COMMITTEE OF THREE

I. CO-OPERATION IN THE POLITICAL FIELD

The Committee on the Atlantic Community in 1952 did not propose rigid rules or "automatic" formulae for political consultation, but stressed the need for the development of a "habit of consultation" between member governments. As criteria for matters which ought to be subject to consultation, the Committee indicated the degree of common interest, or the likelihood of a need for co-ordinated action. Furthermore, the Committee made a general distinction between exchange of information, on the one hand, and actual consultation on the other, the former covering a wider range of topics than the latter. Considerable progress has since been made towards co-ordination of the foreign policies of the NATO countries. The Council has begun to serve as a forum for exchange of information on matters of common concern, and active and effective consultation has in some cases taken place. However, there are also examples of lack of co-ordination and of unilateral action by member governments in matters directly concerning the Alliance, which have had detrimental effects on the unity of NATO and thereby weakened the organization. It therefore seems necessary to find new ways and means of promoting the habit of using the Council as an active instrument of consultation in order to reach closer co-operation in the political field.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL
Principles of Consultation

1. It might be useful to consider the desirability of laying down certain basic principles as guidance for the political consultation on matters of common concern, such as the following:

   (a) The Council should be kept fully informed of any political development in any area which may affect member countries or the Alliance as a whole.

   (b) The duty of informing the Council at an early stage of such developments should be accepted.

   (c) The Council should normally not be requested to take decisions or adopt resolutions of political importance without having had the opportunity to consider the matter in the light of all available information.

   (d) Member governments should endeavour not to make political declarations affecting the Alliance or its member nations without prior consultation through the Council.

   It would be of interest to know the view of member governments on this proposal, with a statement indicating to what extent the above-mentioned principles are acceptable.

Types of Consultation

2. To what extent and under what circumstances is your Government prepared to participate in the following types of consultation within NATO?

   (i) Informal exchanges of information;

   (ii) Preparation of common appreciations in the light of current developments;
(iii) Consultations with the aim of arriving at a general consensus as a basis for determination or guidance of individual government policies;
(iv) Consultation with the aim of arriving at agreement on specific policies or courses of action.

Areas and Limitation of Consultations

3. What should be the basis for determining the matters of common concern which might be the subject of consultation under the four headings listed above, and what should be regarded as the factors limiting such consultation, such as respect for liberty of action of each member government and the non-universal character of NATO?

Co-operation under Article 1

4. To what extent can NATO assist in the peaceful settlement of inter-member disputes and differences? In view of the provisions of Article 1 of the Treaty, should procedures of conciliation and peaceful settlement of disputes, similar to the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter and other international agreements be adopted by NATO?

5. Parliamentary Participation

Should NATO give more formal recognition to parliamentary associations and the Parliamentary Conference and what should be the relationship between the Council and these parliamentary groupings?

II. PROMOTION OF GREATER UNITY IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD

1. Does your Government consider that closer co-operation between member countries within the specialised organizations to which they belong and the establishment of closer relations with them, would represent the most suitable means for promoting greater unity in the economic field between member countries?
2. In this connection, as regards the OEEC, does your Government consider the participation of the United States and Canada as merely "associated members", to be adequate?

3. Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that the parties will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies. Does your Government think that the activities of other organizations, in particular the OEEC, is sufficient to discharge the responsibilities of NATO countries in this respect?

4. Does your Government feel that NATO may have some interest in developing public works for civilian use, as has been done in the military field?

5. Does your Government consider that NATO should take an active part in the economic development of underdeveloped regions within the NATO area or would it be preferable that NATO should limit itself to the appraisal of the political importance for the Alliance of development programmes to this end.

6(a) Does your Government consider that NATO has a vital interest in promoting the development of underdeveloped countries outside the NATO area? If so, bearing in mind the fact that assistance to the underdeveloped countries outside the NATO area should not bear a NATO label, what action does your Government consider can appropriately be carried on by NATO countries to achieve the necessary objectives and what co-ordination can be furnished within NATO?

(b) Does your Government consider that the Statutes of existing and planned international financial agencies give them sufficient flexibility to enable them to operate
suitably under present political conditions and to meet the requirements of the situation with which NATO is now confronted?

7(a) Does your Government feel that, in order to cope with the developing Soviet commercial drive, NATO should consider measures to counter and neutralise Soviet practices which do not conform to the principles by which Western countries carry on their normal trade and financial relations with one another?

(b) Does your Government feel that NATO should consider measures to meet the competition of the Soviet Bloc in the field of contracts for public works in politically sensitive areas?

8. What suggestions can be derived from the experience in the economic field of other regional organizations with a view to the possible application of this experience to other geographical areas?

9. Does your Government consider that it would be in the interests of the Alliance for the NATO countries to consult together when certain important questions are coming up for discussion in international economic bodies in which the Soviet bloc is represented?

10. Are there any other specific economic subjects or classes of subjects of general concern to NATO which are not now being adequately considered in other agencies and which might be discussed usefully in NATO?
III. CO-OPERATION IN THE CULTURAL FIELD

Increased co-operation in the cultural field might serve to strengthen relations between NATO countries, provide a larger measure of public support to NATO and encourage the feeling of belonging to an Atlantic Community.

1. Does your government consider that these aims will be served by setting up:

   (a) a common research institute for Atlantic Community studies?
   
   (b) a civilian version of the NATO Defence College (Wilton Park) in which short courses on political, economic, social and cultural problems of the Atlantic Community would be given to those in the position to influence public opinion, such as journalists, teachers, etc?

2. Does your government consider that NATO should encourage co-operation between youth movements in NATO countries, bearing in mind the co-ordination of youth activities in communist countries? Should the Council discuss youth co-operation problems?

3. Does your government consider that NATO should undertake the co-ordination of measures to increase the recruitment and training on a long-term basis of scientists, technicians and specialists, bearing in mind the developments in these fields in communist countries?

4. What educational activities, if any, should be undertaken by NATO to strengthen the ties of the Atlantic Community, which are not already carried out by existing International Organizations such as UNESCO?

5. Would your government favour the exchange of service personnel individually or in groups for the purpose of
familiarising themselves with conditions in other member countries and for the propagation of good will?

6. Which of the possible programmes under questions 1, 2, 3, 4 should, in the judgment of your government, be financed:

   (a) under a commonly financed infrastructure programme;
   (b) on a joint user basis;
   (c) singly by member governments?

IV. CO-OPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD

Increased co-operation in the information field, particularly under the conditions of competitive co-existence and the new Soviet policies, might serve to increase support for NATO of a well-informed public opinion and thus increase the unity of the Alliance.

1. Does your government consider that the Information Service should concentrate on purely factual information about NATO?

2. Does your government consider the necessity of a better co-ordination of efforts in the information field to deal with the Soviet initiatives in the propaganda field?

3. Does your government consider that reciprocal visits of professional groups such as teachers, journalists, etc. should be extended?

4. Does your government consider that co-operation between the NATO Information Service and national information agencies, governmental as well as private, could be improved?

5. Considering the importance of the impact on public opinion of extending political consultation in NATO, has your government any suggestion on how to improve the "public relations" in this field?
V. ORGANIZATIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL QUESTIONS

1. What specific changes in procedure would your government recommend to ensure closer and more effective consultation in the Council and closer co-operation in the political field?

2. To what extent does your government consider that experts could be used more either on a permanent or ad hoc basis to assist the Council in the process of consultation?

3. Does your government consider that greater use could be made of NATO machinery for the circulation on a NATO-wide basis of "basic position material" by individual governments (e.g. texts of agreements, basic statements of position, etc.)?

4. To what extent should the Secretary General play an active role in the field of political consultation, and to what particular types of problems should such a role extend?

5. In view of the additional economic responsibilities of NATO, and those in prospect, what organizational changes does your government consider are required to discharge them?

6. The suggestion has been made that a closer relationship might be established between NATO and the United Nations, possibly establishing the position of NATO as a regional organization in terms of Chapter 8 of the United Nations Charter. What could be the advantages and disadvantages of such a course?
The Committee of Three, consisting of Mr. Lange, Foreign
Minister of Norway, Dr. Martino, Foreign Minister of Italy, and
Mr. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada,
were appointed by decision of the North Atlantic Council of 6th May
"to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO
co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity
within the Atlantic Community".

A study of some of these problems had already been made
by the Committee on the Atlantic Community in 1951-1952 under the
chairmanship of Mr. Pearson. This Committee did not propose rigid
rules for "automatic" formulas for consultation, but stressed the
need for the development of a "habit of consultation" between member
governments. As criteria for matters which ought to be subject to
consultation, the Committee indicated the degree of common interest,
or the likelihood of a need for co-ordinated action. Furthermore,
the Committee made a general distinction between exchange of inform-
ation, on the one hand, and actual consultation on the other, the
former covering a wider range of topics than the latter. Considerable
progress has since been made towards co-ordination of the foreign
policies of the NATO countries. The Council has begun to serve as a
forum for exchange of information on matters of common concern, and
active and effective consultation has in some cases taken place.
However, there are also examples of lack of co-ordination and of
unilateral action by member governments in matters directly concerning
the Alliance, which have had detrimental effects on the unity of
NATO and thereby weakened the organization. It therefore seems
necessary to find new ways and means of promoting the habit of using
the Council as an active instrument of consultation in order to reach
closer co-operation in the political field.

