dire que
tous les problèmes qui intéressent les relations de la République fédé-
rale avec l'URSS continueront d'être examinés en liaison étroite
avec les membres de l'Alliance atlantique.

51. M. von Brentano poursuit en exprimant la satisfaction que
lui cause l'obligation où se trouve le Gouvernement soviétique de
tenir compte plus largement du désir de paix de la population russe.
Ceci dit, il n'est pas convaincu que cette nouvelle politique soit
déterminée par un véritable amour de la paix. Elle ressortit plutôt
t à un désir de consolider et d'étendre la sphère d'influence soviéti-
que par des méthodes plus raffinées. Il est indispensable, de l'avis
du Gouvernement fédéral, de s'en tenir au programme de défense arrêté
au sein de l'Alliance. Conformément à ce programme, la mise sur pied
des contingents ne cesse de se poursuivre et 95.000 hommes environ
seront sous les armes à la fin de l'année. Enfin, la préparation lé-
gislative nécessaire à l'instauration du service militaire obliga-
toire est désormais assez avancée pour que le vote des lois corres-
pondantes puisse intervenir avant les vacances parlementaires.
52. Le CONSEIL:
prend note de la déclaration du Ministre des Affaires étrangères de la République Fédérale d'Allemagne.

E. Désarmement

Document: C-M(56)57(Révisé)

53. M. PEARSON (Canada) regrette qu'il ne reste que peu de temps pour examiner la question très importante du désarmement. Le Sous-Comité de la Commission du Désarmement des Nations Unies qui siège à Londres depuis le 19 mars, a suspendu ses travaux la veille de la présente session du Conseil et fera prochainement rapport aux Nations Unies. Les résultats obtenus n'ont pas été aussi fructueux que l'on pouvait l'espérer lorsque les Russes ont formulé les propositions qui ont conduit à l'institution du Sous-Comité. Le Gouvernement soviétique a refusé de revenir sur la position qu'il a prise au Sous-Comité le 27 mars. Le document C-M(56)57(Révisé) expose en détail les raisons pour lesquelles l'accord n'a pas été possible. Ce document indique en outre que, de l'avis des quatre pays OTAN représentés au Sous-Comité, l'œuvre entreprise ne doit pas être abandonnée et que de nouveaux efforts devront être déployés en vue d'un accord. Ces quatre pays ont souligné leur désir et leur détermination de mettre en œuvre tous les moyens dont ils disposent dans ce domaine. M. Pearson estime que la position adoptée par les Alliés occidentaux doit être rendue publique afin qu'il ne soient pas tenus responsables d'un échec final des discussions.

54. Néanmoins, les entretiens de Londres ont été utiles en ce sens qu'ils ont donné aux puissances alliées un aperçu de la politique et de la tactique de l'URSS sur une question très importante, à une période significative de l'évolution du bloc soviétique.

55. M. LANGE (Norvège) estime que le problème du désarmement doit rester inscrit à l'ordre du jour du Conseil de l'OTAN. Il propose donc de renvoyer le document C-M(56)57(Révisé) au Conseil en session permanente et, au besoin, de le soumettre pour observation aux divers gouvernements membres. Comme le Représentant du Canada, il attache une grande importance à l'aspect psychologique de la question. Le problème auquel le monde libre doit faire face consiste à déterminer le meilleur moyen de présenter la position qu'il a prise, afin que le monde sache sur qui retombe la responsabilité de l'échec.

56. M. SELWYN LLOYD (Royaume-Uni) pense que la propagande soviétique s'efforcera de convaincre l'opinion publique que l'URSS a accepté la proposition initiale des puissances occidentales, mais que celles-ci sont ensuite revenues en arrière et ont rendu ainsi tout accord impossible. Les Russes feront valoir que le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis a refusé de ramener ses forces au-dessous du chiffre de deux millions et demi, alors que les Gouvernements du Royaume-Uni et de la France avaient proposé à l'origine le chiffre d'un million et demi. La vérité est que les Etats-Unis proposent une réduction à deux millions et demi, à titre de premier stade du processus de désarmement, tandis que les Soviets proposent un chiffre...
de un million et demi à titre définitif. Bien plus, aucune déclaration des Soviets ne permet de supposer qu'ils accepteraient autre chose qu'un système de contrôle artificiel. En effet, ils ont nettement fait savoir qu'ils n'accepteront jamais de doter les équipes de contrôle de pouvoirs effectifs. Ces équipes seraient uniquement habilitées à faire rapport au Conseil de Sécurité, où l'URSS a le droit de veto. En outre, d'après les Soviets, le désharment devrait être mené à bien sans que les questions politiques en suspens aient été au préalable réglées, ce qui est une manière extrêmement irrationnelle d'aborder le problème. L'URSS refuse en outre tout examen de la question du contrôle des armes atomiques.

57. On peut donc dire que la position des puissances occidentales est parfaitement justifiée, mais qu'elles doivent étudier soigneusement la manière de la présenter à l'opinion publique mondiale. A cette fin, la proposition du Représentant de la Norvège sera sans aucun doute extrêmement utile.

58. M. FOSTER DULLES (Etats-Unis) déclare que son Gouvernement est persuadé que le fondement le plus solide pour le désarmement consisterait à combiner le meilleur système possible d'inspection au règlement des graves problèmes politiques qui continuent à mettre la paix en danger. M. Dulles sait qu'il n'a pas besoin de rappeler combien les États-Unis désirent être délivrés d'une partie de la charge de leur effort de défense. En revanche, ils ne veulent pas désarmer pour la troisième fois dans des conditions qui ne favoriseraient pas la paix, comme ce serait le cas si le désarmement n'allait pas de pair avec un règlement des différents politiques.

59. Les États-Unis ont, dans le monde entier, des obligations qui exigent le maintien de troupes nombreuses à l'étranger et de forces de soutien encore plus nombreuses sur le territoire national. C'est pourquoi ils ne peuvent accepter de ramener l'effectif de leurs forces armées au-dessous du chiffre de 2,500,000 pendant la première phase du désarmement.

60. La question du système de contrôle est encore plus importante que celle de l'effectif des forces armées. Dans ce domaine, les États-Unis désirent éviter une répétition de la tactique frauduleuse qui a permis à la Corée du Nord de réarmer en profitant du fait que les commissions de contrôle ne disposaient pas de pouvoirs assez étendus. En l'absence de solutions politiques, les États-Unis insisteront pour que l'on établisse au moins un système de contrôle absolument sûr. Les États-Unis ont essayé à maintes reprises de résoudre le problème du désarmement, et s'ils ont échoué, c'est uniquement parce que les Soviets ne se sont pas montrés disposés à étudier les problèmes politiques et à accepter un système de contrôle efficace. Aussi les États-Unis se voient-ils dans l'obligation de conserver la puissance militaire nécessaire à leur sécurité et à celle de leurs alliés.

61. Le CONSEIL:

décide de renvoyer le document C-M(56)57(Révisé) au Conseil en session permanente pour un nouveau examen.

La séance du Conseil est suspendue jusqu'à 22h30.
62. Le Conseil est ensuite saisi d'un projet de communiqué. Sur la base de ce projet, il prend les décisions de fond suivantes:

VI. DEVELOPPEMENT DE LA COOPERATION NON MILITAIRE ENTRE PAYS OTAN

A. Désignation d'un Comité de trois Ministres

63. Le CONSEIL juge que le moment est venu pour les membres de la Communauté Atlantique d'examiner activement quelles mesures ils pourraient prendre pour servir au mieux leurs intérêts communs.

64. Pour mettre le Conseil à même de mieux assumer ces tâches, les Ministres ont décidé:

(1) de charger un Comité de trois Ministres de présenter au Conseil des recommandations quant aux mesures à prendre pour améliorer et développer la coopération entre pays de l'OTAN dans des domaines non militaires et pour accroître l'unité au sein de la Communauté Atlantique;

(2) d'inviter M. Lester B. Pearson, M. G. Martino et M. H. Lange à siéger à ce Comité;

(3) d'inviter le Comité à présenter son rapport cette année dans le plus court délai possible.

B. Mesures adoptées par le Conseil

65. En attendant, le CONSEIL a décidé:

(1) d'examiner périodiquement les aspects politiques des problèmes économiques;

(2) de renforcer la coopération économique entre pays membres, de s'efforcer d'éliminer toute opposition dans leurs politiques économiques internationales et de développer les conditions propres à assurer la stabilité et le bien-être;

(3) de donner instruction à ses représentants d'examiner conformément aux idées énoncées ci-dessus, les problèmes économiques et le plan proposé par M. Pineau, Ministre des Affaires étrangères de France; les représentants permanents appelleront à collaborer un Comité de conseil technicques qui travaillera sous leur autorité.

VII. COMMUNIQUE FINAL

66. Le CONSEIL approuve un texte de communiqué final pour publication immédiate (voir communiqué de presse).

Palais de Chaillot, Paris, XVIe.
To: Permanent Representatives
From: Secretary General

Committee of Three

The Committee of Three desire you to submit the attached Questionnaire to your Governments with the request that they should send their replies to me by the 20th August at latest.

2. It is the intention of the Committee to use these replies as a basis of discussion with member countries when they reassemble in Paris early in September.

3. Within a few days there will be a memorandum circulated by the Committee containing explanatory notes and guidance to assist countries in the preparation of their replies to some of the questions.

(Signed) ISMAY

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVe.
The Committee of Three, consisting of Mr. Lange, Foreign Minister of Norway, Dr. Martino, Foreign Minister of Italy, and Mr. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, were appointed by decision of the North Atlantic Council of 6th May "to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community".

A study of some of these problems had already been made by the Committee on the Atlantic Community in 1951 - 1952 under the chairmanship of Mr. Pearson. This Committee did not propose rigid rules for "automatic" formulae for consultation, but stressed the need for the development of a "habit of consultation" between member governments. As criteria for matters which ought to be subject to consultation, the Committee indicated the degree of common interest, or the likelihood of a need for coordinated action. Furthermore, the Committee made a general distinction between exchange of information, on the one hand, and actual consultation on the other, the former covering a wider range of topics than the latter. Some progress has since been made towards co-ordination of the foreign policies of the NATO countries. The Council has begun to serve as a forum for exchange of information on matters of common concern, and active and effective consultation has in some cases taken place. However, there are also examples of lack of co-ordination and of unilateral action by member governments in matters directly concerning the Alliance, which have had detrimental effects on the unity of NATO and thereby weakened the organization. It therefore seems necessary to find new ways and means of promoting the habit of using the Council as an active instrument of consultation in order to reach closer co-operation in the non-military fields.

The questions which follow are intended to elicit in as concise form as possible, the views of your Government on the problems raised by the task set the Committee by the Council. This list is not to be regarded as exhaustive, and should your Government wish to supplement their answers with any additional statements or suggestions, these will be welcome.

I. POLITICAL QUESTIONS

1. It might be useful to consider the desirability of laying down certain basic principles as guidance for the political consultation on matters of common concern, such as the following:
The Council should be kept fully informed of any political development in any area which may affect significantly member countries or the Alliance as a whole.

The duty of informing the Council at an early stage of such developments should be accepted.

The Council should normally not be requested to take decisions or adopt resolutions of political importance without having had the opportunity to consider the matter in the light of all available information.

Member governments should endeavour not to make political declarations significantly affecting the Alliance or its member nations without prior consultation through the Council.

It would be of interest to know the view of member governments on this proposal, with a statement indicating to what extent the above-mentioned principles are acceptable.

2. To what extent and under what circumstances is your Government prepared to participate in the following types of consultation within NATO?

(i) Informal exchanges of information;

(ii) Preparation of common appreciations in the light of current developments;

(iii) Consultations with the aim of arriving at a general consensus as a basis for determination or guidance of individual government policies;

(iv) Consultation with the aim of arriving at agreement on specific policies or courses of action.

3. What should be the basis for determining the matters of common concern which might be the subject of consultation under the four headings listed above, and what should be regarded as the factors limiting such consultation, such as respect for liberty of action of each member government and the non-universal character of NATO?

4. To what extent can NATO assist in the peaceful settlement of inter-member disputes and differences? In view of the provisions of Article 1 of the Treaty, should procedures of conciliation and peaceful settlement of disputes, similar to the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter and other international agreements be adopted by NATO?

5. Should NATO give more formal recognition to parliamentary associations and the Parliamentary Conference and what should be the relationship between the Council and these parliamentary groupings?
II. ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

1. Does your Government consider that closer co-operation between member countries of NATO within the specialised organizations to which they belong and the establishment of closer relations with such organizations, would represent the most suitable means for promoting greater unity in the economic field between member countries?

2. In this connection, as regards the OEEC, does your Government consider the participation of the United States and Canada as merely "associated members" to be adequate?

3. Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that the parties will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies. Does your Government think that the activities of other organizations, in particular the OEEC, is sufficient to discharge the responsibilities of NATO countries in this respect? To what extent does your Government consider that NATO could assist in the conciliation of economic conflicts arising between member countries?

4. Does your Government feel that NATO may have some interest in developing public works for civilian use, as has been done in the military field?

5. Does your Government consider that NATO should take an active part in the economic development of underdeveloped regions within the NATO area or would it be preferable that NATO should limit itself to the appraisal of the political importance for the Alliance of development programmes to this end?

6. (a) Does your Government consider that NATO has a vital interest in promoting the economic development of underdeveloped countries outside the NATO area? If so, bearing in mind the non-universal character of NATO, what action in assisting underdeveloped countries does your Government consider can appropriately be carried on by NATO countries to achieve the necessary objectives and what co-ordination can be furnished within NATO?

(b) Does your Government consider that the Statutes of existing and planned international financial agencies give them sufficient flexibility to enable them to operate suitably under present political conditions and to meet the requirements of the situation with which NATO is now confronted?

7. (a) Does your Government feel that NATO should consider measures to counter and neutralize Soviet commercial practices which do not conform to the principles by which Western countries carry on their normal trade and financial relations with one another?

(b) Does your Government feel that NATO should consider measures to meet the competition of the Soviet Bloc in the field of contracts for public works in politically sensitive areas?
8. What suggestions can be derived from the experience in the economic field of other regional organizations with a view to the possible application of this experience to other geographical areas?

9. Does your Government consider that it would be in the interests of the Alliance for the NATO countries to consult together when certain important questions are coming up for discussion in international economic bodies in which the Soviet bloc is represented?

10. Are there any other specific economic subjects or classes of subjects of general concern to NATO which are not now being adequately considered in other agencies and which might be discussed usefully in NATO?

III. CULTURAL QUESTIONS

Increased co-operation in the cultural field might serve to strengthen relations between NATO countries, provide a larger measure of public support for NATO and encourage the feeling of belonging to an Atlantic Community.

1. Does your Government consider that these aims will be served by setting up:

(a) a common research institute for Atlantic Community studies?

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3. Does your Government consider that NATO should undertake the co-ordination of measures to increase the recruitment and training on a long-term basis of scientists, technicians and specialists, bearing in mind the developments in these fields in communist countries?

4. What educational activities, if any, should be undertaken by NATO to strengthen the ties of the Atlantic Community, which are not already carried out by existing International Organizations such as UNESCO?

5. Would your Government favour the exchange of service personnel individually or in groups for the purpose of familiarising themselves with conditions in other member countries and for the promotion of goodwill?
6. Which of the possible programmes under questions 1, 2, 3, 4 should, in the judgment of your Government, be financed:

(a) under a commonly financed programme;
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1. Does your Government consider that the Information Service should concentrate on purely factual information about NATO?

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1. What specific changes in procedure or organizational arrangements would your Government recommend to ensure closer and more effective consultation in the Council to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community?

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3. To what extent should the Secretary General play an active role in the field of political consultation, and to what particular types of problems should such a role extend?

4. In view of the economic responsibilities of NATO, and those in prospect, what organizational changes, if any, does your Government consider are required to discharge them?
5. Does your Government consider that greater use could be made of NATO machinery for the circulation on a NATO-wide basis of "basic position material" by individual governments (e.g. texts of agreements, basic statements of position, etc.)?

6. The suggestion has been made that a closer relationship might be established between NATO and the United Nations, possibly establishing the position of NATO as a regional organization in the terms of Chapter 8 of the United Nations Charter. What are the views of your Government on this question?
To: Permanent Representatives
From: Secretary General

The Committee of Three desire you to submit the attached Questionnaire to your Governments with the request that they should send their replies to me by the 20th August at latest.

2. These replies will be for use by the Committee only and will serve as a basis of discussion with individual member countries when the Committee reassembles in Paris early in September.

3. Within a few days there will be circulated a memorandum by the Committee containing explanatory notes and guidance to assist countries in the preparation of their replies to some of the questions.

(Signed) ISMAY

Palais de Chaillot, Paris, XVIe.
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Comité des Trois

Le Comité des Trois vous demande de bien vouloir soumettre le questionnaire ci-joint à votre Gouvernement en le priant de m'adresser sa réponse avant le 20 août au plus tard.

2. Ces réponses ne seront utilisées que par le Comité, qui les prendra pour base de discussion dans les entretiens qu'il tiendra individuellement avec chaque gouvernement membre lorsqu'il se réunira à nouveau à Paris au début de septembre.

3. Les délégations recevront dans quelques jours un mémoandum du Comité contenant des notes explicatives et des directives destinées à aider les pays à préparer leur réponse à certaines des questions ci-après.

(Signé) ISMAY

Palais de Chaillot, Paris, XVIe.
COMITE DES TROIS

QUESTIONNAIRE

Le Comité des Trois, composé de M. Lange, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Norvège, du Dr. Martino, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d’Italie, et de M. Pearson, Secrétaire d’État aux Affaires Extérieures du Canada, a été chargé le 6 mai par le Conseil de l’Atlantique Nord de présenter au Conseil des recommandations quant aux mesures à prendre pour améliorer et développer la coopération entre pays de l’OTAN dans des domaines non militaires et pour accroître l’unité au sein de la Communauté Atlantique”.

Certains de ces problèmes ont déjà été “étudiés en 1951-1952 par le Comité de la Communauté Atlantique” présidé par M. Pearson. Ce Comité n’a proposé ni règles rigides ni formules "automatiques" de consultation, mais il a souligné la nécessité de développer "l’habitude des consultations" entre gouvernements membres. Comme critères des questions qui devraient faire l’objet de consultations, ce Comité a mentionné la mesure dans laquelle elles présentent un intérêt commun ou sont de nature à appeler une action coordonnée.

En outre, il a établi une distinction générale entre les échanges de renseignements d’une part, et les consultations proprement dites de l’autre, en précisant que les premiers devraient porter sur des sujets plus nombreux que les secondes. Depuis lors, certains progrès ont été réalisés dans le sens de la coordination des politiques étrangères des pays de l’OTAN. Le Conseil a commencé à servir à l’échange de renseignements sur des questions d’intérêt commun, et des consultations actives et efficaces ont eu lieu dans certains cas. Toutefois, il existe également des exemples de manque de coordination et de mesures unilatérales prises par des gouvernements membres au sujet de questions intéressant directement l’Alliance; ce manque de coordination et ces mesures ont nuit à l’unité de l’OTAN et affaibli de ce fait l’organisation. Il semble donc nécessaire de trouver de nouveaux moyens propres à encourager les pays à faire du Conseil un outil efficace de consultation, afin d’aboutir à une coopération plus étroite dans les domaines non militaires.

Les questions suivantes ont pour objet de permettre à votre gouvernement de faire connaître sous une forme aussi concise que possible ses vues sur les problèmes que pose la mission confiée au Comité par le Conseil. Cette liste ne doit pas être considérée comme limitative, et toute déclaration ou proposition complémentaires que votre gouvernement désirerait ajouter à sa réponse sera la bienvenue.

I. QUESTIONS POLITIQUES

Il pourrait être intéressant d’examiner s’il est souhaitable de poser, à titre de directives pour les consultations politiques sur des questions d’intérêt commun, certains principes fondamentaux tels que les suivants :

(a) Le Conseil doit être tenu pleinement au courant de toute évolution de la situation politique dans une région quelconque, de nature à avoir des répercussions sensibles sur les pays membres ou l’ensemble de l’Alliance.
Il serait intéressant que les gouvernements membres fassent connaître leurs vues sur cette proposition et précisent dans quelle mesure ils jugent ces principes acceptables.

2. Dans quelle mesure et dans quelles circonstances votre gouvernement est-il disposé à participer aux types suivants de consultations au sein de l'OTAN ?

(i) Echanges officieux de renseignements;

(ii) Établissement de jugements communs en fonction de l'évolution de la situation;

(iii) Consultations visant à parvenir à un accord général sur lequel chaque gouvernement se fonderait, ou dont il s'inspirerait pour élaborer sa politique ;

(iv) Consultations visant à parvenir à un accord sur une politique ou une ligne de conduite sur des questions déterminées.

3. Sur quelles bases doivent être déterminées les questions d'intérêt commun pouvant donner lieu à consultations sous les quatre rubriques ci-dessus, et quels éléments doivent être considérés comme limitant ces consultations, tels que le respect de la liberté d'action de chaque gouvernement membre et le caractère non universel de l'OTAN ?

4. Dans quelle mesure l'OTAN peut-elle contribuer au règlement pacifique des différends et divergences de vues entre pays membres ? Compte tenu des dispositions de l'Article 1 du Traité, l'OTAN doit-elle adopter des procédures de conciliation et de règlement pacifique des différends analogues aux dispositions correspondantes de la Charte des Nations Unies et de certains autres accords internationaux ?

5. L'OTAN doit-elle accorder une valeur plus officielle aux associations de parlementaires et à la Conférence des parlementaires et quelles doivent-elles être les relations entre le Conseil et ces groupements ?

II. QUESTIONS ECONOMIQUES

1. Votre Gouvernement considère-t-il que le renforcement de la coopération entre pays membres de l'OTAN au sein des organisations spécialisées dont ils font partie et l'établissement de relations plus étroites avec ces organisations, constituerait le
meilleur moyen de renforcer l’unité entre les pays membres dans
le domaine économique.

2. A ce sujet, et en ce qui concerne l’OCDE, votre Gouverne-
ment considère-t-il comme suffisante la participation actuelle des
Etats-Unis et du Canada aux travaux de cet organisme à titre de
simples "membres associés"?

3. L’Article 2 du Traité de l’Atlantique Nord stipule que
les parties s’efforceront d’éliminer toute opposition dans leurs
politiques économiques internationales. Votre Gouvernement estime-t-
il que les activités d’autres organisations, notamment l’OCDE, sont
suffisantes pour permettre aux pays OTAN de s’acquitter de leurs
responsabilités dans ce domaine ? Dans quelle mesure votre Gouver-
nement considère-t-il que l’OTAN pourrait aider à régler les conflits
economiques entre pays membres ?

4. Votre Gouvernement estime-t-il que l’OTAN aurait intérêt
tà lancer des travaux publics dans le secteur civil, comme elle l’a
fait dans le domaine militaire ?

5. Votre Gouvernement estime-t-il que l’Organisation Atlanti-
que doit prendre une part active au développement économique des pays
sous-développés de la zone OTAN, ou juge-t-il préférable qu’elle se
borne à évaluer l’importance politique que présentent pour l’Alliance
des programmes de développement élaborés à cette fin ?

6. (a) Votre Gouvernement considère-t-il qu’il est d’un inté-
rêt capital pour l’Organisation Atlantique de favoriser le développe-
ment économique des pays sous-développés situés en dehors de la
zone OTAN ? Dans l’affirmative, étant donné le caractère non univer-
sel de l’Organisation, quelles mesures d’aide aux pays sous-développés
votre Gouvernement estime-t-il que les pays de l’OTAN pourraient
prendre pour atteindre les objectifs recherchés et quelle coordina-
tion peut être instituée dans le cadre de l’Alliance ?

(b) Votre Gouvernement considère-t-il que les statuts
des organismes financiers internationaux existants ou prévus leur
donnent une souplesse suffisante pour leur permettre de fonctionner
convenablement dans les conditions politiques actuelles et de faire
face à la situation devant laquelle l’OTAN se trouve actuellement
placée ?

7. (a) Votre Gouvernement estime-t-il que l’OTAN doit envisa-
ger l’adoption de mesures visant à contrecarrer et à neutraliser
les pratiques commerciales soviétiques qui ne sont pas conformes
eux principes sur lesquels les pays occidentaux fondent normalement
leurs relations financières et commerciales mutuelles ?

(b) Votre Gouvernement estime-t-il que l’OTAN doit envi-
sager l’adoption de mesures lui permettant de lutter contre la con-
currence du bloc soviétique en ce qui concerne les contrats de
travaux publics dans les régions qui constituent des points névralgi-
ques du point de vue politique ?

8. Quelles suggestions peut-on formuler en fonction de l’ex-
périence acquise dans le domaine économique par d’autres organisa-
tions régionales, en vue de leur application éventuelle à d’autres
régions ?
9. Votre Gouvernement considère-t-il que l'Alliance aurait intérêt à ce que les pays OTAN se consultent lorsque certaines questions importantes viennent en discussion dans des organismes économiques internationaux où le bloc soviétique est représenté ?

10. Existe-t-il d'autres questions ou catégories de questions économiques déterminées d'intérêt commun pour l'OTAN, qui ne sont pas actuellement l'objet d'études suffisantes dans d'autres organismes et qui pourraient être examinées utilement par l'OTAN ?

III. QUESTIONS CULTURELLES

Le développement de la coopération dans le domaine culturel pourrait servir à renforcer les relations entre les pays de l'Alliance, à assurer à l'Organisation un appui accru de l'opinion publique et à développer le sentiment d'appartenance à une Communauté Atlantique.

1. Votre Gouvernement considère-t-il que ces objectifs seront mieux atteints par la création :

   (a) d'un institut commun de recherche sur la Communauté Atlantique ?

   (b) d'un collège civil analogue au Collège de Défense OTAN, où des cours de brève durée sur les problèmes politiques, économiques, sociaux et culturels de la Communauté Atlantique seraient donnés aux personnes qui sont en mesure d'agir sur l'opinion, telles que professeurs, journalistes, etc. ?

2. Votre Gouvernement estime-t-il que l'OTAN doit encourager la coopération entre les mouvements de jeunesse des pays de l'Alliance eu égard à la coordination des activités de jeunesse dans les pays communistes ? Le Conseil doit-il examiner les problèmes relatifs à la coopération des mouvements de jeunesse ?

3. Votre Gouvernement considère-t-il que l'OTAN doit entreprendre la coordination de mesures de longue haleine destinées à développer le recrutement et la formation de savants, de techniciens et de spécialistes, eu égard aux progrès accomplis dans ces domaines par les pays communistes ?

4. Afin de renforcer les liens de la Communauté Atlantique, quelles seraient éventuellement, dans le domaine de l'éducation, les tâches que l'OTAN pourrait entreprendre et dont des organisations internationales existantes telles que l'UNESCO ne se sont pas déjà chargées ?

5. Votre Gouvernement serait-il favorable à des échanges de personnel militaire, soit individuellement, soit en groupes, grâce auxquels ce personnel pourrait se familiariser avec la situation dans d'autres pays membres et la compréhension internationale serait facilitée ?

6. Quels sont parmi les programmes éventuels entrant dans le cadre des questions 1, 2, 3 et 4, ceux qui devraient, de l'avis de votre gouvernement, être financés :

- 5 -
IV. QUESTIONS RELATIVES À L’INFORMATION

Le développement de la coopération dans le domaine de l’information, particulièrement dans le cadre de la coexistence compétitive et compte tenu de la nouvelle politique soviétique, pourrait servir à renforcer l’appui accordé à l’OTAN par une opinion publique bien informée et resserrer ainsi l’unité de l’Alliance.

1.Votre Gouvernement estime-t-il que le service de l’information ne doit chercher qu’à donner des renseignements d’ordre purement documentaire sur l’OTAN ?

2. Votre Gouvernement estime-t-il nécessaire de mieux coordonner les efforts dans le domaine de l’information pour faire échec aux initiatives de la propagande soviétique ?

3. Votre Gouvernement considère-t-il qu’il convient de développer les visites réciproques de groupements professionnels, tels que professeurs, journalistes, etc.? ?

4. Votre Gouvernement estime-t-il qu’il convient d’améliorer la coopération entre le service d’information de l’OTAN et les organismes d’information nationaux, tant publics que privés ?

5. Etant donné l’importance des répercussions sur l’opinion publique du développement des consultations politiques au sein de l’OTAN, votre gouvernement a-t-il des suggestions à formuler sur la mesure dans laquelle le public doit être tenu au courant des activités déployées dans ce domaine ?

V. QUESTIONS D’ORDRE ORGANIQUE ET FONCTIONNEL

1. Quels changements précis dans la procédure ou les dispositions relatives à l’organisation votre Gouvernement recommande-t-il en vue d’améliorer et de resserrer les consultations au sein du Conseil, de renforcer et d’étendre la coopération des pays OTAN dans les domaines non militaires et d’accroître l’unité de la Communauté Atlantique ?

2. Dans quelle mesure votre Gouvernement estimerait-il utile pour l’organisation de faire davantage appel au concours d’experts, sur une base soit permanente, soit ad hoc, au cours des consultations politiques du Conseil ?

3. Dans quelle mesure le Secrétaire Général doit-il jouer un rôle actif en matière de consultations politiques, et sur quels types particuliers de problèmes doit porter son action ?

4. Etant donné les responsabilités économiques assumées actuellement par l’OTAN et celles qu’elle envisage d’assumer, quelles sont éventuellement les modifications d’ordre organique que votre Gouvernement considère comme nécessaires pour permettre à l’OTAN de s’acquitter de ces responsabilités ?
5. Votre Gouvernement estime-t-il que le mécanisme de l'OTAN pourrait être davantage utilisé pour la diffusion par chaque gouvernement à l'échelle de l'OTAN de "documents fondamentaux" (tels que textes d'accords, déclarations de principe, etc.) ?

6. Il a été mentionné que des relations plus étroites pourraient être établies entre l'OTAN et les Nations Unies, peut-être en établissant la position de l'OTAN en tant qu'organisation régionale, conformément au sens du Chapitre VIII de la Charte des Nations Unies. Quelles sont les vues de votre Gouvernement sur ce point ?
Attached is a memorandum containing explanatory notes and guidance to assist countries in the preparation of their replies to the Questionnaire of the Committee of Three, which was circulated a few days ago.

(Signed) ISMAY

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.
The questions put to Member Governments by the Committee are intended, as far as possible, to be self-explanatory. In cases where the question may require clarification, explanatory comment is offered in this paper to help bring out the information desired by the Committee. In the event that any further clarification is desired either on the points listed below, or any other points contained in the questionnaire, this should be sought through Permanent Representatives on the North Atlantic Council.

In preparing their answers or any supplementary statements, Governments may wish to refer to the following material produced in previous studies:

1. "NATO, the First Five Years" by Lord Ismay, in particular Chapter XIV.
2. The first Report of the Committee on the Atlantic Community submitted in Rome in November 1951 (C9-D/6).
5. Survey of Article 2 Activities (C-M56)45).

I. POLITICAL QUESTIONS

Questions 4 and 5. The Committee did not have in mind such structural changes as would involve renegotiation of the Treaty. See also General Note on Section V.

II. ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

Question 1. The Committee wishes to make it clear that there is no intention that NATO should assume responsibilities now discharged by OEEC or other international economic agencies.

Question 3. The intention of the Committee is to find out the opinions of Member Governments on whether, in view of the political importance for NATO of eliminating economic conflicts between Member Governments, the activities of existing international economic organizations, especially the OEEC, are adequate to take care of the common interests of the Alliance, or whether additional tasks might be envisaged for those organizations. The views of Member Governments are also desired on what might be done in NATO which is not already being done in existing international economic organizations, especially the OEEC, to bring conflicting interests of member countries into harmony. With regard to the last sentence of Question 3, the Committee has in mind those economic conflicts, which if allowed to remain unresolved, might have serious political repercussions on NATO.
Question 6(a). In answering this question, Governments might also give their views on the possibility of associating private enterprise with programmes for the development of economically underdeveloped countries, and on the incentives which might be required for this purpose.

Question 6(b). The reference: "the status of existing and planned international financial agencies" is in particular to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance Corporation and the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SURFED).

Question 7(a). The Committee has in mind particularly Soviet commercial and financial practices undertaken for political purposes, such as purchases above market prices, sales below market prices, the granting of special terms on loans, etc.

Question 8. The reference particularly is to the Colombo Plan and the Economic Committee of the Baghdad Pact. This question is therefore especially directed to those countries who are members of these organizations.

III. CULTURAL QUESTIONS

Question 1(a). It has been suggested that member countries consider the establishment of a centre of Atlantic Community Studies whose main task would be to promote basic long-term research and thinking about the common values of the Atlantic Community. This research centre would have the status of a university and might be financed from common funds.

Question 1(b). It has been suggested that in addition there should be short (say 6 months) courses to discuss common problems of non-military co-operation specially for those who have professional opportunities for influencing public opinion such as teachers, journalists, etc. The Wilton Park College in the United Kingdom has been suggested as an example of the kind of institution envisaged.

Question 3. The Soviet leaders have invested substantial resources in a rapid development of their educational system to ensure the recruitment on a long-term basis of scientists, technicians and specialists. This problem has been the subject of studies such as the report published in the Annals of the American Academy (January 1956) entitled "Soviet Science in the Post Stalin Era". The situation as regards "Shortages and Surpluses of Highly Qualified Scientists and Engineers" in the Western World has been the subject of a report by the Manpower Committee of OECD (document C(55)160 dated 20th June 1955). These studies point to certain problems of common concern and it might be useful to consider if and how NATO might assist in finding ways and means to deal with it.

Question 5. The intention is to find out if Governments would be in favour of programmes of a multilateral or bilateral character for exchanges of visits of service personnel in member countries, either by encouraging and facilitating individual travelling or by organizing travelling groups for personnel on leave.
IV. INFORMATION QUESTIONS

Question 5. What is intended here is an indication of how far Member Governments believe information should be given out about political consultations in NATO either through communiqués or press conferences in order that the public should be made aware of the more important issues involved in such consultations. The desirability of keeping the public informed has to be weighed against considerations of security, particularly with respect to the exchange of confidential views and information upon which the development of the habit of political consultation so much depends.

V. ORGANIZATIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL QUESTIONS

General Note on Section V

The Committee realises the difficulty of trying to renegotiate the Treaty at this time and therefore has in mind particularly organizational and functional proposals which could be implemented without renegotiation of the Treaty.

Question 2. One suggestion that has been made is that senior experts most familiar with the thinking of their Governments in any given field might be made available on an ad hoc basis to assist their Governments' Permanent Representatives in the Council as well as to consult with their counterparts from other member countries. In this connection, Governments will wish to bear in mind the decision of the Council taken at Lisbon on the organization of the Council in Permanent Session (Final Communiqué, 25th February 1952).
The Committee had in mind the possibility of determining certain categories of questions with respect to which member countries would agree that they should be submitted to a consultation procedure.
Veuillez trouver ci-joint un mémorandum contenant des notes explicatives et des directives destinées à aider les pays à préparer leurs réponses au Questionnaire du Comité des Trois distribué il y a quelques jours.

(Signé) ISMAY

Palais de Chaillot, 
Paris, XVIe.
Les questions posées aux gouvernements membres par le Comité sont destinées à se passer autant que possible de toutes explications. Pour les questions qui appelleront certains éclaircissements, le présent document apporte un commentaire explicatif destiné à bien faire ressortir ce que désire savoir le Comité.

Si un délégué désirerait avoir des précisions supplémentaires sur l'un des points énumérés ci-dessus ou sur tout autre point du questionnaire, elle est invitée à les demander par l'intermédiaire de son Représentant permanent auprès du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord.

En préparant leurs réponses ou toute autre déclaration supplémentaire, les gouvernements pourront se reporter aux documents suivants publiés précédemment :

1. "OTAN, les Cinq Premières Années" par Lord Ismay, particulièrement le Chapitre XIV.

2. Le premier rapport du Comité sur la Communauté Atlantique soumis à Rome en novembre 1951 (C3-D/6).

3. Le rapport définitif du Comité sur la Communauté Atlantique soumis à Lisbonne au mois de février 1952 (C9-D/8).

4. Le rapport du Dr. H.J. Reinink sur le Renforcement de la coopération culturelle entre les pays de l'OTAN (AC/52-D/53).

5. L'Etude sur les activités relatives à l'Article 2 (C-M(56)45).

I. QUESTIONS POLITIQUES

Questions 4 et 5. Le Comité n'a pas envisagé de changements organiques qui impliqueraient une nouvelle négociation du traité. Voir également la note générale sur la partie V.

II. QUESTIONS ÉCONOMIQUES

Question 1. Le Comité tient à préciser qu'il n'est pas question que l'OTAN assume des responsabilités qui incombent à l'heure actuelle à l'OECE ou à d'autres organismes économiques internationaux.

Question 3. Le Comité veut savoir si les gouvernements membres estiment qu'en raison de l'importance politique que revêt pour l'OTAN le règlement des conflits économiques entre les gouvernements membres, les activités des organisations internationales existantes et en particulier de l'OECE suffisent à sauvegarder les intérêts communs de l'Alliance, où s'il faut envisager la possibilité de confier des attributions nouvelles à ces organisations.
Le Comité aimerait également connaître les vues des gouvernements membres quant à ce qui pourrait être fait par l’OTAN dans les domaines dont ne s’occupent pas les organisations économiques internationales actuelles, notamment l’OEEC, afin d’aplanir les conflits d’intérêt entre pays membres. En ce qui concerne la dernière phrase de la Question 3, le Comité songe aux conflits économiques qui, s’ils restent sans solution, risquent d’avoir de sérieuses répercussions politiques pour l’OTAN.

**Question 6(a).** En répondant à cette question, les gouvernements pourraient également dire ce qu’ils pensent de la possibilité d’associer des entreprises privées au développement économique des pays sous-développés, ainsi que des stimulants requis à cette fin.

**Question 6(b).** Les mots "les statuts des organismes financiers internationaux existants ou prévus" visent en particulier la Banque internationale pour la reconstruction et le développement, la Corporation financière internationale et le Fonds spécial des Nations Unies pour le développement économique (SUNFED).

**Question 7(a).** Le Comité pense en particulier aux pratiques commerciales et financières soviétiques, adoptées à des fins politiques, tels que les achats à des prix supérieurs aux cours, les ventes à des prix inférieurs aux cours, l’octroi de prêts à des conditions spéciales, etc.

**Question 8.** Le Comité pense surtout au Plan de Colombo et au Comité économique du Pacte de Bagdad. Cette question est donc spécialement destinée aux pays membres de ces organisations.

**III. QUESTIONS CULTURELLES**

**Question 1(a).** Il a été suggéré que les pays membres envisagent la création d’un centre d’études sur la Communauté Atlantique qui aurait pour but principal d’encourager des recherches et études de longue haleine sur les valeurs communes de la Communauté Atlantique. Ce centre de recherche aurait rang d’université et pourrait être financé sur les fonds communs.

**Question 1(b).** On a suggéré d’établir, en outre, de brefs cours (de 6 mois par exemple), consacrés aux problèmes communs de coopération non militaire, et spécialement destinés aux professeurs, journalistes, etc… qui, en raison de leur profession, peuvent influencer l’opinion publique. Le "Wilton Park College au Royaume-Uni a été mentionné comme exemple du genre d’institution envisagé.

Question 5. Cette question a pour but de voir si les gouvernements sont partisans de programmes d'ordre multilatéral ou bilatéral pour les échanges de visites de personnel militaire entre pays membres, soit en encourageant et en facilitant les voyages individuels, soit en organisant des voyages collectifs pour le personnel en permission.

IV. QUESTIONS RELATIVES À L'INFORMATION

Question 5. Le Comité voudrait savoir dans quelle mesure les gouvernements membres estiment qu'il convient de diffuser des informations sur les consultations politiques au sein de l'OTAN au moyen de communiqués ou de conférences de presse, afin de tenir le public au courant des problèmes les plus importants traités au cours de ces échanges de vues. D'une part il est souhaitable que le public soit informé de ces échanges de vues, mais d'autre part il convient de tenir compte de considérations de sécurité, spécialement en ce qui concerne l'échange d'opinions et de renseignements confidentiels dont dépend, dans une si grande mesure, le développement de l'habitude de ces consultations politiques.

V. QUESTIONS D'ORDRE ORGANIQUE ET FONCTIONNEL

Note générale sur la Section V

Le Comité sait combien il serait difficile de négocier à nouveau le traité à l'heure actuelle, et il songe par conséquent spécialement aux propositions d'ordre organique et fonctionnel qui seraient applicables sans nouvelle négociation du traité.

Question 2. Il a été suggéré de faire appel, sur une base ad hoc, à des experts réputés, qui connaissent bien les vues de leurs gouvernements dans un domaine donné, qui aideraient les représentants permanents de leurs gouvernements auprès du Conseil, et procéderaient à des échanges de vues avec leurs collègues des autres pays membres. À cet égard, les gouvernements n'oublieront certainement pas la décision du Conseil adoptée à Lisbonne sur l'organisation du Conseil en session permanente (Communiqué final, 25 février 1952).
COMITE DES TROIS

NOTES EXPLICATIVES POUR LE QUESTIONNAIRE

ADDITIF

au

Document CT-D/2
(en date du 27 juin 1956)

I. QUESTIONS POLITIQUES

Question 3. Le Comité avait à l'esprit la possibilité d'identifier certaines catégories de questions au sujet desquelles les pays membres seraient d'accord de recourir à une procédure de consultation.

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.
To: Permanent Representatives
From: Secretary General

Committee of Three

As was indicated in the cover note to their Questionnaire (1), the Committee of Three intend to hold discussions with member governments individually on the basis of the replies to be received.

2. The Committee propose to arrange these discussions according to the attached timetable. It will be seen that it is intended to meet each day with the representatives of two governments, one in the morning and one in the afternoon.

3. Would you kindly let me know at the next meeting of the Council, on Wednesday, 18th July, if possible, whether your government can accept these arrangements.

(Signed) ISMAY

Palais de Chaillot, Paris, XVIe.

(1) CT-D/1(Revised) √
**Proposed Programme for the Committee of Three**

**September 10th to 22nd, 1956**

**Preparatory Meetings**
September 10th and 11th

**Consultations with other NATO Governments**

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**Concluding Meetings**

September 20th to 22nd
Comité des Trois

Comme l'indiquait la note de couverture de son Questionnaire (1), le Comité des Trois se propose d'avoir, avec chacun des gouvernements membres individuellement, des entretiens auxquels les réponses à ce questionnaire serviront de base.

2. Le Comité propose, pour l'organisation de ces entretiens, le calendrier ci-joint. Comme on le verra, il compte se réunir chaque jour avec les représentants de deux gouvernements, les uns dans la matinée, les autres dans l'après-midi.

3. Je vous prie de bien vouloir me faire savoir, si possible au cours de la prochaine réunion du Conseil, le mercredi 18 juillet, si votre gouvernement est en mesure d'accepter ces dispositions.

(Signé) ISMAY

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.

(1) CT-D/1(Révisé) √
Programme proposé pour le Comité des Trois
Du 10 au 22 septembre 1956

Réunions préparatoires
10 et 11 septembre
Entretiens avec les autres gouvernements de l'OTAN

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Réunions finales
20 au 22 septembre
TO: Members of the Committee of Three
FROM: Acting Secretary General

The attached study of the possible implications for NATO if it were to become a regional organization in the terms of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, has been prepared by the International Staff in response to the Committee's request.

(Signed) A. BENTINGK

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe
POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO IF IT WERE TO BECOME A REGIONAL ORGANIZATION* IN THE TERMS OF CHAPTER VIII OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

NATO cannot be considered, in its present form, as a "regional arrangement or agency" within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. There is no definition or general ruling as to the requisites necessary for an organization to be considered a "regional arrangement or agency". Article 52 of the Charter itself implicitly calls for the existence of a machinery adequate to meet the requirement that the members of such organizations should "make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council". No such machinery is envisaged in the North Atlantic Treaty. The fact is that NATO was not intended by its authors to be a regional organization, that the member governments have repeatedly emphasised this fact, and that a simple declaration that they henceforth consider it "a regional arrangement or agency" would not be in itself sufficient to turn it into such.

2. It follows that some appropriate adjustment or amplification of the Treaty would be necessary to confer on NATO the character of a "regional arrangement or agency" in the terms of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. There is no ruling as to what particular machinery or action should formally be adopted in order to attain this object. It is, however, felt that no such machinery or action, given its far-reaching character, could be adopted formally, without involving constitutional processes of member governments, either for a renegotiation of the Treaty or for other action (e.g. an additional protocol).

3. Apart from the juridical and constitutional problems involved by a renegotiation of the Treaty or by any other action as might be necessary in order to transform NATO into a regional organization, the implication of such a change should be weighed very seriously against the background of the general political situation and of the very carefully balanced considerations which were kept in mind in the original drafting of the Treaty.

4. It was the consistent intent of the authors of the Treaty to write it strictly within the framework of the United Nations Charter. It was also their purpose to provide, at the same time, an insurance against any situation which the Security Council itself might be unable to control.

The legal background was provided for by Article 51, Chapter VII, of the Charter which stipulates:

"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures

The term regional organization is used throughout the context as corresponding to "regional arrangements and agencies" in the meaning of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain and restore international peace and security".

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty has, therefore, a twofold purpose:

(a) To make clear to any would-be aggressor that his attacks would be met by the continued resistance of all the member states. The first part of Article 5 reads accordingly as follows:

"The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area".

(b) To confirm the full respect of the provisions set forth in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. The second part of Article 5 goes on in fact to state:

"Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security."

It may also be usefully recalled here that full adherence to the Charter is further confirmed by Article 7 of the Treaty which recites:

"This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way, the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security".

It can thus be seen that the wording of Articles 5 and 7 of the Treaty offers a clear-cut and, at the same time, absolutely adequate way to establish the formal obligation of the members of the Alliance automatically to take action under certain circumstances, and to stress the full consistency of such actions with the provisions of the Charter.
5. A fundamental consideration to be borne in mind is that the careful drafting of the Treaty with its specific and exclusive reference to Article 51 of the Charter, which embodies the principle of "inherent right of individual or collective self-defence", implies a reminder that such action does not require any prior authority from the Security Council and, therefore, can in no way be subject to the paralysing veto of one of the five permanent members.

In this connection, it is helpful to contrast this with the relevant part of Article 53 of the United Nations Charter which reads as follows:

"The Security Council shall, where appropriate utilise such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council......".

The stand repeatedly taken in the past by adversaries of NATO is that, while normally recognising the "right of individual or collective self-defence" to member nations, the Charter rules out instead any action if it is to be taken under regional arrangements, except when ordered by the Security Council. By upholding the theory that NATO is in fact a regional organization, such adversaries have challenged the legitimacy of the obligation of its members, under Article 5 of the Treaty, to "take forthwith...... such action...... including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area".

The point at issue has been sufficiently cleared by authoritative jurists to the effect that a definite distinction must be drawn between "measures of self-defence, individual or collective", as authorised by Article 51 of the Charter (and contemplated by the Treaty), and, on the other hand, "measures of enforcement", which do require instead prior authority from the Security Council and imply action decided for the purpose of the restoration of peace. The language of the Charter does not confuse the distinction between these terms and the whole sense of the Charter requires them to be completely distinguished.

The fact remains, however, that Article 53 of the United Nations Charter offers a margin of doubt for discussion and that any debate on its practical implications in the case of NATO becoming a regional organization, would tend to blur the issue. This also is one of the reasons why, in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding or hesitancy, the authors of the Treaty preferred to avoid any reference to regional agreements. This consideration still appears valid today.

6. A similar set of considerations applies to the impact of Article 54 of the United Nations Charter, should NATO become a regional agreement.

Article 54 says that the "Security Council is to be kept informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements for the maintenance of peace and security". It is generally recognised that this wording is obscure and susceptible of causing misunderstanding. The generally accepted explanation tends to limit the purport of Article 54 to action already taken
or which it is contemplated to take under prior authorisation of the Security Council.

However, there has so far been no official ruling as to the exact interpretation of Article 51. Again, here, we are faced with the problem of a wording which is sufficiently confused to allow for the possibility, indeed probability, were NATO a regional organization, of far-reaching questioning, not only at large but also in the United Nations themselves, in relation to the actual purport of the right of the Security Council to be kept informed of the activities of NATO, including possibly even its military planning and defence arrangements.

7. As against the negative aspects of a formal transformation of NATO into a regional organization, there would in fact be no need to proceed to such juridical changes in order to allow the member governments, if they so wish, to undertake any or all of the activities at present conducted by existing regional organizations - such as the OAS - for the purpose of settlement of disputes among their respective partners. In the first place, NATO members, where normal diplomatic channels prove insufficient, can always have recourse to an exchange of views within the North Atlantic Council. This was, in fact, the normal procedure envisaged by the authors of the Treaty. It is also open to NATO members, in existing circumstances, to put into practical effect any of the measures for the pacific settlement of disputes as are set forth in Article 33 and other Articles of Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. A resolution by the North Atlantic Council to that effect, whether designed to establish a general ruling or referring to specific cases, would be sufficient.

8. If the considerations made in the preceding paragraph are pertinent and well-founded, a further aspect to be kept in mind, apart from the immediate one of the relations between NATO members, concerns the psychological projection of NATO on public opinion at large. Not only must the authority and respect which NATO commands remain unimpaired, but no doubt must be allowed to grow that the adoption by NATO of the practices or machinery of regional organizations reflects a change in the fundamental aims of the Alliance. Whatever advantage may be gained in the field of relations between members by adopting new activities and machinery, it would be essential always to make it clear that this in no way implies:

(a) a weakening or change in the original juridical basis (Article 51 of the United Nations Charter) and application of the North Atlantic Treaty provisions (Articles 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Treaty); or

(b) an abandonment of the achievements and machinery functions already developed within NATO.

Otherwise, vis-à-vis world opinion, the implications would be extremely harmful to the original aims of NATO without having corresponding advantages from such a change of emphasis.
Aux: Membres du Comité des Trois
Du: Secrétaire Général par intérim

L'étude ci-jointe des incidences que pourrait avoir pour l'OTAN sa transformation en organisation régionale aux termes du Chapitre VIII de la Charte des Nations Unies a été établie par le Secrétariat International à la demande du Comité.

(Signé) A. BENTINCK

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.

* CT-R/4, paragraphe 9 ✓
INcidences que pourrait avoir pour l'OTAN sa transformation en organisation régionale aux termes du chapitre VIII de la Charte des Nations-Unies

1. Sous sa forme actuelle, l'OTAN ne peut être considérée comme un "Accord ou organisme régional" au sens du chapitre VIII de la Charte des Nations-Unies. Il n'existe aucune définition ou règle générale précisant les conditions nécessaires pour qu'une organisation soit considérée comme un "Accord ou organisme régional". L'article 52 de la Charte elle-même exige implicitement l'existence d'un mécanisme propre à permettre aux membres de ces organisations de "faire tous leurs efforts pour régler d'une manière pacifique, par le moyen desdits accords ou organismes, les différends d'ordre local, avant de les soumettre au Conseil de Sécurité". Aucun mécanisme de cet ordre n'est envisagé par le Traité de l'Atlantique Nord. Le fait est que les créateurs de l'OTAN n'ont pas entendu en faire une organisation régionale, que les gouvernements membres ont souligné ce fait à maintes reprises et qu'ils ne leur suffirait pas de déclarer qu'ils considèrent désormais l'OTAN comme un "Accord ou organisme régional" pour que cette transformation soit un fait acquis.

2. Il en résulte que pour conférer à l'OTAN le caractère d'un "Accord ou organisme régional" aux termes du chapitre VIII de la Charte des Nations-Unies, le Traité devrait être modifié ou sa portée élargie de manière appropriée. Aucune règle ne précise la procédure officielle à suivre à cette fin. Il semble toutefois qu'aucune mesure de cet ordre, étant donné ses profondes répercussions, ne puisse être adoptée officiellement sans que des procédures constitutionnelles soient mises en œuvre par les gouvernements membres, soit aux fins d'une nouvelle négociation du Traité, soit à d'autres fins (par exemple, en vue de la conclusion d'un Protocole additionnel).

3. En dehors des problèmes juridiques et constitutionnels que poserait une nouvelle négociation du Traité ou toute autre mesure nécessaire pour faire de l'OTAN une organisation régionale, les incidences d'une telle transformation doivent être examinées très soigneusement dans le contexte de la situation politique générale et des considérations mûrement réfléchies qui ont présidé à l'origine à la rédaction du Traité.

4. Les auteurs du Traité se sont constamment efforcés de rester strictement dans le cadre de la Charte des Nations-Unies. En même temps, ils ont aussi cherché à se prémunir contre toute situation qui échapperait au contrôle du Conseil de Sécurité. La base juridique du Traité est fournie par l'article 51, chapitre VII de la Charte, qui est ainsi conçu:

"Aucune disposition de la présente Charte ne porte atteinte au droit naturel de légitime défense, individuel ou collectif, dans le cas où un Membre des Nations-Unies est l'objet d'une agression armée, jusqu'à ce que le Conseil"
de Sécurité ait pris les mesures nécessaires pour maintenir la paix et la sécurité internationales. Les mesures prises par les des Membres dans l'exercice de ce droit de légitime défense sont immédiatement portées à la connaissance du Conseil de Sécurité et n'affectent en rien le pouvoir et le devoir qu'a le Conseil, en vertu de la présente Charte, d'agir à tout moment de la manière qu'il juge nécessaire pour maintenir ou rétablir la paix et la sécurité internationales."

L'Article 5 du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord a donc un double but:

(a) Avertir clairement tout agresseur éventuel qu'il se heurterait à la résistance soutenue de tous les Etats membres. C'est pourquoi la première partie de l'Article 5 est ainsi conçue:

"Les Parties conviennent qu'une attaque armée contre l'une ou plusieurs d'entre elles survenant en Europe ou en Amérique du Nord sera considérée comme une attaque dirigée contre toutes les Parties, et en conséquence, conviennent que, si une telle attaque se produit, chacune d'elles, dans l'exercice du droit de légitime défense, individuelle ou collective, reconnue par l'Article 51 de la Charte des Nations-Unies, assistera la Partie ou les Parties ainsi attaquées en prenant aussitôt, individuellement et d'accord avec les autres Parties, telle action qu'elle jugera nécessaire, y compris l'emploi de la force armée, pour rétablir et assurer la sécurité dans la région de l'Atlantique Nord."

(b) Confirmer le respect intégral des dispositions de l'Article 51 de la Charte des Nations-Unies. La deuxième partie de l'Article 5 stipule donc expressément que:

"toute attaque armée de cette nature et toute mesure prise en conséquence seront immédiatement portées à la connaissance du Conseil de Sécurité. Ces mesures prendront fin quand le Conseil de Sécurité aura pris les mesures nécessaires pour rétablir et maintenir la paix et la sécurité internationales".

Il n'est peut-être pas inutile de rappeler à ce sujet que le respect intégral de la Charte est encore confirmé par l'Article 7 du Traité, aux termes duquel:

"le présent Traité n'affecte pas et ne sera pas interprété comme affectant en aucune façon les droits et obligations découlant de la Charte pour les Parties qui sont membres des Nations-Unies ou la responsabilité primordiale du Conseil de Sécurité dans le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales".

Il apparaît donc que le texte des Articles 5 et 7 du Traité permet d'établir clairement et d'une manière entièrement adéquate l'obligation formelle pour les membres de l'Alliance d'intervenir automatiquement dans certaines circonstances, tout en soulignant l'entièrecompatibilité des mesures de cet ordre avec les dispositions de la Charte.
5. Il ne faut pas perdre de vue la considération fondamentale suivante: le texte soigneusement rédigé du Traité, qui se réfère spécifiquement et exclusivement à l'Article 51 de la Charte, lequel fait état du "droit naturel de légitime défense individuelle ou collective" rappelle implicitement qu'aucune mesure de cet ordre n'exige l'autorisation préalable du Conseil de Sécurité et ne peut donc être paralysée par le veto de l'un des cinq membres permanents.

A cet égard, il convient de rappeler par contre le passage pertinent de l'Article 53 de la Charte des Nations-Unies, qui est ainsi conçu:

"Le Conseil de Sécurité utilise, s'il y a lieu, les accords ou organismes régionaux pour l'application des mesures coercitives prises sous son autorité. Toutefois, aucune action coercitive ne sera entreprise en vertu d'accords régionaux ou par des organismes régionaux sans l'autorisation du Conseil de Sécurité; ..."

La position prise à maintes reprises dans le passé par les adversaires de l'OTAN est qu'à la Charte, tout en reconnaissant en principe aux pays membres le "droit de légitime défense individuelle ou collective", exclut en revanche toute mesure prise en vertu d'accords régionaux, sauf sur l'ordre du Conseil de Sécurité. En soutenant que l'OTAN est en fait une organisation régionale, ces tenants de cette thèse ont contesté la légitimité de l'obligation qui incombe à ses membres, aux termes de l'Article 5 du Traité de prendre "aussitôt..., telle action..., y compris l'emploi de la force armée, pour rétablir et assurer la sécurité dans la région de l'Atlantique Nord".

La question en cause a été suffisamment clarifiée par des juristes autorisés dans le sens suivant: une nette distinction doit être établie entre les "mesures de légitime défense individuelle ou collective" autorisées par l'Article 51 de la Charte (et envisagées par le Traité), d'une part, et d'autre part les "mesures coercitives" qui, elles, exigent au contraire l'autorisation préalable du Conseil de Sécurité et présupposent des dispositions prises pour le rétablissement de la paix. Le texte de la Charte maintient clairement la distinction entre ces expressions, et tout l'esprit de la Charte exige que cette distinction soit maintenue.

Il n'en reste pas moins qu'à cet égard l'Article 53 de la Charte peut donner dans une certaine mesure matière à discussion, et que tout débat relatif aux conséquences pratiques de cet article, au cas où l'OTAN deviendrait une organisation régionale, tendrait à obscurcir le problème. C'est également l'une des raisons pour lesquelles, afin d'éviter tout risque de malentendu ou d'hésitation, les auteurs du Traité ont préféré s'abstenir de faire mention des accords régionaux. Il apparaît que cette considération conserve aujourd'hui toute sa valeur.


Aux termes de l'Article 54, "le Conseil de Sécurité doit, en tout temps, être tenu pleinement au courant de toute action entreprise ou envisagée en vertu d'accords régionaux ou par des organismes régionaux, pour le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales". Il est généralement admis que ce texte est obscur et peut
Toutefois, aucune décision officielle n'est intervenue jusqu'à présent au sujet de l'interprétation exacte de l'Article 54. Là encore, nous sommes en présence d'un texte assez confus pour rendre possible, voire probable, au cas où l'OTAN deviendrait une organisation régionale, que se posent des questions d'une grande portée, non seulement dans le public, mais aussi aux Nations-Unies elles-mêmes, au sujet du sens exact du droit pour le Conseil de Sécurité d'être tenu au courant de l'activité de l'OTAN, y compris, éventuellement, ses plans militaires et ses dispositions de défense.

7. Tels sont les aspects négatifs d'une transformation officielle de l'OTAN en organisation régionale; en revanche, aucune modification juridique de cette nature ne serait nécessaire pour permettre aux gouvernements membres, s'ils le désirent, d'entreprendre l'exécution de l'une quelconque ou de toutes les tâches actuellement accomplie par les organisations régionales existantes, telles que l'Organisation des États américains, aux fins de règlement des différend entre leurs membres. En premier lieu, lorsque les voies diplomatiques normales se révèlent insuffisantes, les membres de l'OTAN peuvent toujours procéder à un échange de vues au sein du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord. Telle est en fait la procédure normale envisagée par les auteurs du Traité. Les membres de l'OTAN ont également la faculté, dans les conditions actuelles, d'appliquer n'importe quelle mesure de règlement pacifique des différends envisagée par l'Article 33 et d'autres articles du Chapitre VI de la Charte des Nations-Unies. Il suffirait à cet effet d'une résolution du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord, qu'elle soit destinée à établir une règle générale ou qu'elle concerne des cas particuliers.

8. Si les considérations formulées dans le paragraphe précédents sont pertinentes et bien fondées, il ne faut pas non plus oublier, en dehors du problème immédiat des relations entre pays OTAN, la question de l'impact psychologique de l'OTAN sur l'opinion. Non seulement l'autorité de l'OTAN et le respect qu'elle commande doivent rester intacts, mais il ne faut laisser croire à personne que l'adoption par l'OTAN des usages et procédures des organisations régionales traduit une modification des buts fondamentaux de l'Alliance. Quelque avantage que puissent présenter, dans le domaine des relations entre États membres, l'adoption de nouvelles activités et la création de nouveaux mécanismes, il serait toujours indispensable de préciser que ces mesures n'impliquent à aucun degré

(a) l'affaiblissement ou la transformation de son fondement juridique initial (l'article 51 de la Charte des Nations-Unies) ou de l'application des dispositions du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord (Articles 3, 4, 5 et 6 du Traité);

(b) l'abandon des résultats et de l'organisation déjà acquis au sein de l'OTAN.

Faute de quoi, l'effet sur l'opinion publique des mesures prises serait extrêmement nuisible aux objectifs initiaux de l'OTAN, sans que la nouvelle orientation présente des avantages correspondants.
To: Permanent Representatives
From: Acting Secretary General

COMMITTEE OF THREE

The attached Memorandum by the Danish and Norwegian Governments on a "Centre of Atlantic Community Studies" is circulated at the request of the Committee of Three.

The Committee considers that this Memorandum will be useful to other governments in the preparation of their answers to the questions set out in Section III, sub-sections 1(a) and (b) of the Committee of Three's questionnaire. (1)

(Signed) A. BENTINCK

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.

(1) CT-D/1(Revised)
The Committee of Three: from left to right, Mr Halvard Lange, Prof. Gaetano Makino, and Mr L. B. Pearson.

With reference to the question of setting up a "Centre of Atlantic Community Studies", the Governments of Denmark and Norway wish to make the following comments.

1. Discussions in NATO on the further development of the Atlantic Community in the spirit of Article 2 have stressed the need for:

   (a) A more profound cognisance of the political, economic, social and cultural ideas on which the Community is based;

   (b) Collective efforts within NATO to promote and extend the understanding of the Atlantic Community, thus making it a lasting reality.

2. For more than four years NATO Defence College, under the direction of the Standing Group, has carried out valuable work by imparting to a limited number of military and civilian officials from member countries, through 6 months' courses, a better understanding of the defence problems of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

3. Recognition of the demands, arising from developments, for an intensification of NATO co-operation in the non-military fields, naturally leads to the idea of setting up a "Centre of Atlantic Community Studies", which, as a civilian version of NATO Defence College, would be able to foster a more profound appreciation of the solidarity within the Atlantic Community and to disseminate this knowledge to wider circles.

4. The following preliminary thoughts are presented regarding the activities of the Centre:

   The Centre should undertake teaching and should principally be open to persons who are in a position to influence public opinion, such as teachers, journalists, leaders of youth activities, etc., as well as civil servants, in order to enable these persons to promote in their home countries a better understanding of the political, economic, social and cultural life of the Atlantic Community.

   In addition to an advanced education of qualified persons for the above purpose, the task of the Centre should be to bring about, on a broader basis and preferably through short elementary courses, a better knowledge and appreciation of the common ideals and historical heritage of the NATO countries. In this respect the educational activities of the Nordic Folk High Schools are kept in mind.

   Finally, the activities of the Centre should form the basis for research on matters of common concern to the member countries and on issues bearing upon the developments of the Atlantic Community.
5. In relation to NATO the Centre should have the same independent status as a university in a democratic country. This would entail, amongst other things, that representatives of non-NATO countries may have the opportunity to participate in the activities of the Centre.

For purposes of organization the Centre should be placed directly under the North Atlantic Council. It is suggested that a number of Council members and distinguished representatives of cultural life in the member countries be elected to serve as the Steering Board of the Centre. A director (principal) nominated by the Council for a term of say three years, should be in charge of the management of the Centre.

The Centre should be seated in Paris. In order to avoid duplication of work the Centre should keep in close contact with NATO Defence College. The functions of the Centre should be laid down in a Charter prepared by a Committee of Experts, and adopted by the North Atlantic Council.

6. The Centre should be financed by common NATO funds.
Aux : Représentants Permanents
Du : Secrétaire Général par intérim

COMITE DES TROIS

Le mémorandum ci-joint des gouvernements danois et norvégien sur un "Centre d'études atlantiques" est distribué à la demande du Comité des Trois.

Le Comité estime que les autres gouvernements pourront utilement consulter ce mémorandum lorsqu'ils établiront leur réponse aux questions de la Section III, sous-sections 1 (a) et (b) du questionnaire du Comité des Trois. (1)

(Signé) A. BENTINCK

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.

(1) CT-D/1 (Révisé) √
CENTRE D’ÉTUDES SUR LA COMMUNAUTÉ ATLANTIQUE

Mémorandum des gouvernements du Danemark et de la Norvège

Les gouvernements du Danemark et de la Norvège désirent formuler les observations ci-après au sujet de la création d’un "Centre d’études sur la Communauté atlantique".

1. Les échanges de vues qui ont été consacrés au sein de l’OTAN à un nouveau développement de la Communauté atlantique dans l’esprit de l’article 2 ont fait ressortir la nécessité:

   (a) d’une connaissance plus approfondie des principes politiques, économiques, sociaux et culturels sur lesquels repose cette Communauté;

   (b) d’efforts collectifs au sein de l’OTAN afin de promouvoir et de développer la connaissance de la Communauté atlantique et d’en faire une réalité durable.

2. Depuis plus de quatre ans, le Collège de Défense de l’OTAN, sous la direction du Groupe permanent, accomplit une tâche précieuse en apprenant à un petit nombre d’officiers et de fonctionnaires des pays membres au moyen de cours d’une durée de six mois à mieux comprendre les problèmes de défense de l’Organisation du Traité de l’Atlantique Nord.

3. En reconnaissant la nécessité, née de l’évolution de la situation, d’intensifier la coopération OTAN dans les domaines non militaires, on en vient tout naturellement à l’idée de la création d’un "Centre d’études sur la Communauté atlantique". Ce centre, version civile du Collège de Défense de l’OTAN, serait en mesure de faire naître une conscience plus profonde de la solidarité des membres de la Communauté atlantique, et de diffuser cette conscience dans des milieux plus larges.

4. On trouvera ci-après des notions préliminaires relatives aux activités du Centre:

   Ce Centre devrait se consacrer à l’enseignement et s’adresser principalement aux personnes qui sont en mesure d’influencer l’opinion publique, telles que professeurs, journalistes, dirigeants de mouvements de jeunesse, etc... ainsi qu’aux fonctionnaires, afin de permettre à ces personnes de contribuer à mieux faire connaître dans leur pays la vie politique, économique, sociale et culturelle de la Communauté atlantique.

   Toutefois, le Centre ne se contenterait pas de dispenser à des personnes qualifiées un enseignement poussé aux fins décrites ci-dessus; il s’efforcerait également de développer, sur une base plus large et de préférence au moyen de cours élémentaires de
courte durée, une meilleure connaissance et une plus grande appréciation des idéaux et de l'héritage historique communs aux pays de l'OTAN. A cet égard, il convient de rappeler l'activité éducatrice des écoles secondaires populaires des pays nordiques.

Enfin, c'est sur l'activité du Centre que devraient se fonder les recherches entreprises sur des questions qui intéressent également les pays membres ou qui ont une influence sur l'évolution de la Communauté atlantique.

5. Vis-à-vis de l'OTAN, le Centre devrait avoir la même indépendance qu'une université dans un pays démocratique, ce qui aurait notamment pour conséquence de permettre aux représentants des pays non OTAN de participer à l'activité du Centre.

L'organisation du Centre devrait dépendre directement du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord. Il est suggéré qu'un certain nombre de membres du Conseil et d'éménants représentants des activités culturelles des pays membres soient élus au Comité de direction du Centre. La direction du Centre devrait incomber à un Principal désigné par le Conseil pour une période de trois ans par exemple.

Le Centre aurait son siège à Paris. En vue d'éviter tout double emploi, il devrait coïncider en contact étroit avec le Collège de Défense de l'OTAN. Les fonctions du Centre devraient être définies dans une Charte établie par un Comité d'experts et adoptée par le Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord.

6. Les dépenses du Centre seraient imputées sur les fonds communs de l'OTAN.
TO:     Members of the Committee of Three

FROM: Acting Secretary General

The attached note on procedures for the pacific settlement of disputes within various international organizations, has been prepared by the International Staff in response to the Committee's request.*

(Signed) A. BENTINCK

Palais de Chaillot, Paris, XVIe.

* CT-R/1, paragraph 8.√
NOTE ON PROCEDURES FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES WITHIN VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The procedures followed for the pacific settlement of international disputes are, as is well known, of three kinds: pre-juridical, semi-juridical and juridical; they include diplomatic negotiation, enquiry, good offices, conciliation, arbitration and recourse to the International Court of Justice. The question is whether they could be applied by an organization such as NATO. Other international organizations - the Organization of American States, the United Nations, the Western European Union - have adopted them.

A. THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

2. The Organization of American States prescribes the following:

Pre-juridical procedures

In the first instance, it provides for pre-juridical procedures (American Treaty on Pacific Settlement - Pact of Bogota, 30th April, 1948).

1) In the event of failure of diplomatic negotiation, recourse is had to good offices. The good offices are not necessarily those of States but may also be supplied by eminent citizens, whose function is that of mediators, not judges. The mediators act a period of from 3 to 6 months for the Parties to reach a peaceful settlement of their differences; if they fail to do so, conciliation procedures are resorted to.

2) Conciliation procedures can assume various forms. The Commission of Investigation, consisting of five American members, is convened by the Council of the OAS and must submit a report within six months. The OAS Council may itself act as a conciliation panel (under the terms of the 1947 Treaty of Rio). It can act in this capacity in cases of violation of the territorial integrity, the sovereignty or independence of member States by one of themselves or by a non-member State.

The Inter-American Peace Committee is a little outside the orbit of the OAS (possibly through an oversight on the part of the drafters of the 1948 Pact of Bogota). Composed of five members, unlike the Council of the Organization itself it is vested with juridical powers.

It should be noted that certain American States consider that the Council, with its ability to act in the dual capacity of conciliator and organ of political consultation is in danger of becoming too powerful, while others consider that, with its membership of five, the Inter-American Peace Committee is not unlike an oligarchy.
Semi-juridical procedures

3. Provision also exists for a semi-juridical procedure: 

**ARBITRATION.**

This procedure has often been adopted by the American States. The arbiter has sometimes been the head of a State, sometimes the Permanent Court of Arbitration of The Hague. The present arbitration procedure is that laid down in the Pact of Bogota (Chapter 5, Articles 38 et seq.).

Recourse to arbitration is optional but becomes compulsory when a dispute having been brought before the International Court of Justice of The Hague, the latter has declared itself to be without jurisdiction to hear the controversy (see paragraph 4 hereunder).

The Pact of Bogota specifies how the Arbitral Tribunal is to be established, how the special arbitration agreement is to be drawn up, the role of the Council in the event of failure to appoint the arbiter, the form in which the award is to be drafted, etc.

Juridical procedures

4. One of the aims of the American States is to reach the stage of inter-American justice. To take account of this desire for compulsory jurisdiction, the Pact of Bogota, in Chapter 4, Article 31, makes the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice of The Hague compulsory. The Pact refers specifically to Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice and recognises as compulsory the jurisdiction of the Court in all disputes of a juridical nature (e.g. the interpretation of a treaty; any question of international law; the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute the breach of an international obligation; the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation).

The Pact also provides that either of the parties to a dispute may have recourse to the Court when conciliation procedure has failed or arbitration has not been accepted.

Furthermore, the Court alone is competent to determine the merits of a plea by one of the parties that it is without jurisdiction to hear the controversy. If the Court declares itself without jurisdiction on the grounds that the controversy is national in character, that it has already been settled or that all internal means of recourse have not been exhausted, such controversy shall be declared ended. If the Court declares itself to be without jurisdiction for any other reason, this decision is tantamount to referring the dispute to arbitration which, as stated above (paragraph 3), becomes compulsory in certain cases. This procedure provides means of settling political differences by arbitration.

System of Collective Security

5. The American States have organized in the American continent a system of internal collective security (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Rio de Janeiro, 2nd September, 1947).

They regard the interference of any State in the affairs of another State as tantamount to aggression. They have signed various pacts which reject war as an instrument of policy and
mutually reject their right to territorial conquest; they do not recognize gains obtained by the use of force. During the War, a so-called emergency committee was set up for political defence; it held a watching brief over all the American States to forestall any infiltration or any political aggression detrimental to the continent and was, in reality, directed against the Axis Powers. In its role of an investigating and co-ordinating body, it was able to make recommendations to the Council of the Union.


The Treaty prescribes preventive measures and sanctions covering all conflicts, and stresses the need for close co-operation between the American Governments for the maintenance of peace.

(a) It specifies that an attack by any State against the territorial integrity, the sovereignty or political independence of any other State shall be considered as an attack against all the other American States;

(b) it imposes conciliation on the American States as a duty. As a provisional measure, the Council can assume this duty by convening the Foreign Ministers of the countries concerned. (No time limit is set, and it can happen, as it already has, that the Council, after convening the Foreign Ministers without specifying the date of their meeting, itself acts as the organ of conciliation);

(c) the Council also acts as the organ of political consultation. In this capacity, it is vested with powers of determination, and this makes its prescriptions, which are collective in character, binding on States parties to the Treaty.

These prescriptions may comprise recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions; breaking of diplomatic, consular and finally postal relations; interruption of commercial, economic and financial relations; the use of armed force.

They are optional in the case of a mere threat or of an extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, compulsory in the case of armed aggression or an aggression which, though not an armed attack, affects the sovereignty, the independence or the territorial integrity of one of the member States.

The rejection of pacifying action by an American State will stamp that State as an aggressor. However, no American State is required to make use of armed force.

B. THE UNITED NATIONS

7. The American States, like the Atlantic States, have at their disposal an alternative system for the peaceful settlement of international controversies, i.e. the one written into the United Nations Charter.
The Charter provides for situations of two kinds; the existence of disputes the continuance of which may constitute a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security, and the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.

For the first case, the Charter (Article 33, 1) lays down that the parties shall first of all seek a solution of the dispute by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement, or by recourse to regional agencies or arrangements (Article 36, 1). This clause not only prescribes the traditional methods, but also, it is worth noting, recognises the priority and value of regional arrangements for the settlement of international disputes. The procedures of an agency such as the Organization of American States, are fully warranted under this head.

Should the parties omit to have recourse to peaceful means, the Security Council, if it deems it necessary, urges them to settle their dispute by such means. If this advice is followed, the Council may nevertheless recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment; the legislation of all the States leaves them freedom to adopt these recommendations. The Council is, of course, expected to take into consideration any procedures already initiated and the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in legal matters. Should the parties "fail to settle the dispute", either of them may refer it to the Council. The latter recognises or denies the existence of a dispute and, in the affirmative, decides whether it concerns a reserved field, i.e. one outside the purview of any international authority, ascertains whether the procedures for pacific settlement referred to above (negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other Council recommendation) have been followed, and determines whether the continuance of the dispute is, in fact, likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace. It may then, if it deems it desirable, recommend the adoption of further means of pacific settlement, the employment of methods of appeasement, or even suitable terms of settlement. The field of action of the Council is, therefore, extremely wide.

The second situation comprises threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression (Article 39). When the Council has determined the existence of such circumstances, it makes recommendations or decides what measures shall be taken. These may be provisional measures which it imposes on the parties concerned (Article 40); on the other hand, it may call on all members of the Organization, or only some of them, to apply other sets of measures. The latter may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations or of rail, sea, air, postal and other means of communication (Article 41). If it considers these to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The attention of the Security Council may be drawn to these disputes by the parties concerned, including States which are not Members (Article 35, paragraph 2), by member States which are not parties to the dispute, by the Secretary-General (Article 99) and by members of the Council themselves (Article 39).
11. It is a moot point whether the General Assembly may itself bring a dispute to the notice of the Council but it would seem so (Articles 10 and 12, 4). The General Assembly is, in any case, empowered to discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security (Article 11) such as: supervision of the execution of the provisions of the Peace Treaties, attempts at finding peaceful means of smoothing out differences or of dealing with situations endangering peace (Article 14). The General Assembly has itself recognised that whenever there are threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression in respect of which the Security Council has been unable to fulfil its basic function, it may be convened for recommendations on the collective measures which should be taken (Resolution of 3rd November, 1950). However, this declaration of competence leaves unimpaired the primacy of the Security Council.

12. In brief, the United Nations Charter, although it refers legal disputes insofar as is feasible, to the International Court of Justice, provides that political disputes shall be handled entirely by a political agency, first and foremost the Security Council. However, the Charter omits certain definitions which, given a combination of procedures for the settlement of disputes, would appear to be essential, for instance, the definition of a dispute (presumably a deadlock between two parties regarding the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of certain obligations) or that of aggression. Consequently, the peaceful settlement of disputes by the Council rests on very fragile foundations. Last, but not least, in respect of questions of substance as opposed to procedure, the veto rule can operate.

This probably explains the interest evinced by the Charter itself in efficient regional agencies, to which Chapter VIII is devoted.

C. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

13. It will not be out of place to examine the relations of the United Nations with agencies such as the Organization of American States for the pacific settlement of disputes.

The character of the OAS is two-fold. It is an international organization designed to permit of the exercise of the inherent right to individual or collective self-defence; its basis is Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (Article 3 of the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, 1947). The American, like the Atlantic States can resort to force after they have been the victims of armed aggression. It is the Organ of Consultation of the OAS which determines the character of aggression.

Unlike NATO, the OAS must also be regarded as a regional agency set up within the framework of the United Nations (Article 1 of the OAS Charter, Bogota, 30th April 1948). According to the United Nations Charter, the purpose of regional agencies is primarily to deal with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action. This is certainly the aim of the procedures for the pacific settlement of disputes between member States adopted by the OAS. They are thus consistent with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.
Consequently, in implementation of the combined stipulations of the Charter and of the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, in the event of a dispute, the American States must first try to settle it themselves by the methods they have accepted as members of a regional agency. However, they may not use coercive measures without the authority of the Security Council. They notify the latter of the existence of a dispute and keep it informed of the activities undertaken or in contemplation for its settlement. Any member government can draw the attention of the Security Council or the General Assembly to the existence of the conflict (see paragraph 9 above). As has already been noted (see paragraph 7 above), the United Nations must refer the dispute back again if all means of settlement under the prescribed regional procedures have not been exhausted. The Security Council retains the right to ensure that the action taken is consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations (Article 52 of the Charter).

D. WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

14. The members of the Western European Union have also stressed, in Article 8 of the Brussels Treaty (17th March 1948), their determination to settle disputes between themselves only by peaceful means. While the present Treaty remains in force, they agree to recognize the competence of the International Court of Justice as regards disputes of a legal character and to submit all other disputes, by which are meant political disputes, to arbitration procedure. However, so far, this procedure does not appear to have been defined.

CONCLUSIONS

15. The position of NATO States with respect to the peaceful settlement of disputes still remains to be examined.

(a) As regards legal disputes, the position is reasonably clear. All its members, with the exception of the German Federal Republic, are members of the United Nations and as such they have acknowledged not only the optional jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice but, under Article 36 of the Statute of the Court, its compulsory jurisdiction subject to the reservations made by certain countries. As for the German Federal Republic, its position is on a par with that of its six WEU partners, by virtue of Article 8 of the Brussels Treaty.

(b) As regards disputes of a political character, member States are bound only by the provisions of Article 1 of the North Atlantic Treaty and, with the exception of the German Federal Republic, by the United Nations Charter. These provisions are very obscure and, in a certain measure, problematical. If the prescribed procedures were followed, any difference between two NATO States would be submitted to the Security Council. There is no need to dwell on the benefit the enemies of the Alliance would derive from a public dispute between two parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, quite apart from the fact that the situation could only deteriorate as a result of such action.
(c) Under the terms of the relevant agreements, in the final analysis it normally falls to the North Atlantic Council to attempt itself to settle differences between member countries. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent the parties to a dispute if they are members of NATO, from submitting voluntarily to a procedure for its pacific settlement along the lines of those adopted by the American States, or from accepting a procedure recommended to them by the North Atlantic Council.
Aux : Membres du Comité des Trois
Du : Secrétaire Général par intérim

La note ci-jointe sur les procédures de règlement pacifique des différends dans différentes organisations internationales a été établie par le Secrétariat International à la demande du Comité (+).

(Signé) L. BENTINCK

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.
NOTE SUR LES PROCÉDURES DE RÈGLEMENT PACIFIQUE DES DIFFÉRENTS DANS DIFFÉRENTES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES

Les procédés employés pour la solution pacifique des différends internationaux sont bien connus : prêjuridictionnels, parajuridictionnels, juridictionnels; ce sont les négociations diplomatiques, les enquêtes, les bons offices, la médiation, l'arbitrage, le recours devant la Cour Internationale de Justice. Une institution comme l'ONU pourrait-elle les employer ?


A. L'ORGANISATION DES ÉTATS AMÉRICAINS

2. L'Organisation des États Américains use des procédures suivantes :

Procédures préjuridictionnelles

En premier lieu sont prévues des procédures préjuridictionnelles : (Traité américain de règlement pacifique : Pacte de Bogota 30 avril 1948).

18) En cas d'échec des négociations diplomatiques on a recours à la procédure des bons offices. Les bons offices ne sont pas rendus nécessairement par des États, mais par des citoyens éminents; ceux-ci agissent en qualité de médiateurs et non de juges. Les médiateurs doivent fixer un délai de 3 à 6 mois pour que les Parties aboutissent à un règlement pacifique de leurs différends; en cas d'insuccès, il est recouru aux procédures de conciliation.


La Commission interaméricaine de la Paix se situe un peu en marge de l'organisation de l'ONU. (peut-être par suite d'une négligence des rédacteurs du Pacte de Bogota 1948), Composée de cinq membres, elle dispose, à la différence du Conseil de l'Organisation lui-même, de pouvoirs juridiques propres.

Il faut noter que certains États américains estiment que le Conseil, par le cumul du rôle de conciliateur et de celui d'organe de consultation politique, risque de devenir trop puissant ; d'autres, par contre, estiment que composée de cinq membres, la Commission interaméricaine de la Paix offre des allures oligarchiques.

Procédures parajuridictionnelles

3. Il existe aussi une procédure parajuridictionnelle : l'ARBITRAGE.
Il a été souvent employé par les États Américains. L'arbitre a été parfois un chef d'État, parfois la Cour Permanente d'Arbitrage de La Haye. À l'heure actuelle, le Pacte de Bogota (chapitre 5, articles 38 et suivants), organise une procédure de l'arbitrage.

Le recours à l'arbitrage est facultatif; il devient obligatoire au cas où une affaire ayant été portée à la Cour Internationale de Justice de La Haye, celle-ci s'est déclarée incompétente pour en connaître (cf. ci-dessous par. 4).

Le Pacte de Bogota précise le mode de désignation du tribunal arbitral, les conditions de rédaction du compromis, le rôle du Conseil en cas de carence de l'arbitre, la rédaction de la sentence arbitrale, etc.

**Procédures juridictionnelles**

4. Les États Américains ont essayé d'atteindre le stade de la justice internationale. Tenant compte de cette aspiration à la juridiction obligatoire, le Pacte de Bogota, chapitre 4, article 31 a proclamé la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour de La Haye. Le Pacte se réfère en effet à l'article 36, paragraphe 2 du Statut de la Cour Internationale de Justice, et déclare obligatoire le compétence de la Cour à l'égard de différends d'ordre juridique (par exemple: interprétation du traité; tout point de droit international; l'existence de tout fait qui, s'il était établi, constituait la violation d'un engagement international; la nature et l'étendue de la réparation due pour la rupture d'un engagement international).

Le Pacte prévoit en second lieu qu'une partie peut citer l'autre devant la Cour si dans un différend la conciliation a échoué ou si l'arbitrage n'a pas été accepté.

En outre, la Cour jouit d'une compétence exclusive pour décider du bien-fondé de l'exception au domaine réseré qui serait alléguée par une partie. Si elle se déclare incompétente, pour le motif que le litige est de compétence nationale, ou bien qu'il est déjà réglé ou bien que les voies internes de recours n'ont pas été épuisées, le différend doit être considéré comme terminé. Si sa décision d'incompétence est fondée sur d'autres motifs, elle constitue renvoi à une procédure d'arbitrage qui, comme nous l'avons vu plus haut (par. 3), revêt un caractère obligatoire. Cette procédure permet que des différends d'ordre politique puissent être résolus par l'arbitrage.

**Système de Sécurité Collective**


Ils considèrent l'intervention d'un État dans les affaires d'un autre État comme une véritable agression. Par différents pactes ils ont proclamé la suppression de la compétence de guerre et du droit de conquête territoriale les uns envers les autres : ils ne reconnaissent pas les acquisitions dues à la force. Pendant la guerre a été créé un comité d'urgence pour la défense politique ; il exerçait un droit de regard sur tous les États américains afin de...
prévenir toute infiltration, toute agression politique susceptible
d'atteindre le continent, il était en fait dirigé contre l'Axe;
ayant un rôle d'étude et de coordination il pouvait faire des recom-
mandations au Conseil de l'Union.

6. Le système de sécurité collective, organisé par l'Acte
de Chapultepec (1945) est défini par le Traité de Rio (1947).

Ce texte organise la prévention et la sanction de tout
conflit, insiste sur la nécessité de la solidarité étroite des
gouvernements américains pour maintenir la paix.

a) Il pose le principe que toute atteinte d'un État
terri­torial, à la souveraineté politique d'un autre État est considérée comme un acte d'agression
contre tous les autres membres de l'O.E.A.

b) il donne à l'O.E.A. le devoir de conciliation. Le
Conseil peut l'exercer à titre provisoire à charge pour lui de
convoquer les Ministres des Affaires Étrangères qui en sont responsables (aucune limite de durée n'est fixée pour cette convocation;
il peut arriver, et il est arrivé, que le Conseil convoquant les
ministres des Affaires Étrangères, sans fixer la date de leur réun-
ion, agisse seul en qualité d'organisme conciliateur).

c) Le Conseil agit enfin en qualité d'organe de consulta-
tion politique. A ce titre il jouit d'un pouvoir déterminant,
c'est-à-dire que ses prescriptions sont obligatoires pour les
États Parties au Traité et ont un caractère collectif.

Ces prescriptions peuvent être: le rappel des Chefs de
Mission Diplomatique; la rupture des relations diplomatiques, puis
consulaires, puis postales; l'interruption des relations commercia-
les, économiques, financières, l'usage de la force armée.

Elles sont facultatives en cas de simple menace ou conflits
extra ou intra continentaux; elles sont obligatoires en cas d'agres-
sion armée; elles le sont également en cas d'agression non armée,
mais attentatoire à la souveraineté, à l'indépendance, à l'intégrité
territoriale d'un des États membres.

Le refus d'un État américain de s'associer à des mesures pacifiques le fait considérer comme un agresseur. Au contraire aucun
État américain n'est tenu de faire usage de la force armée.

B - LES NATIONS UNIES

7. Les États américains, comme les États atlantiques dispo-
sent parallèlement d'un autre système de règlement pacifique des
conflits, celui inscrit dans la Charte des Nations Unies.

Deux cas sont à considérer d'après la Charte, celui des
différends dont la prolongation est susceptible de menacer le
maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationale, et celui des
menaces contre la paix, des ruptures de paix, des actes de guerre.

8. Dans la première série d'hypothèses, la Charte (article 33,
1) prévoit que les parties doivent d'abord rechercher la solution
du différend par voie de négociation, d'encouêté, de médiation,
de conciliation, d'arbitrage, de règlement judiciaire ou par recours
aux organismes ou accords régionaux (art. 35, 1°). Cette disposi-
tion est constitutive d'une part un renvoi aux procédures traditionnelles.
et d'autre part, cela vaut d'être souligné, une reconnaissance de la priorité et de la valeur du régionalisme comme cadre pour la solution des différends internationaux. Les procédures d'une organisation comme l'O.E.A. ont, de ce chef, leur pleine utilité.