The questions which follow are intended to elicit in as
concise form as possible, the views of your Government on the
problems raised by the task set the Committee by the Council. This
list is not to be regarded as exhaustive, and should your Government
wish to supplement their answers with any additional statements or
suggestions, these will be welcome.
POLITICAL QUESTIONS

1. It might be useful to consider the desirability of laying down certain basic principles as guidance for the political consultation on matters of common concern, such as the following:

(a) The Council should be kept fully informed of any political development in any area which may affect significantly member countries or the Alliance as a whole.

(b) The duty of informing the Council at an early stage of such developments should be accepted.

(c) The Council should normally not be requested to take decisions or adopt resolutions of political importance without having had the opportunity to consider the matter in the light of all available information.

(d) Member governments should endeavour not to make political declarations affecting the Alliance or its member nations without prior consultation through the Council.

It would be of interest to know the view of member governments on this proposal, with a statement indicating to what extent the above-mentioned principles are acceptable.

2. To what extent and under what circumstances is your Government prepared to participate in the following types of consultation within NATO?

(i) Informal exchanges of information;

(ii) Preparation of common appreciations in the light of current developments;
(iii) Consultations with the aim of arriving at a general consensus as a basis for determination or guidance of individual government policies;

(iv) Consultation with the aim of arriving at agreement on specific policies or courses of action.

3. What should be the basis for determining the matters of common concern which might be the subject of consultation under the four headings listed above, and what should be regarded as the factors limiting such consultation, such as respect for liberty of action of each member government and the non-universal character of NATO?

4. To what extent can NATO assist in the peaceful settlement of inter-member disputes and differences? In view of the provisions of Article 1 of the Treaty, should procedures of conciliation and peaceful settlement of disputes, similar to the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter and other international agreements be adopted by NATO?

5. Should NATO give more formal recognition to parliamentary associations and the Parliamentary Conference and what should be the relationship between the Council and these parliamentary groupings?

II. ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

1. Does your Government consider that closer co-operation between member countries within the specialised organizations to which they belong and the establishment of closer relations with them, would represent the most suitable means for promoting greater unity in the economic field between member countries?
2. In this connection, as regards the OECD, does your Government consider the participation of the United States and Canada as merely "associated members", to be adequate?

3. Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that the parties will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies. Does your Government think that the activities of other organizations, in particular the OECD, is sufficient to discharge the responsibilities of NATO countries in this respect? To what extent does your Government consider that NATO could assist in the conciliation of economic conflicts arising between member countries?

4. Does your Government feel that NATO may have some interest in developing public works for civilian use, as has been done in the military field?

5. Does your Government consider that NATO should take an active part in the economic development of underdeveloped regions within the NATO area or would it be preferable that NATO should limit itself to the appraisal of the political importance for the Alliance of development programmes to this end.

6. (a) Does your Government consider that NATO has a vital interest in promoting the development of underdeveloped countries outside the NATO area? If so, bearing in mind the fact that assistance to the underdeveloped countries outside the NATO area should not bear a NATO label, what action does your Government consider can appropriately be carried on by NATO countries to achieve the necessary objectives and what co-ordination can be furnished within NATO?

   (b) Does your Government consider that the Statutes of existing and planned international financial agencies give them sufficient flexibility to enable them to operate
suitably under present political conditions and to meet the requirements of the situation with which NATO is now confronted?

7(a) Does your Government feel that, in order to cope with the developing Soviet commercial drive, NATO should consider measures to counter and neutralise Soviet practices which do not conform to the principles by which Western countries carry on their normal trade and financial relations with one another?

(b) Does your Government feel that NATO should consider measures to meet the competition of the Soviet Bloc in the field of contracts for public works in politically sensitive areas?

8. What suggestions can be derived from the experience in the economic field of other regional organizations with a view to the possible application of this experience to other geographical areas?

9. Does your Government consider that it would be in the interests of the Alliance for the NATO countries to consult together when certain important questions are coming up for discussion in international economic bodies in which the Soviet bloc is represented?

10. Are there any other specific economic subjects or classes of subjects of general concern to NATO which are not now being adequately considered in other agencies and which might be discussed usefully in NATO?
III. CULTURAL QUESTIONS

Increased co-operation in the cultural field might serve to strengthen relations between NATO countries, provide a larger measure of public support for NATO and encourage the feeling of belonging to an Atlantic Community.

1. Does your government consider that these aims will be served by setting up:

(a) a common research institute for Atlantic Community studies?
(b) a civilian version of the NATO Defence College in which short courses on political, economic, social and cultural problems of the Atlantic Community would be given to those in the position to influence public opinion, such as journalists, teachers, etc?

2. Does your government consider that NATO should encourage co-operation between youth movements in NATO countries, bearing in mind the co-ordination of youth activities in communist countries? Should the Council discuss youth co-operation problems?

3. Does your government consider that NATO should undertake the co-ordination of measures to increase the recruitment and training on a long-term basis of scientists, technicians and specialists, bearing in mind the developments in these fields in communist countries?

4. What educational activities, if any, should be undertaken by NATO to strengthen the ties of the Atlantic Community, which are not already carried out by existing International Organizations such as UNESCO?

5. Would your government favour the exchange of service personnel individually or in groups for the purpose of
familiarising themselves with conditions in other member countries and for the promotion of goodwill?

6. Which of the possible programmes under questions 1, 2, 3, 4 should, in the judgment of your government, be financed:
   (a) under a commonly financed programme;
   (b) on a joint user basis;
   (c) singly by member governments?

IV. INFORMATION QUESTIONS

Increased co-operation in the information field, particularly under the conditions of competitive co-existence and the new Soviet policies, might serve to increase support for NATO of a well-informed public opinion and thus increase the unity of the Alliance.

1. Does your government consider that the Information Service should concentrate on purely factual information about NATO?

2. Does your government consider the necessity of a better co-ordination of efforts in the information field to deal with the Soviet initiatives in the propaganda field?

3. Does your government consider that reciprocal visits of professional groups such as teachers, journalists, etc. should be extended?

4. Does your government consider that co-operation between the NATO Information Service and national information agencies, governmental as well as private, should be improved?

5. Considering the importance of the impact on public opinion of extending political consultation in NATO, has your government any suggestion on how to improve the "public relations" in this field?
V. ORGANIZATIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL QUESTIONS

1. What specific changes in procedure would your government recommend to ensure closer and more effective consultation in the Council to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community.

2. To what extent does your government consider that experts could be used more either on a permanent or ad hoc basis to assist the Council in the process of political consultation?

3. To what extent should the Secretary General play an active role in the field of political consultation, and to what particular types of problems should such a role extend?

4. In view of the additional economic responsibilities of NATO, and those in prospect, what organizational changes does your government consider are required to discharge these?

5. The suggestion has been made that a closer relationship might be established between NATO and the United Nations, possibly establishing the position of NATO as a regional organization in terms of Chapter 8 of the United Nations Charter. What could be the advantages and disadvantages of such a course?

6. Does your government consider that greater use could be made of NATO machinery for the circulation on a NATO-wide basis of "basic position material" by individual governments (e.g. texts of agreements, basic statements of position, etc.)?

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.
COMMITTEE OF THREE

Draft Analysis of the Replies to the Questionnaire

Note by the Secretary

The attached draft analysis has been prepared by the International Staff on the basis of replies received by 31st August. An analysis of the replies of Denmark, France, Iceland and Turkey will be prepared as soon as these replies have been received.

(Signed) K.H. BEYEN

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.
1. It might be useful to consider the desirability of laying down certain basic principles as guidance for the political consultation on matters of common concern, such as the following:

(a) The Council should be kept fully informed of any political development in any area which may affect significantly member countries or the Alliance as a whole.

(b) The duty of informing the Council at an early stage of such developments should be accepted.

(c) The Council should normally not be requested to take decisions or adopt resolutions of political importance without having had the opportunity to consider the matter in the light of all available information.

(d) Member governments should endeavour not to make political declarations significantly affecting the Alliance or its member nations without prior consultation through the Council.

PART I - POLITICAL QUESTIONS

(a) Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway accept the principle.

Italy emphasises here, and under (b), that exchange of information should be rapid and full.

Greece accepts it and suggests adding "in good time".

Portugal accepts it but would exclude domestic questions.

UK finds it generally acceptable but thinks "formalisation" as a code undesirable.

US agrees the principle but points out that advance information is rarely possible; the aim of "elucidation" is more feasible.

(b) Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway accept the principle.

Greece, Portugal, UK and US accept it but apply the same provisos mentioned under (a) above.

(c) Belgium, Canada, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and US accept the principle.