Si les parties négligent de recourir aux moyens pacifiques, le Conseil de Sécurité, s'il le juge nécessaire, les incite à régler le différend par de tels moyens (art. 37). Si elles utilisent ces moyens, le Conseil peut, cependant, recommander des procédures ou des méthodes d'ajustement appropriées ; les États restent libres in jure de suivre cette recommandation. Il est bien entendu que le Conseil doit avoir égard aux procédures déjà engagées et à la compétence d'ordre juridique de la Cour Internationale. Si les parties n'ont pas réussi à "régler le différend" chacune d'elles peut porter celui-ci devant le Conseil. Celui-ci dira s'il existe réellement ou non un différend, statuerà pour savoir si celui-ci est du domaine réservé c'est-à-dire échappe à la compétence de toute instance internationale, vérifiera si les procédures de règlement pacifique visées plus haut (négociation, enquête, médiation, conciliation, arbitrage, règlement judiciaire ou toute autre recommandée par le Conseil) ont été suivies, vérifiera si la prolongation du différend menace véritablement la paix du monde. Puis il pourra, s'il le juge utile, recommander soit que de nouvelles procédures de règlement pacifique soient observées, soit que des méthodes d'apaisement soient employées, soit même un règlement approprié du conflit. Le champ d'action du Conseil est donc infiniment varié.

9. La seconde série d'hypothèses comprend des menaces contre la paix, la rupture de la paix, les actes de guerre (art. 39); lorsque le Conseil a constaté que de telles circonstances existent, il fait des recommandations ou décide quelles mesures seront prises. Ce peuvent être des mesures provisoires qu'il impose aux parties intéressées (art. 40); à défaut il peut demander à tous les membres de l'organisation ou à partie d'entre eux d'appliquer d'autres séries de mesures. Ces dernières peuvent être : l'interruption partielle ou complète des relations économiques, ou celle des communications ferroviaires, maritimes, aériennes, postales, etc..., la rupture des relations diplomatiques (art. 41). Si ces dernières lui paraissent inadéquates, il pourrait entreprendre au moyen de forces aériennes, navales ou terrestres, toute action jugée nécessaire au maintien ou au rétablissement de la paix et de la sécurité internationales.

10. De tous ces différends le Conseil de Sécurité peut être saisi par les Parties intéressées, y compris des États non membres (art. 35, par. 2), par les États membres non parties au différend, par le Secrétaire Général (art. 99) par le Conseil lui-même (art. 39).

11. L'Assemblée Générale peut-elle le saisir également ? Il le semble (art. 10 et 12, 49). Celle-ci d'ailleurs a une compétence générale pour discuter toute question se rattachant au maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales (art. 11); par exemple la surveillance de l'exécution des traités de paix, la recherche de solutions destinées à apaiser les différends ou les situations menaçantes pour la paix (art. 14). Aussi bien a-t-elle admis elle-même que dans tous les cas de menace à la paix, de rupture de la paix, d'acte d'agression, où le Conseil de Sécurité n'aurait pas été en mesure de s'acquitter de sa fonction essentielle, elle pourrait être réunie pour faire des recommandations sur les mesures
collectives à prendre (Résolution du 3 Novembre 1950). Toutefois cette réclamation de compétence laisse intacte la prééminence du Conseil de Sécurité.

12. En somme, la Charte des Nations Unies, si elle renvoie les différends d'ordre juridique dans la mesure du possible à la Cour Internationale de Justice, laisse les différends d'ordre politique à l'exclusivité compétence d'une institution politique au premier chef, le Conseil de Sécurité. Bien plus, la Charte ne donne point certaines définitions qui, dans un ensemble de procédures de solution de conflits, seraient bien nécessaires: par exemple celle des différends (on peut admettre que c'est la nette opposition entre 2 parties quant à l'exécution de la non exécution de certaines obligations), celle de l'agression. C'est dire que la solution pacifique des différends par le Conseil repose sur des bases fragiles. Enfin et surtout, pour ces questions, qui sont de substance et non de procédure, la règle du veto peut jouer (cf. art. 27).

On comprend dès lors l'intérêt attaché par la Charte elle-même au bon fonctionnement des Organisations régionales au sens de son chapitre VIII.

C - RAPPORTS DES NATIONS UNIES AVEC L'O.E.A.

13. Quels sont les rapports des Nations Unies et d'une organisation comme l'O.E.A. du point de vue du règlement pacifique des différends ?

L'O.E.A. a un double caractère: c'est une organisation internationale destinée à permettre la mise en œuvre de la légitime défense, individuelle et collective; elle est fondée sur l'article 51 de la Charte des Nations Unies (art. 3 du Traité de Rio de Janeiro 1947). Les États américains, comme les États atlantiques, peuvent recourir à la force s'ils sont d'abord l'objet d'une agression armée. L'appréciation du caractère de l'agression appartient à l'Organe de Consultation de l'O.E.A.


Dès lors, en application des dispositions combinées de la Charte et du Traité de Rio de Janeiro, en cas de différend, les États américains sont tenus d'abord d'essayer de le régler eux-mêmes suivant les méthodes auxquelles ils ont souscrit en tant que membre d'une organisation régionale. Toutefois ils ne peuvent user de mesures coercitives sans l'autorisation du Conseil de Sécurité. Ils doivent faire rapport à celui-ci sur l'existence du conflit et les méthodes employées ou projetées en vue de le résoudre. Tout gouvernement membre a le droit de soumettre le conflit à l'attention du Conseil de Sécurité ou de l'Assemblée Générale (par. 9 ci-dessus). Mais comme nous l'avons vu (par. 7 ci-dessus) les Nations Unies doivent renvoyer le différend si les procédures régionales ne sont pas épuisées.
Le Conseil de Sécurité conserve le droit de vérifier à tous moments la compatibilité de l'action entreprise avec les buts et principes des Nations Unies (art. 52 de la Charte).

D - UNION DE L'EUROPE OCCIDENTALE

14. Les membres de l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale ont également souligné, à l'article 8 du Traité de Bruxelles (17 mars 1948) leur détermination de ne régler leurs différends que par des voies pacifiques; pendant la durée de l'application du Traité, ils s'engagent à respecter la compétence de la Cour Internationale de Justice concernant les différends d'ordre juridique, et à soumettre à une procédure de conciliation tous les autres différends, c'est-à-dire les différends d'ordre politique; toutefois, il ne semble pas que cette procédure ait été définie jusqu'à ce jour.

CONCLUSION

15. Quelle est la situation des États de l'OTAN au regard du règlement pacifique des différends.

a) En ce qui concerne les différends d'ordre juridique, la situation est assez claire. Tous, sauf la République Fédérale, sont membres des Nations Unies; en cette qualité ils ont reconnu non seulement la compétence facultative de la Cour Internationale de Justice, mais encore en application de l'art. 36 du Statut de la Cour, sa juridiction obligatoire sous certaines réserves formulées par certains pays. Pour la République Fédérale elle est dans une situation analogue à l'égard de ses six partenaires de l'U.E.O., en application de l'art. 8 du Traité de Bruxelles.

b) En ce qui concerne les différends d'ordre politique, ils ne sauraient que par les formules de l'article I du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord, et sauf pour la République Fédérale par celles de la Charte des Nations Unies. Celles-ci sont bien vagues et dans une certaine mesure aléatoires: en effet, s'il fallait suivre les procédures prévues, un conflit entre deux États atlantiques serait soumis au Conseil de Sécurité: le profit que tireraient les adversaires de l'Alliance d'une discussion politique entre deux signataires du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord, il n'est pas nécessaire de le souligner, sans compter que la situation elle-même ne pourrait que s'envenimer.

c) Dans l'état actuel des textes, c'est en définitive normalisé au Conseil Atlantique lui-même de s'employer à régler les différends entre ses membres. Rien ne s'oppose d'autre part, à ce que les parties en cause à un différend, et membres de l'O.T.A.N, se soumettent, de leur gré, à une procédure de solution pacifique du type de celles adoptées par les États américains, ou acceptent d'en suivre une qui leur serait recommandée par le Conseil Atlantique.
To: Members of the Committee of Three
From: Acting Secretary General

The attached outline of what NATO has done so far in the non-military fields has been prepared by the International Staff in response to the Committee's request.

(Signed) A. BENTINCK

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.

* CT-R/1, para. 6

NATO CONFIDENTIAL
OUTLINE OF WHAT NATO HAS DONE SO FAR IN THE NON-MILITARY FIELDS

The achievements of the NATO countries during the past ten years in the field of non-military co-operation have been considerable. This is demonstrated in the Survey of Article 2 activities prepared recently at the request of the Council. (1) But the practical achievements of NATO itself in this field have been severely limited, largely because most members of NATO are also members of a wide range of other agencies which deal with various aspects of non-military co-operation. Most of these agencies have a wider membership than NATO and provide essential political and economic links between the Atlantic countries and the rest of the world. The policy of NATO has therefore been to avoid a duplication of effort which would not only be wasteful but might weaken other agencies and harm these valuable links.

2. This policy is implicit in the Ottawa Declaration of 20th September 1951 in which the Council announced that it had set up a five-power Ministerial Committee on the North Atlantic Community to consider ways and means of implementing Article 2 of the Treaty "without duplicating the work of other international organizations which promote the same objectives" as NATO. The final report of this Committee, (2) adopted by the Council in February 1952, recommended that the tasks of the Committee be transferred to the Council in permanent session and made various suggestions for developing co-operation on the following subjects:

- co-ordination and consultation on foreign policy;
- economic co-operation;
- the movement of labour;
- cultural co-operation;
- information activities.

The subject of social co-operation was also considered but the Committee felt that there was little that NATO could do which was not already being done, unless there was an opportunity in the future of developing trans-Atlantic collaboration. It recommended that the subject be kept under review. The following is a brief summary of what has been done so far in the non-military fields.

Co-ordination and consultation on foreign policy

3. Political discussions by the Council have increased steadily in scope and importance during the past few years. Certain subjects are debated regularly in Permanent and in Ministerial Sessions of the Council: the political implications of the military situation, taking account of the relative military strength of the Communist Bloc and of the West; relations in the Communist Bloc and trends in Soviet policy. On this latter subject a Working Group has been set up to advise the Council. Other questions

(1) C-M(56)h5(Revised)
(2) C/9-D/8
have been brought before the Council by member governments which were of concern to other member governments or to the Organization as a whole. Special mention should be made of the consultations on the German problem, European security, and disarmament; and on the decisions taken at major international conferences. It is a sign of the growing use of the Council as a forum for political consultation that the earlier international conferences were discussed only after they had been held whereas before the Geneva conference in 1955 there were preliminary consultations on the line which would be followed.

Nevertheless, political consultations have by no means reached the point of using the Alliance to the fullest advantage. The NATO countries are rightly reluctant to behave as though they were members of a tightly closed bloc, but many problems of common interest to member countries have as yet barely been touched upon.

**Economic co-operation**

5. The work of this Organization in this field has fallen into two parts. First, economic studies of member countries are made in the course of the Annual Review (using to a great extent the results of the economic survey conducted by the OECD). Although the purpose of these studies stems from the need to ensure that the defence effort rests on a secure economic base, they may fairly be regarded as having non-military implications. Following the precedent set by the Temporary Council Committee in 1951, the Council in debating the results of the Annual Review, has from time to time made recommendations on economic policy, while leaving the practical consequences of these recommendations to be worked out elsewhere.

6. Secondly, the Council has set up a committee to advise it on economic developments and policies in the Soviet countries, with particular reference to trends in the comparative economic strengths of the NATO and Soviet countries. Recently, this committee was requested to prepare periodic surveys of Soviet economic moves vis-à-vis the outside world, especially the underdeveloped areas. In addition, a committee of technical experts has been established which at present is studying the Pineau Plan for aid to underdeveloped countries.

7. It will be noted that the growing interest of the Organization in economic matters arises from the changing tactics of the Soviet bloc rather than from the intention of member countries to use NATO as an instrument for general economic collaboration in the sense that this is implied in Article 2 of the Treaty.

**Social co-operation - the movement of labour**

8. The only social question considered by NATO is that of the movement of labour. A working group has been set up to study trends in employment, labour mobility and migration and to advise the Council on means of freeing the movement of labour and assisting migration. This working group produces annual reports containing general conclusions but no precise recommendations for action.
Cultural and information activities

9. A Council committee has been established to give policy guidance on matters of information and cultural relations. Various studies have been made to find the most fruitful ways of developing cultural co-operation within NATO. In 1954, a temporary consultant was appointed who produced a report for the Council. In July 1956, a meeting was held of senior officers concerned with government sponsored cultural activities in member countries; their report is currently under consideration.

10. The results of five years of debate and study are not very impressive. So far the following action has been taken by NATO:

   (a) a NATO Fellowship and Scholarship Programme was established in 1955. It distributed its first sixteen grants in April 1956;

   (b) a summer course for representatives of Universities and Youth Organizations from NATO countries was held in Paris in July 1955. A further meeting of representatives of Youth Organizations was held this year;

   (c) NATO contributed to a Summer Seminar on International Organisations held in Oxford in July 1956.

11. The main information activities undertaken by the organization are: NATO sponsored journalists' tours, conferences of heads of national information services, conferences and courses on troop information, briefing of visitors to NATO Headquarters, the publication of the NATO Letter, of handbooks and other documentation, the organization of mobile exhibits and the production and distribution of films.

12. Despite an annual increase in the financial support for cultural and information activities, the total amount now made available seems small compared with the resources of member countries. At the same time, governments have failed to provide the alternative to increased support for NATO-wide activities - sustained and adequately programmed activities on a national basis.
Le Secrétaire Général par intérim

Aux: Membres du Comité des Trois

Le document ci-joint, qui expose dans ses grandes lignes l’œuvre accomplie jusqu’ici par l’OTAN dans les domaines non militaires, a été établi par le Secrétariat International à la demande du Comité.  

(Signé) A. BENTINCK

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.

* CT-R/1, paragraphe 6
L'œuvre accomplie par les pays de l'OTAN au cours des dix dernières années dans le domaine de la coopération non militaire est considérable, comme le prouve l'"Étude sur les Activités relatives à l'Article 2", récemment rédigée à la demande du Conseil(1). Sur le plan pratique cependant, les réalisations de l'OTAN proprement dites en ce domaine ont été fortement limitées, du fait surtout que la plupart de ses membres font également partie de nombreux autres organismes dont l'activité s'exerce dans divers domaines de la coopération non militaire. Ces organismes, qui, pour la plupart, groupent un nombre de pays plus important que l'OTAN, permettent d'établir les liens politiques et économiques essentiels entre les pays atlantiques et le reste du monde. La politique de l'OTAN a donc consisté à éviter un chevauchement des efforts qui ne serait pas seulement inutile mais risquerait aussi d'affaiblir les autres organismes et de porter atteinte à ces liens d'une très grande valeur.

2. Cette politique est implicitement contenue dans la Déclaration d'Ottawa du 20 septembre 1951, par laquelle le Conseil annonçait qu'il avait créé une Commission ministérielle de cinq puissances sur la Communauté de l'Atlantique Nord avec mission d'étudier les voies et moyens permettant d'appliquer les dispositions de l'Article 2 du Traité "sans que son travail fasse double emploi avec celui d'autres organisations internationales qui visent au même but". Dans son rapport final(2) adopté par le Conseil en février 1952, la Commission recommanda que les tâches qui lui avaient été confiées fussent transférées au Conseil Permanent et présentât diverses suggestions en vue de développer la coopération dans les domaines suivants:

- coordination et consultations en matière de politique étrangère;
- coopération économique;
- mouvement de la main-d'œuvre;
- coopération culturelle;
- activités relatives à l'information.

La question de la coopération sociale avait été examinée elle aussi, mais la Commission estima qu'il restait à l'OTAN bien peu à faire qui ne fût déjà fait dans ce domaine, à moins que la possibilité ne se présente par la suite de développer la collaboration entre les pays situés de part et d'autre de l'Atlantique. Elle recommanda que la question ne fût pas perdue de vue, On trouvera ci-après un résumé des résultats obtenus jusqu'à présent dans les domaines non militaires.

Coordination et consultations en matière de politique étrangère

3. Au cours des dernières années, les consultations politiques se sont développées régulièrement au sein du Conseil aussi bien en étendue qu'en importance. Certains sujets font
l'objet de délibérations régulières au sein du Conseil permanent et au cours des sessions ministérielles: ce sont, par exemple, les incidences politiques de la situation militaire, compte tenu de la force militaire relative du bloc communiste et de l'Ouest; les relations avec le bloc communiste et les tendances de la politique soviétique. Pour cette dernière étude, un Groupe de travail a été créé avec mission de formuler des avis au Conseil. Les Gouvernements membres ont également saisi le Conseil d'autres questions qui intéressent soit d'autres pays de l'Alliance, soit l'organisation dans son ensemble. Il convient de mentionner en particulier les consultations sur le problème allemand, sur la sécurité européenne, sur le désarmement et sur les décisions prises au cours des grandes conférences internationales. Alors que, dans le passé, la déroulement des conférences internationales n'était généralement étudié qu'après coup, les consultations politiques qui ont précédé la conférence de Genève de 1955 montrent le rôle de plus en plus grand que joue le Conseil en tant que centre de consultations politiques.

4. Cependant, le développement des consultations politiques est loin d'avoir atteint le point où celles-ci permettraient de conférer à l'Alliance toute sa valeur. Les pays de l'OTAN répugnent à juste titre à se conduire comme s'ils étaient les éléments d'un bloc monolithique mais jusqu'à présent un grand nombre de problèmes d'un intérêt commun pour les membres de l'Organisation n'ont guère été effleurés.

**Coopération économique**

5. Les travaux de l'Organisation en ce domaine se présentent sous deux aspects. Tout d'abord, les études économiques auxquelles procèdent les pays membres à l'occasion de l'Examen annuel (en utilisant largement les résultats de l'examen économique effectué par l'OECI). Bien que l'utilité de ces études tienne à la nécessité d'assurer à l'effort de défense une base économique saine, elles pouvaient raisonnablement être considérées comme ayant des incidences non militaires. Suivant en cela l'exemple donné par le Comité Temporaire du Conseil en 1954, le Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord, lorsqu'il examine les résultats de l'examen annuel, formule parfois des recommandations sur la politique économique tout en laissant à d'autres la mise en œuvre pratique de ces recommandations.

6. En second lieu, le Conseil a créé un autre comité avec mission de formuler des avis sur l'évolution et la politique économique des pays soviétiques, en considérant particulièrement les tendances de la puissance économique relative de l'OTAN et du bloc soviétique. Ce comité a été récemment chargé de procéder à la revue périodique des initiatives économiques des Soviétis à l'égard du monde extérieur et notamment des régions insuffisamment développées. En outre, un Comité de techniciens créé depuis peu étudie actuellement le plan Pincoff d'aide aux pays sous-développés.

7. Il convient de noter que l'intérêt croissant de l'OTAN pour les questions économiques est dû davantage à la nouvelle tactique soviétique qu'à la volonté de ses membres d'utiliser l'organisation comme un instrument de collaboration économique générale au sens donné à ce terme dans l'Article 2 du Traité.
Coopération sociale - Mouvements de main-d'œuvre

8. La seule question sociale prise en considération par l'OTAN est celle des mouvements de main-d'œuvre. Un Groupe de travail a été constitué pour étudier les tendances de l'emploi, la mobilité de la main-d'œuvre et les migrations et pour renseigner le Conseil sur les moyens de libérer les mouvements de main-d'œuvre et de favoriser les migrations. Ce Groupe de travail rédige des rapports annuels abordant à des conclusions générales mais qui ne contiennent aucune recommandation précise sur les mesures à prendre.

Activités culturelles et Information

9. Un Comité établi par le Conseil a pour mission de donner des directives générales sur les questions d'information et les relations culturelles. Ce Comité a procédé à diverses études sur les moyens les plus efficaces pour développer la coopération culturelle au sein de l'OTAN. Un Conseiller temporaire, nommé en 1954, a rédigé un rapport à l'intention du Conseil. En juillet 1956, une réunion de hauts fonctionnaires a étudié les activités culturelles patronnées par le gouvernement dans les divers pays membres ; ce rapport est actuellement à l'étude.

10. Le résultat de cinq années de délibérations et d'études n'est pas très impressionnant. Jusqu'à présent, les réalisations de l'OTAN ont été les suivantes :

(a) Un programme de bourses d'études et de recherches créé en 1955. Les seize premières bourses ont été décernées en avril 1956.

(b) Un cours d'été pour des représentants d'universités et d'organisations de jeunesse appartenant aux pays de l'OTAN qui a eu lieu à Paris en juillet 1955. Une nouvelle réunion des Représentants des organisations de jeunesse, tenue en 1956.

(c) L'OTAN a participé à un cours d'été consacré aux organisations internationales qui a eu lieu à Oxford en juillet 1956.

11. Les principales activités d'information entreprises par l'organisation sont : les voyages de journalistes, patronnés par l'OTAN, les conférences des Directeurs des services d'information nationaux, les conférences et les cours pour l'information des forces armées, les "briefings" aux personnes qui viennent visiter le siège de l'OTAN, la publication des "Nouvelles de l'OTAN" de manuels et d'autres documents, l'organisation d'expositions itinérantes et la production et la distribution de films.

12. En dépit de l'augmentation annuelle des moyens financiers accordés aux activités culturelles et à l'information, le total des sommes actuellement disponibles semble faible eu égard des ressources des pays membres. Par ailleurs, les gouvernements n'ont pas fourni l'alternative à un appui accru aux activités OTAN, à savoir un programme d'activités culturelles et d'information régulier et convenablement conçu à l'échelon national.
To: Members of the Committee of Three

From: Acting Secretary General

Attached are lists of political and economic questions which have been put before the Council in the past. These lists have been prepared in accordance with an instruction from the Committee (1).

2. As will be seen, the list on political subjects and the list on economic subjects have been sub-divided into questions submitted for information only and questions which have been discussed and acted upon by the Council. Attached to each sub-division is an index of the subjects which have been dealt with.

(Signed) A. BENTINCK

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.

(1) CT-R/1 paragraph 7
### POLITICAL SUBJECTS CONSIDERED BY THE COUNCIL

#### 1952

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**NATO SECRET**

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Reference: The Committee of Three: from left to right, Mr Halvard Lange, Prof. Gaetano Makino, and Mr L. B. Pearson.
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<td>C-R(52)16</td>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>16.7.52</td>
<td>German defence effort and NATO-EDC liaison</td>
<td>The Council agreed on a number of points.</td>
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<td>C-R(52)17</td>
<td>Common action to counter Soviet propaganda</td>
<td>12.6.52</td>
<td>The possibility was discussed of common action to counter Soviet propaganda</td>
<td>The Council instructed the Information Policy Working Group to make recommendations.</td>
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<td>C-R(52)17</td>
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<td>Progress report on the work of the EDC Interim Committee</td>
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<td>Co-ordination of defence plans between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>20.8.52</td>
<td>Statement of the policies of the occupying Powers toward Germany by the French, UK and US Representatives</td>
<td>It was agreed that the occupying Powers had primary responsibility for the reply to the recent Soviet note, but that the principles underlying it were of great concern to all of the NATO powers.</td>
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<td>4.9.52</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-R(52)19</td>
<td>Meteorology and the Neutrals</td>
<td>3.9.52</td>
<td>Exchange of meteorological information with neutral countries in time of war</td>
<td>The Council agreed that this was a matter for individual countries and not NATO as an organization.</td>
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<td>C-R(52)18</td>
<td>Germany and the Annual Review</td>
<td>20.8.52</td>
<td>German participation in the Annual Review exercise</td>
<td>The Council agreed on a number of points.</td>
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<td>C-R(52)20</td>
<td>Swiss Merchant Marine</td>
<td>10.9.52</td>
<td>NATO and Swiss shipping in time of war</td>
<td>The Council agreed that the Italian Government inform the Swiss Government in form of views on the possibility of Swiss ships refuelling in NATO harbours in time of war.</td>
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<td>C-R(52)22</td>
<td>Germany and NATO</td>
<td>24.9.52</td>
<td>Statement to the press by NATO on discussions concerning the reply of the Three Occupying Powers to a Soviet note;</td>
<td>The Council agreed that no statement should be made to the press.</td>
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<td>C-R(52)22</td>
<td>Communist Party Congress in Moscow</td>
<td>24.9.52</td>
<td>Agreement for the discussion at a subsequent meeting of the Communist Party Congress to be held in Moscow on 5.10.52 and NATO's counter-propaganda policy</td>
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<td>Swiss Merchant Marine</td>
<td>1.10.52</td>
<td>Aide-mémoire for use by the Italian Government in respect of the question of the Swiss Merchant Marine</td>
<td>The Council agreed that the Italian Government use the aide-mémoire in replying to the Swiss Government</td>
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<td>The Council approved a resolution on EDC to be released to the press</td>
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<td>NATO and the PGs</td>
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<td>The Council agreed to have the matter examined</td>
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<td>Development of a NATO policy concerning PGs.</td>
<td>The Council agreed to have two documents prepared for the Ministerial session</td>
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<td>The Council agreed that Supreme Commanders should submit reports of a political nature to the Council prior to their release.</td>
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<td>C-R(53)31</td>
<td>NATO concerted action in connection with NATO diplomats in the Soviet Union</td>
<td>26.6.53</td>
<td>Concerted action by NATO countries on movements of NATO diplomats and journalists in the Soviet Union</td>
<td>The Council agreed to take action of this nature.</td>
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<td>TC-R(53)33</td>
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<td>1.7.53</td>
<td>Restrictions imposed on movements of NATO diplomats and journalists in the Soviet Union</td>
<td>The Council agreed on a number of points and decided to consider further the matter.</td>
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<td>C-R(53)34</td>
<td>Soviet representatives in NATO countries</td>
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<td>Travel restrictions on Soviet and Satellite representatives</td>
<td>The Council agreed to consider the matter further.</td>
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<td>C-R(53)34</td>
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<td>15.7.53</td>
<td>Meeting of Big Three Foreign Ministers in Washington to consider a number of international issues (Germany - EDC - NATO)</td>
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<td>C-R(53)35</td>
<td>Soviet representatives in NATO countries</td>
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<td>Travel restrictions on Soviet and Satellite representatives</td>
<td>The Council agreed on interim measures and further consideration of the matter.</td>
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<td>C-R(53)36</td>
<td>NATO countries</td>
<td>5.8.53</td>
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<td>The Council agreed that some relaxation was desirable in the travel restrictions on Soviet Representatives</td>
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<td>C-R(53)37</td>
<td>NATO and Red Cross Societies</td>
<td>29.7.53</td>
<td>League of Red Cross Societies request for NATO assistance</td>
<td>It was agreed to relax travel restrictions on Hungarian satellite diplomats but that no effort would be made to achieve concerted NATO action.</td>
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<td>Big Three and the Soviet</td>
<td>21.8.53</td>
<td>Big Three reply to Soviet note on Germany and proposed meeting with the Soviet Union to discuss the German question</td>
<td>The Council agreed that the League should be requested to approach individual Governments</td>
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<td>N2(53)17</td>
<td>NATO and Parliaments</td>
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<td>Association of members of Parliament with the work of NATO - Conference of NATO parliamentarians proposed by Norway</td>
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<td>Three Powers reply on Soviet note on Germany</td>
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<td>Big Three and the Soviet</td>
<td>1.9.53</td>
<td>The Big Three circulated the text of the reply which they intended to deliver to Soviet Government regarding Germany</td>
<td>The Council considered the matter and agreed to further examination</td>
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<td>Union</td>
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<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>17.9.53</td>
<td>Soviet courses of action up to mid-1953 by US Representative</td>
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<td>28.10.53</td>
<td>Denial of US intention to withdraw US forces in Europe</td>
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<td>4.11.53</td>
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<td>18.11.53</td>
<td>Invitation to the Secretary General of the United Nations to attend the Berlin Conference</td>
<td>The Council agreed that the attention of Governments of member-countries should be called on this matter</td>
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<td>24.11.53</td>
<td>Big Three reply to Soviet note on barracks in Schleswig-Holstein</td>
<td>The Council agreed that no NATO action was possible</td>
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<td>Statement by the US Representative on the Soviet note of 26.11.53</td>
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<td>Big Three reply to Soviet note on barracks in Schleswig-Holstein</td>
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<td>C-R(54)2</td>
<td>Communist front organizations</td>
<td>26.1.54</td>
<td>Conferences of Communist front organizations in NATO countries</td>
<td>The Council agreed to recommend to governments of member countries action making it impossible to hold such conferences.</td>
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<td>Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia</td>
<td>26.1.54</td>
<td>The Military conferences between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia are not in conflict with NATO planning</td>
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<td>Four-Power Conference in Berlin</td>
<td>3.2.54, 10.2.54, 17.2.54, 27.2.54</td>
<td>French, UK, US statements on developments in the Four-Power discussions taking place in Berlin</td>
<td>The Council welcomed M. Bidault's suggestion to meet with the Council in order to give them an account of the Berlin Conference.</td>
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<td>C-R(54)8</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
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<td>Trends of Soviet policy</td>
<td>The Council agreed that a paper should be submitted to the Ministerial Session</td>
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<td>NATO - EDC relations</td>
<td>The study of this matter is postponed</td>
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<td>C-R(54)10</td>
<td>EDC</td>
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<td>Marshal Juin's statement on EDC</td>
<td>The Council agreed to express regret and to the release of a statement</td>
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<td>6-7.4.54</td>
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<td>C-R(54)14</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>7.4.54</td>
<td>Soviet membership of NATO</td>
<td>The Council agreed that comments made by Permanent Representatives should be conveyed to the drafters of the Big Three reply to a Soviet note</td>
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<td>The Council agreed to favour extension of political consultation in NATO</td>
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<td>The Council agreed not to recognize the German Democratic Republic as an independent government</td>
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<td>The Council agreed to call on all member countries to consider the matter</td>
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<td>Damage by NATO craft to Swedish fishing boats</td>
<td>The Council agreed on way to handle matter</td>
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<td>The Council agreed on the terms of a resolution</td>
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<td>The grant by the Soviet Union of &quot;Sovereignty&quot; to the German Democratic</td>
<td>The Council finalized the resolution considered on 26.5.54</td>
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<td>Eastern Germany</td>
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**NATO SECRET**

CT-1/8
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-R(54)26</td>
<td>Washington conversations</td>
<td>30.6.54</td>
<td>Washington talks between the President of the US and the Prime Minister of the UK on EDC, etc.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Balkan Pact</td>
<td>30.6.54</td>
<td>Several Representatives stressed out the political consequences of the proposed Balkan Pact</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Central Europe</td>
<td>16.7.54</td>
<td>Calamities in Central Europe</td>
<td>The Council agreed that NATO action should be limited within the NATO area</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Balkan Pact</td>
<td>21.7.54</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Greek and Turkish Representatives will provide the Council with a written statement of the main points of the proposed Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>26.7.54</td>
<td>Portuguese settlements in India</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Balkan Pact</td>
<td>26.7.54</td>
<td>What would be the position if Yugoslavia was attacked and Greece and Turkey went to her aid?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>26.7.54</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Representatives of France, UK and US will circulate copies of the Soviet notes of 25th July 1954</td>
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<tr>
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<td>O-R(54)26</td>
<td>Balkan Pact</td>
<td>29.7.54</td>
<td>Final discussion on the proposed Balkan Pact</td>
<td>The Balkan Pact is welcomed</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>2.8.54</td>
<td>Suggestions of the Council to answer the Soviet note of 25th July</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Balkan Pact</td>
<td>2.8.54</td>
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<td>West Germany</td>
<td>2.8.54</td>
<td>Security measures in West Germany</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>19.9.54, 3.9.54, 7.9.54</td>
<td>Draft reply of the Big Three to the Soviet note of 25th July and suggestions of the Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>O-R(54)34</td>
<td>W.E.U.</td>
<td>16.9.54</td>
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<td>O-R(54)35</td>
<td>W.E.U.</td>
<td>22.9.54</td>
<td>Preparatory London Conference</td>
<td>Sir Anthony Eden's tour of European capitals on a substitute to EEC</td>
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<td>O-R(54)36</td>
<td>W.E.U.</td>
<td>5.10.54</td>
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<td>O-R(54)37</td>
<td>W.E.U.</td>
<td>6.10.54</td>
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<td>C-R(54)37</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
<td>6.10.54</td>
<td>Soviet declaration on German Democratic Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-R(54)40</td>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>27.10.54</td>
<td>Interim measures pending ratification of WEU agreements</td>
<td>The Council agreed to associate in a certain measure Germany with the work of NATO, pending German accession to NATO</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-R(54)41</td>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>3.11.54</td>
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<td>The Council expressed concern that any proposal had been made to establish a special Western Union military organization</td>
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<td>17.11.54</td>
<td>Discussion on draft replies made by the Three to Soviet notes of</td>
<td>The Council agreed that every effort should be made to achieve identical replies from the 12 (or at least 9) NATO nations to whom the Soviet note had been addressed. The delivery of the Nine-Power Note would be made on the same day</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>22.11.54 23rd October and 13th November 1954</td>
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<td>26.11.54 1954</td>
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<td>27.11.54 9 nations reply to Soviet note</td>
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<td>C-R(54)45</td>
<td>French North Africa</td>
<td>1.12.54</td>
<td>Redeployment of French forces earmarked for SHAPE in Algeria</td>
<td>The Council had the agreement signed on 22.6.55.</td>
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<td>C-R(54)46</td>
<td>Atomic information</td>
<td>3.12.54</td>
<td>Agreement for co-operation regarding atomic information</td>
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<td>C-R(54)50</td>
<td>Political versus military authority</td>
<td>17.12.54</td>
<td>Military Committee's report</td>
<td>The Council agreed that it was the responsibility of Governments of member countries for putting plans into action in the event of hostilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-R(54)50</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>17.12.54</td>
<td>Trends of Soviet policy</td>
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<td>C-R(55)1</td>
<td>W.E.U. and the Soviet Union</td>
<td>12, 1.55</td>
<td>Soviet note to a number of NATO countries regarding the ratification of the Paris agreements and W.E.U. countries reply to the Soviet Union</td>
<td>The Council agreed on a common attitude</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-R(55)1</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>19, 1.55</td>
<td>Developments in the Soviet Union</td>
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<td>Developments in the Soviet Union</td>
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<td>Developments in the Soviet Union</td>
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<td>C-R(55)6</td>
<td>NATO and Parliaments</td>
<td>14, 2.55</td>
<td>Parliamentarian meeting at NATO Headquarters, Paris</td>
<td>The Council agreed to the holding of the meeting</td>
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<td>C-R(55)6</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>9, 2.55</td>
<td>Developments in the Soviet Union</td>
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<td>2, 3.55</td>
<td>Developments in the Soviet Union</td>
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<td>Baghdad Pact</td>
<td>2, 3.55</td>
<td>Statement by the Turkish Representative on a Turkish - Iraqi Pact</td>
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<td>Baghdad Pact</td>
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<td>Statement by the Turkish Representative on a Turkish - Iraqi Pact</td>
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<td>Statement by the Turkish Representative on a Turkish - Iraqi Pact</td>
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<td>C-R(55)8</td>
<td>Atomic information</td>
<td>2, 3.55</td>
<td>Procedure for signing agreement for co-operation on atomic information</td>
<td>The Council agreed on the procedure to be followed</td>
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<td>C-R(55)8</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
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<td>UK statement on the continuity of Soviet Foreign Policy</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
<td>16, 3.55</td>
<td>US statement on Soviet comments on the possibility of an Austrian Treaty</td>
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<td>C-R(55)8</td>
<td>Communists and the atom</td>
<td>23, 3.55</td>
<td>Communist attitude to atomic weapons</td>
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<td>Baghdad Pact</td>
<td>30, 3.55</td>
<td>UK joins the Turkish - Iraqi alliance</td>
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<td>Bandung</td>
<td>30, 3.55</td>
<td>Bandung Conference</td>
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<td>Communists and the atom</td>
<td>6, 5.55</td>
<td>Statement by the Big Three on a Communist-sponsored Congress on effects of atomic explosions</td>
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<td>C-R(55)18</td>
<td>Germany in NATO</td>
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<td>German accession to NATO</td>
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<td>C-R(55)18</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>9, 5.55</td>
<td>Trends of Soviet Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-R(55)19</td>
<td>Genoa &quot;summit&quot; conference</td>
<td>9. 5.55</td>
<td>Agenda of Geneva &quot;summit&quot; conference</td>
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<td>C-R(55)20</td>
<td>Disarmament</td>
<td>10. 5.55</td>
<td>Disarmament negotiations</td>
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<td>C-R(55)20</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>10. 5.55</td>
<td>Consideration of Middle East situation</td>
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<td>C-R(55)20</td>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>10. 5.55</td>
<td>Consideration of Far East situation, including Formosa and the Bandung Conference</td>
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<td>C-R(55)23</td>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>26. 5.55</td>
<td>Revised terms of reference of SACEUR</td>
<td>The Council agreed on the revised terms</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
<td>1. 6.55</td>
<td>Military implications for NATO of Austria's neutrality</td>
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<td>Yugoslavia and Soviet Union</td>
<td>1. 6.55</td>
<td>Relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union</td>
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<td>Genoa &quot;summit&quot; meeting</td>
<td>1. 6.55</td>
<td>Arrangements for the Geneva &quot;summit&quot; meeting</td>
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<td>Yugoslavia and Soviet Union</td>
<td>8. 6.55</td>
<td>Relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union</td>
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<td>Geneva &quot;summit&quot; meeting</td>
<td>15. 6.55</td>
<td>The question of a Ministerial Session</td>
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<td>Big Three and Yugoslavia</td>
<td>20. 6.55</td>
<td>prior to the &quot;summit&quot; meeting and the Three-Power talks in New York</td>
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<td>Genoa &quot;summit&quot; meeting</td>
<td>22. 6.55</td>
<td>Belgrade military meeting of Big Three and Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>&quot;Summit&quot; Conference</td>
<td>22. 6.55</td>
<td>&quot;Summit&quot; Conference and preliminary Western powers talks</td>
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<td>Genoa &quot;summit&quot; meeting</td>
<td>27. 6.55</td>
<td>Report of status of San Francisco talks with Mr. Molotov concerning the forthcoming &quot;summit&quot; meeting</td>
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<td>C-R(55)31</td>
<td>Redeployment of US forces in Europe</td>
<td>13.7.55</td>
<td>Redeployment from Austria to Italy of US forces</td>
<td>The Council agreed to the redeployment</td>
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<td>C-R(55)31</td>
<td>French North Africa</td>
<td>13.7.55</td>
<td>Movement of French forces from Europe to Algeria</td>
<td>The Council agreed that France should restore as soon as possible her forces in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-R(55)34</td>
<td>Geneva &quot;summit&quot; conference</td>
<td>27.7.55</td>
<td>Briefing and discussion following &quot;summit&quot; Conference</td>
<td>The Council agreed on this policy</td>
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<td>C-R(55)37</td>
<td>Military manoeuvres</td>
<td>14.9.55</td>
<td>Public relations policy on Exercise &quot;Fox-Fay&quot;</td>
<td>The Council requested the Greek Representative to convey these views to Athens</td>
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<td>C-R(55)37</td>
<td>Greece and military manoeuvres</td>
<td>14.9.55</td>
<td>Views of Council on Greek decision of non-participation in military manoeuvres</td>
<td>The Council agreed on this policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-R(55)40</td>
<td>NATO public opinion and the Soviet Union</td>
<td>5.10.55</td>
<td>The question of policy vis-à-vis the Soviet and the education of NATO public opinion</td>
<td>The Council agreed to consider the question</td>
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<td>October Big-Four Geneva Conference</td>
<td>5.10.55</td>
<td>Ministerial session prior to the Geneva Conference</td>
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<td>C-R(55)40</td>
<td>National defence establishments</td>
<td>5.10.55</td>
<td>Changes in national defence efforts</td>
<td>The Council approved a resolution to this effect</td>
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<td>NATO information activities</td>
<td>6.10.55</td>
<td>Development of NATO information activities</td>
<td>The Council agreed to develop, if possible, such activities</td>
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<td>C-R(55)45</td>
<td>Military affairs</td>
<td>12.10.55</td>
<td>Defence Ministers Conference</td>
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<td>October Big-Four Geneva Conference</td>
<td>13.10.55</td>
<td>National comments on the report of the Working Group on October Big-Four Geneva Conference</td>
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<td>NATO public opinion and the Soviet Union</td>
<td>19.10.55</td>
<td>The question of policy vis-à-vis the Soviet and the education of NATO public opinion</td>
<td>The Council agreed to consider the question once a month</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-R(55)47</td>
<td>October Big-Four Geneva Conference</td>
<td>25.10.55</td>
<td>Exchange of views prior to the Geneva Conference</td>
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<td>C-R(55)49</td>
<td>The Secretary-General and Greek-Turkish relations</td>
<td>2.11.55</td>
<td>Personal action by Secretary-General for the improvement of Greek-Turkish relations</td>
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<td>The Soviet Union and the Middle East</td>
<td>9.11.55</td>
<td>US statement on Soviet activities in the Middle East</td>
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<td>October Big-Four Geneva Conference</td>
<td>16.11.55</td>
<td>German and French report on the Conference by the Big-Three</td>
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<td>21.11.55</td>
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<td>C-R(55)55</td>
<td>Belgium and the Austrian State Treaty</td>
<td>7.12.55</td>
<td>Belgian protest at late reception of Austrian State Treaty in advance of publication</td>
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<td>Disputes among NATO countries</td>
<td>7.12.55</td>
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<td>The Council agreed that the Secretary-General could discuss controversial issues informally with his colleagues and eventually make a personal appeal to governments.</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-R(55)58</td>
<td>International situation</td>
<td>15.12.55</td>
<td>Comments on a Canadian statement on the reunification of Germany</td>
<td>Approval by Council</td>
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<td>C-R(55)59</td>
<td>NATO defence planning</td>
<td>15.12.55</td>
<td>Military Committee's report on NATO defence planning</td>
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<td>C-R(55)59</td>
<td>Air defence Command in NATO Europe</td>
<td>15.12.55</td>
<td>Military Committee's recommendations on the Air Defence Command and Control in NATO Europe</td>
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<td>11. 1.56</td>
<td>Agreement for co-operation regarding atomic information</td>
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<td>C-R(56)3</td>
<td>Iron curtain diplomats in Italy</td>
<td>25. 1.56</td>
<td>Treatment of Iron curtain diplomats and nationals in Italy</td>
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<td>C-R(56)5</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
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<td>Report on trends in Soviet policy</td>
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<td>C-R(56)6</td>
<td>NATO and Parliaments</td>
<td>15. 2.56</td>
<td>W.E.U. and internal defence and police forces</td>
<td>The Council approved the meeting</td>
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<td>C-R(56)9</td>
<td>NATO and Parliaments</td>
<td>2. 3.56</td>
<td>Meeting of Parliamentarians of NATO countries, at Headquarters, Paris</td>
<td>The Council agreed on the reply to the W.E.U. Secretary General</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-R(56)10</td>
<td>Disarmament and German reunification</td>
<td>7. 3.56</td>
<td>Pineau statement on disarmament and German reunification</td>
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<td>C-R(56)10</td>
<td>Disarmament</td>
<td>7. 3.56</td>
<td>Letter of President Eisenhower to Bulganin on disarmament</td>
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<td>Congresses</td>
<td>7. 3.56</td>
<td>Communiqué of Congrès de l'Internationale Socialiste</td>
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<td>US offer to finance two initial links in the proposed forward scatter communication project</td>
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<td>The Icelandic Representative asked for the views of the Council as to the military necessity for the facilities in Iceland</td>
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<td>19, 6.56</td>
<td>The Chairman called attention on the need to counter attacks on NATO in non-NATO countries</td>
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<td>Bulgarin letters on disarmament</td>
<td>An informal Working Group of the seven countries which had received letters from Bulgarin would be established to prepare a list of general principles on which replies could be based</td>
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<td>28.8.52</td>
<td>Secretary General stressed importance of Article 2 ideas and requested all representatives to give this matter their most urgent and serious attention.</td>
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<td>C-R(52)25</td>
<td>Working Group on Movement of Labour</td>
<td>15.10.52</td>
<td>Statement by Greece reminding Council of decision to set up a working group. Requested working group should be treated with importance which nature of its work justified.</td>
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<td>C-R(53)2(44)</td>
<td>Article 2 of N.A.T.O.</td>
<td>21.1.53</td>
<td>Chairman's statement on monthly reports from committees and working groups on Article 2. Reports at monthly intervals would begin after February, 1953.</td>
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<td>11.2.53</td>
<td>Statement by Netherlands Delegation on economic effects of recent disasters.</td>
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<td>East-West Trade</td>
<td>18.2.53</td>
<td>Turkish Representative stated his Government had received invitation to conference in Switzerland dealing with East-West trade on multilateral basis.</td>
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<td>Economic Conference in Peking</td>
<td>25.2.53</td>
<td>Statement by French Delegation on undesirability of attending Peking Conference.</td>
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<td>C-R(53)38</td>
<td>U.S. Immigration Quota</td>
<td>5.8.53</td>
<td>U.S. Delegate stated that an additional 214,000 immigrants would be admitted in next 3 years, principally from N.A.T.O. countries. U.S. Administrative support for this measure had been greatly stimulated by Work of N.A.T.O. Working Group on Labour Mobility.</td>
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<td>Greek Earthquake Disaster</td>
<td>25.11.53</td>
<td>Statement by French Delegation on adoption of 2 Greek townships.</td>
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<td>Danish Trade with Russia</td>
<td>29.7.54</td>
<td>Danish Representative informed Council of breakdown of trade negotiations and recall of Danish trade delegation from Moscow.</td>
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<td>Informal meeting</td>
<td>McGarran Act</td>
<td>2.8.54</td>
<td>U.S. Representative stated he had brought to attention of his government views on Section 212 of McGarran Act and discussions on this section had now been reopened.</td>
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## Reference | Subject | Date of meeting | Information
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Informal meeting Item 1 | Memorandum by Canadian Delegation on economic discussions at NATO Council Meetings | 7.12.55 | The Canadian representative put forward a memorandum suggesting that time be given at future ministerial meetings to discuss economic problems of interest to all member countries. Supported by the Italian Representative.
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<td>Informal meeting</td>
<td>Report by René Massigli on visit of MM. Mollet and Pincau to Moscow</td>
<td>26.5.56</td>
<td>US asked if Pincau Plan had been substantively discussed. Mr. Massigli said &quot;no&quot;, but Russians had expressed interest.</td>
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<td>C-R(56)33</td>
<td>Oral Report by Committee of Three Ministers</td>
<td>22.6.56</td>
<td>The Ministers reported that they had considered main lines of their report, inter alia: a chapter on economic consultation referring particularly to role of NATO in the economic field; with an analysis of what NATO could do and what it should not attempt to do.</td>
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(Further reference to most of these subjects will be found in the index to subjects considered by the Council for discussion or action)

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C-R(52)21 Item II | Labour Mobility | 22.9.52 | **The Council:** agreed that a small section of the International Staff/Secretariat should be charged with specific responsibility of dealing with the manpower problem, working in close touch with national experts in this field, the results of its work being submitted to the Working Group on the Movement of Labour. | 

C-R(52)21 Item III | Relations with Trade Unions | 22.9.52 | **The Council:** approved proposals made by the Secretary General in C-M(52)76 for closer association with trade unions. | 

C-R(52)31 Item IV | Labour Mobility | 3.12.52 | C-M(52)111 (see C-R(52)21 above) | (1) approved recommendation in para. 6 of C-M(52)111. *(2) agreed that Secretary General should address communication to Permanent Representatives. (3) agreed that the question of the chairmanship of the Working Group on Labour Mobility be considered later.*

C-R(52)37 Item IV (Ministerial Session) | Implementation of Article 2 | 15.12.52 | Exchange of views between Ministers, with emphasis to be given to non-military aspects of NATO. | The Council instructed the Secretariat to prepare a draft resolution for consideration by the Council, taking into account proposals made by the Representative of Turkey and views expressed in course of discussion.
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<td>(1) requested Permanent Representatives to consider ideas put forward by</td>
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<td>Turkey and France</td>
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<td>(2) agreed to include in final communiqué UK reference to intention of USSR</td>
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<td>to divide the free world.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(2) agreed that reference to resolution would be made in final communiqué.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>Date of meeting</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-R(53)4</td>
<td>Flood Disaster in Holland, United Kingdom and Belgium</td>
<td>3.2.53</td>
<td>French Delegate considered that flood disasters in NATO countries called for joint assistance</td>
<td>The Council agreed with the French proposal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-R(53)6(35)</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>18.2.53</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Council agreed that account of contribution made by NATO countries to flood victims should be given to the press.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item VII</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Council:-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-R(53)8(33)</td>
<td>Meeting of Commercial Experts</td>
<td>4.3.53</td>
<td>Turkish memorandum on East-West trade. C-R(53)14.</td>
<td>(1) agreed that governments should maintain close contact to work out common line of policy in Geneva.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item III</td>
<td>organised by JCE in Geneva</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2) that Information Policy Working Group should study question of Geneva Conference from propaganda angle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(3) invited Secretariat, in connection with long-term problem of East-West trade, to make an initial study and to report to the Council when that study was completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>Date of meeting</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-R(53)39</td>
<td>Earthquake disaster in Ionian</td>
<td>19.8.53</td>
<td>The Council:-</td>
<td>(1) adopted resolution expressing sympathy with Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item I</td>
<td>Islands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2) invited Chairman of Joint Working Group on Information Policy and Cultural Co-operation to consider which action in future should be taken by NATO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-R(53)40</td>
<td>East-West trade</td>
<td>2.9.53</td>
<td>The Council referred C-R(53)86 on long-term problem of East-West trade to Working Group on Trends of Soviet Policy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item I</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>Aid to Greece after</td>
<td>17.9.53</td>
<td>Secretary General proposed to aid Greece on a NATO basis. In course of discussion, pointed out that whatever action was taken should be linked to article 2.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>Earthquake disasters</td>
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<tr>
<td>Item VII</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-R(53)42</td>
<td>Assistance to Greece after</td>
<td>23.9.53</td>
<td>The Council:-</td>
<td>(1) adopted a resolution on aid to Greece after earthquake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item V</td>
<td>Earthquake disasters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2) approved a press conference on this subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-R(53)44</td>
<td>NATO co-operation for</td>
<td>14.10.53</td>
<td>The Council approved procedure proposed by Committee on Information and Cultural Relations set out in para. 3 of C-M(53)125.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item II</td>
<td>Disaster Relief</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-R(53)49</td>
<td>Report by Working Group on</td>
<td>25.11.53</td>
<td>The Council:-</td>
<td>(1) agreed to defer decision on para. 39(c).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item VI</td>
<td>Labour Mobility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2) approved remainder of recommendation in para. 39.</td>
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<td>Reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-R(54)1</td>
<td>Recommendations by Working Group on Labour Mobility</td>
<td>13.1.54</td>
<td>see C-R(53)49 above</td>
<td>The Council approved redraft prepared by Secretariat and set out in para.2 of C-H(53)175.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-R(54)8</td>
<td>Paper on Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy</td>
<td>19.3.54</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Council agreed that a paper should be submitted to the Ministerial Meeting on trends and implications of Soviet policy, prepared by the Secretariat and reviewed by the Working Group on Soviet Policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal meeting Para.4-15</td>
<td>McCarran Act</td>
<td>30.6.54</td>
<td>Discussion of problems created for seamen by certain articles of the McCarran Act. Considered contrary to spirit of Article 2.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-R(54)44</td>
<td>Economic Comparison between NATO countries and Soviet bloc</td>
<td>26.11.54</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Council agreed:—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1) that study in C-H(54)99 was of great value and work should be continued</td>
<td>(1) that study in C-H(54)99 was of great value and work should be continued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2) to consider C-H(54)99 further at the next meeting</td>
<td>(2) to consider C-H(54)99 further at the next meeting</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(3) that a decision would be taken whether or not to bring document to the attention of the Ministers.</td>
<td>(3) that a decision would be taken whether or not to bring document to the attention of the Ministers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date of meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.12.54</td>
<td>The Council agreed:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(1) study by Secretariat should be continued</td>
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<td>(2) a working group should be set up to work in co-ordination with the Secretariat</td>
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<td>(3) the Secretary General would appoint a member of the staff as Chairman of the working group</td>
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<td>(4) the Secretary General would include paragraph on comparative economic potential of NATO countries and the Soviet bloc</td>
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The Council approved the report on Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy, C-R(54) 116.
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<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Date of meeting</th>
<th>Discussion</th>
<th>Action taken</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-R(55)7</td>
<td>Review of trends in employment, labour mobility and migration and action taken by member governments and international organizations</td>
<td>23.2.55</td>
<td>Discussion in which Italian, Greek, French, Danish and Canadian Representatives participated</td>
<td>The Council:-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1) approved the recommendations contained in para, 3 of cover note of C-M(55)12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-R(55)55</td>
<td>Comparison of economic trends in NATO and Soviet countries</td>
<td>7.12.55</td>
<td></td>
<td>(2) agreed that the question of publicity should be dealt with by the Secretary General at the next press conference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item VI</td>
<td></td>
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<td>The Council:-</td>
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<td>(1) agreed to forward C-M(55)119 for discussion at the ministerial meeting</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(2) invited the Working Group to continue its studies on this question and report to the Council</td>
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<td>(3) invited the Internation Staff to consider downgrading the paper from NATO SECRET to permit wider circulation</td>
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NATO SECRET
CT-D/8
### 1955

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Subject</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-R(55)58</td>
<td>Review of international situation</td>
<td>15.12.55</td>
<td>The Ministers discussed at length various problems of Soviet policy raised by the documents under review: (1) Intelligence Survey by Standing Group (MCH-4-55) (2) Report on Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy (C-M(55)121) (3) Report on Comparison of Economic Trends in NATO and Soviet Countries (C-M(55)119) and proceeded to consider possible NATO action for the implementation of Article 2 (see C-R(56)3 below).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-R(55)60</td>
<td>Implementation of Article 2</td>
<td>16.12.55</td>
<td>The Council of Ministers adopted the following resolution:— (1) recognising recent developments in international situation make it necessary to have closer co-operation between members of Alliance as envisaged in Article 2 of Treaty (2) taking note of statements made to this effort at present meeting (3) decide to instruct the Permanent Council to examine and implement all measures conducive to this end.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>Date of meeting</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-R(56)3</td>
<td>Implementation of Article 2</td>
<td>25.1.56</td>
<td>The Council agreed to consider various points made in the course of discussion at the meeting on 8th February, in particular:—&lt;br&gt; 1) the desirability of the survey of Article 2 activities proposed by the UK in C-R(56)3, and&lt;br&gt; (a) under whose auspices should the paper go out&lt;br&gt; (b) what would be the scope of the paper&lt;br&gt; (c) who would prepare the paper&lt;br&gt; 2) whether an analysis should be prepared of Soviet political and economic actions outside the Iron Curtain; the Council subsequently to decide on possible countermeasures&lt;br&gt; 3) the relations of NATO with other international organizations dealing, in particular, with economic questions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-R(56)4</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>1.2.56</td>
<td>The Council agreed to discuss the UK proposal for Article 2 survey on 8th February but to postpone remainder of discussion until 15th February 1956.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| C-R(56)5 | -do- | 8.2.56 | The Council instructed the International Staff to submit draft terms of reference as basis for preparing a factual study setting out work done in the Atlantic area within and outside NATO on co-operative basis which had had effect of accomplishing the objectives of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty. | **NATO SECRET**
<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Date of meeting</th>
<th>Discussion</th>
<th>Action taken</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Informal meeting</td>
<td>Private discussions</td>
<td>15.2.56</td>
<td>Herr Blakenhorn urged the importance of private consultation with the Council on both diplomatic and economic aspects of Soviet policy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| C-R(56)6 | Implementation of Article 2    | 15.2.56         | Discussion of draft outline by the International Staff (C-M(56)11) on factual study of work done within and outside NATO on a co-operative basis having effect of accomplishing objectives of Article 2. | The Council:—  
(1) agreed that the survey of Article 2 activities should follow the lines proposed in C-M(56)11  
(2) took note of suggestions made in the course of discussion. |
| C-R(56)8 | NATO co-operation for Disaster Relief | 24.2.56        | Discussion on immediate and longer-term effects of abnormally severe winter conditions in Europe.                                                                                                           | The Council:—  
(1) agreed to urge member governments to authorize their forces assigned to NATO to prepare urgently to deal with the expected disasters from floods  
(2) recommended member governments give consideration to action required to deal with shortage of food resulting from agricultural damage. |
| C-R(56)12| Survey of Article 2 activities | 21.3.56         |                                                                                                                                                                                                              | The Council:—  
(1) invited the International Staff to complete survey of Article 2 activities on lines of C-M(56)11 by third week in April  
(2) agreed as soon as survey was available to consider whether short paper for publication could be prepared for consideration at Ministerial Meeting in May  
(3) invited delegations to submit proposals in writing as to future action on article 2. |
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<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
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<th>Discussion</th>
<th>Action taken</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Informal Meeting Item I</td>
<td>Analysis of trends of Soviet policy</td>
<td>21.3.56</td>
<td>Discussion at some length on NATO's role in economic co-operation with particular reference to aid to underdeveloped countries and East-West competition. General agreement that NATO was a valuable forum for consultation and political directives but not necessarily as agency for implementing economic projects. French and Italian Delegates stated they would shortly present papers on this subject to the Council.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-R(56)13 Item VI</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>28.3.56</td>
<td>UK urged clear distinction between general question of trends of Soviet policy and particular problem of Soviet economic penetration in the Middle East.</td>
<td>The Council agreed that economic aspects should be discussed after Easter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-R(56)14 Item VIII</td>
<td>Article 2 activities</td>
<td>11.4.56</td>
<td>Italian Representative stated he would submit a paper on Article 2 activities for discussion in private session.</td>
<td>The Council:-(1) agreed to discuss Italian paper at private meeting on 18th April (2) agreed that Council at next meeting should examine the factual Article survey and that Secretariat would prepare draft outline of paper for publication.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Committee of Three: from left to right, Mr Halvard Lange, Prof. Gaetano Makino, and Mr L. B. Pearson.

1956

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Date of meeting</th>
<th>Discussion</th>
<th>Action taken</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Informal Meeting</td>
<td>Action under Article 2</td>
<td>18.4.56</td>
<td>Italian Delegate expounded proposals circulated by his Delegation:</td>
<td>The Council:-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item II</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1) to examine the nature of Soviet economic offensive with a view to deciding on possible counter-measures.</td>
<td>(1) agreed to set up a working group under UK chairmanship to prepare</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(2) to set up a Group of Senior Counsellors to advise Council on these problems and suggest how they can be resolved</td>
<td>(a) draft Introductory Statement to be submitted together with C-M(56)45 to Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Discussion of when and how Italian proposals should be raised at forthcoming Ministerial Meeting. Germany supported Italian proposal.</td>
<td>(b) draft of a passage to be included in final communique of Ministerial Meeting dealing with</td>
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<td>UK did not favour too ambitious an approach to consideration of economic problems in NATO. Not useful to establish Committee of Economic Experts.</td>
<td>Article 2 activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-R(56)16</td>
<td>Survey of Article 2</td>
<td>18.4.56</td>
<td>Discussion of Staff paper on Survey of Article 2 activities (C-M(56)45).</td>
<td>(2) agreed that revision of C-M(56)45 would be undertaken after Minister Meeting and would</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item IV</td>
<td>activities</td>
<td></td>
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<td>incorporate both suggestions by delegations and comments made by Ministers in the course of</td>
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<td>discussion.</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-R(56)17</td>
<td>Introductory statement on survey of Article 2 activities</td>
<td>28.4.56</td>
<td>The Council:</td>
<td>(1) invited the International Staff to amend C-RP(56)1 in the light of the discussion (final text C-M(56)55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item V</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>(2) agreed that the document as amended should be submitted to Ministers as a report by the Working Party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-R(56)20</td>
<td>Trends and implications of Soviet policy</td>
<td>4.5.56</td>
<td>Discussion between Ministers on various aspects of Soviet policy, including economic plans C-M(56)49 C-M(56)52 C-M(56)50 (Soviet Sixth 5 Year Plan)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-R(56)21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Discussion between Ministers on various aspects of Soviet policy, including economic plans C-M(56)49 C-M(56)52 C-M(56)50 (Soviet Sixth 5 Year Plan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Item IIa</td>
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<td>Discussion between Ministers on various aspects of Soviet policy, including economic plans C-M(56)49 C-M(56)52 C-M(56)50 (Soviet Sixth 5 Year Plan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Ministerial Session)</td>
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<td>Discussion between Ministers on various aspects of Soviet policy, including economic plans C-M(56)49 C-M(56)52 C-M(56)50 (Soviet Sixth 5 Year Plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-R(56)21</td>
<td>Political and economic questions arising from current Soviet tactics</td>
<td>4.5.56</td>
<td>Speeches by Mr. von Brentano (Germany), Presentation of Pineau Plan by Mr. Pincau (France), Speech by Mr. Martino (Italy), etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item IIB</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Speeches by Mr. von Brentano (Germany), Presentation of Pineau Plan by Mr. Pincau (France), Speech by Mr. Martino (Italy), etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Ministerial Session)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Speeches by Mr. von Brentano (Germany), Presentation of Pineau Plan by Mr. Pincau (France), Speech by Mr. Martino (Italy), etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-R(56)23</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.5.56</td>
<td>Turkey considered that NATO countries should adopt common line in other international organizations on Article 2 activities.</td>
<td>The Council agreed to appoint a Committee of Three Ministers to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community. The Council also agreed:</td>
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<td>Reference</td>
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<td>Date of meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-R(56)23 (contd.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-R(56)24</td>
<td>Outcome of Ministerial Meeting:</td>
<td>14.5.56</td>
<td>Preliminary discussion on methods of examining economic and political problems of Pineau Plan, i.e. setting up committee of technical advisers.</td>
<td>It was decided that the International Staff should service the Committee of Three Ministers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Item III</td>
<td>B. Committee of Three</td>
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<tr>
<td>E. Pineau Plan for aid to Under-developed Countries</td>
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<td>(2) to strengthen economic cooperation between member countries, to seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and to promote conditions of stability and wellbeing.</td>
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<tr>
<td>I. Article 2 Survey</td>
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<td>(3) to instruct the Permanent Representatives of the Council to examine economic problems in the light of the ideas set out above and of the plan put forward by Mr. Pineau, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, calling upon the services of a committee of technical advisers working under their authority.</td>
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<tr>
<td>J. Proposal by German Foreign Minister regarding periodic surveys of Soviet economic penetration in underdeveloped countries</td>
<td></td>
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<td>The Council agreed to set up a Working Group to start editing and revising the Article 2 Survey (C-M(56)45).</td>
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The Council agreed that periodic studies of Soviet economic penetration should be made at quarterly intervals by International Staff on basis of information supplied by delegations.
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-R(56)25</td>
<td>Quarterly surveys of Soviet economic penetration</td>
<td>17.5.56</td>
<td>US wished International Staff to prepare terms of reference for studies in question</td>
<td>The Council requested the Secretary General to prepare terms of reference for quarterly surveys of Soviet economic penetration for submission to the Council as soon as possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>Pinau Plan and para.5 of final communiqué of ministerial meeting</td>
<td>25.5.56</td>
<td>Discussion on distinction between Pinau Plan and para.5 of communiqué dealing with political aspects of economic problems. Italy urged creation of Committee of Economic Experts. Supported by France, UK and others thought definition of directives essential before appointment of experts.</td>
<td>The Council agreed to consider Pinau Plan and para.5 of final communiqué at meeting on 6th June (see C-R(56)26).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-R(56)26</td>
<td>Committee of Three Ministers</td>
<td>25.5.56</td>
<td>Secretary General stated that Three Ministers were arriving in Paris in July. Was any preparatory work necessary? Canadian Representative suggested Staff should prepare reference papers listing suggestions for strengthening Atlantic Community.</td>
<td>The Council invited the Secretary General to prepare a paper on lines suggested by the Canadian Representative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>Organization and functions of NATO</td>
<td>30.5.56</td>
<td>US referred to possible enlargement of scope of NATO, including role of technical advisers for economic matters having political implications for NATO. Portuguese Delegate raised possibility of NATO becoming unpopular if &quot;supervisor&quot; of work of other organizations. Greek and Norwegian Delegates thought report on Six Power Conference in Venice would be useful. Belgian Delegate agreed to provide this.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>Date of meeting</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>Action taken</td>
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<tr>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>Egyptian tenders for dock construction at Alexandria</td>
<td>18.6.56</td>
<td>The Italian Delegate drew attention to a concrete case of possible Soviet politico-economic penetration in an uncommitted country. In March 1956 Egyptian government requested tenders from a number of firms both in Soviet and in Western countries for dock construction in Alexandria. After construction, management of the dock would be entrusted to representatives of Egypt and of the constructing company. There was a risk that the USSR or a satellite would enter a low bid in order to obtain the contract. Hence Soviet penetration in the eastern Mediterranean with subsidised dock servicing Soviet shipping. Was there any scope for joint NATO action in this matter? Discussion followed of the many implications of the problem raised.</td>
<td>The Council: (1) invited Representatives to report to their governments on Italian statement and to find out if any private firms proposed to submit tenders. (2) decided to discuss the matter in restricted session on 27th June.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-R(56)32</td>
<td>Periodic surveys of Soviet economic penetration</td>
<td>21.6.56</td>
<td>C-R(56)78</td>
<td>The Council approved the draft decision on periodic surveys of Soviet economic moves set out in C-R(56)78.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item I</td>
<td>Egyptian tenders for dock construction at Alexandria</td>
<td>27.6.56</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Council agreed to refer question of Egyptian tenders for dock construction at Alexandria raised by Italian Delegation to the Working Group on Soviet Economic Policy for a factual study and report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>Date of meeting</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>Action taken</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-R(56)38</td>
<td>Pineau Plan</td>
<td>11.7.56</td>
<td>The UK, France and Canada considered that it would be unwise for NATO to become involved in this problem but agreed with Italy that the position should be kept under review.</td>
<td>The Council established a Committee of Technical Advisers to report on the Pineau Plan by 1st November 1956.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-R(56)40</td>
<td></td>
<td>18.7.56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-R(56)42</td>
<td>Egyptian tenders for dock construction at Alexandria</td>
<td>25.7.56</td>
<td>The UK, France and Canada considered that it would be unwise for NATO to become involved in this problem but agreed with Italy that the position should be kept under review.</td>
<td>The Council agreed that the report submitted by the Committee on Soviet Economic Policy (C-M(56)100) should be referred to member governments and that the question should be kept under review by the Committee on Soviet Economic Policy.</td>
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## INDEX OF ECONOMIC SUBJECTS CONSIDERED BY
THE COUNCIL FOR DISCUSSION OR ACTION

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<td>- Survey of Article 2 Activities</td>
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<td>- Study on long term Problem of East-West Trade</td>
<td>2.7.53</td>
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<td>Economic implications of Soviet Policy</td>
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<td>- General discussion</td>
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<td>- Report on Soviet 6th 5 year Plan</td>
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<td>- General</td>
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<td>- Chairmanship of Working Group on Labour Mobility</td>
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<td>- Report on Labour Mobility</td>
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<td>Role of NATO in Economic Co-operation</td>
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ENGLISH ONLY
3rd September, 1956

COMMITTEE OF THREE

LIST OF DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE

1. Questionnaire (CT-D/1(Revised)) with explanatory notes (CT-D/2).

2. Replies from all countries except Denmark, France, Iceland and Turkey, and Draft Analysis of these replies, prepared by International Staff (CT-D/9).

3. Summary Record (CT-R/1) containing decisions reached during June meetings of the Committee.

4. Timetable of consultations with governmental representatives (CT-D/3). Note: this timetable has been agreed to by all governments. The following two items should, however, be added to it:

   12th September, 10 - 12 a.m. - meeting with the Standing Committee of the Parliamentary Association

   15th September, 10 - 12 a.m. - meeting with the Atlantic Treaty Association

5. Papers prepared by the International Staff:

   (i) possible implications for NATO if it were to become a regional organization in the terms of chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter (CT-D/4);

   (ii) notes on procedures for the pacific settlement of disputes within various international organizations (CT-D/6);

   (iii) outline of what NATO has done so far in the non-military fields (CT-D/7);

   (iv) list of political and economic subjects considered by the Council (CT-D/8).

NATO CONFIDENTIAL
6. Proposals and contributions:

(i) memorandum by the Danish and Norwegian Governments on a "Centre of Atlantic Community studies" (CT-D/5);

(ii) memorandum by Prof. L.D. Sohn of Harvard University, dated 8th June, 1956, on the strengthening of NATO, particularly with respect to the settlement of legal and political disputes and the setting up of an inter-parliamentary assembly;

(iii) letter from Mr. M. Koster (of London) to Mr. Lange, dated 19th June, 1956, containing a proposal for the exchange of civil servants between NATO member countries;

(iv) letter from Dr. Kurt Hahn to Lord Ismay dated 11th July, 1956 containing a proposal for the setting up of NATO colleges.

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVie.
The Committee of Three, consisting of Mr. Halvard Lange (Norway), Mr. Gaetano Martino (Italy) and Mr. Lester B. Pearson (Canada) was established by the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session on 5th May, 1956, with the following terms of reference:

"... to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community."

2. The Committee held its first meetings from 20th to 22nd June, 1956, at NATO Headquarters in Paris. During these discussions, the procedure to be followed by the Committee was established, and it was decided to send a Questionnaire to each NATO Member Government in order to obtain its views on the problems raised by the task set the Committee by the Council. This Questionnaire, which was circulated on 28th June, contained a number of specific questions with respect to co-operation in the political, economic, cultural and information fields and regarding the organization and functions of NATO. In addition, the Committee issued a memorandum containing explanatory notes and guidance to assist countries in the preparation of their replies to the Questionnaire. Governments were requested to submit their replies by 20th August.

3. The Committee reassembled in Paris on 10th September, 1956, and held a series of meetings lasting until the 22nd of that month. After having examined and analysed the replies to the Questionnaire, the Committee held consultations with each member country individually. The purpose of these consultations was to clarify, where necessary, the position taken by governments in their replies, and to obtain their views on a number of specific proposals selected from the different replies and summarised in a preliminary working paper which was circulated to serve as a basis for these discussions.

4. The consultations took place in the following order:

Wednesday, 12th September

a.m. Iceland (represented by Mr. H.G. Anderson, Permanent Representative of Iceland to the North Atlantic Council)

p.m. Turkey (represented by Mr. N. Birgi, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
Thursday, 13th September  a.m. The Netherlands (represented by Mr. J.W. Boyen, Foreign Minister)
p.m. Greece (represented by Mr. Averoff, Foreign Minister)

Friday, 14th September  a.m. Belgium (represented by Mr. P.H. Spaak, Foreign Minister)
p.m. Germany (represented by Professor Hallstein, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)

Monday, 17th September  a.m. Luxembourg (represented by Mr. M.J. Bech, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister)

a.m. France (represented by Mr. C. Pineau, Foreign Minister)
p.m. United States (represented by Senator George, special representative of the President)

p.m. Portugal (represented by Mr. P. Cunha, Foreign Minister)

Tuesday, 18th September  a.m. Denmark (represented by Mr. Erling Christiansen, Deputy Foreign Minister)

p.m. United Kingdom (represented by Mr. Anthony Nutting, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)

5. In addition the Committee met with the following groups:

(a) On Wednesday, 12th September, meeting with the Standing Committee of the Conference of Members of Parliament from NATO Countries, consisting of the following persons:

Belgium       M. Frans Van Cauwelaert
              M. A. de Moeclar

Canada        Senator, The Hon. Wishart McL.
              Robertson, P.C.

France        M. Maurice Schumann

Germany       Herr F. Berendsen
              Dr. Richard Jaeger
The Committee of Three: from left to right, Mr. Halvard Lange, Prof. Gaetano Makino, and Mr. L. B. Pearson.

United States Congressman Wayne L. Hays, M.C.

(b) On Saturday, 15th September, meeting with the Atlantic Treaty Association, represented by:

Count Morra, Chairman
Dr. Nord, Vice-Chairman
Dr. Flynt, Vice-Chairman, and
Mr. John Eppstein, Secretary General

and a number of delegates from national member organizations.

(c) On Tuesday, 18th September, meeting with General Billotte and Mr. Barton, representing the Signatories of the Declaration of Atlantic Unity.

6. As a result of those consultations a draft report to the Council was prepared.

7. (Paragraph about the meeting in November and its results).

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.
COMMITTEE OF THREE

DRAFT FORMAL RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
(to be Annexed to the Report)

The Committee of Three, consisting of Dr. Gaetano Martino (Italy), Mr. Halvard Lange (Norway) and Mr. Lester B. Pearson (Canada) was established by the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session on 5th May, 1956, with the following terms of reference:

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2. The Committee held its first meetings from 20th to 22nd June, 1956, at NATO Headquarters in Paris. During these discussions, the procedure to be followed by the Committee was established, and it was decided to send a Questionnaire to each NATO member government in order to obtain its views on a number of specific problems with respect to co-operation in the political, economic, cultural and information fields and regarding the organization and functions of NATO. In addition, the Committee issued a memorandum containing explanatory notes and guidance to assist countries in the preparation of their replies to the Questionnaire. The Questionnaire was circulated on 28th June, 1956, and governments were requested to submit their replies by 20th August.

3. The Committee reassembled in Paris on 10th September, 1956, and held a series of meetings lasting until the 22nd of that month. After having examined and analysed the replies to the Questionnaire, the Committee held consultations with each member country individually. The purpose of these consultations was to clarify, where necessary, the position taken by governments in their replies, and to discuss with the representatives of other governments in a preliminary way certain views of the Committee.

4. The consultations took place in the following order:

Wednesday, 12th September a.m. Iceland (represented by Mr. H.G. Andersen, Permanent Representative of Iceland to the North Atlantic Council)

p.m. Turkey (represented by Mr. E. Birgi, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
Thursday, 13th September a.m. The Netherlands (represented by Mr. J.W. Beyen, Minister for Foreign Affairs)
p.m. Greece (represented by Mr. Averoff, Minister for Foreign Affairs)

Friday, 14th September a.m. Belgium (represented by Mr. P.H. Spaak, Minister for Foreign Affairs)
p.m. Germany (represented by Professor Halstein, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)

Monday, 17th September a.m. Luxembourg (represented by Mr. M.J. Bech, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs)
am. France (represented by Mr. C. Pineau, Minister for Foreign Affairs)
p.m. United States (represented by Senator George, special representative of President Eisenhower)
p.m. Portugal (represented by Mr. P. Cunha, Minister for Foreign Affairs)

Tuesday, 18th September a.m. Denmark (represented by Mr. Ernst Christiansen, Deputy Foreign Minister)
p.m. United Kingdom (represented by Mr. Anthony Nutting, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs)

5. In addition the Committee met with the following groups:

(a) On Wednesday, 12th September, meeting with the Standing Committee of the Conference of Members of Parliament from NATO Countries, consisting of the following persons:

Belgium Mr. Frans Van Cauwelaert
Mr. A. de Meulder
Canada Senator, The Hon. Wishart McI. Robertson, P.C.
France Mr. Maurice Schumann
Germany Herr F. Berendsen
Dr. Richard Jaeger
Netherlands  Mr. J.J. Fens  
          Mr. J.L. Kranenburg  
          Mr. E.A. Vermeer  

Turkey    Colonel Seyfi Kurtbek  

United Kingdom    Colonel Walter Elliot, C.H.,  
                   M.C., M.P.  

United States Congressman Wayne L. Hays, M.C.  

(b) On Saturday, 15th September, meeting with the Atlantic Treaty Association, represented by:  
    Count Morra, Chairman  
    Dr. Nord, Vice-Chairman  
    Dr. Flynt, Vice Chairman, and  
    Mr. John Eppstein, Secretary General  

    and a number of delegates from national member organizations.  

(c) On Tuesday, 18th September, meeting with General Billotte and Mr. Barton, representing the Signatories of the Declaration of Atlantic Unity.  

6. As a result of these consultations a draft report to the Council was prepared. In this work the Committee benefitted from the expert advice of three special consultants. They were Professor Lincoln Gordon (Harvard University), Professor Guido Carli (Rome) and Dr. Robert Major (Oslo).  

7. (Paragraph about the meeting in November and its results).  

Palais de Chaillot,  
Paris, XVIe.
Le 28 juin, le Secrétaire Général a fait distribuer au nom du Comité des Trois le questionnaire du Comité en demandant que les réponses des gouvernements lui soient soumises avant le 20 août au plus tard.

2. On m'a prié de faire savoir que le Comité aimerait recevoir de chaque gouvernement 35 exemplaires de sa réponse.

(Signé) A. BENTINCK

Aux : Représentants Permanents
Du : Secrétaire Général par interim

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.
COMMITTEE OF THREE

DECESSIONS REACHED DURING MEETINGS HELD
ON 20th-22nd JUNE, 1956, AT THE
PALAIS DE CHAILLOT, PARIS

(1) A questionnaire (CT-D/1) will be circulated to all countries as soon as possible with the request that replies be sent to the Secretary General by 20th August.

(2) A Memorandum containing guidance and explanatory notes to assist countries in the preparation of their replies to some of the questions will be circulated as soon as possible after the issuance of the questionnaire.

(3) The Committee will hold its second session beginning September 10th and possibly lasting for two weeks, to consider the replies received, to consult with Governments, individually or in the Council, and to start with the drafting of the Report.

(4) In order to assist in the analysis of the replies to the questionnaire, an advance party will meet in Paris during the week beginning 3rd September.

(5) In order to assist the Committee in the preparation of its Report a few highly qualified experts will be approached to serve as consultants on particular questions. In this connection it was suggested that Mr. Lange ask the Head of the Norwegian Research Council for a suggestion as to a possible consultant on scientific education; that Mr. Pearson approach Professor Lincoln Gordon of Harvard University to serve as a consultant on economic questions; that Dr. Martino approach Professor Carli on the same subject; and finally that Mr. Marjolin might also be approached on behalf of the Committee of Three.

The Terms of Reference of these consultants will be determined by the Committee. After their provisional agreement has been obtained they will be invited officially in writing by the Secretary General, on behalf of the Committee, to serve as consultants for a period of about 2 months beginning in August. The Secretary General is to specify, furthermore, that NATO will reimburse travel expenses and will pay a daily allowance of an amount which will be settled later.

(6) The International Staff is to prepare a chapter of the Report on what NATO has done so far in the non-military field.

(7) The International Staff is to prepare as a background document for the work of the Committee a list of political and economic questions which have been put before the Council in the past, and of the results achieved. This list is to be divided in:

NATO CONFIDENTIAL
(a) questions submitted purely for the purpose of information,
(b) questions submitted for information and discussion, and
(c) questions on which action was taken after discussion.

(8) The International Staff is to prepare a study of the machinery
for settlement of disputes between States as it exists in
other organizations, with particular reference to the
Organization of American States.

(9) The International Staff is to prepare a study of the possible
implications for NATO if it were to become a regional
organization in the terms of Chapter 8 of the United Nations
Charter.

(10) The Committee's activities will, as far as possible, be
concentrated in Paris. The Committee do not intend to
tavel to the different capitals as had originally been
suggested.

(11) Members of the Committee will informally contact Governments
of those countries which are members of OEEC but not of NATO,
in the following manner:

Mr. Pearson will contact the Irish Government.
Mr. Lange will contact the Swedish Government.
Dr. Martino will contact the Governments of Austria and
Switzerland, and the Government of Spain as a prospective
member of OEEC.

(12) Dr. Martino and Mr. Pearson will contact the Secretary of
the NATO Parliamentary Committee in London during the week
beginning 25th June.

(13) During their meeting in September the Committee will not hear
individuals or associations but will consider any suggestions
which are submitted in writing.

(14) The Secretary is to write a letter in the name of the
Committee of Three to the Secretary General of the Atlantic
Treaty Association, on the occasion of its meeting in Milan
11th-15th September, indicating that the Committee would
welcome any suggestions which might come out of the
Association's meeting, especially in the field of cultural
co-operation and information and which might be considered
by the Committee when drafting its report.

(15) The Committee of Three has been approached by the Director
of the International Refugee Organization with the request
that the Committee consider recommending an increase in the
contribution of NATO countries to IRO. It was agreed that
the Committee would consider this question favourably.

(16) It was provisionally agreed that the outline of the Report
should be as set out at annex.

(17) For the preparation of the chapter on cultural relations,
the results of the meeting of Heads of Cultural Departments,
which is to take place in July, will have to be taken into
account.
(18) The Report will be submitted to the Council in Permanent Session in November. A special meeting of Foreign Ministers to receive the report is not deemed necessary. The Report is to be discussed by the Council during its Ministerial Session in December; two days might be devoted to this discussion.

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.
DRAFT OUTLINE OF THE REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE OF THREE

I. INTRODUCTION
(The political aims of the Alliance to be drafted by Mr. Pearson.)

II. SURVEY OF NON-MILITARY CO-OPERATION AS CARRIED OUT BY NATO IN THE PAST
(To be prepared by the Secretariat.)

III. THE MACHINERY OF NATO
(A discussion on the question whether the present machinery is adequate and what improvements could be envisaged.)

IV. CONSULTATION IN THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FIELD

V. THE RELATION TO OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

VI. CO-OPERATION IN THE FIELD OF CULTURAL RELATIONS AND INFORMATION

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
COMITÉ DES TROIS

DÉCISIONS PRISES AU COURS DES RÉUNIONS QUI SE SONT TENUES AU PALAIS DE CHAILLOT, PARIS, DU 20 AU 22 JUIN 1956

(1) Un questionnaire (CT-D/1) sera distribué dès que possible à tous les pays, qui seront priés d'envoyer leurs réponses au Secrétaire Général avant le 20 août.

(2) Un mémorandum contenant des directives et des notes explicatives destinées à aider les pays à préparer leurs réponses à certaines questions sera diffusé dès que possible après la distribution du questionnaire.

(3) Le Comité tiendra sa seconde session qui durera probablement deux semaines à partir du 10 septembre, pour examiner les réponses qu'il aura reçues, consulter les gouvernements individuellement ou au sein du Conseil, et commencer la rédaction de son rapport.

(4) Avant cette session, un groupe se réunira à Paris, pendant la semaine du 3 septembre pour commencer l'analyse des réponses au questionnaire.

(5) Pour la préparation de son rapport, le Comité fera appel à l'aide de quelques spécialistes hautement qualifiés, qui feront fonction de consultants dans certains domaines. À cet égard, il a été suggéré que M. Lange demande au Chef du Conseil norvégien de la recherche scientifique de lui proposer le nom d'un spécialiste de l'enseignement scientifique; que M. Pearson demande au Professeur Lincoln Gordon, de l'Université Harvard, de faire fonction de consultant pour les questions économiques, que le Dr. Martino pressente le Professeur Carli dans le même but et enfin que le Comité des Trois fasse également appel à M. Marjolin.

Le Comité fixera le mandat de ces consultants. Lorsqu'ils auront accepté en principe, le Secrétaire Général les invitera par écrit, au nom du Comité, à faire fonction de consultants pendant une période d'environ deux mois à partir du mois d'août. De plus, le Secrétaire Général précisera que l'OTAN remboursera leurs frais de voyage et leur versera une indemnité journalière dont le montant sera fixé ultérieurement.

(6) Le Secrétariat International doit préparer, pour le rapport, un projet de chapitre sur les réalisations de l'OTAN dans les domaines non militaires.
Pour aider le Comité dans son travail, le Secrétariat International doit préparer une liste des questions politiques et économiques dont a été saisi le Conseil dans le passé, ainsi que des résultats obtenus. Cette liste comportera:

(a) les questions soumises uniquement à des fins d'information,
(b) les questions soumises pour information et examen,
(c) les questions dont l'examen a entraîné l'adoption de certaines mesures.

Le Secrétariat International doit préparer une étude sur la procédure suivie dans les autres organisations, particulièrement à l'Organisation des États américains pour le règlement des différends entre États.


Dans la mesure du possible le Comité poursuivra ses activités à Paris. Le Comité n'a pas l'intention de se rendre dans les différentes capitales, comme il avait été proposé à l'origine.

Les membres du Comité se mettront officieuselement en rapport avec les gouvernements des pays qui sont membres de l'OCDE mais non de l'OTAN, de la façon suivante:

M. Pearson se mettra en rapport avec le gouvernement irlandais.
M. Lange avec le gouvernement suédois.
Le Dr. Martino avec les gouvernements autrichien et suisse, ainsi qu'avec le gouvernement espagnol en tant que membre éventuel de l'OCDE.

Le Dr. Martino et M. Pearson se mettront en rapport avec le Secrétaire de la Conférence des parlementaires de l'OTAN à Londres, au cours de la semaine du 25 juin.

Au cours de sa réunion du mois de septembre, le Comité n'accordera d'audience à aucun particulier ou association, mais examinera toutes les suggestions qui lui seront soumises par écrit.

Le Secrétaire doit écrire au nom du Comité des Trois au Secrétaire Général de l'Association du Traité de l'Atlantique, à l'occasion de la réunion qui aura lieu à Milan du 11 au 15 septembre, pour lui faire savoir que le Comité accueillera avec plaisir toute suggestion que lui ferait l'Association à la suite de sa réunion, notamment dans le domaine de la coopération culturelle et de l'Information et qui serait susceptible d'être prise en considération par le Comité au cours de la préparation de son rapport.

Le Directeur de l'Organisation internationale des Réfugiés a demandé au Comité des Trois d'envisager de recommander une augmentation des contributions versées par les pays de l'OTAN à l'OIR. Le Comité a décidé qu'il examinera cette demande avec bienveillance.
(16) Il est décidé provisoirement que le rapport suivra le plan indiqué en annexe.

(17) Pour la préparation du chapitre sur les relations culturelles, le Comité devra tenir compte des résultats de la réunion des chefs des Services Culturels qui doit avoir lieu au mois de juillet.

(18) Le rapport sera soumis au Conseil en session permanente au mois de novembre. Il est jugé inutile de présenter le rapport à une réunion spéciale des ministres des Affaires étrangères. Le rapport doit être discuté par le Conseil au cours de sa session ministérielle du mois de décembre. Deux jours pourraient être consacrés à cet examen.

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.
Committee of Three Meeting with the Standing Committee of the Conference of Members of Parliament from the NATO Countries Held on Wednesday, 12th September, 1956 at 10 a.m.

List of members of the Standing Committee:

<table>
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<th>Name</th>
<th>Country</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Frans Van Cauwelaert</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>Mr. A. de Meeler</td>
<td>(Belgium)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. J.J. Pens</td>
<td>Mr. J.L. Kranenburg</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. E.A. Vermeer</td>
<td>(Netherlands)</td>
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<td>Senator The Hon Wishart McL. Robertson, P.C.</td>
<td>Canada</td>
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<td>Colonel Seyfi Kurtbek</td>
<td>(Turkey)</td>
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<td>Mr. M. Schumann</td>
<td>(France)</td>
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<td>Mr. F. Berendsen</td>
<td>Colonel Walter Elliot, C.H., M.C., M.P.</td>
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<td>Mr. G.R. Fischer</td>
<td>(Germany)</td>
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<td>Dr. Richard Jaeger</td>
<td>Congressman Wayne L. Hays</td>
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<td>Mr. Billings</td>
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<td>(United States)</td>
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Executive Secretary: Mr. Douglas Robinson

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1. After a world of welcome from Mr. Lange, Senator ROBERTSON, in an introductory statement, proposed a discussion on the following three points:

   (1) the role of parliament in relation to NATO;

   (2) political consultation within NATO;

   (3) economic co-operation within NATO;

2. The meeting had before it a memorandum as requested by the Committee of Three from the Standing Committee. He went on to say that he hoped that the Committee of Three would recommend in their report that steps be taken to ensure the fullest possible support of the Conference of Members of Parliament by NATO.

I. THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS IN RELATION TO NATO

3. Mr. VAN CAUTIVALAERT (Belgium) noted that as the military threat had, at present, decreased, it would be more difficult to obtain parliamentary support for NATO. Since this support remained, nevertheless, essential, he was strongly in favour of a more formal recognition of the Conference of Parliamentarians, and of its continuance as a permanent body. He also urged that NATO give more assistance to the work of the Conference.

4. Mr. HAYS (United States) stated that the United States Congress was at present cooling off in its enthusiasm for NATO, as well as for other overseas commitments, and replies to the questionnaire sent out by the Standing Committee had been poor. The opinion was being expressed publicly that NATO was dying. He believed that the present conference should establish closer liaison between parliaments and NATO in order to impress upon parliamentarians that NATO was still very much alive.

5. Colonel KURTEK (Turkey), speaking as the representative of one of the countries most exposed to the Communist threat, emphasised the need for a formal, permanent and realistic liaison between parliaments and NATO, in order that NATO might have the fullest support from public opinion.

6. Mr. BERENDSBN (Germany) felt that closer contact between NATO and the parliamentarians of member countries would be most useful. Discussions on NATO matters should take place among parliamentarians before, and in preparation for, parliamentary discussions. In addition to the Annual Review stock-taking of the military situation, it would be useful for NATO to have an annual report on political questions. Member countries should aim at co-ordinating their policies in fighting Communism.

7. Colonel WALTER ELLIOT (United Kingdom) supported the proposals by previous speakers. He noted that the conference had governmental backing to the extent that all those attending it had been chosen by the presidents of their national legislatures. NATO had so far neglected to ensure support from public opinion, to which the national legislatures were responsible; it was time for NATO to educate public opinion in the importance of the Organization. He would like to see close liaison between
parliamentarians and the NATO Secretariat. For example, a request for a report by the Secretariat on the comparative economic position of the NATO and Soviet blocs had been refused for security reasons, but he thought that it should be possible to provide a report to parliamentarians which would avoid these difficulties. Similarly, a report would be useful on the comparative position in the two blocs regarding cultural facilities and exchanges. In conclusion, he asked whether the Committee of Three would consider recommending that NATO give modest financial help to the annual Conference of Parliamentarians, who represented valuable "public relations officers" for NATO in their constituencies.

8. Mr. LANGE said that the Committee would consider this point.

II. POLITICAL CONSULTATION WITHIN NATO

9. Mr. FENS (Netherlands) thought it essential that the NATO block should evolve a common foreign policy in the international field and that NATO should become a political unity.

10. Mr. SCHUMANN (France) said that, though replies to the questionnaire circulated in January 1956 showed that the majority of French parliamentarians supported NATO, it was clear that the electorate's interest in NATO was waning. Public opinion was not adequately informed about NATO. Political consultation within NATO on questions of common interest was still insufficient. He suggested that the Council should act as a permanent intermediary between governments and public opinion in member countries; that its members should have direct political responsibility; that all questions concerning the alliance should be brought before the Council for discussion, and that the public should be informed when such questions were discussed.

11. Colonel WALTER ELLIOT (United Kingdom) noted that in the United Kingdom the desirability of a common NATO foreign policy had been recognised by 60% of the parliamentarians who replied to the questionnaire. He emphasised the usefulness of parliamentary discussion in spreading information about NATO.

12. In conclusion, it was noted that the development of political consultation within NATO would be one of the primary recommendations to be made by the Committee of Three.

III. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION WITHIN NATO

13. Senator ROBERTSON thought that the existence of other international organizations concerned with economic co-operation was no bar to the development of economic co-operation within NATO, since the element of economic interdependence among NATO countries was strong. A number of political problems facing the Alliance were, in origin, economic. It was the collective responsibility of the NATO countries to ensure the highest possible degree of prosperity in each member country.

14. Mr. BERENDSEN (Germany) emphasised the need for closer economic co-operation, both in the military field, as regards the maintenance of equipment, and in the civilian field.
15. Mr. VAN CAUWELAERT (Belgium) pointed out that the economic policies of the Soviet bloc made it necessary for the NATO countries also to adopt a common economic policy. If Communism were found to produce greater prosperity than the free Western system, public opinion in the West would be seriously affected. The Atlantic community should express itself in a common economic policy with objectives in the following order of priority:

1. aid for underdeveloped NATO countries;
2. the common development of Central Africa;
3. the development of nuclear energy in the civilian field;
4. the education of technicians, including exchanges of personnel and students. For this purpose, NATO might call together a conference of educationalists. It might also prove necessary to set up new agencies for this purpose.

16. Colonel WALTER ELLIOT (United Kingdom) thought that while it might not be necessary for NATO itself to organize joint economic activities, it should be recognized that economic co-operation was an integral part of the task of the Alliance. The question was therefore one of organization in the international field. Since the resources of NATO member countries were not unlimited, a degree of selection would be necessary in the aid to underdeveloped countries. A survey should be made of the trained personnel available in the NATO area, as compared with the Soviet bloc; also of NATO and Soviet economic resources, bearing in mind, for example, such points as the fact that the Soviet bloc disposed of a fuel surplus, whereas NATO had to import fuel from outside the NATO area. Finally, NATO should study the possibility of making corresponding university degrees and diplomas interchangeable.

17. Mr. HAYS (United States) agreed that the NATO countries should try to make the best joint use of their economic resources.

18. Colonel KURTEK (Turkey) emphasised the need for economic aid as regards the replacement of equipment, and suggested that NATO might set up special agencies to deal with economic problems, in particular, economic warfare.

19. Mr. VERMEER (Netherlands) thought that there should be an Atlantic programme of investment in underdeveloped non-NATO countries, aimed at promoting stability and peace. Such activities would help to give NATO much-needed publicity.

20. In conclusion, it was noted that there was general agreement on the need for closer economic co-operation among member countries, either within NATO, or in other existing international organizations.
21. Mr. Lange and Mr. Pearson thanked the Members of Parliament for their valuable suggestions, which would be of great help in the Committee's work.

Palais de Chaillot, Paris, XVIe.
MEETING BETWEEN NATO'S COMMITTEE OF THREE FOREIGN MINISTERS
and the
STANDING COMMITTEE of the
CONFERENCE OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT FROM THE NATO COUNTRIES

MEMORANDUM

requested by the Committee of Three from the
Standing Committee of the Conference of Members of Parliament from the NATO Countries

PREFACE

In the interests of brevity, the Standing Committee in the preparation of this Memorandum has put down its suggestions on only those matters to which, in the comparatively short time which has been available, it has been able to give some consideration and formulate certain proposals.

The Committee hopes, however, that it may make its views known to the Ministers verbally on a number of other aspects, relevant to the terms of reference given the Ministers, on which its views do not appear in this Memorandum, or of which only brief mention has been made.

The Committee has not had an opportunity to study the analysis of the replies to its Survey of Parliamentary Opinion in the NATO Countries, copies of which have been sent separately to the Committee of Three. In the light of study of the report of the Survey the Committee might wish to amend or add to their remarks and proposals contained in this Memorandum at a later date.

INTRODUCTION

NATO and UNO

The Committee felt that the task of preparing a report on the development of closer economic and political unity given to the Committee of Three, gives an opportunity to stress again that NATO is fully compatible with the aims of the Charter of the United Nations Organization - indeed, that in a sense it is already a regional organization.

The North Atlantic Council

On ways and means of making the North Atlantic Council more effective the Committee expresses the hope that the question is one which is receiving the attention of the three Ministers, and that among the ways and means they may consider will be more frequent meetings of the Council at Ministerial level, an increase in the calibre and/or rank of the present permanent representatives if they see fit and all other methods of increasing the authority of the Council.
SECTION ONE - THE PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE

The Committee would like to discuss with the Ministers how "more formal recognition" can be given to the Conference of Members of Parliament from the NATO countries.

Some indication of permanence and a more realistic income is regarded as essential to the effective working of the Conference now and in the future.

In particular some financial arrangement permitting of relatively modest but planned expenditure over a period of say, three years, would be helpful to the Standing Committee of the Conference and enable it to achieve maximum effectiveness at the lowest overall cost.

Another form of recognition could be given if the North Atlantic Council passed a resolution welcoming and acknowledging the Conference, its aims and activities, and charging the NATO Secretariat to grant every facility to the Conference, its Officers and Committees.

(See also last paragraph, Section Three - Economic).

Annual Report

The Committee felt that the NATO Parliamentarians should receive an Annual Report prepared by the NATO Secretariat, which could serve as a basis for an informed and intelligent debate on the activities and problems of NATO, at their annual Conference.

For both the Conference and the Standing Committee it is felt that more information than that given the Press should be made available concerning the NATO activities, problems and its future.

SECTION TWO - POLITICAL

Prior Consultation

The Standing Committee favours greater use of the Council as a forum for early discussion of questions of common concern and especially those likely to be raised in wider international forums, e.g. the United Nations Organization, where representatives of Communist countries are also present.

Settlement of Disputes

The Committee would hope that prior discussion in the Council would lead to the settlement of disputes between member countries, if not through the discussions themselves, then through an agreement resulting from them that the case in question be considered by the appropriate international body, notably the International Court of Justice at The Hague.

A particular reason - among many others - why the North Atlantic Council should be used for such purposes is that Germany for instance is not yet a Member of the United Nations and needs an international forum in which she may discuss problems common to her and nations with which she has close economic, political and military ties.
SECTION THREE - ECONOMIC

Objectives of closer economic co-operation within the North Atlantic Community need not, in the view of the Committee, imply new organizations.

Before considering means, however, the Committee felt it should suggest certain principles which might be followed when considering the possibilities of greater economic co-operation between the NATO countries.

**Principles**

Practical acknowledgement should be made of the principle of utilising best and co-ordinating most effectively the combined economic resources of the NATO group of countries.

Due consideration should be given at the same time to strategic interests of the NATO community.

In considering the role NATO countries might play as a group towards underdeveloped territories, first consideration should be given to such areas within the North Atlantic Community.

When this has been done then consideration should be given as to what joint action member states can take towards meeting the needs of underdeveloped areas outside the confines of the North Atlantic group, though, if any such action were agreed, it should, in the view of the Committee, be undertaken through the appropriate existing bodies such as the specialised agencies of the United Nations.

The NATO countries as a group should not allow the initiative in economic as in political matters always to be the monopoly of the Soviet; neither, however, should they be tempted into matching each Soviet offer of economic aid with a similar or larger offer without regard to the economic soundness of the project in question or to the inevitable diversion of resources from the development of NATO countries which such economic aid involves.

The Committee feels strongly that there are several objectives which should be the aim of member countries of the North Atlantic Community and for which fresh approaches should be tried, or study of existing lines of approach intensified.

Among them should be:

1. Convertibility
2. Eventual full freedom of trade
3. Mobility of labour
4. Development of a "North Atlantic Low Tariff Club"
5. The setting up of a Joint Programme for the development of underdeveloped territories.

**Means**

OEEC

Among the many points raised at the meeting of Officers of the Standing Committee on the means available for obtaining closer economic co-operation between member countries of the North
Atlantic Community were (i) the effectiveness, suitability or otherwise of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation as the medium for meeting the economic purposes of Article Two of the North Atlantic Treaty, and (ii) the adequacy or otherwise of the associate membership of the United States and Canada in OEEC. While the Standing Committee recognises that the Committee of Three may not be in a position to concern themselves with OEEC, its effectiveness or its composition, it was unanimous in its view that, in respect of the economic needs and potentialities of the North Atlantic Community, the present associate membership status of the United States and Canada in OEEC is unsatisfactory and that OEEC itself is inadequate to meet fully current requirements and the potential of the North Atlantic Community.

Irrespective, however, of whether the possibility exists or not for the Ministers to make recommendations touching upon OEEC and regardless of whether the present services of OEEC could or could not be utilised, the Committee considers that among the "means" or lines of approach to the objectives outlined above - and means and objectives in one or two cases overlap - are the following:

(a) Co-ordination by the NATO countries of their policies in the various international organizations, economic and otherwise, to which they belong;

(b) drawing up of a list of areas, both within and outside the North Atlantic Community, to which priority would be given for investments and economic aid;

(c) consideration of ways and means of pooling capital resources of the NATO countries for joint investments within the North Atlantic Community;

(d) creation of a joint programme for economic aid and investment in underdeveloped areas to be carried out through the appropriate existing institutions;

(e) the setting up of teams of technicians, scientists and qualified and experienced administrators to assist in the development of those areas in which joint action is undertaken by member countries;

(f) the setting up of an exchange equalisation fund for the NATO countries;

(g) a series of treaties covering, for instance, (i) trade and currency, (ii) investment and development, (iii) commodities;

(h) an international buffer stock scheme for primary products.

It is appreciated that each of these suggestions is highly technical and carries implications which require expert study and that the list is by no means complete.

The Committee would like to discuss with the Ministers the role that it believes the Conference and the Standing
Committee might play in the months ahead in exploring these and other possible avenues of progress further, and which might be provided for in connection with the more formal recognition of the Conference and Committee referred to earlier in this Memorandum.

GENERAL

The Committee is in agreement that greater emphasis should be put on the role NATO can play in developing closer intellectual ties between the member countries of NATO.

There should be regular visits of Members of Parliament between North America and Western Europe.

More and larger exchanges should be arranged between journalists, broadcasters and between those professionally concerned with the teaching of international relations.

Propaganda in the armed forces of each NATO country informing their members of NATO, its worth and purpose and the principles of the countries and civilisation which it seeks to defend, should be increased and should be more co-ordinated.

In propaganda, films, literature and so on, about NATO and the North Atlantic Community, greater emphasis should be placed upon the positive and peaceful benefits of closer co-operation between the NATO countries, in addition to stressing the value of their co-operation for purposes of defence. Stress should be laid on the potential of the North Atlantic Community as a force for peace given increasing unity in purpose and action.

CONCLUSION

The aim of the Standing Committee in its discussions leading to the preparation of this Memorandum has been to put forward possible solutions or possible lines of action, which, in the belief of the Committee, are neither too visionary nor too staid to go unheeded in the parliaments which, in the final analysis, would be asked to sanction them.

The Committee looks forward to its meeting with the Committee of Three and submits, at their request, this Memorandum for the prior attention and convenience of the Ministers.

Senator, The Hon. Wishart McL. Robertson, P.C.,

President of the

Conference and Standing Committee of Members of Parliament from the NATO Countries.
ENGLISH ONLY
14th September, 1956

NATO CONFIDENTIAL
CT-R/3

COMMITTEE OF THREE

Report on the Consultation with Iceland on Wednesday, 12th September, 1956 at noon

Representatives of Iceland: Mr. H.G. Andersen
Mr. H. Helgason

The Icelandic Representative made a general statement to the effect that his Government fully agreed with the endeavour to strengthen the co-operation within NATO and would give its full support to the recommendations which the Committee of Three would make. He particularly stressed the importance of better co-operation in the economic field citing as an example the fact that since it had become more and more difficult for his country to find export markets for its products, the Icelandic economy had become more and more dependent on commercial relations with Soviet areas. As a result the Soviet Union was now the biggest customer of Icelandic products and although this was regretted in Iceland, certain repercussions in the political and cultural field had been inevitable. In reply to specific questions the Icelandic Representative made the following points:

1. Political Consultation: The case of Iceland is a typical example for the need for better and more timely consultation.

2. Consultation about Economic Questions treated in other Organizations: Although the Icelandic fishery dispute has been discussed in OEEC, discussion in NATO, taking into account the political aspects of the problem, might have been more successful.
ENGLISH ONLY

14th September, 1956

COMMITTEE OF THREE

Report on the consultation with Turkey on Wednesday, 12th September, 1956 at 4 p.m., and Thursday, 13th September at noon

Representatives of Turkey: Mr. N. Birgi Mr. M. A. Tiney Mr. M. Esenbaş

The Turkish Representative made the following points:

I - POLITICAL CO-OPERATION

1. Consultation. As regards the Council recommendations referred to in sub-paragraph (A) (7), the intention is not that there should be any formal recommendation or vote which, according to established procedure, would require unanimity, but simply that, through discussion, a general agreement would emerge by which member governments would be guided in making national decisions. Turkey can accept this requirement.

2. Peaceful settlement of disputes. Turkey affirms the need for political consultation, and recommends that member countries should inform the Council before taking any step which might affect another member country. Turkey is not, however, in favour of creating the machinery proposed in sub-paragraphs (2) and (3), for the reason that the institution of such machinery, even though there would be no legal obligation on member countries to use it, would create a moral obligation, with the result that should disputes arise and member countries be unwilling to refer them to the bodies proposed, the authority of NATO would be weakened in the eyes of the outside world. The creation of such machinery might therefore, in fact, be harmful to NATO. Turkey is in favour of a more flexible solution whereby it should be left to the Council to decide how disputes brought before it should be dealt with.

Turkey can accept the obligation not to resort to any other international agency without having first submitted the question to NATO on the understanding that this does not imply the creation of any special machinery.

II - ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

1. Aid to underdeveloped areas. Turkey would like a specific reference (in paragraphs 1, A(1) and (2) of the Economic Section of CT-WP(5)Revised) to the granting of priority to the development of underdeveloped countries within NATO.

2. Civilian Public Works. NATO should develop public works in the civilian field. One example would be the construction of roads linking the different member countries. A more elastic system of common infrastructure than the present military concept could be envisaged.
3. As regards Turkey's suggestion that NATO study the exploitation and transport of certain products of primary economic and strategic importance, a specific example would be petroleum supplies and pipelines.

4. Canada and the USA should be more closely associated with the work of the OEEC.

5. Relationship with other regional organizations. There should be a close relationship with the Economic Committee of the Baghdad Pact with a view to co-ordinating aid by NATO countries to underdeveloped regions in the Middle East. Provision has been made for countries which are not members of the Baghdad Pact to accede to the Economic Committee of that Pact. This would make it possible for NATO to establish a link with the Pact, and for economic aid to be provided to uncommitted countries, which might include, for example, Colombo Plan countries. If a NATO Economic Advisory Committee is set up, this Committee should establish liaison with the Baghdad Pact Committee.

6. Soviet Economic Initiatives. The initiative for action in the commercial and economic field, planned to seize initiative from the Soviet bloc, might be taken:

   (1) by the Council;
   (2) by the Committee on Soviet Economic Policy, which could also act in an advisory capacity to individual member countries;
   (3) by individual member countries after consultation within the Council or the Committee on Soviet Economic Policy whereas the ultimate policy would remain the responsibility of individual governments. NATO should study those problems and give advice on them.

7. The proposals on Technical and Scientific Co-operation are acceptable to Turkey.

8. NATO machinery for economic consultations. Turkey does not favour, at least at this stage, the creation of special machinery within NATO for economic consultations. Procedure for consultations should remain flexible.

IV - CO-OPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD

Wherever possible, it is desirable to inform public opinion when major problems are discussed in the Council, while avoiding mentioning facts or names which would give rise to the possibility of "propaganda campaigns" while decisions are still pending. Publicity should be given in an active way, i.e. with the object of guiding public opinion.

V - ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

1. The Secretary General's right of initiative in the field of political consultations should be limited in order to avoid the Secretary General finding himself in a difficult position.
2. Turkey supports the proposals that the Secretary General should prepare an annual report on the state of the Alliance and that a political Annual Review be established.

3. More frequent ministerial meetings should be held. These need not be on a large scale; meetings of Foreign Ministers alone, each time in a different NATO capital, would help to impress public opinion with the effectiveness of NATO as a political alliance.
ENGLISH ONLY
14th September, 1956

NATO CONFIDENTIAL
C1-R/5

COMMITTEE OF THREE

Report on the consultation with the Netherlands on Thursday, 13th September, 1956 at 10 a.m.

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NETHERLANDS
Mr. J.W. Beyen
Mr. H.E. Van der Beugel
Mr. Eszauchier
Mr. Both
Mr. M.F. Vigeveno

The Netherlands Representative made the following points:

I. POLITICAL CONSULTATION

1. Political Consultation in General. NATO should not be apologetic about the military aspect of its work, but the task before NATO has now changed and broadened, and the organization must be adapted to meet this new task. Political consultation should begin in time, i.e., before questions are already in the public eye, and all member countries, large and small, should use the NATO forum for consultation as early and as frequently as possible. An example of a problem on which consultation would be useful is the anti-western attitude of the Asian and African countries who were represented at the Bandung Conference.

2. Inter-member Disputes. The usefulness of formalising procedures for the settlement of disputes is to be doubted, although there may be certain advantages in such a formalisation. Formal measures for consultation are ineffective unless backed by a genuine desire for agreement. While it is necessary to reinforce NATO as a political forum, there is no point in creating machinery solely with the view of impressing public opinion.

3. The Netherlands is not in favour of NATO's conducting a Political Annual Review, or of the Secretary General's preparing an annual political report.

4. The link with Parliamentarians is still the best approach to public opinion. Recognition of the Parliamentary Conference would make it possible to determine and delimitate the fields to be covered by the Conference. The dangers in giving such formal recognition are recognised, however, and that it may be preferable for NATO to limit itself to giving financial assistance and to making use of Parliamentarians in order to inform public opinion about NATO.
II. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

1. The Netherlands objects to a formalised common NATO policy in other international organizations for the reason that this might lead other countries to think that the NATO countries were "ganging up" against them. There should, however, be informal talks within the NATO Council about the policies to be adopted in such organizations.

2. Countering Soviet economic offensives. NATO should not enter into economic warfare with the Soviet bloc, but the Council could discuss the political aspects of Soviet economic initiatives with serious repercussions for the Alliance.

The proposal that countries abstain from bilateral financial and commercial transactions with the Soviet bloc is unrealistic.

3. Economic co-operation related to defence. The direct economic consequences of the defence effort should be more fully studied. In particular, the Defence Production Committee should be enabled to make more concrete progress than at present on standardisation.

4. Economic Advisory Committee. It would be preferable to increase the personnel of the Secretariat dealing with economic questions, rather than to create a new body.

5. Scientific and technical co-operation. This is already dealt with in other international organizations and the question may be asked: What NATO could usefully do in this field. However, the Netherlands are not opposed to the proposal contained in the Working Paper.

6. The association of Canada and the United States with the OEEC. The existing arrangement works satisfactorily, and a more formal association would raise more problems than it would solve.

III. CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

The Council should study the possibility of creating courses of 4 to 6 weeks for teachers, journalists, trade union leaders and others in a position to influence public opinion. The intention is that these courses should take place at the NATO Defence College, which should be expanded by an increase of the civilian elements on the staff.

IV. CO-OPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD

1. In order to facilitate free and frank discussion, little publicity should be given to the discussions in the Permanent Council. At Ministerial Meetings, however, press communiqués should continue to be made.

2. Closer contact between NATO and national information services is desirable.

Palais de Chaillot, Paris, XVIe.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL
Report on the consultation with Greece on Thursday, 15th September, 1956 at 4 p.m.

REPRESENTATIVES OF GREECE

Mr. Averoff
Mr. M. Melas
Mr. D. Micolaretzis

The Greek Representative made the following points:

I. POLITICAL CONSULTATION

1. Consultations. In view of the changed tactics of the Soviet Union amounting to "peaceful aggression", political consultations have taken on greatly increased importance. Greece agrees with the principles on this subject set out in the Working Paper.

2. Settlement of Disputes. Although the proposal for the settlement of disputes, as contained in the Working Paper, might improve the present situation it has the serious weakness that the proposed measures are not obligatory in character but dependent on the agreement of the parties concerned. It would be preferable to establish an obligatory procedure even if its scope was more modest than the proposals under consideration. Greece, for this reason, had proposed only a Fact Finding Committee the functioning of which would, however, be obligatory. The work of such a Committee would by itself have a strong impact on the parties in a dispute. Greece would furthermore be in favour of arbitration by NATO provided parties would be bound by the decisions reached by the panel. It is believed that this could be established without the necessity for amending the Treaty (a note developing this argument will be submitted by the Greek Delegation separately).

3. On the other hand, Greece believes that the institution of non-obligatory procedures would weaken rather than strengthen the Alliance, since such machinery would not be used in cases of serious conflict, which would have a bad effect on the prestige of NATO.

II. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

1. Relations with Underdeveloped Countries. While agreeing to the proposals on this subject contained in the Working Paper, Greece is of the opinion that NATO should, in the first place
assist in the economic development of its own member countries. This would strengthen the confidence and the feeling of cohesion in the Alliance. There is a very real danger that otherwise the Soviet Union may try to gain a hold on certain member countries by extensive economic aid which, in particular circumstances, it might be difficult to refuse. Aid to underdeveloped areas outside NATO should be undertaken with the greatest possible caution in view of undesirable political consequences which, in the past, have resulted in certain cases.

III. CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

1. Greece is in favour of all measures designed to strengthen the cultural co-operation in NATO.

IV. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

1. The proposals contained in the Working Paper are acceptable. The authority and the right of initiative of the Secretary General should be increased and it should be left to his judgment and discretion to decide which questions he should bring up for discussion. Member governments should provide the Secretary General and the Political Division with all the documentation they need for their task.

2. Publicity. On the question of publicity to be given to consultations in the Council, no hard and fast rules can be developed. It will have to be decided on a case by case basis how much publicity should be given to the results of a particular discussion.

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.
ENGLISH ONLY
11th September, 1956

COMMITTEE OF THREE

Report on the Consultation with Belgium on
Friday, 11th September, 1956, at 10 a.m.

Representatives of Belgium: Mr. P.H. Spaak
Mr. A. de Staercke
Baron J. Pepeiana de Morechoven
Baron de Selys Longchamp
Mr. Rothschild

The Belgian Representative made the following points.

I. POLITICAL CO-OPERATION

1. Consultation. While being fully in agreement with the principles of increased political consultation as outlined in the Working Paper, Mr. Spaak objected to the limitations of political consultation contained in sub-paragraphs (3) and (4) of paragraph I (B) of the Working Paper. Countries should not be allowed to refuse consultation on subjects of interest to NATO; on the contrary there should be a moral obligation on the part of all member countries to consult on every question affecting the interests of the Alliance. Furthermore, the non-universal character of NATO should not be used as a pretext to exclude certain subjects from discussion in the Council; the most important political issues in recent years had arisen outside the NATO area. It would be regrettable if the members of the Alliance would co-ordinate their policy only within the artificially established geographical area covered by the Treaty. Although formation of an official NATO bloc in other organizations should be avoided it would be desirable to have preliminary consultations before member countries took definite positions in other organizations on questions of importance for the Alliance.

2. The confidential character of consultations in the NATO Council should be safeguarded. This action depends entirely on the will of the participants.

3. Meetings of Foreign Ministers. Council meetings at Ministerial level would be preferable to mixed meetings of Ministers and Permanent Representatives since only the responsible politicians could in a negotiation come to concrete results.


5. Belgium is not in favour of a Political Annual Review since this would be of too hypothetical a nature.
6. Conference of Parliamentarians. Contacts between parliamentarians of different member countries, particularly from the two sides of the Atlantic, should be encouraged but the creation of a new Parliamentary Assembly should be avoided since assemblies without the power of decision create many difficulties. The annual conference in Paris, however, should be continued.

II. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

1. Aid to Underdeveloped Countries should be carefully studied both from its political and from its economic aspects and indiscriminate assistance to countries that may use their strengthened economic position against the interest of those who have assisted them should be avoided. In any case, aid by the West should not wear a NATO label. The political aspects of this subject could, however, well be discussed in NATO before countries determined their policy in this field. In this connection the West should be careful not to be misled by Soviet promises of aid to underdeveloped countries which to a large extent may prove to be nothing but bluff and blackmail.

2. Trade Relations with the Soviets. It would not be desirable to adopt a collective trade policy towards the Soviet Union only. On the whole Mr. Spaak thought that the text as now written was too exclusively pointed towards action against the Soviet Union. He thought that in the presentation of the final report it should be avoided.

3. Association of Canada and the United States in OEEC. Economic association of Canada and the United States with their European partners would certainly be desirable from a European point of view; this, however, depends on how far the North American countries want to go and it would seem difficult for them to agree to full membership in OEEC.

Scientific and Technical Co-operation

4. The proposals contained in the Working Paper appear acceptable and should be further explored.

III. CULTURAL CO-OPERATION AND INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

1. Careful distinction should be made between cultural activities on the one hand and information and propaganda on the other. As to the first, it is doubtful whether NATO can do much useful work without duplicating the activities of such organizations as UNESCO. On the other hand, efforts in the fields of information and even propaganda should be very much more developed.

V. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

1. No changes in the present set-up are required but the proposals for setting up a Committee on Inter-member Disputes or an Arbitration Panel should be further explored.

2. There is no need for the establishment of a Permanent Economic Advisory Committee. It would be preferable to reinforce the economic side of the International Staff if necessary.
ENGLISH ONLY

17th September, 1956

COMMITTEE OF THREE

REPORT ON THE CONSULTATION WITH GERMANY ON
FRIDAY, 14TH SEPTEMBER, 1956 AT 3 P.M.

REPRESENTATIVES OF GERMANY

Professor Hallstein
Mr. Krappf
Count Beudissin
Mr. Harkourt
Mr. Schnippenkoetter
Mr. Wickert

The German Representative made the following points:

I. GENERAL

(1) It is essential to ensure real and permanent consultation in the Council as a means towards bringing about the adoption of a common, active, global policy. To this end, the German Government suggests the creation of a "political annual review".

(2) Institutional changes are not in themselves sufficient. Decisions might, however, have to be taken on the competence of the Council. Furthermore, the organization must be adapted to the tasks now facing the Alliance, and the powers of the Secretary General should be strengthened.

Germany emphasizes the importance and urgency of settling inter-member disputes. The Secretary General should be empowered and requested to play a more specific and active role. In this respect, Germany would not object to his assuming supra-national functions.

(3) The political aspects of economic problems must be recognised, and in this field NATO has a role to play.

II. POLITICAL CO-OPERATION

Political Annual Review.* In the view of the German Government such a review would strengthen among members the feeling of moral responsibility to consult the Council on major questions and leave it to the adoption of a common political line. It would also enable the Council to:

(a) establish the extent to which member countries had lived up to their obligations to consult their Allies;

* A memorandum on this subject was given to members of the Committee.
(b) evaluate the existing situation.

(c) identify main objectives and possibly determine political priorities and targets. The latter should, of course, be flexible and subject to change.

(d) encourage the Alliance to adopt an active policy, thus forcing the Soviet bloc into a defensive position.

Germany believes that if such a review were instituted each country would, before taking any significant action in the international field, examine the possible repercussions on other member countries.

Germany recognises the right of any member to raise for discussion any subject from the point of view of the interests of NATO. Believing that an international organization can only be as effective as its own permanent machinery, Germany suggests that the Secretary General should be entitled to initiate discussions.

Germany agrees that full weight should be given to Council recommendations in arriving at final national decisions and policies. It is suggested that these recommendations could be given to countries as a result of the proposed political annual review.

Germany agrees that governments should, wherever possible, consult with the Council before making any major statement of an international political character which may affect the Alliance. Such consultation should not take the form merely of last minute information, but should be real consultation allowing of the possibility of modification in the policy of that government.

Inter-member disputes. Germany is prepared to accept the obligation to submit disputes for settlement within the NATO framework before resorting to any other international agency.

As regards the establishment of a special Committee of the Council, Germany does not consider that the proposed system of rotation would be practicable.

As regards the establishment of a "panel of Atlantic Community arbitrators", Germany would prefer a solution in which the Secretary General would be an initiator and moving force in reconciling the parties at dispute. Certain discretionary authority should be allowed to the Secretary General. He would not, for example, be obliged to set up a Committee at the request of only one party concerned in a dispute. In addition, Germany considers that a Committee of the Council convened by the Secretary General should be empowered to make substantive recommendations to the countries at dispute.

II. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

Germany agrees with the requirements and limitations set out in the Working Paper.

Germany agrees that NATO should counteract the Soviet bloc offensive in developing the world's underdeveloped areas.
The Soviet bloc tries to bind the underdeveloped countries to it by long-term bilateral agreements. The Western philosophy is that of economic partnership and multilateral agreements. Germany suggested that NATO should counter Soviet tactics and should try to impose on the Soviet bloc the rules of liberal multilateral trade. To achieve this NATO should try to convince the underdeveloped countries that multilateral trade with the Western countries is more advantageous than bilateral links with the economic system of the Eastern bloc.

As regards scientific and technical co-operation, Germany is in favour of the proposed NATO ad hoc conference.

As regards the machinery of economic consultations, the views of Germany are in line with those of the Committee of Three. Germany envisages a Committee of government experts at high level.

As regards public works in the civilian field, Germany is only in favour of NATO undertaking public works in cases where civilian emergency planning is concerned.

III. CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

Germany is not in favour of the proposed establishment of a common research institute for Atlantic Community studies.

IV. CO-OPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD

Germany has had excellent co-operation from the Information Division. Overall co-operation might be facilitated by periodic meetings of the heads of national information services, to exchange views and plans for the future. In this way a kind of public relation planning centre would be created.

As regards broadcasting services, Germany points out that the system in Germany is completely autonomous and not subject to influence by the Federal Government, but in principle, is in favour of the suggestion in the Working Paper.

Germany attaches great importance to information problems in relation to non-member countries generally, and supports the suggestion that the question should be studied.

V. ORGANIZATION OF FUNCTIONS

Germany considers that frequent meetings of the Council should be with the participation of national officials, e.g., permanent heads of foreign ministries. Such meetings would accustom officials in their daily work to bear in mind the need for consultation.

As regards the proposal for a "state of the Alliance", progress reports by the Secretary General, Germany notes that this is in line with the German proposal for a political annual review, but that it would in fact represent only the first state of such a review.
Committee of Three

Report on the Consultation with Luxembourg on Monday, 17th September 1956, at 10 a.m.

Representatives of Luxembourg

Mr. M. J. Bech
Mr. N. Hommel

The Luxembourg Representative made the following points:

Opening General Remarks

In spite of the new problems which the changed international situation has posed, NATO's primary objective should remain the security of its members. A reduction in arms or a retreat of troops from the Continent would have disastrous political effects. The Soviet threat remains, but is now psychologically more dangerous than before. The Organization should beware of following too many diversified aims, which would weaken its effectiveness in countering the Soviet threat. Luxembourg doubts whether the political and economic potential of the Alliance could be increased by structural reforms within the Organization.

I. Political Consultations

Luxembourg is in general agreement with the proposals put forward. As regards inter-member disputes, Luxembourg would not oppose the creation of the machinery proposed, but is sceptical as to its effectiveness. Experience has shown that the essential factor in the settlement of inter-member disputes is the will of the countries concerned to bring these matters before NATO for settlement. If machinery is set up which fails in its purpose, or which is not used by member countries, this would weaken the authority of NATO.

II. Economic Consultation

Luxembourg considers that NATO should not become an operating agency in the economic sphere, and that NATO's economic role should be confined to discussing the military and political implications of economic problems. It would be useful to have NATO support for European integration in the economic sphere; the development of a common European market would create a natural community of interests and a solidarity which would prevent the Soviets from exploiting discords between western countries.
III. CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

Luxembourg is in general agreement with the proposals put forward, and particularly emphasises that instruction on NATO should be given in schools.

IV. CO-OPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD

Luxembourg considers that the more NATO can achieve in the information sphere the better. NATO should aim at maintaining continuous contact with youth movements and private organizations, who should be used to spread information about NATO.

V. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

Luxembourg is in general agreement with the proposals put forward, and considers that the present organizational structure is adequate. Luxembourg would agree that the Secretary General should have the right to propose items for NATO consultation, and would support the idea of a political annual review.
17th September, 1956

COMMITTEE OF THREE

Report on the Consultation with France on
Monday, 17th September, 1956 at 11 a.m

Representatives of France: Mr. C. Pineau
Mr. A. Parodi

In the absence of Mr. Lange and Mr. Martino, Mr. Boyesen and Mr. Alessandri represented Norway and Italy on the Committee of Three.

I. POLITICAL CONSULTATION

1. France agrees generally with the requirements for consultation suggested by the Committee of Three. Member governments should inform the Council of any developments in their policies which may significantly affect member countries or the Alliance as a whole. In order, however, that this information may be used effectively, certain modifications will be necessary in the operation of the organization, as proposed below.

2. France recognises the right of any country to raise for discussion any subject of interest to NATO, but suggests that the Secretariat, reinforced if necessary, should examine whether a subject is of sufficient interest to the Alliance as a whole, for discussion.

3. France agrees that, wherever possible, member countries should not adopt firm policies on matters of common concern without early advance consultation. Similarly, countries should consult with the Council wherever possible before making any major statement likely to affect the Alliance as a whole.

4. While recognising the non-universal character of NATO, this limitation should not be given too definite an interpretation, and France would not exclude the possibility of discussion within NATO of world-wide problems concerning all the members of the Alliance.

5. Peaceful settlement of disputes France notes that experience has shown that disputes may arise which it is difficult to settle within NATO. France considers that the proposed special Committee of the Council, and the "Panel of Atlantic Community Arbitrators", would be useful, provided that their functions and the nature of the questions which might be brought before them are clearly defined. The Panel should be presided by the Secretary General, and its primary rôle should be one of conciliation. Only major questions which might affect the unity of the Alliance should be referred to it, and it should be composed of countries not involved in the dispute. In the last resort it should refer to the Council. Only political questions and not purely legal disputes should be submitted to this procedure, the latter belonging to the competence of the International Court of Justice.
6. As regards disputes involving one or more member countries vis-à-vis a non-NATO country, NATO should only be associated with the settlement of such disputes if this appears politically desirable.

7. As regards parliamentary associations, France considers that there should be no formal relationship, but that practical arrangements should be made for liaison with the Council.

II. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

1. Subject to the comments below, closer economic co-operation would be of great use to NATO at this stage. France endorses recognition of NATO common economic interests on the lines suggested by the Committee of Three.

2. Economic consultation. It is essential to avoid duplication of work by NATO and the OEEC; NATO should discuss only those economic questions which have important political aspects. The examples given in paragraph II (B) are excellent. As regards the development of atomic power, a decision has still to be taken on the relative fields of responsibility of different international organizations which have been set up in this field, before a decision on NATO's activities is taken.

3. Conflicts in Economic Policies. Here again it should be noted that certain conflicts in economic policies may have to be settled within other organizations, such as the OEEC, or GATT, though there should be continuous exchanges of information within NATO.

4. Relations with underdeveloped areas. France agrees that NATO should not become an operating agency for administering programmes of economic aid. There should, however, be discussion in the Council, with the object of adopting a common NATO line in other international organizations. The general policy to be followed with respect to underdeveloped areas should be also discussed (example: the cancellation by Indonesia of its debt to the Netherlands). Other subjects for discussion would be the construction of great works for civilian use, and the policy to be followed regarding the disposal of surpluses of raw materials.

5. Soviet economic developments and initiatives. France emphasises that it is not enough in this sphere to attempt to counter Soviet initiatives; NATO must itself take the initiative and by means of discussion evolve a positive common policy in order to demonstrate to the world and, in particular, to underdeveloped countries, that the initiatives of the West are better.

6. As regards relations with other organizations, while there should be no attempt to create a "NATO bloc" in organizations composed wholly of free countries, it is desirable to evolve as far as possible a common NATO line in other international organizations. Positive, and not merely counteracting, policies should be adopted in international organizations in which the Soviets participate.

7. Scientific and technical co-operation. France is in favour of convening a conference at a high level on the lines proposed, provided that a clearly defined agenda is drawn up. The conference should study general organizational problems, and should then possibly be succeeded by sub-groups to study particular technical aspects. It may be necessary to set up a documentation centre for technical information.
8. NATO machinery for economic consultations. France supports the establishment of an Economic Advisory Committee, which might act as a filter for the exchange of economic information among member countries recommended above. Meetings of high officials would also be commendable provided the agenda for such meetings cover specific points.

III. CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

1. The proposal for the establishment of a Common Research Institute is an interesting one, but its functions and subjects of study should be more clearly defined. It would also be useful to broaden the basis of the NATO Defence College as suggested, provided that suitable precautions are taken to safeguard the security element involved.

2. Exchange of persons. Here again, the division of responsibility between NATO and the OEBC should be respected.

IV. CO-OPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD

1. France would support a strengthening of the NATO Information Services, and improved liaison with national information services. It is obvious that some difficulties will have to be overcome, for example, national information services vary from country to country in their degree of dependence from national governments.

2. Great care should be exercised in granting financial aid to private organizations supporting NATO.

3. Information problems in relation to the Soviet bloc. France considers that NATO should review its information policy in relation to the Soviet bloc, and should develop a positive, instead of a defensive, propaganda line.

V. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

France considers this part of the document to be the most interesting. NATO can play a more important role in the future, provided the structure of the organization is reinforced. The following three proposals are put forward:

(1) It is essential that foreign ministers should participate more frequently in regular Council meetings. Where a Council meeting with attendance of foreign ministers is planned, all foreign ministers should attend, unless exceptional circumstances prevent them.

(2) The authority of permanent representatives should be increased. At present permanent representatives do not have the authority which, for example, United Nations government representatives have.

(3) The authority of the Secretary General should be increased, on the lines of the Secretary General of the United Nations.

As regards the proposal for a political annual review, France would support such a review, provided the subjects it covered were carefully selected in order that the discussion at ministerial meetings should cover precisely defined questions.
ENGLISH ONLY
19th September, 1956

COMMITEE OF THREE

Report on the Consultation with the United States on
Monday, 17th September, 1956, at 3 p.m.

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES

Senator George
Mr. Holmes
Mr. Perkins
Mr. Nolting

The United States Representative made the following
points:

Opening General Remarks

The United States believes there is an urgent need for
increased unity of purpose and action among the nations of the
Atlantic Community. This need can be met within the scope of the
present NATO treaty and of other existing organizations within the
Atlantic area, provided that all member countries are dedicated to
finding better ways for obviating dissensions among themselves and
to bringing their foreign policies into a larger degree of harmony.
The United States will cooperate to impart new vigour to the insti-
tutions of the NATO Community through consultation and common action,
and to develop a closer association of free nations to meet the
demands of situations which transcend the capacity of each government
acting singly. At the same time, the United States cannot ignore the
vital interests and responsibilities which it and certain other
members have outside the Atlantic Area; the fulfilment of these
responsibilities, which may involve treaty obligations or impose
occasional need for emergency action, must not be hampered by
exclusive involvement in NATO commitments.

I. POLITICAL CO-OPERATION

1. Consultation in general. The United States would welcome
a wider range of topics for discussion among the Atlantic
Pact partners and more authoritative consultations. It
believes that the precise scope and nature of consultation
will best develop on a pragmatic basis, and that it would be
inadvisable to attempt to formulate rigid rules to govern the
conduct of consultations. The United States proposes that the
existing arrangements for consultation in the NATO Council be
supplemented by providing for a new type of occasional consulta-
tions conducted by representatives ("Ministerial Delegates") who
have high rank and influence within their respective governments
who are intimately acquainted with governmental policies and the
considerations underlying these policies, and who are therefore
particularly qualified to discuss a wide range of common problem
with both knowledge and authority. (A more detailed description
of this proposal has been submitted to the Committee of Three).
2. The United States favours the principle of an open agenda, and would not exclude from consideration any topic in which NATO members feel a substantial interest, though NATO should concern itself primarily with problems directly affecting the Treaty Area. The extent to which NATO members might seek to progress from a simple exchange of views to efforts to achieve co-ordinated or unified policies can be expected to emerge in the course of each consultation.

3. As regards the requirements for consultation by member governments, the United States is opposed to trying to define precisely those matters on which NATO consultations should be held, and the scope, depth and timing of such consultations. The United States hopes that the final report of the Committee of Three will be couched in terms which are less rigid than in their working paper, and that the limitations on consultation will be more directly linked to the requirements.

4. Settlement of disputes. It is better that inter-member disputes should be settled within the NATO family, rather than be allowed to go to other forums such as the United Nations, NATO itself does not now possess adequate procedural arrangements for the settlement of disputes between members. Arrangements should be made for informal machinery to deal with disputes from the moment that they arise. Such arrangements should apply to possible future disputes, and not to current ones, unless the members involved so choose. The proposed Special Committee of the Council should have the right to take the initiative in approaching member governments involved in the dispute. The Secretary General should be an ex-officio member of the Committee. The Panel of Arbitrators should consist of people of the highest reputation whose prestige would incite parties to have recourse to arbitrators. The United States feels that if machinery exists for the settlement of disputes, member countries will be more inclined to bring their disputes to NATO than if no such machinery exists.

5. Parliamentary Associations. The present relation between NATO and parliamentary associations should be continued. The United States would not be opposed to NATO granting a small subsidy to the annual Parliamentary Conference in cases where it was not possible for the NATO Secretariate to provide the Conference with services, such as translation. The appropriation granted by the U.S.Congress for the NATO Parliamentary Committee might, however, help in the solution of this problem.

6. As regards the proposed political annual review, the United States considers that this proposal merits further study. It is complementary to the United States' proposal for an annual "state of the Alliance" report by the Secretary General, which was meant to be not only factual but also critical, and was to include a preview of the immediate future for the purpose of discussion by the Council. This might have a persuasive influence on member governments' policies, and help NATO governments to proceed beyond the consultative stage to the evolution of a common policy consistent with their Treaty obligations. The report might also serve the purpose of adequate detailed preparation of the agenda for ministerial meetings.
II. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

1. NATO should not become an operating economic agency, but should limit itself to consultation concerning the economic policies of member countries in other international agencies, particularly with reference to the Communist bloc and to the underdeveloped countries of the free world.

2. The interchange of information and views mentioned in paragraph II(b) should be limited to those cases in which results achieved in other organizations do not adequately cover the political aspects of interest to the Alliance. Paragraph II(b) should refer to a common policy rather than to a common course of action.

3. Scientific and technical co-operation. The problem of scientific and technical co-operation is closely linked with the educational requirements of the Atlantic Community. The proposed Conference should have a free hand in considering these requirements.

III. CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

1. Co-operation in this field is mainly a function of private organizations and groups rather than of governments. Governments should concern themselves with cultural, scientific and educational activities to the degree that such action seems necessary to stimulate private initiative or to achieve paramount common objectives as, for instance, the preservation of the West's scientific and technological superiority. Specific NATO projects should be judged strictly in terms of their essentiality and feasibility; they should not be conceived as ends in themselves, but as ancillary to the major political purposes of the Alliance.

2. The United States is opposed to broadening the basis of the NATO Defence College, since it feels that this would defeat the primary purpose of the College, which is to train important government officials. The United States would, however, support a civilian college alongside, and independent of, the Defence College, which would provide short courses for, e.g., teachers and journalists.

3. As regards youth organizations, the United States is in favour of holding meetings for the leaders of such organizations, but not of mass meetings.

IV. CO-OPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD

1. There is need for a wider exchange of information throughout the Atlantic area. Co-operation in this field should also be directed toward countering Communist propaganda.

2. The United States agrees that NATO should aim at coordinating the policies to be adopted by broadcasting services on issues of common concern to NATO.

V. ORGANIZATIONS AND FUNCTIONS

1. The policy of sending expert advisers to Council meetings, to assist the permanent representatives or to serve on ad hoc working groups, should be expanded.
2. It would be useful to have individual exchanges of military personnel among NATO, ANZUS, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact countries in order that they might better appreciate their common aims. These exchanges should in each case be limited to a few officers only.

3. The establishment of a formal relationship between NATO and the United Nations is unnecessary and undesirable.
ENGLISH ONLY
20th September, 1956

REPORT OF THREE

Report on the consultation with Portugal on
Monday, 17th September, 1956 at 5 p.m.

Representatives of Portugal: Mr. T. Cunha
Count de Tovar
Mr. A. Novaia Machado
Mr. J. de Freitas-Cruz

The Portuguese Representative made the following points:

I. POLITICAL CO-OPERATION

1. Consultation. Whilst being in favour of increased political consultations within NATO, Mr. Cunha felt that this could be useful only if consultations were conducted with complete mutual confidence in the safeguarding of secrecy. Furthermore, member countries would need the assurance that political consultation would not result in any curtailing of national liberty of action. He believed that when the issue was of direct concern to one member country no consultation should be initiated without the consent of this country. If a reluctant country were under legal obligation to accept consultation on the matter at hand, the necessary spirit of confidence would be lacking and the object of the exercise would be defeated.

2. With reference to I B(4) of the working paper, Mr. Cunha felt that matters outside the geographical area of NATO should not be excluded from discussion in the Council, but that with respect to such matters greater flexibility should be preserved, and consultation should only be undertaken after careful consideration.

3. Reliance should be placed on the free will of governments to accept consultation and on the practical development of consultations; the setting up of firm rules should be avoided.

4. On inter-member disputes, Mr. Cunha expressed agreement on II(1) of the working paper. On (2) he stated that generally speaking his Government was not in favour of the establishment of new intricate machinery. However, he would not object to providing for some very simple organ such as a special good offices committee of the Council. He would not object either to the setting up of a panel of arbitrators provided this was co-ordinated with existing bilateral panels. On (4) he was unable to express agreement without further consultation with his colleagues on the Portuguese Government and further clarification of the obligations NATO would undertake in connection with the implementation or maintenance of the settlement.

5. The Portuguese Government is not in favour of formal recognition of the Parliamentary Conference.
II. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

6. Portugal is in general agreement with this section of the working paper. However, concrete projects should not be handled by NATO but efforts should be directed towards the co-ordination of economic policies of member countries. The establishment within NATO of a permanent economic organ should be avoided; this would tend to bring about a degree of overlapping with OEEC. Nevertheless, it might be useful for a group of experts within NATO to prepare the work in advance of economic consultation.

7. It would be extremely useful to undertake a study on the present situation as regards the recruitment, training and utilisation of scientists and technicians.

III. CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

8. The Portuguese Government was in agreement with the working paper in this connection except as regards the promotion of closer relations with youth organizations.

V. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

9. The activity of the Secretary General could indeed be developed, but his present status should be maintained. Mr. Cunha was unable to express an opinion as to the proposals in the working paper for enhancing the role of the Secretary General and for changing his status to that of president of the Council also at ministerial meetings. He would report to his Government and reply shortly.
Committee of Three

Report on the Consultation with Denmark on Tuesday, 18th September, 1956, at 10 a.m.

Representatives of Denmark: Mr. Christiansen
Mr. Wassard
Mr. Sandager Jeppesen
Mr. Hesselund Jensen

The Danish Representatives made the following points:

I. Political Co-operation


2. With regard to the settlement of inter-member disputes, Denmark questions whether the Alliance could bear the strain if it were to become a regular forum for such disputes. It would be preferable to rely on the amiable spirit existing in the Council. The Council should only intervene in inter-member disputes at the request of the parties involved and no fixed rules of procedure should be set up. Denmark agrees, however, that disputes should be submitted to NATO before being brought to the United Nations, and would also be favourable to the Secretary General taking the initiative to try to conciliate in disputes between members.

3. The proposed Political Annual Review is an interesting idea and the Danish Government would like to think further about it.

4. The importance of the role of Parliamentarians is realised and the contact with them should be improved but their conference should not be given formal recognition. On the other hand, Denmark would agree that the Secretary General assist their meetings as much as possible and even to a certain extent financially.

II. Economic Co-operation

1. NATO should not take up economic questions as a new function independent from its political and military task. It would have a bad effect on public opinion if it were announced that NATO had taken on certain economic functions and that afterwards this proved to be an empty shell. But Denmark would approve of NATO discussing important economic questions with political and military implications. It should be publicly stated, however, that NATO is not to become an operative agency in the economic field.

2. There would be no useful purpose in meetings of officials dealing with East/West trade, but the political aspects of this trade might well be discussed by the Council. A closer contact between
the NATO Secretariat and COCOM could also be envisaged. Political aspects of COCOM's work could well be discussed in NATO but should be limited to general principles of policy and not go into details.

3. Denmark is not in favour of setting up an Economic Advisory Committee but stresses that any country should be able to take up economic questions of importance in its relations with other member countries. An example is the question of civil aviation, which could also take on strategic importance in wartime. Strengthening the Secretariat to enable it to act as a "watchdog" to follow discussion in other organizations might be envisaged, although Denmark would not be enthusiastic about such a measure.

4. Denmark is in favour of the proposals contained in the Working Paper concerning technical education.

III. CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

1. If the Danish/Norwegian proposal for a common research institute for Atlantic Community studies is not accepted, the task of the NATO Defence College might be extended, but in that case the NATO Defence College would have to be placed under the authority of the Council instead of the Standing Group, as at present.

2. Denmark is strongly in favour of increasing contacts between Youth Organizations, in particular between the two sides of the Atlantic.

IV. INFORMATION

1. The proposals contained in the Working Paper are acceptable. Denmark stresses, however, that propaganda should be left to the individual governments and that NATO's rôle should be limited to serving national governments for this purpose.

V. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

1. The power of initiative of the Secretary General should be in no way restricted. His rôle in political consultation should be strengthened.

2. Denmark is in favour of meetings of Foreign Ministers to be held in other capitals provided such meetings do not entail very great expense.

Palais de Chaillot, Paris, XVIe.
ENGLISH ONLY
21st September, 1956

COMMITTEE OF THREE

Report on the consultation with the United Kingdom on Tuesday, 18th September, 1956,
at 2.30 p.m.

Representatives of United Kingdom: Mr. Anthony Nutting
Lord Hood
Mr. Stevenson
Mr. Cheetham

The Representatives of the United Kingdom made the following points:

I. POLITICAL CO-OPERATION

NATO should never lose sight of, or apologise for the fact that it is primarily a military Alliance. However, an improvement is needed in the political consultation and in the economic co-operation in NATO, particularly with regard to its relations with the Soviet bloc. It is preferable, however, to develop the habit of consultation rather than to set up machinery for it.

2. The work of the Council should be developed. Permanent Representatives should regard their position as similar to that of Ministers in a Cabinet. They should continuously report to NATO the policies of their governments, whenever possible before these policies have taken definite shape. The proposal of a meeting of "Ministerial Delegates" should not be followed since it would lead to a depreciation of the Council. On the other hand, the Permanent Representatives should be kept fully informed and in very close touch with developments in their home countries.

3. The requirement set forth in paragraph I(8) can be followed only insofar as possible, i.e. not in an emergency, particularly one arising in an area outside NATO. The principle of the open agenda contained in I(3) is fully acceptable.

4. The limitations on the requirements for consultation are very important and should be studied in close connection with those requirements.

5. With respect to the settlement of disputes, the United Kingdom would hesitate to agree definitely to the idea that such disputes should be brought to NATO before being submitted to other international organizations. In general, this would be acceptable but there might very well be exceptions to this rule. The proposed conciliation committee is not seen with much favour. In particular, the United Kingdom objects to the proposal that this Committee...
would have the right "to take cognisance" of disputes. There does not seem to be the need for a special committee since the Council could in any case discuss disputes between member countries with the consent of the parties involved. It would be bad to create the impression that machinery was being set up to do more than NATO can in fact do. The United Kingdom equally objects to the setting up of a panel of arbitrators; arbitration should only be applied in legal disputes and these do not primarily belong to the competence of NATO.

6. The United Kingdom is in favour of close contact between NATO and Parliamentarians but is definitely opposed to the setting up of a consultative parliamentary assembly.

7. The "Political Annual Review" is considered a very interesting proposition which deserves further study. Its contents should not be made too complicated and subjects should be selected which could be fully and leisurely studied during the next year. An example would be a study on the political situation in the Middle East.

II. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

The United Kingdom is in general agreement with the proposals contained in the Working Paper.

2. It is stressed that aid to underdeveloped countries should never bear a NATO label.

3. The proposal contained in paragraph V(B) that there be periodic meetings of officials involved in Soviet bloc commercial negotiations is considered to be of doubtful value since these officials would presumably not be competent to discuss the political implications of such negotiations.

4. On the subject of technical education, the United Kingdom prefers to withhold its judgement to a later date.

5. The setting up of an Economic Advisory Committee would not appear to be advisable as there would be a danger of overlapping between this Committee and OEEC. The United Kingdom would not be opposed, however, to a Committee of experts with adaptable personnel which could be called together whenever the need arose.

III. CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

The United Kingdom would be in favour of broadening the NATO Defence College.

2. No solution has yet been found for the foreign exchange difficulties connected with trans-Atlantic travel.

3. The possibility of an exchange of service personnel is being studied in the United Kingdom and it is hoped that a contribution to this undertaking can be made.
IV. INFORMATION

The United Kingdom is much in favour of the proposals in the Working Paper aiming at a better co-ordination of information activities.

V. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

As it would be difficult to hold more Ministerial Meetings than is the habit at present, it would be preferable for foreign ministers to attend meetings of the Council in Permanent Session from time to time. Express obligations should not be established in this connection. It is very important, however, that more time should be devoted to meetings of the Council in Ministerial Session and that the discussions should be more adequately prepared.

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.
COMMITTEE OF THREE

I. CO-OPERATION IN THE POLITICAL FIELD

The Committee on the Atlantic Community in 1952 did not propose rigid rules or "automatic" formulae for political consultation, but stressed the need for the development of a "habit of consultation" between member governments. As criteria for matters which ought to be subject to consultation, the Committee indicated the degree of common interest, or the likelihood of a need for co-ordinated action. Furthermore, the Committee made a general distinction between exchange of information, on the one hand, and actual consultation on the other, the former covering a wider range of topics than the latter. Considerable progress has since been made towards co-ordination of the foreign policies of the NATO countries. The Council has begun to serve as a forum for exchange of information on matters of common concern, and active and effective consultation has in some cases taken place. However, there are also examples of lack of co-ordination and of unilateral action by member governments in matters directly concerning the Alliance, which have had detrimental effects on the unity of NATO and thereby weakened the organization. It therefore seems necessary to find new ways and means of promoting the habit of using the Council as an active instrument of consultation in order to reach closer co-operation in the political field.
Principles of Consultation

1. It might be useful to consider the desirability of laying down certain basic principles as guidance for the political consultation on matters of common concern, such as the following:

   (a) The Council should be kept fully informed of any political development in any area which may affect member countries or the Alliance as a whole.
   (b) The duty of informing the Council at an early stage of such developments should be accepted.
   (c) The Council should normally not be requested to take decisions or adopt resolutions of political importance without having had the opportunity to consider the matter in the light of all available information.
   (d) Member governments should endeavour not to make political declarations affecting the Alliance or its member nations without prior consultation through the Council.

   It would be of interest to know the view of member governments on this proposal, with a statement indicating to what extent the above-mentioned principles are acceptable.

Types of Consultation

2. To what extent and under what circumstances is your Government prepared to participate in the following types of consultation within NATO?

   (i) Informal exchanges of information;
   (ii) Preparation of common appreciations in the light of current developments;
(iii) Consultations with the aim of arriving at a general consensus as a basis for determination or guidance of individual government policies; 
(iv) Consultation with the aim of arriving at agreement on specific policies or courses of action.

Areas and Limitation of Consultations

3. What should be the basis for determining the matters of common concern which might be the subject of consultation under the four headings listed above, and what should be regarded as the factors limiting such consultation, such as respect for liberty of action of each member government and the non-universal character of NATO?

Co-operation under Article 1

4. To what extent can NATO assist in the peaceful settlement of inter-member disputes and differences? In view of the provisions of Article 1 of the Treaty, should procedures of conciliation and peaceful settlement of disputes, similar to the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter and other international agreements be adopted by NATO?

5. Parliamentary Participation

Should NATO give more formal recognition to parliamentary associations and the Parliamentary Conference and what should be the relationship between the Council and these parliamentary groupings?

II. PROMOTION OF GREATER UNITY IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD

1. Does your Government consider that closer co-operation between member countries within the specialised organizations to which they belong and the establishment of closer relations with them, would represent the most suitable means for promoting greater unity in the economic field between member countries?
2. In this connection, as regards the OEEC, does your Government consider the participation of the United States and Canada as merely "associated members", to be adequate?

3. Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that the parties will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies. Does your Government think that the activities of other organizations, in particular the OEEC, is sufficient to discharge the responsibilities of NATO countries in this respect?

4. Does your Government feel that NATO may have some interest in developing public works for civilian use, as has been done in the military field?

5. Does your Government consider that NATO should take an active part in the economic development of underdeveloped regions within the NATO area or would it be preferable that NATO should limit itself to the appraisal of the political importance for the Alliance of development programmes to this end.

6(a) Does your Government consider that NATO has a vital interest in promoting the development of underdeveloped countries outside the NATO area? If so, bearing in mind the fact that assistance to the underdeveloped countries outside the NATO area should not bear a NATO label, what action does your Government consider can appropriately be carried on by NATO countries to achieve the necessary objectives and what co-ordination can be furnished within NATO?

(b) Does your Government consider that the Statutes of existing and planned international financial agencies give them sufficient flexibility to enable them to operate
suitably under present political conditions and to meet the requirements of the situation with which NATO is now confronted?

7(a) Does your Government feel that, in order to cope with the developing Soviet commercial drive, NATO should consider measures to counter and neutralise Soviet practices which do not conform to the principles by which Western countries carry on their normal trade and financial relations with one another?

(b) Does your Government feel that NATO should consider measures to meet the competition of the Soviet Bloc in the field of contracts for public works in politically sensitive areas?

8. What suggestions can be derived from the experience in the economic field of other regional organizations with a view to the possible application of this experience to other geographical areas?

9. Does your Government consider that it would be in the interests of the Alliance for the NATO countries to consult together when certain important questions are coming up for discussion in international economic bodies in which the Soviet bloc is represented?

10. Are there any other specific economic subjects or classes of subjects of general concern to NATO which are not now being adequately considered in other agencies and which might be discussed usefully in NATO?
III. CO-OPERATION IN THE CULTURAL FIELD

Increased co-operation in the cultural field might serve to strengthen relations between NATO countries, provide a larger measure of public support to NATO and encourage the feeling of belonging to an Atlantic Community.

1. Does your government consider that these aims will be served by setting up:

   (a) a common research institute for Atlantic Community studies?

   (b) a civilian version of the NATO Defence College (Wilton Park) in which short courses on political, economic, social and cultural problems of the Atlantic Community would be given to those in the position to influence public opinion, such as journalists, teachers, etc?

2. Does your government consider that NATO should encourage co-operation between youth movements in NATO countries, bearing in mind the co-ordination of youth activities in communist countries? Should the Council discuss youth co-operation problems?

3. Does your government consider that NATO should undertake the co-ordination of measures to increase the recruitment and training on a long-term basis of scientists, technicians and specialists, bearing in mind the developments in these fields in communist countries?

4. What educational activities, if any, should be undertaken by NATO to strengthen the ties of the Atlantic Community, which are not already carried out by existing International Organizations such as UNESCO?

5. Would your government favour the exchange of service personnel individually or in groups for the purpose of
familiarising themselves with conditions in other member countries and for the propagation of good will?

6. Which of the possible programmes under questions 1, 2, 3, 4 should, in the judgment of your government, be financed:
   (a) under a commonly financed infrastructure programme;
   (b) on a joint user basis;
   (c) singly by member governments?

IV. CO-OPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD

Increased co-operation in the information field, particularly under the conditions of competitive co-existence and the new Soviet policies, might serve to increase support for NATO of a well-informed public opinion and thus increase the unity of the Alliance.

1. Does your government consider that the Information Service should concentrate on purely factual information about NATO?

2. Does your government consider the necessity of a better co-ordination of efforts in the information field to deal with the Soviet initiatives in the propaganda field?

3. Does your government consider that reciprocal visits of professional groups such as teachers, journalists, etc. should be extended?

4. Does your government consider that co-operation between the NATO Information Service and national information agencies, governmental as well as private, could be improved?

5. Considering the importance of the impact on public opinion of extending political consultation in NATO, has your government any suggestion on how to improve the "public relations" in this field?
V. ORGANIZATIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL QUESTIONS

1. What specific changes in procedure would your government recommend to ensure closer and more effective consultation in the Council and closer co-operation in the political field?

2. To what extent does your government consider that experts could be used more either on a permanent or ad hoc basis to assist the Council in the process of consultation?

3. Does your government consider that greater use could be made of NATO machinery for the circulation on a NATO-wide basis of "basic position material" by individual governments (e.g. texts of agreements, basic statements of position, etc.)?

4. To what extent should the Secretary General play an active rôle in the field of political consultation, and to what particular types of problems should such a rôle extend?

5. In view of the additional economic responsibilities of NATO, and those in prospect, what organizational changes does your government consider are required to discharge them?

6. The suggestion has been made that a closer relationship might be established between NATO and the United Nations, possibly establishing the position of NATO as a regional organization in terms of Chapter 8 of the United Nations Charter. What could be the advantages and disadvantages of such a course?
22nd June, 1956

COMMITTEE OF THREE

DRAFT QUESTIONNAIRE

The Committee of Three, consisting of Mr. Lange, Foreign Minister of Norway, Dr. Martino, Foreign Minister of Italy, and Mr. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, were appointed by decision of the North Atlantic Council of 6th May "to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community".

A study of some of these problems had already been made by the Committee on the Atlantic Community in 1951-1952 under the chairmanship of Mr. Pearson. This Committee did not propose rigid rules for "automatic" formulas for consultation, but stressed the need for the development of a "habit of consultation" between member governments. As criteria for matters which ought to be subject to consultation, the Committee indicated the degree of common interest, or the likelihood of a need for co-ordinated action. Furthermore, the Committee made a general distinction between exchange of information, on the one hand, and actual consultation on the other, the former covering a wider range of topics than the latter. Considerable progress has since been made towards co-ordination of the foreign policies of the NATO countries. The Council has begun to serve as a forum for exchange of information on matters of common concern, and active and effective consultation has in some cases taken place. However, there are also examples of lack of co-ordination and of unilateral action by member governments in matters directly concerning
The Alliance, which have had detrimental effects on the unity of NATO and thereby weakened the organization. It therefore seems necessary to find new ways and means of promoting the habit of using the Council as an active instrument of consultation in order to reach closer co-operation in the political field.

The questions which follow are intended to elicit in as concise form as possible, the views of your Government on the problems raised by the task set the Committee by the Council. This list is not to be regarded as exhaustive, and should your Government wish to supplement their answers with any additional statements or suggestions, these will be welcome.
I. POLITICAL QUESTIONS

1. It might be useful to consider the desirability of laying down certain basic principles as guidance for the political consultation on matters of common concern, such as the following:

   (a) The Council should be kept fully informed of any political development in any area which may affect significantly member countries or the Alliance as a whole.

   (b) The duty of informing the Council at an early stage of such developments should be accepted.

   (c) The Council should normally not be requested to take decisions or adopt resolutions of political importance without having had the opportunity to consider the matter in the light of all available information.

   (d) Member governments should endeavour not to make political declarations affecting the Alliance or its member nations without prior consultation through the Council.

   It would be of interest to know the view of member governments on this proposal, with a statement indicating to what extent the above-mentioned principles are acceptable.

2. To what extent and under what circumstances is your Government prepared to participate in the following types of consultation within NATO?

   (i) Informal exchanges of information;

   (ii) Preparation of common appreciations in the light of current developments;
(iii) Consultations with the aim of arriving at a general consensus as a basis for determination or guidance of individual government policies;
(iv) Consultation with the aim of arriving at agreement on specific policies or courses of action.

3. What should be the basis for determining the matters of common concern which might be the subject of consultation under the four headings listed above, and what should be regarded as the factors limiting such consultation, such as respect for liberty of action of each member government and the non-universal character of NATO?

4. To what extent can NATO assist in the peaceful settlement of inter-member disputes and differences? In view of the provisions of Article 1 of the Treaty, should procedures of conciliation and peaceful settlement of disputes, similar to the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter and other international agreements be adopted by NATO?

5. Should NATO give more formal recognition to parliamentary associations and the Parliamentary Conference and what should be the relationship between the Council and these parliamentary groupings?

II. ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

1. Does your Government consider that closer co-operation between member countries within the specialised organizations to which they belong and the establishment of closer relations with them, would represent the most suitable means for promoting greater unity in the economic field between member countries?
2. In this connection, as regards the OEEC, does your Government consider the participation of the United States and Canada as merely "associated members", to be adequate?

3. Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that the parties will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies. Does your Government think that the activities of other organizations, in particular the OEEC, is sufficient to discharge the responsibilities of NATO countries in this respect? To what extent does your Government consider that NATO could assist in the conciliation of economic conflicts arising between member countries?

4. Does your Government feel that NATO may have some interest in developing public works for civilian use, as has been done in the military field?

5. Does your Government consider that NATO should take an active part in the economic development of underdeveloped regions within the NATO area or would it be preferable that NATO should limit itself to the appraisal of the political importance for the Alliance of development programmes to this end.

6. (a) Does your Government consider that NATO has a vital interest in promoting the development of underdeveloped countries outside the NATO area? If so, bearing in mind the fact that assistance to the underdeveloped countries outside the NATO area should not bear a NATO label, what action does your Government consider can appropriately be carried on by NATO countries to achieve the necessary objectives and what co-ordination can be furnished within NATO?

(b) Does your Government consider that the Statutes of existing and planned international financial agencies give them sufficient flexibility to enable them to operate
suitably under present political conditions and to meet the requirements of the situation with which NATO is now confronted?

7(a) Does your Government feel that, in order to cope with the developing Soviet commercial drive, NATO should consider measures to counter and neutralise Soviet practices which do not conform to the principles by which Western countries carry on their normal trade and financial relations with one another?

(b) Does your Government feel that NATO should consider measures to meet the competition of the Soviet Bloc in the field of contracts for public works in politically sensitive areas?

8. What suggestions can be derived from the experience in the economic field of other regional organizations with a view to the possible application of this experience to other geographical areas?

9. Does your Government consider that it would be in the interests of the Alliance for the NATO countries to consult together when certain important questions are coming up for discussion in international economic bodies in which the Soviet bloc is represented?

10. Are there any other specific economic subjects or classes of subjects of general concern to NATO which are not now being adequately considered in other agencies and which might be discussed usefully in NATO?
III. CULTURAL QUESTIONS

Increased co-operation in the cultural field might serve to strengthen relations between NATO countries, provide a larger measure of public support for NATO and encourage the feeling of belonging to an Atlantic Community.

1. Does your government consider that these aims will be served by setting up:

   (a) a common research institute for Atlantic Community studies?
   (b) a civilian version of the NATO Defence College in which short courses on political, economic, social and cultural problems of the Atlantic Community would be given to those in the position to influence public opinion, such as journalists, teachers, etc?

2. Does your government consider that NATO should encourage co-operation between youth movements in NATO countries, bearing in mind the co-ordination of youth activities in communist countries? Should the Council discuss youth co-operation problems?

3. Does your government consider that NATO should undertake the co-ordination of measures to increase the recruitment and training on a long-term basis of scientists, technicians and specialists, bearing in mind the developments in these fields in communist countries?

4. What educational activities, if any, should be undertaken by NATO to strengthen the ties of the Atlantic Community, which are not already carried out by existing International Organizations such as UNESCO?

5. Would your government favour the exchange of service personnel individually or in groups for the purpose of
familiarising themselves with conditions in other member countries and for the promotion of goodwill?

6. Which of the possible programmes under questions 1, 2, 3, 4 should, in the judgment of your government, be financed:
   (a) under a commonly financed programme;
   (b) on a joint user basis;
   (c) singly by member governments?

IV. INFORMATION QUESTIONS

Increased co-operation in the information field, particularly under the conditions of competitive co-existence and the new Soviet policies, might serve to increase support for NATO of a well-informed public opinion and thus increase the unity of the Alliance.

1. Does your government consider that the Information Service should concentrate on purely factual information about NATO?

2. Does your government consider the necessity of a better co-ordination of efforts in the information field to deal with the Soviet initiatives in the propaganda field?

3. Does your government consider that reciprocal visits of professional groups such as teachers, journalists, etc. should be extended?

4. Does your government consider that co-operation between the NATO Information Service and national information agencies, governmental as well as private, should be improved?

5. Considering the importance of the impact on public opinion of extending political consultation in NATO, has your government any suggestion on how to improve the "public relations" in this field?
V. ORGANIZATIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL QUESTIONS

1. What specific changes in procedures would your government recommend to ensure closer and more effective consultation in the Council to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community.

2. To what extent does your government consider that experts could be used more either on a permanent or ad hoc basis to assist the Council in the process of political consultation?

3. To what extent should the Secretary General play an active role in the field of political consultation, and to what particular types of problems should such a role extend?

4. In view of the additional economic responsibilities of NATO, and those in prospect, what organizational changes does your government consider are required to discharge them?

5. The suggestion has been made that a closer relationship might be established between NATO and the United Nations, possibly establishing the position of NATO as a regional organization in terms of Chapter 8 of the United Nations Charter. What could be the advantages and disadvantages of such a course?

6. Does your government consider that greater use could be made of NATO machinery for the circulation on a NATO-wide basis of "basic position material" by individual governments (e.g., texts of agreements, basic statements of position, etc.)?

Palais de Chaillot, Paris, XVIe.
COMMITTEE OF THREE

Draft Analysis of the Replies to the Questionnaire

Note by the Secretary

The attached draft analysis has been prepared by the International Staff on the basis of replies received by 31st August. An analysis of the replies of Denmark, France, Iceland and Turkey will be prepared as soon as these replies have been received.

(Signed) K.H. BEYEN

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVie.
1. It might be useful to consider the desirability of laying down certain basic principles as guidance for the political consultation on matters of common concern, such as the following:

(a) The Council should be kept fully informed of any political development in any area which may affect significantly member countries or the Alliance as a whole.

(b) The duty of informing the Council at an early stage of such developments should be accepted.

(c) The Council should normally not be requested to take decisions or adopt resolutions of political importance without having had the opportunity to consider the matter in the light of all available information.

(d) Member governments should endeavour not to make political declarations significantly affecting the Alliance or its member nations without prior consultation through the Council.

It might be useful to consider the desirability of laying down certain basic principles as guidance for the political consultation on matters of common concern, such as the following:

(a) Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway accept the principle.

Italy emphasises here, and under (b), that exchange of information should be rapid and full.

Greece accepts it and suggests adding "in good time".

Portugal accepts it but would exclude domestic questions.

UK finds it generally acceptable but thinks "formalisation" as a code undesirable.

US agrees the principle but points out that advance information is rarely possible: the aim of "elucidation" is more feasible.

(b) Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway accept the principle.

Greece, Portugal, UK and US accept it but apply the same provisos mentioned under (a) above.

(c) Belgium, Canada, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and US accept the principle.

Italy thinks this principle should apply to all, and not merely political questions.

The UK comment mentioned under (a) above also applies here.
It would be of interest to know the views of member governments on this proposal, with a statement indicating to what extent the above-mentioned principles are acceptable.

(d) Belgium, Canada, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal accept the principle.

Italy thinks the principle should apply also to officials and others whose statements carry weight, even when the statements are not regarded as "government pronouncements".

UK objection to "formalisation" as a code applies here as with (a), (b) and (c), but (d) also presents difficulties if literally interpreted (e.g. time factor etc. if Minister had to seek Council clearance for speech or statement to Parliament).

US has "grave doubts" if (d) is to be construed as a "firm obligation", because of the same difficulties referred to by UK (obligations to its own people and Parliament; need for prompt action), and also because of special responsibilities and obligations relating to non-NATO areas of the world. US says matters relating to these areas are not excluded but a "carefully selective" approach is needed and priority should be given to NATO area questions. US points out that if consultation is effectively developed, declarations made without formal consultation would automatically reflect the sentiment of the group.

Note Canada suggests adding two further "basic principles":

(e) No NATO government should adopt a firm policy on important matters of concern to the whole alliance without early advance consultation with other members of the alliance.

(f) When such consultation has taken place ... member governments should seek to develop their national policies in the light of the interests and views of other NATO governments.

Canada also offers as a "basis for discussion", a statement on the meaning of section (a) of this question. Italy suggests that governments should seek to define the "sphere of common interest" with respect to which consultation should be pledged by governments.
2. To what extent and under what circumstances is your Government prepared to participate in the following types of consultation within NATO?

(i) informal exchanges of information;

(ii) preparation of common appreciations in the light of current developments;

(iii) consultations with the aim of arriving at a general consensus as a basis for determination or guidance of individual government policies;

(iv) consultation with the aim of arriving at agreement on specific policies or courses of action.

Italy suggests that when a consensus of opinion is formed, any government acting (as entitled) on its own, but in a way divergent from the consensus of opinion, should at least explain its attitude in a report to the Council.

On (i) all replies are in favour. Opinions are varied regarding the scope of these exchanges:

- no limitation of subject or geographic area (Norway);

- on every important question - in some cases even domestic questions affecting other members (Italy);

- on subjects of special interest to the Alliance (Portugal);

- on subjects which would significantly affect one or more members (Netherlands);

- (applies also to (iv)) on Soviet bloc questions and other questions proportionately to their importance for NATO (Greece).

Luxembourg and the Netherlands emphasise the need for safeguarding the confidential character of these exchanges and consultation.

On (ii) all replies are in favour. Opinions on scope of this item are:

- selection of subjects needs care (UK);

- on Soviet bloc developments and other general issues such as "anti-colonial" attitudes (the Netherlands);

- on matters of common concern such as the external threat; Germany; disarmament (Norway);

- on questions which have important effects for the Alliance, but which do not call for specific action, e.g. Soviet policy; relations with China; North Africa; Indo-China (Italy).
As regards methods, Canada suggests normally through Secretariat studies, and Norway suggests extending the work of the Working Group on Soviet Trends.

On (iii) the general acceptance is in certain cases more qualified.

Canada restates the formulation of the question and so does UK, which adds that limiting factors (see Question 3) apply here.

Norway suggests that 'consensus' should not be binding, some governments having special responsibilities and possibilities of action not shared by others. Germany accepts the principle and suggests a "Political Annual Review".

As regards the scope of (iii) Italy sees it as applying where member countries are obliged to take action on matters affecting the Alliance (e.g. relations with Soviet bloc; the Arab-Israel dispute) specific questions arising in other international bodies. The Netherlands sees it as useful for problems outside the NATO area, Greece thinks that (iii) and (iv) relate especially to Soviet bloc questions.

On (iv) the position is similar to that of (iii).

Canada is willing to apply (iv) in certain defined fields (see Question 3) and sees inadequate security as an obstacle in the field of consultation. Italy feels (iv) applies where the basic interests of the Alliance are at stake, or where the Alliance must act as such. Norway feels that binding agreements under (iv) would give rise to difficulties because in some cases parliamentary sanction would be needed, and because some governments have special responsibilities not shared by others, but that nevertheless greater willingness should be expected to reach common policy on questions directly relating to the NATO area and the external threat. The Netherlands thinks (iv) applies to problems directly affecting the NATO area. The UK thinks that the decision to consult should be on a "case by case" basis.
Note In connection with question 2 some general and some additional points are made.

Italy suggests regular, not occasional consultation (see also Question 1). The UK suggests

(a) more frequent meetings of the Permanent Council;

(b) agendas prepared sufficiently in advance for representatives to consult governments; (Canada also asks for adequate warning whenever possible);

(c) maximum frankness combined with maximum security, including that of communications between delegations and home governments (c.f. also Canadian view).

The US suggests adding (v) – exchange of views on matters generally deemed of concern to NATO.

In general, the US thinks it impossible to determine in advance the circumstances and the extent of consultation along specific lines, and favours an "open agenda" principle. It suggests:

(a) greater use of government experts in Council discussions;

(b) greater initiative for the International Staff in proposing items for agendas;

(c) greater availability of experts on Soviet affairs (from governments) to International Staff and delegations;

(d) greater exchange of information.
3. What should be the basis for determining the matters of common concern which might be the subject of consultation under the four headings listed above, and what should be regarded as the factors limiting such consultation, such as respect for liberty of action of each member government and the non-universal character of NATO?

There seems to be a general agreement that the 'basis' referred to in the question cannot be precisely defined in advance. The US speaks of an "experimental and evolutionary" approach. Italy deals with question 3 as part of question 2 (q.v.); Greece says the basis should be as may be agreed and empirically established; the Netherlands points out that the more directly a problem affects the Alliance and its objectives, the more pressing is the need for consultation and in some cases co-ordination of policies and action. Portugal says the basis cannot be a priori and generally means questions which affect the Alliance or its members. The UK says the basis is broadly the threat to NATO and the strengthening of the Alliance to meet the threat. Belgium mentions (a) questions involving threat to peace anywhere; (b) those affecting the unity of the Alliance, and (c) those affecting the stability and domestic order of members and their territories. Germany, Luxembourg, and Norway point to the Treaty (especially the Preamble and Article 4) as indicating the 'basis'.

On the limiting factors: Norway (see also question 2) refers to the need to avoid duplicating the role of other international bodies. The UK mentions (a) national governments must retain final responsibility for national policy, and (b) governments tendering advice cannot thereby be held to accept responsibility. The US also refers to the liberty of action of each government and to the non-universal character of NATO, but points out that the application of these limiting factors will necessarily vary in each case. Belgium, Luxembourg, and Portugal refer to the point that each government must be free to act according to its lights; Portugal adds that opposition by a member country or countries concerned would be a limiting factor, but that the non-universal character of NATO should not limit discussion on questions affecting the Alliance.

Note Canada suggests:

1. 'No interference in domestic affairs' is necessary but should not be legalistically interpreted; there should be no veto on discussion of any subject of common concern but there must be general agreement if action is required.

2. NATO political appreciations should record minority opinions rather than achieve a 'lowest common denominator' of opinion.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL
4. To what extent can NATO assist in the peaceful settlement of inter-member disputes and differences? In view of the provisions of Article I of the Treaty, should procedures of conciliation and peaceful settlement of disputes, similar to the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter and other international agreements, be adopted by NATO?

All countries agree that NATO can play some part in assisting the peaceful settlements referred to in the question.

At least five countries are opposed to new or formal machinery (Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and the UK). Replies suggest relying on common action or appropriate diplomatic initiatives (Portugal); exchanges of views and development of consultation in the Council (Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands); also, possibly, on an ad hoc Conciliation Commission appointed by the Council (the Netherlands); on "good offices" and NATO as a "friendly forum" (UK); and without NATO "recommending" solutions or acting as executive agency unless parties concerned agree (UK); on mediation through the Secretary General in the first instance (Germany), and through the medium of an "Annual Political Review" (Germany); by means of a "Fact-Finding Committee" (Greece) before attempting procedures of conciliation, mediation, etc.
Greece emphasises that some agreement on procedure for this purpose is essential for the success of the Committee of Three because of the effects of the Cyprus dispute on NATO. Norway thinks that the Cyprus and Icelandic questions should lead the Council to explore the possibility of solution, and generally suggests (a) that the Council should have the right to investigate any inter-member dispute to determine whether its continuance is likely to endanger the security or unity of the Alliance, and (b) the Secretary General should have the right to bring such disputes to the attention of the Council. The Council could use "good offices commissions", mediation, or conciliation.

Italy suggests that Permanent Representatives be given a specific mandate to study, with the help of jurists, the possibility of agreeing on a procedure, as binding as possible, to deal with such disputes, and as a first step thinks that member governments should undertake not to raise such disputes in other international organizations until after their examination by NATO.

Canada suggests:

(a) in the first instance direct discussions between the parties to a dispute;

(b) agreement by all NATO members to accept, with minimum reservations, the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court;

(c) investigating the possibility of setting up in advance additional machinery for conciliation, mediation and arbitration, with the Secretary General having an important role in conciliation;

(d) although need for formal provisions would decrease to the extent that effective political consultation is developed in NATO, adequate provisions for peaceful settlements is an important NATO requirement.
The US sees a need for additional NATO procedures. These should reflect the 'voluntary approach' and avoid elaborate or formal machinery. Accordingly, the US suggests:

(a) the adoption of a resolution under Article 1 of the Treaty, and in accordance with Article 33 of the United Nations Charter, to declare the intention of NATO governments to submit in the first instance all inter-member disputes for settlement within NATO framework;

(b) a special Committee of the Council to take cognisance, under this resolution, of any future disputes, and to apply "good offices" and be mainly concerned with procedures - entering into substantive questions only at the request of the parties concerned;

(c) a "Panel of Atlantic Community Arbitrators" composed of eminent persons;

(d) where appropriate and necessary, NATO to sponsor proposals for settlement, to give general or specific support, or to assume definite obligations in connection with the implementation or maintenance of the settlement.

5. Should NATO give more formal recognition to parliamentary associations and the Parliamentary Conference and what should be the relationship between the Council and these parliamentary groupings?

The Netherlands has no objection in principle to formal recognition, with delimitation of the activities of a Parliamentary Conference and a defined relationship to the Council. It favours the organization of Parliamentary contacts within the NATO framework, and the giving of assistance and possibly of guidance by the Council.

The other ten countries see objections and/or difficulties in such a course.

These countries present various suggestions to encourage the interest of Parliamentarians:

- by giving all possible facilities and help (Canada, UK, US);
- by more regular activity of Parliamentary Conferences (Norway);
- by more contacts between Parliamentarians of different countries, especially European-North American links (Italy);
- by more (unofficial) contacts between NATO and Parliamentarians (Italy), especially 'on the level of information' (Belgium);
- by individual governments suggesting suitable subjects for discussion to their Parliamentary groups (UK, Norway);
- by speeches to Parliamentarians by national representatives, the Secretary General and senior military advisers of NATO (Canada);
- by submission to the Council of reports of Parliamentarians' discussions, while discouraging them from addressing resolutions to the Council (Canada).
II. ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

Does your Government consider that closer co-operation between member countries of NATO within the specialised organizations to which they belong and the establishment of closer relations with such organizations would represent the most suitable means for promoting greater unity in the economic field between member governments?

There is general agreement that efforts to bring about economic unity should be made chiefly through the specialised organizations, in particular through OEEC. While all countries are, so far, agreed upon the desirability of close co-operation between NATO members within other economic organizations, opinions vary about the extent to which NATO members should co-ordinate their policies within these organizations.

Greece, Italy, the Federal German Republic, Norway, Portugal and the United States suggest that NATO members should consult together for the purpose of developing common views on policies to be implemented through other agencies.

- Greece proposes that a Working Group should be set up for this purpose.
- Italy would prefer regular consultation on such problems in the Committee of Technical Advisors.
- Norway stresses the need for NATO consultations on economic problems in cases where

(a) they have so far received little attention in the appropriate agencies and where no solution satisfactory to NATO has been found;

(b) it is desirable to avoid conflicting views among NATO members on matters discussed elsewhere;

(c) strategic and political implications cannot properly be discussed in other organizations.

The United Kingdom and Canada approve the principle of discussion by NATO of economic problems but both stress that no recommendations should be made for action through other agencies on specific issues. The United States would prefer NATO to concentrate on "those issues related to the achievement or conditions conducive to economic growth" but would agree to the discussion of concerns primarily related to national interests if these represented a serious threat to the unity of the Alliance. The Belgian Government would limit discussion to the political aspects of economic problems.
In reply to the question on the establishment of closer relations with other organizations, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States would welcome a closer working association but Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Greece are concerned about the possible reaction of non-NATO members of these agencies.

Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, the United States and Canada all consider the present-OECE status of the United States and Canada to be adequate, while the Netherlands fear that an amendment to the OECE Convention would be necessary to bring about a change of status. Although Canada and the United States are both willing to increase their participation in the work of this organization, they prefer to retain their present status. Canada, particularly, is anxious to preserve the European character of the OECD and fears that full membership might prevent her from giving full agreement to certain regional activities. Canada would, nevertheless, give sympathetic consideration to any invitation to become a full member.

Norway considers that a change of status for these two countries would only prove to be necessary if, in the future, the OECD should devote increasing attention to the economic relationship of Europe and the North American Continent. The Italian Government, however, suggests that there may be specific projects on which it would be desirable for the United States and Canada to cooperate more closely than their present "associate" status permits.

Luxembourg does not consider full membership to be indispensable but would nevertheless welcome such a change. The Portuguese Government would be prepared to accept a new status for these countries if this would permit closer co-operation, while the United Kingdom would support the setting up of an OECD Working Group to consider ways by which increased participation might be brought about.
3. Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that the parties will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies. Does your Government think that the activities of other organizations and particularly the OEEC is sufficient to discharge the responsibilities of NATO countries in this respect?