Italy thinks this principle should apply to all, and not merely political questions.

The UK comment mentioned under (a) above also applies here.
It would be of interest to know the view of member governments on this proposal, with a statement indicating to what extent the above-mentioned principles are acceptable.

(d) Belgium, Canada, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal accept the principle.

Italy thinks the principle should apply also to officials and others whose statements carry weight, even when the statements are not regarded as "government pronouncements".

UK objection to "formalisation" as a code applies here as with (a), (b) and (c), but (d) also presents difficulties if literally interpreted (e.g. time factor etc. if Minister had to seek Council clearance for speech or statement to Parliament).

US has "grave doubts" if (d) is to be construed as a "firm obligation", because of the same difficulties referred to by UK (obligations to its own people and Parliament; need for prompt action), and also because of special responsibilities and obligations relating to non-NATO areas of the world. US says matters relating to these areas are not excluded but a "carefully selective" approach is needed and priority should be given to NATO area questions. US points out that if consultation is effectively developed, declarations made without formal consultation would automatically reflect the sentiment of the group.

Note Canada suggests adding two further "basic principles":

(e) No NATO government should adopt a firm policy on important matters of concern to the whole alliance without early advance consultation with other members of the alliance.

(f) When such consultation has taken place ... member governments should seek to develop their national policies in the light of the interests and views of other NATO governments.

Canada also offers as a "basis for discussion", a statement on the meaning of section (a) of this question. Italy suggests that governments should seek to define the "sphere of common interest" with respect to which consultation should be pledged by governments.
2. To what extent and under what circumstances is your Government prepared to participate in the following types of consultation within NATO?

(i) informal exchanges of information;

(ii) preparation of common appreciations in the light of current developments;

(iii) consultations with the aim of arriving at a general consensus as a basis for determination or guidance of individual government policies;

(iv) consultation with the aim of arriving at agreement on specific policies or courses of action.

Italy suggests that when a consensus of opinion is formed, any government acting (as entitled) on its own, but in a way divergent from the consensus of opinion, should at least explain its attitude in a report to the Council.

On (i) all replies are in favour. Opinions are varied regarding the scope of these exchanges:

- no limitation of subject or geographic area (Norway);
- on every important question – in some cases even domestic questions affecting other members (Italy);
- on subjects of special interest to the Alliance (Portugal);
- on subjects which would significantly affect one or more members (Netherlands);
- (applies also to (iv)) on Soviet bloc questions and other questions proportionately to their importance for NATO (Greece).

Luxembourg and the Netherlands emphasise the need for safeguarding the confidential character of these exchanges and consultation.

On (ii) all replies are in favour. Opinions on scope of this item are:

- selection of subjects needs care (UK);
- on Soviet bloc developments and other general issues such as "anti-colonial" attitudes (the Netherlands);
- on matters of common concern such as the external threat; Germany; disarmament (Norway);
- on questions which have important effects for the Alliance but which do not call for specific action, e.g. Soviet policy; relations with China; North Africa; Indo-China (Italy).
As regards methods, Canada suggests normally through Secretariat studies, and Norway suggests extending the work of the Working Group on Soviet Trends.

On (iii) the general acceptance is in certain cases more qualified.

Canada restates the formulation of the question and so does UK, which adds that limiting factors (see Question 3) apply here.

Norway suggests that 'consensus' should not be binding, some governments having special responsibilities and possibilities of action not shared by others. Germany accepts the principle and suggests a "Political Annual Review".

As regards the scope of (iii) Italy sees it as applying where member countries are obliged to take action on matters affecting the Alliance (e.g., relations with Soviet bloc; the Arab-Israel dispute) specific questions arising in other international bodies. The Netherlands sees it as useful for problems outside the NATO area, Greece thinks that (iii) and (iv) relate especially to Soviet bloc questions.

On (iv) the position is similar to that of (iii).

Canada is willing to apply (iv) in certain defined fields (see Question 3) and sees inadequate security as an obstacle in the field of consultation. Italy feels (iv) applies where the basic interests of the Alliance are at stake, or where the Alliance must act as such. Norway feels that binding agreements under (iv) would give rise to difficulties because in some cases parliamentary sanction would be needed, and because some governments have special responsibilities not shared by others, but that nevertheless greater willingness should be expected to reach common policy on questions directly relating to the NATO area and the external threat. The Netherlands thinks (iv) applies to problems directly affecting the NATO area. The UK thinks that the decision to consult should be on a "case by case" basis.
Note  In connection with question 2 some general and some additional points are made.

Italy suggests regular, not occasional consultation (see also Question 1).

The UK suggests

(a) more frequent meetings of the Permanent Council;

(b) agendas prepared sufficiently in advance for representatives to consult governments; (Canada also asks for adequate warning whenever possible);

(c) maximum frankness combined with maximum security, including that of communications between delegations and home governments (c.f. also Canadian view).

The US suggests adding (v) - exchange of views on matters generally deemed of concern to NATO.

In general, the US thinks it impossible to determine in advance the circumstances and the extent of consultation along specific lines, and favours an "open agenda" principle. It suggests:

(a) greater use of government experts in Council discussions;

(b) greater initiative for the International Staff in proposing items for agendas;

(c) greater availability of experts on Soviet affairs (from governments) to International Staff and delegations;

(d) greater exchange of information.
3. What should be the basis for determining the matters of common concern which might be the subject of consultation under the four headings listed above, and what should be regarded as the factors limiting such consultation, such as respect for liberty of action of each member government and the non-universal character of NATO?

There seems to be a general agreement that the 'basis' referred to in the question cannot be precisely defined in advance. The US speaks of an "experimental and evolutionary" approach. Italy deals with question 3 as part of question 2 (q.v.); Greece says the basis should be as may be agreed and empirically established; the Netherlands points out that the more directly a problem affects the Alliance and its objectives, the more pressing is the need for consultation and in some cases co-ordination of policies and action. Portugal says the basis cannot be a priori and generally means questions which affect the Alliance or its members. The UK says the basis is broadly the threat to NATO and the strengthening of the Alliance to meet the threat. Belgium mentions (a) questions involving threat to peace anywhere; (b) those affecting the unity of the Alliance, and (c) those affecting the stability and domestic order of members and their territories. Germany, Luxembourg, and Norway point to the Treaty (especially the Preamble and Article 4) as indicating the 'basis'.

On the limiting factors: Norway (see also question 2) refers to the need to avoid duplicating the role of other international bodies. The UK mentions (a) national governments must retain final responsibility for national policy, and (b) governments tendering advice cannot thereby be held to accept responsibility. The US also refers to the liberty of action of each government and to the non-universal character of NATO, but points out that the application of these limiting factors will necessarily vary in each case. Belgium, Luxembourg and Portugal also refer to the point that each government must be free to act according to its lights; Portugal adds that opposition by a member country or countries concerned would be a limiting factor, but that the non-universal character of NATO should not limit discussion on questions affecting the Alliance.

Note Canada suggests:

(1) 'No interference in domestic affairs' is necessary but should not be legalistically interpreted; there should be no veto on discussion of any subject of common concern but there must be general agreement if action is required.

(2) NATO political appreciations should record minority opinions rather than achieve a 'lowest common denominator' of opinion.
4. To what extent can NATO assist in the peaceful settlement of inter-member disputes and differences? In view of the provisions of Article I of the Treaty, should procedures of conciliation and peaceful settlement of disputes, similar to the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter and other international agreements be adopted by NATO?

All countries agree that NATO can play some part in assisting the peaceful settlements referred to in the question.

At least five countries are opposed to new or formal machinery (Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and the UK). Replies suggest relying on common action or appropriate diplomatic initiatives (Portugal); exchanges of views and development of consultation in the Council (Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands); also possibly on an ad hoc Conciliation Commission appointed by the Council (the Netherlands); on "good offices" and NATO as a "friendly forum" (UK), and without NATO "recommending" solutions or acting as executive agency unless parties concerned agree (UK); on mediation through the Secretary General in the first instance (Germany), and through the medium of an "Annual Political Review" (Germany); by means of a "Fact-Finding Committee" (Greece) before attempting procedures of conciliation, mediation, etc.
Greece emphasises that some agreement on procedure for this purpose is essential for the success of the Committee of Three because of the effects of the Cyprus dispute on NATO. Norway thinks that the Cyprus and Icelandic questions should lead the Council to explore the possibility of solution, and generally suggests (a) that the Council should have the right to investigate any inter-member dispute to determine whether its continuance is likely to endanger the security or unity of the Alliance, and (b) the Secretary General should have the right to bring such disputes to the attention of the Council. The Council could use "good offices commissions", mediation, or conciliation.

Italy suggests that Permanent Representatives be given a specific mandate to study, with the help of jurists, the possibility of agreeing on a procedure, as binding as possible, to deal with such disputes, and as a first step thinks that member governments should undertake not to raise such disputes in other international organizations until after their examination by NATO.