All countries so far consider that the OEEC or the other specialised economic agencies are the appropriate organizations for resolving economic conflicts between member states but agree that there may be some aspects of economic policies which might usefully be discussed by NATO.

The Norwegian Government thinks that it would be for the International Staff to follow closely the progress made by member countries in harmonising their policies in other economic organizations and, if necessary, to draw the attention of the Council to important issues under discussion. In cases where economic disputes between members might have harmful political consequences it should be decided on an ad hoc basis whether the matter should be dealt with by NATO or exclusively by the OEEC.

Belgium, the Federal German Republic, Greece, the United Kingdom and the United States show particular concern for those economic conflicts likely to damage the political and economic strength of members of the Alliance. Belgium believes that countries should have the right to raise such questions for discussion by NATO. Germany suggests that were efforts at conciliation in other organizations have failed (a) countries should be entitled to submit questions of dispute to NATO and (b) each member country should have the right to offer its good offices for the peaceful settlement of disputes in cases of particular importance for the defence capacity of NATO. The United Kingdom stresses the desirability of discussing those differences which might be exploited by the Soviet bloc in other international organizations.

Portugal would agree to prior consultations amongst NATO members on the economic policies to be carried out in other bodies while Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands think that discussion in NATO might assist countries in settling their differences in other organizations.

The United States, while sharing the preoccupations outlined above, makes a distinction between those types of economic conflicts arising from the free play of market forces and those springing from governmental action detrimental to the interests of other members of the Alliance. In the view of the United States only the second type of problem - if it represents a danger to the solidarity of the
Alliance - should be explored by NATO once all other possible action has been taken in the appropriate international bodies. This should be approached on an ad hoc basis.

Canada recalls that the Annual Reviews carried out by NATO and the OPEC provide member countries with an opportunity for informing themselves of the economic problems of their allies and urges that this complementary review should continue to function as at present. The Canadian Government argues that economic conflicts will be avoided only insofar as NATO members approach a freely and efficiently functioning system of non-discriminatory trade and payments over as wide an area as possible and take care that exceptional measures to promote exports or to dispose of surpluses show a real regard for the interests of other countries. In those cases where conflicts arise every effort should be made to resolve them within the framework of the appropriate international organization. It may, at times, be desirable to raise the matter in NATO itself but, in any case, NATO countries should be willing to consult together when such conflicts arise or appear imminent.

Most countries state clearly that NATO should refrain from this type of activity. The Federal German Republic however makes an exception in the case of questions touching on civil defence capacity - such as civil emergency planning.

Portugal suggests that NATO members might consult together with a view to co-ordinating their policies within other organizations fitted to deal with this problem. Greece feels that such schemes would have an excellent effect on public opinion but would prefer them to be administered through other international organizations. These agencies might also be invited to participate financially.

The Norwegian Government would like the question to be explored further while Italy suggests that the economic and military advantages to the Alliance of particular projects might justify NATO action.

Does your Government feel that NATO may have some interest in developing public works for civilian use, as has been done in some military fields?
5. Does your Government consider that NATO should take an active part in the economic development of underdeveloped regions within the NATO area or would it be preferable that NATO should limit itself to the appraisal of the political importance for the alliance of development programmes to this end?

All countries agree that action in this field should be left to the appropriate specialised agencies but many of them would welcome discussion in NATO of the political aspects of such schemes.

Canada draws attention to the amount of aid already given to NATO members by the IMF and the IBRD and urges member countries to play an active role in these agencies. It is pointed out by Canada that, here again, the Annual Review procedure already enables members of the Alliance to discuss the economic situation of these regions.

The German Government suggests that NATO collect data on this type of aid and that an analysis of this information might reveal unexploited possibilities. Germany would also like NATO to make recommendations and suggestions on matters of principle, while Italy, too, suggests a periodical examination by NATO of the work done by other organizations in this field. Greece proposes that NATO countries give instructions to their representatives to other international organizations to encourage this policy. The Greek Government, in view of the presence of non-NATO members in such bodies as the OEEC, would approve discussion by NATO of the political aspects of these problems only if absolute secrecy could be assured.

Portugal, while recognising the importance of the problem, points out that the success of such an action would depend upon the capacity of member countries to contribute towards the cost.

The Norwegian Government suggests that in cases where it is difficult to obtain support in the appropriate specialised agencies for plans of political importance to NATO discussions should take place within the Organization on an ad hoc basis with a view to finding solutions.
6(a). Does your Government consider that NATO has a vital interest in promoting the economic development of underdeveloped countries outside the NATO area? If so, bearing in mind the non-universal character of NATO, what action in assisting underdeveloped countries does your Government consider can appropriately be carried out by NATO countries to achieve the necessary objectives and what co-ordination can be furnished by NATO?

There is general agreement that NATO should not itself undertake any action in this field but opinions vary about the extent to which the Organization should discuss policy problems related to underdeveloped areas.

The Italian Government believes that NATO should:

(a) agree on principles on which member countries should base their policies individually and in other organizations;

(b) draw up political priorities as a guide for action by individual member countries;

(c) consult together on all aspects of economic assistance to underdeveloped areas. Furthermore, it is suggested that the NATO staff draw up an inventory of the resources which could be devoted to assisting underdeveloped economic areas by individual member countries and by the specialised agencies to which they belong. The Italian Government is strongly in favour of leaving all further initiative in this area to the OECD.

The German Government suggests that economic data on the subject should be collected and analysed so as to form a basis for assessing its political importance. The United States recalls that a useful beginning has already been made in this direction by the Committee of Technical Advisers and urges continuing discussion of NATO policy on aid problems.

The Norwegian Government also supports strongly the suggestion for periodic discussion in NATO with a view to co-ordinating their policies on economic assistance to underdeveloped countries both within the specialised agencies or between themselves.

The United Kingdom and Canada attach particular importance to a study of Soviet activities in this field. The United Kingdom relies to a large extent on the OECD for discussion of the general economic problems arising from aid but feels that this organization is not a fit place for the discussion of the problem of
countering Soviet moves in this area. NATO should be able to discuss a general policy of counter-action but should avoid specific issues. The United Kingdom Government suggests that private firms should be encouraged to participate in such schemes but that no special inducements should be held out to them.

Luxembourg and the Netherlands would limit NATO discussion of these problems to an assessment of their political importance to the Alliance while Belgium insists that the whole matter should be left to the specialised agencies.

Greece, on the other hand, feels that the experience of the West in this field has often been unfortunate and that great care should be taken in the future that favourable political results should result from aid to underdeveloped countries.

Canada, Germany, Greece, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States consider that no changes are necessary in the Statutes of the international financial agencies although Greece and Italy are ready to examine further suggestions. The Netherlands and Belgium do not believe it to be the rôle of NATO to discuss the Statutes of these agencies while Portugal, as a non-member, feels she cannot comment.

The United Kingdom points out that the real problem is not lack of flexibility but lack of funds and considers that the limitations on aid imposed by the IMF and the IBRD have had the valuable effect of encouraging sound financial policies in underdeveloped countries. The United Kingdom Government warns of the danger of undermining the IBRD by setting up another international agency to make loans on easier terms than those justified by economic considerations but recognises that some countries need basic help before their economies can become sufficiently stable to permit them to apply for aid from the Bank or Fund. Consequently, the United Kingdom would favour the setting up of an agency such as SUNTED once agreement has been reached on internationally controlled disarmament under the aegis of the United Nations. As this is not the case at the moment the United Kingdom is not prepared to extend its commitments.

Luxembourg, on the other hand, stresses that the conditions imposed by the IMF and the IBRD call for a political stability which does not always exist in underdeveloped countries and suggests that common action by NATO countries within these agencies might ease the terms on which aid is granted.
7(a). Does your Government feel that NATO should consider measures to counter and neutralise Soviet commercial practices which do not conform to the principles by which Western countries carry on their normal trade and financial relations with one another?

All countries show concern about this problem but differ in their views on how far NATO itself should intervene.

Norway feels strongly that this is one of the most important subjects on which there should be closer cooperation within NATO and calls for discussions on the broader lines of the basic economic policy to be followed in relation to the Soviet bloc as well as on the specific problem of countering certain Soviet commercial policies.

Canada suggests that NATO collect information on any Soviet commercial activities which might affect the security of NATO members or threaten the independence of underdeveloped countries in which NATO has a political interest. Discussion in NATO should be for information purposes only and action should be left to the initiative of countries concerned. The Canadian Government points out the danger of allowing Soviet moves to disorganize generally existing Western financial and commercial arrangements although there may be some cases where exceptions might have to be made. The United Kingdom agrees that NATO should collect data on Soviet commercial activities but thinks that discussion of any infringements of normal trade practices should be left to such organizations as GATT. The United States also proposed that the International Staff prepare a study on this subject but would be prepared to consider further measures only after an exchange of views.

The Italian Government warns of the danger of abandoning the established commercial practices of the West in an attempt to counter Soviet moves and suggests that NATO should only consider acting in cases of emergency. The appreciation of emergency cases might be left to the Committee of Technical Advisers.

The Netherlands and Greece feel that no measures could be considered by NATO which conflicted with the established economic policies of members — these would not only be dangerous from an economic point of view but would probably be unsuccessful. Luxembourg and Belgium also find it difficult to envisage any measures which could be adopted by countries possessing a democratic constitution.
Portugal would agree to a co-ordinated policy by NATO in this field while Germany urges NATO countries to adhere to the principle of multilateral trade policies vis-à-vis the Eastern bloc and to agree not to buy transit goods originating in underdeveloped countries from Eastern bloc states.

Greece argues that NATO policy should be to encourage the maximum trade with all countries paying particular attention to those countries in which the USSR shows special interest only insofar as transactions would be economically profitable. The Greek Government suggests, however, that any NATO country which refused a transaction with a Soviet bloc state in the interests of the Alliance should receive compensation from its allies.

Opinion on this question falls into four main groups:

(1) Italy, Germany and Portugal would approve discussion by NATO members with a view to co-ordinating their activities in this area.

- Germany does not envisage action by NATO itself but recommends consultation with existing economic organizations if this proves to be useful.

- Italy suggests that the Committee of Technical Advisers appreciate the importance of Soviet activities and call attention to emergency cases. Discussions should then take place on whether any action should be taken by NATO.

(2) Greece, Belgium and Norway feel that it would be dangerous, economically and politically, to enter into a competitive race with the Soviet Union in this field.

(3) The United Kingdom and Luxembourg are prepared to discuss the political importance of particular situations as and when they arise but do not envisage any action by NATO.

(4) Canada finds it impossible to generalise on this subject while the United States urges great caution. The United States Government recalls that the problem is already receiving attention in the Committee on Soviet Economic Penetration.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL
8. What suggestions can be derived from the experience in the economic field of other regional organizations with a view to the possible application of this experience to other geographical areas?

Those countries which belong neither to the Baghdad Pact nor to the Colombo Plan generally refrain from commenting on this suggestion although the German Government does put forward the general recommendation that member countries should co-ordinate their policies in order to avoid too great a strain on the economic capacities of the countries concerned.

The United Kingdom does not think that NATO should extend its economic activities in any way comparable to those of the Colombo Plan while the United States doubts whether the experiences in question are directly comparable to other economic areas.

Canada concludes that the chief lesson to be drawn is the vital necessity of avoiding the impression that aid is given for political reasons and recalls several features of the Colombo Plan which he believes contributes largely to its success.

All countries are prepared to agree to some consideration by NATO of these questions. Germany, however, considers that NATO should only intervene if agreement cannot be reached in the wider circle of Western countries, while Greece and Belgium remind allies of the danger of creating a NATO "bloc" in other organizations. The Netherlands points out that the habit of mutual consultation is already observed in many cases - this form of consultation should be broadened but not formalised. Canada feels that the initiative for such discussions should lie with the Secretary General and with individual countries.

It is suggested by both Luxembourg and Norway and Portugal that certain subjects due to be discussed in the CEI, e.g. the Soviet proposal for an agreement on Pan-European economic co-operation, would be suitable for discussion by NATO.

The United States and the United Kingdom are particularly concerned that NATO countries should avoid disagreements in other economic organizations which might be exploited by the Soviet bloc and the United States suggests the possibility that many Soviet proposals are put forward mainly in order to create dissensions amongst NATO allies.
10. Are there any other specific economic subjects or classes of subjects of general concern to NATO which are not being adequately considered in other agencies and which might be discussed usefully by NATO?

Several suggestions were put forward concerning subjects suitable for study by NATO although all governments are concerned that NATO should not impinge on the fields of activity of other economic organizations.

- Norway suggests that NATO should discuss:

  - the policy of member countries in the field of civil aviation particularly in view of recent protectionist tendencies in some countries;
  
  - merchant shipping problems, particularly with regard to the recent increase in discriminatory policies.

- The Netherlands would welcome further exploration of such defence economy questions as standardisation of production and logistic integration,

- Italy suggests that NATO should make a general survey of the economic activities of existing international agencies with a view to assessing their importance for the Atlantic Alliance.

- The United Kingdom thinks that NATO should limit itself to considering the political and strategic implications of what is being done in the OEEC and other organizations and suggests several topics as being suitable for examination including the problems of utilisation of nuclear energy, the lay-out of the economic resources of NATO powers appropriate to competitive co-existence, the economic policies of NATO and the Soviet bloc in relation to important underdeveloped territories and the political implications of the reliance of NATO powers or oil supplies from the Middle East.

- The United States stresses the importance of concerting economic strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc and particularly the maintenance of common politics on the COMUM-CHÉLON strategic trade control.
Canada agrees that NATO should pay special attention to Soviet economic and commercial activities particularly in underdeveloped territories, although leaving action to the specialised agencies. The United States, however, suggests that NATO should first discuss whether multilateral action in this field in other economic agencies is adequate to present and emerging problems.

The Greek Government asks NATO to make a special effort to understand the economic problems of underdeveloped regions of member countries when dealing with defence problems.

Belgium considers that NATO should limit itself to a consideration of economic problems resulting from wartime problems.
1.Votre Gouvernement considère-t-il que ces objectifs seront mieux atteints par la création :

(a) d'un institut commun de recherche sur la Communauté Atlantique?

(b) d'un collège civil analogue au Collège de Défense OTAN, où des cours de brève durée sur les problèmes politiques, économiques, sociaux et culturels de la Communauté Atlantique seraient donnés aux personnes qui sont en mesure d'agir sur l'opinion, telles que professeurs, journalistes, etc.? 

1. QUESTIONS CULTURELLES

1. (a) La Norvège rappelle qu'avec le Danemark elle est à l'origine des propositions pour la création d'un centre d'études de la Communauté Atlantique. Le Canada, les États-Unis, l'Italie ne sont pas défavorables à la création d'un institut commun de recherche sur la Communauté Atlantique; en général, ils souhaitent qu'un comité composé de personnes compétentes procède à une étude préalable. Le Royaume-Uni ne s'y oppose pas non plus mais ne lui accorde pas une très grande priorité; il souhaiterait plutôt encourager les études atlantiques dans des institutions existantes des deux côtés de l'océan. Au contraire la Belgique, la République Fédérale, la Grèce, les Pays-Bas et le Portugal n'envisagent pas volontiers qu'un tel institut puisse être créé.

1. (b) Le Canada, les États-Unis, la République Fédérale, le Portugal; la Grèce acceptent également que soit envisagé un tel collège. Les États-Unis, le Portugal et le Canada soulignent toutefois qu'une attentive étude devrait être faite au préalable. L'Italie ne répond ni oui ni non; la Belgique, le Luxembourg, les Pays-Bas le Royaume-Uni ne sont pas favorables au projet envisagé. La Belgique, les Pays-Bas et le Royaume-Uni soulignent qu'il suffirait d'ouvrir plus largement l'accès du Collège de Défense OTAN aux civils.

1. Appendice

Lors même qu'ils répondent affirmativement ou négativement aux questions 1(a) et 1(b) certains pays ajoutent des propositions de leur propre chef. Les Pays-Bas demandent que soient créées des cours de faible durée - 4 à 6 semaines - sur les problèmes militaires et la coopération civile pour toutes personnes en mesure d'influencer l'opinion (professeurs, journalistes, syndicalistes, etc....). Le Royaume-Uni souligne qu'il conviendrait d'encourager avant toute autre chose les études atlantiques dans les institutions existantes des deux côtés de l'océan et d'encourager les séminaires comme celui qui a eu lieu à Oxford en juillet dernier. Les États-Unis indiquent qu'autre la création d'un institut visé à la question 1(a) ou du collège visé à la question 1(b) des projets tels qu'une université atlantique pourraient être envisagés. Le Canada insiste particulièrement sur l'importance des liens transatlantiques.
2. Votre Gouvernement estime-t-il que l'OTAN doit encourager la coopération entre les mouvements de jeunesse des pays de l'Alliance eu égard à la coordination des activités de jeunesse dans les pays communistes? Le Conseil doit-il examiner les problèmes relatifs à la coopération des mouvements de jeunesse?

2. En général les pays membres sont d'accord pour souligner l'intérêt qu'offre pour Nato la coopération avec les organisations de jeunesse. Toutefois la Belgique d'une façon absolue, le Portugal et le Luxembourg avec hésitation, donnent une réponse négative. Le Canada de son côté indique qu'il ne peut répondre car la question posée ne regarde que des organisations de jeunesse elles-mêmes dont l'indépendance à l'égard du gouvernement est absolue. La Norvège, les Pays-Bas, le Royaume-Uni et les États-Unis marquent les limites que doit rencontrer une coopération avec la jeunesse: l'indépendance et le caractère privé des mouvements de jeunesse doivent en tous les cas être respectés. La Norvège insiste pour qu'un examen périodique soit fait de la situation des organisations de jeunesse et souhaiterait même qu'un fonctionnaire de l'OTAN soit spécialement chargé de suivre cette question.

3. Votre Gouvernement considère-t-il que l'OTAN doit entreprendre la coordination de mesures de longue haleine destinées à développer le recrutement et la formation de savants, de techniciens et de spécialistes, eu égard aux progrès accomplis dans ces domaines par les pays communistes?

3. D'une façon générale les réponses marquent un accord à ce que cette question soit étudiée par l'OTAN. La Belgique note que la question n'en relève pas moins cependant de la responsabilité nationale. Les États-Unis soulignent que si cet objectif est très important pour l'OTAN, le problème dégarnit la cadre des questions culturelles pour être aussi économique et militaire. L'Italie va plus loin soulignant que le recrutement et le perfectionnement ne doivent pas avoir pour objet seulement des savants mais également des techniciens. Elle propose la création d'un centre ou d'une agence qui évaluerait les besoins en personnel des différents pays membres, désignerait telle institution universitaire ou tel autre établissement d'enseignement où le personnel pourrait s'inscrire et se perfectionner et s'efforcerait de leur permettre de prendre place dans le cycle de la production.
4. Afin de renforcer les liens de la Communauté Atlantique, quelles seraient éventuellement, dans le domaine de l'éducation, les tâches que l'OTAN pourrait entreprendre et dont les organisations internationales existantes telles que l'UNESCO ne se sont pas déjà chargées?

4. La Belgique, les Pays-Bas et le Portugal révèlent qu'ils n'ont point de proposition à formuler à cet égard. Le Luxembourg donne la même impression mais espère trouver des propositions dans les rapports qui sortiront de la Conférence sur le rôle de l'école dans la Communauté Atlantique (Palais de Chaillot 3-7 septembre). Le Canada expose que ce sont surtout des échanges bi-latéraux qu'il faut développer et encourager, surtout au travers de l'océan atlantique. Le Royaume-Uni serait content que soient examinés les projets présentés ou recommandés par la conférence des Experts Culturels, juillet 1956. Il estime qu'il faudrait faire davantage dans les écoles dans la mesure où les règles administratives nationales le permette, se servir des organismes nationaux comme le Comité Atlantique, renouveler l'expérience de la réunion des Responsables de l'Éducation (3-7 septembre 1956). La République Fédérale souhaite que des réunions comme cette dernière soient encouragées et que continue le Fellowship Programme. La Norvège souligne l'importance des échanges de personnes, des summer courses, des visiting professors. Dans le cadre de l'OTAN les accords culturels doivent être développés ainsi que la participation active aux travaux de l'UNESCO; le rôle de l'OTAN doit être dans ce domaine de lancer des projets, d'en encourager d'autres. L'Italie souligne qu'il est important d'enseigner les fins et la nature de la Communauté Atlantique surtout dans les régions sous-développées. Pour les États-Unis il reste encore des domaines culturels qui doivent être explorés par l'OTAN et qui sont ouverts à la coopération atlantique (éducation); l'établissement de chaires atlantiques, le développement des visiting professors et des séminaires d'été, la création de prix de la Communauté Atlantique en sont des exemples.
5. Votre Gouvernement serait-il favorable à des échanges de personnel militaire, soit individuellement, soit en groupes, grâce auxquels ce personnel pourrait se familiariser avec la situation dans d'autres pays membres et la compréhension internationale serait facilitée?

5. Les Gouvernements sont d'accord pour que les échanges de personnel militaire se continuent et même se développent. Les Pays-Bas notent que des difficultés de tous ordres se rencontreront dans ces échanges. La Grèce n'a pas d'objection de principe à formuler mais croit que le collège de défense OTAN répond à l'objectif. Le Royaume-Uni estime la question intéressante et va l'étudier en ce qui concerne les militaires en permission. Le Canada est également favorable à l'idée mais estime que les initiatives privées doivent suffire pour tout ce qui concerne les échanges de personnel en dehors du cadre des programmes d'entraînement. Les États-Unis souhaitent un large développement de ces échanges, se demandant cependant ce qu'il adviendrait d'un programme commun dans ce domaine et note l'intérêt d'échanges OTAN, SEATO, ANZUS, Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord. Il est à noter que tandis que le Portugal s'oppose à des échanges de personnel civil qui coûteraient trop cher, l'Italie y serait favorable.
6. Quels sont parmi les programmes éventuels entant dans le cadre des questions 1, 2, 3 et 4, ceux qui devraient, de l'avis de votre gouvernement, être financés:

(a) dans le cadre d'un programme financé en commun;
(b) en commun par les pays intéressés;
(c) par les gouvernements membres individuellement?

6. La Norvège n'a pas répondu à cette question. Les Pays-Bas estiment qu'avant de donner leur réponse une étude plus approfondie des problèmes posés serait nécessaire. Le Canada et le Luxembourg hésitent également à répondre dans l'ignorance où ils se trouvent des projets qui seront adoptés. L'un et l'autre indiquent qu'ils ne sont pas opposés pour certains projets, notamment pour les cours de brève durée (Luxembourg) au mode de financement (a).

La République Fédérale indique qu'au lieu de mise en commun des ressources culturelles, le financement doit être fait selon (c). Pour la Grèce et l'Italie, elles sont favorables au financement selon (a) en général, sauf certains cas particuliers. Le Royaume-Uni préfère en principe le financement (b) sauf des exceptions : les séminaires d'été et la coopération de la jeunesse qui doivent être financés selon (a) et (c). Les États-Unis proposent un financement (a) avec addition de (b) pour la coopération scientifique et les établissements d'enseignement atlantique ; pour les cours d'été atlantique et les réunions de la jeunesse ou conférences similaires, ils proposent un financement (c), avec, lorsqu'il s'agit de conférences notamment au Palais de Chaillot, une aide de NATO. Le Portugal est en faveur d'un financement (a) pour un collège de défense OTAN à l'usage des civils, pour un financement (c) pour ce qui concerne la coopération de la jeunesse, pour un financement (b) pour le recrutement et la formation des savants.
IV. QUESTIONS RELATIVES À L’INFORMATION

1. La Belgique, le Canada, le Luxembourg, les Pays-Bas, le Royaume-Uni et la Norvège sont favorables à cette formule: laisser aux services nationaux la responsabilité d’interpréter les faits, et limiter le rôle de l’OTAN au seul exposé de ces faits. Le Royaume-Uni, le Luxembourg, la Belgique la Norvège et l’Italie admettent toutefois que la notion de "renseignements d’ordre purement documentaire" doit être prise au sens le plus large, c’est-à-dire non seulement les événements concernant l’OTAN, mais aussi l’ensemble des données qui expliquent les raisons d’être de l’OTAN et unissent entre eux les membres de la Communauté Atlantique. Le Canada estime que ces renseignements documentaires ne doivent pas nécessairement se limiter au sujet de l’OTAN.

À l’opposé de cette attitude, le Portugal et la Grèce repoussent de façon absolue toute limitation des fonctions de l’OTAN en matière d’information sous peine d’inefficacité.

Les États-Unis, l’Allemagne et l’Italie se refusent également à limiter le rôle de la division d’information de l’OTAN à la diffusion de renseignements purement documentaires comme insuffisant et inadéquat, au regard de la lutte idéologique.

Dans tous les cas, un accord se dégage (1) sur l’importance des opinions publiques comme facteur d’unité de l’Alliance et la nécessité, pour obtenir leur acceptation, de les mieux informer, (2) sur la nécessité d’éviter que tout matériel d’information susceptible d’être attribué à l’OTAN puisse revêtir un caractère de propagande, la tâche de l’OTAN consistant à fournir aux services nationaux les éléments d’une propagande nationale, (3) sur la liberté des services nationaux en fait de propagande, soit que la responsabilité de l’interprétation des faits leur appartienne en totalité (Royaume-Uni, Pays-Bas, Luxembourg, Norvège), soit que les pays sollicitent et reçoivent de l’OTAN une aide en matériel d’information ou en services (États-Unis, Canada), en vue de l’information et aussi de la propagande. Estimant que le développement de la consultation politique offrira une opportunité de développer l’information, les États-Unis insistent sur le besoin de doter la division d’information de tous les moyens appropriés et d’aboutir sans délai à une coopération accrue permettant l’élaboration de méthodes appropriées à la fois dans la zone OTAN.
et dans la zone non-OTAN pour l'information, la contre-propagande et la propagande.

La Norvège suggère que les informations diffusées par l'OTAN aient un caractère positif expliquant les idéaux que l'Alliance défend plutôt que le système auquel elle s'oppose.

2. Votre Gouvernement estime-t-il nécessaire de mieux coordonner les efforts dans le domaine de l'information pour faire échec aux initiatives de la propagande soviétique ?

2. A l'exception du Royaume-Uni et de la Norvège, l'ensemble des pays considèrent qu'il est indispensable que les pays de l'OTAN coordonnent leurs efforts pour répondre d'une façon plus efficace aux initiatives de la propagande soviétique. Le Royaume-Uni et la Norvège admettent cependant qu'une meilleure liaison entre les pays et la définition d'une ligne d'action commune sont choses souhaitables.

Un accord général se dégage d'autre part sur la nécessité d'exercer cette coordination avec beaucoup de mesure et de souplesse en raison de la diversité des situations dans les pays. Alors que l'Allemagne, le Portugal, les Pays-Bas, la Grèce, la Norvège et l'Italie expriment un désir de coordination sans réserve, les États-Unis et le Canada insistent sur la différenciation indispensable des méthodes par lesquelles il doit être répondu selon les pays aux initiatives de la propagande soviétique. La Belgique attire l'attention sur l'extrême susceptibilité de la presse vis-à-vis de toute tentative de direction de l'information.

Les États-Unis préconisent l'échange régulier d'informations sur la propagande communiste dans les pays OTAN et sur les mesures prises pour y répondre. Le Canada suggère plusieurs formes de coopération selon les zones: dans la zone OTAN (ou associée), définir une approche commune des problèmes et atteindre un degré maximum de coopération tout en se conformant avant tout aux désirs des gouvernements. Dans la zone des pays "non engagés", charger les missions diplomatiques d'informer l'opinion par des contacts personnels ou tous autres moyens techniques adéquats de façon à dissiper la méfiance croissante à l'égard de l'OTAN. Dans la zone des pays du bloc soviétique, coordonner les émissions radio des pays de l'OTAN vers eux-même et échanger les expériences relatives à cette forme d'information, ceci permettant d'éviter les contradictions (Cf. la question de la consultation politique).
3. Votre Gouvernement considère-t-il qu'il convient de développer les visites réciproques de groupes professionnels, tels que professeurs, journalistes, etc. ?

3. La réponse des pays est unanimement favorable au principe de ces visites qui se sont avérées jusqu'ici très efficaces et profitables au renforcement de l'Alliance. Toutefois cet accord est assorti de recommandations visant à l'amélioration de leur rendement.

   (1) Mettre l'accent sur les échanges transatlantiques (Royaume-Uni, Pays-Bas) et veiller à ce que les programmes d'échanges existants accordent plus de place à l'OTAN (Royaume-Uni).

   (2) Développer (Royaume-Uni: dans la mesure du possible) les programmes financés en commun par l'OTAN et les pays membres (États-Unis, Norvège).

   (3) Étendre les voyages à d'autres catégories de visiteurs que les journalistes: éducateurs, syndicalistes, chefs de mouvements de jeunesse, conférenciers (Royaume-Uni, États-Unis, Norvège, Italie).

   (4) Veiller avec le plus grand soin à la sélection des participants et à l'organisation des voyages (Portugal, Luxembourg, Belgique) et, dans ce but, s'en tenir à de petits groupes (Royaume-Uni).

   (5) Quant au programme de ces visites, la Belgique demande qu'elles aient avant tout pour objet les organismes civils et militaires dépendant directement de l'OTAN. L'Italie par contre souhaite une meilleure définition des secteurs à mettre en valeur et que ces visites ne s'appliquent pas tant à l'organisation elle-même civile et militaire qu'à son caractère de communauté.
4. Votre Gouvernement estime-t-il qu’il convient d’améliorer la coopération entre le service d’information de l’OTAN et les organismes nationaux d’information, tant publics que privés ?

4. La situation actuelle en ce domaine est jugée d’ores et déjà satisfaisante par l’Allemagne, le Royaume-Uni, le Portugal, la Grèce, le Canada et le Luxembourg. Elle devrait être améliorée et la coopération intensifiée (Royaume-Uni, États-Unis, Pays-Bas, Grèce, Canada et Norvège).

Le Royaume-Uni et l’Italie mettent l’accent sur le développement et le resserrement de la coopération entre l’OTAN, les services nationaux et les organisations privées. Le Royaume-Uni demande que cette coopération soit sous contrôle du Comité de l’information et des relations culturelles et recommande que les divers gouvernements accordent un soutien financier aux associations privées en faveur de l’OTAN.

Les États-Unis considèrent que les services nationaux devraient assurer une meilleure distribution du matériel d’information OTAN et que la coopération serait grandement facilitée par l’établissement et la communication de plans et de rapports périodiques permettant les discussions en commun des projets.

La désignation d’un fonctionnaire chargé dans chaque capitale de veiller à la diffusion des informations sur les activités de l’OTAN et d’assurer une liaison avec l’Organisation est vivement recommandée par les États-Unis et l’Italie, tandis que le Royaume-Uni la juge inutile en ce qui le concerne mais reconnaît que cette initiative pourrait être utile en d’autres pays au gré et à la charge des pays hôtes.

Dans le même esprit, la Norvège suggère que les fonctionnaires chargés de l’information dans les pays de l’OTAN participent plus fréquemment aux travaux du Comité de l’information et des relations culturelles.

La Grèce, la Norvège et l’Italie insistent pour que soient surmontées les difficultés de langues. Pour la Grèce, il s’agirait de compléter le personnel de l’information de façon à ce qu’il comprenne toutes les langues des pays de l’Alliance, ainsi que les langues slaves.

La Belgique estime que le développement de la coopération entre la division d’information et les représentants de la presse résidant à Paris devrait suffire à résoudre le problème de l’amélioration de la coopération OTAN-organismes nationaux.
5. Etant donné l'importance des répercussions sur l'opinion publique du développement des consultations politiques au sein de l'OTAN, votre Gouvernement a-t-il des suggestions à formuler sur la mesure dans laquelle le public doit être tenu au courant des activités déployées dans ce domaine ?

5. Tous les pays, sauf la Belgique, insistent sur le caractère confidentiel des consultations politiques et les conditions de sécurité dont elles doivent être entourées. Cette considération fondamentale est au premier plan des préoccupations qui ont inspiré leurs réponses.

Le Portugal et les Pays-Bas en concluent à la nécessité presque absolue d'un secret rigoureux autour de ces délibérations.

Par contre, l'Allemagne, le Royaume-Uni, les États-Unis, la Grèce, le Canada, le Luxembourg, la Norvège, l'Italie sont conscients de la nécessité de donner, chaque fois que cela est possible, la meilleure publicité au principe même de ces consultations politiques, sinon à leur contenu. Ils cherchent par conséquent à en définir les moyens et les limites et à établir un équilibre satisfaisant entre les données contradictoires du secret des délibérations et de la publicité autour de leur existence. Sur ce point l'accord est général : il doit appartenir au Conseil Permanent (ou au Secrétaire Général agissant en son nom : États-Unis) de décider hors de toute règle rigide dans quel cas, dans quelle mesure et sous quelle forme on peut, sans porter atteinte au secret indispensable, répondre néanmoins aux besoins de publicité autour de la consultation politique. La Belgique estime que c'est par les communiqués ministériels et les déclarations des ministres ayant participé aux consultations que l'opinion publique pourrait être informée. Ensuite seulement, la division d'information insisterait sur les résultats concrets obtenus. Les autorités nationales s'abstiendraient quant à elles, de toute déclaration publique prématurée sur des questions devant faire l'objet de discussions au Conseil.
V. ORGANIZATIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL QUESTIONS

The Governments of Belgium, Canada, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom consider that no fundamental organizational changes are required.

Canada, Italy and the United Kingdom recommend more frequent Ministerial Meetings. These same countries and Belgium would also favour ministers attending sessions of the Permanent Council, Canada and Italy furthermore recommend that more time should be devoted to Ministerial Meetings, and Italy suggests that in certain cases countries might be represented at Council meetings by their Heads of Government. Italy and Norway stress the importance of the Council in Permanent Session; Italy recommends the strengthening of the power of effective decision by the Permanent Representatives, and Norway considers it essential that member governments give very high priority to their representation on the Council and secure the closest possible link between governments and their representatives. Norway furthermore believes that the Council is sometimes overloaded with work and should therefore consider the possibility of delegating its power of decision in certain fields to the appropriate Council Committees, which might necessitate the strengthening of the national representation on these committees.

Canada, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom would favour a better preparation of political consultations. Canada is of the opinion that more attention should be paid by governments to the preparatory work on the problems to be discussed. It also suggests that senior officials might be sent in advance of meetings to assist in the preparatory work and that senior experts might be sent as consultants on special subjects. The Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom point to the preparation of discussions on trends of Soviet policy as an example for the preparation of other subjects. The United Kingdom accordingly suggests that the Working Group on Trends of Soviet Policy might extend its activities to other selected political questions, and that its chairman (DSG or AG Political) should keep in touch with delegations to ensure that suitable political questions are reviewed in the working group before discussion by the Council.
The Greek Government is of the opinion that the Political Division should be more closely associated with political consultations in the Council, and suggests that on specific questions a member of the Council might be asked to act as rapporteur. Private sessions of the Council should be limited to very delicate questions only.

The United States proposes the establishment of a Committee of Ministerial delegates which would meet regularly in Paris for top level political consultations. A similar proposal is made by Germany which furthermore suggests the setting up of a Political Annual Review.

Most Governments appear to favour a flexible, ad hoc approach to the question of the use of experts, leaving it to each country individually to decide which expert is required, and when.

The Governments of Italy and Norway stress the importance of expert advice for political discussions, such as it already is used in the analysis of Soviet policy. They would be in favour of continuing this practice in special committees. Italy suggests that experts on particular political questions might either assist their Permanent Representatives at Council meetings, or hold special meetings for the purpose of preparing technical advice for the Council, which in all cases would retain the power of decision. The United States points to a special need for more national experts on Soviet affairs to assist Council members.

Norway recommends that the work of the Working Group on Trends of Soviet Foreign Policy be pursued in closer co-operation between all member countries, and that the scope of this work be extended to cover developments in all Communist countries in the political as well as the economic field, establishing thereby a permanent NATO institute for the study of political and economic relations between the Western Countries and the Soviet bloc.

2. To what extent does your Government consider that experts could be used more either on a permanent or ad hoc basis to assist the Council in the process of political consultation?

3. To what extent should the Secretary General play an active rôle in the field of political consultation, and to what particular types of problems should such a rôle extend?
Lisbon, underlining particularly his right to initiate matters for Council action.

The Canadian Government stress the necessity for the Secretary General to be kept fully informed on the thinking of member governments on questions of common concern. They furthermore suggest that through periodic visits to member governments and through personal consultation he should be able to offer his informal good offices whenever this might be conducive to the conciliation of diverging interests.

The Governments of Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States propose that the Secretary General should preside at all Council meetings, including those in Ministerial Session.

The Italian Government suggests that in order to assist the Secretary General in his task of stimulating political consultations, the Political Division should be strengthened, given more responsibilities and, through a better utilisation of the NATO information services, be provided with the necessary material.

The German Government suggests that the Secretary General be given a position as mediator. When called upon by a NATO Government, he might form, under his chairmanship, a Mediating Committee consisting of representatives of three NATO countries not involved in the dispute.

The United States suggests that the Secretary General preside over the Committee on inter-community disputes proposed by it, that he attend on invitation international conferences of interest to NATO, and that he submit an annual "State of the Alliance" message at each December meeting.

The Netherlands Government sees the possibility of a further development of the Secretary General's activities in the preparatory stage of political consultation, and in the drafting of evaluations of specific political developments.
4. In view of the economic responsibilities of NATO, and those in prospect, what organizational changes, if any, does your Government consider are required to discharge them?

All countries appear to agree that no organizational changes are required for NATO to discharge its economic responsibilities. To this general statement the Netherlands add, however, that care should be taken to ensure that the organizational machinery of NATO be adequate to perform NATO's task with respect to those specific economic problems directly related to co-operation in the military field.

The United Kingdom points out that economic experts are readily available in OEEC.

Italy and the United States suggest that the existing Committee of Technical Advisers might become a general economic committee which on the request of the Council could evaluate the merit of NATO consideration of economic items in the light of current developments, and make such recommendations as seemed appropriate.

The Norwegian Government believed it to be hardly advisable to set up new committees of a permanent character with fixed terms of reference, but would prefer the convocations of expert meetings on an ad hoc basis.

5. Does your Government consider that greater use could be made of NATO machinery for the circulation on a NATO-wide basis of "basic position material" by individual governments (e.g. texts of agreements, basic statements of position, etc.)?

All countries consider that greater use could be made of NATO machinery for the circulation of basic position material, with the exception of Belgium and Portugal who are of the opinion that this would be unnecessary.

The Luxembourg Government points out that the material circulated should directly or indirectly relate to NATO.

The United Kingdom state that they could also make available for circulation Government White Papers, speeches by Ministers, etc.

In the opinion of the United States it might also be desirable to consider the more systematic sharing of other basic materials such as certain types of intelligence reports.
6. The suggestion has been made that a closer relationship might be established between NATO and the United Nations, possibly establishing the position of NATO as a regional organization in the terms of Chapter 6 of the United Nations Charter. What are the views of your Government on this question?

No Government appears to be in favour of formally establishing the position of NATO as a regional organization under the United Nations Charter.
Introduction

In the light of the general considerations advanced in the preceding chapter, closer and more effective continuing consultation on political matters of common concern between member states and a resolute effort to reconcile dissensions between them stand out as the conditions precedent to the strengthening of NATO in the political field and the further development of the Atlantic Community.

If there is to be vitality in the concept of the Atlantic Community, then NATO through its member governments must demonstrate that this international organization has something special to offer to its members which is not available to them in the United Nations or other international associations and this without in any way weakening the United Nations or these other organizations. The solid foundation of NATO is and remains the solemn basic obligation of its members to consider that an attack on one is an attack on all which will be met by the collective action of all. This commitment and the defence activities which flow from it serve to provide protection for member states and to maintain the conditions of peace and security in which international co-operation can prosper. NATO, based as it is on the developing concept of the Atlantic Community, provides in addition the means for closer co-operation in many fields other than defence.
This closer political co-operation should aim at the maintenance of the unity of the Alliance, including closer relationships in Western Europe, at a time when international tensions and the fear of military aggression may be less severe than in recent years; the development of policies which will strengthen relationships and understanding between NATO and non-NATO countries including the "uncommitted" ones; finding an effective basis of action for the Western world in the face of the continuing and complex challenge of international communism.

Any effective international co-operation requires common approaches to the solution of common problems. This ought to be easier for members of the Atlantic Community, because of the special ties between them. But this will not happen except to the extent to which member governments develop the habit of consulting one another before taking action.

Consultation will not be made more effective by declarations of intent to consult, but only by demonstrations of the will to consult through tackling of specific problems which now confront the Alliance and a willingness to re-examine purely national interests when the occasion requires in relation to the common interests of the Alliance. By the steady and persistent, if gradual development of effective procedures and habits of consultation, NATO can best achieve an effective basis for developing a common foreign policy for the Alliance in important areas of common concern.

The recommendations that follow are to be interpreted in this light: not as rigid rules but as indications by the Committee of how, in their judgment, the habit of consultation can be further developed. Their effectiveness will be judged by the extent to which they are applied to specific cases to give greater unity and strength to the Alliance.

RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Consultation

(A) Types of Consultation

The types of consultations in NATO should include:
(1) exchange of information on any matter which any member or the Secretary General considers of general interest or common concern to the Alliance;

(2) exchanging views and providing material for appreciation of current political developments;

(3) consulting with other members with a view to arriving at a general consensus in the light of which member governments would draw their own conclusions and determine national policies;

(4) consulting in certain fields of common concern to co-ordinate lines of policy and agreed action.

(B) Implementation

(1) In addition to the general understanding that member governments should inform one another on matters of common concern and interest to the Alliance, they should in particular accept the responsibility of informing the Council of any developments in their policies or positions which may significantly affect member countries or the Alliance as a whole.

(2) For the effective implementation of political consultation, the right to raise for discussion in the Council or in any subordinate body any subject from the point of view of the interests of NATO needs to be fully accepted.

(3) Member governments should not adopt firm policies in matters of concern to the whole Alliance without early advance consultation with the other members of the Alliance.

(4) Member governments should seek to develop their national policies in the light of the interests and views of other NATO governments as expressed in consultations even where no consensus or recommendations have been reached.

(5) Where a consensus has been reached, this should be taken into account in formulating national policy; when for national reasons the consensus is not followed, the government concerned should explain its reasons to the Council.
(6) Where agreement on specific policies or courses of action is reached, the Council has to proceed by way of recommendations to governments. To share in such consultation places the responsibility on all governments to see to it that full weight is given to such recommendations in arriving at their final national decisions and policies.

(7) When a major statement of an international political character may significantly affect the Alliance as a whole or some of its members, the government making or responsible for such a statement should endeavour to consult in advance through the Council.

(c) Limitations

It should be recognised that the various forms of consultation outlined above would operate in practice under certain limitations such as:

(1) that the desirability of advance consultation in NATO should not hamper prompt action in real emergencies;
(2) that the ultimate responsibility for making national policies and decisions must inevitably rest with the individual member government, taking into account the broader interests of the partnership;
(3) that consultation on domestic affairs may appropriately take place only with the agreement of the country most directly concerned, and only on those aspects which may significantly affect other members of the Alliance;
(4) that although NATO is non-universal in character, and the obligations under the Treaty do not extend beyond the NATO area, geographical considerations should not preclude discussion of questions relating to non-NATO areas when such questions concern the general interests of the Alliance;
(5) that the agenda of the Council should not be so overburdened by discussions of subsidiary political questions that consultation is delayed or hampered on matters of primary importance to the unity and common interest of the Alliance;
(D) **Peaceful Settlement of Disputes**

Members of NATO have undertaken under Article 1 of the Treaty the obligation to "settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means". Current disputes between member governments seriously threaten the unity of the Alliance. If political co-operation in NATO is to develop effectively it is of crucial importance to make progress in settling these disputes. Unless this progress is made, whether by direct negotiations between the parties concerned or within the framework of NATO, generalised recommendations on possible procedures for dealing with inter-member disputes will inevitably seem academic and serve only to draw attention to the existence of unresolved disputes. In view of the wide range of suggested procedures put forward in the replies to the questionnaire, it will be necessary for the Committee of Three to examine this question in detail in discussion with their colleagues, in order to clarify the possible procedures and to find a common basis for agreement. A possible basis may be found in the following proposals.

1. A resolution under Article 1 of the Treaty, and in accordance with Article 33 of the UN Charter, to declare the intention of NATO governments to submit in the first instance any inter-member dispute for settlement within the NATO framework.

2. A special Committee of the Council to take cognisance of any such dispute and to apply "good offices"; it would be mainly concerned with procedures and "fact-finding" without entering into substantive questions except at the request of the parties concerned.

3. A "Panel of Atlantic Community Arbitrators" composed of eminent persons and available to member governments on request of the interested parties.

4. Where appropriate and necessary, NATO to sponsor proposals for a settlement; to give general or specific support to it; or to assume definite obligations in connection with the implementation or maintenance of the settlement.
As an alternative to these proposals, the Committee recommends that the Council should without delay set up an expert Working Group in which all member governments would be asked to participate, in order to consider and draw up specific proposals on such procedures to deal with inter-member differences and disputes as may be immediately applicable to current disputes as well as to disputes which may arise in the future. The Working Group would submit its findings to the Committee of Three.

Pending the results of the study suggested above and consideration of their application to current differences, it is recommended that in the interests of the Alliance as a whole recourse should not be made to international machinery outside NATO in inter-member disputes.

E) Parliamentary associations and Parliamentary Conference

It is recognised that the formation of national Parliamentary associations and the activities of the Parliamentary Conference contribute to the development of public support for NATO and solidarity among its members. The following measures are therefore recommended for bringing these bodies into closer relationship with the Council of NATO:

1) That the Council continue to place the facilities of NATO headquarters at the disposal of Parliamentary meetings and to give all possible help with arrangements for such meetings.

2) That Parliamentary Conferences might be attended for speeches and discussion periods, by invited representatives of member governments, by the Secretary General and other senior representatives of NATO civil and military authorities. In this way the parliamentarians would be informed on the state of the Alliance and the problems before it, and so enabled to hold useful discussions.

3) That while any Parliamentary meeting might submit a report of its discussions to the Council, for the present it should be discouraged from addressing resolutions to the Council.
CHAPTER II: CO-OPERATION IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD

Introduction

1. The economic interests shared in common by the members of NATO fall into three major categories:

   (a) an interest in the economic health and growth of the member nations themselves and in harmonious relations among them which is essential to the well-being and self-confidence of the Atlantic peoples as well as to an adequate defence effort;

   (b) an interest in the successful economic development of the world's under-developed areas which is desirable as an end in itself and is essential to the Atlantic Community's own welfare, to the maintenance of freedom, and to stable and fruitful relations between these regions and the Atlantic world; and

   (c) an interest in countering and frustrating, and if possible anticipating and forestalling, those Soviet initiatives in the economic field which are intended to create division within the Alliance to subvert freedom or to strengthen Soviet political and economic influence in non-member countries.
In contrast with the military and political fields, the common economic interests of NATO members, where they require international co-operation, can be and are being pursued through other organizations whose membership generally is well adapted to the desired forms of co-operation. The outstanding instances are the OEEC (which includes all NATO countries as full or associate members and four others); the GATT, the IMF, the IBRD and the IFC, and the various United Nations specialised agencies including the Economic Commission for Europe. The work of GATT would be assisted by bringing into existence the proposed OEC. Several NATO members participate actively in the Colombo Plan for promoting economic development for Asia. Most members are taking an active part in technical assistance programmes and are also participating in discussions of proposals for the creation of a SUNFED. There are also institutions for close economic co-operation among smaller groupings of the European member nations.

It would not serve the interests of the Atlantic Community for NATO to take over the operating functions of any of these co-operative organizations, in all of which NATO members play a major part. Nor, in the Committee’s view, do there now appear to be significant new areas for common economic action requiring execution by NATO itself. The Committee believes, however, that the community of economic interest, and indeed the long run security of the North Atlantic area broadly conceived, require a substantial expansion of exchange of information and of consultation in the economic as well as in the political field. Especially where economic matters are clearly related to the political and security interests of NATO, such consultation should seek to secure a common approach on the part of member governments.
The resulting action, however, should normally be taken either bilaterally or through other international organizations.

(B) **Areas for Economic Consultation**

4. Just as in the political field, NATO's arrangements for expanded economic consultation should permit any member, or the Secretary General, to raise in the Council at any time any economic matter felt to be of significance to the Alliance. Apart from this "open agenda" principle, there are areas where the Alliance requires at least the regular interchange of information and of governmental attitudes, and in certain cases a concerted effort to reconcile views and to agree on a common course of action.

**Strengthening Members' Economies and Promoting their Economic Co-operation**

5. There now exists adequate provision for a regular assessment of each member country's general economic position, prospects and problems through the OEEC and NATO Annual Reviews. The basic requirements for economic health and growth, which are vital to the Alliance, are sound internal economic policies and organized co-operation to promote the greatest possible freedom in trade and payments, and the movements of manpower and long-term capital.

While there remains a great deal to be accomplished in these respects, the requisite machinery for co-operation among NATO members exists in other organizations. This is not felt to be an appropriate field for new NATO arrangements.

6. On the other hand, issues may arise, affecting the economic health of the Atlantic Community, where NATO may be the only effective organization for consultation because of their partly political character or because of their relation to the
common defence. On both these counts NATO might be properly concerned, for example, with the assurance of oil supplies for Western Europe and with the adequacy of action for the development of atomic power. Economic aspects of defence, including questions of economic mobilisation and stockpiling of civilian supplies are already under review in NATO; such matters should continue to be a regular concern of the organization.

7. One important new area of this type, especially appropriate for NATO consultation, is the field of scientific and technical co-operation. This includes not only the problem of adequate recruitment and training of scientists and technicians, but also the exchange of scientific information and co-operation in scientific research. The Committee recommends:

(to be completed on the basis of Dr. Major's report).

Conflicts in Economic Policies of Member Countries

8. The Committee distinguishes between disagreements on economic policy which are the normal subject of bilateral negotiation or multilateral discussion in other organizations, and economic disputes which may have political or strategic repercussions damaging to the Alliance. Nothing would be gained by merely having repeated in NATO the same arguments made in other and more technically specialized organizations; to do so might even weaken the effectiveness of NATO in seeking to resolve disputes of genuine political or strategic importance. On the other hand, it should be open to members to raise for discussion in NATO issues on which they feel consideration elsewhere is not making adequate progress and NATO consultation might facilitate solutions contributing to the objectives of the Atlantic Community.
The Committee of Three: from left to right, Mr Halvard Lange, Prof. Gaetano Makino, and Mr L. B. Pearson.

Relations with Under-Developed Areas

10. It is a matter of common consent that the Atlantic Community has a major positive concern with the assurance of political stability and freedom in the under-developed areas and consequently with their healthy and accelerated economic development. It is likewise agreed that NATO is not an appropriate agency for administering programmes of assistance for economic development or even for generallyconcerting the relevant policies of member nations. The Committee recommends that member countries keep each other and the Organization informed of their programmes and policies in this field, and that there be occasional discussion in NATO of the adequacy of existing action in relation to the interests of the Alliance, including the degree of priority which should be given to areas of particular concern to the Atlantic Community.

Soviet Economic Initiatives

11. Because of its unique political basis, NATO is the only major international organization in which governments can exchange information and views freely and frankly on Soviet economic initiatives. The recent tendency of Soviet policy to use economic measures as a deliberate means of weakening the Western Alliance, or of creating in neutral areas a dangerous degree of dependence on the Soviet world, makes it especially important that NATO undertake systematic consultation in this field.
12. The Committee recommends that NATO continue its regular reporting on economic trends in Soviet countries (including the comparison with member countries) and trends in Soviet economic policy. To this end, governments should undertake to report relevant information regularly, and there should be periodic meetings of experts on Soviet economic affairs drawn from the various capitals. In addition to the exchange of information, there should be periodic discussion of the implications of such trends for the Alliance and of possible lines of action which might be taken by member governments individually or co-operatively.

Where general Soviet initiatives are made in the field of economic policy (as in the case of the proposal for "all-European economic co-operation" presented to the ECE in Geneva last April), there should be NATO consultation concerning the possible lines of response by member countries.

13. With respect to Soviet commercial relations with member countries, arrangements should be made for periodic meetings of officials involved in Soviet bloc commercial negotiations for an exchange of information and views. In the case of an important new Soviet commercial or financial proposal to any member country, with possible political implications, it would be desirable for the member concerned to bring it to the attention of the Council. In connection with strategic controls on Eastern Europe and China, it would be desirable to review in NATO from time to time the broader political and strategic aspects of the control arrangements and to seek agreement on the lines of action in this area most conducive to the welfare of the Atlantic Community.

14. The Alliance also has a positive interest in the more complex and difficult field of Soviet economic relations with non-members, especially the under-developed countries. The Committee welcomes the first steps in the exchange of information on this
topic in the Committee on Soviet Economic Policy, and believes that exchange of information in this field should be a continuing function of NATO. Whether a particular Soviet initiative should be countered by member countries is a matter for ad hoc consideration on which no attempt at advance generalisation is possible. It would clearly not be desirable to engage in indiscriminate competition with the Soviets, but in any event NATO consultation in this field would be highly advantageous to the Alliance. Member governments and the Secretary General should bring to the Council's attention any case in which they feel that failure to respond to, or to forestall, a Soviet initiative may significantly contribute to Soviet penetration or diminished independence in any area important to the Atlantic Community. Governments may then exchange views and consider the possibility of positive action, even if this requires an exceptional departure from the basic foreign economic policies of the West. In this as in other economic fields, however, any indicated action would be undertaken not by NATO as such, but by individual governments or appropriate organizations.

(C) Relations with Other Organizations

15. For reasons already outlined, the co-operative economic actions required by members in the interests of the Atlantic Alliance are best carried out through organizations other than NATO itself. NATO should not, as such, seek to establish formal relations with these other organizations and the harmonising of attitudes and of action should rather be left to member governments. With respect to the organizations composed wholly of free countries, it is neither necessary nor desirable for NATO members to seek to form a common policy front. Creation of a "NATO bloc" within such organizations would be positively harmful and tend to alienate the other members. Exceptional issues arising in such
organizations, with special political or strategic interest to NATO, may be raised for discussion by any member or the Secretary General. With respect to international economic organizations in which the Soviets participate, notably the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the Economic Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, and the Economic and Social Council - the Committee recommends that consultation be scheduled by the Secretary General in advance of each meeting to review the agenda, identify points in which Atlantic interests may be attacked or endangered, consider possible Western initiatives, and where appropriate, establish a general community of attitude. Western tactics, as distinct from broad policies, should be concerted by national delegations at the respective organizations; in suitable cases this may include free nations not members of NATO. There should be neither the fact nor the appearance of a formal NATO bloc, and there should certainly be no attempt to direct Western tactics in such organizations from the Palais de Chaillot. On the other hand, consultations in NATO should go sufficiently far to assure the frustration of Soviet tactics deliberately designed to divide or weaken the Alliance.

(D) NATO Machinery for Economic Consultation

There has been, in recent months, a considerable evolution in NATO's machinery for economic consultation, notably in the work on Soviet economic trends and policies, including Soviet economic penetration in under-developed countries and the creation of the Committee of Technical Advisers. In addition, a number of economic matters have been brought before the Council for consideration on an ad hoc basis. No substantial new machinery in this field is called for. However, in view of the extended range of topics for regular exchange of information and consultation...
described above the Committee recommends Council consideration of
establishing on a permanent basis a Committee of the Council
under some such title as "Economic Advisory Committee". This
Committee if established would be entrusted with the regular exchange
of information and preliminary discussion, in those areas of system-
atic consultation outlined above, together with such ad hoc projects
as might be initiated by the Council or approved by the Council at
the Committee's request. Any continuing function of the Committee
of Technical Advisers would be absorbed by the Economic Advisory
Committee. Membership should be flexible, governments being
represented by highly qualified specialists as the topics under
consideration may require. The highly specialised character of
Soviet economic studies might make it desirable to retain this respon-
sibility with the Committee on Soviet Economic Policy. In any
event, whether or not a Economic Advisory Committee is
established, arrangements should be made for more meetings of
officials who are dealing currently with various economic matters
important to the Alliance, such as Soviet commercial negotiations,
trends in under-developed countries, scientific and technical co-
operation, and the like. Informal discussion among officials with
corresponding specialised responsibilities is a particularly
valuable means of concerting governmental attitudes in the earliest
stages of policy formation.

(B) Conclusion

The Committee has carefully reviewed the question of
whether the obligations of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty
call for additional action by NATO as such. The Committee regards
the objectives of Article 2 as of basic importance to the stability
and well-being not only of the North Atlantic area but of the
entire free world. In their considered judgment, however, these
objectives will best be fostered by continued and enhanced economic
collaboration both bilaterally and through organizations other than
NATO, but reinforced by NATO consultation where the interests of
the Alliance are involved. It is a misconception of Article 2
to believe that its purpose can be achieved only through NATO
action. The Organization should make clear to the world how
vigorously these objectives are being pursued by its members and
how NATO's action effectively complements their action through
other channels.
CHAPTER III: CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

Introduction

Durable unity within the Atlantic Alliance can be constructed and will be maintained only on the firm foundation of strong popular support throughout the NATO area. A sense of community must bind the people as well as the institutions of the Atlantic nations and this sense of community will exist in the measure that there is a realisation of their common cultural heritage, institutions and modes of thought. The Committee therefore considers it indispensable for the NATO countries to seek all practical means to promote cultural co-operation among their peoples in order to strengthen their relations and to develop maximum support for the Atlantic Alliance. In view of the geographical characteristics of the NATO area, it is particularly important to ensure that the Community's cultural activities should be strongly trans-Atlantic in nature, although this should not preclude member governments from acting on a multilateral or bilateral basis, to strengthen their own cultural relations within the broader Atlantic framework.

The Committee welcomes the cultural activities which have been initiated by private individuals and non-governmental groups. The Committee considers it essential that those sources of initiative be encouraged to pursue and increase their activities. Care should be exercised to avoid government initiative duplicating or dominating cultural activities by non-governmental groups. Both have important rôles to play, with government activities supporting and supplementing private efforts.

Recommendations

(A) General Principles

To promote effective cultural collaboration within the Atlantic Alliance, the Committee suggests that member governments

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should be guided by the following general principles:

1. In advocating and implementing cultural projects, member governments should make the most effective use of existing resources and concentrate on projects not already adequately covered from the NATO point of view.

2. As distinct from action by national governments or private groups, member governments should give priority to those projects which require joint NATO action, and thus contribute to a developing sense of community.

3. Member governments should give special emphasis to cultural projects which will tend to generate similar initiatives by private groups and institutions in other NATO countries.

4. In their consideration of all proposed cultural projects, member governments should include a realistic appreciation of the financial implications. To the extent that agreement can be reached within the Alliance on useful cultural projects, based on practical and equitable financial and administrative arrangements, member governments should at the same time be prepared to pay their fair share of the cost of such projects.

(B) Specific Proposals

1. In order to develop public awareness and knowledge of the Atlantic Community, and to provide a link between the institutions of the Atlantic area and public opinion, member governments should support the principle of the establishment of a common research institute for Atlantic Community studies. This type of undertaking requires thorough study; member governments should therefore seek
This year, for the first time, NATO helped to finance undertakings initiated by a member government or a private organization (the Oxford University seminar, and the Study Conference on "The Role of the School in the Atlantic Community"). This method of joint financing NATO cultural projects proved to be useful and should be used more extensively.
CHAPTER IV: CO-OPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD

Introduction and General Principles

Wide popular support throughout the Atlantic area is the indispensable basis for the strength and cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance. The maintenance and growth of this favourable public opinion depend mainly on the existence at all times of a clear understanding of NATO's aspirations and accomplishments in every field of its activities. The Committee hopes that its recommendations on political and economic consultations will lead to greater opportunities for expanding NATO information work and for widening NATO appeal to public opinion.

In particular the Committee invites the attention of member governments to the following principles which appear basic for effective NATO information activities:

(a) the primary objective of NATO information activities must be public opinion in the NATO area. The attitude taken towards NATO in non-NATO areas will be influenced to the extent that the peoples of the Alliance have themselves firm conviction about NATO's purposes and accomplishments;

(b) the maintenance of a loyal and favourable public opinion in NATO countries greatly depends on the degree of agreement which is found in member states on the basic concepts and objectives of NATO co-operation.

The understanding of NATO objectives is necessary outside the NATO area if the efforts of member governments towards the fulfilment of the aims and purposes of the Alliance are to be viewed sympathetically, and if their political and economic co-operation is not to be misinterpreted by governments not members of the Organization.
Positive action by NATO to counter communist propaganda will help to develop better mutual understanding within and outside the Atlantic area. The Committee believes there is scope in this particular field for improving liaison between member governments on all matters of information dealing with the Soviet and satellite countries, comparable to the current exchange of information on the subject of contacts with Soviet and satellite countries.

NATO information activities should not extend into fields which more appropriately belong to national information services of member governments. The task of explaining and reporting on NATO activities on the basis of factual information rests primarily with national information services of each member government. Publicity, however, for the bonds and common traditions which unite them is a field which NATO should jointly cultivate with members of the Alliance.

The Committee appreciates that no rigid dividing line is possible and that national requirements and practices have to be taken fully into account. The formulation of national information policies, however, should provide enough scope and range to enable member governments to discharge effectively their commitments and responsibilities towards NATO.

(5) Specific Proposals

1. The Information Division of NATO should not concern itself exclusively with the presentation of factual information about the Organization but should, when required, provide national services with special studies on matters of common interest to member governments, although these studies may not necessarily deal with NATO.
Further study should be given to ways and means of improving co-ordination of efforts by individual governments in the propaganda field, both in regard to the uncommitted countries and the Soviet and satellite countries.

Member governments should now direct their attention to informing the peoples of the uncommitted countries of the defensive, as well as the non-military, aspects of the Atlantic Community. This might be achieved by information activities conducted by the diplomatic missions of the various NATO governments in these countries, and designed to remove mistaken impressions about NATO.

NATO governments should also pool their experience relating to the dissemination of information aimed at Soviet and satellite countries. The Committee on Information and Cultural Relations could be used for this purpose.

2. Member governments are already doing valuable work on a bilateral basis in sponsoring visits of professional groups. In this connection, special mention may be made of the United States' Technical Assistance Programme which has enabled an important number of European technicians and skilled workers to acquaint themselves with the United States and working conditions there. Indirectly, such visits serve to develop a feeling of community between the peoples of the countries concerned. Member governments should recognise the need to develop such bilateral exchanges and, whenever possible, give them a NATO flavour.

It is generally recognised that great benefit has accrued to NATO through the Journalists' Tours sponsored by the Organization. These tours should, therefore, be continued but their character, it is felt, should now be changed. They should no longer be confined to journalists but should include trade union...
and youth leaders, lecturers, etc.

NATO should also organize conferences of a few days' duration for a wider variety of professional groups.

The success of undertakings of this kind largely depends on the quality of participants. Governments are therefore urged to pay special attention to the selection of suitably qualified representatives.

3. The Committee on Information and Cultural Relations is being increasingly used to achieve closer co-operation between the NATO Information Division and national information services.

To further co-operation in the information field, the following additional practical measures are suggested:

(1) An officer should be designated by national information services to maintain liaison with NATO and to be responsible for the dissemination of NATO information material;

(2) Governments should report to NATO the information programmes which they plan to implement, with a view to subjecting these programmes to review and discussion in the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations. Representatives of national information services from capitals might usefully be encouraged to take part in these discussions and to attend normal meetings of the Committee;

(3) Governments should actively consider making practical use of and give financial aid, if necessary, to private organizations supporting NATO. They should encourage the establishment of closer relations between such organizations and the NATO Information Division;

(4) Within the Information Division budget, provision should be made for a translation fund so that NATO information material can be translated into the non-official languages of the Alliance, according to reasonable requirements of the member governments.

4. Widespread public understanding of the implications of political consultation within NATO is essential if NATO is to be considered more than a military alliance.

It will always be a question of judgment, however, to determine the extent to which information should be given regarding the political activities of the Alliance, as the advantages of publicity must be balanced against security requirements.

Insofar as possible, NATO should inform the public when a collective view is reached or when an important decision has been taken. When appropriate, more use should be made in Ministerial statements to national parliaments of the phrase "consultation with our NATO Allies."

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CHAPTER V: ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

Introduction

The Committee considers that the structure of NATO is generally capable of performing the tasks expected of it. The Committee is not therefore proposing any basic structural changes, but has certain procedural measures to suggest to the Secretary General and to member governments to facilitate the implementation of its recommendations.

One primary consideration for the development of fuller and franker consultations is respect for their confidential character, and the observation of strict security measures.

Meetings at Ministerial Level

1. More time should be allowed at the Ministerial meetings in order to permit thorough consideration of the important issues on the agenda.

2. Efforts should be made to encourage discussion rather than declarations of policy prepared in advance. The agendas should be prepared with this aim in view. For the discussions of Ministers possibly some mixing of the two official languages' rule may be needed on occasion.

3. Foreign Ministers should meet more frequently. Certain of these meetings might be held from time to time in other NATO countries. They should also more frequently participate in regular Council meetings, even though not all Foreign Ministers may find it convenient to attend such meetings at the same time.

Meetings of Permanent Representatives

1. Problems on the agenda of ministerial meetings should be thoroughly and frankly examined and relevant proposals prepared before Ministers meet. For this purpose it may be found necessary for governments to send senior experts ad hoc to consult on agenda items.
In the case of consultations on special subjects, more use should be made of senior experts to assist permanent delegations by calling them, on an ad hoc basis, to do preparatory work.

Consideration might be given to the possibility of occasional meetings of the Council with the participation of the permanent official heads of foreign ministries or "ministerial delegates".

Governments may wish to review their arrangements for more effective presentation of their policies and views in these meetings, and for follow-up action in the different national capitals, in the light of their varying governmental practices.

More frequent meetings will presumably be necessary to discharge the additional responsibilities suggested in this report. It may be found desirable to separate their consultations on important questions from the routine aspects of their work.

Political questions for discussion in the Council should be previously reviewed and discussed in the Working Group on Soviet Trends, the role of which should be extended accordingly and supported by further ad hoc experts. The Chairman of the Working Group should be responsible for contacts with delegations to ensure the orderly selection of subjects for discussion, to enable governments to be informed in advance, and to give them time to formulate their considered views.

Member governments should in the general interest of the Alliance make available "basic position material" to one another through NATO for background information. This would help the Alliance as a whole in the consideration of problems of common concern and would assist individual governments to understand more fully the reasons for the position adopted by any member country on a particular issue which might be its special concern, but which might also affect in varying degrees other members of NATO.
The Secretary General and the Staff

To provide continuity and assistance in the development of a common NATO perspective the role of the Secretary General and the staff needs to be enhanced. In particular:

(1) The Secretary General should be free to propose items for the agenda of the Council.

(2) The Secretary General should be responsible for directing consultations (with the Deputy Secretary General and the Assistant Secretaries General for Political and Economic Affairs and his advisers and assistants in this work.)

Member governments should undertake to keep the Secretary General and his advisers fully informed through their permanent delegations of their governments' thinking on questions of common concern to the Alliance, if possible in advance of Council discussions.

(4) Through periodic visits to member governments and through personal consultations, the Secretary General should be encouraged to use his good offices, on an informal basis, whenever this might be helpful for reconciling diverging interests.

(5) Member governments should invite the Secretary General to submit to the Council in Ministerial Session an annual report on the "state of the Alliance", designed to provide member governments with a frank critical assessment of the progress and present and potential problems of the Alliance.

(6) The Secretary General, with the co-operation of member governments should make the appropriate staff arrangements for the effective implementation of the recommendations in this report.
INTRODUCTION

Closer and more effective continuing consultation on political matters of common concern between member states and a resolute effort to reconcile dissensions between them stand out as the conditions precedent to the strengthening of NATO in the political field and the further development of the Atlantic Community.

If there is to be vitality in the concept of the Atlantic Community, then NATO through its member governments must demonstrate that this international organization has something special to offer to its members which is not available to them in the United Nations or other international associations and this without in any way weakening the United Nations or these other organizations. The solid foundation of NATO is and remains the solemn basic obligation of its members to consider that an attack on one is an attack on all which will be met by the collective action of all. This commitment and the defence activities which flow from it serve to provide protection for member states and to maintain the conditions of peace and security in which international co-operation can prosper. NATO, based as it is on the developing concept of the Atlantic Community, provides in addition the means for closer co-operation in many fields other than defence.
This closer political co-operation should aim at the maintenance of the unity of the Alliance, including closer relationships in Western Europe, at a time when international tensions and the fear of military aggression may be less severe than in recent years; the development of policies which will strengthen relationships and understanding between NATO and non-NATO countries including the "uncommitted" ones; finding an effective basis of action for the Western world in the face of the continuing and complex challenge of international communism.

Any effective international co-operation requires common approaches to the solution of common problems. This ought to be easier for members of the Atlantic Community, because of the special ties between them. But this will not happen except to the extent to which member governments develop the habit of consulting one another before taking action.

Consultation will not be made more effective by declarations of intent to consult, but only by demonstrations of the will to consult through tackling of specific problems which now confront the Alliance and a willingness to re-examine purely national interests when the occasion requires in relation to the common interests of the Alliance. By the steady and persistent, if gradual development of effective procedures and habits of consultation, NATO can best achieve an effective basis for developing a common foreign policy for the Alliance in important areas of common concern.

The recommendations that follow are to be interpreted in this light: not as rigid rules but as indications by the Committee of how, in their judgment, the habit of consultation can be further developed. Their effectiveness will be judged by the extent to which they are applied to specific cases to give greater unity and strength to the Alliance.

RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Consultation

(A) Types of Consultation

The types of consultations in NATO should include:
(1) exchange of information on any matter which any member or the Secretary General considers of general interest or common concern to the Alliance;

(2) exchanging views and providing material for appreciation of current political developments;

(3) consulting with other members with a view to arriving at a general consensus in the light of which member governments would draw their own conclusions and determine national policies;

(4) consulting in certain fields of common concern to co-ordinate lines of policy and agreed action.

(B) Implementation

(1) In addition to the general understanding that member governments should inform one another on matters of common concern and interest to the Alliance, they should in particular accept the responsibility of informing the Council of any developments in their policies or positions which may significantly affect member countries or the Alliance as a whole.

(2) For the effective implementation of political consultation, the right to raise for discussion in the Council or in any subordinate body any subject from the point of view of the interests of NATO needs to be fully accepted.

(3) Member governments should not adopt firm policies in matters of concern to the whole Alliance without early advance consultation with the other members of the Alliance.

(4) Member governments should seek to develop their national policies in the light of the interests and views of other NATO governments as expressed in consultations even where no consensus or recommendations have been reached.

(5) Where a consensus has been reached, this should be taken into account in formulating national policy: when for national reasons the consensus is not followed, the government concerned should explain its reasons to the Council.
(6) Where agreement on specific policies or courses of action is reached, the Council has to proceed by way of recommendations to governments. To share in such consultation places the responsibility on all governments to see to it that full weight is given to such recommendations in arriving at their final national decisions and policies.

(7) When a major statement of an international political character may significantly affect the Alliance as a whole or some of its members, the government making or responsible for such a statement should endeavour to consult in advance through the Council.

(c) Limitations

It should be recognised that the various forms of consultation outlined above would operate in practice under certain limitations such as:

1. that the desirability of advance consultation in NATO should not hamper prompt action in real emergencies;
2. that the ultimate responsibility for making national policies and decisions must inevitably rest with the individual member government, taking into account the broader interests of the partnership;
3. that consultation on domestic affairs may appropriately take place only with the agreement of the country most directly concerned, and only on those aspects which may significantly affect other members of the Alliance;
4. that although NATO is non-universal in character, and the obligations under the Treaty do not extend beyond the NATO area, geographical considerations should not preclude discussion of questions relating to non-NATO areas when such questions concern the general interests of the Alliance;
5. that the agenda of the Council should not be so overburdened by discussions of subsidiary political questions that consultation is delayed or hampered on matters of primary importance to the unity and common interest of the Alliance;
II. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

Members of NATO have undertaken under Article 1 of the Treaty the obligation to "settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means". Current disputes between member governments seriously threaten the unity of the Alliance. If political co-operation in NATO is to develop effectively it is of crucial importance to make progress in settling these disputes. Unless this progress is made, whether by direct negotiations between the parties concerned or within the framework of NATO, generalised recommendations on possible procedures for dealing with inter-member disputes will inevitably seem academic and serve only to draw attention to the existence of unresolved disputes. In view of the wide range of suggested procedures put forward in the replies to the questionnaire, it will be necessary for the Committee of Three to examine this question in detail in discussion with their colleagues, in order to clarify the possible procedures and to find a common basis for agreement. A possible basis may be found in the following proposals.

(1) A resolution under Article 1 of the Treaty, and in accordance with Article 33 of the UN Charter, to declare the intention of NATO governments to submit in the first instance any inter-member dispute for settlement within the NATO framework.

(2) A special Committee of the Council to take cognizance of any such dispute and to apply "good offices"; it would be mainly concerned with procedures and "fact-finding" without entering into substantive questions except at the request of the parties concerned.

(3) A "Panel of Atlantic Community Arbitrators" composed of eminent persons and available to member governments on request of the interested parties.

(4) Where appropriate and necessary, NATO to sponsor proposals for a settlement; to give general or specific support to such a settlement; or to assume definite obligations in connection with its implementation or maintenance of the settlement.
If the above proposals do not provide an acceptable basis the Committee recommends that the Council should without delay set up an expert Working Group in which all member governments would be asked to participate, in order to consider and draw up specific proposals on procedures to deal with inter-member differences and disputes which would be immediately applicable to current disputes as well as to more which may arise in the future. The Working Group would submit its findings to the Committee of Three.

Pending action on those proposals and consideration of their application to current differences, it is recommended that in the interests of the Alliance as a whole recourse should not be made to international machinery outside NATO in inter-member disputes.

III. Parliamentary associations and Parliamentary Conference

It is recognised that the formation of national Parliamentary associations and the activities of the Parliamentary Conference contribute to the development of public support for NATO and solidarity among its members. The following measures are therefore recommended for bringing these bodies into closer relationship with the Council of NATO:

(1) That the Council continue to place the facilities of NATO headquarters at the disposal of Parliamentary meetings and to give all possible help with arrangements for such meetings.

(2) That Parliamentary Conferences might be attended (for speeches and discussion periods) by invited representatives of member governments and by the Secretary General and other senior representatives of NATO civil and military authorities. In this way the parliamentarians would be informed on the state of the Alliance and the problems before it, and so enabled to hold useful discussions.
(3) That while any Parliamentary meeting might submit a report of its discussions to the Council, for the present it should be discouraged from addressing resolutions to the Council.
CHAPTER II: CO-OPERATION IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD

(A) INTRODUCTION

1. The economic interests shared in common by the members of NATO fall into three major categories:

(a) an interest in the economic health and growth of the member nations themselves and in harmonious relations among them which are essential to the well-being and self-confidence of the Atlantic peoples as well as to an adequate defence effort;

(b) an interest in the successful economic development of the world's underdeveloped areas which is desirable as an end in itself and is essential to the Atlantic Community's own welfare, to the maintenance of freedom, and to stable and fruitful relations between these regions and the Atlantic world; and

(c) an interest in countering and frustrating, and if possible anticipating and forestalling, those Soviet initiatives in the economic field which are intended to create division within the Alliance, to subvert freedom, or to strengthen Soviet political and economic influence in non-member countries.
2. In contrast with the military and political fields, the common economic interests of NATO members, where they require international co-operation, can be and are being pursued through other organizations whose membership generally is well adapted to the desired forms of co-operation. The outstanding instances are the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) (which includes all NATO countries as full or associate members and four others); the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the various United Nations specialized agencies including the Economic Commission for Europe. The work of GATT would be assisted by the establishment of the proposed Organization for Trade Co-operation (OTC). Several NATO members participate actively in the Colombo Plan for promoting economic development for Asia. Most members are taking an active part in technical assistance programmes and are also participating in discussions of proposals for the creation of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED). There are also institutions for close economic co-operation among smaller groupings of the European member nations.

3. It would not serve the interests of the Atlantic Community for NATO to take over or duplicate the operating functions of any of these organizations, in all of which NATO members play a major part. Nor, in the Committee's view, do there now appear to be significant new areas for common economic action requiring execution by NATO itself. The Committee believes, however, that the community of economic interest, and indeed the long run security of the North Atlantic area broadly conceived, require a substantial expansion of exchange of information and of consultation in the economic as well as in the political field. Especially where economic matters are clearly related to the political and security interests of NATO, such consultation should seek to secure a common approach on the part of member governments.
The resulting action, however, should normally be taken by Governments either directly or through other international organizations.

(B) AREAS FOR ECONOMIC CONSULTATION.

4. Just as in the political field, NATO's arrangements for expanded economic consultation should permit any member, or the Secretary General, to raise in the Council at any time any economic matter felt to be of significance to the Alliance. Apart from this "open agenda" principle, there are areas where the Alliance requires at least a regular interchange of information and views and in certain cases a concerted effort to reach a consensus on a common course of action.

Strengthening Members' Economies and Promoting their Economic Co-operation

5. There now exists adequate provision for a regular assessment of each member country's general economic position, prospects and problems through the OEEC and NATO Annual Reviews. The basic requirements for economic health and growth, which are vital to the Alliance, are sound internal economic policies and organized co-operation to promote the greatest possible freedom in trade and payments and in the movements of manpower and long-term capital. While there remains a great deal to be accomplished in these respects, the requisite machinery for co-operation among NATO members exists in other organizations. This is not felt to be an appropriate field for new NATO arrangements.

6. On the other hand, issues may arise, affecting the economic health of the Atlantic Community, where NATO may be the only effective organization for consultation because of their political implications or because of their relation to the
common defence. On both these counts NATO might be properly concerned, for example, with the assurance of oil supplies for Western Europe and with the adequacy of action for the development of atomic power. Economic aspects of defence, including questions of economic mobilisation and stockpiling of civilian supplies are already receiving some attention in NATO; such matters should continue to be a regular concern of the organization.

7. One important new area, especially appropriate for NATO consultation, is the field of scientific and technical co-operation. This includes not only the problem of adequate recruitment and training of scientists and technicians, but also the exchange of scientific information and co-operation in scientific research. The Committee recommends:

(to be completed in an addendum)

Conflicts in Economic Policies of Member Countries

8. The Committee distinguishes between disagreements on economic policy which are normally dealt with through bilateral negotiation or multilateral discussion in other organizations, and on the other hand economic disputes which may have political or strategic repercussions damaging to the Alliance. Nothing would be gained by merely having repeated in NATO the same arguments made in other and more technically specialised organizations; to do so might even weaken the effectiveness of NATO in seeking to resolve disputes of genuine political or strategic importance. It should however be open to members to raise for discussion in NATO issues on which they feel that consideration elsewhere is not making adequate progress and that NATO consultation might facilitate solutions contributing to the objectives of the Atlantic Community.
9. Whenever an aggrieved member government or the Secretary General considers that an unresolved dispute in the economic field may involve dangerous political or strategic consequences for NATO as a whole, the procedures for peaceful settlement under NATO auspices as described under Section II of Chapter I, should be applicable.

Relations with Under-Developed Areas

10. It is a matter of common consent that the Atlantic Community has a major positive concern with the assurance of political stability and freedom in the under-developed areas and consequently with their healthy and accelerated economic development. It is likewise agreed that NATO is not an appropriate agency for administering programmes of assistance for economic development or even for systematically co-ordinating the relevant policies of member nations. The Committee recommends that member countries keep each other and the Organization informed of their programmes and policies in this field, and that there be occasional discussion in NATO of the adequacy of existing action in relation to the interests of the Alliance, including the degree of priority which should be given to areas of particular concern to the Atlantic Community.

Soviet Economic Initiatives

11. Because of its unique political basis, NATO is the only major international organization in which governments can exchange information and views freely and frankly on Soviet economic initiatives. The recent tendency of Soviet policy to use economic measures as a deliberate means of weakening the Western Alliance, or of creating in neutral areas a dangerous degree of dependence on the Soviet world, it makes it especially important that NATO undertake systematic consultation in this field.
12. The Committee recommends that NATO continue its regular reporting on economic trends in Soviet countries (including the comparison with member countries) and developments in Soviet economic policy. To this end, governments should undertake to report relevant information regularly, and there should be periodic meetings of experts on Soviet economic affairs drawn from the various capitals. In addition to the exchange of information, there should be periodic discussion of the implications of such trends for the Alliance and of possible lines of action which might be taken by member governments individually or co-operatively. Where general Soviet initiatives are made in the field of economic policy (as in the case of the proposal for "all-European economic co-operation" presented to the ECE in Geneva last April), there should be NATO consultation concerning the possible lines of response by member countries.

13. With respect to Soviet commercial relations with member countries, arrangements should be made for periodic meetings of officials involved in Soviet bloc commercial negotiations for an exchange of information and views. In the case of an important new Soviet commercial or financial proposal to any member country, with possible political implications, it would be desirable for the member concerned to bring it to the attention of the Council. In connection with strategic controls on trade with the Soviet bloc and Communist China, it would be desirable to review in NATO from time to time the broader aspects of the control arrangements and to seek agreement on the lines of action in this area most conducive to the security and welfare of the Atlantic Community.

14. The Alliance also has a positive interest in the more complex and difficult field of Soviet economic relations with non-members, especially the under-developed countries. The Committee welcomes the first steps in the exchange of information on this
topic in the Committee on Soviet Economic Policy, and believes that exchange of information in this field should be a continuing function of NATO. Whether a particular Soviet initiative should be countered by member countries is a matter for ad hoc consideration on which no attempt at advance generalisation is possible. It would clearly not be desirable to engage in indiscriminate competition with the Soviets, but in any event NATO consultation in this field would be highly advantageous to the Alliance. Member governments and the Secretary General should bring to the Council's attention any case in which they consider that failure to respond to, or to forestall, a Soviet initiative may significantly contribute to Soviet penetration or to diminished independence in any area important to the Atlantic Community. Governments may then exchange views and consider the possibility of positive action, even if this requires an exceptional departure from the basic foreign economic policies of the West. In this as in other economic fields, however, any indicated action would be undertaken not by NATO as such, but by individual governments or appropriate organizations.

(C) RELATIONS WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

15. For reasons already outlined, the co-operative economic actions required by members in the interests of the Atlantic Alliance are best carried out through organizations other than NATO itself. NATO should not, as such, seek to establish formal relations with these other organizations and the harmonising of attitudes and of action should rather be left to member governments. With respect to the organizations composed wholly of free countries, it is neither necessary nor desirable for NATO members to seek to form a common policy front. Creation of a "NATO bloc" within such organizations would be positively harmful and tend to alienate the other members. Exceptional issues arising in such
organizations, with special political or strategic interest to NATO, may be raised for discussion by any member or the Secretary General.

16. On the other hand with respect to international economic organizations in which the Soviets participate - notably the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the Economic Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, and the Economic and Social Council - the Committee recommends that consultation be scheduled by the Secretary General in advance of each meeting to review the agenda, identify points in which Atlantic interests may be attacked or endangered, consider possible Western initiatives, and where appropriate, establish a general community of attitude. Western tactics, as distinct from broad policies, should be concerted by national delegations at the respective organizations; in suitable cases this may include free nations not members of NATO. There should be neither the fact nor the appearance of a formal NATO bloc, and there should certainly be no attempt to direct Western tactics in such organizations from the Palais de Chaillot. On the other hand, consultations in NATO should go sufficiently far to assure the frustration of Soviet tactics deliberately designed to divide or weaken the Alliance.

(b) NATO MACHINERY FOR ECONOMIC CONSULTATION

17. There has been, in recent months, a considerable evolution in NATO's machinery for economic consultation, notably in the work on Soviet economic trends and policies, including Soviet economic penetration in under-developed countries and the creation of the Committee of Technical Advisers. In addition, a number of economic matters have been brought before the Council for consideration on an ad hoc basis. No substantial new machinery in this field is called for. However, in view of the extended range of topics for regular exchange of information and consultation
CHAPTER III: CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

INTRODUCTION

Durable unity within the Atlantic Alliance can be constructed and will be maintained only on the firm foundation of strong popular support throughout the NATO area. A sense of community must bind the people as well as the institutions of the Atlantic nations and this sense of community will exist in the measure that there is a realisation of their common cultural heritage, institutions and modes of thought. The Committee therefore considers it indispensable for the NATO countries to seek all practical means to promote cultural co-operation among their peoples in order to strengthen their relations and to develop maximum support for the Atlantic Alliance. In view of the geographical characteristics of the NATO area, it is particularly important to ensure that the Community's cultural activities should be strongly trans-Atlantic in nature, although this should not preclude member governments from acting on a multilateral or bilateral basis, to strengthen their own cultural relations within the broader Atlantic framework.

The Committee welcomes the cultural activities which have been initiated by private individuals and non-governmental groups. The Committee considers it essential that those sources of initiative be encouraged to pursue and increase their activities. Care should be exercised to avoid government initiative duplicating cultural activities by non-governmental groups. Both have important roles to play, with government activities supporting and supplementing private efforts.

RECOMMENDATIONS

(A) General Principles

To promote effective cultural collaboration within the Atlantic Alliance, the Committee suggests that member governments
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position to influence public opinion. This would involve broadening the basis of the College and adjusting its curriculum.

2. Youth movements being voluntary in character, cooperation between youth organizations of member countries is the responsibility of the organizations themselves. Governments should, however, actively promote closer relations between NATO and youth organizations. The recent Conference of Representatives of youth organizations of member countries held in Paris in July under NATO auspices, served a useful purpose from the point of view of the Organization. NATO should sponsor such gatherings annually. Liaison between NATO and youth organizations would be facilitated by the creation of a post of "Youth Specialist" within the International Staff.

3. The latest NATO study on co-operation in the cultural field(1) shows that there are a number of areas which could be usefully explored, especially with respect to education. The proposals put forward are, it is felt, susceptible of developing a better appreciation of the aims of the Alliance, and are worthy of support by member governments and NATO.

(1) Report of the Meeting of Senior Officers concerned with Government-sponsored Cultural Activities, document AC/52-D/178
4. Examples of educational and related activities which NATO or member governments might appropriately support, are listed below:

   (1) Summer schools or seminars along the lines of the course held this summer at Oxford University, aimed at attracting nationals from member countries in a position to influence public opinion.

   (2) Visiting Professorships.

   (3) The creation of university chairs of Atlantic studies.

   (4) The use of NATO information material in the schools.

   (5) The establishment of special NATO awards for students.

   (6) Exchange of persons programmes designed particularly to strengthen trans-Atlantic ties.

5. Governments might also review their financial and other policies affecting travel between different parts of the Atlantic area in the light of the importance attached to easier and more frequent contacts among the peoples of the various member countries.

6. In view of the importance of promoting better understanding and goodwill between NATO service personnel, it would be desirable to extend exchanges of such personnel beyond the limits of normal training programmes. Since such schemes involve practical difficulties, they might, as a first step, be developed by governments on a bilateral basis. In addition, member governments should try to enlist the support of the Atlantic Treaty Association and other voluntary organizations, for any exchange of service personnel programmes that might be developed. NATO military authorities could give considerable assistance in implementing schemes of this kind.

7. The method of financing NATO cultural projects depends primarily on the nature and objective of these specific undertakings. Cultural projects, however, which, by their very nature, benefit the Alliance as a whole should normally be commonly financed.
This year, for the first time, NATO helped to finance undertakings initiated by a member government or a private organization (the Oxford University seminar, and the Study Conference on "The Role of the School in the Atlantic Community"). This method of jointly financing NATO cultural projects proved to be useful and should be used more extensively.
CHAPTER IV: CO-OPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD

A. INTRODUCTION

1. The maintenance and growth of a public opinion favourable to NATO depend on the existence of a clear understanding of the aspirations and accomplishments of the Organization in every field of its activities. The Committee believes that action on its recommendations on political and economic consultation, as well as on cultural activities will provide substance for a more effective NATO information programme and widen NATO's appeal to public opinion. The maintenance of a favourable public opinion in NATO countries greatly depends on the degree of agreement which is found in member states on the basic concepts and objectives of NATO co-operation.

2. NATO information activities should be directed primarily to public opinion in the NATO area. At the same time, the understanding outside the NATO area of NATO objectives is necessary if the efforts of member governments towards the fulfilment of the aims and purposes of the Alliance are to be viewed sympathetically, and if their political and economic co-operation is not to be misinterpreted by governments not members of the Organization.

Attitudes in non-NATO areas will be influenced by the extent to which the peoples of the Alliance have themselves firm convictions about NATO's purposes and accomplishments.

3. NATO information activities should not extend into fields which more appropriately belong to national information services of member governments. The task of explaining and reporting on NATO activities on the basis of factual information rests primarily with national information services of each member government. There is, however, no sharp dividing line. In particular, the promotion of public understanding of the bonds and common traditions which form the Atlantic Community is a field which should be cultivated jointly.
by NATO and member governments. In the formulation of their national information programmes, member governments should provide enough scope and range to enable their information services to discharge effectively their commitments and responsibilities towards NATO.

B. SPECIFIC PROPOSALS

4. To improve co-operation between the NATO Information Division and national information services, the following measures are suggested:

(1) An officer should be designated by each national information service to maintain liaison with NATO and to be responsible for the dissemination of NATO information material;

(2) Governments should submit to NATO the relevant information programmes which they plan to implement, for discussion in the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations. Representatives of national information services from capitals might usefully be encouraged to take part in these discussions and to attend meetings of the Committee;

(3) Within the Information Division budget, provision should be made for a translation fund so that NATO information material can be translated into the non-official languages of the Alliance, according to reasonable requirements of the member governments.

5. The Information Division of NATO should, when required, provide national services with special studies on matters of common interest to member governments, although these studies may not necessarily deal with NATO.

6. Further study should be given to ways and means of improving co-ordination of efforts by individual governments in countering Soviet propaganda, both within their countries and in
relation to the uncommitted countries and the Soviet and satellite countries.

7. Member governments should take steps to inform the peoples of the uncommitted countries of the defensive character, as well as the non-military, aspects of the Atlantic Community. This might be achieved through information activities of the diplomatic missions of the various NATO governments in those countries, and by other means.

8. NATO governments should pool their experiences relating to the dissemination of information aimed at Soviet and satellite countries. It would be particularly useful for member governments to exchange views on the lines to be adopted by their international broadcasting services on issues of common concern to NATO. The Committee on Information and Cultural Relations could be used for this purpose.

9. It is generally recognised that great benefit has accrued to NATO through the Journalists' Tours sponsored by the Organization. These tours should, therefore, be continued but their character, it is felt, should now be changed. They should no longer be confined to journalists but should include such others in a position to influence public opinion as trade union and youth leaders, teachers and lecturers. NATO should also organize conferences of a few days' duration for a wider variety of professional groups. The success of undertakings of this kind largely depends on the quality of participants. Governments are therefore urged to pay special attention to the selection of suitably qualified representatives.

10. Governments should consider making practical use of and giving financial aid, if necessary, to private organizations supporting NATO. They should encourage the establishment of closer relations between such organizations and the NATO Information Division.
11. Insofar as possible, NATO should inform the public when a collective view is reached or when an important decision has been taken. When appropriate, more use should be made in Ministerial statements to national parliaments of the phrase "after consultation with our NATO Allies".
CHAPTER V: ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

Introduction

The Committee considers that the structure of NATO is generally capable of performing the tasks expected of it. The Committee is not therefore proposing any basic structural changes, but has certain procedural measures to suggest to the Secretary General and to member governments to facilitate the implementation of its recommendations.

One primary consideration for the development of fuller and franker consultations is respect for their confidential character, and the observation of strict security measures.

Meetings at Ministerial Level

(1) More time should be allowed at the Ministerial meetings in order to permit thorough consideration of the important issues on the agenda.

(2) Efforts should be made to encourage discussion rather than declarations of policy prepared in advance. Arrangements for meetings should be made with this aim in view.

(3) Foreign Ministers should meet more frequently. Certain of these meetings might be held from time to time in other NATO countries. The Ministers might also more frequently participate in regular Council meetings, even though not all of them may find it convenient to attend such meetings at the same time.

Meetings of Permanent Representatives

(1) Problems on the agenda of Ministerial meetings should be thoroughly and frankly examined by permanent representatives and relevant proposals prepared before Ministers meet. For this purpose it may be found necessary for governments to send senior experts ad hoc to consult on agenda items.
(2) In the case of consultations on special subjects, more use should be made of senior experts to assist permanent delegations by calling them, on an ad hoc basis, to do preparatory work.

(3) Consideration might be given to the possibility of occasional meetings of the Council with the participation of the permanent official heads of foreign ministries or "ministerial delegates".

(4) Governments may wish to review their arrangements to achieve effective presentation of their policies and views in these meetings, and for follow-up action in the different national capitals, in the light of their varying governmental practices.

(5) Since more frequent meetings will presumably be necessary to discharge the additional responsibilities suggested in this report, it may be found desirable to separate their consultations on important questions from the routine aspects of their work.

(6) Political questions for discussion in the Council should as far as practicable be previously reviewed and discussed in an appropriate Committee, with respect to economic matters, proposals on organization are contained in Chapter II, paragraph 16. The Chairman should be responsible for contacts with delegations to ensure the orderly selection of subjects for discussion, to enable governments to be informed in advance, and to give them time to formulate their considered views.

(7) Member governments should in the general interest of the Alliance make available "basic position material" to one another through NATO for background information. This would help the Alliance as a whole in the consideration of problems of common concern and would assist individual governments to understand more fully the reasons for the position adopted by any member country on a particular issue which might be its special concern, but which might also affect in varying degrees other members of NATO.
The Secretary General and the Staff

To provide continuity and assistance in the development of a common NATO perspective the role of the Secretary General and the staff needs to be enhanced. In particular:

(1) The Secretary General should be encouraged to propose items for NATO consultation in the fields covered by this report and should be responsible for directing all such consultations.

(2) In view of these responsibilities, member governments should undertake to keep the Secretary General fully and currently informed through their permanent delegations of their governments' thinking on questions of common concern to the Alliance.

(3) Through periodic visits to member governments and through personal consultations, the Secretary General should be encouraged to use his good offices, on an informal basis, whenever this might be helpful for reconciling diverging interests.

(4) The Secretary General should be invited to submit in addition to his progress reports, an annual report on the "state of the Alliance", designed to provide member governments with a frank assessment of the progress and present and potential problems of the Alliance. This report should be discussed by the Council in Ministerial Session.

(5) The Secretary General should be enabled to make the appropriate staff arrangements for the effective implementation of the recommendations in this report.
COMMITTEE OF THREE
PRELIMINARY WORKING PAPER
SECTION 1
POLITICAL CO-OPERATION

I. Consultation

(A) Possible Types of Consultation

(1) exchanging information on any matter which any member or the Secretary General considers of general interest or common concern to the Alliance;

(2) exchanging views and providing material for appreciation of current political developments;

(3) consulting with a view to arriving at a general consensus in the light of which member governments would draw their own conclusions and determine national policies;

(4) consulting in certain fields of common concern to co-ordinate lines of policy and agreed action.

(B) Implementation by Member Governments

(1) Keeping other member governments informed on matters of common concern to the Alliance (essential preliminary to consultation).

(2) Accepting the responsibility of informing the Council of any developments in Member Governments' policies or positions which may significantly affect member countries or the Alliance as a whole,

(3) Recognising the right of any member to raise for discussion any subject from the point of view of the interests of NATO.
(4) Agreeing not to adopt firm policies on matters of common concern without early advance consultation.

(5) In developing national policies, taking into account the interests and views of other NATO governments as expressed in consultations, even where no consensus has been reached or recommendations have been made.

(6) Taking any consensus into account in formulating national policy: when for national reasons the consensus is not followed, the government concerned to explain its reasons to the Council.

(7) Giving full weight to Council recommendations in arriving at final national decisions and policies.

(8) Endeavouring to consult with the Council before any major statement is made of an international political character which may affect the Alliance as a whole or some of its members.

(C) Limitations

(1) The need for prompt action in real emergencies;

(2) retention of ultimate responsibility for making national policies and decisions with the individual member government, taking into account the broader interests of the partnership;

(3) consultation on domestic affairs only with the agreement of the country most directly concerned, and only on those aspects which may significantly affect other members of the Alliance;

(4) recognition of the non-universal character of NATO; but permitting discussion of questions relating to non-NATO areas when such questions concern the general interests of the Alliance;
(5) not overburdening the Council Agenda with consultations on minor questions;
(6) the need to respect the confidential nature of discussions and to achieve strict security.

II. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

Because of the great importance and urgency of this matter, and the wide range of views put forward in the replies to the questionnaire, it will be especially necessary for the Committee of Three to examine this question in detail in discussion with their colleagues. One proposal which has been put forward may be summarised as follows:

1. A resolution under Article 1 of the Treaty, and in accordance with Article 33 of the UN Charter, to declare the intention of NATO governments to submit any inter-member dispute for settlement within the NATO framework before resorting to any other international agency.

2. Establishment of a special Committee of the Council to take cognisance of any such dispute and to apply "good offices"; it would be mainly concerned with procedures and "fact-finding" without entering into substantive questions except at the request of the parties concerned.

3. Establishment of a "Panel of Atlantic Community Arbitrators" composed of eminent persons and available to member governments on request of the interested parties.

4. Where appropriate and necessary, NATO to sponsor proposals for a settlement to give general or specific support to such a settlement; or to assume definite obligations in connection with the implementation or maintenance of the settlement.
Presumably any procedure adopted would be immediately applicable to current disputes as well as to any which may arise in the future.

Pending action in this field, and consideration of the application of any proposals to current differences, agreement might be reached that recourse should not be made to international machinery outside NATO in inter-member disputes.

III. Parliamentary associations and Parliamentary Conference

No formal relationship, but practical arrangements to improve the contact of these bodies with the Council.
SECTION 2
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

I. General

Economic objectives to be fostered by continued and enhanced collaboration both bilaterally and through organizations other than NATO, but reinforced by NATO consultation where the interests of the Alliance are involved. Recognition that Article 2 purposes need not be achieved only through NATO.

II. Economic Consultation

(A) Any member, or the Secretary General, to have the right to raise at any time any economic matter felt to be of significance to the Alliance including matters of this type on which inadequate progress is being made elsewhere;

(B) Regular interchange of information and views on economic matters clearly related to the political or security interests of NATO, e.g. economic aspects of defence; oil supplies for Western Europe; adequacy of action for development of atomic power;

(C) In certain cases an effort to agree on a common course of action.

III. Conflicts in Economic Policies of Member Countries

Where dangerous political or strategic consequences might be involved, any procedures for peaceful settlement of political disputes to be made applicable to disputes in the economic field.

IV. Relations with Under-Developed Areas

(A) Recognition that NATO is not an appropriate agency for administering programmes of assistance for economic development or for systematically concerting the relevant policies of member countries.
(B) Members to keep each other and NATO informed of programmes and policies in this field, with occasional discussion in NATO of the adequacy of existing action in relation to the interests of the Alliance, including the degree of priority which should be given to areas of particular concern to the Atlantic Community.

V. Soviet Economic Developments and Initiatives

(A) Periodic meetings of experts on Soviet economic affairs drawn from the various capitals to exchange information and views on trends in Soviet bloc economies, including comparison with member countries, and Soviet economic policies. In addition, continued periodic discussion of the implications of such trends for the Alliance and possible lines of action to be taken individually or co-operatively.
(B) Where general Soviet initiatives are made in the field of economic policy (as in the case of the proposal for "all-European economic co-operation" presented to the ECE in Geneva last April), possible NATO consultation concerning lines of response by member countries.

(C) Periodic meetings of officials involved in Soviet bloc commercial negotiations for an exchange of information and views.

(D) Notification to the Council of any important new Soviet commercial or financial proposal, with possible political implications, made to any member country.

(E) Possible NATO review from time to time of broader aspects of strategic export control arrangements with a view to agreement on the lines of action most conclusive to the security and welfare of the Atlantic Community.

(F) Ad hoc consideration of whether Soviet initiatives in economic relations with non-members, especially underdeveloped countries, should be countered by member countries individually or through other organizations. No indiscriminate competition with the Soviets, but NATO consultation wherever there is a serious risk of Soviet penetration in any area important to the Atlantic Community. Consideration of possible action in serious cases, even if requiring exceptional departure from basic foreign economic policies of the West.

VI. Relations with other organizations

(A) No attempt to create a "NATO bloc" in organizations composed wholly of free countries. Discussion in NATO of exceptional issues, arising in such organizations, of special political or strategic interest to NATO.
(B) With respect to international economic organizations in which the Soviets participate—notably the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the Economic Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, and the Economic and Social Council—consultation to be scheduled in advance of each meeting to review the agenda, identify points in which Atlantic interests may be attacked or endangered, consider possible Western initiatives, and where appropriate, establish a general community of attitude.

VII. Scientific and Technical Co-operation

Progress in this field is so crucial to the future of the Atlantic Community that it seems proper for NATO to ensure that no possibilities of fruitful co-operation are left unexplored. NATO might convene a conference composed of one or, at the most, two outstanding authorities, private or governmental, from each member country in order:

(A) to exchange information and views among the participants concerning their most urgent problems in the recruitment, training and utilization of scientists, engineers and technicians, and the best means of solving these problems;

(B) to foster closer relations among the participants with a view to continuing future interchange of experience and stimulation of constructive work in member countries;

(C) and to propose, for consideration by the North Atlantic Council, specific measures for future international co-operation in this field, whether through NATO or other international organizations.
VIII. NATO machinery for economic consultations

(A) The possible establishment of an Economic Advisory Committee on a permanent basis as a Committee of the Council, entrusted with the regular exchange of information and preliminary discussion in areas requiring systematic consultation, together with any ad hoc projects assigned to it. Any continuing function of the Committee of Technical Advisers would be absorbed by the Economic Advisory Committee. Membership would be flexible, governments being represented by highly qualified specialists as to the topics under consideration might require.

(B) Whether or not an Economic Advisory Committee is established, arrangements to be made for more meetings of officials dealing currently with various economic matters important to the Alliance, such as Soviet commercial negotiations, trends in under-developed countries, scientific and technical co-operation, and the like.
SECTION 3
CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

I. General

(A) Making the most effective use of existing resources and concentrating on projects not adequately covered from the NATO point of view.
(B) Giving priority to those projects which require joint NATO action.
(C) Encouraging initiatives by private groups and institutions which will stimulate like action in other NATO countries.
(D) Making a realistic appreciation of the financial implications of proposed cultural projects.

II. NATO Institutions

(A) The possible establishment of a Common Research Institute for Atlantic Community Studies, this proposal to be considered by member governments with the assistance of competent experts.
(B) Consideration to be given simultaneously to broadening the basis of the NATO Defence College by admitting teachers, journalists, and others in a position to influence public opinion, and adjusting the curriculum accordingly.

III. Youth Movements

Co-operation between youth organizations of member countries is the responsibility of the organizations themselves. NATO might, nevertheless, promote closer relations with youth organizations. To this end, NATO might sponsor annually gatherings such as the recent conference of Representatives of youth organizations of member countries and might create a post of "Youth Specialist" within the International Staff to maintain liaison with such organizations.
IV. Educational and related activities

(A) Encouragement of Summer schools or seminars along the lines of the course held this summer at Oxford University, aimed at attracting nationals from member countries in a position to influence public opinion.

(B) Support of arrangements for visiting Professorships

(C) Creation of university chairs of Atlantic studies.

(D) Use of NATO information material in schools.

(E) Establishment of special NATO awards for students.

(F) Exchange of persons programmes designed particularly to strengthen transatlantic ties.

V. Private Travel

Review by governments of foreign exchange and other policies affecting private travel between different parts of the Atlantic area, in light of the importance of easier and more frequent contacts among the Atlantic peoples.

VI. Exchanges of Service Personnel

(A) Possible extension of exchanges of service personnel on a bilateral basis beyond the limits of normal training programmes.

(B) Enlisting the support of voluntary organizations for such exchanges. NATO military authorities could give considerable assistance in implementing schemes of this kind.

VII. Financing

(A) The method of financing NATO cultural projects depends primarily on the nature and objective of these specific undertakings. Cultural projects benefiting the Alliance as a whole to be commonly financed.

(B) For agreed NATO cultural projects initiated by a member government or a private organization, NATO financial support jointly with the sponsor to be used more extensively when necessary to supplement national resources.
SECTION 4

CO-OPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD

I. General

(A) NATO information activities should not extend into fields which more appropriately belong to national information services of member governments. There is, however, no sharp dividing line, and the promotion of public understanding of the bonds and common traditions which form the Atlantic Community might be undertaken jointly by NATO and member governments.

(B) Member governments to provide adequate support for their information services to discharge their NATO responsibilities.

(C) Whenever possible, NATO to inform the public when a collective view is reached or when an important decision has been taken.

(D) When appropriate, more use to be made in Ministerial statements to national parliaments of the phrase "after consultation with our NATO Allies".

II. Co-operation between NATO and National Information Services

(A) Designation of an officer in each national information service to maintain liaison with NATO.

(B) Submission to NATO of relevant information programmes which governments plan to implement, for discussion in the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations.

(C) Representatives of national information services from capitals to be encouraged to take part in these discussions and from time to time to attend regular meetings of the Committee.
(D) Provision of a fund for translating NATO information material into the non-official languages.

(E) Additional steps by member governments through their diplomatic missions and otherwise to inform peoples of the non-member countries of the defensive character, as well as the non-military aspects, of the Atlantic Community.

III. Information problems in relation to the Soviet Bloc

(A) Improved co-ordination of efforts by individual governments in countering Soviet propaganda.

(B) Pooling of experiences on the dissemination of information aimed at Soviet and satellite countries and consultation on the lines to be adopted by broadcasting services on issues of common concern to NATO.

IV. NATO Tours and Conferences for Professional Groups

(A) Journalists' Tours to be continued, but broadened to include others in a position to influence public opinion such as trade union and youth leaders, teachers, and lecturers.

(B) Conferences of a few days' duration for a wider variety of professional groups.

V. Financial Aid to Private Organizations

Possible financial aid to private organizations supporting NATO.
SECTION 5

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

I. General

No basic structural changes, but certain procedural measures to be considered.

II. Meetings at Ministerial Level

(A) More time for Ministerial Meetings to permit thorough consideration of the important issues on the agenda.

(B) Making arrangements to encourage discussion rather than presentation of prepared declarations of policy.

(C) Meetings of Foreign Ministers to be held more frequently, occasionally in other NATO countries, and individual Foreign Ministers to participate more frequently in regular Council meetings.

III. Meetings of Permanent Representatives

(A) More thorough preparation of the agenda and proposals for Ministerial Meetings.

(B) Use of national senior experts to help in this preparatory work and assist permanent delegations in consultations on special subjects.

(C) Arrangements for review of political and economic questions in advance of Council meetings through discussing in appropriate Committees.

(D) Review by governments of their arrangements for making their representation on the Council as authoritative as possible, for providing maximum effectiveness in the presentation of their views and policies and for ensuring follow-up action.
(E) Occasional meetings of the Council with the participation of the permanent official heads of foreign ministries or "ministerial delegates".

(F) Circulation by member governments of "basic position material" for background information.

(G) Separating consultations on important questions from routine business.

IV. Enhancing the Role of the Secretary General and his Staff

(A) The Secretary General to be encouraged to propose items for NATO consultation, and to promote the process of consultation.

(B) Member governments to keep the Secretary General fully and currently informed through their permanent delegations of their thinking on questions of common concern to the Alliance.

(C) The Secretary General to be encouraged to make available his good offices, on an informal basis, through periodic visits to member governments and through personal consultations, whenever this might be helpful for reconciling diverging interests.

(D) The Secretary General to submit, in addition to his progress reports on the Organization as such, an annual report on the "State of the Alliance", designed to provide member governments with a frank assessment of its conditions and present and potential problems; this report to be discussed by the Council in Ministerial Session.

(E) The Secretary General to be enabled to make the appropriate staff arrangements for effective implementation of any new tasks assigned to NATO.
I. Consultation

(A) Requirements for Consultation by Member Governments

(1) Keeping other member governments informed on matters of common concern to the Alliance (essential preliminary to consultation).

(2) Accepting the responsibility of informing the Council of any developments in Member Governments' policies or positions which may significantly affect member countries or the Alliance as a whole.

(3) Recognising the right of any member to raise for discussion any subject from the point of view of the interests of NATO.

(4) Agreeing not to adopt firm policies on matters of common concern without early advance consultation.

(5) In developing national policies, taking into account the interests and views of other NATO governments as expressed in consultations, even where no consensus has been reached or recommendations have been made.

(6) Taking any consensus into account in formulating national policy: when for national reasons the consensus is not followed, the government concerned to explain its reasons to the Council.

(7) Giving full weight to Council recommendations in arriving at final national decisions and policies.

(8) Endeavouring to consult with the Council before any major statement is made of an international political character which may affect the Alliance as a whole or some of its members.

(B) Limitations

(1) The need for prompt action in real emergencies;
(2) retention by the individual member government of ultimate responsibility for making national policies and decisions, taking into account the broader interests of the partnership;

(3) consultation on domestic affairs only with the agreement of the country most directly concerned, and only on those aspects which may significantly affect other members of the Alliance;

(4) recognition of the non-universal character of NATO; but permitting discussion of questions relating to non-NATO areas when such questions concern the general interests of the Alliance;

(5) not overburdening the Council Agenda with consultations on minor questions;

(6) the need to respect the confidential nature of discussions and to achieve strict security.

II. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

Because of the great importance and urgency of this matter, and the wide range of views put forward in the replies to the questionnaire, it will be especially necessary for the Committee of Three to examine this question in detail in discussion with their colleagues. One proposal which has been put forward may be summarised as follows:

(1) A resolution under Article I of the Treaty, and in accordance with Article 33 of the UN Charter, to declare the intention of NATO governments, in the case of any dispute which has not proved capable of settlement through direct discussion and negotiation, to submit such dispute for settlement within the NATO framework before resorting to any other international agency.

(2) Establishment of a special committee of the Council, perhaps composed of three to five Permanent Representatives serving in rotation, to take cognisance of any such dispute and to apply "good offices". It would be mainly concerned with procedures, and would deal with substantive aspects only at the request of the parties concerned. Its chief purpose would be to assist the parties to achieve an amicable agreement.

(3) Establishment of a "Panel of Atlantic Community Arbitrators" composed of eminent persons and available to member governments on request of the interested parties.

(4) Where appropriate and necessary, the association of NATO with the settlement of such disputes through its sponsorship of proposals for a settlement, the general or specific support that it might lend to such a settlement, or the assumption of definite obligations in connection with the implementation or maintenance of the settlement.
The question is also raised of the immediate applicability of any agreed procedure to current disputes as well as to any which may arise in the future.

III. Parliamentary associations and Parliamentary Conference

No formal relationship, but practical arrangements to improve the contact of these bodies with the Council.
SECTION 2
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

I. General

(A) Recognition of common economic interests on the following lines:

(1) Economic health and growth of the member nations themselves and harmonious relations among them, (including the relevance thereto of European economic integration as well as co-operation on a wider basis);

(2) Successful economic development of the world's underdeveloped areas; and

(3) Preventing Soviet initiatives in the economic field from creating division within the Alliance or subverting freedom.

(B) Economic objectives to be fostered by continued and enhanced collaboration both bilaterally and through organizations other than NATO, but reinforced by NATO consultation where the interests of the Alliance are involved. Recognition that Article 2 purposes need not be achieved only through NATO.

II. Economic Consultation

(A) Any member, or the Secretary General, to have the right to raise at any time any economic matter felt to be of significance to the Alliance including matters of this type on which inadequate progress is being made elsewhere;

(B) Regular interchange of information and views on economic matters of special concern to NATO, e.g. economic aspects of defence; oil supplies for Western Europe; adequacy of action for development of atomic power;

(C) An effort to agree on a common course of action where economic matters are clearly related to the political or security interests of NATO.

III. Conflicts in Economic Policies of Member Countries

Where dangerous political or strategic consequences might be involved, any procedures for peaceful settlement of political disputes to be made applicable to disputes in the economic field.

IV. Relations with Underdeveloped Areas

(A) Recognition that the Atlantic Community has a major positive concern with their political stability and freedom, and consequently their healthy and accelerated economic development, but that NATO is not an appropriate agency for administering programmes of assistance for economic development or for systematicallyconcerting the relevant policies of member countries.
(B) Members to keep each other and NATO informed of programmes and policies in this field, with occasional discussion in NATO of the adequacy of existing action in relation to the interests of the Alliance, including the degree of priority which should be given to areas of particular concern to the Atlantic Community.

V. Soviet Economic Developments and Initiatives

(A) Where general Soviet initiatives are made in the field of economic policy (as in the case of the proposal for "all-European economic co-operation" presented to the ECE in Geneva last April), possible NATO consultation concerning lines of response by member countries.

(B) Notification to the Council of any important new Soviet commercial or financial proposal, with possible political implications, made to any member country and periodic meetings of officials involved in Soviet bloc commercial negotiations for an exchange of information and views.

(C) Possible NATO review from time to time of broader aspects of strategic export control arrangements with a view to agreement on the lines of action most conducive to the security and welfare of the Atlantic Community.

(D) Ad hoc consideration of whether Soviet initiatives in economic relations with non-members, especially underdeveloped countries, should be countered by member countries individually or through other organizations. No indiscriminate competition with the Soviets, but NATO consultation wherever there is a threat to the independence of any area important to the Atlantic Community. Consideration of possible action in serious cases, even if requiring exceptional departure from basic foreign economic policies of the West.

VI. Relations with other organizations

(A) Certainly no attempt to create a "NATO bloc" in organizations composed wholly of free countries. Discussion in NATO of exceptional issues, arising in such organizations, of special political or strategic interest to NATO.

(B) With respect to international economic organizations in which the Soviets participate - notably the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the Economic Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, and the Economic and Social Council - consultation to be scheduled in advance of each meeting to review the agenda, identify points in which Atlantic interests may be attacked or endangered, consider possible Western initiatives, and where appropriate, establish a general community of attitude, without however creating a "NATO bloc".
VII. Scientific and Technical Co-operation

Progress in this field is so crucial to the future of the Atlantic Community that it seems proper for NATO to ensure that no possibilities of fruitful co-operation are left unexplored. NATO might convene a conference composed of one or, at the most, two outstanding authorities, private or governmental, from each member country in order:

(A) to exchange information and views among the participants concerning their most urgent problems in the recruitment, training and utilisation of scientists, engineers and technicians, and the best means of solving these problems;

(B) to foster closer relations among the participants with a view to continuing future interchange of experience and stimulation of constructive work in member countries;

(C) and to propose, for consideration by the North Atlantic Council, specific measures for future international cooperation in this field, whether through NATO or other international organizations.

VIII. NATO machinery for economic consultations

(A) The possible establishment of an Economic Advisory Committee on a permanent basis as a Committee of the Council, entrusted with the regular exchange of information and preliminary discussion in areas requiring systematic consultation, together with any ad hoc projects assigned to it. Any continuing function of the Committee of Technical Advisers would be absorbed by the Economic Advisory Committee. Membership would be flexible, governments being represented by highly qualified specialists as the topics under consideration might require.

(B) Whether or not an Economic Advisory Committee is established, arrangements to be made for more meetings of officials dealing currently with various economic matters important to the Alliance, such as Soviet commercial negotiations, trends in under-developed countries and scientific and technical co-operation.
SECTION 3

CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

I. NATO Institutions

(A) The possible establishment of a Common Research Institute for Atlantic Community Studies, this proposal to be con-
sidered by member governments with the assistance of
competent experts.

(B) Consideration to be given simultaneously to broadening
the basis of the NATO Defence College by admitting
teachers, journalists, and others in a position to
influence public opinion, and adjusting the curriculum
accordingly.

II. Youth Movements

NATO to promote closer relations with youth organizations.

III. Educational Activities

Encouragement of Atlantic Community projects in specific
fields which are not already adequately covered, such as summer
schools or seminars; visiting professorships; university chairs of
Atlantic studies; and special NATO awards for students.

IV. Exchange of persons and facilitation of private travel

(A) Exchange of persons programmes designed particularly to
strengthen trans-Atlantic ties;

(B) Review by governments of foreign exchange and other
policies affecting private travel between different parts
of the Atlantic area.

V. Exchanges of Service Personnel

Possible extension of exchanges of service personnel
beyond the limits of normal training programmes, with the help of
voluntary organizations and the NATO military authorities.

VI. Financing

(A) Cultural Projects benefiting the Alliance as a whole to
be commonly financed on the basis of a realistic apprecia-
tion of their financial implications;

(B) For agreed NATO cultural projects initiated by a member
government or a private organization, NATO financial
support jointly with the sponsor to be used more exten-
sively when necessary to supplement national resources.
SECTION 4

CO-OPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD

I. Information Activities in Relation to NATO Countries

(A) NATO information activities should not extend into fields which more appropriately belong to national information services of member governments. There is, however, no sharp dividing line. Promotion of public understanding of the bonds and common traditions which form the Atlantic Community to be undertaken jointly by NATO and member governments.

(B) Member governments to provide adequate support for agreed information activities of NATO interest.

(C) Strengthening the co-operation between NATO and national information services.

(D) Broadening the character of participation in NATO tours and promoting conferences of professional groups.

(E) Possible financial aid to private organizations supporting NATO.

II. Information problems in relation to the Soviet Bloc

(A) Improved co-ordination of efforts by individual governments in countering Soviet propaganda.

(B) Pooling of experiences on the dissemination of information aimed at Soviet and satellite countries and consultation on the lines to be adopted by broadcasting services on issues of common concern to NATO.

III. Information problems in relation to non-member Countries generally

(A) Additional steps by member governments through their diplomatic missions and otherwise to inform peoples of the non-member countries of the defensive character, as well as the non-military aspects, of the Atlantic Community.
SECTION 5

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

I. General

No basic structural changes, but certain procedural measures to be considered.

II. Meetings at Ministerial Level

(A) More time for Ministerial Meetings to permit thorough consideration of the important issues on the agenda.

(B) Making arrangements to encourage discussion rather than presentation of prepared declarations of policy.

(C) Meetings of Foreign Ministers to be held more frequently, occasionally in other NATO countries, and individual Foreign Ministers to participate more frequently in regular Council meetings.

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(A) More thorough preparation of the agenda and proposals for Ministerial Meetings.

(B) Use of national senior experts to help in this preparatory work and assist permanent delegations in consultations on special subjects.

(C) Arrangements for review of political and economic questions in advance of Council meetings through discussion in appropriate Committees.

(D) Review by governments of their arrangements for making their representation on the Council as authoritative as possible, for providing maximum effectiveness in the presentation of their views and policies and for ensuring follow-up action.

(E) Occasional meetings of the Council with the participation of the permanent official heads of Foreign Ministries or "ministerial delegates".

(F) Circulation by member governments of "basic position material" for background information.

(G) Separating consultations on important questions from routine business.

IV. Enhancing the Role of the Secretary General and his Staff

(A) The Secretary General to be encouraged to propose items for NATO consultation, and to promote the process of consultation.

(B) Member governments to keep the Secretary General fully and currently informed through their permanent
delegations of their thinking on questions of common concern to the Alliance.

(C) The Secretary General to be encouraged to make available his good offices, on an informal basis, through periodic visits to member governments and through personal consultations, whenever this might be helpful for reconciling diverging interests.

(D) The Secretary General to submit, in addition to his progress reports on the Organization as such, an annual report on the "State of the Alliance", designed to provide member governments with a frank assessment of its conditions and present and potential problems; this report to be discussed by the Council in Ministerial Session.

(E) The Secretary General to be enabled to make the appropriate staff arrangements for effective implementation of any new tasks assigned to NATO.
COMITE DES TROIS

AVANT-PROJET DE DOCUMENT DE TRAVAIL

SECTION 1

COORDINATION POLITIQUE

I. Consultations

(A) Ce que les consultations requièrent des gouvernements des pays membres

1. Tenir les gouvernements des autres pays membres informés en ce qui concerne les questions d’intérêt commun pour l’Alliance (préalable essentiel aux consultations).

2. Accepter la responsabilité d’informer le Conseil de tout ce qui, dans leurs politiques ou prises de position, peut avoir des incidences sérieuses pour d’autres pays membres ou pour l’Alliance dans son ensemble.

3. Reconnaître à chaque pays membre le droit de demander la discussion de toute question du point de vue des intérêts de l'OTAN.

4. Accepter de ne pas adopter de politiques définitives sur des questions d’intérêt commun sans consultation préalable suffisamment à l’avance.

5. Tenir compte, dans l’élaboration de leurs politiques nationales, des intérêts et des vues que les autres pays de l’OTAN ont fait valoir lors des consultations, même si aucun accord n’a été atteint ou s’il n’a pas été formulé de recommandations.

6. Tenir compte de tout accord dans la déclaration de leur politique nationale; au cas où des considérations d’ordre national entraîneraient un gouvernement à faire exception à cette règle, celui-ci devrait en expliquer les raisons au Conseil.

7. Donner leur plein effet aux recommandations du Conseil dans les décisions et politiques nationales définitivement adoptées;

8. S’efforcer de consulter le Conseil avant de faire toute déclaration importante d’une portée politique internationale qui soit susceptible d’avoir des conséquences pour l’Alliance dans son ensemble ou pour certains de ses membres.
(B) Limitations

(1) Nécessité d'une action rapide en cas de crise réelle.

(2) Réserve du droit, pour chaque gouvernement membre, d'arrêter en dernier ressort les politiques et décisions nationales en tenant compte des intérêts généraux de la communauté.

(3) Subordination de toute consultation sur des affaires d'ordre intérieur à l'acceptation du pays le plus directement intéressé, et limitation de ces consultations aux éléments de ces affaires qui peuvent avoir des incidences sérieuses pour les autres membres de l'Alliance.

(4) Reconnaissance de la non-universalité de la compétence de l'OTAN, la discussion de questions relatives à des régions extérieures à l'OTAN restant toutefois permise quand les intérêts généraux de l'Alliance sont en cause.

(5) Nécessité de ne pas surcharger l'ordre du jour du Conseil avec des consultations sur des questions mineures.

(6) Nécessité de respecter le caractère confidentiel des discussions et d'en assurer rigoureusement la sécurité.

II. Règlement pacifique des différends

Etant donné la grande importance du problème, la spéciale urgence de sa solution et la diversité des vues qui ont été exprimées dans les réponses au questionnaire, il sera particulièrement nécessaire que le Comité des Trois examine la question en détail avec les autres ministres. Le Comité a reçu une proposition que l'on peut résumer comme il suit:

(1) Le Conseil adopterait une résolution fondée sur l'Article 1 du Traité, et conforme à l'Article 33 de la Charte des Nations Unies, dans laquelle les gouvernements des pays de l'OTAN déclaraient qu'au cas où un différend n'aurait pas pu être réglé par le moyen de discussions et de négociations directes, ils entendent s'efforcer d'en obtenir le règlement dans le cadre de l'OTAN avant de recourir à toute autre institution internationale.

(2) On créerait un Comité spécial du Conseil, que pourraient peut-être former de trois à cinq représentants permanents dont le remplacement s'effectuerait par rotation, pour connaître de tels différends et exercer ses "bons offices" en vue de leur règlement. Ce Comité s'occuperait surtout de questions de procédure et ne traiterait de problèmes concrets qu'à la requête des parties intéressées. Son principal objectif serait d'aider ces dernières à parvenir à un accord amiable.

(3) On créerait un "Bureau Arbitral de la Communauté Atlantique", qui serait composé de personnalités éminentes et mettrait ses services à la disposition des gouvernements membres à la requête des parties intéressées.
(4) Chaque fois que cela serait nécessaire et approprié, l'OTAN s'associerait au règlement des différends en présentant des propositions de règlement, en donnant, selon ses possibilités, un appui général ou particulier au règlement envisagé, ou en prenant des engagements précis quant à la mise en œuvre ou à la sauvegarde de l'accord de règlement.

Est en outre posé la question d'une immédiate application de toute procédure adoptée aux différends pendant, ainsi qu'à tous les différends qui pourraient surgir à l'avenir.

III. Associations de parlementaires et Conférence des parlementaires

Pas de relations officielles, mais des arrangements pratiques pour améliorer les rapports de ces organismes avec le Conseil.
SECTION 2
COOPERATION ÉCONOMIQUE

I. Dispositions générales

(A) Reconnaissance d'une communauté d'intérêts économiques couvrant ce qui suit :

(1) Santé et développement économiques des divers pays membres, et maintien de relations harmonieuses entre ceux-ci (y compris l'intégration économique européenne et l'extension de la coopération qui leur sont liées);

(2) Efficace développement économique des régions sous-développées du monde; et

(3) Échec aux initiatives prises par les Soviets dans le domaine économique en vue de diviser les pays de l'Alliance ou de porter atteinte à la liberté.

(B) Pour la poursuite de ces objectifs économiques, les pays maintiendraient entre eux une collaboration permanente et accrue, tant bilatéralement que dans le cadre d'organisations autres que l'OTAN, cet effort étant complété par des consultations au sein de l'OTAN chaque fois que les intérêts de l'Alliance seraient en jeu. Il n'est pas indispensable de limiter au cadre de l'OTAN les efforts en vue d'atteindre les buts énoncés à l’Article 2.

II. Consultations économiques

(A) Tout pays membre, ou le Secrétaire Général, aurait le droit de soulever à tout moment toute question économique jugée importante pour l'Alliance, y compris les questions de cet ordre pour lesquelles on n'enregistrerait que des progrès insuffisants par ailleurs;

(B) Institution d'échanges réguliers d'informations et de vues sur les questions économiques d'une particulière importance pour l'OTAN : aspects économiques de l'organisation de la défense, approvisionnement pétrolier de l'Europe occidentale, efficacité des mesures prises pour le développement des utilisations de l'énergie atomique;

(C) Effort pour adopter une ligne d'action commune s'agissant de questions économiques nettement liées aux intérêts politiques et à la sécurité de l'OTAN.

III. Conflits entre les politiques économiques de pays membres

Quant une situation serait de nature à avoir des répercussions politiques ou stratégiques dangereuses, toute procédure adoptée pour le règlement pacifique des différends politiques serait rendue applicable aux différends surgis dans le domaine économique.

IV. Relations avec les régions sous-développées

(A) Reconnaissance que la Communauté Atlantique a un intérêt positif majeur à voir ces régions demeurer politiquement
stables et libres, et, par conséquent, à ce que leur économie progresse rapidement et de façon saine, étant toutefois précisé que l'OTAN n'est pas un organisme qui puisse gérer des programmes d'assistance conçus en vue du développement économique ou de la coordination systématique des politiques des pays membres en la matière;

(B) Les pays membres se tiendraient mutuellement au courant et tiendraient l'OTAN informée des programmes et politiques adoptés par eux dans ce domaine et procéderaient de temps à autre à des discussions sur l'opportunité des mesures prises, ceci du point de vue des intérêts de l'Alliance et en examinant, entre autres, quelle priorité reconnaître aux régions qui ont une importance particulière pour la Communauté Atlantique.

V. Evolution de la situation économique en URSS et initiatives prises par ce pays dans ce domaine

(A) Chaque fois que les Soviets prendront des initiatives de portée générale en matière de politique économique (telle la proposition de "coopération économique pan-européenne" faite à la Commission économique pour l'Europe, à Genève, en avril dernier), des consultations pourraient avoir lieu à l'OTAN relativement à l'attitude que les pays membres devraient adopter.

(B) Le Conseil serait informé de toutes nouvelles propositions commerciales ou financières importantes faites par les Soviets à tout pays membre ainsi que des conséquences possibles de telles propositions, et des réunions périodiques seraient tenues par les hauts fonctionnaires chargés des négociations commerciales avec les pays du bloc soviétique, aux fins d'échanges de renseignements et de vues.

(C) L'OTAN pourrait effectuer périodiquement un examen des principaux aspects des dispositions prises pour le contrôle des exportations stratégiques, en vue de décider des mesures les plus propres à garantir la sécurité et le bien-être de la Communauté Atlantique.

(D) On examinerait, selon les besoins dans chaque cas, si c'est individuellement ou dans le cadre d'autres organisations que les pays membres doivent s'efforcer de faire écho aux initiatives prises par les Soviets dans leurs relations économiques avec des pays non-membres, et, en particulier, avec des pays sous développés. Il ne s'agirait pas d'entrer sans discernement en concurrence avec les Soviets, mais l'OTAN entreprendrait des consultations chaque fois que l'indépendance d'une région importante pour la Communauté Atlantique serait menacée. Les mesures qui pourraient être prises dans les cas graves seraient examinées, même si celles-ci impliquaient une exceptionnelle dérogation aux politiques fondamentales des Occidentaux en matière de rapports économiques internationaux.

VI. Relations avec les autres organisations

(A) Il ne devrait certainement y avoir aucune tentative pour constituer un "bloc OTAN" au sein d'organisations entièrement composées de pays libres. Mais l'OTAN pourrait discuter des problèmes exceptionnels, d'une importance politique
ou stratégique spéciale pour l'OTAN, qui se trouveraient soulevés dans ces organisations.

(B) En ce qui concerne les organisations économiques internationales dont l'URSS est membre - et, notamment, la Commission Economique pour l'Europe des Nations Unies, la Commission Economique de l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies et la Conférence Economique et Sociale - des consultations seraient organisées avant chaque réunion pour en étudier l'ordre du jour, pour déterminer les points sur lesquels les intérêts atlantiques pourraient être attaqués ou menacés, pour considérer les initiatives que les Occidentaux pourraient prendre et, chaque fois que de besoin, pour décider d'une communauté générale d'attitude, sans cependant créer le "bloc OTAN".

VII. Coopération scientifique et technique

Des progrès dans ce domaine sont si décisifs pour l'avenir de la Communauté Atlantique qu'il semble être du devoir de l'OTAN de veiller à ne laisser aucune possibilité de coopération fructueuse sans examen. L'OTAN pourrait convoquer une conférence à laquelle chaque pays serait représenté par une ou, au maximum, deux personnalités jouissant d'une exceptionnelle autorité :

(A) pour permettre un échange de renseignements et de vues entre les participants sur leurs problèmes les plus pressants concernant le recrutement, la formation et l'utilisation des savants, ingénieurs et techniciens et sur les meilleures mesures à prendre pour résoudre ces problèmes;

(B) pour établir des relations plus étroites entre les participants en vue d'une poursuite de cette mise en commun de l'expérience et afin d'encourager les pays membres à travailler de façon constructive;

(C) pour que les participants puissent soumettre à l'examen du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord les mesures définies qu'ils proposent de prendre pour développer la coopération internationale dans ce domaine, que celles-ci doivent être mises en œuvre par l'intermédiaire de l'OTAN ou par les soins de toute autre organisation internationale.

VIII. Dispositif OTAN pour les consultations économiques

(A) On pourrait créer un Comité Économique Consultatif permanent dépendant directement du Conseil, qui serait chargé d'assurer un échange régulier de renseignements et les discussions préliminaires voulues dans les domaines où des consultations systématiques sont nécessaires, en même temps que d'étudier tout projet spécial qui lui serait délégué. Toute fonction permanente du Comité des Conseillers Techniques serait transférée au Comité Économique Consultatif. La composition de celui-ci serait variable, les gouvernements y étant représentés par les spécialistes hautement qualifiés dont les questions à l'étude pourraient requérir la présence.

(B) Qu'un Comité Consultatif soit ou non créé, des dispositions seraient prises pour multiplier les réunions des hauts fonctionnaires normalement chargés de questions économiques importantes pour l'Alliance comme les négociations commerciales avec les Soviets, la situation dans les pays sous-développés et la coopération scientifique et technique.
SECTION 3

COOPERATION CULTURELLE

I. Institutions OTAN

(A) On pourrait envisager la création d'un Institut Commun de Recherche pour l'Étude sur la Communauté Atlantique - l'examen de cette proposition étant effectué par les gouvernements des pays membres avec l'assistance d'experts compétents;

(B) On pourrait en même temps étudier l'élargissement des bases sur lesquelles repose le Collège de Défense de l'OTAN, par l'admission, à ses cours et conférences, de membres de l'enseignement, de journalistes et d'autres personnes en mesure d'influer sur l'opinion du public, les programmes du Collège étant modifiés en conséquence.

II. Mouvvements de jeunesse

L'OTAN pourrait resserrer ses liens avec les organisations de jeunesse.

III. Activités éducatives

Encourager la mise sur pied de projets propres à la Communauté Atlantique dans les domaines qui ne se trouvent pas encore convenablement couverts : cours ou réunions d'été, création de chaires temporaires pour des professeurs étrangers, institution de chaires universitaires d'étude atlantiques, attribution de prix spéciaux OTAN à des étudiants, etc.

IV. Echange de personnes et facilitation des voyages privés

(A) Mise sur pied de programmes d'échange de personnes dans le but particulier de renforcer les liens transatlantiques;

(B) Examen, par les gouvernements, des mesures appliquées par eux en matière de change et de toutes autres dispositions qui affecteraient les voyages des particuliers entre les diverses parties de la région atlantique.

V. Echange de militaires

On pourrait développer les échanges de militaires au-delà des limites des programmes normaux d'entraînement, avec l'aide d'organisations bénévoles et des autorités militaires de l'OTAN.

VI. Financement

(A) Les projets culturels bénéficiant à l'ensemble de l'Alliance feraient l'objet d'un financement en commun fondé sur une appréciation réaliste de leurs incidences financières;
(b) Pour les projets culturels approuvés par l'OTAN à l'initiative d'un gouvernement membre ou d'une institution privée, l'OTAN pourrait fournir un plus large concours financier aux auteurs des projets quand cela serait nécessaire pour compléter les moyens dégagés dans les budgets des pays intéressés.
SECTION 4

COOPERATION EN MATIÈRE D’INFORMATION

I. Activités en matière d’information en ce qui concerne les pays de l’OTAN

(A) Les activités de l’OTAN dans le domaine de l’information ne devraient pas s'étendre à des domaines qui appartiennent plutôt aux services nationaux d'information des gouvernements membres. On ne peut cependant pas établir ici de ligne rigide de partage. Les efforts nécessaires pour faire comprendre au public les liens et traditions communes qui font la communauté atlantique pourraient être poursuivis en commun par l’OTAN et les gouvernements membres.

(B) Les gouvernements membres pourraient fournir l’assistance financière appropriée pour les activités agréées en matière d’information qui revêtent un intérêt pour l’OTAN.

(C) Renforcement de la coopération entre l’OTAN et les services nationaux d’information.

(D) Élargir la formule de participation aux voyages OTAN et encourager l’organisation de conférences de groupes professionnels.

(E) On pourrait envisager l’octroi de subventions aux organisations privées qui soutiennent l’OTAN.

II. Problèmes que pose le bloc soviétique en matière d’information

(A) Améliorer la coordination des efforts poursuivis par les divers gouvernements pour faire échec à la propagande soviétique.

(B) Mettre en commun l'expérience accumulée relativement à la diffusion d'informations à l'intention de l'URSS et des pays satellites, et organiser des consultations sur l'attitude que les services de radiodiffusion devraient adopter à propos de questions d'intérêt commun pour l’OTAN.

III. Problèmes posés en matière d’information en ce qui concerne généralement les pays non-membres de l’OTAN

(A) Les gouvernements des pays membres pourraient prendre de nouvelles mesures, faisant appel à leurs missions diplomatiques ou à tous autres moyens, pour informer les peuples des pays non-membres tant du caractère défensif que des aspects non militaires de la Communauté Atlantique.
SECTION 5

ORGANISATION ET FONCTIONS

I. Organisation générale

Pas de changement fondamental de structure, mais certaines dispositions de procédure à étudier.

II. Réunions à l'échelon ministériel

(A) Accroître la durée des sessions ministérielles pour permettre un examen approfondi des questions importantes à l'ordre du jour.

(B) Prendre les dispositions voulues pour encourager les membres du Conseil à procéder à des discussions au lieu de formuler des déclarations de principe préparées à l'avance.

(C) Accroître la fréquence des réunions de ministres des affaires étrangères, qui se tiendraient à l'occasion dans d'autres pays de l'OTAN, et amener les divers ministres des affaires étrangères à venir plus fréquemment prendre part aux réunions ordinaires du Conseil.

III. Réunions du Conseil Permanent

(A) Préparation plus complète de l'ordre du jour et des réunions prévues à l'échelon ministériel.

(B) Recours à des experts nationaux hautement qualifiés pour aider à effectuer ce travail préparatoire et pour assister les délégations permanentes dans leurs consultations sur des questions spéciales.

(C) Organisation de discussions dans les comités appropriés de manière à assurer une étude des questions politiques et économiques posées avant les réunions du Conseil.

(D) Révision de leurs arrangements respectifs par les divers gouvernements, en vue de conférer le plus d'autorité possible à leurs représentants au Conseil, de donner le maximum d'efficacité à l'exposition de leurs vues et politiques et de garantir l'adoption des mesures nécessaires.

(E) Organisation périodique de réunions du Conseil auxquelles participeraient les hauts fonctionnaires permanents qui assurent la direction des ministères des affaires étrangères, ou des "délégués ministériels".

(F) Distribution, par les gouvernements des pays membres, de documents "de base" fournissant les éléments d'information accessoires nécessaires.

(G) Établissement d'une séparation entre consultations sur des questions importantes et travail courant.
IV. Renforcement du rôle du Secrétaire général et de ses Services

(A) Le Secrétaire général serait encouragé à proposer l'examen de certaines questions dans le cadre des consultations OTAN et à s'efforcer de développer celles-ci.

(B) Les gouvernements des pays membres tiendraient le Secrétaire général pleinement et régulièrement informé de leur avis sur les questions d'intérêt commun pour l'Alliance par l'intermédiaire de leurs délégations permanentes.

(C) Le Secrétaire général serait encouragé à exercer ses bons offices - à titre non-officiels - chaque fois que cela pourrait contribuer à la mise en accord d'intérêts divergents; il pourrait s'y employer au cours de ses visites périodiques aux gouvernements des pays membres et dans des consultations personnelles.

(D) Outre ses rapports sur l'activité de l'Organisation elle-même, le Secrétaire général ferait chaque année un rapport sur "l'état de l'Alliance", dans lequel il dresserait, au bénéfice des gouvernements des pays membres, un franc tableau de la situation au sein de l'Alliance, des problèmes qui se posent à celle-ci et des problèmes auxquels elle pourrait avoir à faire face; ce rapport serait examiné par le Conseil en session ministérielle.

(E) Le Secrétaire général serait mis à même de prendre les dispositions voulues en matière de personnel pour que l'OTAN puisse convenablement assumer toute nouvelle tâche qui lui serait assignée.
ENGLISH ONLY
12th September, 1956

LIST OF CERTAIN PROPOSALS NOT CONTAINED IN THE PRELIMINARY WORKING PAPER (CT-WP/5 (Revised)) BUT WHICH MIGHT BE RAISED IN ALL CONSULTATIONS TO ELICIT COUNTRIES' REACTIONS

1. Any member to have right to raise for discussion in the Council an inter-member dispute on which it believes it has exhausted the possibilities of direct negotiation. The Council could then set up a "Fact Finding Committee", the report of this Committee to be discussed in the Council in order to try and find a basis for conciliation (Greece). This proposal might be examined in relation to Stage 2 of the US proposal.

2. A "Political Annual Review", for which governments would supply information, to be made in the form of a report (Germany).

3. Member countries should adhere to the principle of multilateral trade with the Eastern bloc. They should undertake not to conclude new bilateral payments agreements with Eastern bloc states and to allow those already in existence to expire. NATO countries should also agree not to buy transit goods originating in under-developed countries from Eastern bloc countries (Germany).

4. Common action within the NATO framework by capital-exporting countries might bring about a relaxation of the conditions under which the IMF and the IBRD would grant aid to certain under-developed countries (Luxembourg, France, Turkey).

5. With respect to co-operation in the field of information, countries' opinions might be asked about the question how to strike a balance between the needs of NATO security and of safeguarding the confidential nature of the Council's discussions on the one hand and the need to inform public opinion about positive results achieved by consultation in NATO on political subjects on the other.

Palais de Chaillot, Paris, XVe.
CHAPTER II. CO-OPERATION IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD

(A) INTRODUCTION

Political co-operation and economic conflict are not reconcilable. Therefore, in the economic field also there must be a genuine desire among the members to work together, and to consult on questions of common concern; a desire based on the recognition of common interests.

2. The economic interests shared by the members of NATO call for:

   (a) co-operative and individual action to achieve healthy and developing economies both for the well-being and confidence of the Atlantic peoples and as the essential support for an adequate defence effort;

   (b) assistance to economically underdeveloped areas for reasons of enlightened self-interest and to promote better relations between peoples;

   (c) the promotion of human welfare and economic progress as the best protection against the subversive forces of communism.

3. A recognition of these common NATO interests, and collective and individual effort to promote them, need not in any way prejudice close and co-operative economic relations; or, in certain circumstances, special economic arrangements with non-NATO countries. Economic co-operation, as is the case with political co-operation, is and must remain wider than NATO. At the same time the countries of the Atlantic Community also have an interest in arrangements for especially close economic co-operation among

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smaller groupings of European member nations and it should be possible for the development of such arrangements to promote rather than conflict with the wider objectives of the Atlantic Community and the rest of the non-Communist world.

(B) ARTICLE 2, NATO, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

4. The objectives of Article 2 are of basic importance to the stability and well-being not only of the North Atlantic area but of the entire non-Communist world. It is not, however, necessary that member countries pursue the purposes of Article 2 only through action in NATO itself. It would not serve the interests of the Atlantic Community for NATO to take over or duplicate the operating functions of international organizations designed for various forms of economic co-operation(1). NATO members play a major part in all these agencies, and their membership is generally well adapted to their special purposes.

5. Nor, in the Committee's view do there now appear to be significant new areas for common economic action requiring execution by NATO itself. The common economic concerns of the member nations will rather best be fostered by continued and enhanced collaboration both directly and through organizations other than NATO, but reinforced by NATO consultation where the interests of the Alliance are involved. This requires a substantial expansion of exchange of information and views in the economic as well as in the political field. Especially where economic matters are clearly related to the political and security interests of NATO, such consultations should seek to secure a common approach on the part of member governments. The resulting action, however, should normally be taken by governments either directly or through other international organizations.

(1) The outstanding instances are the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) (which includes all NATO countries as full or associate members and four others); the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); the International
Monetary Fund (IMF); the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC); and the various United Nations specialised agencies including the Economic Commission for Europe. Several NATO members participate actively in the Colombo Plan for promoting economic development for Asia. Most members are taking an active part in technical assistance programmes and are also participating in discussions of proposals for the creation of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED).
(C) AREAS FOR ECONOMIC CONSULTATION

Strengthening members' economies and promoting their economic co-operation

6. There now exists adequate provision for a regular assessment of each member country's general economic position, prospects and problems through the OECD and NATO Annual Reviews. Economic growth and health, which are vital to the Alliance, require expanding economies based on sound policies and organized co-operation to promote the greatest possible freedom in trade and payments and in the movements of manpower and long-term capital. While there remains a great deal to be accomplished in these respects, the requisite machinery for co-operation among NATO members exists in other organizations.

7. At the same time, issues may arise, affecting the economic health of the Atlantic Community, where NATO may be the most effective organization for consultation because of their political implications or because of their relation to the common defence. Possibly in Cover Note: On both these counts NATO might be properly concerned, for example, with the assurance of oil supplies for Western Europe and with the adequacy of action for the development of atomic power. Economic aspects of defence, including questions of economic mobilisation and stockpiling of civilian supplies, are already receiving some attention in NATO; such matters should continue to be a regular concern of the organization.

Scientific and Technical Co-operation

8. One area of special importance to the Atlantic Community is the field of science and technology. During the last decade, it has become ever clearer that the ability to hold the lead in science and engineering can be decisive in determining the position of nations in world affairs.
future security and welfare of the Atlantic Community are as dependent on effective progress in this field as on the maintenance of an adequate collective defence, which itself requires continued technological superiority. Such progress is also vital if the NATO countries are to play their proper rôle in relation to underdeveloped areas.

9. Within the general field of science and technology, one especially urgent need is that appropriate measures be taken to improve the quality and to increase the supply of scientists, engineers and technicians. Responsibility for recruitment, training and utilisation of scientific and technical personnel is primarily a national rather than an international matter. Nor is it a responsibility solely of national governments. In the member countries with Federal systems, State and Provincial Governments play the major part, and many of the universities and institutes of higher learning in the Atlantic area are independent institutions free from detailed control by governments. At the same time, properly designed measures of international co-operation could stimulate individual member countries to adopt more positive policies and, in some cases, help guide them into the most constructive channels.

10. Certain activities in this connection are already being carried out by other organizations. Progress in this field, however, is so crucial to the future of the Atlantic Community that NATO members should ensure that no possibilities of fruitful co-operation are left unexplored. As a first concrete step, therefore, it is recommended that a conference be convened (either by NATO or on the initiative of member governments through another appropriate Organization), composed of one or, at the most, two outstanding authorities, private or governmental, from each country in order:
(a) to exchange information and views among the participants concerning their most urgent problems in the recruitment, training and utilisation of scientists, engineers and technicians, and the best means, both long-term and short-term, of solving these problems;

(b) to foster closer relations among the participants with a view to continuing future interchange of experience and stimulation of constructive work in member countries; and

(c) to propose specific measures for future international co-operation in this field, whether through NATO or other international organizations.

Conflicts in Economic Policies of Member Countries

11. The Committee distinguishes between disagreements on economic policy which are normally dealt with through direct negotiation or multilateral discussion in other organizations, and economic disputes which may have political or strategic repercussions damaging to the Alliance. Nothing would be gained by merely having repeated in NATO the same arguments made in other and more technically qualified organizations. It should, however, be open to any member or to the Secretary General to raise for discussion in NATO issues on which they feel that consideration elsewhere is not making adequate progress and that NATO consultation might facilitate solutions contributing to the objectives of the Atlantic Community. The principles for peaceful settlement discussed in the previous Chapter should, of course, be applicable to major disputes of an economic as well as a purely political character.
Relations with Underdeveloped Areas

12. It is a matter of common consent that the Atlantic Community has a major positive concern with the healthy and accelerated economic development in the underdeveloped areas. It is likewise agreed that NATO is not an appropriate agency for administering programmes of assistance for economic development or even for systematically concording the relevant policies of member nations. The Committee recommends that member countries keep each other and the Organization informed of their programmes and policies in this field, and that there be occasional discussion in NATO of the adequacy of existing action in relation to the interests of the Alliance, possibly in Cover Note: including the degree of priority which should be given to areas of particular concern to the Atlantic Community, both inside and outside the North Atlantic Area.

13. The Alliance also has a positive interest in the more complex and difficult field of Soviet economic relations with non-members, especially the underdeveloped countries. The Committee welcomes the first steps in the exchange of information on this topic in the Committee on Soviet Economic Policy, and believes that this should be a continuing function of NATO. The Atlantic Community has no interest in disturbing normal economic relations between underdeveloped areas and the Soviet countries, but it should be concerned with cases where Soviet action appears calculated to foster Communist political penetration or to reduce the freedom of other countries to maintain healthy economic relations with the NATO members. It would clearly not be desirable to engage in indiscriminate competition with the Soviets in this field, in which the main endeavour of member governments should be to cultivate affirmatively their mutual interests with the
underdeveloped areas. At the same time, NATO consultation in particular cases might, on occasion, suggest the need for special action, even if this requires an exceptional departure from the basic foreign economic policies of member governments. In this as in other economic fields, however, any indicated action would be undertaken not by NATO as such but by individual governments or appropriate international organizations.
Soviet Economic Activities

14. The recent tendency of Soviet policy to use economic measures which may have the effect of weakening the Western Alliance, or of creating in other areas a dangerous degree of dependence on the Soviet world, makes it especially important that NATO undertake systematic consultation in this field. What is needed now generally on the part of NATO countries is a progressive development of their commercial and financial policies. In particular, they should avoid creating situations of which the Soviets might take advantage to the detriment of the Atlantic Community and of other non-Communist countries. In any event it is desirable that member countries should be in a position to determine their course deliberately and with the fullest possible knowledge.

15. The Committee recommends that NATO continue its regular reporting on economic trends in Soviet countries (including the comparison with member countries) and developments in Soviet economic policy. To this end, governments should undertake to report relevant information regularly, and there should be periodic meetings of experts on Soviet economic affairs drawn from the various capitals. Where general Soviet initiatives are made in the field of economic policy, there should be NATO consultation concerning the possible lines of response by member countries.

16. With respect to Soviet commercial relations with member countries, arrangements should be made for periodic meetings of officials involved in Soviet bloc commercial negotiations for an exchange of information and views. \[Possibly in Cover Note:\] In the case of an important new Soviet commercial or financial proposal to any member country, with possible political implications, it would be desirable for the member concerned to bring it to the attention of the Council. In connection with strategic controls
on trade with the Soviet bloc and Communist China, it would be desirable to review in NATO from time to time the broader aspects of the control arrangements and to seek agreement on the lines of action in this area most conducive to the security and welfare of the Atlantic Community.

(D) RELATIONS WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

17. NATO, as such, should not seek to establish formal relations with international economic organizations, and the harmonising of attitudes and actions should be left to the representatives of the NATO governments therein.

Not is it necessary or desirable for NATO members to seek a common policy front, or bloc, in such organizations. This would only alienate other and friendly governments, with harmful results.

When, however, in other organizations economic issues arise which have a special political or strategic interest to NATO, they should be discussed in the NATO Council. There should also be NATO consultation prior to the meetings of international economic agencies when interests of the Atlantic Community may be subject to attempts in those agencies to divide and weaken the Alliance. Here again NATO discussions do not preclude wider consultation when that is practicable and desirable.

(E) NATO MACHINERY FOR ECONOMIC CONSULTATION

18. There has been, in recent months, a considerable evolution in NATO's machinery for regular economic consultation. In addition, a number of economic matters have been brought before the Council for consideration on an ad hoc basis. No substantial new machinery in this field is called for. However, in view of the extended range of topics for regular exchange of information and consultation described above, the Committee
The Committee of Three: from left to right, Mr Halvard Lange, Prof. Gaetano Makino, and Mr L. B. Pearson.

NATO CONFFDENTIAL

recommends the establishment under the Council of a Committee of Economic Advisers. This group would be entrusted with the regular exchange of information and preliminary discussion in those areas of systematic consultation outlined above, together with such ad hoc projects as might be initiated by the Council or approved by the Council at the Committee's request. It would absorb any continuing function of the Committee of Technical Advisers. Since its duties would be far less than full-time, member governments would presumably wish to be represented normally by officials mainly concerned with the work of other economic organizations, but membership should be flexible, the Committee being composed when appropriate of specialists from the capitals on particular topics under consideration. In any event, whether or not such a Committee is established, arrangements should be made for more meetings of officials dealing currently with various economic matters important to the Alliance, such as Soviet commercial negotiations, trends in underdeveloped countries, scientific and technical cooperation and the like. Informal discussion among officials with corresponding specialised responsibilities is a particularly valuable means of concerting governmental attitudes in the earliest stages of policy formation.
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CHAPTER 2: ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
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CHAPTER 3: CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. If there is to be vitality and growth in the concept of the Atlantic Community, the relations between the members of NATO must rest on a solid basis of confidence and understanding. Without this there cannot be the kind of political co-operation which, with collective security, constitutes the special value of NATO for its members.

2. The deepening and strengthening of this political co-operation does not imply the weakening of the ties of NATO members with other international associations, such as the United Nations, or of their friendly relations with other countries. Support for NATO is not exclusive or restrictive. Nor should the evolution of the Atlantic Community through NATO prevent the formation of even closer relationships among some members, for instance within groups of European countries. The moves toward Atlantic co-operation and European unity can be parallel and complementary and need not be competitive or conflicting.

3. Effective and constructive international co-operation requires a resolve to work together for the solution of common problems. There are special ties between NATO members, special incentives and security interests, which should make this task easier. But its successful accomplishment will depend largely on
the extent to which member governments, in their own policies and actions, take into consideration the interests of the Alliance. This requires not only the acceptance of the obligation of consultation and co-operation whenever necessary, but also the development of practices by which the discharge of this obligation becomes a normal part of governmental activity.

4. It is easy to profess devotion to the principle of political - or economic - consultation in NATO. It is difficult to convert the profession into practice. Consultation within an alliance means more than exchange of information, though that is necessary. It means more than letting the Council of NATO know about decisions that have already been taken, or merely trying to enlist support for national policy. It means the discussion of problems collectively, in the early stages of policy formation, before national positions become set. At its best, this will result in collective decisions on matters of common interest affecting the Alliance. At the least, it will ensure that no action is taken by one member without a knowledge of the views of the others.

II. CONSULTATION ON FOREIGN POLICIES

A. Scope and Character of Political Consultation

5. The essential rôle of consultation in fostering political co-operation was clearly defined by the earlier Committee on the North Atlantic Community in 1951:

"... The achievement of a closer degree of coordination of the foreign policies of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty, through the development of the 'habit of consultation' on matters of common concern, would greatly strengthen the solidarity of the North Atlantic Community and increase the individual and collective capacity of its members to serve the peaceful purposes for which
NATO was established. ... In the political field, this means that while each North Atlantic Government retains full freedom of action and decision with respect to its own policy, the aim should be to achieve, through exchanging information and views, as wide an area of agreement as possible in the formulation of policies affecting the North Atlantic Community as a whole. "Special attention must be paid, as explicitly recognised in Article 4 of the Treaty, to matters of urgent and immediate importance to the members of NATO, and to 'emergency' situations where it may be necessary to consult closely on national lines of conduct affecting the interests of members of NATO as a whole. There is a continuing need, however, for effective consultation at an early stage on current problems, in order that national policies may be developed and action taken on the basis of a full awareness of the attitudes and interests of all the members of NATO. While all members of NATO have a responsibility to consult with their partners on appropriate matters, a large share of responsibility for such consultation necessarily rests on the more powerful members of the Community."

6. Those words were written five years ago. They still hold true. Nor have they been ignored by NATO. The practice of consulting together has developed in the NATO Council in recent years and it has contributed to co-operation in the Alliance. But there is ample room for improvement - for broadening the scope and deepening the character of consultation.

7. It should, however, be remembered that collective discussion is not an end in itself, but a means to the end of securing
the maximum possible agreement on policy and action on all matters that concern the common interests of the Atlantic Community.

8. Such agreement, even with the closest possible cooperation and consultation, is not easy to secure. But it is essential to the Atlantic Alliance that steady and continuous effort be made to bring it about, for there cannot be solidarity in defence and cleavage in foreign policy.

9. There are, of course, certain practical limitations to consultation. They are sufficiently obvious in fact to make it unnecessary to emphasise them in words. Indeed the danger is less that they will be minimised or evaded than that they will be exaggerated and used to justify practices which ignore the common interest.

10. One of these limitations is the fact that the ultimate responsibility for decision and action still rests on national governments; in a situation of emergency, therefore, action may be required by one government before consultation is possible with the others.

11. Another limitation is the difficulty and the un-wisdom of trying to specify in advance the subjects and the situations where consultation is necessary; to separate by area or by subject the matters of NATO concern from those of purely national concern; to define in detail obligations and duties. Those things have to work themselves out in practice. In this process, experience is a better guide than fixed rules.

12. The essential thing is that on all occasions and in all circumstances member governments before acting or even before pronouncing, should keep the interests and the requirements of the Alliance in mind. If they have not the desire and the will to do this, no resolutions or recommendations or declarations will be of any value.
13. On the justifiable assumption, however, that this will and this desire do exist, the following principles and practices in the field of political consultation are submitted for acceptance:

(a) Members should inform the Council of any development which significantly affects the Alliance. They should do this, not merely as a formality but as a preliminary to effective political consultation.

(b) Both individual member governments and the Secretary General should have the right to raise for discussion in the Council any subject which is of common NATO interest and not of a purely domestic character.

(c) A member government should not, without adequate advance consultation, adopt firm policies or make major political pronouncements on matters which affect the Alliance or any of its members in a significant way, unless circumstances make such prior consultation demonstrably impossible.

(d) Members should seek to develop their national policies in the light of the interests and views of other governments as expressed in NATO consultation, even where no community of view or consensus has been reached in the Council.

(e) Where a consensus has been reached, it should be reflected in the formation of national policies. When for national reasons the consensus is not followed, the government concerned should offer an explanation to the Council. It is even more
important that where an agreed recommendation has emerged from the Council discussions, governments should give it full weight in any national actions or policies related to the subject of that recommendation.

B. Annual Political Appraisal

14. To strengthen the process of consultation, it is recommended that Foreign Ministers, at their Spring meeting, make an appraisal of the political progress of the Alliance and consider the lines along which it should advance.

15. To prepare for this discussion, the Secretary General should submit a report:

(a) analysing the major political problems of the Alliance;
(b) reviewing the extent to which member governments have consulted and co-operated on such problems, or failed to do so;
(c) indicating the problems and potential developments which may require future consultation in order to resolve difficulties and work out positive and constructive initiatives.

16. Member governments, through their Permanent Representatives, should give the Secretary General such information and assistance, including that of technical experts, as he may require in preparing his report.

C. Preparation of Political Consultation

17. Effective consultation also requires careful planning and preparation of the agenda for meetings of the Council both in Ministerial and permanent session. Political questions coming up for discussion in the Council should as far as practicable be
previously reviewed and discussed, so that representatives may have background information on the thinking both of their own and of other governments. When appropriate, drafts of resolutions should be prepared in advance as a basis for discussion. Additional preparatory work will also be required for the annual political appraisal referred to in the preceding section.

18. To assist the Permanent Representatives and the Secretary General in discharging their responsibilities for political consultation, there should be constituted under the Council a committee of political advisers from each delegation, aided when necessary by specialists from the capitals. It would meet under the chairmanship of a member of the International Staff appointed by the Secretary General, and would include among its responsibilities current studies such as those on trends of Soviet policy.

III. PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF INTER-MEMBER DISPUTES

19. In the development of effective political co-operation in NATO, it is of crucial importance to avoid serious inter-member disputes and to settle them quickly and satisfactorily when they occur. The settlement of such disputes is in the first place the direct responsibility of the member governments concerned, under both the Charter of the United Nations (Article 33) and the North Atlantic Treaty (Article 1). To facilitate the carrying out of these obligations, it is recommended that the Council adopt a resolution under Article 1 of the Treaty on the following lines:

(a) reaffirming the obligation of members to settle by peaceful means any dispute between themselves;

(b) declaring their intention to submit any such disputes, which have not proved capable
of settlement directly, to good offices procedures within the NATO framework before resorting to any other international agency; except for disputes of a legal character appropriate for submission to a judicial tribunal, and those disputes of an economic character for which attempts at settlement might best be made initially in the appropriate specialised economic organization;

(c) recognising the right and duty of member governments and of the Secretary General to bring to the attention of the Council matters which in their opinion may threaten the solidarity or effectiveness of the Alliance;

(d) empowering the Secretary General to offer his good offices informally at any time to the parties in dispute, and with their consent to initiate or facilitate procedures of enquiry, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration; and

(e) empowering the Secretary General, where he deems it appropriate for these purposes, to use the assistance of not more than three Permanent Representatives chosen by him in each instance.

IV. PARLIAMENTARY ASSOCIATIONS AND THE PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE

20. Among the best supporters of NATO and its purposes are those Members of Parliament who have had a chance to see at first hand some of its activities and problems, and to exchange views with their colleagues from other parliaments. In particular, the formation of national Parliamentary Associations and the activities
of the Conference of Members of Parliament from NATO countries have contributed to the development of public support for NATO and solidarity among its members.

21. The following arrangements are therefore recommended to maintain a close relationship with NATO:

(a) That the Secretary General continue to place the facilities of NATO headquarters at the disposal of Parliamentary Conference and give all possible help with arrangements for its meetings.

(b) That invited representatives of member governments and the Secretary General and other senior NATO civil and military officers attend these meetings for speeches and discussion periods. In this way the parliamentarians would be informed on the state of the Alliance and the problems before it, and the value of their discussions would be increased.
CHAPTER 2: ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

I. INTRODUCTION

Political co-operation and economic conflict are not reconcilable. Therefore, in the economic as well as in the political field there must be a genuine desire among the members to work together and a readiness to consult on questions of common concern based on the recognition of common interests.

2. The economic interests shared by the members of NATO call for:

(a) co-operative and individual action to achieve healthy and developing economies, both to promote the well-being and self-confidence of the Atlantic people and to serve as the essential support for an adequate defence effort;

(b) assistance to economically underdeveloped areas for reasons of enlightened self-interest and to promote better relations among peoples; and

(c) demonstrating, under conditions of competitive coexistence, the superiority of free institutions in promoting human welfare and economic progress.

3. A recognition of these common NATO interests, and collective and individual effort to promote these economic aims, need not in any way prejudice close economic relations with non-NATO countries. Economic, like political co-operation, is and must remain wider than NATO. At the same time, the countries of the Atlantic Community have an interest in arrangements for especially close economic co-operation among groups of European member nations, and it should be possible for the development of such arrangements to promote rather than conflict with the wider objectives of the Atlantic Community and the rest of the non-Communist world.
II. NATO AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

4. The economic objectives of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty are of basic importance to the stability and well-being not only of the North Atlantic area but of the entire non-Communist world. It is not, however, necessary that member countries pursue the purposes of Article 2 only through action in NATO itself. It would not serve the interests of the Atlantic Community for NATO to duplicate the operating functions of other international organizations designed for various forms of economic co-operation (1). NATO members play a major part in all these agencies, whose membership is generally well adapted to the special purposes.

5. Nor do there now appear to be significant new areas for common economic action requiring execution by NATO itself. The common economic concerns of the member nations will best be fostered by continued and enhanced collaboration both directly and through organizations other than NATO. This should be reinforced, however, by NATO consultation where economic issues of special interest to the Alliance are involved. This, in turn, requires a substantial expansion of exchange of information and views in the economic as well as in the political field. Where economic matters are clearly related to the political and security interests of the Alliance, NATO consultation should seek to secure a common approach on the part of member governments. The resulting action,

(1) The outstanding instances are the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OECEC) (which includes all NATO countries as full or associate members and four others); the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); the International Finance Corporation (IFC); and the various United Nations specialised agencies including the Economic Commission for Europe. Several NATO members participate actively in the Colombo Plan for promoting economic development in Asia. Most members are taking an active part in technical assistance programmes and are also participating in discussions of proposals for the creation of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED).
however, should normally be taken by governments either directly or through other international organizations.

6. NATO, as such, should not seek to establish formal relations with these other organizations, and the harmonising of attitudes and actions should be left to the representatives of the NATO governments therein. Nor is it necessary or desirable for NATO members to form a "bloc" in such organizations. This would only alienate other friendly governments. There should, however, be NATO consultation when economic issue of special political or strategic interest to NATO arise in other organizations, and particularly before meetings of such organizations at which interests of the Atlantic Community may be subject to attempts to divide or weaken the Alliance.

III. \textbf{FIELDS FOR ECONOMIC CONSULTATION WITHIN NATO}

A. \textbf{Strengthening members' economies and promoting their economic co-operation}

7. Economic growth and health require expanding economies based on sound policies, and organized co-operation to promote the greatest possible freedom in trade and payments and in the movements of manpower and long-term capital. While there remains a great deal to be accomplished in these respects, the requisite machinery for co-operation among NATO members exists in other organizations.

8. There is now adequate provision for a regular assessment of each member country's general economic position, prospects and problems through the CEBC and NATO Annual Reviews. In addition, issues may arise affecting the economic health of the Atlantic Community, where NATO may be the most effective organization for consultation because of their political implications, or because of their relation to the common defence.

B. \textbf{Resolving conflicts in Economic Policies of Member Countries}

9. NATO has a positive interest in the resolution of
economic disputes which may have political or strategic repercussions damaging to the Alliance. These are to be distinguished from disagreements on economic policy which are normally dealt with through direct negotiations or multilateral discussion in other organizations. Nothing would be gained by merely having repeated in NATO the same arguments made in other and more technically qualified organizations. It should, however, be open to any member or to the Secretary General to raise for discussion in NATO issues on which they feel that consideration elsewhere is not making adequate progress and that NATO consultation might facilitate solutions contributing to the objectives of the Atlantic Community. The procedures for peaceful settlement discussed in the previous Chapter should be available for major disputes of an economic as well as a purely political character.

C. Scientific and Technical Co-operation

10. One area of special importance to the Atlantic Community is the field of science and technology. During the last decade, it has become ever clearer that progress in science and engineering can be decisive in determining the security of nations and their position in world affairs. Such progress is also vital if the Western world is to play its proper rôle in relation to economically underdeveloped areas.

11. Within the general field of science and technology, there is an especially urgent need to improve the quality and to increase the supply of scientists, engineers and technicians. Responsibility for recruitment, training and utilisation of scientific and technical personnel is primarily a national rather than an international matter. Nor is it a responsibility solely of national governments. In the member countries with federal systems, state and provincial governments play the major part, and
many of the universities and institutes of higher learning in the Atlantic area are independent institutions free from detailed control by governments. At the same time, properly designed measures of international co-operation could stimulate individual member countries to adopt more positive policies and, in some cases, help guide them in the most constructive directions.

12. Certain activities in this connection are already being carried out by other organizations. Progress in this field, however, is so crucial to the future of the Atlantic Community that NATO members should ensure that no possibilities of fruitful co-operation are left unexplored. As a first concrete step, therefore, it is recommended that a conference be convened (either by NATO or on the initiative of NATO member governments through another appropriate organization), composed of one or at the most two outstanding authorities, private or governmental, from each country in order:

(a) to exchange information and views concerning the most urgent problems in the recruitment, training and utilisation of scientists, engineers and technicians, and the best means, both long-term and short-term, of solving these problems;

(b) to foster closer relations among the participants with a view to continued interchange of experience and stimulation of constructive work in member countries; and

(c) to propose specific measures for future international co-operation in this field, through NATO or other international organizations.

D. Relations with Other Areas

13. It is a matter of common consent that the Atlantic Community has a major positive concern with healthy and accelerated
development in economically underdeveloped areas, both outside and within the NATO area. It is likewise agreed that NATO is not an appropriate agency for administering programmes of assistance for economic development, or even for systematically concerting the relevant policies of member nations. Member countries should, however, keep each other and the Organization informed of their programmes and policies in this field, and when required NATO should review the adequacy of existing action in relation to the interests of the Alliance.

14. The economic interests of the Atlantic Community cannot be considered in isolation from the activities and policies of the Soviet bloc. The Soviets are resorting all too often to the use of economic measures which may have the effect of weakening the Western Alliance, or of creating in other areas a dangerous degree of dependence on the Soviet world. In this situation it is more than ever important that NATO countries actively develop their own constructive commercial and financial policies. In particular, they should avoid creating situations of which the Soviets might take advantage to the detriment of the Atlantic Community and of other non-Communist countries. In this whole field member countries should consult together in order to determine their course deliberately and with the fullest possible knowledge.

15. NATO should continue its regular analysis of economic trends in Soviet countries (including the comparison with member countries) and developments in Soviet economic policy. To this end, governments should undertake to report relevant information regularly, and there should be periodic meetings of experts on Soviet economic affairs drawn from the various capitals whose discussions might be the basis for consultation in particular cases. Arrangements should also be made for periodic meetings of
officials from the national capitals involved in commercial negotiations with the Soviet bloc, for an exchange of information and views. In the case of an important new commercial or financial proposal from the Soviet bloc to any member country, with possible political implications, it would be desirable for the member concerned to bring it to the attention of the Council.

16. The Alliance also has a positive interest in the complex and difficult field of Soviet economic relations with the underdeveloped countries. NATO should be concerned with cases where Soviet economic action appears calculated to undermine sound relations between the underdeveloped countries and members of the Atlantic Community. Here the main endeavour of member governments should be to work co-operatively and constructively with the underdeveloped areas in promoting their economic development on a mutually satisfactory basis. It would clearly not be desirable to engage in indiscriminate competitive bidding with the Soviets in the field of assistance for development. At the same time, NATO consultation in certain cases might suggest the need for special efforts by members to assist underdeveloped countries in dealing with unusual problems, even if this requires an exceptional departure from ordinary commercial and financial practices.

IV. NATO ARRANGEMENTS FOR ECONOMIC CONSULTATION

17. There has been a considerable evolution in NATO's arrangements for regular economic consultation. In addition, a number of economic matters have been brought before the Council for consideration on an ad hoc basis. No substantial new machinery in this field is called for. However, in view of the extended range of topics for regular exchange of information and consultation described above, there should be established under the Council a Committee of Economic Advisers. This group should be
entrusted with the regular exchange of information and preliminary
discussion in those areas of systematic consultation outlined
above, together with such tasks as may be assigned by the
Council or approved by the Council at the Committee's request. It
would absorb any continuing function of the Committee of Technical
Advisers. Since its duties would not be full-time, member
governments would presumably wish to be represented normally by
officials mainly concerned with the work of other economic
organizations; but membership should be flexible, the Committee
being composed, when appropriate, of specialists from the
capitals on particular topics under consideration. In any event
arrangements should be made for more meetings of officials dealing
currently with various economic matters important to the
Alliance, such as Soviet commercial negotiations, trends in
underdeveloped countries, or scientific and technical co-operation.
CHAPTER 3: CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

1. A sense of community must bind the people as well as the institutions of the Atlantic nations. This will exist only to the extent that there is a realisation of their common cultural heritage and of the values of their free way of life and thought. It is important, therefore, for the NATO countries to promote cultural co-operation among their peoples by all practical means in order to strengthen their unity and develop maximum support for their alliance. It is particularly important that this cultural co-operation should be wider than continental. This, however, does not preclude particular governments from acting on a more limited multilateral or even bilateral basis to strengthen their own cultural relations within the broader Atlantic framework.

2. The Committee welcomes the measures for cultural co-operation within the Atlantic Community which have been initiated by private individuals and non-governmental groups. These should be encouraged and increased. To further cultural collaboration, the Committee suggests that member governments be guided by the following general principles:

(a) Government activities in this field should not duplicate but should support and supplement private efforts.

(b) Member governments should give priority to those projects which require joint NATO action, and thus contribute to a developing sense of community.

(c) In developing new activities in the cultural field, NATO can most fruitfully place the main emphasis on inspiring and promoting transatlantic contacts.

(d) There should be a realistic appreciation of the financial implications of cultural projects.
3. In order to develop public awareness and understanding of NATO and the Atlantic Community, the Council should work out arrangements for NATO courses and seminars for teachers, journalists and others in a position to influence public opinion.

4. NATO and its member governments should broaden their support of other educational and related activities such as the NATO Fellowship and Scholarship Programme; creation of university chairs of Atlantic studies; visiting professorships; government-sponsored programmes for the exchange of persons, especially on a transatlantic basis; use of NATO information materials in schools; and establishment of special NATO awards for students.

5. Governments should actively promote closer relations between NATO and youth organizations and a specialist should be added to the International Staff in this connection. Conferences under NATO auspices of representatives of youth organizations such as that of July, 1956, should be held from time to time.

6. In the interests of promoting easier and more frequent contacts among the NATO peoples, governments should review and, if possible, revise their foreign exchange and other policies which restrict travel.

7. In view of the importance of promoting better understanding and goodwill between NATO service personnel, it would be desirable, in cooperation with the military authorities, to extend exchanges of such personnel beyond the limits of normal training programmes. Such exchanges might, as a first step, be developed by governments on a bilateral basis. In addition, member governments should seek the assistance of the Atlantic Treaty Association and other voluntary organizations in the further development of such exchanges.
8. Cultural projects which have a common benefit should be commonly financed. Agreed cultural projects initiated by a single member government or a private organization, such as the recent seminar held at Oxford or the Study Conference sponsored by the Atlantic Treaty Association on "The Role of the School in the Atlantic Community", should receive financial support from NATO where that is necessary to supplement national resources.
CHAPTER 4: CO-OPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD

1. The people of the member countries must know about NATO if they are to support it. Therefore they must be informed not only of NATO's aspirations, but of its achievements. There must be substance for an effective NATO information programme and resources to carry it out. The public should be informed to the greatest possible extent of significant results achieved through NATO consultation.

2. NATO information activities should be directed primarily to public opinion in the NATO area. At the same time, an understanding outside the NATO area of the objectives and accomplishments of the Organization is necessary if it is to be viewed sympathetically, and if its activities are not to be misinterpreted.

3. The important task of explaining and reporting NATO activities rests primarily on national information services. They cannot discharge this task if member governments do not make adequate provision in their national programmes for that purpose. It is essential, therefore, that such provision be made. NATO can and should assist governments in this work. The promotion of information about and public understanding of NATO and the Atlantic community should, in fact, be a joint endeavour by the Organization and its members.

4. One of NATO's functions should be to co-ordinate the work of national information services in fields of common interest. Governments should pool their experiences and views in NATO to avoid differences in evaluation and emphasis. This is particularly important in the dissemination of information about NATO to
other countries. Co-ordinated policy should underline the
defensive character of our Alliance and the importance of its
non-military aspects. It should cover also replies to
anti-NATO propaganda and the analysis of communist moves and
statements which affect NATO.

5. In its turn, the NATO Information Division must be given
the resources by and the support from governments without which
they could not discharge these new tasks - and should not be
asked to do so.

6. In order to facilitate co-operation between the NATO
Information Division and national information services, the
following specific measures are recommended:

(a) An officer should be designated by each national
information service to maintain liaison with NATO
and to be responsible for the dissemination of
NATO information material;

(b) governments should submit to NATO the relevant
information programmes which they plan to implement,
for discussion in the Committee on Information and
Cultural Relations. Representatives of national
information services should take part in these
discussions;

(c) within the NATO Information Division budget, pro-
vision should be made for a translation fund so
that NATO information material can be translated
into the non-official languages of the Alliance,
according to reasonable requirements of the
member governments;
(d) NATO should, on request, provide national services with special studies on matters of common interest.

7. The journalists' tours sponsored by NATO should be broadened to include others in a position to influence public opinion, such as trade union and youth leaders, teachers and lecturers. Closer relations between private organizations supporting NATO and the NATO Information Division should also be encouraged.
CHAPTER 5: ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

1. The Committee considers that NATO in its present form is capable of discharging the functions required of it. Structural changes are not needed. The machine is basically satisfactory provided that governments make use of it.

2. At the same time, certain improvements in the procedures and functioning of the Organization will be required if the recommendations of this report are to be fully implemented. The proposals in this Chapter are submitted for this purpose.

A. Security

3. There must be a strict observance of security measures and unqualified respect for the confidential character of meetings. Otherwise there cannot be the type of full and frank consultation which the Committee regards as essential.

B. Meetings of the Council

4. More time should be allowed for Ministerial Meetings. Experience has shown that, without more time, important issues on the agenda cannot be adequately considered. Decisions concerning some of them will not be reached at all, or will be reached only in an unclear form.

5. Efforts should be made to encourage discussion rather than simply declarations of policy prepared in advance. Arrangements for meetings should be made with this aim in view. For most sessions, the numbers present should be sharply restricted. In order to facilitate free discussion, when Ministers wish to speak in a language other than French or English, consecutive translation into one of these official languages should be provided by interpreters from their own delegations.

6. Meetings of Foreign Ministers should be held whenever required, and occasionally in locations other than NATO.
Headquarters. Ministers might also participate more frequently in regular Council meetings, even though not all of them may find it possible to attend such meetings at the same time. There should be no firm or formal line between Ministerial and other meetings of the Council.

C. Strengthening the links between the Council and member governments

7. Governments should ensure that their representation on the Council is as authoritative as possible, should provide for maximum effectiveness in the presentation of their views and policies, and should see to it that the necessary follow-up action is taken.