Canada suggests

(a) in the first instance direct discussions between the parties to a dispute;

(b) agreement by all NATO members to accept, with minimum reservations, the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court;

(c) investigating the possibility of setting up in advance additional machinery for conciliation, mediation and arbitration, with the Secretary General having an important role in conciliation;

(d) although need for formal provisions would decrease to the extent that effective political consultation is developed in NATO, adequate provisions for peaceful settlements is an important NATO requirement.
The US sees a need for additional NATO procedures. These should reflect the 'voluntary approach' and avoid elaborate or formal machinery. Accordingly, the US suggests:

(a) the adoption of a resolution under Article 1 of the Treaty, and in accordance with Article 33 of the United Nations Charter, to declare the intention of NATO governments to submit in the first instance all inter-member disputes for settlement within NATO framework;

(b) a special Committee of the Council to take cognisance, under this resolution, of any future disputes, and to apply "good offices" and be mainly concerned with procedures'—entering into substantive questions only at the request of the parties concerned;

(c) a "Panel of Atlantic Community Arbitrators" composed of eminent persons;

(d) where appropriate and necessary, NATO to sponsor proposals for settlement, to give general or specific support, or to assume definite obligations in connection with the implementation or maintenance of the settlement.

5. Should NATO give more formal recognition to parliamentary associations and the Parliamentary Conference and what should be the relationship between the Council and these parliamentary groupings?

The Netherlands has no objection in principle to formal recognition, with delimitation of the activities of a Parliamentary Conference and a defined relationship to the Council. It favours the organization of Parliamentary contacts within the NATO framework, and the giving of assistance and possibly of guidance by the Council.

The other ten countries see objections and/or difficulties in such a course.

These countries present various suggestions to encourage the interest of Parliamentarians:

- by giving all possible facilities and help (Canada, UK, US);
- by more regular activity of Parliamentary Conferences (Norway);
- by more contacts between Parliamentarians of different countries, especially European-North American links (Italy);
- by more (unofficial) contacts between NATO and Parliamentarians (Italy), especially 'on the level of information' (Belgium);
- by individual governments suggesting suitable subjects for discussion to their Parliamentary groups (UK, Norway);
- by speeches to Parliamentarians by national representatives, the Secretary General and senior military advisers of NATO (Canada);
- by submission to the Council of reports of Parliamentarians' discussions, while discouraging them from addressing resolutions to the Council (Canada).
II. ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

1. Does your Government consider that closer co-operation between member countries of NATO within the specialised organizations to which they belong and the establishment of closer relations with such organizations would represent the most suitable means for promoting greater unity in the economic field between member governments?

There is general agreement that efforts to bring about economic unity should be made chiefly through the specialised organizations, in particular through OECD. While all countries are, so far, agreed upon the desirability of closer co-operation between NATO members within other economic organizations, opinions vary about the extent to which NATO members should co-ordinate their policies within these organizations.

Greece, Italy, the Federal German Republic, Norway, Portugal and the United States suggest that NATO members should consult together for the purpose of developing common views on policies to be implemented through other agencies.

- Greece proposes that a Working Group should be set up for this purpose.
- Italy would prefer regular consultation on such problems in the Committee of Technical Advisors.
- Norway stresses the need for NATO consultations on economic problems in cases where

(a) they have so far received little attention in the appropriate agencies and where no solution satisfactory to NATO has been found;

(b) it is desirable to avoid conflicting views among NATO members on matters discussed elsewhere;

(c) strategic and political implications cannot properly be discussed in other organizations.

The United Kingdom and Canada approve the principle of discussion by NATO of economic problems but both stress that no recommendations should be made for action through other agencies on specific issues. The United States would prefer NATO to concentrate on "those issues related to the achievement of conditions conducive to economic growth" but would agree to the discussion of concerns primarily related to national interests if these represented a serious threat to the unity of the Alliance. The Belgian Government would limit discussion to the political aspects of economic problems.
In reply to the question on the establishment of closer relations with other organizations, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States would welcome a closer working association but Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Greece are concerned about the possible reaction of non-NATO members of these agencies.

Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, the United States and Canada all consider the present OEEC status of the United States and Canada to be adequate, while the Netherlands fear that an amendment to the OEEC Convention would be necessary to bring about a change of status. Although Canada and the United States are both willing to increase their participation in the work of this organization, they prefer to retain their present status. Canada, particularly, is anxious to preserve the European character of the OEEC and fears that full membership might prevent her from giving full agreement to certain regional activities. Canada would, nevertheless, give sympathetic consideration to any invitation to become a full member.

Norway considers that a change of status for these two countries would only prove to be necessary if, in the future, the OEEC should devote increasing attention to the economic relationship of Europe and the North American Continent. The Italian Government, however, suggests that there may be specific projects on which it would be desirable for the United States and Canada to co-operate more closely than their present "associate" status permits.

Luxembourg does not consider full membership to be indispensable but would nevertheless welcome such a change. The Portuguese Government would be prepared to accept a new status for these countries if this would permit closer co-operation, while the United Kingdom would support the setting up of an OEEC Working Group to consider ways by which increased participation might be brought about.
3. Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that the parties will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies. Does your Government think that the activities of other organizations and particularly the OEEC is sufficient to discharge the responsibilities of NATO countries in this respect?

To what extent does your Government consider that NATO should assist in the conciliation of economic conflicts arising between member countries?

All countries so far consider that the OEEC or the other specialised economic agencies are the appropriate organizations for resolving economic conflicts between member states but agree that there may be some aspects of economic policies which might usefully be discussed by NATO.

The Norwegian Government thinks that it would be for the International Staff to follow closely the progress made by member countries in harmonising their policies in other economic organizations and, if necessary, to draw the attention of the Council to important issues under discussion. In cases where economic disputes between members might have harmful political consequences it should be decided on ad hoc basis whether the matter should be dealt with by NATO or exclusively by the OEEC.

Belgium, the Federal German Republic, Greece, the United Kingdom and the United States show particular concern for those economic conflicts likely to damage the political and economic strength of members of the Alliance. Belgium believes that countries should have the right to raise such questions for discussion by NATO. Germany suggests that where efforts at conciliation in other organizations have failed (a) countries should be entitled to submit questions of dispute to NATO and (b) each member country should have the right to offer its good offices for the peaceful settlement of disputes in cases of particular importance for the defence capacity of NATO. The United Kingdom stresses the desirability of discussing those differences which might be exploited by the Soviet bloc in other international organizations.

Portugal would agree to prior consultations amongst NATO members on the economic policies to be carried out in other bodies while Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands think that discussion in NATO might assist countries in settling their differences in other organizations.

The United States, while sharing the preoccupations outlined above, makes a distinction between those types of economic conflicts arising from the free play of market forces and those springing from governmental action detrimental to the interests of other members of the Alliance. In the view of the United States only the second type of problem - if it represents a danger to the solidarity of the
Alliance - should be explored by NATO once all other possible action has been taken in the appropriate international bodies. This should be approached on an ad hoc basis.

Canada recalls that the Annual Reviews carried out by NATO and the OEEC provide member countries with an opportunity for informing themselves of the economic problems of their allies and urges that this complementary review should continue to function as at present. The Canadian Government argues that economic conflicts will be avoided only insofar as NATO members approach a freely and efficiently functioning system of non-discriminatory trade and payments over as wide an area as possible and take care that exceptional measures to promote exports or to dispose of surpluses show a real regard for the interests of other countries. In those cases where conflicts arise every effort should be made to resolve them within the framework of the appropriate international organization. It may, at times, be desirable to raise the matter in NATO itself but, in any case, NATO countries should be willing to consult together when such conflicts arise or appear imminent.

Most countries state clearly that NATO should refrain from this type of activity. The Federal German Republic however makes an exception in the case of questions touching on civil defence capacity - such as civil emergency planning.

Portugal suggests that NATO members might consult together with a view to co-ordinating their policies within other organizations fitted to deal with this problem. Greece feels that such schemes would have an excellent effect on public opinion but would prefer them to be administered through other international organizations. These agencies might also be invited to participate financially.

The Norwegian Government would like the question to be explored further while Italy suggests that the economic and military advantages to the Alliance of particular projects might justify NATO action.
5. Does your Government consider that NATO should take an active part in the economic development of underdeveloped regions within the NATO area or would it be preferable that NATO should limit itself to the appraisal of the political importance for the alliance of development programmes to this end?

All countries agree that action in this field should be left to the appropriate specialised agencies but many of them would welcome discussion in NATO of the political aspects of such schemes.

Canada draws attention to the amount of aid already given to NATO members by the IMF and the IBRD and urges member countries to play an active role in these agencies. It is pointed out by Canada that, here again, the Annual Review procedure already enables members of the Alliance to discuss the economic situation of these regions.

The German Government suggests that NATO collect data on this type of aid and that an analysis of this information might reveal unexploited possibilities. Germany would also like NATO to make recommendations and suggestions on matters of principle, while Italy, too, suggests a periodical examination by NATO of the work done by other organizations in this field. Greece proposes that NATO countries give instructions to their representatives to other international organizations to encourage this policy. The Greek Government, in view of the presence of non-NATO members in such bodies as the OEEC, would approve discussion by NATO of the political aspects of these problems only if absolute secrecy could be assured.