8. It is indispensable to the kind of consultations envisaged in this report that Permanent Representatives should be in a position to speak authoritatively and to reflect the current thinking of their governments. Differences in location and in constitutional organization make impossible any uniform arrangements in all member governments. In some cases it might be desirable to designate a high official in the national capital to be concerned primarily with NATO affairs. The purpose would be to help both in fostering NATO consultations whenever national policies impinge on the common interests of the Atlantic Community, and in translating the results of such consultations into effective action within the national governments.

9. To ensure the closest possible tie between current thinking in the governments and consultations in the Council, there might be occasional Council meetings with the participation of such specially designated officials or the permanent official heads of foreign ministries.
D. Preparation for Council meetings

10. Items on the Agenda of Ministerial meetings should be thoroughly examined by Permanent Representatives and relevant proposals prepared before Ministers meet. For this purpose it may be found desirable for governments to send senior experts to consult on agenda items before the meetings take place.

11. The preparation of questions for discussion in the Council should be assisted by appropriate use of the Council's Committees of Political and Economic Advisers. (Recommendations on the establishment of these Committees are set forth in Chapter 1, paragraph 18, and Chapter 2, paragraph 17).

12. In the case of consultations on special subjects, more use should be made of senior experts from national capitals to assist permanent delegations by calling them, on an ad hoc basis, to do preparatory work. Informal discussion among specialists with corresponding responsibilities is a particularly valuable means of concerting governmental attitudes in the early stages of policy formation.

13. Member governments should make available "basic position material" to one another through NATO for background information. This would help the Alliance as a whole in the consideration of problems of common concern and would assist individual governments to understand more fully the reasons for the position adopted by any member country on a particular issue which might be its special concern, but which might also affect in varying degrees other members of NATO.

E. The Secretary General and the International Staff

14. To enable the Organization to make its full contribution, the role of the Secretary General and the International Staff needs to be enhanced.
15. It is recommended that the Secretary General preside over meetings of the Council in Ministerial, as he does now in permanent sessions. Such a change with respect to the conduct of the Council's business would follow naturally from the new responsibilities of the Secretary General and his even closer relationship to the Council, arising out of the recommendations of this report. It is also warranted by the Secretary General's unique opportunities for becoming familiar with the problems and the activities of the Alliance as a whole.

16. It would, however, still be desirable to have one Minister chosen each year as President of the Council in accordance with the present practice of alphabetical rotation. This Minister, as President, would continue to have especially close contact with the Secretary General during and between Ministerial Meetings, and would, as at present, act as the spokesman of the Council on all formal occasions. He would also preside at the formal opening and closing of Ministerial sessions of the Council.

17. In addition:

(a) The Secretary General should be encouraged to propose items for NATO consultation in the fields covered by this report and should be responsible for promoting and directing the process of consultation.

(b) In view of these responsibilities, member governments should undertake to keep the Secretary General fully and currently informed through their permanent delegations of their governments' thinking on questions of common concern to the Alliance.

(c) Attention is also called to the additional responsibilities of the Secretary General,
18. The effective functioning of NATO depends in large measure on its Staff. Acceptance of the recommendations in this report would impose on it new duties and responsibilities. Governments must be prepared to give the International Staff the necessary support, both in finance and personnel.

recommended in connection with the annual political appraisal (Chapter 1, paragraph 15) and the peaceful settlement of disputes (Chapter 1, paragraph 19).
(DRAFT) REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE
OF THREE
ON
NON-MILITARY
CO-OPERATION
IN
NATO

Gaetano Martino: Foreign Minister of Italy
Halvard Lange: Foreign Minister of Norway
L.B. Pearson: Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada
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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The Committee on Non-Military Co-operation, set up by the Council of NATO at its session of May, 1956, was requested: "to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community".

2. The Committee has interpreted these terms of reference as requiring it (1) to examine and re-define the objectives and needs of the Alliance, especially in the light of current international developments; and (2) to make recommendations for strengthening its internal solidarity, cohesion and unity.

3. The Committee hopes that the report and recommendations which it now submits will make NATO's purely defensive and constructive purposes better understood in non-NATO countries; that it will facilitate and encourage steps to lessen international tension; and that it will assist in the effort to achieve a durable and honourable basis for competitive and ultimately for co-operative co-existence with the Communist world.

4. The foundation of NATO, on which alone a strong superstructure can be built, is the political obligation that its members have taken for collective defence; to consider that an attack on one is an attack on all, which will be met by the collective action of all. There is a tendency at times to overlook the far-reaching importance of this commitment; especially during those periods when the danger of having to invoke it may seem to recede.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL
5. With this political commitment for collective defence as the cornerstone of the foreign and defence policies of its members, NATO has a solid basis for existence. It is true, of course, that the ways and means by which the obligation is to be discharged may alter as political or strategic conditions alter; as the threat to peace changes its character or its direction. However, any variations in plans and strategic policies which may be required need not weaken NATO or the confidence of its members in NATO and in each other; providing, and the proviso is decisive, that each member retains its will and its capacity to play its full part in discharging the political commitment for collective action against aggression which it undertook when it signed the Pact; providing also - and this is equally important - that any changes in national strategy or policy which affect the coalition are made only after collective discussion and agreement.

6. The first essential, then, of a healthy and developing NATO lies in the whole-hearted acceptance by all its members of the political commitment for collective defence, and in the confidence which each has in the will and ability of the others to honour that commitment if aggression should take place.

7. This is our best present deterrent against aggression; and consequently the best assurance that the commitment undertaken will not be engaged. In this way, NATO provides a strong guarantee of peace.

8. This peace-ensuring role of NATO, however, based on solidarity and strength, can be discharged only if the political and economic relations between its members...
members are co-operative and close. An Alliance in which the members ignore each other's interests or engage in political or economic conflict, or harbour suspicions of each other, cannot be effective either for deterrence or defence.

9. It is useful, in searching for ways and means of strengthening NATO unity and understanding, to recall the origin and the aims of the Organization.

10. The Treaty which was signed in Washington in 1949 was a collective response - we had learned that a purely national response was insufficient for security - to the fear of military aggression by the forces of the USSR and its allies. These forces were of overwhelming strength. The threat to Greece, the capture of Czechoslovakia, the Blockade of Berlin, and the pressure against Yugoslavia showed that they were also aggressive.

11. While fear may have been the main urge for the creation of NATO, there was also the realization - conscious or instinctive - that in a shrinking nuclear world it was wise and timely to bring about a closer association of kindred Atlantic and Western European nations for other than defence purposes alone; that a partial pooling of sovereignty for mutual protection should also promote progress and co-operation generally. There was a feeling among the governments and peoples concerned, that this closer unity was both natural and desirable; that the common cultural traditions, free institutions and democratic concepts which were being challenged, and were marked for destruction by those who challenged them, were things which should also bring the NATO nations closer together, not only for their defence but for their development. There was, in short, a
sense of Atlantic Community, alongside the realization of an immediate common danger.

12. Any such feeling was certainly not the decisive, or even the main impulse in the creation of NATO. Nevertheless, it gave birth to the hope that NATO would grow beyond and above the emergency which brought it into being.

13. The expression of this hope is found in the Preamble and in Articles 2 and 4 of the Treaty. These two Articles, limited in their terms but with at least the promise of the grand design of an Atlantic Community, were included because of this insistent feeling that NATO must become more than a military alliance. They reflected the very real anxiety that if NATO failed to meet this test, it would disappear with the immediate crisis which produced it, even though the need for it might be as great as ever.

14. From the very beginning of NATO, then, it was recognized that while defence co-operation was the first and most urgent requirement, this was not enough. It has also become increasingly realized since the Treaty was signed that security is today far more than a military matter. The strengthening of political consultation and economic co-operation, the development of resources, progress in education and public understanding, all these can be as important, or even more important, for the protection of the security of a nation, or an alliance, as the building of a battleship or the equipping of an army.

15. These two aspects of security - civil and military - can no longer safely be considered in watertight compartments; either within or between nations.
Perhaps NATO has not yet fully recognized their essential inter-relationship, or done enough to bring about that close and continuous contact between its civil and military sides which is essential if it is to be strong and enduring.

16. North Atlantic political and economic cooperation, however, let alone unity, will not be brought about in a day or by a declaration, but by creating over the years and through a whole series of national acts and policies, the habits and traditions and precedents for such co-operation and unity. The process will be a slow and gradual one at best; slower than we might wish. We can be satisfied if it is steady and sure. This will not be the case, however, unless the member governments – especially the more powerful ones – work with and through NATO for more than purposes of collective military defence.

17. While the members of NATO have already developed various forms of non-military co-operation between themselves and have been among the most active and constructive participants in various international organizations, NATO as such has been hesitant in entering this field, particularly in regard to economic matters. Its members have been rightly concerned to avoid duplication and to do, through other existing international organizations, the things which can best be done in that way.

18. Recently, however, the members of NATO have been examining and re-assessing the purposes and the needs of the Organization under the impetus provided by certain changes in Soviet tactics and policies which have taken place since the death of Stalin. These changes have faced NATO with an additional challenge, this time largely non-military in character; that of competitive co-existence with the Sino-Soviet bloc of
nations. They have also removed - that may have been their main international purpose - some of the immediate fear of large-scale military aggression against Western Europe; a process facilitated by the evidence that the Kremlin now realizes that any such all-out aggression would be met by a sure, swift and devastating retaliation; that there could be no victor in a war of this kind with nuclear weapons on both sides.

19. As the danger of total military aggression may seem somewhat to recede and the atmosphere of anxiety to lighten, questions arise more insistently regarding NATO's ability to meet effectively this new situation of competitive co-existence, with its emphasis on conflict without catastrophe. There is also an increased realization that non-military ties have to be strengthened if NATO is to grow; or even perhaps to survive.

20. Certain questions now take on a new urgency. Have NATO's needs and objectives changed, or should they be changed? Is the organization operating satisfactorily in the altered circumstances of 1956? If not, what can be done about it? There is the even more far-reaching question: "Can a loose association of sovereign states hold together at all without the common binding force of fear?"

21. The Committee has been examining these questions in the light of its firm conviction that the objectives which governments had in mind when the Pact was signed remain valid; that NATO is as important now to its member states as it was at that time.

22. The first of these objectives - as has already been pointed out - is security, based on collective action with adequate armed forces both for deterrence and defence.
23. Certainly NATO unity and strength in the pursuit of this objective remains as essential as it was in 1949. Soviet tactics may have changed. But Soviet armed strength remains unchanged. Therefore that of NATO must not be reduced, though its character and capabilities should be constantly adapted to changing circumstances. Strengthening the political and economic side of NATO is an essential complement to - not a substitute for - continuous co-operation in defence.

24. The new tactics of Soviet leaders may place greater emphasis on political, economic and propaganda action. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that this will be permitted to prejudice in any way the maintenance of a high level of military power in its most modern form as a base for Soviet activity in these other fields.

25. We should welcome changes in tactics and policies that have taken place - or may take place - in Moscow if they are genuinely designed to ease international tensions. But we must remain on guard so long as Soviet leaders persist in their determination to maintain a preponderance of military power for the achievement of their own political objectives and those of their allies.

26. We must also remember that the weakening and eventual dissolution of NATO remains a major communist goal. Threats having failed, more subtle, softer methods are being attempted. Efforts to weaken NATO in various non-military ways, economic and political, are being pushed with energy and skill. They embody challenges which require policies that are not only firm but positive. Therefore, while NATO must not be cajoled into military weakness, it must also develop
to a far greater degree than formerly, co-operation and unity as well as flexibility of diplomatic action.

27. This brings us again to the second and long-term aim of NATO: the development of an Atlantic Community whose roots are deeper even than the necessity for common defence. This implies nothing less than the permanent association of the free Atlantic peoples for the promotion of their greater unity and the protection and the advancement of the interests which, as free democracies, they have in common.

28. If we are to secure this long-term aim, we must prevent the centrifugal forces of opposition or indifference from weakening the alliance. NATO has not been destroyed, or even weakened, by the threats or attacks of its enemies. It can be destroyed by the lethargy or complacency of its members; by dissension or division between them; by putting narrow national considerations above the collective interest. There are signs that these things are happening. To avoid them, NATO must be used by its members, more than it has been used, for sincere and genuine consultation and co-operation on questions of common concern. For this purpose, resolution is more important than resolutions; will, than words.

29. The problem, however, goes deeper than this. NATO countries are faced by a political as well as a military threat. It comes from the revolutionary doctrines of communism which have by careful design of the Communist leaders over many years been sowing seeds of falsehood concerning our free and democratic way of life. The best answer to such falsehoods is a continuing demonstration of the superiority of our own institutions.
over communist ones. We can show by word and deed that we welcome political progress, economic advancement and orderly social change and that the real reactionaries of this day are these communist regimes which, adhering to an inflexible pattern of economic and political doctrine, have been more successful in destroying freedom than in promoting it.

30. We must however realize that falsehoods concerning our institutions have sometimes been accepted at face value and that there are those, even in the non-communist world, who under the systematic influence of communist propaganda, do not accept our own analysis of NATO's aims and values. They believe that while NATO may have served a useful defensive and deterrent role in the Stalinist era, it is no longer necessary, even for the security of its members; that it is tending now to become an agency for the pooling of the strength and resources of the "colonial" powers in defence of imperial privileges, racial superiority, and Atlantic hegemony under the leadership of the United States. The fact that we know these views to be false and unjustified does not mean that NATO and its governments should not do everything they can to correct and counteract them.

31. NATO should not forget that the influence and interests of its members are not confined to the area covered by the Treaty. Therefore, while striving to improve their relations with each other, and to strengthen and deepen their own unity, they should also be concerned to ensure that their activities harmonize with the broader interests of the whole international community; particularly in working through the United Nations and elsewhere for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the solution of the problems that now
divide the world.

32. In following this course, NATO can show that it is more than a defence organization acting and reacting to the ebb and flow of the fears and dangers arising out of Soviet policy. It can prove its desire to co-operate fully with other members of the international community in bringing to reality the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It can show that it is not merely concerned with preventing the cold war from deteriorating into a shooting one; or with defending itself if such a tragedy should take place; but that it is even more concerned with seizing the political initiative to bring about a secure peace for all nations; with replacing competitive by co-operative co-existence.

33. Our caution in accepting without question the pacific character of certain Soviet moves; our refusal to dismantle our defences before we are convinced that conditions of international confidence have been restored, will be understood by all people of sincerity and goodwill. What would not be understood is any lack of interest or effort on our part in breaking down the barriers with a view to establishing such confidence.

34. We must above all reject the temptation to play up fears and suspicions merely because they help to keep the NATO coalition together. That would indeed be a sterile and defeatist attitude.

35. The coming together of the Atlantic nations for good and constructive purposes - which is the basic principle and ideal underlying the NATO concept - must rest on and grow from deeper and more permanent factors than the divisions and dangers of the last ten years. It is a historical, rather than a contemporary develop-
ment and if it is to achieve its real purpose, it must be considered in that light and the necessary conclusions drawn. A short-range view will not suffice.

36. The fundamental historical fact underlying this development, as two world wars have now demonstrated, is that the nation state, by itself and relying exclusively on national policy and national power, is inadequate for progress or even for survival in the nuclear age. As the founders of the North Atlantic Treaty foresaw, the growing interdependence of states, politically and economically as well as militarily, calls for an ever-increasing measure of international cohesion and co-operation. Some states may be able to enjoy a degree of political and economic independence when things are going well. No state, however powerful, can guarantee its security and its welfare by national action alone.

37. This conviction underlies our report and the recommendations contained therein which appear in the subsequent chapters.

38. It has not been difficult to make these recommendations. It will be far more difficult for the member governments to carry them into effect. This will require, on their part, the firm conviction that the transformation of the Atlantic Community into a vital and vigorous political reality is as important as any purely national purpose. It will require above all, the will to carry this conviction into the realm of practical governmental policy.
CHAPTER 2: POLITICAL CO-OPERATION

1. INTRODUCTION

1. If there is to be vitality and growth in the concept of the Atlantic Community, the relations between the members of NATO must rest on a solid basis of confidence and understanding. Without this there cannot be constructive or solid political co-operation.

2. The deepening and strengthening of this political co-operation does not imply the weakening of the ties of NATO members with other friendly countries or with other international associations, particularly the United Nations. Adherence to NATO is not exclusive or restrictive. Nor should the evolution of the Atlantic Community through NATO prevent the formation of even closer relationships among some of its members; for instance within groups of European countries. The moves toward Atlantic co-operation and European unity should be parallel and complementary, not competitive or conflicting.

3. Effective and constructive international co-operation requires a resolve to work together for the solution of common problems. There are special ties between NATO members, special incentives and security interests, which should make this task easier than it otherwise would be. But its successful accomplishment will depend largely on the extent to which member governments, in their own policies and actions, take into consideration the interests of the Alliance. This requires not only the acceptance of the obligation of consultation and co-operation whenever necessary, but also the development of practices by which the discharge of this obligation becomes a normal part of governmental activity.
4. It is easy to profess devotion to the principle of political - or economic - consultation in NATO. It is difficult to convert the profession into practice. Consultation within an alliance means more than exchange of information, though that is necessary. It means more than letting the NATO Council know about national decisions that have already been taken; or trying to enlist support for those decisions. It means the discussion of problems collectively, in the early stages of policy formation, and before national positions become fixed. At best, this will result in collective decisions on matters of common interest affecting the Alliance. At the least, it will ensure that no action is taken by one member without a knowledge of the views of the others.

II. CONSULTATION ON FOREIGN POLICIES

A. Scope and Character of Political Consultation

5. The essential role of consultation in fostering political co-operation was clearly defined by an earlier NATO Committee on the North Atlantic Community in 1951:

"... The achievement of a closer degree of co-ordination of the foreign policies of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty, through the development of the 'habit of consultation' on matters of common concern, would greatly strengthen the solidarity of the North Atlantic Community and increase the individual and collective capacity of its members to serve the peaceful purposes for which NATO was established. ... In the political field, this means that while each North Atlantic Government retains full freedom of action and decision with respect to its own policy, the aim should be to achieve, through exchanging information and views, as wide an area of agreement as possible in
in the formulation of policies as a whole

"Special attention must be paid, as explicitly recognised in Article 4 of the Treaty, to matters of urgent and immediate importance to the members of NATO, and to 'emergency' situations where it may be necessary to consult closely on national lines of conduct affecting the interests of members of NATO as a whole. There is a continuing need, however, for effective consultation at an early stage on current problems, in order that national policies may be developed and action taken on the basis of a full awareness of the attitudes and interests of all the members of NATO. While all members of NATO have a responsibility to consult with their partners on appropriate matters, a large share of responsibility for such consultation necessarily rests on the more powerful members of the Community."

6. Those words were written five years ago. They still hold true. Nor have they been ignored by NATO. The practice of consulting together has grown in the NATO Council in recent years and it has contributed to cooperation in the Alliance. But there is ample room for improvement - for broadening the scope and deepening the character of consultation.

7. It should, however, be remembered that collective discussion is not an end in itself, but a means to the end of securing the maximum possible agreement on policy and action on all matters that concern the common interests of the Atlantic Community.
8. Such agreement, even with the closest possible co-operation and consultation, is not easy to secure. But it is essential to the Atlantic Alliance that a steady and continuous effort be made to bring it about. There cannot be unity in defence and disunity in foreign policy.

9. There are, of course, certain practical limitations to consultation in this field. They are sufficiently obvious in fact to make it unnecessary to emphasise them in words. Indeed the danger is less that they will be minimised or evaded than that they will be exaggerated and used to justify practices which unnecessarily ignore the common interest.

10. One of these limitations is the hard fact that ultimate responsibility for decision and action still rests on national governments. In a situation of emergency, therefore, action may have to be taken by one government before consultation is possible with the others.

11. Another limitation is the difficulty, and indeed the unwisdom of trying to specify in advance all the subjects and all the situations where consultation is necessary; to separate by area or by subject the matters of NATO concern from those of purely national concern; to define in detail the obligations and duties of consultation. These things have to work themselves out in practice. In this process, experience is a better guide than dogma.

12. The essential thing is that on all occasions and in all circumstances member governments before acting or even before pronouncing, should keep the interests and the requirements of the Alliance in mind. If they have not the desire and the will to do this, no resolutions or recommendations or declarations by the Council or any Committee of the Council will be of any great value.
13. On the assumption, however, that this will and this desire do exist, the following principles and practices in the field of political consultation are recommended:

(a) Members should inform the Council of any development which significantly affects the Alliance. They should do this, not merely as a formality but as a preliminary to effective political consultation.

(b) Both individual member governments and the Secretary General should have the right to raise for discussion in the Council any subject which is of common NATO interest and not of a purely domestic character.

(c) A member government should not, without adequate advance consultation, adopt firm policies or make major political pronouncements on matters which significantly affect the Alliance or any of its members, unless circumstances make such prior consultation obviously and demonstrably impossible.

(d) In developing their national policies, members should take into consideration the interests and views of other governments, particularly those most directly concerned, as expressed in NATO consultation, even where no community of view or consensus has been reached in the Council.

(e) Where a consensus has been reached, it should be reflected in the formation of national policies. Where for national reasons the consensus is not followed, the government concerned should offer an explanation to the Council. It is even more important that where an agreed and formal recommendation has emerged from the Council discussions, governments should give it full weight in any
national actions or policies related to the subject of that recommendation.

B. Annual Political Appraisal

14. To strengthen the process of consultation, it is recommended that Foreign Ministers, at each Spring meeting, should make an appraisal of the political progress of the Alliance and consider the lines along which it should advance.

15. To prepare for this discussion, the Secretary General should submit an annual report:

(a) analysing the major political problems of the Alliance;

(b) reviewing the extent to which member governments have consulted and co-operated on such problems, or failed to do so;

(c) indicating the problems and possible developments which may require future consultation, so that difficulties might be resolved and positive and constructive initiatives taken.

16. Member governments, through their Permanent Representatives, should give the Secretary General such information and assistance, including that of technical experts, as he may require in preparing his report.

C. Preparation for Political Consultation

17. Effective consultation also requires careful planning and preparation of the agenda for meetings of the Council both in Ministerial and permanent session. Political questions coming up for discussion in the Council should so far as practicable be previously reviewed and discussed, so that representatives may have background information on the thinking both of their own and of other governments. When
appropriate, drafts of resolutions should be prepared in advance as a basis for discussion. Additional preparatory work will also be required for the annual political appraisal referred to in the preceding section.

18. To assist the Permanent Representatives and the Secretary General in discharging their responsibilities for political consultations, there should be constituted under the Council a committee of political advisers from each delegation, aided when necessary by specialists from the capitals. It would meet under the chairmanship of a member of the International Staff appointed by the Secretary General, and would include among its responsibilities current studies such as those on trends of Soviet policy.

III PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF INTER-MEMBER DISPUTES

19. In the development of effective political cooperation in NATO, it is of crucial importance to avoid serious inter-member disputes and to settle them quickly and satisfactorily when they occur. The settlement of such disputes is in the first place the direct responsibility of the member governments concerned, under both the Charter of the United Nations (Article 33) and the North Atlantic Treaty (Article 1). To clarify NATO's responsibilities in dealing with disputes which have not proved capable of settlement directly and to enable NATO, if necessary, to help in the settlement of such disputes, the Committee recommends that the Council adopt a resolution under Article 1 of the Treaty on the following lines:

(a) reaffirming the obligation of members to settle by peaceful means any dispute between themselves;
(b) declaring their intention to submit any such disputes, which have not proved capable of
settlement directly, to good offices procedures within the NATO framework before resorting to any other international agency; except for disputes of a legal character appropriate for submission to a judicial tribunal, and those disputes of an economic character for which attempts at settlement might best be made initially in the appropriate specialised economic organization;

(c) recognising the right and duty of member governments and of the Secretary General to bring to the attention of the Council matters which in their opinion may threaten the solidarity or effectiveness of the Alliance;

(d) empowering the Secretary General to offer his good offices informally at any time to the parties in dispute, and with their consent to initiate or facilitate procedures of enquiry, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration; and

(e) empowering the Secretary General, where he deems it appropriate for the purpose outlined in (d) above, to use the assistance of not more than three Permanent Representatives chosen by him in each instance.

IV. PARLIAMENTARY ASSOCIATIONS AND THE PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE

20. Among the best supporters of NATO and its purposes are those Members of Parliament who have had a chance at first hand to see some of its activities and to learn of its problems, and to exchange views with their colleagues from other parliaments. In particular, the formation of national Parliamentary Associations and the activities of the Conference of Members of Parliament from NATO countries have
contributed to the development of public support for NATO and solidarity among its members.

21. In order to maintain a close relationship of Parliamentarians with NATO, the following arrangements are recommended:

(a) That the Secretary General continue to place the facilities of NATO headquarters at the disposal of Parliamentary Conferences and give all possible help with arrangements for their meetings.

(b) That invited representatives of member governments and the Secretary General and other senior NATO civil and military officers attend these meetings. In this way the parliamentarians would be informed on the state of the Alliance and the problems before it, and the value of their discussions would be increased.
CHAPTER 3: ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

I. INTRODUCTION

Political co-operation and economic conflict are not reconcilable. Therefore, in the economic as well as in the political field there must be a genuine desire among the members to work together and a readiness to consult on questions of common concern based on the recognition of common interests.

2. These common economic interests shared by the members of NATO call for:

(a) co-operative and national action to achieve healthy and expanding economies, both to promote the well-being and self-confidence of the Atlantic peoples and to serve as the essential support for an adequate defence effort;

(b) the greatest possible freedom in trade and payments and in the movement of manpower and long term capital;

(c) assistance to economically underdeveloped areas for reasons of enlightened self-interest and to promote better relations among peoples; and

(d) policies which will demonstrate the superiority of free institutions in promoting human welfare and economic progress under conditions of competitive coexistence.

3. A recognition of these common NATO interests, and collective and individual effort to promote them, need not in any way prejudice close economic relations with non-NATO countries. Economic, like political co-operation, is and must remain wider than NATO. At the same time, the NATO countries have an interest in any arrangements for especially close economic co-operation among groups of European member nations. It should be possible - as it is desirable - for such special arrangements to promote rather than conflict with the wider objectives of Article 2 of
our Treaty, which are of basic importance to the stability and
well being, not only of the North Atlantic area, but of the
whole non-communist world.

II. NATO AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

4. While the purposes and principles of Article 2 are of
vital importance, it is not necessary that member countries
pursue them only through action in NATO itself. It would not
serve the interests of the Atlantic Community for NATO to
duplicate the operating functions of other international or-
ganizations designed for various forms of economic co-oper-
ation (1). NATO members play a major part in all these agen-
cies, whose membership is generally well adapted to the pur-
poses they serve.

5. Nor do there now appear to be significant new areas
for collective economic action requiring execution by NATO it-
self. In fact, the common economic concerns of the member
nations will often best be fostered by continued and increased
collaboration both bilaterally and through organizations other
than NATO. This collaboration should be reinforced, however,
by NATO consultation whenever economic issues of special inter-
est to the Alliance are involved; particularly those which have
political or defence implications or affect the economic health
of the Atlantic Community as a whole. This, in turn, requires
a substantial expansion of exchange of information and views
in NATO in the economic as well as in the political field.
Such economic consultation should seek to secure a common
approach on the part of member governments where the ques-

(1) The outstanding instances are the Organization for European
Economic Co-operation (OEEC) (which includes all NATO countries
as full or associate members and four others); the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF); the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (IBRD); the International Finance Corporation
(IFC); and the various United Nations specialised agencies
including the Economic Commission for Europe. Several NATO
members participate actively in the Colombo Plan for promot-
ing economic development in Asia. Most members are taking
an active part in technical assistance programmes and are
also participating in discussions of proposals for the cre-
ation of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Develop-
ment (SUNFED).
tions are clearly related to the political and security interests of the Alliance. Action resulting from such a common approach, however, should normally be taken by governments either directly or through other international organizations.

6. NATO, as such, should not seek to establish formal relations with these other organizations, and the harmonising of attitudes and actions should be left to the representatives of the NATO governments therein. Nor is it necessary or desirable for NATO members to form a "bloc" in such organizations. This would only alienate other friendly governments. It would be sufficient if the representatives of NATO countries in these other organizations consult together when economic issues of special political or strategic interest to NATO arise; and in particular before meetings at which there may be attempts to divide or weaken the Atlantic Alliance, or prejudice its interests.

III. CONFLICTS IN ECONOMIC POLICIES OF NATO COUNTRIES

7. NATO has a positive interest in the resolution of economic disputes which may have political or strategic repercussions damaging to the Alliance. These are to be distinguished from disagreements on economic policy which are normally dealt with through direct negotiations or by multilateral discussions in other organizations. Nothing would be gained by merely having repeated in NATO the same arguments made in other and more technically qualified organizations. It should, however, be open to any member or to the Secretary General to raise in NATO issues on which they feel that consideration elsewhere is not making adequate progress and that NATO consultation might facilitate solutions contributing to the objectives of the Atlantic Community. The procedures for peaceful settlement of political disputes discussed in the previous Chapter should also be available for major disputes of an economic character which are appropriate for NATO consideration.

IV. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

8. One area of special importance to the Atlantic Community is that of science and technology. During the last decade, it
has become ever clearer that progress in this field can be decisive in determining the security of nations and their position in world affairs. Such progress is also vital if the Western world is to play its proper role in relation to economically underdeveloped areas.

9. Within the general field of science and technology, there is an especially urgent need to improve the quality and to increase the supply of scientists, engineers and technicians. Responsibility for recruitment, training and utilisation of scientific and technical personnel is primarily a national rather than an international matter. Nor is it a responsibility solely of national governments. In the member countries with federal systems, state and provincial governments play the major part, and many of the universities and institutes of higher learning in the Atlantic area are independent institutions free from detailed control by governments. At the same time, properly designed measures of international co-operation could stimulate individual member countries to adopt more positive policies and, in some cases, help guide them in the most constructive directions.

10. Certain activities in this connection are already being carried out by other organizations. Progress in this field, however, is so crucial to the future of the Atlantic Community that NATO members should ensure that every possibility of fruitful co-operation is examined. As a first concrete step, therefore it is recommended that a conference be convened (either by NATO or on the initiative of NATO member governments through another appropriate organization), composed of one or at the most two outstanding authorities, private or governmental, from each country in order:

(a) to exchange information and views concerning the most urgent problems in the recruitment, training and utilisation of scientists, engineers and technicians, and the best means,
both long-term and short-term, of solving these problems;
(b) to foster closer relations among the participants
with a view to continued interchange of experience
and stimulation of constructive work in member
countries; and
(c) to propose specific measures for future international
co-operation in this field, through NATO or other
international organizations.

V. CONSULTATION ON ECONOMIC PROBLEMS BEYOND THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA

11. It is agreed that the Atlantic Community has a positive
concern with healthy and accelerated development in economically
underdeveloped areas, both inside and outside the NATO area. The
Committee feels however that NATO is not an appropriate agency for
administering programmes of assistance for economic development, or
even for systematicallyconcerting the relevant policies of member
nations. What member countries can and should do is to keep each
other and the Organization informed of their programmes and policies
in this field. When required NATO should review the adequacy of
existing action in relation to the interests of the Alliance.

12. The economic interests of the Atlantic Community cannot
be considered in isolation from the activities and policies of the
Soviet bloc. The Soviets are resorting all too often to the use
of economic measures designed to weaken the Western Alliance, or
to create in other areas a high degree of dependence on the Soviet
world. In this situation it is more than ever important that NATO
countries actively develop their own constructive commercial and
financial policies. In particular, they should avoid creating
situations of which the Soviets might take advantage to the detriment
of the Atlantic Community and of other non-Communist countries.
In this whole field of competitive economic coexistence member
countries should consult together more fully in order to determine
their course deliberately and with the fullest possible knowledge.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL
13. NATO should continue its regular analysis of economic trends in Soviet countries and developments in Soviet economic policy. To this end, governments should undertake to report relevant information regularly. There should also be periodic meetings of experts on Soviet economic affairs drawn from the various capitals whose discussions might be the basis for consultation in particular cases. Arrangements should also be made for periodic meetings of officials from the national capitals involved in commercial negotiations with the Soviet bloc, for an exchange of information and views. In the case of an important new commercial or financial proposal from the Soviet bloc to any member country, with possible political implications, it would be desirable for the member concerned to bring it to the attention of the Council before action is taken.

14. The Alliance also has a positive interest in the complex and difficult field of Soviet economic relations with the economically underdeveloped countries. NATO should be concerned with cases where Soviet economic action appears calculated to undermine sound and friendly relations between these and members of the Atlantic Community. Here the main endeavour of member governments should be to work co-operatively and constructively with the underdeveloped areas in promoting their economic development on a mutually satisfactory basis. It would clearly not be desirable to engage in indiscriminate competitive bidding with the Soviets in the field of assistance for development. At the same time, NATO consultation in certain cases might suggest the need for special efforts by members to assist underdeveloped countries in dealing with unusual problems, even if this requires an exceptional departure from ordinary commercial and financial practices.

VI. NATO ARRANGEMENTS FOR ECONOMIC CONSULTATION

15. There has been a considerable evolution in NATO's arrangements for regular economic consultation. In addition, a number of economic matters have been brought before the Council.
for consideration on an ad hoc basis. No substantial new machinery in this field is called for. However, in view of the extended range of topics for regular exchange of information and consultation described above, there should be established under the Council a Committee of Economic Advisers. This group should be entrusted with the regular exchange of information and preliminary discussion in those areas of systematic consultation outlined above, together with such tasks as may be assigned by the Council or approved by the Council at the Committee's request. It would absorb any continuing function of the Committee of Technical Advisers. Since its duties would not be full-time, member governments could be represented normally by officials mainly concerned with the work of other international economic organizations. Membership however should be flexible, the Committee being composed, when appropriate, of specialists from the capitals on particular topics under consideration.
CHAPTER 4: CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

1. A sense of community must bind the people as well as the institutions of the Atlantic nations. This will exist only to the extent that there is a realisation of their common cultural heritage and of the values of their free way of life and thought. It is important, therefore, for the NATO countries to promote cultural co-operation among their peoples by all practical means in order to strengthen their unity and develop maximum support for the alliance. It is particularly important that this cultural co-operation should be wider than continental. This, however, does not preclude particular governments from acting on a more limited multilateral or even bilateral basis to strengthen their own cultural relations within the broader Atlantic framework. The Committee welcomes the measures for cultural co-operation within the Atlantic Community which have been initiated by private individuals and non-governmental groups. These should be encouraged and increased.

2. To further cultural collaboration, the Committee suggests that member governments be guided by the following general principles:

(a) Government activities in this field should not duplicate but should support and supplement private efforts.

(b) Member governments should give priority to those projects which require joint NATO action, and thus contribute to a developing sense of community.

(c) In developing new activities in the cultural field, NATO can most fruitfully place the main emphasis on inspiring and promoting transatlantic contacts.

(d) There should be a realistic appreciation of the financial implications of cultural projects.
3. In order to develop public awareness and understanding of NATO and the Atlantic Community, the Council should work out arrangements for NATO courses and seminars for teachers, journalists and others in a position to influence public opinion.

4. NATO and its member governments should broaden their support of other educational and related activities such as the NATO Fellowship and Scholarship Programme; creation of university chairs of Atlantic studies; visiting professorships; government-sponsored programmes for the exchange of persons, especially on a transatlantic basis; use of NATO information materials in schools; and establishment of special NATO awards for students.

5. Governments should actively promote closer relations between NATO and youth organizations and a specialist should be added to the International Staff in this connection. Conferences under NATO auspices of representatives of youth organizations such as that of July, 1956, should be held from time to time.

6. In the interests of promoting easier and more frequent contacts among the NATO peoples, governments should review and, if possible, revise their foreign exchange and other policies which restrict travel.

7. In view of the importance of promoting better understanding and goodwill between NATO service personnel, it would be desirable, in co-operation with the military authorities, to extend exchanges of such personnel beyond the limits of normal training programmes. Such exchanges might, as a first step, be developed by governments on a bilateral basis. In addition, member governments should seek the assistance of the Atlantic Treaty Association and other voluntary organizations in the further development of such exchanges.
8. Cultural projects which have a common benefit should be commonly financed. Agreed cultural projects initiated by a single member government or a private organization, such as the recent seminar held at Oxford or the Study Conference sponsored by the Atlantic Treaty Association on "The Role of the School in the Atlantic Community", should receive financial support from NATO where that is necessary to supplement national resources.
CHAPTER 5: CO-OPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD

1. The people of the member countries must know about NATO if they are to support it. Therefore they must be informed not only of NATO's aspirations, but of its achievements. There must be substance for an effective NATO information programme and resources to carry it out. The public should be informed to the greatest possible extent of significant results achieved through NATO consultation.

2. NATO information activities should be directed primarily to public opinion in the NATO area. At the same time, an understanding outside the NATO area of the objectives and accomplishments of the Organization is necessary if it is to be viewed sympathetically, and if its activities are not to be misinterpreted.

3. The important task of explaining and reporting NATO activities rests primarily on national information services. They cannot discharge this task if member governments do not make adequate provision in their national programmes for that purpose. It is essential, therefore, that such provision be made. NATO can and should assist national governments in this work. The promotion of information about and public understanding of NATO and the Atlantic community should, in fact, be a joint endeavour by the Organization and its members.

4. One of NATO's functions should be to co-ordinate the work of national information services in fields of common interest. Governments should pool their experiences and views in NATO to avoid differences in evaluation and emphasis. This is particularly important in the dissemination of information about NATO to other countries. Co-ordinated policy should underline the defensive character of our Alliance and the importance of its non-military aspects. It should cover also replies to anti-NATO propaganda and the analysis of communist moves and
statements which affect NATO.

5. In its turn, the NATO Information Division must be given the resources by governments as well as their support, without which it could not discharge these new tasks - and should not be asked to do so.

6. In order to facilitate co-operation between the NATO Information Division and national information services, the following specific measures are recommended:

(a) An officer should be designated by each national information service to maintain liaison with NATO and to be responsible for the dissemination of NATO information material;

(b) governments should submit to NATO the relevant information programmes which they plan to implement, for discussion in the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations. Representatives of national information services should take part in these discussions;

(c) within the NATO Information Division budget, provision should be made for a translation fund so that NATO information material can be translated into the non-official languages of the Alliance, according to reasonable requirements of the member governments;

(d) NATO should, on request, provide national services with special studies on matters of common interest.

7. The journalists' tours sponsored by NATO should be broadened to include others in a position to influence public opinion, such as trade union and youth leaders, teachers and lecturers. Closer relations between private organizations supporting NATO and the NATO Information Division should also be encouraged.
CHAPTER 6: ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

1. The Committee considers that NATO in its present form is capable of discharging the non-military functions required of it. Structural changes are not needed. The machine is basically satisfactory. It is for governments to make use of it.

2. At the same time, certain improvements in the procedures and functioning of the Organization will be required if the recommendations of this report are to be fully implemented. The proposals in this Chapter are submitted for this purpose.

A. Security

3. There must be a strict observance of security measures and unqualified respect for the confidential character of meetings. Otherwise, there cannot be the type of full and frank consultation which the Committee regards as essential.

B. Meetings of the Council

4. More time should be allowed for Ministerial Meetings. Experience has shown that, without more time, important issues on the agenda cannot be adequately considered. Decisions concerning some of them will not be reached at all, or will be reached only in an unclear form.

5. Efforts should be made to encourage discussion rather than simply declarations of policy prepared in advance. Arrangements for meetings should be made with this aim in view. For most sessions, the numbers present should be sharply restricted. In order to facilitate free discussion, when Ministers wish to speak in a language other than French or English, consecutive translation into one of these official languages should be provided by interpreters from their own delegations.

6. Meetings of Foreign Ministers should be held whenever required, and occasionally in locations other than NATO
headquarters. Ministers might also participate more frequently in regular Council meetings, even though not all of them may find it possible to attend such meetings at the same time. The Council of Permanent Representatives, has powers of effective decision: in other words, the authority of the Council as such is the same whether governments are represented by Ministers or by their Permanent Representatives. Thus there should be no firm or formal line between Ministerial and other meetings of the Council.

C. Strengthening the links between the Council and member governments

7. It is indispensable to the kind of consultations envisaged in this report that Permanent Representatives should be in a position to speak authoritatively and to reflect the current thinking of their governments. Differences in location and in constitutional organization make impossible any uniform arrangements in all member governments. In some cases it might be desirable to designate a high official in the national capital to be concerned primarily with NATO affairs. The purpose would be to help both in fostering NATO consultations whenever national policies impinge on the common interests of the Atlantic Community, and in translating the results of such consultations into effective action within the national governments.

8. To ensure the closest possible connection between current thinking in the governments and consultations in the Council, there might be occasional Council meetings with the participation of specially designated officials or the permanent official heads of foreign ministries.
D. Preparation for Council Meetings

9. Items on the Agenda of Ministerial meetings should be thoroughly examined by Permanent Representatives and relevant proposals prepared before Ministers meet. For this purpose it may be found desirable for governments to send senior experts to consult on agenda items before the meetings take place.

10. The preparation of questions for discussion in the Council should be assisted by appropriate use of the Council's Committees of Political and Economic Advisers. (Recommendations on the establishment of these Committees are set forth in Chapter 2, paragraph 18, and Chapter 3, paragraph 7).

11. In the case of consultations on special subjects, more use should be made of senior experts from national capitals to assist permanent delegations by calling them, on an ad hoc basis, to do preparatory work. Informal discussion among specialists with corresponding responsibilities is a particularly valuable means ofconcerting governmental attitudes in the early stages of policy formation.

12. Member governments should make available to one another through NATO "basic position material" for background information. This would help the Alliance as a whole in the consideration of problems of common concern and would assist individual governments to understand more fully the reasons for the position adopted by any member country on a particular issue which might be its special concern, but which might also affect in varying degrees other members of NATO.

E. The Secretary General and the International Staff

13. To enable the Organization to make its full contribution, the role of the Secretary General and the International Staff needs to be enhanced.
14. It is recommended that the Secretary General preside over meetings of the Council in Ministerial, as he does now in other sessions. Such a change with respect to the conduct of the Council's business would follow naturally from the new responsibilities of the Secretary General and his even closer relationship to the Council, arising out of the recommendations of this report. It is also warranted by the Secretary General's unique opportunities for becoming familiar with the problems and the activities of the Alliance as a whole.

15. It would, however, still be desirable to have one Minister chosen each year as President of the Council in accordance with the present practice of alphabetical rotation. This Minister, as President, would continue to have especially close contact with the Secretary General during and between Ministerial Meetings, and would, as at present, act as the spokesman of the Council on all formal occasions. He would also preside at the formal opening and closing of Ministerial sessions of the Council.

16. In addition:

(a) The Secretary General should be encouraged to propose items for NATO consultation in the fields covered by this report and should be responsible for promoting and directing the process of consultation.

(b) In view of these responsibilities, member governments should undertake to keep the Secretary General fully and currently informed through their permanent delegations of their governments' thinking on questions of common concern to the Alliance.

(c) Attention is also called to the additional responsibilities of the Secretary General,
recommended in connection with the annual political appraisal (Chapter 2, paragraph 14) and the peaceful settlement of disputes (Chapter 2, paragraph 19).

17. The effective functioning of NATO depends in large measure on the efficiency, devotion and morale of its Secretariat. Acceptance of the recommendations in this report would impose on the Secretariat new duties and responsibilities. Governments must, therefore, be prepared to give the International Staff all necessary support, both in finance and personnel. If this is not done, the recommendations of the report, even if accepted by governments, will not be satisfactorily carried out.
CORRIGENDUM

to

CT-WP/7(Revised)
(dated 26th September, 1956)

Page 22, (Chapter IV, Introduction)

Paragraph 3

Add the following sentence at the end of the paragraph:

"Whenever possible the public should be informed of significant results achieved through NATO consultation."

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.
CHAPTER V. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

INTRODUCTION

1. The Committee considers that NATO in its present general form is capable of discharging the functions entrusted to it. Structural changes are not required. The machine is basically satisfactory provided that governments make use of it.

2. At the same time, certain improvements in the procedures and the functioning of the organization will be required if the recommendations of this report are to be implemented. The proposals in this Chapter are submitted for this purpose.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Security

3. There must be a strict observance of security measures and unqualified respect for the confidential character of meetings. Otherwise there cannot be the type of full and frank political and economic consultation which the Committee regards as essential.

Meetings of the Council

4. More time should be allowed for Ministerial Meetings. Experience has shown that, without more time, important issues on the agenda cannot be adequately considered. Decisions concerning some of them will not be reached at all, or will be reached only in an unclear form.

5. Efforts should be made to encourage discussion rather than simply declarations of policy prepared in advance. Arrangements for meetings should be made with this aim in view. For most sessions, the numbers present should be sharply restricted.
Where it would help in free discussion, Ministers should be permitted to speak in a non-official language, with consecutive translation into one of the official languages provided by interpreters from their own delegations.

6. Meetings of Foreign Ministers should be held whenever required, and occasionally in other NATO countries. Ministers might also participate more frequently in regular Council meetings, even though not all of them may find it possible to attend such meetings at the same time. There should be no firm or formal line between Ministerial and other meetings of the Council.

Strengthening the links between the Council and member governments

7. Governments should ensure that their representation on the Council is as authoritative as possible, should provide for maximum effectiveness in the presentation of their views and policies, and should see to it that the necessary follow-up action is taken.

8. It is indispensable to the kind of consultations envisaged in this report that Permanent Representatives should be in a position to speak authoritatively and to reflect the current thinking of their governments before it is crystallised into definite positions. Differences in location and in constitutional organization make impossible any uniform pattern for all member governments. In some cases it might be desirable to designate a high official in the national capital concerned primarily with NATO affairs, to help both in the development of NATO consultations whenever national policies impinge
on the common interests of the Atlantic Community, and in translating the results of such consultations into effective action within the national governments.

9. To ensure the closest possible tie between current thinking in the governments and consultations in the Council, there might be occasional Council meetings with the participation of such specially designated officials or with the permanent official heads of foreign ministries.

Preparation for Council meetings

10. Items on the Agenda of ministerial meetings should be thoroughly examined by Permanent Representatives and relevant proposals prepared before Ministers meet. For this purpose it may be found desirable for governments to send senior experts to consult on agenda items before the meetings take place.

11. The preparation of questions for discussion in the Council should be assisted by appropriate use of the Council's Committees of Political and Economic Advisers. (Recommendations on the establishment of these Committees are set forth in Chapter I, paragraph 19, and Chapter II, paragraph 18)

12. In the case of consultations on special subjects, more use should be made of senior experts from national capitals to assist permanent delegations by calling them, on an ad hoc basis, to do preparatory work. Informal discussion among specialists with corresponding responsibilities is a particularly valuable means of concerting governmental attitudes in the early stages of policy formation.

13. Member governments should make available "basic
position material" to one another through NATO for background information. This would help the Alliance as a whole in the consideration of problems of common concern and would assist individual governments to understand more fully the reasons for the position adopted by any member country on a particular issue which might be its special concern, but which might also affect in varying degrees other members of NATO.

The International Staff

14. The effective functioning of NATO depends in large measure on the strength of its staff. Acceptance of the recommendations in this report would impose on it new duties and responsibilities. Governments must be prepared to give the International Staff the necessary support, both in finance and personnel.

15. To enable the Organization to make its full contribution, the role of the Secretary General and the International Staff needs to be enhanced. In particular:

   (1) The Secretary General should be encouraged to propose items for NATO consultation in the fields covered by this report and should be responsible for promoting the process of consultation.

   (2) In view of these responsibilities, member governments should undertake to keep the Secretary General fully and currently informed through their permanent delegations of their governments' thinking on questions of common concern to the Alliance.

   (3) As a basis for the proposed annual political appraisal, the Secretary General should prepare each year a report on the lines set out in Chapter I, paragraph 17.
(4) The Secretary General should be given new responsibilities for promoting the peaceful settlement of inter-nation disputes on the lines recommended in Chapter I, paragraph 21.
CHAPTER 1: POLITICAL CO-OPERATION

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   A. Scope and Character of Political Consultation
   B. Annual Political Appraisal
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III. PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF INTER-MEMBER DISPUTES

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COMMITTEE OF THREE
DRAFT REPORT

PART II
CHAPTER 1: POLITICAL CO-OPERATION

I. INTRODUCTION

1. If there is to be vitality and growth in the concept of the Atlantic Community, the relations between the members of NATO must rest on a solid basis of confidence and understanding. Without this there cannot be the kind of political co-operation which, with collective security, constitutes the special value of NATO for its members.

2. The deepening and strengthening of this political co-operation does not imply the weakening of ties of NATO members with other international associations, such as the United Nations, or their friendly relations with other countries. Support for NATO is not exclusive or restrictive. Nor should the evolution of the Atlantic Community through NATO prevent the formation of even closer relationships among some members, for instance within groups of European countries. The move toward Atlantic co-operation and European unity can be parallel and complementary and need not be competitive or conflicting.

3. Effective and constructive international co-operation requires a resolve to work together for the solution of common problems. There are special ties between NATO members, special incentives and security interests, which should make this task easier. But its successful accomplishment will depend largely on
the extent to which member governments, in their own policies and actions, take into consideration the interests of the Alliance. This requires not only the acceptance of the obligation of consultation and co-operation whenever necessary, but also the development of practices by which the discharge of this obligation becomes a normal part of governmental activity.

4. It is easy to profess devotion to the principle of political - or economic - consultation in NATO. It is difficult to convert the profession into practice. Consultation within an alliance means more than exchange of information, though that is necessary. It means more than letting the Council of NATO know about decisions that have already been taken, or merely trying to enlist support for national policy. It means the discussion of problems collectively, in the early stages of policy formation, before national positions become set. At its best, this will result in collective decisions on matters of common interest affecting the Alliance. At the least, it will ensure that no action is taken by one member without a knowledge of the views of the others.

II. CONSULTATION ON FOREIGN POLICIES

A. Scope and Character of Political Consultation

5. The essential role of consultation in fostering political co-operation was clearly defined by the earlier Committee on the North Atlantic Community in 1951:

"... The achievement of a closer degree of co-ordination of the foreign policies of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty, through the development of the 'habit of consultation' on matters of common concern, would greatly strengthen the solidarity of the North Atlantic Community and increase the individual and collective capacity of its members to serve the peaceful purposes for which
NATO was established. In the political field, this means that while each North Atlantic Government retains full freedom of action and decision with respect to its own policy, the aim should be to achieve, through exchanging information and views, as wide an area of agreement as possible in the formulation of policies affecting the North Atlantic Community as a whole.

"Special attention must be paid, as explicitly recognised in Article 4 of the Treaty, to matters of urgent and immediate importance to the members of NATO, and to 'emergency' situations where it may be necessary to consult closely on national lines of conduct affecting the interests of members of NATO as a whole. There is a continuing need, however, for effective consultation at an early stage on current problems, in order that national policies may be developed and action taken on the basis of a full awareness of the attitudes and interests of all the members of NATO. While all members of NATO have a responsibility to consult with their partners on appropriate matters, a large share of responsibility for such consultation necessarily rests on the more powerful members of the Community."

6. These words were written five years ago. They still hold true. Nor have they been ignored by NATO. The practice of consulting together has developed in the NATO Council in recent years and it has contributed to co-operation in the Alliance. But there is ample room for improvement - for broadening the scope and deepening the character of consultation.

7. It should, however, be remembered that collective discussion is not an end in itself, but a means to the end of securing
the maximum possible agreement on policy and action on all matters that concern the common interests of the Atlantic Community.

8. Such agreement, even with the closest possible cooperation and consultation, is not easy to secure. But it is essential to the Atlantic Alliance that steady and continuous effort be made to bring it about, for there cannot be solidarity in defence and cleavage in foreign policy.

9. There are, of course, certain practical limitations to consultation. They are sufficiently obvious in fact to make it unnecessary to emphasise them in words. Indeed the danger is less that they will be minimised or evaded than that they will be exaggerated and used to justify practices which ignore the common interest.

10. One of these limitations is the fact that the ultimate responsibility for decision and action still rests on national governments; in a situation of emergency, therefore, action may be required by one government before consultation is possible with the others.

11. Another limitation is the difficulty and the un-wisdom of trying to specify in advance the subjects and the situations where consultation is necessary; to separate by area or by subject the matters of NATO concern from those of purely national concern; to define in detail obligations and duties. These things have to work themselves out in practice. In this process, experience is a better guide than fixed rules.

12. The essential thing is that on all occasions and in all circumstances member governments before acting or even before pronouncing, should keep the interests and the requirements of the Alliance in mind. If they have not the desire and the will to do this, no resolutions or recommendations or declarations will be of any value.
13. On the justifiable assumption, however, that this will and this desire do exist, the following principles and practices in the field of political consultation are submitted for acceptance:

(a) Members should inform the Council of any development which significantly affects the Alliance. They should do this, not merely as a formality but as a preliminary to effective political consultation.

(b) Both individual member governments and the Secretary General should have the right to raise for discussion in the Council any subject which is of common NATO interest and not of a purely domestic character.

(c) A member government should not, without adequate advance consultation, adopt firm policies or make major political pronouncements on matters which affect the Alliance or any of its members in a significant way, unless circumstances make such prior consultation demonstrably impossible.

(d) Members should seek to develop their national policies in the light of the interests and views of other governments as expressed in NATO consultation, even where no community of view or consensus has been reached in the Council.

(e) Where a consensus has been reached, it should be reflected in the formation of national policies. When for national reasons the consensus is not followed, the government concerned should offer an explanation to the Council. It is even more
important that where an agreed recommendation has emerged from the Council discussions, governments should give it full weight in any national actions or policies related to the subject of that recommendation.

B. Annual Political Appraisal

14. To strengthen the process of consultation, it is recommended that Foreign Ministers at their Spring meeting, make an appraisal of the political progress of the Alliance and consider the lines along which it should advance.

15. To prepare for this discussion, the Secretary General should submit a report:

(a) analysing the problems which bear on the political effectiveness of the Alliance;
(b) reviewing the extent to which member governments have consulted and co-operated on such problems, or failed to do so;
(c) indicating the problems and potential developments which may require future consultation in order to resolve difficulties and work out positive and constructive initiatives.

16. Member governments, through their Permanent Representatives, should give the Secretary General such information and assistance, including that of technical experts, as he may require for this task.

C. Committee of Political Advisers

17. Effective consultation also requires careful planning and preparation of the agenda for meetings of the Council both in Ministerial and permanent session, so that governments may provide the necessary information and guidance to their representatives. Political questions coming up for discussion in the Council should
as far as practicable be previously reviewed and discussed, so that representatives may have background information on the thinking both of their own and of other governments. When appropriate, drafts of resolutions should also be prepared in advance, as a basis for discussion. Additional preparatory work will also be required for the annual political appraisal referred to in the preceding section.

18. The responsibility for this preparatory work for the Council meetings falls upon the Permanent Representatives and the Secretary General. To assist in this work there should be constituted under the Council a committee of political advisers from each delegation, aided when necessary by specialists from the capitals. It would meet under the chairmanship of a member of the International Staff appointed by the Secretary General, and would include among its responsibilities current studies such as those on trends of Soviet policy.

III. PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF INTER-MEMBER DISPUTES

19. In the development of effective political co-operation in NATO, it is of crucial importance to avoid serious inter-member disputes and to settle them quickly and satisfactorily when they occur. The settlement of such disputes is in the first place the direct responsibility of the member governments concerned, under both the Charter of the United Nations (Article 33) and the North Atlantic Treaty (Article 1). To facilitate the carrying out of the obligations under Article 1 of the Treaty, it is recommended that the Council adopt a resolution on the following lines:

(a) reaffirming the obligation of members to settle by peaceful means any dispute between themselves;

(b) declaring their intention to submit any such disputes which have not proved capable
of settlement directly, to good offices procedures within the NATO framework before resorting to any other international agency; except for disputes of a legal character appropriate for submission to a judicial tribunal, and those disputes of an economic character for which attempts at settlement might best be made initially in the appropriate specialised economic organization;

(c) recognising the right and duty of member governments and of the Secretary General to bring to the attention of the Council matters which in their opinion may threaten the solidarity or effectiveness of the Alliance;

(d) empowering the Secretary General to offer his good offices informally at any time to the parties in dispute; and with their consent to initiate or facilitate procedures of enquiry, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration; and

(e) empowering the Secretary General, where he deems appropriate for these purposes, to use the assistance of not more than three Permanent Representatives chosen by him in each instance.

IV. PARLIAMENTARY ASSOCIATIONS AND THE PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE

20. Among the best supporters of NATO and its purposes are those Members of Parliament who have had a chance to see at first hand some of its activities and problems, and to exchange views with their colleagues from other parliaments. In particular, the formation of national Parliamentary Associations and the activities
of the Conference of Members of Parliament from NATO countries have contributed to the development of public support for NATO and solidarity among its members.

21. The following arrangements are therefore recommended to facilitate a continued close relationship with NATO:

(1) That the Secretary General continue to place the facilities of NATO headquarters at the disposal of Parliamentary Conference and give all possible help with arrangements for its meetings.

(2) That invited representatives of member governments and the Secretary General and other senior representatives of NATO civil and military authorities attend these meetings for speeches and discussion periods. In this way the parliamentarians would be informed on the state of the Alliance and the problems before it, and the value of their discussion would be increased.
CHAPTER 2: ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

I. INTRODUCTION

Political co-operation and economic conflict are not reconcilable. Therefore, in the economic as well as in the political field there must be a genuine desire among the members to work together and a readiness to consult on questions of common concern based on the recognition of common interests.

2. The economic interests shared by the members of NATO call for:

(a) co-operative and individual action to achieve healthy and developing economies, both to promote the well-being and self-confidence of the Atlantic peoples and to serve as the essential support for an adequate defence effort;

(b) assistance to economically underdeveloped areas for reasons of enlightened self-interest and to promote better relations among peoples; demonstrating the superiority of free institutions in promoting human welfare and economic progress under conditions of competitive coexistence.

3. A recognition of these common NATO interests and collective and individual effort to promote these economic aims need not in any way prejudice close and co-operative economic relations with non-NATO countries. Economic, like political co-operation, is and must remain wider than NATO. At the same time the countries of the Atlantic Community have an interest in arrangements for especially close economic co-operation among groups of European member nations, and it should be possible for the development of such arrangements to promote rather than conflict with the wider objectives of the Atlantic Community and the rest of the non-Communist world.
II. NATO AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

4. The economic objectives of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty are of basic importance to the stability and well-being not only of the North Atlantic area but of the entire non-Communist world. It is not, however, necessary that member countries pursue the purposes of Article 2 only through action in NATO itself. It would not serve the interests of the Atlantic Community for NATO to duplicate the operating functions of other international organizations designed for various forms of economic co-operation (1). NATO members play a major part in all these agencies, and their membership is generally well adapted to the special purposes of those agencies.

5. Nor do there now appear to be significant new areas for common economic action requiring execution by NATO itself. The common economic concerns of the member nations will best be fostered by continued and enhanced collaboration both directly and through organizations other than NATO. This should be reinforced, however, by NATO consultation where the economic issues of special interest to the Alliance are involved. This, in turn, requires a substantial expansion of exchange of information and views in the economic as well as in the political field. Where economic matters are clearly related to the political and security interests of the Alliance, NATO consultation should seek to secure a common approach on the part of member governments. The resulting action,

(1) The outstanding instances are the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) (which includes all NATO countries as full or associate members and four others); the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); the International Finance Corporation (IFC); and the various United Nations specialised agencies including the Economic Commission for Europe. Several NATO members participate actively in the Colombo Plan for promoting economic development in Asia. Most members are taking an active part in technical assistance programmes and are also participating in discussions of proposals for the creation of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED).
however, should normally be taken by governments either directly or through other international organizations.

6. NATO, as such, should not seek to establish formal relations with these other organizations, and the harmonising of attitudes and actions should be left to the representatives of the NATO governments therein. Nor is it necessary or desirable for NATO members to form a "bloc", in such organizations. This would only alienate other and friendly governments, with harmful results. There should, however, be NATO consultation prior to the meetings of international economic agencies when interests of the Atlantic Community may be subject to attempts in those agencies to divide or weaken the Alliance.

III. FIELDS FOR ECONOMIC CONSULTATION WITHIN NATO

A. Strengthening members' economies and promoting their economic co-operation

7. Economic growth and health require expanding economies based on sound policies and organized co-operation to promote the greatest possible freedom in trade and payments and in the movements of manpower and long-term capital. While there remains a great deal to be accomplished in these respects, the requisite machinery for co-operation among NATO members exists in other organizations.

8. There is now adequate provision for a regular assessment of each member country's general economic position, prospects and problems through the OEC and NATO Annual Reviews. In addition, issues may arise affecting the economic health of the Atlantic Community, where NATO may be the most effective organization for consultation because of their political implications or because of their relation to the common defence.

B. Resolving conflicts in Economic Policies of Member Countries

9. NATO has a positive interest in the resolution of
economic disputes which may have political or strategic repercussions damaging to the Alliance. These are to be distinguished from disagreements on economic policy which are normally dealt with through direct negotiations of multilateral discussion in other organizations. Nothing would be gained by merely having repeated in NATO the same arguments made in other and more technically qualified organizations. It should, however, be open to any member or to the Secretary General to raise for discussion in NATO issues on which they feel that consideration elsewhere is not making adequate progress and that NATO consultation might facilitate solutions contributing to the objectives of the Atlantic Community. The procedures for peaceful settlement discussed in the previous Chapter should be available for major disputes of an economic as well as a purely political character.

C. Scientific and Technical Co-operation

10. One area of special importance to the Atlantic Community is the field of science and technology. During the last decade, it has become ever clearer that progress in science and engineering can be decisive in determining the security of nations and their position in world affairs. Such progress is also vital if the Western world is to play its proper rôle in relation to economically underdeveloped areas.

11. Within the general field of science and technology, there is an especially urgent need to improve the quality and to increase the supply of scientists, engineers and technicians. Responsibility for recruitment, training and utilisation of scientific and technical personnel is primarily a national rather than an international matter. Nor is it a responsibility solely of national governments. In the member countries with federal systems, state and provincial governments play the major part, and
many of the universities and institutes of higher learning in the Atlantic area are independent institutions free from detailed control by governments. At the same time, properly designed measures of international co-operation could stimulate individual member countries to adopt more positive policies and, in some cases, help guide them in the most constructive directions.

12. Certain activities in this connection are already being carried out by other organizations. Progress in this field, however, is so crucial to the future of the Atlantic Community that NATO members should ensure that no possibilities of fruitful co-operation are left unexplored. As a first concrete step, therefore, it is recommended that a conference be convened (either by NATO or on the initiative of NATO member governments through another appropriate organization), composed of one or at the most two outstanding authorities, private or governmental, from each country in order:

(a) to exchange information and views concerning the most urgent problems in the recruitment, training and utilisation of scientists, engineers and technicians, and the best means, both long-term and short-term, of solving these problems;

(b) to foster closer relations among the participants with a view to continued interchange of experience and stimulation of constructive work in member countries; and

(c) to propose specific measures for future international co-operation in this field, through NATO or other international organizations.

D. Relations with Other Areas

13. It is a matter of common consent that the Atlantic Community has a major positive concern with healthy and accelerated
development in economically underdeveloped areas, both outside and within the NATO area. It is likewise agreed that NATO is not an appropriate agency for administering programmes of assistance for economic development or even for systematically conceiving the relevant policies of member nations. Member countries should however keep each other and the Organization informed of their programmes and policies in this field, and when required NATO should review the adequacy of existing action in relation to the interests of the Alliance.

14. The economic interests of the Atlantic Community cannot be considered in isolation from the activities and policies of the Soviet bloc. The Soviets are resorting all too often to the use of economic measures which may have the effect of weakening the Western Alliance, or of creating in other areas a dangerous degree of dependence on the Soviet world. In this situation it is more than ever important that NATO countries actively develop their own constructive commercial and financial policies. In particular, they should avoid creating situations of which the Soviets might take advantage to the detriment of the Atlantic Community and of other non-Communist countries. In this whole field member countries should consult together in order to determine their course deliberately and with the fullest possible knowledge.

15. NATO should continue its regular reporting on economic trends in Soviet countries (including the comparison with member countries) and developments in Soviet economic policy. To this end, governments should undertake to report relevant information regularly, and there should be periodic meetings of experts on Soviet economic affairs drawn from the various capitals whose discussions might be the basis for consultation in particular cases. Arrangements should also be made for periodic meetings of
officials from the national capitals involved in commercial
negotiations with the Soviet bloc, for an exchange of information
and views. In the case of an important new commercial or
financial proposal from the Soviet bloc to any member country, with
possible political implications, it would be desirable for the
member concerned to bring it to the attention of the Council.

16. The Alliance also has a positive interest in the complex
and difficult field of Soviet economic relations, with the under-
developed countries. NATO should be concerned with cases where
Soviet economic action appears calculated to undermine sound
relations between the underdeveloped countries and members of the
Atlantic Community. Here the main endeavour of member governm ents
should be to work co-operatively and constructively with the under-
developed areas in promoting their economic development on a
mutually satisfactory basis. It would clearly not be desirable
to engage in indiscriminate competitive bidding with the Soviets
in the field of assistance for development. At the same time,
NATO consultation in certain cases might suggest the need for
special efforts by members to assist underdeveloped countries in
dealing with unusual problems, even if this requires an
exceptional departure from ordinary commercial and financial
practices.

IV. NATO ARRANGEMENTS FOR ECONOMIC CONSULTATION

17. There has been a considerable evolution in NATO's
arrangements for regular economic consultation. In addition, a
number of economic matters have been brought before the Council
for consideration on an ad hoc basis. No substantial new
machinery in this field is called for. However, in view of the
extended range of topics for regular exchange of information and
consultation described above, there should be established under
the Council a Committee of Economic Advisers. This group should be
entrusted with the regular exchange of information and preliminary discussion in those areas of systematic consultation outlined above, together with such ad hoc tasks as may be assigned by the Council or approved by the Council at the Committee's request. It would absorb any continuing function of the Committee of Technical Advisers. Since its duties would not be full-time, member governments would presumably wish to be represented normally by officials mainly concerned with the work of other economic organizations; but membership should be flexible, the Committee being composed, when appropriate, of specialists from the capitals on particular topics under consideration. In any event arrangements should be made for more meetings of officials dealing currently with various economic matters important to the Alliance, such as Soviet commercial negotiations, trends in underdeveloped countries, or scientific and technical co-operation.
CHAPTER 3: CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

1. A sense of community must bind the people as well as the institutions of the Atlantic nations. This will exist only to the extent that there is a realisation of their common cultural heritage and of the values of their free way of life and thought. It is important, therefore, for the NATO countries to promote cultural co-operation among their peoples by all practical means in order to strengthen their unity and develop maximum support for their alliance. It is particularly important that this cultural co-operation should be wider than continental. This, however, does not preclude particular governments from acting on a more limited multilateral or even bilateral basis to strengthen their own cultural relations within the broader Atlantic framework.

2. The Committee welcomes the measures for cultural co-operation within the Atlantic Community which have been initiated by private individuals and non-governmental groups. These should be encouraged and increased. To promote further cultural collaboration within the Atlantic Alliance, the Committee suggests that member governments should be guided by the following general principles:

(a) Government activities in this field should not duplicate but should support and supplement private efforts.

(b) Member governments should give priority to those projects which require joint NATO action, and thus contribute to a developing sense of community.

(c) In developing new activities in the cultural field, NATO can most fruitfully place the main emphasis on inspiring and promoting trans-Atlantic contacts.

(d) There should be a realistic appreciation of the financial implications of cultural projects.
3. In order to develop public awareness and understanding of NATO and the Atlantic Community, the Council should work out arrangements for courses and seminars for teachers, journalists and others in a position to influence public opinion.

4. NATO and its member governments should broaden their support of other educational and related activities such as the NATO Fellowship and Scholarship Programme, the creation of university chairs of Atlantic studies; visiting professorships; government-sponsored programmes for the exchange of persons, especially on a transatlantic basis; the use of NATO information materials in schools; and the establishment of special NATO awards for students.

5. Governments should actively promote closer relations between NATO and youth organizations and a specialist should be added to the International Staff in this connection. Conferences under NATO auspices of representatives of youth organizations such as that of July, 1956, should be held from time to time.

6. In the interests of promoting easier and more frequent contacts among the NATO peoples, governments should review and, if possible, revise their foreign exchange and other policies which restrict travel.

7. In view of the importance of promoting better understanding and goodwill between NATO service personnel, it would be desirable, in co-operation with the military authorities, to extend exchanges of such personnel beyond the limits of normal training programmes. They might, as a first step, be developed by governments on a bilateral basis. In addition, member governments should seek the support of the Atlantic Treaty Association and other voluntary organizations for any programmes that might be developed for the exchange of service personnel.
3. Cultural projects which have a common benefit should be commonly financed. Agreed cultural projects initiated by a single member government or a private organization, such as the recent seminar held at Oxford or the Study Conference sponsored by the Atlantic Treaty Association on "The Role of the School in the Atlantic Community", should receive financial support from NATO where that is necessary to supplement national resources.
1. The people of the member countries must know about NATO if they are to support it. Therefore they must be informed not only of NATO's aspirations, but of its achievements. There must be substance for an effective NATO information programme and resources to carry it out. The public should be informed to the greatest possible extent of significant results achieved through NATO consultation.

2. NATO information activities should be directed primarily to public opinion in the NATO area. At the same time, an understanding outside the NATO area of the objectives and accomplishments of the Organization is necessary if it is to be viewed sympathetically, and if its activities are not to be misinterpreted.

3. The important task of explaining and reporting NATO activities rests primarily on national information services. They cannot discharge this task if member governments do not make adequate provision in their national programmes for that purpose. It is essential, therefore, that such provision be made. NATO can and should assist governments in this work. The promotion of information about and public understanding of NATO and the Atlantic community should, in fact, be a joint endeavour by the Organization and its members.

4. One of NATO's functions should be to co-ordinate the work of national information services in fields of common interest. Governments should pool their experiences and views in NATO to avoid differences in evaluation and emphasis. This is particularly important in the dissemination of information about NATO to
other countries. Co-ordinated policy should stress the defensive character of our Alliance and the importance of its non-military aspects. It should cover also replies to communist anti-NATO propaganda and the analysis of communist moves and statements which affect NATO.

5. In its turn, the NATO Information Division must be given the resources by and the support from governments without which they could not discharge these new tasks - and should not be asked to do so.

6. In order to facilitate co-operation between the NATO Information Division and national information services, the following specific measures are recommended:

(a) An officer should be designated by each national information service to maintain liaison with NATO and to be responsible for the dissemination of NATO information material;

(b) Governments should submit to NATO the relevant information programmes which they plan to implement, for discussion in the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations. Representatives of national information services should take part in these discussions;

(c) within the NATO Information Division budget, provision should be made for a translation fund so that NATO information material can be translated into the non-official languages of the Alliance, according to reasonable requirements of the member governments;
(d) NATO should, on request, provide national services with special studies on matters of common interest.

7. Journalists' tours, sponsored by NATO, and which have been most beneficial, should be broadened to include others in a position to influence public opinion, such as trade union and youth leaders, teachers and lecturers. Closer relations between private organizations supporting NATO and the NATO Information Division should also be encouraged.
CHAPTER 5: ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

A. Introduction

1. The Committee considers that NATO in its present form is capable of discharging the functions required of it. Structural changes are not needed. The machine is basically satisfactory provided that governments make use of it.

2. At the same time, certain improvements in the procedures and functioning of the Organization will be required if the recommendations of this report are to be implemented. The proposals in this Chapter are submitted for this purpose.

B. Security

3. There must be a strict observance of security measures and unqualified respect for the confidential character of meetings. Otherwise there cannot be the type of full and frank consultation which the Committee regards as essential.

C. Meetings of the Council

4. More time should be allowed for Ministerial Meetings. Experience has shown that, without more time, important issues on the agenda cannot be adequately considered. Decisions concerning some of them will not be reached at all, or will be reached only in an unclear form.

5. Efforts should be made to encourage discussion rather than simply declarations of policy prepared in advance. Arrangements for meetings should be made with this aim in view. For most sessions, the numbers present should be sharply restricted. In order to facilitate free discussion, when Ministers wish to speak in a language other than French or English, consecutive translation into one of these official languages should be provided by interpreters from their own delegations.

6. Meetings of Foreign Ministers should be held whenever required, and occasionally in locations other than NATO.
Headquarters. Ministers might also participate more frequently in regular Council meetings, even though not all of them may find it possible to attend such meetings at the same time. There should be no firm or formal line between Ministerial and other meetings of the Council.

D. Strengthening the links between the Council and member governments

7. Governments should ensure that their representation on the Council is as authoritative as possible, should provide for maximum effectiveness in the presentation of their views and policies, and should see to it that the necessary follow-up action is taken.

8. It is indispensable to the kind of consultations envisaged in this report that Permanent Representatives should be in a position to speak authoritatively and to reflect the current thinking of their governments. Differences in location and in constitutional organization make impossible any uniform arrangements in all member governments. In some cases it might be desirable to designate a high official in the national capital to be concerned primarily with NATO affairs in order to help both in the development of NATO consultations whenever national policies impinge on the common interests of the Atlantic Community, and in translating the results of such consultations into effective action within the national governments.

9. To ensure the closest possible tie between current thinking in the governments and consultations in the Council, there might be occasional Council meetings with the participation of such specially designated officials or with the permanent official heads of foreign ministries.
E. Preparation for Council meetings

10. Items on the Agenda of Ministerial meetings should be thoroughly examined by Permanent Representatives and relevant proposals prepared before Ministers meet. For this purpose it may be found desirable for governments to send senior experts to consult on agenda items before the meetings take place.

11. The preparation of questions for discussion in the Council should be assisted by appropriate use of the Council’s Committees of Political and Economic Advisers. (Recommendations on the establishment of these Committees are set forth in Chapter 1, paragraph 18, and Chapter 2, paragraph 17).

12. In the case of consultations on special subjects, more use should be made of senior experts from national capitals to assist permanent delegations by calling them, on an ad hoc basis, to do preparatory work. Informal discussion among specialists with corresponding responsibilities is a particularly valuable means of concerting governmental attitudes in the early stages of policy formation.

13. Member governments should make available "basic position material" to one another through NATO for background information. This would help the Alliance as a whole in the consideration of problems of common concern and would assist individual governments to understand more fully the reasons for the position adopted by any member country on a particular issue which might be its special concern, but which might also affect in varying degrees other members of NATO.

F. The Secretary General and the International Staff

14. To enable the Organization to make its full contribution, the role of the Secretary General and the International Staff needs to be enhanced.
15. The Committee recommends that the Secretary General should preside over meetings of the Council in Ministerial, as he does now in permanent sessions. Such a change with respect to the conduct of the Council's business would follow naturally from the new responsibilities of the Secretary General and his even closer relationship to the Council, arising out of the recommendations of this report. It is also warranted by the Secretary General's unique opportunities for becoming familiar with the problems and the activities of the Alliance as a whole.

16. It would, however, still be desirable to have one Minister chosen each year as President of the Council in accordance with the present practice of alphabetical rotation. This Minister, as President, would continue to have especially close contact with the Secretary General during and between Ministerial Meetings, and would, as at present, act as the spokesman of the Council on all formal occasions. Furthermore, this Minister would preside at the formal opening and closing of Ministerial sessions of the Council.

17. In addition:

(a) The Secretary General should be encouraged to propose items for NATO consultation in the fields covered by this report and should be responsible for promoting and directing the process of consultation.

(b) In view of these responsibilities, member governments should undertake to keep the Secretary General fully and currently informed through their permanent delegations of their governments' thinking on questions of common concern to the Alliance.

(c) Attention is also called to the additional responsibilities of the Secretary General.
recommended in connection with the Annual Political Appraisal (Chapter 1, paragraph 15) and the peaceful settlement of disputes (Chapter 1, paragraph 19).

18. The effective functioning of NATO depends in large measure on its Staff. Acceptance of the recommendations in this report would impose on it new duties and responsibilities. Governments must be prepared to give the International Staff the necessary support, both in finance and personnel.
Report of a Meeting held on Thursday, 7th June, 1956.
In preparation for the work of the Committee of Three

PRESENT
Chairman: Baron A. Bentinck
Canada: Mr. L. D. Wilgness
Mr. P. Tremblay
Norway: Mr. J. K. Boyesen
Mr. K. Aars
Italy: Mr. M. Pina-Caboni
Mr. E. Rubino
Secretary: Mr. K. K. Beyen

I. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE JUNE MEETING OF THE THREE MINISTERS

The meeting is to take place from Wednesday, 20th June,
to Friday, 22nd June. The first meeting is to be held on
Wednesday morning at 11 o'clock provided the Ministers arrive in
Paris in time. Otherwise the first meeting will be held at 5 o'clock.
In order to enable the Committee to meet on Wednesday it will be
suggested that the Council advance its weekly meeting to Tuesday,
19th June.

2. The Committee of Three is to meet with the Council on
Friday afternoon at 3.30 p.m. unless Mr. Martino, who is to leave
for Rome that same evening, were to require an earlier meeting.

3. A note is to be sent to all Permanent Representatives
suggesting that the normal Council meeting be held on the 19th
June, and a meeting with the Committee of Three on the 22nd June
in the afternoon or possible in the morning.

4. It was agreed that attendance at the June meeting of the
Committee of Three should be kept as small as possible. Presumably
each participating country will be represented by the Foreign
Minister, the Permanent Representative and not more than two
advisers. The International Staff would be represented by three,
or at the most four, of its members (including the Secretary General).

5. The meetings are to take place in Conference Room VIII.
There will be one "stand-by" interpreter for interpretation from
French into English when required. Room 404 will be reserved for
the Committee of Three and, if possible, two or three other
offices will be put at the disposal of the Foreign Ministers.

6. It was agreed that, in order to reduce the eagerness of
the Press, a short Press Release should be issued on the 19th June
stating that the meeting of the three Foreign Ministers would only
discuss the procedure for the Committee's future work, and that no
decisions of substance could be expected as a result of it.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL
7. It was agreed that the question whether a second meeting of the Committee of Three should be held in July would have to be decided by the Ministers themselves at their meeting in June. It was pointed out, however, that Mr. Pearson will be in London for the Commonwealth Conference until 5th July. If a meeting of the Committee of Three is to be held in July he would therefore prefer it to be held as soon after the 5th as possible. A further meeting of the Committee of Three will probably have to be held by the end of September or early in October.

II. DATE AND PLACE OF A MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS TO CONSIDER THE REPORT

8. After discussion it was agreed to recommend a proposal made by the Norwegian Representative to the effect that the Report of the Committee of Three should be presented to the Council of Ministers at a special meeting to take place in the United States one or two days before the opening of the United Nations General Assembly (11th November). This meeting might be held either in Ottawa, New York or Washington. The Chairman felt that it would be preferable to avoid the United Nations atmosphere and suggested that Washington might provide an advantage from the point of view of American public opinion.

9. Presenting the Report by the Committee of Three to a special meeting of the Council of Ministers was felt to have a considerable advantage from the point of view of public relations and would prevent contents of the Report from leaking out before it had been officially transmitted. The Report could subsequently be discussed by the Council of Ministers at its December meeting in Paris. The presence of the Ministers of Finance on this occasion was felt to be an advantage.

10. The meeting in December is to take place from Tuesday 11th to Friday, 14th. If one day is to be devoted to a full discussion of the current international political situation it might be necessary to continue the meeting on the Saturday of that week. It was agreed to suggest that in any case a possible meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers should not be allowed to interfere with the work of the North Atlantic Council. It might be proposed that the WEU Council meet on Monday, 10th December, before the opening of the NATO Council meeting.

11. The three Ministers have agreed that they should visit the different NATO capitals individually and not as a team, Mr. Lange taking the northern countries, Mr. Pearson Washington and London, and Mr. Martino Paris and the southern capitals. It was felt, however, that a preference might exist for a visit to Washington to be made by the Committee as a whole. This might conceivably be combined with the Committee's meeting mentioned in paragraph 7 above.

12. Finally, the Chairman asked to be given clear instructions by the delegations concerned with respect to the way in which the operation, including the meeting in June, had to be presented to the Press. It was the general agreement that at least for the time being the operation would have to be played down so as not to create too great expectations about the outcome.

III. QUESTIONNAIRE - INTRODUCTORY SECTION ON POLITICAL AIMS

13. The Canadian Representative suggested that in order to save time some work might already be done by the Permanent Representatives and the International Staff on the drafting of an introductory section
to the questionnaire which might possibly be sent to the NATO Member Governments, without prejudice to the ultimate decision on the usefulness of such a questionnaire.

14. The Italian and Norwegian Representatives promised to get instructions on this point.

15. The Norwegian Representative said that whereas general questions and questions concerning political consultation would presumably be handled directly by the Ministers themselves, certain specific questions of a more technical nature might be entrusted to specialised people from outside who could act as rapporteurs. Such questions were, for instance, scientific and technical education, closer co-operation in the economic and financial field, increased information activities particularly with respect to troop information, the possibility of having recruits serve part of their time in other countries than their own, etc. The possibility of entrusting the study of these and similar questions to a small group of highly qualified people was also discussed but it was felt that, at least for the time being, the Committee of Three should not delegate its powers to another Body.

16. It was agreed that the delegations present would seek further instructions on the principle of the questionnaire and the proposed introductory statement, and on specific subjects to be included therein.

17. The next meeting is to be held on Thursday, 14th June, at 10.30 a.m. in Room 404.
Report of a Meeting held on Thursday, 14th June, 1956, in preparation for the work of the Committee of Three

PRESENT
Chairman: Lord Ismay
Canada: Mr. L.D. Wilgress Mr. P. Tremblay
Norway: Mr. K. Aars Mr. P. Jebsen
Italy: Mr. M. Pinna-Caboni Mr. E. Rubino
Baron A. Bentinck
Secretary: Mr. K.H. Beyen

I. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE JUNE MEETING OF THE THREE MINISTERS

The following points were made:

(a) Mr. Martino would like the very first meeting of the Committee on Wednesday morning, to be attended by the Three Ministers only without anybody else present. This meeting will take place in Room 404 at 11 a.m. Mr. Lange and Mr. Pearson have been informed about this wish of Mr. Martino and it can be assumed that they will agree.

(b) The further meetings of the Committee will be attended by the Three Ministers, the three Permanent Representatives, one or two advisers per delegation, the Secretary General and the Deputy Secretary General (possibly alternatively), and the Secretary. Other members of the International Staff will only be called in when their presence is required. The advisers each delegation may bring along will not sit at the table.

II. DATE AND PLACE OF MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS TO CONSIDER REPORT

2. Mr. Pearson has agreed to Mr. Lange's proposals that the Report of the Committee of Three be presented to a special meeting of the Council to be held in North America between the date of the United States Presidential Elections (4th November) and the opening session of the United Nations General Assembly (11th November). At this meeting the Report will only be tabled and explained by the Committee of Three, but it will not be discussed. The discussion will take place at the Ministerial Conference in December in Paris.
III. PRESS COMMUNIQUÉ

3. The text of the Press Communiqué prepared by the Secretary was discussed and redrafted. It was agreed that delegations would cable this text to their capitals for approval. The Chairman pointed out that it was highly desirable to issue the Communiqué prior to the meeting since many representatives of the Press would be calling up and asking for information as soon as the news of the meeting of the Committee of Three had leaked out, and a sensible answer had to be given them. It was agreed that each representative should try to get approval for the release of the Communiqué by the beginning of next week.

IV. QUESTIONNAIRE - INTRODUCTORY SECTION ON POLITICAL AIMS

4. It was generally agreed that the questions to be sent to countries should be few, direct, simple and leading. The Deputy Secretary General particularly stressed the time factor involved. In view of the coming holiday season it would not be easy to get answers to the questionnaire early enough to be of use for the drafting of the Report. It was agreed that, subject to any final decisions to be made by the Three Ministers with respect to the questionnaire, the replies should be asked for by the beginning of August.

5. The following comments were made with respect to the questionnaire:

(a) Lord Ismay suggested that a question might be included on how to strengthen the NATO machine. He stressed the necessity of appointing to delegations and to the International Staff the very best people available for the job.

(b) With reference to questions 1 B and E of the Canadian proposal, Lord Ismay suggested that any discrimination between the Ministerial Council and the Council of Permanent Representatives would be fatal to the whole concept of NATO.

Mr. Wilgress explained that the idea behind question E was that in addition to Ministerial Council meetings certain meetings might be held at which countries would be represented by top officials from their respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs. He added, however, that he personally was more in favour of meetings of the Foreign Ministers themselves at stated intervals, e.g. every three months. This system would combine the advantages of the League of Nations, at which Ministers used to meet frequently, and those of the United Nations, where member nations are represented by Permanent Representatives in the same way as in NATO.

A question might be added whether meetings in other cities than Paris would be desirable;
(c) Lord Ismay felt that although meetings of
Parliamentarians should continue to be encouraged
it was necessary to avoid a situation in which
such meetings could pass resolutions mandatory
on the Council. The Council should not be put
into a position where it had to serve two masters.
If a meeting of Parliamentarians reached a decision
it was up to the participants to convince their own
home parliaments of the necessity to have those
decisions carried out by their governments.

(d) The question was discussed how to obtain the views
of private organizations such as the Atlantic
Treaty Association. The possibility of organizing
an unofficial Seminar consisting of highly qualified
personalities, similar to the group which had met
at Garmisch under the Chairmanship of Prince Bernard
of the Netherlands was considered. The Deputy
Secretary General pointed out that the Chairman
of the International Federation of Trade Unions had
indicated that he would like to be consulted by
the Committee of Three. It might be useful to
include a representative of the Trade Unions in
such a Seminar. The Norwegian Representative
pointed out that the Conference of Youth Leaders,
which was shortly to be held at the Palais de
Chaillot, might also come up with suggestions which
could be of interest to the Committee of Three.
It was agreed that this entire subject needed
further study.

(e) Lord Ismay suggested the inclusion of the question
whether countries would be prepared to keep their
representatives in non-NATO countries fully
informed about the decisions and the policy of
NATO and to instruct them to defend NATO's position
when the occasion arose.

6. The Canadian Representative indicated that Mr. Pearson's
proposals for economic and cultural questions would be forthcoming
soon.

7. It was agreed to hold another meeting on Monday morning,
at 10.30 a.m. The Norwegian Representative agreed to prepare a
redraft of the introductory section and of the questionnaire for
that meeting.
Report of a Meeting held on Monday, 18th June, 1956, in preparation for the work of the Committee of Three

PRESENT

Chairman: Lord Ismay

Canada: Mr. L.D. Wilgress
Mr. P. Tremblay

Norway: Mr. K. Aars
Mr. P. Jebeen

Italy: Mr. M. Pinna-Caboni
Mr. C. Gasparini

Baron A. Bentinck

Secretary: Mr. K.H. Beyen

I. PRESS RELEASE

An amendment, proposed by the Norwegian Representative, and incorporating part of the text of the final Communiqué of 5th May, was adopted subject to notification of approval by the Italian Representative (this notification was given later in the day). It was agreed that the Communiqué, the text of which is at annex, should be issued on Tuesday morning.

II. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MEETING

2. The Three Ministers will meet alone on Wednesday morning, 20th June, at 11 a.m. in Room 404. The first full meeting of the Committee will presumably take place at 3 o'clock in the afternoon in Room VIII.

3. The Secretary General pointed out that the time and date of a meeting with the Council, if decided upon, should be settled at the earliest possible moment so as to give the Council sufficient notice.

4. It was assumed that the Three Ministers would not wish to hold a Press Conference, but confirmation of this assumption would have to be sought.

5. The Committee of Three may wish to indicate what kind of assistance from the International Staff they will require for their work.

6. It was agreed that these questions should be submitted to the Ministers for their early decision.

7. The Canadian Representative said that Mr. Pearson will be accompanied by Mr. Ignatieff who will be prepared to stay in Paris for as much as 30 days if the work requires this. Mr. Lange
will be accompanied by Mr. Christiansen. The latter will presumably have to return to Norway at the end of this week.