Portugal, while recognizing the importance of the problem, points out that the success of such an action would depend upon the capacity of member countries to contribute towards the cost.

The Norwegian Government suggests that in cases where it is difficult to obtain support in the appropriate specialised agencies for plans of political importance to NATO discussions should take place within the Organization on an ad hoc basis with a view to finding solutions.
6(a). Does your Government consider that NATO has a vital interest in promoting the economic development of underdeveloped countries outside the NATO area? If so, bearing in mind the non-universal character of NATO, what action in assisting underdeveloped countries does your Government consider can appropriately be carried out by NATO countries to achieve the necessary objectives and what co-ordination can be furnished by NATO?

There is general agreement that NATO should not itself undertake any action in this field but opinions vary about the extent to which the Organization should discuss policy problems related to underdeveloped areas.

The Italian Government believes that NATO should:

(a) agree on principles on which member countries should base their policies individually and in other organizations;

(b) draw up political priorities as a guide for action by individual member countries;

(c) consult together on all aspects of economic assistance to underdeveloped areas. Furthermore, it is suggested that the NATO staff draw up an inventory of the resources which could be devoted to assisting underdeveloped economic areas by individual member countries and by the specialised agencies to which they belong. The Italian Government is strongly in favour of leaving all further initiative in this area to the OECD.

The German Government suggests that economic data on the subject should be collected and analysed so as to form a basis for assessing its political importance. The United States recalls that a useful beginning has already been made in this direction by the Committee of Technical Advisers and urges continuing discussion of NATO policy on aid problems.

The Norwegian Government also supports strongly the suggestion for periodic discussion in NATO with a view to co-ordinating their policies on economic assistance to underdeveloped countries both within the specialised agencies or between themselves.

The United Kingdom and Canada attach particular importance to a study of Soviet activities in this field. The United Kingdom relies to a large extent on the OECD for discussion of the general economic problems arising from aid but feels that this organization is not a fit place for the discussion of the problem of
6(b). Does your Government consider that the Statutes of existing and planned international financial agencies give them sufficient flexibility to enable them to operate suitably under present political conditions and to meet the requirements of the situation with which NATO is now confronted?

countering Soviet moves in this area. NATO should be able to discuss a general policy of counter-action but should avoid specific issues. The United Kingdom Government suggests that private firms should be encouraged to participate in such schemes but that no special inducements should be held out to them.

Luxembourg and the Netherlands would limit NATO discussion of these problems to an assessment of their political importance to the Alliance while Belgium insists that the whole matter should be left to the specialised agencies.

Greece, on the other hand, feels that the experience of the West in this field has often been unfortunate and that great care should be taken in the future that favourable political results should result from and to underdeveloped countries.

Canada, Germany, Greece, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States consider that no changes are necessary in the Statutes of the international financial agencies although Greece and Italy are ready to examine further suggestions. The Netherlands and Belgium do not believe it to be the rôle of NATO to discuss the Statutes of these agencies while Portugal, as a non-member, feels she cannot comment.

The United Kingdom points out that the real problem is not lack of flexibility but lack of funds and considers that the limitations on aid imposed by the IMF and the IBRD have had the valuable effect of encouraging sound financial policies in underdeveloped countries. The United Kingdom Government warns of the danger of undermining the IBRD by setting up another international agency to make loans on easier terms than those justified by economic considerations but recognises that some countries need basic help before their economies can become sufficiently stable to permit them to apply for aid from the Bank or Fund. Consequently, the United Kingdom would favour the setting up of an agency such as SUNTED once agreement has been reached on internationally controlled disarmament under the aegis of the United Nations. As this is not the case at the moment the United Kingdom is not prepared to extend its commitments.

Luxembourg, on the other hand, stresses that the conditions imposed by the IMF and the IBRD call for a political stability which does not always exist in underdeveloped countries and suggests that common action by NATO countries within those agencies might ease the terms on which aid is granted.
7(a). Does your Government feel that NATO should consider measures to counter and neutralise Soviet commercial practices which do not conform to the principles by which Western countries carry on their normal trade and financial relations with one another?

All countries show concern about this problem but differ in their views on how far NATO itself should intervene.

Norway feels strongly that this is one of the most important subjects on which there should be closer co-operation within NATO and calls for discussions on the broader lines of the basic economic policy to be followed in relation to the Soviet bloc as well as on the specific problem of countering certain Soviet commercial policies.

Canada suggests that NATO collect information on any Soviet commercial activities which might affect the security of NATO members or threaten the independence of underdeveloped countries in which NATO has a political interest. Discussion in NATO should be for information purposes only and action should be left to the initiative of countries concerned. The Canadian Government points out the danger of allowing Soviet moves to disorganize generally existing Western financial and commercial arrangements although there may be some cases where exceptions might have to be made. The United Kingdom agrees that NATO should collect data on Soviet commercial activities but thinks that discussion of any infringements of normal trade practices should be left to such organizations as GATT. The United States also proposed that the International Staff prepare a study on this subject but would be prepared to consider further measures only after an exchange of views.

The Italian Government warns of the danger of abandoning the established commercial practices of the West in an attempt to counter Soviet moves and suggests that NATO should only consider acting in cases of emergency. The appreciation of emergency cases might be left to the Committee of Technical Advisers.

The Netherlands and Greece feel that no measures could be considered by NATO which conflicted with the established economic policies of members - these would not only be dangerous from an economic point of view but would probably be unsuccessful. Luxembourg and Belgium also find it difficult to envisage any measures which could be adopted by countries possessing a democratic constitution.
Portugal would agree to a co-ordinated policy by NATO in this field while Germany urges NATO countries to adhere to the principle of multilateral trade policies vis-à-vis the Eastern bloc and to agree not to buy transit goods originating in underdeveloped countries from Eastern bloc states.

Greece argues that NATO policy should be to encourage the maximum trade with all countries paying particular attention to those countries in which the USSR shows special interest only insofar as transactions would be economically profitable. The Greek Government suggests, however, that any NATO country which refuses a transaction with a Soviet bloc state in the interests of the Alliance should receive compensation from its allies.

Opinion on this question falls into four main groups:

(1) Italy, Germany and Portugal would approve discussion by NATO members with a view to co-ordinating their activities in this area.

- Germany does not envisage action by NATO itself but recommends consultation with existing economic organizations if this proves to be useful.

- Italy suggests that the Committee of Technical Advisers appreciate the importance of Soviet activities and call attention to emergency cases. Discussions should then take place on whether any action should be taken by NATO.

(2) Greece, Belgium and Norway feel that it would be dangerous, economically and politically, to enter into a competitive race with the Soviet Union in this field.

(3) The United Kingdom and Luxembourg are prepared to discuss the political importance of particular situations as and when they arise but do not envisage any action by NATO.

(4) Canada finds it impossible to generalise on this subject while the United States urges great caution. The United States Government recalls that the problem is already receiving attention in the Committee on Soviet Economic Penetration.
8. What suggestions can be derived from the experience in the economic field of other regional organizations with a view to the possible application of this experience to other geographical areas?

Those countries which belong neither to the Baghdad Pact nor to the Colombo Plan generally refrain from commenting on this suggestion although the German Government does put forward the general recommendation that member countries should co-ordinate their policies in order to avoid too great a strain on the economic capacities of the countries concerned.

The United Kingdom does not think that NATO should extend its economic activities in any way comparable to those of the Colombo Plan while the United States doubts whether the experiences in question are directly comparable to other economic areas.

Canada concludes that the chief lesson to be drawn is the vital necessity of avoiding the impression that aid is given for political reasons and recalls several features of the Colombo Plan which he believes contributes largely to its success.

All countries are prepared to agree to some consideration by NATO of these questions. Germany, however, considers that NATO should only intervene if agreement cannot be reached in the wider circle of Western countries, while Greece and Belgium remind allies of the danger of creating a NATO "bloc" in other organizations. The Netherlands points out that the habit of mutual consultation is already observed in many cases - this form of consultation should be broadened but not formalised. Canada feels that the initiative for such discussions should lie with the Secretary General and with individual countries.

It is suggested by both Luxembourg and Norway and Portugal that certain subjects due to be discussed in the EEC, e.g. the Soviet proposal for an agreement on Pan-European economic co-operation, would be suitable for discussion by NATO.

The United States and the United Kingdom are particularly concerned that NATO countries should avoid disagreements in other economic organizations which might be exploited by the Soviet bloc and the United States suggests the possibility that many Soviet proposals are put forward mainly in order to create dissensions amongst NATO allies.
10. Are there any other specific economic subjects or classes of subjects of general concern to NATO which are not being adequately considered in other agencies and which might be discussed usefully by NATO?

Several suggestions were put forward concerning subjects suitable for study by NATO although all governments are concerned that NATO should not impinge on the fields of activity of other economic organizations.

- Norway suggests that NATO should discuss:
  - the policy of member countries in the field of civil aviation particularly in view of recent protectionist tendencies in some countries;
  - merchant shipping problems, particularly with regard to the recent increase in discriminatory policies.

- The Netherlands would welcome further exploration of such defence economy questions as standardisation of production and logistic integration.

- Italy suggests that NATO should make a general survey of the economic activities of existing international agencies with a view to assessing their importance for the Atlantic Alliance.

- The United Kingdom thinks that NATO should limit itself to considering the political and strategic implications of what is being done in the OEEC and other organizations and suggests several topics as being suitable for examination including the problems of utilisation of nuclear energy, the lay-out of the economic resources of NATO powers appropriate to competitive co-existence, the economic policies of NATO and the Soviet bloc in relation to important underdeveloped territories and the political implications of the reliance of NATO powers on oil supplies from the Middle East.

- The United States stresses the importance of concourting economic strategy vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc and particularly the maintenance of common politics on the COCOM/CHROM strategic trade control.
Canada agrees that NATO should pay special attention to Soviet economic and commercial activities particularly in underdeveloped territories, although leaving action to the specialised agencies. The United States, however, suggests that NATO should first discuss whether multilateral action in this field in other economic agencies is adequate to present and emerging problems.

The Greek Government asks NATO to make a special effort to understand the economic problems of underdeveloped regions of member countries when dealing with defence problems.

Belgium considers that NATO should limit itself to a consideration of economic problems resulting from wartime problems.
Votre Gouvernement considère-t-il que ces objectifs seront mieux atteints par la création :

(a) d'un institut commun de recherche sur la Communauté Atlantique?

(b) d'un collège civil analogue au Collège de Défense OTAN, où des cours de brève durée sur les problèmes politiques, économiques, sociaux et culturels de la Communauté Atlantique seraient donnés aux personnes qui sont en mesure d'agir sur l'opinion, telles que professeurs, journalistes, etc.,?

1. (a) La Norvège rappelle qu'avec le Danemark elle est à l'origine des propositions pour la création d'un centre d'études de la Communauté Atlantique. Le Canada, les États-Unis, l'Italie ne sont pas défavorables à la création d'un institut commun de recherche sur la Communauté Atlantique; en général, ils souhaitent qu'un comité composé de personnes compétentes procède à une étude préalable. Le Royaume-Uni ne s'y oppose pas non plus mais ne lui accorde pas une très grande priorité; il souhaiterait plutôt encourager les études atlantiques dans des institutions existantes des deux côtés de l'océan. Au contraire la Belgique, la République Fédérale, la Grèce, les Pays-Bas et le Portugal n'envisagent pas volontiers qu'un tel institut puisse être créé.

1. (b) Le Canada, les États-Unis, la République Fédérale, le Portugal, la Grèce acceptent également que soit envisagé un tel collège. Les États-Unis, le Portugal et le Canada soulignent toutefois qu'une attentive étude devrait être faite au préalable. L'Italie ne répond ni oui ni non; la Belgique, le Luxembourg, les Pays-Bas, le Royaume-Uni ne sont pas favorables au projet envisagé. La Belgique, les Pays-Bas et le Royaume-Uni soulignent qu'il suffirait d'ouvrir plus largement l'accès du Collège de Défense OTAN aux civils.

1. Appendice

Lors même qu'ils répondent affirmativement ou négativement aux questions 1(a) et 1(b) certains pays ajoutent des propositions de leur propre chef. Les Pays-Bas demandent que soient créées des cours de faible durée - 4 à 6 semaines - sur les problèmes militaires et la coopération civile pour toutes personnes en mesure d'influencer l'opinion (professeurs, journalistes, syndicalistes, etc.). Le Royaume-Uni souligne qu'il conviendrait d'encourager avant toute autre chose les études atlantiques dans les institutions existantes des deux côtés de l'océan et d'encourager les séminaires comme celui qui a eu lieu à Oxford en juillet dernier. Les États-Unis indiquent qu'outre la création d'un institut visé à la question 1(a) ou du collège visé à la question 1(b) des projets tels qu'une université atlantique pourraient être envisagés. Le Canada insiste particulièrement sur l'importance des liens transatlantiques.
2. Votre Gouvernement estime-t-il que l'OTAN doit encourager la coopération entre les mouvements de jeunesse des pays de l'Alliance eu égard à la coordination des activités de jeunesse dans les pays communistes ? Le Conseil doit-il examiner les problèmes relatifs à la coopération des mouvements de jeunesse ?

3. Votre Gouvernement considère-t-il que l'OTAN doit entreprendre la coordination de mesures de longue haleine destinées à développer le recrutement et la formation de savants, de techniciens et de spécialistes, eu égard aux progrès accomplis dans ces domaines par les pays communistes ?

2. En général les pays membres sont d'accord pour souligner l'intérêt qu'offre pour NATO la coopération avec les organisations de jeunesse. Toutefois la Belgique d'une façon absolue, le Portugal et le Luxembourg avec hésitation, donnent une réponse négative. Le Canada de son côté indique qu'il ne peut répondre car la question posée ne regarde que des organisations de jeunesse elles-mêmes dont l'indépendance à l'égard du gouvernement est absolue. La Norvège, les Pays-Bas, le Royaume-Uni et les États-Unis marquent les limites que doit rencontrer une coopération avec la jeunesse : l'indépendance et le caractère privé des mouvements de jeunesse doivent en tous les cas être respectés. La Norvège insiste pour qu'un examen périodique soit fait de la situation des organisations de jeunesse et souhaiterait même qu'un fonctionnaire de l'OTAN soit spécialement chargé de suivre cette question.

3. D'une façon générale les réponses marquent un accord à ce que cette question soit étudiée par l'OTAN. La Belgique note que la question n'en relève pas moins cependant de la responsabilité nationale. Les États-Unis soulignent que si cet objectif est très important pour l'OTAN, le problème dépasse le cadre des questions culturelles pour être aussi économique et militaire. L'Italie va plus loin soulignant que le recrutement et le perfectionnement ne doivent pas avoir pour objet seulement des savants mais également des techniciens. Elle propose la création d'un centre ou d'une agence qui évaluerait les besoins en personnel des différents pays membres, désignerait telle institution universitaire ou tel autre établissement d'enseignement où le personnel pourrait s'inscrire et se perfectionner et s'efforcerait de leur permettre de prendre place dans le cycle de la production.
4. Afin de renforcer les liens de la Communauté Atlantique, quelles seraient éventuellement, dans le domaine de l'éducation, les tâches que l'OTAN pourrait entreprendre et dont les organisations internationales existantes telles que l'UNESCO ne se sont pas déjà chargées?

4. La Belgique, les Pays-Bas et le Portugal révèlent qu'ils n'ont point de proposition à formuler à cet égard. Le Luxembourg donne la même impression mais espère trouver des propositions dans les rapports qui sortiront de la Conférence sur le rôle de l'école dans la Communauté Atlantique (Palais de Chaillot 3-7 septembre). Le Canada expose que ce sont surtout des échanges bi-latéraux qu'il faut développer et encourager, surtout au travers de l'océan atlantique. Le Royaume-Uni serait content que soient examinés les projets présentés ou recommandés par la conférence des Experts Culturels, juillet 1956. Il estime qu'il faudrait faire davantage dans les écoles dans la mesure où les règles administratives nationales le permettent, se servir des organismes nationaux comme le Comité Atlantique, renouveler l'expérience de la réunion des Responsables de l'Éducation (3-7 septembre 1956). La République Fédérale souhaite que des réunions comme cette dernière soient encouragées et que continue le Fellowship Programme. La Norvège souligne l'importance des échanges de personnes, des summer courses, des visiting professors. Dans le cadre de l'OTAN les accords culturels doivent être développés ainsi que la participation active aux travaux de l'UNESCO; le rôle de l'OTAN doit être dans ce domaine de lancer des projets, d'en encourager d'autres. L'Italie souligne qu'il est important d'enseigner les fins et la nature de la Communauté Atlantique surtout dans les régions sous-développées. Pour les États-Unis il reste encore des domaines culturels qui doivent être explorés par l'OTAN et qui sont ouverts à la coopération atlantique (éducation): l'établissement de chaires atlantiques, le développement des visiting professors et des séminaires d'été, la création de prix de la Communauté Atlantique en sont des exemples.
5. Votre Gouvernement serait-il favorable à des échanges de personnel militaire, soit individuellement, soit en groupes, grâce auxquels ce personnel pourrait se familiariser avec la situation dans d'autres pays membres et la compréhension internationale serait facilitée?