III. SUBJECTS TO BE COVERED BY THE COMMITTEE

8. The subjects will include political consultation, education (Mr. Lange's proposal on scientific education), information activities, and cultural relations. With respect to this last subject, it was suggested by the Canadian Representative that the Committee might wish to wait for the results of the meeting of Heads of Cultural Departments which is to take place in Paris from 10th to 12th July.

9. The Chairman stressed, however, that the first task of the Committee should be the organization of its work. In this connection it was agreed that if the questionnaire is decided upon, replies should be requested to be sent to the Secretary and copies distributed by him to the three Ministers and the three Permanent Representatives.
PRESS RELEASE

Lord Ismay, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, announced today that the Committee of Three Foreign Ministers which was set up by the North Atlantic Council in May will hold their first series of meetings in Paris from the 20th to 22nd June.

The Committee of Three was set up in order to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community.

Mr. Lange, Mr. Martino and Mr. Pearson will devote these first meetings to discussing the preparatory work that has been done so far, and to co-ordinating their further action. The meetings will be private and exploratory in character and it is not expected that any further information will be given out to the Press.
Report of a Meeting held on Monday, 9th July, 1956, in preparation for the work of the Committee of Three

PRESENT

Chairman: Baron A. Bentinck
Canada: Mr. L.D. Wilgress
        Mr. K.J. Burbridge
Norway: Mr. Raeder
        Mr. K. Aars
Italy: Mr. A. Alessandrini
        Mr. C. Gasparini
Acting Secretary: Lucille M. Peart

I. CONSULTANTS

A. Consultants on Economic Questions

The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE circulated a copy of a letter, dated 26th June, which Mr. Pearson had addressed to Professor Lincoln Gordon. The letter set out, inter alia, the terms of reference of the consultants on economic questions (attached as Annex A). A reply had not yet been received. The Deputy Secretary General would be kept informed.

2. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE went on to say that Mr. Marjolin had also been approached but he had been unable to take on the task of full-time consultant. As one of the French Government's principle advisers on the negotiations taking place in Brussels, Mr. Marjolin would be fully occupied in the latter part of August and in September. He hoped, however, to be able to consult informally with the Group.

3. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that Professor Carli had not yet been approached but this could be done in the immediate future.

4. It was recalled that Mr. Eric Roll of the United Kingdom had been mentioned as a possible substitute.

5. In conclusion, it was agreed that the main task of the Consultants on economic questions was the preparation of the economic section of the report. It would be helpful to Ministers if the Group could begin to draft their report as soon as practicable after their arrival in Paris and before the September meeting of the Committee of Three.

B. Consultants on Scientific and Technical Education

6. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE proposed, and it was agreed, that decision on this question should be postponed until after
the meeting of Heads of Cultural Departments which was to be held from 10th-12th July under the auspices of the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations. The United States Delegation had tabled a paper on scientific and technical education for discussion at the meeting. (1) It would be advisable to await the outcome of the discussion, to see if any recommendations were put forward.

7. It was noted that Mr. Martino approved the terms of reference proposed by Mr. Lange, and that a reply from Mr. Pearson was awaited. The Deputy Secretary General would be kept informed.

8. It was further noted that substantively the terms of references proposed by Mr. Lange were the same as those agreed earlier, although the wording had been changed somewhat.

9. With regard to Mr. Lange's other proposal to the effect that a Three-Man Expert Group should be established, the CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE asked whether it might not be preferable to entrust the task to Mr. Robert Major, Director of the Royal Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, on the understanding that he would be free to travel and consult other experts, in particular Dr. Stratton of the United States and Mr. Zuckerman of London, the other two names put forward by Mr. Lange. To convene a second group of experts might create a wrong impression, especially as the news was bound to leak to the Press.

10. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE had some reservations about this suggestion but undertook to consult Mr. Lange. The Deputy Secretary General would be kept informed.

11. The DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL undertook to clear the point about travelling expenses.

II. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SEPTEMBER MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF THREE

12. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE circulated a proposed programme (Annex B).

13. It was generally agreed that it would be most desirable for Foreign Ministers to be present to consult individually with the Committee of Three or, otherwise, to be represented by a high ranking official.

14. After discussion of the Canadian draft it was agreed:

(a) that the approval of Mr. Pearson, Mr. Martino and Mr. Lange would be sought as a matter of urgency;

(b) if the proposal did not have the unanimous approval of the Three, another meeting would be held to iron out the difficulties;

(c) on the other hand, if the proposal was approved by the Three, the Secretary General would be invited to circulate the draft to other members of the Council with the request that they

(1) AC/52(CE)D/12
ascertain whether the dates proposed were acceptable to their respective Foreign Ministers. If all went well Permanent Representatives might be in a position to relay answers at the Council's meeting on 18th July.

III. EXPLANATORY NOTE ON QUESTION 3 OF THE POLITICAL SECTION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE

15. The Secretary was invited to circulate an addendum to CT-D/2 in accordance with the suggestion of the Italian Authorities, communicated by letter dated 3rd July.

IV. NATO PARLIAMENTARY GROUP

16. It was confirmed that Mr. Pearson and Mr. Martino had conversations in London with the Secretariat of the NATO Parliamentary Group.

V. PUBLICITY FOR THE SEPTEMBER MEETING

17. In a preliminary discussion of this question it was agreed that publicity should be kept to the minimum consistent with the realities of the occasion - personalities involved, etc.

VI. DATE OF THE NEXT MEETING

18. The meeting adjourned without fixing the date for a subsequent meeting.
(Copy of letter to Professor Gordon from Mr. Pearson)

London, 28th June, 1956.

Dear Professor Gordon,

As you probably know, the Committee of three Ministers consisting of Dr. Martino, Mr. Lange and myself have been asked by the North Atlantic Council to advise on "ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic community".

We have just had a meeting in Paris to agree on a programme of work and procedures to carry it out. We have also agreed on a questionnaire which will be going out to member governments.

I anticipate one of the most difficult chapters of the report which we hope to submit to member governments at the end of this year will be the economic one and we therefore agreed to try to bring together a small group of consultants of high qualifications and experience such as yourself and Marjolin to help us with the economic material. Professor Garli has also been suggested by Dr. Martino.

The plan is that the three Ministers will meet again in mid-September and conduct discussions with other foreign ministers or their representatives, on the basis of their governments' answers to the questionnaire, rather on the model of the TOG exercise, with which you are familiar. It will be my idea that the consultants will meet in Paris by the middle of August, if possible, and be available for advice on economic matters for about six weeks or two months.

The terms of reference which I have put to my two colleagues will be as follows:

"To assist the Committee of Three in surveying and analyzing ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in the economic field with a view to developing greater unity within the Atlantic community. To examine this subject in the light of the economic questions put to member governments by the Committee of Three and the answers received and to be available to the Committee of Three for advice on the economic chapter of the report for a period of at least two months".

I would hope that you would be willing to take on this assignment, the importance of which for the future of the coalition I need hardly stress to you. I would certainly feel happier if your experience and knowledge in this field were available to the Committee.

If you agree, the Secretary-General of NATO would follow up with an official offer including, I believe, the offer of an allowance of 10,000 francs per day and your travelling expenses.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) L.B. PEARSON

Prof. Lincoln Gordon,
Graduate School, Business Administration,
Harvard University,
BOSTON 63, Mass., U.S.A.
Proposed Programme for the Committee of Three

September 10th to 22nd, 1956

Preparatory Meetings

September 10th and 11th

Consultations with other NATO Governments

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Concluding Meetings

September 20th to 22nd
Report of a Meeting held on Thursday, 12th July, 1956, concerning the work of the Committee of Three

PRESENT

Chairman: Baron A. Bentick

Canada: Mr. L. D. Wilgress
Mr. K. J. Burbridge

Italy: Mr. A. Alessandrini
Mr. C. Gasparini

Norway: Mr. J. G. Raeder
Mr. K. Aars

Secretary: Mr. K. H. Beyen

I. PROPOSED TIMETABLE FOR THE MEETINGS IN SEPTEMBER

It was agreed to submit to the Council the timetable as proposed by the Canadian Delegation with slight amendments. (CT-D/3)

2. It was noted that Dr. Martino and Mr. Pearson had tentatively agreed in London that the Standing Committee of the Conference on Members of Parliament would meet with the Committee of Three on Wednesday, 12th September. This might necessitate rearrangement of the proposed meetings with representatives of NATO Governments on that date (Iceland and Turkey).

II. ECONOMIC CONSULTANTS

3. It was agreed that Professor Lincoln Gordon would be available to the Committee of Three from 3rd September until the end of that month, and that Professor Carli should be asked to be in Paris on the 3rd September and to stay, if possible, as long as Professor Gordon or otherwise at least until the 22nd September.

4. It was decided to increase the daily allowances for these consultants from Fr.frs. 10,000 to Fr.frs. 20,000.

5. Since Mr. Marjolin will not be available the question will be submitted to the Three Ministers whether they wish to approach Professor Austin Robinson of Oxford University to be a third economic consultant or whether two consultants would be sufficient.

6. Dr. Martino, as Chairman of the Committee, will authorise the Secretary General to write to prospective consultants on behalf of the Committee as soon as preliminary arrangements will have been concluded. The Terms of Reference to be mentioned by the Secretary General in his letter of invitation should be the same as those contained in Mr. Pearson's letter to Professor Lincoln Gordon. The task of the consultants should mainly consist of analysing the replies to the Questionnaire and of formulating recommendations. It would not necessarily include the actual drafting of the economic chapter of the report.
III. CONSULTANTS ON TECHNICAL EDUCATION

7. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE stated that Mr. Robert Major had indicated that he would prefer a Committee of Three Experts as originally proposed by Mr. Lange, to the Canadian proposal under which he would do the job alone. It was agreed that a final decision would have to wait for the views of Mr. Lange to become known on this point.

8. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE was very much in favour of Mr. Major's travelling around to collect the views of different national administrations. He agreed, however, that Mr. Major should be available in Paris during the time the Committee of Three was meeting here. He furthermore indicated that the United States proposal to the conference of Heads of Cultural Departments, made on 11th July (AC/52(CE)D/12), would be turned over to the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations, and that he would suggest that this Committee turn it over to the Committee of Three.

IV. PUBLICITY

9. It was agreed that for the time being no publicity should be given to the appointment of the consultants. The matter could be looked at again in September if necessary. It was furthermore agreed that Dr. Martino and Mr. Pearson would inform Professor Carli and Professor Gordon accordingly so as to avoid undue publicity.

V. NEXT MEETING

10. It was agreed that the next meeting be held on Friday, 20th July, at 11 a.m. in order to finalise the timetable which would have been discussed by the Council on Wednesday, 18th July, and to come to a final decision on the appointment of the consultants.
Report of a Meeting held on Friday, 20th July, 1956, concerning the work of the Committee of Three

PRESENT

Chairman: Baron A. Bentinck
Canada: Mr. L.D. Wilgress
Mr. K.J. Burbridge
Italy: Mr. A. AlessandrinI
Mr. C. Gasparini
Norway: Mr. J.C. Raeder
Mr. K. Aars

Secretary: Mr. K.H. Beyen

I. TIMETABLE FOR THE MEETINGS IN SEPTEMBER

As a number of delegations (Iceland, The Netherlands, Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, France) had already given their approval to the proposed timetable, and as the Portuguese Delegation had stated its provisional agreement, it was agreed that the Delegations of Turkey, Greece, Belgium, Luxembourg and Denmark would be asked individually and informally to state their views on the proposed timetable at the earliest possible date.

2. It was agreed that at the next private meeting of the Council Ambassador Alessandri would mention that the Committee of Three deemed it highly desirable that the Foreign Ministers of the different member countries should themselves meet with the Committee of Three in September.

II. CONSULTANTS

3. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE stated that Professor Lincoln Gordon had accepted to serve as consultant. The text of a letter drafted by the Secretary and to be sent by Lord Ismay to Professor Gordon and Professor Carli was read and agreed to with one small amendment.

4. The Three Ministers had agreed that Dr. Robert Major should be the only consultant on scientific and technical education, and that he should travel to different capitals of member nations to contact national administrations. His terms of reference should be those contained in a letter from the Norwegian Delegation to the Secretary General dated 30th June, 1956. It was agreed that the reimbursement of Dr. Major's expenses during the time he was travelling would be checked with the Financial Controller.
5. (The letters of invitation by the Secretary-General to the three consultants have been sent out on 23rd July. In the letter to Dr. Major it has been specified that he would, in addition to reimbursement of his expenses for transportation, receive a daily allowance of 20,000 francs during the period he has to spend abroad. The letter also stated that Dr. Major's presence in Paris during the period the Committee of Three was to meet here was highly desirable.)

III. PUBLICITY

6. It appeared from a letter read by the Canadian Representative that Mr. Pearson did not wish too rigid a rule to be applied against publicity concerning the consultants. They could state to their universities or national authorities the work on which they were going to be engaged, without, however, publicising their terms of reference. If the Press were to ask questions about it later on the Director of Information could confirm the appointment of these consultants.

IV. PROGRAMME OF FUTURE WORK

7. (a) The Italian and Norwegian "advance party" will arrive on the 3rd September; the Canadian "advance party" presumably not before the 4th September;

(b) The papers which the International Staff was asked to prepare (CT-R/1 points 6, 7, 8 and 9) will be circulated to the Committee as soon as they are ready.

(c) It will be necessary to prepare a draft outline of the report during the time the Committee of Three meets in September so that it can be available before Ministers leave Paris.

(d) The Norwegian Delegation will ask Dr. Major to draft and submit a plan of the trips he proposes to make.

Palais de Chaillot,  
Paris, XVIe.
Report of a Meeting held on Friday, 10th August, 1956, concerning the work of the Committee of Three

PRESENT

Chairman: Baron A. Bentinck

Canada: Mr. L.D. Tilgass
       Mr. K.J. Burbridge

Italy: Mr. W. Pinza-Caboni
       Mr. C. Berin

Norway: Mr. J.O. Raeder
        Mr. P. Jetsen

Acting Secretary: Miss Lucille M. Peart

I. CENTRE OF ATLANTIC COMMUNITY STUDIES

It was agreed that the memorandum by the Danish and Norwegian Governments on this subject should be circulated to all delegations with a cover note by the Acting Secretary General, stating that the memorandum was circulated at the request of the Committee of Three who considered that it would be useful to governments in the preparation of their answers to the questions set out in Section III, sub-sections 1(a) and (b) of the Committee of Three's questionnaire.

II. SEPTEMBER TIME-TABLE

2. It was noted that all the dates proposed for consultations by the Committee of Three with other member governments had now been confirmed. Consultations would start at 10.0 a.m. and 3.0 p.m.

3. A letter from the Secretary of the Atlantic Treaty Association to the Acting Secretary General was discussed, and, in conclusion, it was agreed that the Secretary of the ATA should be informed that plans had already been made for the Committee of Three to meet with representatives of other governments on 13th and 14th September. For this reason, it would be difficult for the Committee to receive the ATA Assembly on either of those days. On the other hand, 15th September was being kept in reserve for the Ministers to meet privately. The suggestion could be put to them that they might wish to receive the ATA Assembly on Saturday morning (15th September), and this would be done if the ATA Secretary agreed.

4. It was confirmed that the Committee of Three would meet the Standing Committee of the Conference of NATO Members of Parliament on 12th September, the following time-table being proposed for that day:

(1) CT-D/1(Revised)
(2) CT-D/3
10.0 a.m. to 12 noon Meeting with the Parliament Standing Committee
12 noon to 1.0 p.m. Consultation with the Representative of the Icelandic Government.
3.0 to 4.0 p.m. Continuation of consultation with Iceland (if necessary)
4.0 to 6.0 p.m. Consultation with the Representative of the Turkish Government.

5. It was agreed that the definitive timetable should be circulated about 1st September.

III. CONSULTANTS

6. It was noted that Professor Gordon and Mr. Carli had replied in the affirmative to the Secretary General's invitation. The Norwegian Representative stated that Mr. Major's reply could be expected the following day.

7. Security Clearance. The Italian Representative confirmed that Mr. Carli had already been "cleared". The Norwegian Delegation will confirm in writing that Dr. Major had also been "cleared". The Acting Secretary General will request clearance for Professor Gordon through the United States Delegation.

8. Secretarial Assistance. Dr. Major and Professor Gordon will require English-language secretarial assistance. The Acting Secretary General will ask Dr. Carli whether he prefers to work in English or French.

IV. DOCUMENTATION

9. On behalf of the Committee of Three the Acting Secretary General will invite all delegations to submit 35 copies of their replies to the questionnaire. Replies by governments will be circulated in the original language only; each Minister is to receive six copies. Ministers should also receive six copies of all other relevant papers, e.g., memoranda prepared by the staff, the latter to be circulated in English (or French) in the first instance and in translation as soon as possible thereafter. Staff studies will be circulated to other Governments at the request of the Committee only.

10. The suggestions put to the Committee of Three by Professor Sohn, Mr. Koster and Dr. Hahn will not be circulated to other governments unless a member of the Committee requests that this should be done.

V. CONFERENCE ROOMS, OFFICE SPACE, SECRETARIAL ASSISTANCE, DRAFT REPORT, ETC.

11. Conference Rooms. The following should be reserved on the dates noted:

3rd September Room VI (See VI (3) below)
10th to 22nd September Room VI (Ministerial Meeting, including Consultations)
3rd to end of September Rooms VII, VIII and the Secretary General's summer office (Working Groups)
12. Delegations. It is foreseen that each Minister will be accompanied by three officials. These officials will probably set up two, or possibly three, working groups to prepare draft chapters of the Ministers' report. (The staff may be asked to produce first drafts as a basis for discussion by the officials.) Drafts, insofar as possible, should be prepared in English. Translation will not be required.

13. Chairmen of Working Groups. Unless otherwise agreed by the Working Groups, an Italian Representative will preside as Chairman.

14. Records. Summary records should be kept of all "consultations". The Ministers' meetings with the Parliamentary Standing Committee and the NATO Assembly will be held in Room II and should be recorded on tape.

15. Offices. Each of the 3 delegations should be provided with an office in the Palais de Chaillot from the 3rd to the end of September. (The Canadian Delegation is making arrangements for an office in the hotel where the Minister will be staying.)

16. Secretarial Assistance. An undetermined number of shorthand/typists will be required, especially at the drafting stage.

VI. SCHEDULE OF Meetings

(1) Friday, 17th August (provisional, no time fixed). It is proposed that the Ambassadors should meet with Dr. Major on that day to hear his plan of work. The Norwegian Delegation was invited to arrange for Dr. Major to attend.

(2) A second meeting of the Ambassadors will be held before the end of the month.

(3) Monday, 3rd September, 10.30 a.m. Meeting of the Ambassadors, officials from capitals, and the three Consultants. The Acting Secretary General will preside.
Report of a Meeting held on Friday, 17th August, 1956, concerning the work of the Committee of Three

PRESENT

Chairman: Baron A. Bentinck

Canada: Mr. L.D. Wilgress
Mr. H.W. Robertson

Italy: Mr. A. Alessandrini
Mr. C. Borel

Norway: Mr. J.G. Ræder
Mr. P. Jebsen

Dr. Robert Major, Director of the Royal Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research

Acting Secretary: Miss Lucille M. Peart

The Chairman welcomed Dr. Major, Consultant to the Committee of Three on questions of scientific and technical education.

Dr. Major said he did not plan to travel to the United States. He had an opportunity of discussing the problem at length with Dr. Trytten of the United States, who had spent some days in Norway. Furthermore, he had accumulated a good deal of printed matter deriving from United States sources.

He had been in the United Kingdom before coming to Paris and planned to go on to Rome and Bonn before returning to Oslo. It was difficult to contact the people he hoped to see in the various capitals at this time of year.

It was agreed that it would be most desirable for Dr. Major to visit Turkey and Greece if he could spare the time.

His task was complicated by the fact that the answers to the OECD questionnaire were not due until the 15th September and would probably not be received until later in the month. It was essential to assemble all relevant facts before he could see the problem in the round and begin to think about recommendations for action by NATO. Conditions varied so much as between countries,

After an exchange of views it was agreed that Dr. Major should plan to return to Paris on the 10th September to meet with the Committee of Three on that or the following day. It would be useful if he could prepare an outline of his report for discussion with the Ministers. At the same time, it was recognised that Dr. Major could not finalise his recommendations until he had an opportunity of studying the replies to the OECD questionnaire. It was hoped that Dr. Major would be available to advise the Ministers during their consultations with other governments.
Meeting of the Committee of Three with the ATA Assembly

The Canadian and Norwegian Representatives said that their Ministers agreed to meet the ATA Assembly on the morning of Saturday, 15th September. Mr. Martino's concurrence was awaited.

Private Meetings with Ministers

It was agreed that during their stay in Paris Ministers would not find it possible to make private appointments between the hours of 10.0 a.m. and 1 p.m. and from 3 p.m. to 6.30 p.m.

Date of the Next Meeting

The date of the next meeting was not fixed.*

* See report of the meeting held on Friday, 10th August, Item VI.
Report of a Meeting held on Wednesday, 29th August, 1956, concerning the work of the Committee of Three

PRESENT

Chairman: Baron A. Bentinck

Canada: Mr. K.J. Burbridge
Norway: Mr. J.G. Raeder
Mr. I.W. Robertson
Mr. A. Langeland

Italy: Mr. A. Alessandri
Mr. O. Borin

Secretary: Mr. K.H. Beyen

I. PROPOSED WEU COUNCIL MEETING

In view of the difficulties of having a Council meeting of WEU and the consultations of the Committee of Three at the same time, on 13th and 14th September, Ambassador Alessandri agreed to suggest to his authorities that the WEU meeting be held either during evening hours or on Saturday afternoon 15th September.

II. ACCOMMODATION

2. Mr. Lange and Mr. Pearson will not require offices in the Palais de Chaillot. Dr. Martino's requirements will be communicated to the Secretary when they are known.

3. The Italian and Norwegian Delegations request one office each in the Palais de Chaillot for their delegations. In addition to the two economic consultants, Dr. Robert Major will also have to have an office at his disposal during his stay in Paris.

III. PROCEDURES

4. Dr. Martino has indicated his agreement with the meeting with the Atlantic Treaty Association on the 15th September. The meeting with the Parliamentarians is to take place on the 12th September in Room II.

5. Mr. Burbridge introduced and distributed a proposal by Mr. Pearson on the procedure for the work of the Committee of Three. The text of this proposal is attached. It was agreed that after discussion by the government officials who will arrive on the 3rd September, a paper setting out agreed points of procedure might be circulated to all delegations.
6. At the opening meeting on Monday, 3rd September, at 11 a.m. the three Permanent Representatives concerned will be present. It may be difficult, however, for the three Permanent Representatives to be present at all consultations between the Committee of Three and the different governmental representatives.

7. In principle the working groups to be established by the officials and consultants after the 3rd September should be chaired by the Italian Representative at such working groups.
Some Thoughts on Procedure for the Work of the Committee of Three

The procedures at the forthcoming meetings of the Committee of Three should aim at making the best use of the short time during which the Ministers will be together and governmental representatives will be available for consultation, in order that a set of recommendations should be produced which can be readily implemented and will serve to strengthen the alliance.

2. The object of this series of consultations between the Committee of Three and the governmental representatives should be:

(a) to enable the Committee of Three to acquaint representatives of other governments with the recommendations which emerge from the preliminary meetings of the Committee of Three in the light of the replies received to their questionnaire;

(b) to obtain an impression from the governmental representatives of how such recommendations would be received by their several governments; and

(c) to obtain some impression from the governmental representatives of how these recommendations might be implemented by their several governments, individually and collectively.

3. The object of the preparatory meetings before the consultations between the Committee of Three and the governmental representatives should therefore be:

(a) to bring out those points in the replies to the questionnaire which seem to have a chance of surviving as recommendations in the report of the Committee of Three;

(b) to communicate these points to the other governmental representatives before their respective interviews with the Committee of Three take place;

(c) to identify those points in the replies of any government to the questionnaire which do not seem to command general support or which differ substantially from those contemplated by the Committee of Three so that the representative of that government might be questioned on the implications of such proposals with a view to determining whether they should be discarded or pursued further;

(d) to identify those ideas from whatever source (i.e., not necessarily from the replies to the questionnaire) which might serve as the basis for recommendations of the Committee of Three, but which might cause difficulty for some members of NATO and on which negotiations might therefore be necessary before inclusion as recommendations in the report.
4. If as it seems probable the three Ministers may have to interview some, if not all, governmental representatives more than the once provided for under the schedule as now agreed, since some of the more contentious recommendations will only emerge after all the initial interviews have been completed, it should be understood that governmental representatives or their permanent representatives on the Council should hold themselves available for further interviews with the Committee of Three as may be required. It is therefore essential that permanent representatives as well as governmental representatives attend the meetings of consultations between the Committee of Three and governmental representatives so that they might attend the further interviews if governmental representatives cannot remain in Paris for this purpose. Attendance at the consultations might therefore be:

(a) for the Committee of Three; the three Ministers, each with his permanent representative on the Council, not more than two advisers, the attendance of consultants to be decided later;

(b) for the other governments; the governmental representative, the permanent representatives, not more than three advisers;

(c) a representative from the Secretariat.

5. If this general approach is acceptable, the working groups consisting of the permanent representatives of each of the three Ministers, the officials accompanying them, their consultants and members of the International Staff should in the first instance concentrate on culling replies to the questionnaire for ideas which might constitute recommendations in the Committee of Three report and prepare drafts (based presumably on the summaries which the Secretariat will have prepared) of such recommendations for consideration of the three Ministers. The organization of these working groups should be left flexible; it might well be found desirable to split up the work according to the various sub-divisions into which the recommendations will naturally fall.

6. It might be desirable at this stage also to clarify the arrangement of the material for the report as this would have a bearing upon procedures of the Committee. If the object of the Committee of Three is to focus attention upon the recommendations and the necessity of following through with specific steps of implementation, perhaps the following might be considered as the revised outline of the Committee of Three report:

Part 1: Introduction - Objectives and needs of NATO (First draft will be circulated when the three Ministers meet).

Part 2: Recommendations - Divided into five chapters - political, economic, cultural, information, organizational (drafts to be prepared during forthcoming meetings of the Committee of Three).

Part 3: Appendices - Such explanatory or historical material as may be necessary to supplement part 2 (to be drafted by the consultants and the International Staff).

7. We are assuming of course that all replies to the questionnaire are being kept strictly confidential.
REPORT OF A MEETING HELD ON MONDAY, 3RD SEPTEMBER 1956 CONCERNING THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE OF THREE

Present:

Canada: Mr. G. Ignatieff
Mr. K.J. Burbridge
Mr. E. Ritchie
Mr. P. Tremblay
Mr. R. Cretault

Italy: Mr. A. Alessandri
Mr. C. Gasparini
Mr. O. Borin
Mr. Pansa Cedronio
Mr. L. Scro

Norway: Mr. J.M. Boyesen
Mr. P. Jebsen
Mr. S. Bille
Mr. G. Kristiansen
Mr. A. Skarstein

Economic Consultants: Dr. Carli
Professor Lincoln Gordon

Secretary: Mr. K.H. Beyen
I. PROCEDURE

1. The meeting examined the proposals by Mr. Pearson on the procedure for the work of the Committee of Three (see report of the meeting held on 29th August). Commenting on these proposals, Mr. Ignatieff said that the Canadian Delegation considered that the purpose of the present discussions was to put forward suggestions to the Committee of Three in order to assist the three Ministers in deciding on recommendations on which they might wish to consult other member governments. The three Ministers might then incorporate such recommendations as they saw fit into their final report.

2. He accordingly suggested that three drafting groups should be set up to draft recommendations for submission to the three Ministers. Ministers might then consider it advisable, immediately after their opening discussions on 10th and 11th September, to circulate to delegations certain preliminary basic recommendations or comments, in order to have the reactions of delegations and, if time permitted, of governments at the forthcoming consultations between the Committee of Three and governmental representatives.

3. The meeting was in general agreement with the proposals put forward by Mr. Pearson and the comments by Mr. Ignatieff.

4. It was agreed that three working groups should be set up
The Committee of Three: from left to right, Mr Halvard Lange, Prof. Gaetano Makino, and Mr L. B. Pearson.

5. The function of the working groups would be to draft recommendations on the basis of replies to the questionnaire, for consideration by the Committee of Three. The groups would take into account any minority recommendations and also new recommendations arising from their discussions.

6. It was further agreed to put forward to the Committee of Three the suggestions made by Mr. Ignatieff in paragraph 2 above.

7. In addition, the following procedural points were agreed:

(a) brief records of the discussions of the working groups would be kept by the Secretariat and circulated to the delegations concerned. Alternatively, working groups might wish to designate a rapporteur from a delegation.
(b) the extent of national representation at the forthcoming consultations should be left to the discretion of ministers; however, it would be desirable in order to facilitate freedom of discussion for the number of advisers not to exceed 4. It was noted that in view of the other commitments on their time, it was unlikely that permanent representatives would be able to attend regularly;

(c) each working group would elect its own Chairman;

(d) it might be necessary at a later stage for the working groups to meet jointly as a Steering Group to review the progress of work; permanent representatives might then be invited to attend;

(e) questions III, figure 3 and IV, figure 4 of the questionnaire, the concern of the Cultural and the Political Working Groups respectively, should also be considered by the Economic Working Group, and any draft recommendation formulated should be drawn up jointly with the Economic Working Group.

II. PUBLICITY

8. The confidential nature of the present discussions was
emphasised. It was agreed to invite the Information Division to draw up, for discussion by the meeting at the end of the week, the general lines of the information to be released to the press; this should be limited to a statement on the arrival of the Committee of Three and an indication that consultations were now beginning.

III. PROPOSED WEU COUNCIL MEETING

9. Ambassador ALESSANDRINI said that he would suggest to his authorities that the WEU meeting be held in the afternoon of 15th September.
In accordance with the Council's request made at the Ministerial Session in May, 1956(1), the Committee of Three here-with submits its Report on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields(2).

2. The Committee feels bound to draw attention to the fact that co-operation between NATO governments has shown signs of deterioration in the interval since the Council entrusted it with its task last May. Not only have existing inter-member differences persisted, but also important initiatives affecting the common interests of the Alliance have been taken by certain members without prior consultation in the NATO Council or directly with other member governments concerned.

3. As a result, unity among its members has been severely strained. These divergencies, if not rapidly removed, threaten to impair not only the solidarity but the very security of the Atlantic Community.

4. In particular, with respect to the Middle East, divergencies were allowed to develop without real efforts being made to overcome them by effective consultation. Thus the resulting situation had serious military consequences in weakening NATO defences, even though temporarily, quite apart from its obvious political implications.

5. This unfortunate deterioration in Western co-operation took place at the very time when the Soviet Union, by the use of force in Hungary and by adopting a threatening attitude on Middle Eastern problems, gave evidence of a return to a policy of renewed harshness and open hostility.

6. The Committee therefore has had to take into account the present critical problems with which NATO is confronted.

7. A basic purpose of NATO - and one which has not been achieved - is to develop the ways and means, as well as the will, to prevent crises between its members, to unify its members in the face of crises provoked by others and to be capable of operating effectively in conditions of crisis.

8. In the light of these considerations, most stress is laid in the Report on the need for developing further the practice of political consultation with a view to agreement on common policies, and on the various ways in which the Committee believes that this improved consultation can be achieved. But the Report can do no more than to set out guide-posts and suggest the framework for such improved consultation.

(1) C-R(56)23.
(2) C-M(56)127.
9. To achieve results, all member governments must themselves put more meaning into and get greater results from consultation by making full use of the means provided by NATO. Unless they do so the Alliance will not be able to achieve its purposes, and will in all probability weaken and eventually disappear.

10. The Committee also draws attention to the Resolution which the Council is invited to adopt on the peaceful settlement of inter-member disputes (Chapter 2, paragraph 58), a draft of which is attached to this note at Annex I. The Committee cannot emphasise too strongly that unless inter-member differences are settled quickly and satisfactorily, the solidarity of the Alliance is bound to suffer.

11. Various possibilities were given careful consideration by the Committee, including the setting up of a standing committee of the Council to aid in the mediation and conciliation of inter-member disputes and the possibility of setting up an arbitral board. The procedure set out in the proposed Resolution is regarded by the Committee as a minimum requirement which should be accepted by the Council if NATO is to be enabled to help member governments in discharging their responsibilities under the first Article of the North Atlantic Treaty. More elaborate procedures might have to be developed by the Council if experience showed that this was necessary.

12. To assist member governments and the Secretary General in giving effect to the Report, a draft Resolution for the consideration and adoption by the Council is attached at Annex II.

13. Considering the importance of better public understanding of NATO's aims and activities, to hold the support of the public in member countries and to avoid unjustified criticism in non-NATO countries, the Committee recommends that while this letter of transmission should remain classified, the text of the Report itself should be released. The Committee therefore suggests that the Council decide to release the Report not later than at the beginning of its Ministerial Session in December. Some points which the Committee believes are inappropriate for inclusion in a public report or which need additional explanation are listed at Annex III.

14. Finally the Committee recommends that as a matter of urgency the Council consider, in the light of the recommendations contained in this Report, measures to overcome the grave situation which has arisen affecting the solidarity and security of the Alliance.

(Signed) GAETANO MARTINO
Foreign Minister of Italy

HALVARD LANGE
Foreign Minister of Norway

L.B. PEARSON
Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.
Draft resolution on the peaceful settlement of disputes and differences between members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

WHEREAS the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty have undertaken to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered;

WHEREAS the parties have further undertaken to seek to eliminate conflicts in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them;

WHEREAS NATO unity and strength in the pursuit of these objectives remain essential for continuous co-operation in military and non-military fields;

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL:

REAFFIRMS the obligations of all its members to settle by peaceful means any dispute between themselves;

DECIDES that any such disputes which have not proved capable of settlement directly be submitted to good offices procedures within the NATO framework before member governments resort to any other international agency; except for disputes of a legal character appropriate for submission to a judicial tribunal and those disputes of an economic character for which attempts at settlement might best be made initially in the appropriate specialised economic organisations;

RECOGNISES the right and duty of member governments and of the Secretary General to bring to its attention matters which in their opinion may threaten the solidarity or effectiveness of the Alliance;

EMPOWERS the Secretary General to offer his good offices informally at any time to member governments involved in a dispute and with their consent to initiate or facilitate procedures of inquiry, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration;

AUTHORISES the Secretary General where he deems it appropriate for the purpose outlined in the preceding paragraph to use the assistance of not more than three permanent representatives chosen by him in each instance.
Draft resolution to be adopted by the North Atlantic Council on the report submitted by the Committee of Three appointed to report on the ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community.

WHEREAS the North Atlantic Council at its meeting in Paris on 5th May established a Committee composed of the foreign ministers of Italy, Canada and Norway to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community;

WHEREAS the Committee of Three has now reported on the task assigned to it and has submitted to the Council a number of recommendations on such ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields;

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL:

APPROVES the report of the Committee of Three;

INVITES all member governments to take all necessary steps to put its recommendations into effect;

INVITES the Secretary General to draw up for consideration by the Council such further specific proposals as may be required for the implementation of these recommendations and to report periodically on their compliance.
Explanatory Notes to the Report

Among the problems of political co-operation, the Committee considered the relationship which NATO should have with parliamentary associations and the parliamentary conference (Chapter 2, paragraphs 59 and 60). While suggesting certain practical arrangements for maintaining a close relationship between the parliamentary conference and NATO, the Committee recognises that there was general agreement between member governments that the time had not yet arrived for setting up a parliamentary consultative assembly.

2. In Chapter 3 on economic co-operation, the Committee has endeavoured in a pragmatic way to set out the forms of co-operation which they deem NATO could usefully undertake under Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as well as to indicate those things which had best be left to other international economic organizations. There are, however, one or two points in the Report which the Committee believes require further explanatory comment:

(a) In paragraph 65 reference is made to issues which may arise affecting the economic health of the Atlantic Community where NATO may be the most effective organization for consultation because of the political implications of such issues or because of their relation to the common defence; instances of such issues would be the assurance of oil supplies for Western Europe and the development of atomic power.

(b) In the recommendation contained in paragraph 66 to the effect that NATO consultation should take place before meetings of organizations at which the interests of the Atlantic Community may be subject to attempts to weaken or divide the Alliance, the Committee had in mind organizations such as the ECSC, EECOSSC and the Economic Committee of the United Nations General Assembly.

(c) (i) On the subject of the training and recruitment of scientists, engineers and technicians (paragraphs 68-70), the Committee has received a report from Mr. Robert Major. This report is being made available to the Council(1).

(ii) In the recommendation in paragraph 70 regarding a conference that might be convened to consider scientific and technical co-operation, the Committee believed that it was important that such a conference should include the participation of non-NATO countries in Europe who would be in a position to make a significant contribution in this field. The Committee therefore suggests that the Council give consideration to the procedure for carrying out this recommendation. There would be advantages in having NATO convene the conference. Alternatively if a NATO-based composition were thought to be too restrictive, NATO countries which are members of OEEC might encourage the Organization to undertake the task or promote its parallel co-operation.

(1) C-M(56)128.
(d) With regard to paragraph 71, dealing with NATO's interests in the development of economically under-developed areas, the Committee recognised that consultation may become desirable on the priority to be given in economic assistance to areas of particular concern to the Atlantic Community, both inside and outside the North Atlantic area.

(e) With reference to paragraph 73 on consultations concerning economic trends in Soviet countries and periodic meetings of experts on Soviet economic affairs, the Committee recognised that it would also be desirable to review in NATO from time to time the broader aspects of the control arrangements on trade with the Soviet bloc and Communist China and to seek agreement on the lines of action in this area most conducive to the security of the Atlantic Community.

3. The chapter on Organization and Functions is self-explanatory. The Committee would emphasise, however, with regard to paragraph 97 the need to ensure that their Permanent Representatives receive regular and prompt instructions to enable them to speak as authoritatively as possible for their governments in the Council. The corollary of this is of course that there should exist in every NATO capital effective machinery to maintain day-by-day contact between governments and their Permanent Representatives.
The Committee of Three: from left to right, Mr Halvard Lange, Prof. Gaetano Makino, and Mr L. B. Pearson.

CORRIGENDUM

to

C-M(56)126
(dated 17th November, 1956)

Holders of document C-M(56)126 are requested to replace Annex III (Explanatory Notes) by the attached revised version of the Explanatory Notes to the Report of the Committee of Three. This revision has been made to take account of changes made by the Committee of Three in their Report, at the request of the Council in Ministerial Session. It should be noted that the references in the attached document therefore relate to document C-M(56)127 (Revised).

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.
Among the problems of political co-operation, the Committee considered the relationship which NATO should have with parliamentary associations and the parliamentary conference (Chapter 2, paragraphs 58 and 59). While suggesting certain practical arrangements for maintaining a close relationship between the parliamentary conference and NATO, the Committee recognises that there was general agreement between member governments that the time had not yet arrived for setting up a parliamentary consultative assembly.

2. In Chapter 3 on economic co-operation, the Committee has endeavoured in a pragmatic way to set out the forms of co-operation which they deem NATO could usefully undertake under Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as well as to indicate those things which had best be left to other international economic organizations. There are, however, one or two points in the Report which the Committee believes require further explanatory comment:

(a) In paragraph 64 reference is made to issues which may arise affecting the economic health of the Atlantic Community where NATO may be the most effective organization for consultation because of the political implications of such issues or because of their relation to the common defence; instances of such issues would be the assurance of oil supplies for Western Europe and the development of atomic power.

(b) In the recommendation contained in paragraph 65 to the effect that NATO consultation should take place before meetings of organizations at which the interests of the Atlantic Community may be subject to attempts to weaken or divide the Alliance, the Committee had in mind organizations such as the EEC, ECOSEC and the Economic Committee of the United Nations General Assembly.

(c) (i) On the subject of the training and recruitment of scientists, engineers and technicians (paragraphs 67-69), the Committee has received a report from Mr. Robert Major. This report is being made available to the Council.

(ii) In the recommendation in paragraph 69 regarding a conference that might be convened to consider scientific and technical co-operation, the Committee believed that it was important that such a conference should include the participation of non-NATO countries in Europe who would be in a position to make a significant contribution in this field. The Committee therefore suggests that the Council give consideration to the procedure for carrying out this recommendation. There would be advantages
in having NATO convene the conference. Alternatively if a NATO-based composition were thought to be too restrictive, NATO countries which are members of OEEC might encourage that Organization to undertake the task or promote its parallel co-operation.

(d) With regard to paragraph 70, dealing with NATO's interests in the development of economically underdeveloped areas, the Committee recognised that consultation may become desirable on the priority to be given in economic assistance to areas of particular concern to the Atlantic Community, both inside and outside the North Atlantic area.

(e) As regards paragraph 71, it should be further pointed out that NATO should continue its regular analysis of economic trends in Soviet countries and developments in Soviet economic policy. To this end, governments should undertake to report relevant information regularly. There should also be periodic meetings of experts on Soviet economic affairs drawn from the various capitals whose discussions might be the basis for consultation in particular cases. Arrangements should also be made for periodic meetings of officials from the national capitals involved in commercial negotiations with the Soviet bloc, for an exchange of information and views. In the case of an important new commercial or financial proposal from the Soviet bloc to any member country, with possible political implications, it would be desirable for the member concerned to bring it to the attention of the Council before action is taken. It would also be desirable to review in NATO from time to time the broader aspects of the control arrangements on trade with the Soviet bloc and Communist China and to seek agreement on the lines of action in this area most conducive to the security of the Atlantic Community.

(f) The Alliance also has a positive interest in the complex and difficult field of Soviet economic relations with the economically underdeveloped countries. NATO should be concerned with cases where Soviet economic action appears calculated to undermine sound and friendly relations between these and members of the Atlantic Community. Here the main endeavour of member governments should be to work co-operatively and constructively with the underdeveloped areas in promoting their economic development on a mutually satisfactory basis. It would clearly not be desirable to engage in indiscriminate competitive
bidding with the Soviet Union in the field of assistance for development. At the same time, NATO consultation in certain cases might suggest the need for special efforts by members to assist underdeveloped countries in dealing with unusual problems, even if this requires an exceptional departure from ordinary commercial and financial practices.

3. The chapter on Organization and Functions is self-explanatory. The Committee would emphasise, however, with regard to paragraph 93 the need to ensure that their Permanent Representatives receive regular and prompt instructions to enable them to speak as authoritatively as possible for their governments in the Council. The corollary of this is of course that there should exist in every NATO capital effective machinery to maintain day-by-day contact between governments and their Permanent Representatives.
CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

NOTE DE PRÉSENTATION DU RAPPORT AU CONSEIL DU COMITE DES TROIS

Comme le Conseil le lui a demandé à sa Session Ministérielle de mai 1956 (1), le Comité des Trois présente ici son rapport(2) sur les mesures à prendre pour améliorer et développer la coopération entre pays de l'OTAN dans les domaines non-militaires.

2. Le Comité juge de son devoir d'appeler l'attention sur l'altération que la coopération entre pays de l'OTAN a marquée depuis que le Conseil l'a investi de sa mission en mai dernier. Non seulement les désaccords qui existaient alors entre pays membres ont subsisté, mais certains de ces pays ont encore pris d'importantes initiatives affectant les intérêts de l'Alliance sans consulter au préalable le Conseil ou, directement, les gouvernements des autres pays membres en cause.

3. L'unité des membres de l'Alliance a ainsi été mise à rude épreuve, s'ils ne sont pas rapidement éliminés, ces désaccords risquent de mettre en péril, non seulement la solidarité, mais la sécurité même de la Communauté Atlantique.

4. Il faut, en particulier, citer ici le Proche-Orient, au sujet duquel on a laissé les pays se diviser sans faire d'effort sérieux pour y remédir par des consultations efficaces. Indépendamment de ses évidentes incidences politiques, la situation qui en est résultée a eu des conséquences militaires graves, et elle a affaibli le système défensif de l'OTAN, ne serait-ce que pour un temps.

5. Cette regrettable altération de la coopération occidentale est intervenue au moment même où l'Union Soviétique, faisant usage de la force en Hongrie et adoptant une attitude menaçante au Proche-Orient, fournissait les preuves d'un retour à une politique de brutalité et d'hostilité ouverte.

6. Le Comité a donc dû tenir compte des graves problèmes devant lesquels l'OTAN se trouve aujourd'hui placée.

7. L'un des buts fondamentaux de l'OTAN - but que l'on n'a pas encore atteint - est de forger les moyens et la volonté de prévenir toute crise entre les pays membres, d'unir ces pays face aux crises que d'autres provoqueraient et de fonctionner efficacement en temps de crise.

8. Ces considérations ont conduit le Comité à insister tout spécialement dans son rapport, sur la nécessité de davantage développer la pratique de la consultation politique en vue de l'adoption de lignes communes de conduite et sur les divers moyens à employer à cet effet. Mais le rapport ne peut faire plus que montrer la voie à suivre et proposer un cadre à cette procédure de consultation améliorée.

9. Pour parvenir à des résultats pratiques, il faut que tous les gouvernements confèrent eux-mêmes une plus grande signification et une meilleure efficacité à la consultation en faisant un plein

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(1) cf. procès-verbal C-R(56)23
(2) document C-M(56)127
usage des moyens que fournir l’OTAN. S’ils y manquent, l’Alliance ne pourra pas atteindre ses buts et, selon toute probabilité, elle s’affaiblira grandement pour, finalement, disparaître.

10. Le Comité appelle également l’attention sur la résolution que le Conseil est invité à adopter au sujet du règlement pacifique des différends entre pays membres (voir Chapitre 2, paragraphe 58), et dont un projet est joint en Annexe I à la présente note. Le Comité ne saurait trop souligner que, si les différends entre pays membres ne sont pas réglés rapidement et de façon satisfaisante, la solidarité de l’Alliance en souffrirait immanquablement.


12. Pour aider les gouvernements des pays membres et le Secrétaire général à donner effet à ses conclusions, le Comité a préparé, à l’intention du Conseil, le projet de résolution que l’on trouvera ci-joint en Annexe II.

13. Considérant qu’il importe que le public comprenne mieux les buts et activités de l’OTAN, si l’on veut s’assurer le soutien de l’opinion publique dans les pays membres et éviter des critiques insinuées dans les autres pays, le Comité recommande la publication de son rapport au débat, la présente note restant cependant classifiée. Il suggère, par conséquent, au Conseil de décider de livrer le rapport au public au début de sa Session Ministérielle de décembre, ou au plus tard. Il est toutefois certains points que le Comité juge inopportun d’inclure dans un rapport public ou qui pourraient appeler des explications : il en est traité dans l’Annexe III.

14. Enfin, le Comité recommande au Conseil d’examiner d’urgence, à la lumière des recommandations faites dans son rapport, les mesures à prendre pour remédier à la grave situation qui s’est développée, portant atteinte à la solidarité et à la sécurité de l’Alliance.

(Signé) GAETANO MARTINO
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d’Italie

HALVARD LANGE
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Norvège

L.B. PEARSON
Secrétaire d’Etat aux Affaires Etrangères du Canada

N.A.T.O. UNCLASSIFIED

NATO CONFIDENTIELLE
Projet de résolution sur le règlement pacifique des litiges et différends entre pays membres de l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord

CONSIDERANT que les Parties au Traité de l'Atlantique Nord se sont engagées à régler par des moyens pacifiques tous différends internationaux dans lesquels elles pourraient être impliquées, de telle manière que la paix et la sécurité internationales, ainsi que la justice, ne soient pas mises en danger;

CONSIDERANT que les Parties se sont, en outre, engagées à s'efforcer d'éliminer toute opposition dans leurs politiques économiques internationales et à encourager la collaboration économique entre chacune d'entre elles ou entre toutes;

CONSIDERANT que l'union et la force dans la poursuite de ces objectifs restent indispensables à une coopération suivie dans les domaines militaires et non-militaires;

LE CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD :

REPÂTIRME l'obligation, pour tous ses membres, de régler par des moyens pacifiques tout différend qui surgirait entre eux;

DÉCIDE que tout différend qui n'aura pu être réglé directement entre les intéressés sera soumis à une procédure de bons offices dans le cadre de l'OTAN avant que les gouvernements des pays membres recourent à aucune autre institution internationale - exception faite, d'une part, pour les différends d'ordre juridique qu'il y aurait lieu de soumettre à un organisme judiciaire et, d'autre part, pour les différends d'ordre économique que l'on pourrait avoir avantage à tenter de régler d'abord dans le cadre de l'organisation économique spécialisée compétente;

AFFIRME le droit et le devoir des gouvernements des pays membres et du Secrétaire Général de porter à son attention les questions qui leur paraîtront comporter une menace pour la solidarité ou l'efficacité de l'Alliance;

HABILITE le Secrétaire Général à offrir officieusement, à tout moment, ses bons offices aux gouvernements des pays membres qu'un différend diviserait et, si ceux-ci y consentent, à prendre l'initiative ou à faciliter l'entreprise d'une enquête, d'une médiation, d'une conciliation ou d'un arbitrage;

AUTORISE le Secrétaire Général à s'assurer, chaque fois qu'il le jugera utile aux fins indiquées au paragraphe précédent, le concours de trois Représentants Permanents, au plus, qui seront choisis par lui dans chaque cas.
Projet de résolution concernant le rapport
du Comité de Trois Ministres que le Conseil a constitué pour lui faire des recommandations quant aux mesures à prendre pour améliorer et développer la coopération entre pays de l'OTAN dans les domaines non-militaires et pour accroître l'unité au sein de la Communauté Atlantique

CONSIDERANT que le Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord, réuni à Paris le 5 mai, a chargé un comité composé des Ministres des Affaires Étrangères d'Italie, du Canada et de Norvège de lui présenter des recommandations quant aux mesures à prendre pour améliorer et développer la coopération entre pays de l'OTAN dans les domaines non-militaires et pour accroître l'unité au sein de la Communauté Atlantique;

CONSIDERANT que ce Comité des Trois lui a maintenant fait rapport de ses travaux et soumis un certain nombre de recommandations sur les mesures à prendre pour améliorer et développer la coopération entre pays de l'OTAN dans les domaines non-militaires;

LE CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD:

APPROUVÉ le rapport du Comité des Trois;

INVITE les gouvernements de tous les pays membres à prendre toutes dispositions nécessaires pour donner effet aux recommandations qu'il contient;

INVITE le Secrétaire Général à lui soumettre toutes autres propositions particulières que la mise en œuvre de ces recommandations pourrait exiger et à lui faire périodiquement rapport de l'exécution donnée à celles-ci.
Notes explicatives sur le rapport

Parmi les problèmes que pose la coopération politique, le Comité a étudié les relations que l'OTAN devrait entretenir avec les associations de parlementaires et la Conférence des Parlementaires (voir Chapitre 2, paragraphes 59 et 60). Toutefois, s'il suggère certaines dispositions pratiques propres à assurer une liaison étroite entre la Conférence des Parlementaires et l'OTAN, le Comité reconnaît que, de l'avis général des pays membres, le temps n'est pas venu de créer une assemblée parlementaire consultative.

2. Dans le chapitre sur la Coopération économique (Chapitre 3), le Comité s'est efforcé à la fois d'établir de façon pratique les formes de coopération auxquelles l'OTAN pourrait utilement recourir dans le cadre de l'Article 2 du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord et de désigner les domaines qu'il conviendrait d'abandonner aux organisations internationales spécifiquement économiques. Le Comité juge cependant quelques explications supplémentaires nécessaires sur un ou deux points :

(a) Au paragraphe 65, il est question des problèmes qui pourraient mettre en jeu la santé économique de la Communauté Atlantique et dont les incidences politiques ou les rapports avec la défense commune feraient de l'OTAN l'organisation la mieux appropriée pour une consultation : pour exemples de tels problèmes, on peut citer le maintien du ravitaillement pétrolier de l'Europe occidentale et le développement de l'emploi de l'énergie atomique.

(b) En recommandant, au paragraphe 66, que des consultations OTAN alent lieu avant les réunions d'organisations internationales où les intérêts de la Communauté Atlantique risquaient d'être menacés par des tentatives pour affaiblir ou diviser l'Alliance, le Comité pensait à des organismes comme l'ECE, l'ECOSOC et la Commission Économique de l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies.

(c) (i) En ce qui concerne la formation et le recrutement d'hommes de science, d'ingénieurs et de techniciens (cf. paragraphes 68 à 70), le Comité a reçu un rapport de M. Robert Major. Ce rapport est présenté par ailleurs au Conseil (1);

(ii) Lorsqu'il recommande, au paragraphe 70, qu'une conférence soit réunie pour étudier les possibilités de coopération scientifique et technique, le Comité juge important que puissent participer à une telle conférence les pays européens qui n'appartiennent pas à l'OTAN mais seraient en mesure de prêter ici un concours appréciable. Il suggère, en conséquence, au Conseil d'étudier la procédure à suivre pour donner effet à cette recommandation. Il y aurait des avantages à ce que ce soit l'OTAN qui réunisse la conférence. Cependant, si une formule de participation fondée sur la composition de l'OTAN devait apparaître trop étroite, les pays de l'OTAN qui sont également

(1) document C-M(56)128
membres de l'OCÉE pourraient, soit encourager cette Organisation à se charger de cette tâche, soit l'inciter à coopérer.

(8) En ce qui concerne le paragraphe 71, qui traite de l'intérêt de l'OTAN à voir progresser les pays économiquement sous-développés, le Comité reconnaît qu'il peut devenir souhaitable de consulter sur l'octroi d'une assistance économique en priorité aux pays auxquels la Communauté Atlantique attache une attention spéciale, à l'intérieur comme à l'extérieur des territoires couverts par le Traité;

(e) Pour ce qui est dit au paragraphe 73 relativement à des consultations sur la tendance économique dans les pays soviétiques et à des réunions périodiques d'experts en économie soviétique, le Comité reconnaît qu'il serait également souhaitable d'étudier périodiquement à l'OTAN, d'un point de vue général, les mesures de contrôle appliquées au commerce avec le bloc soviétique et la Chine communiste et de rechercher une entente sur les lignes de conduite qui, à cet égard, concourraient le mieux à assurer la sécurité de la Communauté Atlantique.

3. Le chapitre sur l'Organisation et les Fonctions se passe de commentaires. Le Comité tient, toutefois, à souligner, à propos du paragraphe 97, la nécessité d'instructions données régulièrement et rapidement aux Représentants Permanents pour leur permettre de parler avec toute l'autorité possible au nom de leurs gouvernements devant le Conseil. En corollaire, il devrait, bien entendu, exister dans chaque capitale OTAN un dispositif qui garantisse une liaison efficace au jour le jour entre les Gouvernements et leurs Représentants Permanents.
Les détenteurs du document C-M(56)126 sont invités à remplacer son Annexe III (Notes explicatives) par le texte révisé ci-joint des Notes explicatives sur le rapport du Comité des Trois. Cette nouvelle rédaction a été établie pour tenir compte des modifications que le Comité des Trois a apportées à son Rapport à la demande du Conseil réuni en Session Ministérielle. Les références indiquées dans les Notes jointes se rapportent donc au document C-M(56)127(Révisé).

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.
Notes explicatives sur le rapport du Comité des Trois

Parmi les problèmes que pose la coopération politique, le Comité a étudié les relations que l'OTAN devrait entretenir avec les associations de parlementaires et la Conférence des Parlementaires (voir Chapitre 2, paragraphes 58 et 59). Toutefois, il suggère certaines dispositions pratiques propres à assurer une liaison étroite entre la Conférence des Parlementaires et l'OTAN, le Comité reconnaît que, de l'avis général des pays membres, le temps n'est pas venu de créer une assemblée parlementaire consultative.

2. Dans le chapitre sur la Coopération économique (Chapitre 3), le Comité s'est efforcé à la fois d'établir de façon pratique les formes de coopération auxquelles l'OTAN pourrait utilement recourir dans le cadre de l'Article 2 du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord et de désigner les domaines qu'il conviendrait d'abandonner aux organisations internationales spécifiquement économiques. Le Comité juge cependant quelques explications supplémentaires nécessaires sur un ou deux points:

(a) Au paragraphe 64, il est question des problèmes qui pourraient mettre en jeu la santé économique de la Communauté Atlantique et dont les incidences politiques ou les rapports avec la défense commune feraient de l'OTAN l'organisation la mieux appropriée pour une consultation : pour exemples de tels problèmes, on peut citer le maintien du ravitaillement pétrolier de l'Europe occidentale et le développement de l'emploi de l'énergie atomique;

(b) En recommandant, au paragraphe 65, que des consultations OTAN aient lieu avant les réunions d'organisations internationales où les intérêts de la Communauté Atlantique risqueraient d'être menacés par des tentatives pour affaiblir ou diviser l'Alliance, le Comité penchait à des organismes comme l'OSCE, l'ECOSOC et la Commission Economique de l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies;

(c) (1) En ce qui concerne la formation et le recrutement d'hommes de science, d'ingénieurs et de techniciens (cf. paragraphes 67 à 69), le Comité a reçu un rapport de M. Robert Major. Ce rapport est présenté par ailleurs au Conseil(2);

(11) Lorsqu'il recommande, au paragraphe 69, qu'une conférence soit réunie pour étudier les possibilités de coopération scientifique et techni- que, le Comité juge important que puissent participer à une telle conférence les pays européens qui n'appartiennent pas à l'OTAN mais seraient en mesure de prêter ici un concours appréciable. Il suggère, en conséquence, au Conseil d'étudier la procédure à suivre pour donner effet à cette recommandation. Il y aurait des avantages à ce que ce soit l'OTAN qui

(1) C-M(56)127(Révisé)
(2) C-M(56)128
réunisse la Conférence. Cependant, si une formule de participation fondée sur la composition de l'OTAN devait apparaître trop étroite, les pays de l'OTAN qui sont également membres de l'OECS pourraient, soit encourager cette organisation à se charger de cette tâche, soit l'inciter à coopérer.

(d) En ce qui concerne le paragraphe 70, qui traite de l'intérêt de l'OTAN à voir progresser les pays économiquement sous-développés, le Comité reconnaît qu'il peut devenir souhaitable de consulter sur l'octroi d'une assistance économique en priorité aux pays appartenant à la Communauté Atlantique attachée une attention spéciale, à l'intérieur comme à l'extérieur des territoires couverts par le Traité;

(e) Pour ce qui est du paragraphe 71, il convient aussi de souligner que l'OTAN devrait poursuivre ses études régulières des tendances économiques des pays soviétiques et de l'évolution de la politique économique des Soviétiques. À cette fin, les gouvernements devraient s'engager à fournir régulièrement les renseignements appropriés. Il faudrait également organiser des réunions périodiques d'experts nationaux en économie soviétique, dont les discussions pourraient servir d'introduction à des consultations dans certains cas particuliers. Il conviendrait aussi d'organiser périodiquement, aux fins d'échanges de renseignements et de vues, des réunions entre les hauts fonctionnaires des diverses capitales qui s'occupent des négociations commerciales avec le bloc soviétique. Tout pays membre auquel le bloc soviétique viendra à faire une proposition commerciale ou financière importante susceptible d'incidences politiques devrait porter celle-ci à l'attention du Conseil avant d'y répondre. Il serait également souhaitable d'étudier périodiquement à l'OTAN, d'un point de vue général, les mesures de contrôle appliquées au commerce avec le bloc soviétique et la Chine communiste et de rechercher une entente sur les lignes de conduite qui, à cet égard, concourraient le mieux à assurer la sécurité de la Communauté Atlantique.

(f) Les relations économiques des Soviétiques avec les pays sous-développés sont aussi une question complexe et délicate qui intérêts nettement l'Alliance. L'OTAN devrait se préoccuper de tous les cas où une initiative économique soviétique semblerait viser à altérer les relations normales et amicales des pays sous-développés avec les membres de la Communauté Atlantique. Les gouvernements des pays membres devraient ici s'efforcer avant tout de maintenir une coopération constructive avec les pays sous-développés en
aidant leur économie à progresser dans des conditions satisfaisantes pour tous, Entreprendre de surenchérir sans discernement avec l’Union Soviétique en matière d’assistance économique serait clairement peu souhaitable. Dans certains cas, cependant, des consultations OTAN pourraient mettre en lumière le besoin d’efforts spéciaux des pays membres pour aider des pays sous-développés à résoudre des problèmes inhabituels, efforts qui pourraient même exiger une exceptionnelle dérogation aux pratiques commerciales et financières normales.

3. Le chapitre sur l’Organisation et les Fonctions se passe de commentaires. Le Comité tient toutefois à souligner, à propos du paragraphe 93, la nécessité d’instructions données régulièrement et rapidement aux Représentants Permanents pour leur permettre de parler avec toute l’autorité possible au nom de leurs gouvernements devant le Conseil. En corollaire, il devrait, bien entendu, exister dans chaque capitale OTAN un dispositif qui garantisse une liaison efficace au jour le jour entre les Gouvernements et leurs Représentants Permanents.
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THREE
ON NON-MILITARY CO-OPERATION IN NATO

Note by the Deputy Secretary General

Attached hereto is the Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Co-operation in NATO, in its published form, together with the resolutions on the peaceful settlement of disputes and differences between members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and on the Report of the Committee of Three, as approved by the North Atlantic Council at its meeting on 13th December, 1956(1) (see Annex II).

(Signed) A. BENTINCK

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.

(1) C-R(56)73
REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE OF THREE
ON
NON-MILITARY
CO-OPERATION
IN
NATO

Gaetano Martino: Foreign Minister of Italy
Halvard Lange: Foreign Minister of Norway
L.B. Pearson: Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada
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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The Committee on Non-Military Co-operation, set up by the North Atlantic Council at its session of May, 1956, was requested: "to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community".

2. The Committee has interpreted these terms of reference as requiring it (1) to examine and re-define the objectives and needs of the Alliance, especially in the light of current international developments; and (2) to make recommendations for strengthening its internal solidarity, cohesion and unity.

3. The Committee hopes that the report and recommendations which it now submits will make NATO's purely defensive and constructive purposes better understood in non-NATO countries; thereby facilitating and encouraging steps to lessen international tension. The events of the last few months have increased this tension and reduced hopes, which had been raised since Stalin's death, of finding a secure and honourable basis for competitive and ultimately for co-operative coexistence with the Communist world. The effort to this end, however, must go on.

4. Inter-allied relations have also undergone severe strains. The substance of this report was prepared by the Committee of Three in the course of its meetings and inter-governmental consultations last September. Subsequent events have reinforced the Committee's conviction that the Atlantic Community can develop greater unity only by working constantly to achieve common policies by full and timely consultation on issues of common concern. Unless this is done, the very framework of co-operation in NATO, which has contributed so greatly to the cause of freedom, and which is so vital to its advancement in the future, will be endangered.

5. The foundation of NATO, on which alone a strong superstructure can be built, is the political obligation that its members have taken for collective defence: to consider that an attack on one is an attack on all, which will be met by the collective action of all. There is a tendency at times to overlook the far-reaching importance of this commitment; especially during those periods when the danger of having to invoke it may seem to recede.

6. With this political commitment for collective defence as the cornerstone of the foreign and defence policies of its members, NATO has a solid basis for existence. It is true, of course, that the ways and means by which the obligation is to be discharged may alter as political or strategic conditions alter; as the threat to peace changes its character or its direction.

However, any variations in plans and strategic policies which may be required need not weaken NATO or the confidence of its members in NATO and in each other; providing, and the proviso is decisive, that each member retains its will and its capacity to play its full part in discharging the political commitment for collective action against aggression which it undertook when it signed the Pact; providing also - and recent events have shown that this is equally important - that any changes in national strategy or policy which affect the coalition are made only after collective consideration.
7. The first essential, then, of a healthy and developing NATO lies in the whole-hearted acceptance by all its members of the political commitment for collective defence, and in the confidence which each has in the will and ability of the others to honour that commitment if aggression should take place.

8. This is our best present deterrent against military aggression; and consequently the best assurance that the commitment undertaken will not be engaged.

9. However, this deterrent role of NATO, based on solidarity and strength, can be discharged only if the political and economic relations between its members are co-operative and close. An Alliance in which the members ignore each other's interests or engage in political or economic conflict, or harbour suspicions of each other, cannot be effective either for deterrence or defence. Recent experience makes this clearer than ever before.

10. It is useful, in searching for ways and means of strengthening NATO unity and understanding, to recall the origin and the aims of the Organization.

11. The Treaty which was signed in Washington in 1949 was a collective response — we had learned that a purely national response was insufficient for security — to the fear of military aggression by the forces of the USSR and its allies. Those forces were of overwhelming strength. The threat to Greece, the capture of Czechoslovakia, the blockade of Berlin, and the pressure against Yugoslavia showed that they were also aggressive.

12. While fear may have been the main urge for the creation of NATO, there was also the realisation — conscious or instinctive — that in a shrinking nuclear world it was wise and timely to bring about a closer association of kindred Atlantic and Western European nations for other than defence purposes alone; that a pooling of sovereignty for mutual protection should also promote progress and co-operation generally. There was a feeling among the governments and peoples concerned, that this closer unity was both natural and desirable; that the common cultural traditions, free institutions and democratic concepts which were being challenged, and were marked for destruction by those who challenged them, were things which should also bring the NATO nations closer together, not only for their defence but for their development. There was, in short, a sense of Atlantic Community, alongside the realisation of an immediate common danger.

13. Any such feeling was certainly not the decisive, or even the main impulse in the creation of NATO. Nevertheless, it gave birth to the hope that NATO would grow beyond and above the emergency which brought it into being.

14. The expression of this hope is found in the Preamble and in Articles 2 and 4 of the Treaty. These two Articles, limited in their terms but with at least the promise of the grand design of an Atlantic Community, were included because of this insistent feeling that NATO must become more than a military alliance. They reflected the very real anxiety that if NATO failed to meet this test, it would disappear with the immediate crisis which produced it, even though the need for it might be as great as ever.

15. From the very beginning of NATO, then, it was recognised that while defence cooperation was the first and most urgent
requirement, this was not enough. It has also become increasingly realised since the Treaty was signed that security is today far more than a military matter. The strengthening of political consultation and economic co-operation, the development of resources, progress in education and public understanding, all these can be as important, or even more important, for the protection of the security of a nation, or an alliance, as the building of a battle-ship or the equipping of an army.

16. These two aspects of security—civil and military—can no longer safely be considered in watertight compartments, either within or between nations. Perhaps NATO has not yet fully recognised their essential inter-relationship, or done enough to bring about that close and continuous contact between its civil and military sides which is essential if it is to be strong and enduring.

17. North Atlantic political and economic co-operation, however, let alone unity, will not be brought about in a day or by a declaration, but by creating over the years and through a whole series of national acts and policies, the habits and traditions and precedents for such co-operation and unity. The process will be a slow and gradual one at best; slower than we might wish. We can be satisfied if it is steady and sure. This will not be the case, however, unless the member governments—especially the more powerful ones—are willing to work, to a much greater extent than hitherto, with and through NATO for more than purposes of collective military defence.

18. While the members of NATO have already developed various forms of non-military co-operation between themselves and have been among the most active and constructive participants in various international organizations, NATO as such has been hesitant in entering this field, particularly in regard to economic matters. Its members have been rightly concerned to avoid duplication and to do, through other existing international organizations, the things which can best be done in that way.

19. Recently, however, the members of NATO have been examining and re-assessing the purposes and the needs of the Organization in the light of certain changes in Soviet tactics and policies which have taken place since the death of Stalin, and of the effect of the present turmoil in Eastern Europe on this development.

20. These changes have not diminished the need for collective military defence but they have faced NATO with an additional challenge in which the emphasis is largely non-military in character. NATO must recognise the real nature of the develop-ments which have taken place. An important aspect of the new Soviet policies of competitive coexistence is an attempt to respond to positive initiatives of the Western nations aimed at improving, in an atmosphere of freedom, the lot of the economically less developed countries, and at establishing a just and mutually beneficial trading system in which all countries can prosper. The Soviet Union is now apparently veering towards policies designed to enslave these countries by economic means and by political subversion, and to fasten on them the same shackles of Communism from which certain members of the Soviet bloc are now striving to release themselves. The members of NATO must maintain their vigilance in dealing with this form of penetration.
21. Meanwhile some of the immediate fears of large-scale all-out military aggression against Western Europe have lessened. This process has been facilitated by evidence that the Soviet Government have realised that any such all-out aggression could be met by a sure, swift and devastating retaliation, and that there could be no victory in a war of this kind with nuclear weapons on both sides. With an increased Soviet emphasis on non-military or para-military methods, a review is needed of NATO's ability to meet effectively the challenge of penetration under the guise of coexistence, with its emphasis on conflict without catastrophe.

22. Certain questions now take on a new urgency. Have NATO's needs and objectives changed, or should they be changed? Are the Organization operating satisfactorily in the altered circumstances of 1956? If not, what can be done about it? There is the even more far-reaching question: "Can a loose association of sovereign states hold together at all without the common binding force of fear?"

23. The Committee has been examining these questions in the light of its firm conviction that the objectives which governments had in mind when the Pact was signed remain valid; that NATO is as important now to its member states as it was at that time.

24. The first of these objectives - as has already been pointed out - is security, based on collective action with adequate armed forces both for deterrence and defence.

25. Certainly NATO unity and strength in the pursuit of this objective remain as essential as they were in 1949. Soviet tactics may have changed; but Soviet armed might and ultimate objectives remain unchanged. Moreover, recent events in Eastern Europe show that the Soviet Union will not hesitate in certain circumstances to use force and the threat of force. Therefore the military strength of NATO must not be reduced, though its character and capabilities should be constantly adapted to changing circumstances. Strengthening the political and economic side of NATO is an essential complement to - not a substitute for - continuous co-operation in defence.

26. In spite of these recent events Soviet leaders may place greater emphasis on political, economic and propaganda action. There is no evidence, however, that this will be permitted to prejudice in any way the maintenance of a high level of military power in its most modern form as a base for Soviet activity in these other fields.

27. We should welcome changes in Soviet policies if they were genuinely designed to ease international tensions. But we must remember that the weakening and eventual dissolution of NATO remains a major Communist goal. We must therefore remain on guard so long as Soviet leaders persist in their determination to maintain a preponderance of military power for the achievement of their own political objectives and those of their allies.

28. This brings us again to the second and long-term aim of NATO: the development of an Atlantic Community whose roots are deeper even than the necessity for common defence. This implies nothing less than the permanent association of the free Atlantic peoples for the promotion of their greater unity and the protection and the advancement of the interests which, as free democracies, they have in common.
29. If we are to secure this long-term aim, we must prevent the centrifugal forces of opposition or indifference from weakening the Alliance. NATO has not been destroyed, or even weakened, by the threats or attacks of its enemies. It has faltered at times through the lethargy or complacency of its members; through dissension or division between them; by putting narrow national considerations above the collective interest. It could be destroyed by these forces, if they were allowed to subsist. To combat these tendencies, NATO must be used by its members, far more than it has been used, for sincere and genuine consultation and cooperation on questions of common concern. For this purpose, resolution is more important than resolutions; will then words.

30. The problem, however, goes deeper than this. NATO countries are faced by a political as well as a military threat. It comes from the revolutionary doctrines of Communism which have by careful design of the Communist leaders over many years been sowing seeds of falsehood concerning our free and democratic way of life. The best answer to such falsehoods is a continuing demonstration of the superiority of our own institutions over Communist ones. We can show by word and deed that we welcome political progress, economic advancement and orderly social change and that the real reactionaries of this day are these Communist régimes which, adhering to an inflexible pattern of economic and political doctrine, have been more successful in destroying freedom than in promoting it.

31. We must, however, realise that falsehoods concerning our institutions have sometimes been accepted at face value and that there are those, even in the non-Communist world, who under the systematic influence of Communist propaganda, do not accept our own analysis of NATO's aims and values. They believe that while Stalinist may have served a useful defensive and deterrent rôle in the Stalinist era, it is no longer necessary, even for the security of its members; that it is tending now to become an agency for the pooling of the strength and resources of the "colonial" powers in defence of imperal privileges, racial superiority, and Atlantic hegemony under the leadership of the United States. The fact that we know these views to be false and unjustified does not mean that NATO and its governments should not do everything they can to correct and counteract them.

32. NATO should not forget that the influence and interests of its members are not confined to the area covered by the Treaty, and that common interests of the Atlantic Community can be seriously affected by developments outside the Treaty area. Therefore, while striving to improve their relations with each other, and to strengthen and deepen their own unity, they should also be concerned with harmonising their policies in relation to other areas, taking into account the broader interests of the whole international community; particularly in working through the United Nations and elsewhere for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the solution of the problems that now divide the world.

33. In following this course, NATO can show that it is more than a defence organization acting and reacting to the ebb and flow of the fears and dangers arising out of Soviet policy. It can prove its desire to co-operate fully with other members of the international community in bringing to reality the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It can show that it is not merely concerned with preventing the cold war from deteriorating...
into a shooting one; or with defending itself if such a tragedy should take place; but that it is even more concerned with seizing the political and moral initiative to enable all countries to develop in freedom, and to bring about a secure peace for all nations.

34. Our caution in accepting without question the pacific character of any Soviet moves, our refusal to dismantle our defences before we are convinced that conditions of international confidence have been restored, will, particularly after the events in Hungary, be understood by all people of sincerity and good will. What would not be understood is any unwillingness on our part to seek ways and means of breaking down the barriers with a view to establishing such confidence.

35. The coming together of the Atlantic nations for good and constructive purposes - which is the basic principle and ideal underlying the NATO concept - must rest on and grow from deeper and more permanent factors than the divisions and dangers of the last ten years. It is a historical, rather than a contemporary, development and if it is to achieve its real purpose, it must be considered in that light and the necessary conclusions drawn. A short-range view will not suffice.

36. The fundamental historical fact underlying this development is that the nation state, by itself and relying exclusively on national policy and national power, is inadequate for progress or even for survival in the nuclear age. As the founders of the North Atlantic Treaty foresaw, the growing interdependence of states, politically and economically as well as militarily, calls for an ever-increasing measure of international cohesion and cooperation. Some states may be able to enjoy a degree of political and economic independence when things are going well. No state, however powerful, can guarantee its security and welfare by national action alone.

37. This basic fact underlies our report and the recommendations contained therein which appear in the subsequent chapters.

38. It has not been difficult to make these recommendations. It will be far more difficult for the member governments to carry them into effect. This will require, on their part, the firm conviction that the transformation of the Atlantic Community into a vital and vigorous political reality is as important as any purely national purpose. It will require, above all, the will to carry this conviction into the realm of practical governmental policy.
CHAPTER 2: POLITICAL CO-OPERATION

I. INTRODUCTION

39. If there is to be vitality and growth in the concept of the Atlantic Community, the relations between the members of NATO must rest on a solid basis of confidence and understanding. Without this there cannot be constructive or solid political co-operation.

40. The deepening and strengthening of this political co-operation does not imply the weakening of the ties of NATO members with other friendly countries or with other international associations, particularly the United Nations. Adherence to NATO is not exclusive or restrictive. Nor should the evolution of the Atlantic Community through NATO prevent the formation of even closer relationships among some of its members; for instance within groups of European countries. The moves toward Atlantic co-operation and European 'unity should be parallel and complementary, not competitive or conflicting.

41. Effective and constructive international co-operation requires a resolve to work together for the solution of common problems. There are special ties between NATO members, special incentives and security interests, which should make this task easier than it otherwise would be. But its successful accomplishment will depend largely on the extent to which member governments, in their own policies and actions, take into consideration the interests of the Alliance. This requires not only the acceptance of the obligation of consultation and co-operation whenever necessary, but also the development of practices by which the discharge of this obligation becomes a normal part of governmental activity.

42. It is easy to profess devotion to the principle of political or economic consultation in NATO. It is difficult and has in fact been shown to be impossible, if the proper conviction is lacking, to convert the profession into practice. Consultation within an alliance means more than exchange of information, though that is necessary. It means more than letting the NATO Council know about national decisions that have already been taken; or trying to enlist support for those decisions. It means the discussion of problems collectively, in the early stages of policy formation, and before national positions become fixed. At best, this will result in collective decisions on matters of common interest affecting the Alliance. At the least, it will ensure that no action is taken by one member without a knowledge of the views of the others.

II. CONSULTATION ON FOREIGN POLICIES

A. Scope and Character of Political Consultation

43. The essential role of consultation in fostering political co-operation was clearly defined by an earlier NATO Committee on the North Atlantic Community in 1954:

"...The achievement of a closer degree of co-ordination of the foreign policies of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty, through the development of the habit of consultation on matters of common concern, would greatly strengthen the solidarity of the North Atlantic..."
Community and increase the individual and collective capacity of its members to serve the peaceful purposes for which NATO was established. ... In the political field, this means that while each North Atlantic government retains full freedom of action and decision with respect to its own policy, the aim should be to achieve, through exchanging information and views, as wide an area of agreement as possible in the formulation of policies as a whole.

"Special attention must be paid, as explicitly recognised in Article 4 of the Treaty, to matters of urgent and immediate importance to the members of NATO, and to 'emergency' situations where it may be necessary to consult closely on national lines of conduct affecting the interests of members of NATO as a whole. There is a continuing need, however, for effective consultation at an early stage on current problems, in order that national policies may be developed and action taken on the basis of a full awareness of the attitudes and interests of all the members of NATO. While all members of NATO have a responsibility to consult with their partners on appropriate matters, a large share of responsibility for such consultation necessarily rests on the more powerful members of the Community."

44. These words were written five years ago. They hold true now more than ever before. If we can say that they have not been ignored by NATO we must also recognise that the practice of consulting has not so developed in the NATO Council as to meet the demands of political changes and world trends. The present need, therefore, is more than simply broadening the scope and deepening the character of consultation. There is a pressing requirement for all members to make consultation in NATO an integral part of the making of national policy. Without this the very existence of the North Atlantic Community may be in jeopardy.

45. It should, however, be remembered that collective discussion is not an end in itself, but a means to the end of harmonising policies. Where common interests of the Atlantic Community are at stake consultation should always seek to arrive at timely agreement on common lines of policy and action.

46. Such agreement, even with the closest possible cooperation and consultation, is not easy to secure. But it is essential to the Atlantic Alliance that a steady and continuous effort be made to bring it about. There cannot be unity in defence and disunity in foreign policy.

47. There are, of course, certain practical limitations to consultation in this field. They are sufficiently obvious in fact to make it unnecessary to emphasise them in words. Indeed the danger is less that they will be minimised or evaded than that they will be exaggerated and used to justify practices which unnecessarily ignore the common interest.

48. One of these limitations is the hard fact that ultimate responsibility for decision and action still rests on national governments. It is conceivable that a situation of extreme emergency may arise when action must be taken by one government before consultation is possible with the others.
49. Another limitation is the difficulty, and indeed the
unwisdom, of trying to specify in advance all the subjects and
all the situations where consultation is necessary: to separate
by area or by subject the matters of NATO concern from those of
purely national concern; to define in detail the obligations and
duties of consultation. These things have to work themselves out
in practice. In this process, experience is a better guide than
dogma.

50. The essential thing is that on all occasions and in all
circumstances member governments, before acting or even before
pronouncing, should keep the interests and the requirements of the
Alliance in mind. If they have not the desire and the will to do
this, no resolutions or recommendations or declarations by the
Council or any Committee of the Council will be of any great value.

51. On the assumption, however, that this will and this
desire do exist, the following principles and practices in the
field of political consultation are recommended:

(a) members should inform the Council of any development
which significantly affects the Alliance. They should
do this, not merely as a formality but as a prelimin-
ary to effective political consultation;

(b) both individual member governments and the Secretary
General should have the right to raise for discussion
in the Council any subject which is of common NATO
interest and not of a purely domestic character;

(c) a member government should not, without adequate
advance consultation, adopt firm policies or make
major political pronouncements on matters which
significantly affect the Alliance or any of its
members, unless circumstances make such prior consul-
tation obviously and demonstrably impossible;

(d) in developing their national policies, members should
take into consideration the interests and views of
other governments, particularly those most directly
concerned, as expressed in NATO consultation, even
where no community of view of consensus has been
reached in the Council;

(e) where a consensus has been reached, it should be
reflected in the formation of national policies.
When for national reasons the consensus is not
followed, the government concerned should offer an
explanation to the Council. It is even more impor-
tant that where an agreed and formal recommendation
has emerged from the Council discussions, governments
should give it full weight in any national actions
or policies related to the subject of that recom-
mendation.

B. Annual Political Appraisal

52. To strengthen the process of consultation, it is recom-
mended that Foreign Ministers, at each Spring meeting, should make an
appraisal of the political progress of the Alliance and consider
the lines along which it should advance.
53. To prepare for this discussion, the Secretary General should submit an annual report:

(a) analysing the major political problems of the Alliance;

(b) reviewing the extent to which member governments have consulted and co-operated on such problems;

(c) indicating the problems and possible developments which may require future consultation, so that difficulties might be resolved and positive and constructive initiatives taken.

54. Member governments, through their Permanent Representatives, should give the Secretary General such information and assistance, including that of technical experts, as he may require in preparing his report.

C. Preparation for Political Consultation

55. Effective consultation also requires careful planning and preparation of the agenda for meetings of the Council both in Ministerial and permanent session. Political questions coming up for discussion in the Council should, as far as practicable be previously reviewed and discussed, so that representatives may have background information on the thinking both of their own and of other governments. When appropriate, drafts of resolutions should be prepared in advance as a basis for discussion. Additional preparatory work will also be required for the annual political appraisal referred to in the preceding section.

56. To assist the Permanent Representatives and the Secretary General in discharging their responsibilities for political consultation, there should be constituted under the Council a Committee of Political Advisers from each delegation, aided when necessary by specialists from the capitals. It would meet under the chairmanship of a member of the International Staff appointed by the Secretary General, and would include among its responsibilities current studies such as those on trends of Soviet policy.

III. PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF INTER-MEMBER DISPUTES

57. In the development of effective political co-operation in NATO, it is of crucial importance to avoid serious inter-member disputes and to settle them quickly and satisfactorily when they occur. The settlement of such disputes is in the first place the direct responsibility of the member governments concerned, under both the Charter of the United Nations (Article 33) and the North Atlantic Treaty (Article 1). To clarify NATO’s responsibilities in dealing with disputes which have not proved capable of settlement directly and to enable NATO, if necessary, to help in the settlement of such disputes, the Committee recommends that the Council adopt a resolution under Article 1 of the Treaty on the following lines:

(a) reaffirming the obligation of members to settle by peaceful means any dispute between themselves;

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(b) declaring their intention to submit any such disputes, which have not proved capable of settlement directly, to good offices procedures within the NATO framework before resorting to any other international agency; except for disputes of a legal character appropriate for submission to a judicial tribunal, and those disputes of an economic character for which attempts at settlement might best be made initially in the appropriate specialised economic organization;

(c) recognising the right and duty of member governments and of the Secretary General to bring to the attention of the Council matters which in their opinion may threaten the solidarity or effectiveness of the Alliance;

(d) empowering the Secretary General to offer his good offices informally at any time to the parties in dispute, and with their consent to initiate or facilitate procedures of enquiry, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration; and

(e) empowering the Secretary General, where he deems it appropriate for the purpose outlined in (d) above, to use the assistance of not more than three Permanent Representatives chosen by him in each instance.

IV. PARLIAMENTARY ASSOCIATIONS AND THE PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE

58. Among the best supporters of NATO and its purposes are those Members of Parliament who have had a chance at first hand to see some of its activities and to learn of its problems, and to exchange views with their colleagues from other parliaments. In particular, the formation of national Parliamentary Associations and the activities of the Conference of Members of Parliament from NATO countries have contributed to the development of public support for NATO and solidarity among its members.

59. In order to maintain a close relationship of Parliamentarians with NATO, the following arrangements are recommended:

(a) that the Secretary General continue to place the facilities of NATO headquarters at the disposal of Parliamentary Conferences and give all possible help with arrangements for their meetings;

(b) that invited representatives of member governments and the Secretary General and other senior NATO civil and military officers attend certain of these meetings. In this way the parliamentarians would be informed on the state of the Alliance and the problems before it, and the value of their discussions would be increased;
CHAPTER 3: ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

I. INTRODUCTION

60. Political co-operation and economic conflict are not reconcilable. Therefore, in the economic as well as in the political field there must be a genuine desire among the members to work together and a readiness to consult on questions of common concern based on the recognition of common interests.

61. These common economic interests shared by the members of NATO call for:

(a) co-operative and national action to achieve healthy and expanding economies, both to promote the well-being and self-confidence of the Atlantic peoples and to serve as the essential support for an adequate defence effort;

(b) the greatest possible freedom in trade and payments and in the movement of manpower and long-term capital;

(c) assistance to economically underdeveloped areas for reasons of enlightened self-interest and to promote better relations among peoples; and

(d) policies which will demonstrate, under conditions of competitive coexistence, the superiority of free institutions in promoting human welfare and economic progress.

62. A recognition of these common NATO interests, and collective and individual effort to promote them, need not in any way prejudice close economic relations with non-NATO countries. Economic, like political co-operation, is and must remain wider than NATO. At the same time, the NATO countries have an interest in any arrangements for especially close economic co-operation among groups of European member nations. It should be possible - as it is desirable - for such special arrangements to promote rather than conflict with the wider objectives of Article 2 of our Treaty, which are of basic importance to the stability and well-being, not only of the North Atlantic area, but of the whole non-Communist world.

II. NATO AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

63. While the purposes and principles of Article 2 are of vital importance, it is not necessary that member countries pursue them only through action in NATO itself. It would not serve the interests of the Atlantic Community for NATO to duplicate the operating functions of other international organizations designed for various forms of economic co-operation (1). NATO members play

(1) The outstanding instances are the Organization for European Co-operation (OEEC) (which includes all NATO countries as full or associate members and four others); the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); the International Finance Corporation (IFC); (continued)
64. Nor do there now appear to be significant new areas for collective economic action requiring execution by NATO itself. In fact, the common economic concerns of the member nations will often best be fostered by continued and increased collaboration both bilaterally and through organizations other than NATO. This collaboration should be reinforced, however, by NATO consultation whenever economic issues of special interest to the Alliance are involved; particularly those which have political or defence implications or affect the economic health of the Atlantic Community as a whole. This, in turn, requires a substantial expansion of exchange of information and views in NATO in the economic as well as in the political field. Such economic consultation should seek to secure a common approach on the part of member governments where the questions are clearly related to the political and security interests of the Alliance and resulting from such a common approach, however, should normally be taken by governments either directly or through other international organizations.

65. NATO, as such, should not seek to establish formal relations with these other organizations, and the harmonising of attitudes and actions should be left to the representatives of the NATO governments therein. Nor is it necessary or desirable for NATO members to form a "bloc" in such organizations. This would only alienate other friendly governments. There should, however, be consultation in NATO when economic issues of special political or strategic importance to NATO arise in other organizations and in particular before meetings at which there may be attempts to divide or weaken the Atlantic Alliance, or prejudice its interests.

III. CONFLICTS IN ECONOMIC POLICIES OF NATO COUNTRIES

66. NATO has a positive interest in the resolution of economic disputes which may have political or strategic repercussions damaging to the Alliance. These are to be distinguished from disagreements on economic policy which are normally dealt with through direct negotiations or by multilateral discussions in other organizations. Nothing would be gained by merely having repeated in NATO the same arguments made in other and more technically qualified organizations. It should, however, be open to any member or to the Secretary General to raise in NATO issues on which they feel that consideration elsewhere is not making adequate progress and that NATO consultation might facilitate solutions contributing to the objectives of the Atlantic Community. The procedures for peaceful settlement of political disputes discussed in the previous chapter should also be available for major disputes of an economic character which are appropriate for NATO consideration.

(1) (continued) and the various other United Nations agencies including the Economic Commission for Europe. Several NATO members participate actively in the Colombo Plan for promoting economic development in Asia. Most members are taking an active part in technical assistance programmes and are also participating in discussions of proposals for the creation of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED)
IV. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

67. One area of special importance to the Atlantic Community is that of science and technology. During the last decade, it has become ever clearer that progress in this field can be decisive in determining the security of nations and their position in world affairs. Such progress is also vital if the Western world is to play its proper role in relation to economically underdeveloped areas.