5. Les Gouvernements sont d'accord pour que les échanges de personnel militaire se continuent et même se développent. Les Pays-Bas notent que des difficultés de tous ordres se rencontreront dans ces échanges. La Grèce n'a pas d'objection de principe à formuler mais croit que le collège de défense OTAN répond à l'objectif. Le Royaume-Uni estime la question intéressante et va l'étudier en ce qui concerne les militaires en permission. Le Canada est également favorable à l'idée mais estime que les initiatives privées doivent suffire pour tout ce qui concerne les échanges de personnel en dehors du cadre des programmes d'entraînement. Les États-Unis souhaitent un large développement de ces échanges, se demandent cependant ce qu'il adviendrait d'un programme commun dans ce domaine et note l'intérêt d'échanges OTAN, SEATO, ANZUS, Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord. Il est à noter que tandis que le Portugal s'oppose à des échanges de personnel civil qui coûteraient trop cher, l'Italie y serait favorable.
6. Quels sont parmi les programmes éventuels entrant dans le cadre des questions 1, 2, 3 et 4, ceux qui devraient, de l'avis de votre gouvernement, être financés:

(a) dans le cadre d'un programme financé en commun;

(b) en commun par les pays intéressés;

(c) par les gouvernements membres individuellement?

6. La Norvège n'a pas répondu à cette question. Les Pays-Bas estiment qu'avant de donner leur réponse une étude plus approfondie des problèmes posés serait nécessaire. Le Canada et le Luxembourg hésitent également à répondre dans l'ignorance où ils se trouvent des projets qui seront adoptés. L'un et l'autre indiquent qu'ils ne sont pas opposés pour certains projets, notamment pour les cours de brève durée (Luxembourg) au mode de financement (a). La République Fédérale indique que pour autant qu'il n'y a pas de mise en commun des ressources culturelles, le financement doit être fait selon (c). Pour la Grèce et l'Italie, elles sont favorables au financement selon (a) en général, sauf certains cas particuliers. Le Royaume-Uni préfère en principe le financement (b) sauf des exceptions; les séminaires d'été et la coopération de la jeunesse qui doivent être financés selon (a) et (c). Les États-Unis proposent un financement (a) avec addition de (b) pour la coopération scientifique et les établissements d'enseignement atlantique; pour les cours d'été atlantique et les réunions de la jeunesse ou conférences similaires, ils proposent un financement (c), avec, lorsqu'il s'agit de conférences notamment au Palais de Chaillot, une aide de NATO. Le Portugal est en faveur d'un financement (a) pour un collège de défense OTAN à l'usage des civils, pour un financement (c) pour ce qui concerne la coopération de la jeunesse, pour un financement (b) pour le recrutement et la formation des savants.
IV. QUESTIONS RELATIVES À L'INFORMATION

1. Votre Gouvernement estime-t-il que le service de l'information ne doit chercher qu'à donner des renseignements d'ordre purement documentaire sur l'OTAN ?

1. La Belgique, le Canada, le Luxembourg, les Pays-Bas, le Royaume-Uni et la Norvège sont favorables à cette formule : laisser aux services nationaux la responsabilité d'interpréter les faits, et limiter le rôle de l'OTAN au seul exposé de ces faits. Le Royaume-Uni, le Luxembourg, la Belgique, la Norvège et l'Italie admettent toutefois que la notion de "renseignements d'ordre purement documentaire" doit être prise au sens le plus large, c'est-à-dire non seulement les événements concernant l'OTAN, mais aussi l'ensemble des données qui expliquent les raisons d'être de l'OTAN et unissent entre eux les membres de la Communauté Atlantique. Le Canada estime que ces renseignements documentaires ne doivent pas nécessairement être limités au sujet de l'OTAN.

À l'opposé de cette attitude, le Portugal et la Grèce repoussent de façon absolue toute limitation des fonctions de l'OTAN en matière d'information sous peine d'inefficacité.

Les États-Unis, l'Allemagne et l'Italie se refusent également à limiter le rôle de la division d'information de l'OTAN à la diffusion de renseignements purement documentaires comme insuffisant et inadéquat, au regard de la lutte idéologique.

Dans tous les cas, un accord se dégage (1) sur l'importance des opinions publiques comme facteur d'unité de l'Alliance et la nécessité, pour obtenir leur autorisation, de les mieux informer, (2) sur la nécessité d'éviter que tout matériel d'information susceptible d'être attribué à l'OTAN puisse revêtir un caractère de propagande, la tâche de l'OTAN consistant à fournir aux services nationaux les éléments d'une propagande nationale, (3) sur la liberté des services nationaux en fait de propagande, soit que la responsabilité de l'interprétation des faits leur appartienne en totalité (Royaume-Uni, Pays-Bas, Luxembourg, Norvège), soit que les pays sollicitent et reçoivent de l'OTAN une aide en matériel d'information ou en services (Etats-Unis, Canada), en vue de l'information et aussi de la propagande. Estimant que le développement de la consultation politique offrira une opportunité de développer l'information, les États-Unis insistent sur le besoin de doter la division d'information de tous les moyens appropriés et d'aboutir sans délai à une coopération accrue permettant l'élaboration de méthodes appropriées à la fois dans la zone OTAN...
2. Votre Gouvernement estime-t-il nécessaire de mieux coordonner les efforts dans le domaine de l'information pour faire échec aux initiatives de la propagande soviétique ?

2. A l'exception du Royaume-Uni et de la Norvège, l'ensemble des pays considèrent qu'il est indispensable que les pays de l'OTAN coordonnent leurs efforts pour répondre d'une façon plus efficace aux initiatives de la propagande soviétique. Le Royaume-Uni et la Norvège admettent cependant qu'une meilleure liaison entre les pays et la définition d'une ligne d'action commune sont choses souhaitables.

Un accord général se dégage d'autre part sur la nécessité d'exercer cette coordination avec beaucoup de mesure et de souplesse en raison de la diversité des situations dans les pays. Alors que l'Allemagne, le Portugal, les Pays-Bas, la Grèce, la Norvège et l'Italie expriment un désir de coordination sans réserve, les États-Unis et le Canada insistent sur la différenciation indispensable des méthodes par lesquelles il doit être répondu selon les pays aux initiatives de la propagande soviétique. La Belgique attire l'attention sur l'extrême susceptibilité de la presse vis-à-vis de toute tentative de direction de l'information.

Les États-Unis préconisent l'échange régulier d'informations sur la propagande communiste dans les pays OTAN et sur les mesures prises pour y répondre.

Le Canada suggère plusieurs formes de coopération selon les zones: dans la zone OTAN (ou associée), définir une approche commune des problèmes et atteindre un degré maximum de coopération tout en se conformant avant tout aux désirs des gouvernements. Dans la zone des pays "non engagés", charger les missions diplomatiques d'informer l'opinion par des contacts personnels ou tous autres moyens techniques adéquats de façon à dissiper la méfiance croissante à l'égard de l'OTAN. Dans la zone des pays du bloc soviétique, coordonner les émissions radio des pays de l'OTAN vers ceux-ci et échanger les expériences relatives à cette forme d'information, ceci permettant d'éviter les contradictions (cf. la question de la consultation politique).
3. Votre Gouvernement considère-t-il qu'il convient de développer les visites réciproques de groupes professionnels, tels que professeurs, journalistes, etc. ?

3. La réponse des pays est unanimement favorable au principe de ces visites qui se sont avérées jusqu'ici très efficaces et profitables au renforcement de l'Alliance. Toutefois cet accord est assorti de recommandations visant à l'amélioration de leur rendement.

   (1) Mettre l'accent sur les échanges transatlantiques (Royaume-Uni, Pays-Bas) et veiller à ce que les programmes d'échanges existants accordent plus de place à l'OTAN (Royaume-Uni).

   (2) Développer (Royaume-Uni : dans la mesure du possible) les programmes financés en commun par l'OTAN et les pays membres (États-Unis, Norvège).

   (3) Étendre les voyages à d'autres catégories de visiteurs que les journalistes : éducateurs, syndicalistes, chefs de mouvements de jeunesse, conférenciers (Royaume-Uni, États-Unis, Norvège, Italie).

   (4) Veiller avec le plus grand soin à la sélection des participants et à l'organisation des voyages (Portugal, Luxembourg, Belgique) et, dans ce but, s'en tenir à de petits groupes (Royaume-Uni).

   (5) Quant au programme de ces visites, la Belgique demande qu'elles aient avant tout pour objet les organismes civils et militaires dépendant directement de l'OTAN. L'Italie par contre souhaite une meilleure définition des secteurs à mettre en valeur et que ces visites ne s'appliquent pas tant à l'organisation elle-même civile et militaire qu'à son caractère de communauté.
Votre Gouvernement estime-t-il qu'il convient d'améliorer la coopération entre le service d'information de l'OTAN et les organismes nationaux d'information, tant publics que privés ?

La situation actuelle en ce domaine est jugée d'ores et déjà satisfaisante par l'Allemagne, le Royaume-Uni, le Portugal, la Grèce, le Canada et le Luxembourg. Elle devrait être améliorée et la coopération intensifiée (Royaume-Uni, États-Unis, Pays-Bas, Grèce, Canada et Norvège).