68. Within the general field of science and technology, there is an especially urgent need to improve the quality and to increase the supply of scientists, engineers and technicians. Responsibility for recruitment, training and utilisation of scientific and technical personnel is primarily a national rather than an international matter. Nor is it a responsibility solely of national governments. In the member countries with federal systems, state and provincial governments play the major part, and many of the universities and institutes of higher learning in the Atlantic area are independent institutions free from detailed control by governments. At the same time, properly designed measures of international co-operation could stimulate individual member countries to adopt more positive policies and, in some cases, help guide them in the most constructive directions.

69. Certain activities in this connection are already being carried out by other organizations. Progress in this field, however, is so crucial to the future of the Atlantic Community that NATO members should ensure that every possibility of fruitful co-operation is examined. As a first concrete step, therefore, it is recommended that a conference be convened composed of one or at the most two outstanding authorities, private or governmental, from each country in order:

(a) to exchange information and views concerning the most urgent problems in the recruitment, training and utilisation of scientists, engineers and technicians, and the best means, both long-term and short-term, of solving those problems;

(b) to foster closer relations among the participants with a view to continued interchange of experience and stimulation of constructive work in member countries; and

(c) to propose specific measures for future international co-operation in this field, through NATO or other international organizations.

V. CONSULTATION ON ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

70. It is agreed that the Atlantic Community has a positive concern with healthy and accelerated development in economically underdeveloped areas, both inside and outside the NATO area. The Committee feels, however, that NATO is not an appropriate agency for administering programmes of assistance for economic development, or even for systematically concereting the relevant policies of member nations. What member countries can and should do is to keep each other and the Organization informed of their programmes
and policies in this field. When required NATO should review
the adequacy of existing action in relation to the interests of
the Alliance.

71. The economic interests of the Atlantic Community cannot
be considered in isolation from the activities and policies of the
Soviet bloc. The Soviets are resorting all too often to the use
of economic measures designed to weaken the Western Alliance, or
to create in other areas a high degree of dependence on the Soviet
world. In this situation it is more than ever important that
NATO countries actively develop their own constructive commercial
and financial policies. In particular, they should avoid creating
situations of which the Soviet bloc countries might take advantage
to the detriment of the Atlantic Community and of other non-
Communist countries. In this whole field of competitive economic
coexistence member countries should consult together more fully
in order to determine their course deliberately and with the
fullest possible knowledge.

72. There has been a considerable evolution in NATO's
arrangements for regular economic consultation. In addition, a
number of economic matters have been brought before the Council
for consideration on an ad hoc basis. No substantial new machinery
in this field is called for. However, in view of the extended
range of topics for regular exchange of information and consultation
described above, there should be established under the Council a
Committee of Economic Advisers. This group should be entrusted
with preliminary discussion, on a systematic basis, of the matters
outlined above, together with such tasks as may be assigned by the
Council or approved by the Council at the Committee's request.
It would absorb any continuing function of the Committee of
Technical Advisers. Since its duties would not be full-time,
membor governments could be represented normally by officials
mainly concerned with the work of other international economic
organizations. Membership, however, should be flexible, the
Committee being composed, when appropriate, of specialists from
the capitals on particular topics under consideration.
CHAPTER 4: CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

73. A sense of community must bind the people as well as the institutions of the Atlantic nations. This will exist only to the extent that there is a realisation of their common cultural heritage and of the values of their free way of life and thought. It is important, therefore, for the NATO countries to promote cultural co-operation among their peoples by all practical means in order to strengthen their unity and develop maximum support for the Alliance. It is particularly important that this cultural co-operation should be wider than continental. This, however, does not preclude particular governments from acting on a more limited multilateral or even bilateral basis to strengthen their own cultural relations within the broader Atlantic framework. The Committee welcomes the measures for cultural co-operation within the Atlantic Community which have been initiated by private individuals and non-governmental groups. These should be encouraged and increased.

74. To further cultural collaboration, the Committee suggests that member governments be guided by the following general principles;

(a) government activities in this field should not duplicate but should support and supplement private efforts;

(b) member governments should give priority to those projects which require joint NATO action, and thus contribute to a developing sense of community;

(c) in developing new activities in the cultural field, NATO can most fruitfully place the main emphasis on inspiring and promoting transatlantic contacts;

(d) there should be a realistic appreciation of the financial implications of cultural projects.

75. In order to develop public awareness and understanding of NATO and the Atlantic Community, the Council should work out arrangements for NATO courses and seminars for teachers.

76. NATO and its member governments should broaden their support of other educational and related activities such as the NATO Fellowship and Scholarship Program; creation of university chairs of Atlantic studies; visiting professorships; government-sponsored programmes for the exchange of persons, especially on a transatlantic basis; use of NATO information materials in schools; and establishment of special NATO awards for students.

77. Governments should actively promote closer relations between NATO and youth organizations and a specialist should be added to the International Staff in this connection. Conferences under NATO auspices of representatives of youth organizations such as that of July 1956 should be held from time to time.

78. In the interests of promoting easier and more frequent contacts among the NATO peoples, governments should review and, if possible, revise their foreign exchange and other policies which restrict travel.
79. In view of the importance of promoting better understanding and goodwill between NATO service personnel, it would be desirable, in co-operation with the military authorities, to extend exchanges of such personnel beyond the limits of normal training programmes. Such exchanges might, as a first step, be developed by governments on a bilateral basis. In addition, member governments should seek the assistance of the Atlantic Treaty Association and other voluntary organizations in the further development of such exchanges.

80. Cultural projects which have a common benefit should be commonly financed. Agreed cultural projects initiated by a single member government or a private organization, such as the recent seminar held at Oxford or the Study Conference sponsored by the Atlantic Treaty Association on "The role of the School in the Atlantic Community", should receive financial support from NATO where that is necessary to supplement national resources.
81. The people of the member countries must know about NATO if they are to support it. Therefore they must be informed not only of NATO's aspirations, but of its achievements. There must be substance for an effective NATO information programme and resources to carry it out. The public should be informed to the greatest possible extent of significant results achieved through NATO consultation.

82. NATO information activities should be directed primarily to public opinion in the NATO area. At the same time an understanding outside the NATO area of the objectives and accomplishments of the Organization is necessary if it is to be viewed sympathetically, and if its activities are not to be misinterpreted.

83. The important task of explaining and reporting NATO activities rests primarily on national information services. They cannot discharge this task if member governments do not make adequate provisions in their national programmes for that purpose. It is essential, therefore, that such provision be made. NATO can and should assist national governments in this work. The promotion of information about and public understanding of NATO and the Atlantic Community should, in fact, be a joint endeavour by the Organization and its members.

84. One of NATO's functions should be to co-ordinate the work of national information services in fields of common interest. Governments should pool their experiences and views in NATO to avoid differences in evaluation and emphasis. This is particularly important in the dissemination of information about NATO to other countries. Co-ordinated policy should underline the defensive character of our Alliance and the importance of its non-military aspects. It should cover also replies to anti-NATO propaganda and the analysis of Communist moves and statements which affect NATO.

85. In its turn, the NATO Information Division must be given the resources by governments as well as their support, without which it could not discharge these new tasks - and should not be asked to do so.

86. In order to facilitate co-operation between the NATO Information Division and national information services, the following specific measures are recommended:

(a) An Officer should be designated by each national information service to maintain liaison with NATO and be responsible for the dissemination of NATO information material;

(b) Governments should submit to NATO the relevant information programmes which they plan to implement, for discussion in the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations. Representatives of national information services should take part in these discussions;

(c) within the NATO Information Division budget, provision should be made for a translation fund so that NATO
information material can be translated into the non-official languages of the Alliance, according to reasonable requirements of the member governments;

(d) NATO should, on request, provide national services with special studies on matters of common interest.

87. The journalists' tours sponsored by NATO should be broadened to include others in a position to influence public opinion, such as trade union and youth leaders, teachers and lecturers. Closer relations between private organizations supporting NATO and the NATO Information Division should also be encouraged.
CHAPTER 6: ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

88. The Committee considers that NATO in its present form is capable of discharging the non-military functions required of it. Structural changes are not needed. The machine is basically satisfactory. It is for governments to make use of it.

89. At the same time, certain improvements in the procedures and functioning of the Organization will be required if the recommendations of this report are to be fully implemented. The proposals in this Chapter are submitted for this purpose.

A. Meetings of the Council

90. More time should be allowed for Ministerial Meetings. Experience has shown that, without more time, important issues on the agenda cannot be adequately considered. Decisions concerning some of them will not be reached at all, or will be reached only in an unclear form.

91. Efforts should be made to encourage discussion rather than simply declarations of policy prepared in advance. Arrangements for meetings should be made with this aim in view. For most sessions, the numbers present should be sharply restricted. In order to facilitate free discussion, when Ministers wish to speak in a language other than French or English, consecutive translation into one of these official languages should be provided by interpreters from their own delegations.

92. Meetings of Foreign Ministers should be held whenever required, and occasionally in locations other than NATO Headquarters. Ministers might also participate more frequently in regular Council meetings, even though not all of them may find it possible to attend such meetings at the same time. The Council of Permanent Representatives has powers of effective decision: in other words, the authority of the Council as such is the same whether governments are represented by Ministers or by their Permanent Representatives. Thus there should be no firm or formal line between Ministerial and other meetings of the Council.

B. Strengthening the Links Between the Council and Member Governments

93. It is indispensable to the kind of consultations envisaged in this report that Permanent Representatives should be in a position to speak authoritatively and to reflect the current thinking of their governments. Differences in location and in constitutional organization make impossible any uniform arrangements in all member governments. In some cases it might be desirable to designate a high official in the national capital to be concerned primarily with NATO affairs. The purpose would be to help both in fostering NATO consultations whenever national policies impinge on the common interests of the Atlantic Community, and in translating
the results of such consultations into effective action within
the national governments.

94. To ensure the closest possible connection between
current thinking in the governments and consultations in the
Council, there might be occasional Council meetings with the
participation of specially designated officials or the permanent
heads of foreign ministries.

C. Preparation for Council Meetings

95. Items on the agenda of Ministerial Meetings should be
thoroughly examined by Permanent Representatives and relevant
proposals prepared before Ministers meet. For this purpose it
may be found desirable for governments to send senior experts
to consult on agenda items before the meetings take place.

96. The preparation of questions for discussion in the
Council should be assisted by appropriate use of the Council's
Committees of Political and Economic Advisers. (Recommendations
on the establishment of these Committees are set forth in
Chapter 2, paragraph 55, and Chapter 3, paragraph 72)

97. In the case of consultations on special subjects, more
use should be made of senior experts from national capitals to
assist permanent delegations by calling them, on an ad hoc basis,
to do preparatory work. Informal discussions among specialists
with corresponding responsibilities are a particularly valuable
means ofconcerting governmental attitudes in the early stages of
policy formation.

98. Member governments should make available to one another
through NATO "basic position material" for background information.
This would help the Alliance as a whole in the consideration of
problems of common concern and would assist individual govern-
ments to understand more fully the reasons for the position adopted
by any member country on a particular issue which might be its
special concern, but which might also affect in varying degrees
other members of NATO.

D. The Secretary General and the International Staff

99. In order to enable the Organization to make its full contribution,
the role of the Secretary General and the International Staff
needs to be enhanced.

100. It is recommended that the Secretary General preside
over meetings of the Council in Ministerial, as he does now in
other sessions. Such a change with respect to the conduct of
the Council's business would follow naturally from the new
responsibilities of the Secretary General, arising out of the
recommendations of this report. It is also warranted by the
Secretary General's unique opportunities for becoming familiar
with the problems and the activities of the Alliance as a whole.

101. It would, however, still be desirable to have one
Minister chosen each year as President of the Council in accordance
with the present practice of alphabetical rotation. This Minister,
as President, would continue to have especially close contact with
the Secretary General during and between Ministerial Meetings, and
would, as at present, act as the spokesman of the Council on all
formal occasions. He would also preside at the formal opening and closing of Ministerial sessions of the Council.

102. In addition:

(a) the Secretary General should be encouraged to propose items for NATO consultation in the fields covered by this report and should be responsible for promoting and directing the process of consultation;

(b) in view of these responsibilities, member governments should undertake to keep the Secretary General fully and currently informed through their permanent delegations of their governments' thinking on questions of common concern to the Alliance;

(c) attention is also called to the additional responsibilities of the Secretary General, recommended in connection with the annual political appraisal (Chapter 2, paragraph 52) and the peaceful settlement of disputes (Chapter 2, paragraph 57).

103. The effective functioning of NATO depends in large measure on the efficiency, devotion and morale of its Secretariat. Acceptance of the recommendations in this report would impose on the Secretariat new duties and responsibilities. Governments must, therefore, be prepared to give the International Staff all necessary support, both in finance and personnel. If this is not done, the recommendations of the report, even if accepted by governments, will not be satisfactorily carried out.

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIIe.
COMMITTEE OF THREE

FORMAL RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

The Committee of Three, consisting of Dr. Gaetano Martino (Italy), Mr. Halvard Lange (Norway) and Mr. Lester B. Pearson (Canada) was established by the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session on 5th May, 1956, with the following terms of reference:

"...to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community."

2. The Committee held its first meetings from 20th to 22nd June, 1956, at NATO Headquarters in Paris. During these discussions, the procedure to be followed by the Committee was established, and it was decided to send a Questionnaire to each NATO member government in order to obtain its views on a number of specific problems with respect to co-operation in the political, economic, cultural and information fields and regarding the organization and functions of NATO. In addition, the Committee issued a memorandum containing explanatory notes and guidance to assist countries in the preparation of their replies to the Questionnaire. The Questionnaire was circulated on 26th June, 1956, and governments were requested to submit their replies by 26th August.

3. The Committee reassembled in Paris on 10th September, 1956, and held a series of meetings lasting until the 22nd of that month. After having examined and analysed the replies to the Questionnaire, the Committee held consultations with each member country individually. The purpose of these consultations was to clarify, where necessary, the position taken by governments in their replies, and to discuss with the representatives of other governments in a preliminary way certain views of the Committee.

4. The consultations took place in the following order:

Wednesday, 12th September a.m. Iceland (represented by Mr. H.C. Anderson, Permanent Representative of Iceland to the North Atlantic Council)

p.m. Turkey (represented by Mr. N. Birgi, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Thursday, 13th September a.m. The Netherlands (represented by Mr. J.W. Beyen, Minister for Foreign Affairs)

p.m. Greece (represented by Mr. E. Averof, Minister for Foreign Affairs)
Friday, 14th September

a.m. Belgium (represented by Mr. P.H. Speakh, Minister for Foreign Affairs)

p.m. Germany (represented by Professor Hällstein, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)

Monday, 17th September

a.m. Luxembourg (represented by Mr. H.J. Bech, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs)

a.m. France (represented by Mr. C. Pincéau, Minister for Foreign Affairs)

p.m. United States (represented by Senator George, special representative of President Eisenhower)

p.m. Portugal (represented by Mr. P. Cunha, Minister for Foreign Affairs)

Tuesday, 18th September

a.m. Denmark (represented by Mr. Ernst Christiansen, Deputy Foreign Minister)

p.m. United Kingdom (represented by Mr. Anthony Nutting, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs)

5. In addition the Committee met with the following groups:

(c) On Wednesday, 12th September, meeting with the Standing Committee of the Conference of Members of Parliament from NATO countries, consisting of the following persons:

Belgium: Mr. Frans Van Couwelaert
Mr. A. de Coeler

Canada: Senator, The Hon. Wishart McI. Robertson, P.C.

France: Mr. Maurice Schumann

Germany: Herr F. Berendseh
Dr. Richard Jaeger

Netherlands: Mr. J.J. Fens
Mr. J.L. Kranenburg
Mr. E.A. Vermeer

Turkey: Colonel Seyfi Kurtbek

United Kingdom: Colonel Walter Elliott, C.H., M.C., M.P.
United States: Congressman Wayne L. Hays, M.C.

(b) On Saturday, 15th September, meeting with the Atlantic Treaty Association, represented by:

- Count Morea, Chairman
- Dr. Nord, Vice-Chairman
- Dr. Flynt, Vice-Chairman and
- Mr. John Eppstein, Secretary General

and a number of delegates from national member organizations.

(c) On Tuesday, 18th September, meeting with General Bilotto and Mr. Barton, representing the Signatories of the Declaration of Atlantic Unity.

6. As a result of these consultations a draft report to the Council was prepared. In this work the Committee benefited from the expert advice of three special consultants. They were Professor Lincoln Gordon (Harvard University), Professor Guido Carli (Rome) and Mr. Robert Major (Oslo).

7. The Committee met again in New York on 18th November and re-examined the report in the light of the important world events which occurred in the interval since its September meeting. The Committee, after approving the report, furnished the other Foreign Ministers with an advance copy, preparatory to consideration of the report by the North Atlantic Council.
RESOLUTION ON THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
OF DISPUTES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MEMBERS
OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

(Adopted by the North Atlantic Council on 13th December, 1956)

WHEREAS the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, under Article 1 of that treaty, have undertaken "to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered";

WHEREAS the parties have further undertaken to seek to eliminate conflicts in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them;

WHEREAS NATO unity and strength in the pursuit of these objectives remain essential for continuous co-operation in military and non-military fields;

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL:

REAFFIRMS the obligations of all its members, under Article 1 of the Treaty, to settle by peaceful means any dispute between themselves;

DECIDES that such disputes which have not proved capable of settlement directly be submitted to good offices procedures within the NATO framework before member governments resort to any other international agency except for disputes of a legal character appropriate for submission to a judicial tribunal and those disputes of an economic character for which attempts at settlement might best be made initially in the appropriate specialised economic organizations;

RECOGNISES the right and duty of member governments and of the Secretary General to bring to its attention matters which in their opinion may threaten the solidarity or effectiveness of the Alliance;

EMPowers the Secretary General to offer his good offices informally at any time to member governments involved in a dispute and with their consent to initiate or facilitate procedures of inquiry, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration;

AUTHorises the Secretary General where he deems it appropriate for the purpose outlined in the preceding paragraph to use the assistance of not more than three permanent representatives chosen by him in each instance.
RESOLUTION ON THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THREE ON NON-MILITARY CO-OPERATION IN NATO

(Adopted by the North Atlantic Council on 13th December, 1956)

WHEREAS the North Atlantic Council at its meeting in Paris on 5th May established a Committee composed of the foreign ministers of Italy, Canada and Norway to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community;

WHEREAS the Committee of Three has now reported on the task assigned to it and has submitted to the Council a number of recommendations on such ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields;

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL:

TAKES NOTE of the Report of the Committee of Three and

APPROVES its recommendations; and

INVITES the Council in Permanent Session to implement in the light of the comments made by governments the principles and recommendations contained in the Report; and

INVITES the Secretary General to draw up for consideration by the Council such further specific proposals as may be required for the implementation of these recommendations and to report periodically on the compliance with these recommendations by governments;

AUTHORIZES the Committee of Three to publish their report.
CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
and
PUBLIC DISCLOSED

RAPPORTE DU COMITE DES TROIS SUR LA
COOPERATION NON-MILITAIRE A L'OTAN

Note du Secretaire General Delegue

On trouvera ci-joint le rapport du Comite des Trois sur la cooperation non-militaire a l'OTAN, tel qu'il a ete publie, ainsi que le texte des resolutions sur le reglement pacifique des litiges et differences entre pays membres de l'Organisation du Traite de l'Atlantique Nord et sur le rapport du Comite des Trois, que le Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord a approuves le 15 decembre 1956 (1) (voir Annexe II).

(Signe) A. BENTINCK

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Paris, XVie.

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RAPPORT DU COMITÉ DES TROIS
SUR
LA COOPERATION NON-MILITAIRE
A L'OTAN

Gaetano Martino : Ministre des Affaires Étrangères d'Italie
Halvard Lange : Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Norvège
L.B. Pearson : Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires Étrangères du Canada
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CHAPITRE I: INTRODUCTION GENERALE

Le Comité sur la coopération non-militaire, que le Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord a créé à sa session de mai 1956 a reçu pour tâche "de présenter au Conseil des recommandations quant aux mesures à prendre pour améliorer et développer la coopération entre pays de l'OTAN dans les domaines non-militaires et pour accroître l'unité au sein de la Communauté Atlantique". (1)

2. Le Comité a estimé que, pour s'acquitter de cette tâche, il devait (1) étudier et définir à nouveau les objectifs et les besoins de l'Alliance, notamment en fonction de l'évolution actuelle de la situation internationale et (2) formuler des recommandations visant à renforcer la solidarité, la cohésion et l'unité de l'Alliance.

3. Le Comité espère que le rapport et les recommandations qu'il présente aujourd'hui feront mieux comprendre dans les pays non-OTAN les buts strictement défensifs et constructifs de l'Alliance et que l'adoption de mesures propres à atténuer la tension internationale s'en trouvera facilitée et encouragée. Les événements de ces derniers mois ont aggravé cette tension et réduit l'espoir que depuis le mort de Staline de jeter les bases solides et honorables d'une coexistence avec le monde communiste, fondée d'abord sur la concurrence et finalement sur la coopération. Les efforts dans ce sens doivent néanmoins se poursuivre.

4. Les relations interalliées ont également été soumises à des sérieuses tensions. Le présent rapport a été élaboré quant au fond par le Comité des Trois au cours de ses réunions et des consultations intergouvernementales de septembre. Les événements intervenus par la suite ont renforcé le Comité dans sa conviction que les membres de la Communauté atlantique ne peuvent accroître leur unité qu'en travaillant constamment à harmoniser leurs politiques en procédant en temps opportun à des consultations approfondies sur des questions d'intérêt commun. Sinon, le cadre même de la coopération au sein de l'OTAN, qui a si bien servi la cause de la liberté, et qui est si essentielle à son progrès serait menacé.

5. La base de l'OTAN, qui seule permet d'édifier une superstructure solide, réside dans l'engagement politique que ses membres ont pris, pour leur défense collective, de considérer une attaque contre l'un d'eux comme une attaque dirigée contre tous, et à laquelle tous répondront par une action collective. On a parfois tendance à sous-estimer la portée de cet engagement, surtout durant les périodes où le risque d'avoir à l'invocer semble diminuer.

6. Cet engagement politique en vue de la défense collective, étant la pierre angulaire de la politique étrangère et de défense des pays membres, l'existence de l'OTAN repose sur une base solide. Certes, les moyens de s'acquitter de cette obligation peuvent varier selon la situation politique ou stratégique et selon le caractère ou la direction que la menace pour la paix viendrait à prendre, Quels que soient, cependant, les changements à apporter aux plans et aux politiques stratégiques, ils ne doivent pas entraîner nécessairement un affaiblissement de l'OTAN, ni ébranler la confiance que ses membres ont en elle et en leurs partenaires, mais il faut également - et ceci est une condition capitale - que
chacun d'eux conserve la volonté et les moyens de remplir l'engagement politique qu'il a accepté lorsqu'il a signé le Traité, et qui est à dire celui de participer pleinement à une action collective contre l'agression; de plus, il importe tout autant, comme l'ont montré les récents événements, qu'aucune modification de nature à affecter la coalition ne soit apportée à la stratégie ou à la politique d'un pays sans discussion collective préalable.

7. Ainsi, pour que l'OTAN puisse se développer sur des bases solides, il est avant tout essentiel que tous ses membres acceptent sans réserve l'engagement politique d'assumer leur part de la défense collective et que chacun d'eux nait confiance dans la résolution et l'aptitude de ses partenaires à faire honneur à cet engagement en cas d'agression.

8. C'est aujourd'hui le meilleur moyen dont nous disposons pour décourager l'agression et, par conséquent, la meilleure garantie que notre engagement n'aurait été invoqué.

9. Toutefois, ce rôle qui consiste à décourager l'agression et qui repose sur la solidarité et sur la force de l'alliance, l'OTAN ne peut le remplir que si ses membres ont entre eux des relations étroites et fondées sur la coopération dans les domaines politique et économique. Une alliance, dont les membres ignorent les intérêts de leurs partenaires, se laisse diviser par des conflits politiques ou économiques ou se méfient les uns des autres, ne peut avoir d'efficacité que ce soit pour décourager une agression ou pour la repousser. Les récents événements l'ont montré plus clairement que jamais.

10. Pour rechercher les moyens de renforcer l'unité et la compréhension mutuelle au sein de l'OTAN, il est utile de rappeler les origines et les buts de l'Organisation.

11. Le Traité qui a été signé à Washington en 1949 constituait une réaction collective - nous avions appris en effet qu'une réaction exclusivement nationale ne suffisait pas à assurer notre sécurité - devant la crainte d'une agression des forces de l'URSS et de ses alliés. Ces forces avaient sur les autres une supériorité manifeste. La menace qui pesait sur la Grèce, la menace sur la Tchécoslovaquie, le blocus de Berlin et les pressions exercées sur la Yougoslavie avaient montré qu'elles étaient aussi un instrument d'agression.

12. Si la crainte a été surtout à l'origine de l'OTAN, nous avons aussi compris - consciemment ou non - qu'en cette ère étonnante, dans un monde où les distances comptent de moins en moins, le moment était venu de grouper en une association plus étroite les nations seules de l'Atlantique et de l'Europe occidentale à des fins autres que strictement défensives, et que la mise en commun d'une partie des souverainets nationales pour notre protection mutuelle contribuerait aussi au progrès et à la coopération en général. Les gouvernements et les peuples intéressés sentaient que cette plus grande unité était à la fois naturelle et souhaitable, que cette communauté de traditions culturelles, de libres institutions et de concepts démocratiques qui étaient mis au défi et voués à la destruction par ceux qui les défrayaient, constituait aussi une raison de s'unir davantage non seulement pour les défendre mais pour les développer. En résumé, la conscience d'un danger immédiat commun se doublet d'un sens de communauté atlantique.
13. Certes un sentiment de cette nature n’a pas été l’élément déterminant dans la création de l’OTAN ni même son principal mobile. Néanmoins il a fait naître l’espoir que l’OTAN, une fois passée la crise qui motivait sa création, continuerait de se développer.

14. Cet espoir trouve son expression dans le préambule et dans les articles 2 et 4 du Traité. L’inclusion de ces deux articles limités dans leur forme mais portant en eux la promesse de ce grand projet de communauté atlantique a été dû à cette conviction que l’OTAN devait devenir davantage qu’une alliance militaire. S’ils reflétaient la crainte très réelle de voir l’OTAN, si elle ne répondait à cette attente, disparaître avec la crise qui l’avait fait naître, même si elle devenait plus nécessaire que jamais.

15. Ainsi dès les origines de l’OTAN, il fut reconnu que si une coopération dans le domaine de la défense était la première et la plus urgente des nécessités, cette coopération ne suffisait pas. De même, il est apparu de plus en plus clairement depuis la signature du Traité que la sécurité est, à notre époque, bien plus qu’un problème militaire. Le développement des consultations politiques et de la coopération économique, la mise en valeur des ressources, le progrès de l’éducation et de la compréhension des peuples, tout cela peut être aussi important, voire plus important, pour la sécurité d’une nation ou d’une alliance que la construction d’un cuirassé ou l’équipement d’une armée.

16. Il serait désormais dangereux de considérer comme des questions absolument distinctes ces deux aspects de la sécurité — l’aspect civil et l’aspect militaire — que ce soit sur le plan national ou sur le plan international. Peut-être l’OTAN n’est-elle pas encore pleinement admis cette interdépendance essentielle ou peut-être n’est-elle pas déployé assez d’efforts pour créer entre ses éléments civils ou militaires, cette liaison étroite et permanente qui est indispensable pour que l’Alliance soit forte et durable.

17. Toutefois, la coopération des pays atlantiques dans les domaines politique et économique — et encore moins leur unité — ne pourra être réalisée en un jour, ni au moyen d’une seule déclaration, et ne pourra l’être que grâce à un long processus de création et par toute une série d’actes et de principes politiques à l’échelon national, par la formation d’habitudes, de traditions et de précedents. Ce processus ne pourra être au mieux que lent et progressif. Il sera probablement plus lent que nous le souhaiterions mais nous devrons êtreatis s’il est régulier et sûr. Pour qu’il en soit ainsi, il convient que les gouvernements des pays membres, en commençant par les plus puissants, se montrent davantage disposés à coopérer avec l’OTAN et par l’OTAN dans un domaine plus large que la seule défense militaire collective.

18. Bien que les pays de l’OTAN aient déjà institué entre eux des formes de coopération dans des domaines non militaires et qu’ils comptent parmi les membres les plus actifs et les plus constructifs de diverses organisations internationales, l’OTAN en tant que telle n’a hésité à s’engager dans cette voie, surtout en ce qui concerne les questions économiques. Ses membres se sont attachés, à juste titre, à éviter tout chevauchement des tâches et à faire, dans le cadre des autres organisations internationales existantes, ce qui pouvait être fait le mieux de cette façon.
19. Cependant les membres de l'OTAN ont procédé dernière-
ment à un nouvel examen des buts et des besoins de l'Organisation
à la lumière de certains changements intervenus dans la tactique
et la politique des Soviets depuis la mort de Staline et des réper-
cussions des troubles actuels d'Europe orientale.

20. Ces changements n'ont en rien diminué la nécessité d'une
defense militaire collective mais ont placé l'OTAN devant un pro-
bлемé supplémentaire qui revêt cette fois un caractère surtout non
militaire. L'OTAN ne doit pas se méprendre sur la nature réelle des
evénements qui viennent de se produire. L'une des manifestations
importantes de la nouvelle politique soviétique de coexistence con-
currentielle consiste à tenter de répondre aux initiatives concrètes
des nations occidentales visant à améliorer, dans un climat de liber-
té, le sort des pays économiquement moins développés et à établir un
système d'échanges à la fois juste et mutuellement profitable dans
le cadre duquel tous les pays puissent prospérer. L'Union Soviétique
semble maintenant s'orienter vers une politique qui, par des moyens
economiques et par la subversion politique, vise à attirer ces pays
dans les filets du communisme et à leur imposer le joug auquel cer-
tains membres du bloc soviétique tentent aujourd'hui de se soustraire.
Les membres de l'OTAN doivent rester vigilants dans leur lutte contre
ces formes de pénétration.

21. Dans le même temps, certaines des craintes immédiates d'une
agression militaire générale contre l'Europe occidentale ont diminué,
cette évolution a été facilitée par le fait que le gouvernement soviéti-
que semble s'être rendu compte que toute agression de ce genre en-
traînerait une riposte certaine, rapide et dévastatrice et qu'il ne
saurait y avoir de vainqueur dans une guerre menée avec des armements
nucléaires des deux côtés. Les Soviets accordant aux méthodes
non militaires ou para-militaires une plus grande place, il est indis-
posable que l'OTAN réexamine les moyens dont elle dispose pour répon-
dre efficacement à une pénétration qui se poursuit sous le couvert de
la coexistence et qui implique principalement des conflits sans issue
catastrophique.

22. Certaines questions se posent maintenant avec une urgence
accrue. Les besoins et objectifs de l'OTAN ont-ils changé ou devraient-
ils changer ? L'Organisation fonctionne-t-elle de façon satisfaisante,
compte tenu de la nouvelle conjoncture de 1956 ? sinon, quels sont les
remèdes ? Une autre question, d'une bien plus grande portée encore, se
pose également : "une association d'États souverains qui ne lie pas
solidement ses membres a-t-elle la moindre chance de subsister sans
le ciment de la crainte" ?

23. Le Comité a étudié ces questions avec la ferme conviction
que les objectifs que les gouvernements avaient en vue lorsqu'ils ont
signé le Traité demeurent valables et que l'OTAN a pour ses membres la
même importance aujourd'hui qu'à cette époque.

24. Le premier de ces objectifs est, comme on l'a déjà souligné,
de sécurité fondée sur une action collective avec des forces armées
suffisantes pour décourager l'agression comme pour la repousser.

25. Il est indiscutable que, pour atteindre cet objectif, l'unité
et la force sont aujourd'hui aussi indispensables à l'OTAN qu'en 1949.
Les Soviets peuvent avoir changé de tactique, mais leur puissance mi-
litaire et leurs buts ultimes demeurent. En outre, les récents événe-
ments d'Europe orientale ont montré que l'Union Soviétique n'hésitera
pas dans certaines circonstances à recourir à l'emploi ou à la menace de la force. Il ne faut donc pas que la puissance de l'OTAN soit réduite bien que son caractère et ses moyens doivent être constamment adaptés aux circonstances. Un renforcement de l'OTAN sur le plan politique et économique est le complément indispensable d'une coopération permanente dans le domaine de la défense, mais il ne doit pas se substituer à elle.

26. Malgré ces récents événements, les dirigeants soviétiques peuvent accorder une plus grande place à l'action politique et économique et à la propagande. Cependant, rien ne prouve qu'ils laissent une telle politique compromettre le maintien de leur potentiel militaire considérable sous sa forme la plus moderne en tant que base de leurs activités dans ces autres domaines.

27. Nous devrions accueillir avec satisfaction tout changement de politique des Soviets s'il était réellement destiné à atténuer les tensions internationales. Mais nous ne devons pas oublier que l'affaiblissement, et en définitive la dissolution de l'OTAN, reste l'un des principaux objectifs des Communistes. Nous devons donc rester sur nos gardes aussi longtemps que les dirigeants soviétiques persisteront dans leur détermination de mettre avant tout leur puissance militaire au service de leurs objectifs politiques et de ceux de leurs alliés.

28. Ceci nous ramène au second objectif – l'objectif à long terme – de l'OTAN, à savoir le développement d'une communauté atlantique reposant sur des fondations encore plus profondes que la nécessité d'une défense commune. Le développement d'une telle communauté n'implique rien moins qu'une association permanente des peuples libres de l'Atlantique Nord visant à renforcer leur unité, à défendre et à servir les intérêts que ces pays, en tant que démocraties libres, ont en commun.

29. Pour atteindre cet objectif à long terme, nous devons empêcher les forces centrifuges de l'opposition ou de l'indifférence d'affaiblir l'Alliance. L'OTAN n'a pas été détruite ni même affaiblie par la menace ou les attaques de ses ennemis. Elle a parfois été entravée par l'apathie ou l'optimisme excessif de certains de ses membres, par des dissensions ou des divisions entre eux ou parce que d'étroites considérations nationales l'ont emporté sur l'intérêt général. De telles forces, si on les laissait subsister, pourraient entraîner la destruction de l'Alliance. Pour les combattre, il faut que les pays membres utilisent l'OTAN bien plus qu'ils ne l'ont fait jusqu'à présent pour des consultations et une coopération véritable et sincère sur les questions d'intérêt commun. Pour cela, la résolution est plus importante que les résolutions, la volonté que les mots.

30. Toutefois, le problème a des racines plus profondes. Les pays de l'OTAN se trouvent en présence d'une menace politique aussi bien que militaire. Cette menace résulte des doctrines révolutionnaires du communisme qui, grâce aux suifs diligents des chefs communistes, ont, depuis des années, semé partout les germes du mensonge au sujet de notre mode de vie libre et démocratique. En face de ces menaces, la meilleure réponse consiste à fournir constamment les preuves de la supériorité de nos institutions sur les institutions communistes. Nous pouvons montrer par nos paroles comme par nos actes que nous sommes partisans du projet politique du développement économique et d'une évolution sociale ordonnée et que de nos jours les vrais réactionnaires sont les régimes communistes qui en défendant une doctrine économique et politique rigide ont mieux réussi à détruire les libertés qu'à les développer.
31. Nous ne devons pas ignorer cependant que les mensonges répandus sur nos institutions ont quelquefois été acceptés sans examen et que même dans le monde non communiste certains esprits perméables à une propagande systématique rejoignent notre propre appréciation des buts de l'OTAN et des valeurs qu'elle défend. Ils pensent que si l'OTAN a pu jouer un rôle défensif et préventif au temps de Staline, elle n'est plus nécessaire même pour la sécurité de ses membres ; ils estiment qu'elle tend maintenant à devenir une sorte d'agence où les puissances "colonisées" mettent en commun leurs forces et leurs ressources pour défendre leurs empêtres et les privilèges qui en résultent, leur supériorité réciproque et l'hégémonie des pays atlantiques sous la direction des États-Unis. Le fait que nous sachions que ces opinions sont fausses et injustes ne signifie pas que l'OTAN et les gouvernements des pays membres ne doivent pas faire tout ce qui est en leur pouvoir pour rétablir la vérité et lutter contre de telles allégations.

32. L'OTAN ne doit pas oublier que l'influence et les intérêts de ses membres ne se limitent pas à la zone d'application du Traité et que des événements extérieurs à cette zone peuvent gravement affecter les intérêts collectifs de la Communauté Atlantique. Tout en s'efforçant d'améliorer leurs relations entre eux et de renforcer leur unité, les pays membres devraient donc aussi s'attacher à harmoniser leurs politiques dans les autres parties du monde en tenant compte des intérêts plus larges de la Communauté internationale tout entière ; ils devraient en particulier travailler aux Nations Unies et ailleurs au maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationale et à la solution des problèmes qui divisent aujourd'hui le monde.

33. En suivant une telle politique, l'OTAN peut démontrer qu'elle n'est pas seulement une organisation défensive dont tout le comportement serait essentiellement dicté par les craintes et les dangers inhérents à la politique des Soviétiques. Elle peut prouver son désir de coopérer pleinement avec les autres membres de la communauté internationale, en donnant vie aux principes de la Charte des Nations Unies. Elle peut montrer que sa préoccupation n'est pas uniquement d'empêcher la guerre froide de dégénérer en conflit ouvert ni de se défendre si une telle catastrophe survenait mais avant tout de prendre l'initiative politique et morale pour que tous les pays puissent se développer dans les libertés et qu'une paix durable puisse être assurée à toutes les nations.

34. Tous les hommes sincères et de bonne volonté comprendront particulièrement après les événements de Hongrie la prudence qui nous incite à ne pas recourir d'emblée pour pacifier les initiatives soviétiques, notre refus de démanteler notre système de défense avant d'être convaincus que les conditions de la confiance entre les nations sont rétablies. Ce qu'ils ne comprendraient pas c'est que nous nous refusons à rechercher les moyens d'abattre les barrières qui interdisent l'établissement d'une telle confiance.

35. L'association des nations atlantiques à des fins nobles et constructives - ce qui est le principe et l'idéal même du concept de l'OTAN - doit se fonder et se développer sur quelque chose de plus profond et de plus durable que les divisions et les dangers de ces dix dernières années. Elle est le résultat d'une évolution historique bien plus qu'un fait contemporain ; et pour qu'elle puisse atteindre son véritable but, nous devons la considérer sous ce jour et tirer les conclusions qui s'imposent. Se limiter à l'immédiat ne suffit pas.
36. Le fait historique qui a commandé cette évolution est qu’un État ne peut à lui seul et avec les seuls moyens qu’il donne sa politique et sa puissance nationales, ni progresser, ni même survivre à l’âge nucléaire. Comme les fondateurs de l’Alliance nord-atlantique l’ont prévu, l’interdépendance croissante des États tant dans les domaines politique et économique que dans le domaine militaire, exige une cohésion et une coopération internationales toujours plus étroites. Certains États peuvent, il est vrai, lorsque la situation est favorable jouer d’une certaine indépendance politique et économique, mais aucun État, si puissant soit-il, ne saurait assurer la sécurité et le bien-être de sa population par une action strictement nationale.

37. C’est ce fait fondamental qui est à la base de notre rapport et des recommandations que l’on trouvera aux chapitres suivants.

38. Il n’a pas été difficile de formuler ces recommandations. Il le sera beaucoup plus pour les gouvernements des pays membres de les mettre en œuvre. Cela exigera de leur part la ferme conviction que la transformation de la Communauté Atlantique en une réalité politique vivante et prospère a autant d’importance que tout objectif d’ordre purement national. Cela nécessitera surtout la volonté de la part des gouvernements de faire passer cette conviction dans le domaine de la politique pratique.
CHAPITRE 2 : COOPERATION POLITIQUE

I. INTRODUCTION

39. Pour que la Communauté Atlantique soit une réalité vivante et capable de progrès, il faut que les relations entre les pays membres de l'OTAN soient fondées sur une confiance et une compréhension mutuelles inaltérables. Il ne saurait sans cela y avoir de coopération politique constructive ou ferme.

40. Le renforcement de cette coopération politique n'implique nullement un affaiblissement, des liens des pays de l'OTAN avec d'autres pays amis ou avec d'autres associations internationales, notamment les Nations Unies. L'appartenance à l'OTAN n'a un caractère ni exclusif ni restrictif. De même, le développement de la Communauté Atlantique par l'intermédiaire de l'OTAN ne doit pas empêcher des pays membres de nouer entre eux des relations encore plus étroites, par exemple dans le cadre de groupes de pays européens, coopération atlantique et unité européenne ne sont pas des concepts concurrents ou antagonistes, et elles devraient constituer des réalisations parallèles et complémentaires.

41. Une coopération internationale efficace et constructive exige une forme résolution de travailler ensemble à la solution des problèmes communs. Les pays de l'OTAN ont entre eux des liens spéciaux, une communauté d'intérêts et des préoccupations communes en matière de sécurité qui devraient leur rendre cette tâche plus facile. Mais le succès dépendra pour beaucoup de la mesure dans laquelle les gouvernements des pays membres tiendront compte des intérêts de l'Alliance dans leurs politiques et actions respectives. Ceci suppose non seulement l'acceptation du principe de consultations et d'une coopération chaque fois que de besoin, mais aussi l'institution de pratiques qui intègrent celles-ci dans le cadre normal de l'activité gouvernementale.

42. Il est facile de proclamer sa dévotion au principe de la consultation politique - ou économique - à l'OTAN. Il est moins aisé - cela s'est même révélé impossible, sans la conviction profonde de passer des paroles aux actes. Des consultations au sein d'une alliance signifient plus que des échanges de renseignements, bien que ceux-ci soient nécessaires. Il ne s'agit pas seulement de mettre le Conseil de l'OTAN au courant de décisions nationales déjà prises ou d'essayer d'y trouver des appuis pour ces décisions. De telles consultations impliquent essentiellement une discussion collective des problèmes aux tous premiers stades de l'élaboration des politiques, avant que la position des pays ne soit définitivement arrêtée. Ainsi parviendra-t-on, au mieux, à des décisions collectives sur les problèmes d'intérêt commun qui affectent l'Alliance - et, au pire, évitera-t-on qu'un pays membre n'agisse sans connaître l'avis des autres.

II. CONSULTATIONS SUR LA POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE

A. Portée et caractère des consultations politiques

43. Le rôle essentiel de la consultation dans le développement de la coopération politique a été clairement défini par un premier Comité de la Communauté Nord-Atlantique, en 1951 :
"Le Comité estime que la réalisation d'une coordination plus étroite des politiques étrangères des pays parties au Traité de l'Atlantique Nord, grâce à la généralisation de l'habitude de consultations sur les questions d'intérêt commun, renforcerait considérablement la solidarité de la Communauté Nord-Atlantique et accroîtrait l'aptitude individuelle et collective de ses membres à servir les buts pacifiques pour lesquels a été créée l'OTAN... Dans le domaine politique, cela signifie que, bien que chaque gouvernement de l'Atlantique Nord garde sa pleine liberté d'action et de décision en ce qui concerne sa propre politique, il faudra arriver, par l'échange d'informations et par des consultations, à un accord aussi étendu que possible dans l'élaboration de politiques intéressant l'ensemble de la Communauté Nord-Atlantique.

Ainsi que le reconnaît explicitement l'Article 4 du Traité, il faudra s'attacher tout spécialement aux questions qui revêtent un caractère d'urgence et d'importance immédiate pour les membres de l'OTAN, et aux situations "exceptionnelles" qui appellent des consultations éclairées sur les lignes de conduite adoptées au plan national qui risquent d'affecter les intérêts des membres de l'OTAN dans leur ensemble. On a également insisté sur la nécessité de consultations promptes et efficaces sur les problèmes d'actualité, afin de permettre la mise au point de politiques nationales et l'adoption des mesures appropriées en pleine conscience des positions et des intérêts de tous les pays de l'OTAN.

Bien que les divers membres de l'OTAN se doivent de consulter leurs partenaires sur les questions appropriées, on a estimé que cette tâche de consultation incombait surtout, par la force des choses, aux membres des plus puissants de la Communauté".

44. Cela a été écrit voilà cinq ans. Et cela est toujours vrai - aujourd'hui plus que jamais. S'il nous est permis de dire que ces recommandations ne sont pas restées lettre morte pour l'OTAN, il nous faut cependant reconnaître que la pratique de la consultation ne s'est pas développée au Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord tout à fait comme l'exigeait l'évolution de la situation politique et des tendances dans le monde. Ce qu'il faut, par conséquent, aujourd'hui, est plus que simplement clarifier le champ des consultations et en accroître la portée. Il est urgent que tous les pays membres fassent des consultations à l'OTAN une part intégrante de la procédure nationale d'élaboration des politiques. S'ils ne s'y pliaient pas, l'existence même de la Communauté Atlantique pourrait être menacée.

45. Il convient toutefois de se rappeler qu'une discussion collective n'est pas une fin en soi et qu'elle constitue uniquement le moyen d'harmoniser des politiques. Chaque fois que les intérêts collectifs de la Communauté Atlantique sont en jeu, la consultation devrait tendre à l'adoption, en temps voulu, de lignes de conduite et de mesures communes.

46. Une telle entente n'est pas aisée à obtenir, même avec la coopération et la consultation les plus étroites. Mais il est vital, pour l'Alliance Atlantique, qu'un effort soutenu soit fait pour y parvenir, car solidarité dans la défense et division en politique étrangère sont incompatibles.
47. La consultation dans ce domaine connaît, bien entendu, certaines limitations pratiques. Celles-ci sont assez évidentes pour qu'il soit inutile de les voir négliger ou nier : il est plus à craindre qu'elles soient exagérées et invoquées pour justifier des pratiques méconnaisant inutilement l'intérêt commun.

48. Une de ces limitations est rigoureuse : la responsabilité derrière la décision et de l'action continue à incomber aux divers gouvernements. On peut concevoir une situation extrêmement grave qui imposerait à un gouvernement d'agir avant d'avoir consulté les autres.

49. Une autre de ces limitations tient à la difficulté, à l'imprudence qu'il y aurait à définir à l'avance tous les problèmes et toutes les circonstances qui appelleront une consultation, à établir une distinction arbitraire entre les problèmes ou catégories de problèmes qui pourraient concerner l'OTAN dans son ensemble et ceux qui n'auraient qu'un intérêt strictement national, et à fixer de façon détaillée les obligations et devoirs qui s'attacheront à la consultation. Tout cela doit se régler à la lumière des faits. Dans ce domaine, l'expérience est un meilleur guide que le dogme.

50. L'essentiel est qu'en toutes occasions et circonstances, les pays membres s'interrogent sur les intérêts et besoins de l'Alliance avant d'agir ou même de se prononcer. S'ils n'en ont pas le désir et la volonté, toutes les résolutions, recommandations ou déclarations du Conseil ou de comités du Conseil resteront sans grande valeur pratique.

51. Supposant cependant que cette volonté et ce désir existent réellement, le Comité soumet à l'agrément du Conseil les principes et méthodes ci-après en matière de consultation politique :

(a) Les pays membres devraient informer le Conseil de tout événement qui pourrait avoir des conséquences sérieuses pour l'Alliance. Ils devraient s'y plier, non comme à une simple formalité, mais en vue d'une véritable consultation politique;

(b) Les gouvernements des pays membres et le Secrétaire Général devraient avoir le droit de proposer à l'examen du Conseil toute question d'intérêt commun pour l'Alliance qui n'aurait pas un caractère strictement national;

(c) Aucun gouvernement ne devrait adopter de politique définitive ou faire des déclarations politiques marquantes sur des questions importantes pour l'Alliance ou pour l'un quelconque de ses membres sans consultation préalable, à moins d'impossibilité matérielle démontrable;

(d) Les pays membres devraient s'efforcer de tenir compte, dans leurs politiques nationales, des intérêts et des vues que les autres pays (et surtout les pays les plus directement en cause) auraient fait valoir lors de consultations OTAN, quand bien même aucune communauté de vue ou entente n'aurait été enregistrée au Conseil;

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(e) Il devrait être tenu compte de toute entente dans la mise au point des politiques nationales. Si des considérations d'ordre national entraînaient un gouvernement à y faire exception, celui-ci devrait en expliquer les raisons au Conseil. Il est plus important encore que, chaque fois qu'une recommandation formelle aura été adoptée à l'issue de débats au Conseil, les gouvernements lui donnent son plein effet dans toutes mesures ou politiques nationales arrêtées concernant l'objet de cette recommandation.

B. Examen Politique Annuel

52. Pour renforcer la procédure de consultation, le Comité recommande qu'à chacune de leurs sessions de printemps, les Ministres des Affaires Étrangères passent en revue les progrès politiques réalisés par l'Alliance et étudient les nouveaux objectifs que celle-ci devrait se fixer.

53. Pour préparer ces discussions, le Secrétaire Général devrait présenter chaque année un rapport dans lequel :

(a) il analyserait les principaux problèmes politiques qui se posent à l'Alliance ;

(b) il étudierait la mesure dans laquelle les pays membres ont consulté et coopéré avec les autres, à propos de ces problèmes ;

(c) il indiquerait les problèmes actuels et futurs au sujet desquels de nouvelles consultations pourraient être nécessaires, pour permettre la solution des difficultés soulevées et l'adoption de mesures positives et constructives.

54. Les gouvernements des pays membres, agissant par l'intermédiaire de leurs Représentants Permanents, devraient fournir au Secrétaire Général les renseignements et l'assistance – l'aide d'experts techniques compris – dont celui-ci pourrait avoir besoin pour préparer son rapport.

C. Préparation des Consultations Politiques

55. D'efficaces consultations exigent aussi que l'on prépare avec soin l'Ordre du jour des réunions du Conseil prévues à l'échéance tant des Ministres que des Représentants Permanents. Les questions politiques proposées à l'examen du Conseil devraient, dans toute la mesure du possible, être étudiées et discutées à l'avance, afin que, le moment venu, les représentants des divers pays disposent chacun des données nécessaires sur la position de leur propre gouvernement et sur celle des gouvernements des autres pays. Chaque fois que de besoin, des projets de résolution devraient être prêts à l'avance à titre de base de discussion. L'examen politique annuel dont il a été question dans la section précédente requerrait, lui aussi, un certain travail préparatoire.

56. Pour aider les Représentants Permanents et le Secrétaire Général à assumer leurs responsabilités en matière de consultation politique, un Comité Politique Consultatif devrait être créé sous l'autorité du Conseil. Les membres en seraient pris dans les diverses délégations, qui leur assureraient, le cas échéant, le
III. RÈGLEMENT PACIFIQUE DES DIFFÉRENTS ENTRE PAYS MEMBRES

57. Pour qu'une coopération politique efficace se développe au sein de l'OTAN, il est d'une importance capitale d'éviter que de graves différends ne s'élèvent entre pays membres et, de défaut, de régler tout différend rapidement et de façon satisfaisante. Le règlement de tels différends incombe au premier chef aux gouvernements des pays membres directement intéressés, aux termes de la Charte des Nations Unies (Article 33) que du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord (Article 1). Pour clairement établir les responsabilités de l'OTAN devenus les différends qui n'auraient pu être réglés directement entre les intéressés et permettre à l'Organisation d'aider, en cas de besoin, à la solution de tels différends, le Comité recommande au Conseil d'adopter une résolution fondée sur l'Article 1 du Traité, dans laquelle:

(a) il réaffirmerait l'obligation, pour les pays membres, de régler par des moyens pacifiques tout différend qui surgirait entre eux;

(b) il déclarerait entendre que tout différend qui n'aurait pu être réglé directement entre les intéressés soit soumis à une procédure de bons offices dans le cadre de l'OTAN avant que l'on recourût à aucune autre institution internationale - exception faite, d'une part, pour les différends d'ordre juridique qu'il y aurait lieu de soumettre à un organisme judiciaire et, d'autre part, pour les différends d'ordre économique que l'on pourrait avoir avantage à tenter de régler d'abord dans le cadre de l'organisation économique spécialisée compétente;

(c) il affirmerait le droit et le devoir des gouvernements des pays membres et du Secrétariat Général de porter à son attention les questions qui leur paraîtraient comporter une menace pour la solidarité ou l'efficacité de l'Alliance;

(d) il habiliterait le Secrétariat Général à offrir officieusement, à tout moment, ses bons offices aux pays qu'un différend divisérait et, si ceux-ci y consentaient, à prendre l'initiative ou à faciliter l'entreprise d'une enquête, d'une médiation, d'une conciliation, ou d'un arbitrage; et

(e) il autoriserait le Secrétariat Général à s'assurer à cet effet, chaque fois qu'il le jugerait utile aux fins indiquées à l'alinéa (d), le concours de trois Représentants Permanents, au plus, qui seraient choisis par lui dans chaque cas.
IV. ASSOCIATIONS DE PARLEMENTAIRES ET CONFÉRENCE DES PARLEMENTAIRES DES PAYS DE L’OTAN

58. Parmi les meilleurs défenseurs de l’OTAN et de son action, figurent les parlementaires qui ont eu l’occasion de s’instruire directement de quelques-unes de ses activités, de s’informer de ses problèmes et d’échanger des vues avec leurs collègues d’autres pays. La constitution d’associations nationales de parlementaires et l’action de la Conférence des parlementaires des pays de l’OTAN ont contribué à accréditer à la fois les soutiens que l’OTAN trouve dans le public et la solidarité entre pays membres.

59. Les arrangements ci-après sont, en conséquence, recommandés en vue du maintien de relations étroites entre les parlementaires et l’OTAN :

(a) Le Secrétaire Général continuerait à mettre les locaux et installations du siège de l’OTAN à la disposition de la Conférence des Parlementaires et à fournir à celle-ci toute l’assistance possible pour l’organisation de ses réunions ;

(b) Des représentants des pays membres, le Secrétaire Général et d’autres hauts fonctionnaires et officiers supérieurs de l’OTAN devraient être invités à assister à certaines de ces réunions. Les parlementaires seraient ainsi informés des progrès réalisés par l’Alliance et des problèmes qui se posent à celle-ci, et la portée de leurs discussions s’en trouverait accrue.

NATO SANS CLASSIFICATION
INTRODUCTION

60. Coopération politique et conflit économique sont inconciliables. Il faut donc que les pays membres soient, dans le domaine économique comme dans le domaine politique, sincèrement désireux de travailler ensemble et prêts à conséler entre eux sur les questions d'intérêt collectif avec une plaine conscience de leur communauté d'intérêts.

61. Les intérêts que les membres de l’OTAN ont en commun dans le domaine économique exigent que ceux-ci :

(a) promettent collectivement et individuellement des mesures propres à assainir et à développer leurs économies, tant pour accroître le bien-être et la confiance en soi des peuples de l’Alliance que pour créer les indissolubles conditions d’un effort de défense suffisant;

(b) accroissent le plus possible la liberté des échanges, des paiements, des mouvements de main-d’œuvre et des investissements;

(c) aident les pays économiquement sous-développés, à la fois par intérêt personnel bien compris et pour travailler à l’amélioration des relations entre les peuples; et

(d) suivent des politiques qui, dans des conditions de coexistence concurrentielle, procurent la supériorité de libres institutions pour le développement du bien-être et le progrès économique.

62. La reconnaissance de cette communauté d’intérêts et de l’effort collectif et individuel qu’elle appelle ne devraient aucunement empêcher le maintien d’étroites relations économiques avec les pays qui n’appartiennent pas à l’OTAN. La coopération économique, tout comme la coopération politique, est et doit rester plus large que l’Alliance. En même temps, les pays de l’OTAN ont intérêt à l’institution, par tout moyen, d’une coopération économique particulièrement étroite au sein de groupes de pays membres européens. Les dispositions spéciales prises à cet effet devraient, comme il est souhaitable, pouvoir aider à atteindre les buts inscrits à l’Article 2 du Traité — qui ont une importance primordiale pour la stabilité et le bien-être, non seulement des pays atlantiques, mais du monde non-communiste tout entier — plutôt que s’y opposer.

II. L’OTAN ET LES AUTRES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES

63. Si les buts et principes énoncés à l’Article 2 du Traité ont une importance capitale, il n’est cependant pas nécessaire que les pays membres se limitent au cadre de l’OTAN dans l’application de ce texte. Il serait sans profit pour la Communauté Atlantique que l’OTAN se chargât d’une tâche qu’assument déjà d’autres organisations internationales créées en vue de diverses formes de
coopération économique. Les membres de l'OTAN jouent un rôle majeur dans toutes ces organisations, qui sont généralement, par leur composition même, bien adaptées à leurs missions particulières.

64. Il ne semble pas non plus qu'il y ait de nouveaux domaines d'importance où une action économique menée en commun exige une intervention de l'OTAN elle-même. En fait, les intérêts économiques communs aux pays membres seront souvent mieux servis par une collaboration accrue, soutenue directement entre ces pays que dans le cadre d'organisations autres que l'OTAN. Cette collaboration devrait évidemment être renforcée par des consultations à l'OTAN chaque fois que se trouveront posées des questions économiques d'un intérêt spécial pour l'Alliance, surtout si elles ont des incidences politiques, des rapports avec la défense ou si elles affectent la santé économique de la Communauté Atlantique tout entière. De telles consultations exigent un développement marqué des échanges de renseignements et de vues à l'OTAN, dans le domaine économique comme dans le domaine politique. Les consultations ainsi entreprises à l'OTAN devraient tendre à l'adoption d'une attitude commune par les gouvernements des pays membres chaque fois qu'il s'agira de questions mettant clairement en jeu les intérêts politiques et la sécurité de l'Alliance. Toutefois, les mesures qu'implique cette entente devraient normalement être prises par les gouvernements eux-mêmes, soit directement, soit dans le cadre d'autres organisations internationales.

65. L'OTAN, en tant qu'organisation internationale, ne devrait pas chercher à établir des relations officielles avec ces autres organisations, et le soin d'harmoniser leurs attitudes et leurs actions devrait être laissé aux représentants des pays de l'OTAN auprès de ces institutions. Il n'est pas non plus nécessaire ni souhaitable que les pays membres de l'OTAN forment un "bloc" au sein de celles-ci. Cela ne fera qu'usurer la crédibilité d'autres gouvernements. Il faudrait, en revanche, que des consultations aient lieu à l'OTAN quand se trouveront soulevées dans d'autres organisations des questions économiques qui présenteront un intérêt politique ou stratégique spécial pour l'OTAN, et surtout avant les réunions où des tentatives risqueraient d'être faites pour diviser ou affaiblir l'Alliance, ou pour porter atteinte à ses intérêts.

III. CONFLITS ENTRE LES POLITIQUES ÉCONOMIQUES DE PAYS MEMBRES

66. L'OTAN a un net intérêt au règlement des différends économiques qui pourraient avoir des répercussions politiques ou stratégiques dommageables pour l'Alliance. Ces différends doivent être distingués des désaccords en matière de politique économique qui sont normalement réglés par le moyen de négociations directes ou de discussions multilatérales dans d'autres organisations. On ne gagnerait rien à simplement répéter à l'OTAN des discussions

qui ont leur place dans d'autres organisations techniquement plus compétentes. Il devrait, en revanche, être permis à tout pays membre ou au Secrétaire Général de soulever à l'OTAN toute question pour laquelle il lui semblerait qu'il n'est fait suffire que des progrès insuffisants et qu'une solution conforme aux buts de la Communauté Atlantique pourrait être facilitée par des consultations OTAN. Les procédures de règlement pacifique que l'on a étudiées au chapitre précédent à propos des différends politiques devraient aussi pouvoir être appliquées pour les différends économiques graves qui justifieraient un examen à l'OTAN.

IV. COOPERATION SCIENTIFIQUE ET TECHNIQUE

67. Science et technique sont des domaines d'une particulière importance pour la Communauté Atlantique. Au cours des dix dernières années, il est devenu de plus en plus évident que le progrès scientifique et technique pouvait être déterminant pour la sécurité des nations et pour leur position dans le monde. Ce progrès est également décisif pour le monde occidental, si celui-ci veut jouer le rôle qui lui appartient vis à vis des pays économiquement sous-développés.

68. D'un point de vue plus particulier, il est urgent d'accroître la qualité et le nombre des savants, ingénieurs et techniciens. Le recrutement, le formation et l'utilisation du personnel scientifique et technique sont affaire plus nationale qu'internationale. Encore les gouvernements nationaux ne sont-ils pas seuls à intervenir ici : dans les pays à structure fédérale, les gouvernements d'état et de province jouent un rôle prépondérant; et nombre d'universités et d'institutions d'enseignement supérieur des pays atlantiques sont même des établissements indépendants exemptes de tout contrôle gouvernemental détaillé. Cependant, des mesures de coopération internationale appropriées pourraient inciter les pays membres à adopter individuellement des politiques plus positives et, dans certains cas, les aider dans la recherche des solutions les plus constructives.

69. D'autres organisations se sont déjà engagées dans certaines activités à cet égard. Toutefois, des progrès dans ce domaine sont-ils suffisants pour l'avenir de la Communauté Atlantique que les membres de l'OTAN devraient veiller à ne laisser sans examen aucune possibilité de coopération fructueuse. Le Comité recommande, par conséquent, comme première mesure concrète, qu'une conférence réunissant des personnalités privées ou officielles d'une exceptionnelle autorité (une ou, au maximum, deux par pays) soit convoquée afin :

(a) de permettre l'échange de renseignements et de vues sur les problèmes les plus urgents concernant le recrutement, la formation et l'utilisation des savants, ingénieurs et techniciens et sur les meilleures mesures à prendre, tant à long qu'à court terme, pour les résoudre;

(b) d'amener les participants à nouer entre eux des relations plus étroites en vue d'une poursuite de cette mise en commun de l'expérience et d'un travail constructif dans les pays membres; et

(c) de proposer les mesures particulières à prendre pour développer la coopération internationale dans ce domaine, que celles-ci incombent à l'OTAN ou qu'elles doivent être mises en œuvre par les soins d'autres organisations internationales.
CONSULTATIONS SUR LES PROBLEMES ECONOMIQUES

70. Il est admis que la Communauté Atlantique a un intérêt positif à voir les pays économiquement sous-développés progresser rapidement et de façon saine, qu'ils appartiennent ou non à la zone nord-atlantique. Le Comité pense cependant que l'OTAN n'est pas l'organisme qui convienne pour gérer des programmes d'assistance conçus en vue du développement économique ou de la coordination systématique des politiques des pays membres en la matière. Ce que les pays membres peuvent et devraient faire est se tenir mutuellement au courant et tenir l'OTAN informée de leurs programmes et politiques dans ce domaine. Quant à l'OTAN, elle devrait, chaque fois que de besoin, examiner si les mesures prises sont bien conformes aux intérêts de l'Alliance.

71. Les intérêts économiques de la Communauté Atlantique ne peuvent être considérés indépendamment des activités et politiques du Bloc soviétique. L'URSS recourt trop souvent à des mesures économiques destinées à affaiblir l'Alliance occidentale ou à établir dans d'autres régions un haut degré de dépendance vis à vis du monde soviétique. Dans ces conditions, il importe plus que jamais que les pays de l'OTAN se préoccupent activement de mettre eux-mêmes au point des politiques commerciales et financières constructives. Ceux-ci devraient, en particulier, éviter de créer des situations dont les pays du Bloc soviétique pourraient tirer parti contre la Communauté Atlantique et d'autres pays non-communistes. Dans tout ce domaine de la concurrence économique, les pays membres devraient avoir entre eux des consultations plus larges pour arrêter ensemble leur ligne de conduite de façon reflétée et en toute connaissance de cause.

72. Les arrangements pris par l'OTAN en vue de consultations économiques régulières ont largement évolué. D'autre part, nombre de questions économiques ont été soumises au Conseil pour qu'il les étudie en fonction des nécessités de chaque cas. Aucun dispositif important nouveau n'est nécessaire dans ce domaine. Toutefois, la grande variété des questions dont il peut être traité lors des échanges réguliers de renseignements et des consultations en question porte à penser que le Conseil devrait créer un comité économique consultatif placé sous son autorité. Ce dernier devrait être chargé de la discussion préliminaire systématique des questions ci-dessus définies, conjointement avec telles autres tâches que le Conseil pourrait lui confier de sa propre initiative ou à la demande du Comité lui-même. Toute fonction qui resterait confiée au Comité des Conseillers Techniques lui serait transférée. L'accomplissement de sa mission ne devrait pas lui imposer un travail régulier, les gouvernements pourraient s'y faire normalement représenter par les hauts fonctionnaires qui s'occupent pour eux des travaux d'autres organisations économiques internationales. Sa composition statutaire devrait néanmoins être assez souple pour que les gouvernements puissent, en cas de besoin, y envoyer, des capitales, des spécialistes des questions particulières examinées.
CHAPITRE 4 : COOPÉRATION CULTURELLE

73. Un sens de la communauté atlantique doit exister parmi les peuples aussi bien que dans les institutions des nations de l’Alliance. Cela ne signifie pas que les peuples auront une conscience, tant du leur commun patrimoine culturel, que du prix des libertés matérielles et de la liberté de pensée qui sont les leurs. Il importe par conséquent au plus haut point que les pays de l’OTAN encouragent la coopération culturelle entre leurs peuples par tous les moyens pratiques à leur disposition, afin de renforcer leur unité et de procurer à l’Alliance le soutien le plus large possible. Il est particulièrement important que cette coopération culturelle dépasse les limites d’un continent. Cela doit cependant pas empêcher les gouvernements de prendre des mesures limitées multilatérales ou même bilatérales, pour resserrer leurs liens culturels dans le cadre général de l’Alliance. Le Comité se félicite des mesures dont des particuliers et des groupements non-gouvernementaux ont pris l’initiative dans des bateaux de coopération culturelle dans la Communauté Atlantique. Celles-ci devraient être encouragées et renforcées.

74. Pour développer la coopération culturelle, le Comité pense qu’il y aurait lieu de s’inspirer des principes généraux suivants:

(a) Les activités gouvernementales dans ce domaine ne devraient pas faire double emploi avec les efforts privés, mais, au contraire, tendre à les soutenir et à les compléter;

(b) les gouvernements devraient donner la priorité aux projets qui appelleront une action conjointe des pays de l’OTAN et contribuent ainsi à accroître chez eux le sens de leur communauté;

(c) en étendant ses activités dans le domaine culturel, l’OTAN aurait le plus grand avantage à se préoccuper avant tout d’inspirer et de faciliter des contacts transatlantiques;

(d) les incidences financières des projets culturels devraient être étudiées de façon réaliste.

75. Pour que le public connaisse et comprenne mieux l’OTAN et la Communauté Atlantique, le Conseil devrait organiser des cours et des réunions OTAN pour les enseignants.

76. L’OTAN et ses membres devraient donner un plus large soutien à des activités pédagogiques ou associées telles que la poursuite des programmes de bourses de recherches et d’études, l’institution de chaires universitaires, d’études atlantiques, la création de chaires pour des professeurs étrangers, l’organisation d’échanges de personnes sous l’égide des gouvernements (échanges transatlantiques, principalement), l’utilisation d’une documentation OTAN dans les écoles et l’octroi de bourses spéciales OTAN à des étudiants.

77. Les gouvernements devraient prendre des mesures concrètes pour faciliter l’établissement de plus étroites relations entre l’OTAN et les organisations de jeunesse, et le Secrétariat International devrait s’assurer les services d’un spécialiste de ces questions.
Des conférences de dirigeants d'organisations de jeunesse analogues à la Conférence de juillet 1956 devraient être périodiquement réunies sous les auspices de l'OTAN.

78. Pour que les contacts entre les peuples des divers pays de l'OTAN soient plus faciles et se multiplient, il faudrait que les gouvernements révoient et, si possible, révisent leurs politiques en matière de change conjointement avec toutes autres dispositions qui restreindraient la liberté de voyage.

79. Etant donné l'importance que revêt un accroissement de la compréhension et de la bonne volonté entre membres des forces armées de l'OTAN, il serait souhaitable de développer les échanges de militaires au delà des limites des programmes normaux d'entraînement, en coopération avec les autorités militaires. Les gouvernements pourraient y poursuivre par des arrangements bilatéraux, pour commencer. Ils devraient aussi s'efforcer d'obtenir, aux mêmes fins, l'aide de l'Association du Traité de l'Atlantique et d'autres institutions bénévoles.

80. Les projets culturels qui bénéficieraient à la communauté devraient faire l'objet d'un financement commun. Les projets culturels agréés qui auront été lancés par un gouvernement membre ou une institution privée (les récentes réunions d'étude Oxford, ou la conférence organisée par l'Association du Traité de l'Atlantique pour étudier le rôle de l'école dans la Communauté Atlantique, par exemple) devraient être subventionnés par l'OTAN quand les moyens dégagés dans les budgets des pays intéressés seront insuffisants.
CHAPITRE 5 : COOPÉRATION DANS LE DOMAINE DE L'INFORMATION

81. Pour lui donner leur appui, les peuples des pays membres doivent connaître l'OTAN. Ils doivent, par conséquent, être informés, non seulement des aspirations de l'OTAN, mais aussi de ses réalisations. Il faut trouver les éléments d'un programme efficace d'information OTAN et les fonds nécessaires à son exécution. Il importe que le public soit informé aussi complètement que possible des importants résultats obtenus grâce aux consultations OTAN.

82. Les activités de l'OTAN en matière d'information devraient avant tout viser à éclairer l'opinion publique dans les pays de l'Alliance. Mais il est en même temps nécessaire que les buts et réalisations de l'Organisation soient compris au delà de l'en voir que celle-ci soit vue avec sympathie et que ses activités ne soient pas mal interprétées.

83. L'important mission d'informer le public des activités de l'OTAN et de les lui expliquer incombe au premier chef aux services nationaux d'information. Ceux-ci ne sauraient la remplir si les gouvernements n'en tiennent pas compte comme il convient dans leurs programmes nationaux. Il est indispensable que les gouvernements y pourvoient. L'OTAN peut et doit les y aider. En fait, l'Organisation et ses membres devraient conjuguer leurs efforts pour mieux renseigner le public sur l'OTAN et la Communauté Atlantique et pour lui faire mieux comprendre celles-ci.

84. L'une des tâches de l'OTAN devrait être de coordonner le travail des services nationaux d'information dans les domaines d'intérêt commun. Les gouvernements devraient, quant à eux, confronter leurs expériences et leurs vues à l'OTAN pour éviter les différences d'interprétation et d'accentuation. Ceci est particulièrement important pour la diffusion des renseignements sur l'OTAN aux autres pays. Une politique coordonnée devrait tendre à mettre en relief le caractère défensif et les importants aspects non militaires de l'Alliance. Elle devrait également couvrir la réplique à la propagande contre l'OTAN et l'étude critique des initiatives et déclarations communis- tes qui concarnaient la Communauté Atlantique.

85. La Division de l'Information de l'OTAN doit, elle-même, recevoir des gouvernements les moyens financiers et l'appui qu'exigent ces nouvelles tâches - concours sans lequel on ne saurait lui imposer celles-ci.

86. Pour faciliter la coopération entre la Division de l'Information de l'OTAN et les services d'information des pays, le Comité recommande l'adoption des mesures particulières ci-après :

(a) Nomination, par les services d'information de chaque pays, d'un fonctionnaire chargé de la liaison avec l'OTAN et de la diffusion de la documentation OTAN;

(b) accès à l'OTAN, par les gouvernements, des programmes d'information qu'ils envisagent, aux fins d'une discussion au Comité de l'Information et des Relations Culturelles - discussion à laquelle des représentants des services nationaux d'information devraient être associés;
(c) inscription de crédits de traduction dans le budget de la Division de l'Information de l'OTAN, afin de permettre la traduction d'éléments de documentation OTAN dans des langues non officielles de l'Alliance pour répondre aux besoins raisonnables des pays membres ;

(d) fourniture, par l'OTAN, d'études spéciales sur des questions d'intérêt commun aux services nationaux d'information qui en feraient la demande.

87. La formule des voyages de journalistes organisés par l'OTAN devrait être élargie, ceux-ci étant ouverts à d'autres personnes en mesure d'influencer sur l'opinion publique (dirigeants de syndicats et d'organisations de jeunesse, enseignants et conférenciers, par exemple). Il conviendrait également d'encourager un rapprochement des liens entre les institutions privées qui soutiennent l'OTAN et la Division de l'Information de l'Organisation.
CHAPITRE 6 : ORGANISATION ET FONCTIONS

88. Le Comité considère que, sous sa forme actuelle, l'OTAN est capable de remplir les missions non-militaires qui lui incombent. Aucune modification de structure n'y est nécessaire. L'organisation en elle-même est satisfaisante. C'est aux gouvernements de l'utiliser.

89. Certaines améliorations aux procédures et au fonctionnement de l'OTAN seront cependant nécessaires si pleine vigueur doit être donnée aux recommandations formulées dans le présent rapport. C'est là l'objet des propositions qui sont faites dans ce chapitre.

A. Réunions du Conseil

90. La durée des sessions ministérielles devrait être accrue. L'expérience a montré que, s'il ne prolonge ses débats, le Conseil ne peut pas examiner convenablement tous les points importants de son ordre du jour. Il laisse alors certains de ceux-ci sans prendre aucune décision, ou ne prennent qu'à des décisions peu claires.

91. On devrait s'efforcer d'encourager la discussion à lieu de se contenter de déclarations de principe rédigées à l'avance. Les réunions devraient être préparées dans cet esprit. Pour la plupart des séances, le nombre des assistants devrait être sévèrement limité. Pour faciliter de libres discussions, les Ministres qui souhaiteraient s'exprimer dans une langue autre que le français ou l'anglais devraient fournir des interprètes de leurs propres délégations pour traduire leurs déclarations, en conséquence, dans l'une ou l'autre des langues officielles.

92. Les Ministres des Affaires Étrangères devraient être réunis chaque fois qu'il en serait besoin et, à l'occasion, en d'autres lieux que le siège de l'OTAN. Les Ministres devraient aussi participer plus fréquemment aux réunions ordinaires du Conseil, quand bien même tous ne seraient pas en mesure de venir en même temps. Le Conseil Permanent a tous pouvoirs de décision; en d'autres termes, l'autorité du Conseil est la même, que les gouvernements y soient représentés par leurs Ministres ou par leurs Représentants Permanents. Il ne devrait donc pas y avoir de distinction stricte ni formelle entre les sessions ministérielles et les autres réunions du Conseil.

B. Renforcement des liens entre le Conseil et les gouvernements des pays membres

93. Le type de consultations que l'on envisage dans le présent rapport exige que les Représentants Permanents soient en mesure de parler avec autorité et de toujours donner une expression authentique de la pensée de leurs gouvernements. La variété des situations géographiques et des organisations constitutionnelles ne permet pas l'adoption des mêmes dispositions dans tous les gouvernements. Dans certains cas, il pourrait être souhaitable qu'un haut fonctionnaire de la capitale soit chargé de s'occuper essentiellement des questions OTAN. Le but visé serait de faciliter,
d'autre part, des consultations OTAN chaque fois que des politiques nationales iraient à l'encontre des intérêts communs des pays de l'Alliance et, d'autre part, la traduction des résultats de ces consultations en actes efficaces dans les divers gouvernements.

94. Pour maintenir un lien aussi étroit que possible entre la pensée des gouvernements et les consultations au Conseil, on pourrait organiser de temps à autre des réunions du Conseil auxquelles participeraient les hauts fonctionnaires chargés de la mission spéciale ci-dessus ou les chefs permanents des ministères des affaires étrangères.

C. Préparation des sessions du Conseil

95. Les questions inscrites à l'ordre du jour des sessions ministérielles devraient être minutieusement étudiées par les Représentants Permanents, les propositions appropriées étant préparées avant la rencontre des Ministres. À cet effet, on pourra juger souhaitable que les gouvernements envoient des experts hautement qualifiés pour procéder à des consultations sur des points de l'ordre du jour avant l'ouverture de la session.

96. La préparation des questions dont le Conseil est appelé à discuter devrait être facilitée par un usage approprié des comités consultatifs politique et économique du Conseil (les recommandations relatives à la création de ces comités figurent au Chapitre 2, paragraphe 56, et au Chapitre 3, paragraphe 72).

97. Pour les consultations sur des questions spéciales, les Délégations Permanentes devraient davantage recourir à des experts nationaux hautement qualifiés, à qui l'on demanderait spécialement de venir des diverses capitales pour faire le travail préparatoire nécessaire dans chaque cas. D'efficaces discussions entre des spécialistes chargés des mêmes responsabilités offrent un très précieux moyen d'accorder les attitudes gouvernementales aux tout premiers stades de l'élaboration des politiques.

98. Les gouvernements des pays membres devraient, pour leur information réciproque, se fournir mutuellement, par l'entremise de l'OTAN, des documents de base sur leurs positions respectives. Cela faciliterait à l'Alliance l'examen des problèmes d'intérêt commun, et aiderait les divers gouvernements à mieux comprendre la position de tout pays membre devant une question qui le toucherait spécialement mais serait, en même temps, susceptible d'incidences plus ou moins sérieuses pour les autres membres de l'OTAN.

D. Le Secrétaire Général et le Secrétariat International

100. Le Comité recommande que le Secrétaire Général assume la présidence du Conseil pour ses sessions ministérielles, comme il le fait déjà pour ses autres réunions. Un tel changement de procédure serait le corollaire normal de l'extension des responsabilités du Secrétaire Général, selon ce qui est recommandé dans le présent rapport. Il serait aussi justifié par la situation privilégiée du Secrétaire Général, qui lui permet de se familiariser avec les problèmes et activités de l'Alliance dans leur ensemble.


102. En outre:

(a) le Secrétaire Général devrait être encouragé à soulever les questions qui lui paraîtraient donner lieu à consultation dans les domaines couverts par le présent rapport, et il devrait être chargé de prendre l'initiative formelle des consultations et d'en assurer la direction;

(b) Pour lui permettre de remplir un tel office, les pays membres devraient s'engager à toujours tenir le Secrétariat Général pleinement informé, par l'intermédiaire de leurs Délégations permanentes, de l'avis de leurs gouvernements sur les questions d'intérêt commun pour l'Alliance;

(c) L'attention du Conseil est également appelée sur les responsabilités supplémentaires que le Comité lui recommande de confier au Secrétariat Général au sujet de l'examen politique annuel (Chapitre 2, paragraphe 52) et du règlement pacifique des différends (Chapitre 2, paragraphe 57).

103. Le bon fonctionnement de l'OTAN dépend dans une large mesure de l'efficacité, du dévouement et du moral de son Secrétariat. De nouvelles tâches et responsabilités seraient imposées à celui-ci par l'acceptation des recommandations que contient le présent rapport. Les gouvernements doivent donc être prêts à donner tout l'appui nécessaire au Secrétariat International, tant sur le plan financier que du point de vue du personnel. S'ils y manquaient, on ne pourrait pas donner une exécution satisfaisante aux recommandations qui sont formulées dans ce rapport, eussent-elles le plein accord des gouvernements.

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.
LE COMITÉ DES TROIS.

Le Comité des Trois, composé du Dr. Gaetano Martino (Italie) de M. Halvard Lange (Norvège) et de M. Lester B. Pearson (Canad), a été constitué le 5 mai 1956 par le Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord, siégeant en Session Ministérielle. Son mandat était le suivant:

"... présenter au Conseil des recommandations quant aux mesures à prendre pour améliorer et développer la coopération entre pays de l'OTAN dans les domaines non-militaires et pour accroître l'unité au sein de la Communauté Atlantique.

2. Le Comité a tenu ses premières réunions au 20 et 22 juin 1956 au siège de l'OTAN, à Paris. Au cours de ces sèances, il a arrêté sa propre procédure et décidé d'envoyer aux gouvernements des divers pays membres un questionnaire demandant leur avis à la fois sur un certain nombre de problèmes particuliers en matière de coopération politique, économique et culturelle, et sur l'organisation et les fonctions de l'OTAN. Il a, en outre, fait distribuer un mémoire donnant aux pays des explications et des directives qui devaient les aider à préparer leurs réponses. Le questionnaire a été diffusé les 28 juin 1956, les gouvernements étant invités à y répondre avant le 20 août.

3. Le Comité s'est à nouveau réuni à Paris le 10 septembre 1956, pour tenir une série de réunions qui dureront jusqu'au 22 septembre. Après avoir examiné et analysé les réponses faites au questionnaire, le Comité a procédé à des consultations avec chacun des pays membres. L'objet de ces consultations était, à la fois, de clarifier, si nécessaire, les positions prises par les gouvernements dans leurs réponses, et de permettre une discussion préliminaire de certaines des vues du Comité avec les représentants d'autres gouvernements.

4. Les consultations en question se sont succédées dans l'ordre suivant:

**Mercredi 12 septembre - Matinée:** Islande (représentée par M. M. G. Andersen, Représentant Permanent de l'Islande auprès du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord)

- Après-midi : Turquie (représentée par M. N. Birgi, Secrétaire Général du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères)

**Jeudi 13 septembre - Matinée:** Pays-Bas (représentés par M. J. W. Beyen, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères)

- Après-midi : Grèce (représentés par M. E. Avoroff, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères)

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Vendredi 14 septembre - Matinée : Belgique (représentée par M. P.H. Spaak, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères)

Après-midi : Allemagne (représentée par le Prof. Hallstein, Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires Etrangères)

Lundi 17 septembre - Matinée : Luxembourg (représenté par M. M.J. Bech, Premier Ministre et Ministre des Affaires Etrangères)

Matinée : France (représentée par M.C. Piau, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères)

Après-midi : États-Unis (représentés par le Sénateur George, Représentant Spécial du Président Eisenhower)

Après-midi : Portugal (représenté par M. P. Cunha, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères)

Mardi 18 septembre - Matinée : Danemark (représenté par M. Ernst Christiansen, Suppléant du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères)

Après-midi : Royaume-Uni (représenté par M. Anthony Nutting, Ministre d'État pour les Affaires Etrangères)

5. Le Comité a, en outre, conféré avec les groupes ci-après :

(a) Le mercredi 12 septembre, réunion avec la Commission Permanente de la Conférence des Parlementaires des Pays de l'OTAN, qui était composée des personnalités ci-après :

Belgique : M. Frans van Cauwelaert M. A. de Meelor

Canada : Le Sénateur Wishart Mol. Robertaon, P.C.

France : M. Maurice Schumann
Allemagne : M. F. Berendsen
Le Dr. Richard Jaeger

Pays-Bas : M. J.J. Fens
M. J.L. Kranenburg
M. E.A. Vermeer

Turquie : Le Colonel Seyfi Kurtbek

Royaume-Uni : Le Colonel Walter Elliot,
C.H., M.C., M.P.

Etats-Unis : M. Wayne L. Hays, M.C.,
 membre du Congrès

(b) Le samedi 15 septembre, réunion avec le Bureau de
l'Association du Traité de l'Atlantique, représenté
par :

Le Comte Morra, Président,
le Dr. Nord, Vice-Président,
le Dr. Flynt, Vice-Président, et
M. John Eppstein, Secrétaire Général

ainsi qu'avec un certain nombre de délégus d'asso-
ciations nationales affiliées.

(c) Le mardi 18 septembre, réunion avec le Général
Billotte et M. Barton, représentant les signataires
de la Déclaration d'Unité Atlantique.

6. A l'issue de ces consultations, un projet de rapport au
Conseil a été préparé. Pour ce travail, le Comité a bénéficié des
avis éclairés de trois consultants spéciaux : le Professeur
Lincoln Gordon (Université de Harvard), le Professeur Guido Carli
(Rome) et M. Robert Major (Oslo).

7. Le Comité s'est réuni une dernière fois le 14 novembre,
à New-York, pour revoir son rapport à la lumière des importants
événements qui étaient intervenus dans le monde depuis sa session
de septembre. Après avoir approuvé son rapport, le Comité en a
remis le texte aux autres Ministres des Affaires Étrangères, pour
qu'ils l'étudient avant son examen par le Conseil de l'Atlantique
Nord.
RESOLUTION SUR LE REGLEMENT PACIFIQUE DES LITIGES ET DIFFERENDS ENTRE PAYS MEMBRES DE L'ORGANISATION DU TRAITE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

(Adoptée par le Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord le 13 décembre 1956)

CONSIDERANT que les Parties au Traité de l'Atlantique Nord, aux termes de l'Article 1 de ce Traité, se sont engagées "à régler par des moyens pacifiques tous différends internationaux dans lesquels elles pourraient être impliquées, de telle manière que la paix et la sécurité internationale, ainsi que la justice, ne soient pas mises en danger";

CONSIDERANT que les Parties se sont, en outre, engagées à s'efforcer d'éliminer toutes oppositions dans leurs politiques économiques internationales et à encourager la collaboration économique entre chacune d'entre elles ou entre toutes;

CONSIDERANT que l'union et la force dans la poursuite de ces objectifs restent indispensables à une coopération suivie dans les domaines militaires et non-militaires;

LE CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD:

REAFFIRME l'obligation, pour tous ses membres, aux termes de l'Article 1 du Traité, de régler par des moyens pacifiques tout différend qui surgirait entre eux;

DÉCIDE que tout différend qui n'aura pu être réglé directement entre les intéressés sera soumis à une procédure de bons offices dans le cadre de l'OTAN avant que les gouvernements des pays membres ne recourent à aucune autre institution internationale — exception faite, d'une part, pour les différends d'ordre juridique qu'il y aurait lieu de soumettre à un organisme judiciaire et, d'autre part, pour les différends d'ordre économique que l'on pourrait avoir avantage à tenter de régler d'abord dans le cadre de l'organisation économique spécialisée compétente;

AFFIRME le droit et le devoir des gouvernements des pays membres et du Secrétaire Général de porter à son attention les questions qui leur paraîtront porter une menace pour la solidarité ou l'efficacité de l'Alliance;

HABILITE le Secrétaire Général à affirir officieusement, à tout moment, ses bons offices aux gouvernements des pays membres qu'un différend divisait et, si ceux-ci y consentent, à prendre l'initiative ou à faciliter l'entreprise d'une enquête, d'une médiation, d'une conciliation ou d'un arbitrage;

AUTORISE le Secrétaire Général à s'assurer, chaque fois qu'il le juge utile aux fins indiquées au paragraphe précédent, le concours de trois Représentants Permanents, au plus, qui seront choisis par lui dans chaque cas.
RESOLUTION CONCERNANT LE RAPPORT SOUMIS PAR LE COMITÉ DES TROIS SUR LA COOPÉRATION ENTRE LES PAYS DE L'OTAN DANS LES DOMAINES NON-MILITAIRES

(Adoptée par le Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord le 13 décembre 1956)

CONSIDÉRANT que le Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord réuni à Paris le 5 mai, a chargé un comité composé des Ministres des Affaires Etrangères d'Italie, du Canada et de Norvège de lui présenter des recommandations quant aux mesures à prendre pour améliorer et développer la coopération entre les pays de l'OTAN dans les domaines non-militaires et pour sécuriser l'unité au sein de la Communauté atlantique;

CONSIDÉRANT que ce Comité des Trois lui a maintenant fait rapport sur ses travaux et soumis un certain nombre de recommandations sur les mesures à prendre pour améliorer et développer la coopération entre les pays de l'OTAN dans les domaines non-militaires;

LE CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD:

PREND NOTE du Rapport du Comité des Trois et en APPROUVÉ les recommandations;

INVITE le Conseil Permanent à mettre en œuvre compte tenu des observations des gouvernements, les principes et recommandations contenues dans ce rapport;

INVITE le Secrétaire Général à lui soumettre toutes autres propositions particulières que la mise en œuvre de ces recommandations pourrait exiger et à lui faire périodiquement rapport sur l'exécution de ces recommandations par les gouvernements;

AUTORISE le Comité des Trois à publier son rapport.