Le Royaume-Uni et l'Italie mettent l'accent sur le développement et le resserrement de la coopération entre l'OTAN, les services nationaux et les organisations privées. Le Royaume-Uni demande que cette coopération soit sous contrôle du Comité de l'information et des relations culturelles et recommande que les divers gouvernements accordent un soutien financier aux associations privées en faveur de l'OTAN.

Les États-Unis considèrent que les services nationaux devraient assurer une meilleure distribution du matériel d'information OTAN et que la coopération serait grandement facilitée par l'établissement et la communication de plans et de rapports périodiques permettant les discussions en commun des projets.

La désignation d'un fonctionnaire chargé dans chaque capitale de veiller à la diffusion des informations sur les activités de l'OTAN et d'assurer une liaison avec l'Organisation est vivement recommandée par les États-Unis et l'Italie, tandis que le Royaume-Uni la juge inutile en ce qui le concerne mais reconnaît que cette initiative pourrait être utile en d'autres pays au gré et à la charge des pays hôtes.

Dans le même esprit, la Norvège suggère que les fonctionnaires chargés de l'information dans les pays de l'OTAN participent plus fréquemment aux travaux du Comité de l'information et des relations culturelles.

La Grèce, la Norvège et l'Italie insistent pour que soient surmontées les difficultés de langues. Pour la Grèce, il s'agirait de compléter le personnel de l'information de façon à ce qu'il connaisse toutes les langues des pays de l'Alliance, ainsi que les langues slaves.

La Belgique estime que le développement de la coopération entre la division d'information et les représentants de la presse résidant à Paris devrait suffire à résoudre le problème de l'amélioration de la coopération OTAN-organismes nationaux.
5. Tous les pays, sauf la Belgique, insistent sur le caractère confidentiel des consultations politiques et les conditions de sécurité dont elles doivent être entourées. Cette considération fondamentale est au premier plan des préoccupations qui ont inspiré leurs réponses.

Le Portugal et les Pays-Bas en concluent à la nécessité presque absolue d'un secret rigoureux autour de ces délibérations.

Par contre, l'Allemagne, le Royaume-Uni, les États-Unis, la Grèce, le Canada, le Luxembourg, la Norvège, l'Italie sont conscients de la nécessité de donner, chaque fois que cela est possible, la meilleure publicité au principe même de ces consultations politiques, sinon à leur contenu. Ils cherchent par conséquent à en définir les moyens et les limites et à établir un équilibre satisfaisant entre les données contradictoires du secret des délibérations et de la publicité autour de leur existence. Sur ce point l'accord est général: il doit appartenir au Conseil Permanent (ou au Secrétaire Général agissant en son nom: États-Unis) de décider hors de toute règle rigide dans quel cas, dans quelle mesure et sous quelle forme on peut, sans porter atteinte au secret indispensable, répondre néanmoins aux besoins de la publicité autour de la consultation politique. La Belgique estime que c'est par les communiqués ministériels et les déclarations des ministres ayant participé aux consultations que l'opinion publique pourrait être informée. Ensuite seulement, la division d'information insisterait sur les résultats concrets obtenus. Les autorités nationales s'abstiendraient quant à elles, de toute déclaration publique prématurée sur des questions devant faire l'objet de discussions au Conseil.
1. What specific changes in procedure or organizational arrangements would your Government recommend to ensure closer and more effective consultation in the Council to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community?

V. ORGANIZATIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL QUESTIONS

The Governments of Belgium, Canada, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom consider that no fundamental organizational changes are required.

Canada, Italy and the United Kingdom recommend more frequent Ministerial Meetings. These same countries and Belgium would also favour ministers attending sessions of the Permanent Council. Canada and Italy furthermore recommend that more time should be devoted to Ministerial Meetings, and Italy suggests that in certain cases countries might be represented at Council meetings by their Heads of Government. Italy and Norway stress the importance of the Council in Permanent Session; Italy recommends the strengthening of the power of effective decision by the Permanent Representatives, and Norway considers it essential that member governments give very high priority to their representation on the Council and secure the closest possible link between governments and their representatives. Norway furthermore believes that the Council is sometimes overloaded with work and should therefore consider the possibility of delegating its power of decision in certain fields to the appropriate Council Committees, which might necessitate the strengthening of the national representation on these committees.

Canada, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom would favour a better preparation of political consultations. Canada is of the opinion that more attention should be paid by governments to the preparatory work on the problems to be discussed. It also suggests that senior officials might be sent in advance of meetings to assist in the preparatory work and that senior experts might be sent as consultants on special subjects. The Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom point to the preparation of discussions on trends of Soviet policy as an example for the preparation of other subjects. The United Kingdom accordingly suggests that the Working Group on Trends of Soviet Policy might extend its activities to other selected political questions, and that its chairman (DSG or ASC Political) should keep in touch with delegations to ensure that suitable political questions are reviewed in the working group before discussion by the Council.
The Greek Government is of the opinion that the Political Division should be more closely associated with political consultations in the Council, and suggests that on specific questions a member of the Council might be asked to act as rapporteur. Private sessions of the Council should be limited to very delicate questions only.

The United States proposes the establishment of a Committee of Ministerial delegates which would meet regularly in Paris for top level political consultations. A similar proposal is made by Germany which furthermore suggests the setting up of a Political Annual Review.

2. To what extent does your Government consider that experts could be used more either on a permanent or ad hoc basis to assist the Council in the process of political consultation?

Most Governments appear to favour a flexible, ad hoc approach to the question of the use of experts, leaving it to each country individually to decide which expert is required, and when.

The Governments of Italy and Norway stress the importance of expert advice for political discussions, such as it already is used in the analysis of Soviet policy. They would be in favour of continuing this practice in special committees. Italy suggests that experts on particular political questions might either assist their Permanent Representatives at Council meetings, or hold special meetings for the purpose of preparing technical advice for the Council, which in all cases would retain the power of decision. The United States points to a special need for more national experts on Soviet affairs to assist Council members.

Norway recommends that the work of the Working Group on Trends of Soviet Foreign Policy be pursued in closer co-operation between all member countries, and that the scope of this work be extended to cover developments in all Communist countries in the political as well as the economic field, establishing thereby a permanent NATO institute for the study of political and economic relations between the Western Countries and the Soviet bloc.

3. To what extent should the Secretary General play an active rôle in the field of political consultation, and to what particular types of problems should such a rôle extend?

All Governments appear to be of the opinion that the rôle of the Secretary General is of paramount importance and should not be restricted by any rigid rules. The United Kingdom while not wishing in any way to limit his powers of initiative, would expect the Secretary General to exercise caution in attempting to mediate or proposing solutions. The Norwegian Government believes that it might be useful if the Council confirmed the authority given to the Secretary General at
Lisbon, underlining particularly his right to initiate matters for Council action.

The Canadian Government stress the necessity for the Secretary General to be kept fully informed on the thinking of member governments on questions of common concern. They furthermore suggest that through periodic visits to member governments and through personal consultation he should be able to offer his informal good offices whenever this might be conducive to the conciliation of diverging interests.

The Governments of Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States propose that the Secretary General should preside at all Council meetings, including those in Ministerial Session.

The Italian Government suggests that in order to assist the Secretary General in his task of stimulating political consultations, the Political Division should be strengthened, given more responsibilities and, through a better utilisation of the NATO information services, be provided with the necessary material.

The German Government suggests that the Secretary General be given a position as mediator. When called upon by a NATO Government, he might form, under his chairmanship, a Mediating Committee consisting of representatives of three NATO countries not involved in the dispute.

The United States suggests that the Secretary General preside over the Committee on inter-community disputes proposed by it, that he attend on invitation international conferences of interest to NATO, and that he submit an annual "State of the Alliance" message at each December meeting.

The Netherlands Government sees the possibility of a further development of the Secretary General's activities in the preparatory stage of political consultation, and in the drafting of evaluations of specific political developments.
4. In view of the economic responsibilities of NATO, and those in prospect, what organizational changes, if any, does your Government consider are required to discharge them?

All countries appear to agree that no organizational changes are required for NATO to discharge its economic responsibilities. To this general statement the Netherlands add, however, that care should be taken to ensure that the organizational machinery of NATO be adequate to perform NATO's tasks with respect to those specific economic problems directly related to co-operation in the military field.

The United Kingdom points out that economic experts are readily available in OECD.

Italy and the United States suggest that the existing Committee of Technical Advisers might become a general economic committee which on the request of the Council could evaluate the merit of NATO consideration of economic items in the light of current developments, and make such recommendations as seemed appropriate.

The Norwegian Government believed it to be hardly advisable to set up new committees of a permanent character with fixed terms of reference, but would prefer the convocations of expert meetings on an ad hoc basis.

5. Does your Government consider that greater use could be made of NATO machinery for the circulation on a NATO-wide basis of "basic position material" by individual governments (e.g. texts of agreements, basic statements of position, etc.)?

All countries consider that greater use could be made of NATO machinery for the circulation of basic position material, with the exception of Belgium and Portugal who are of the opinion that this would be unnecessary.

The Luxembourg Government points out that the material circulated should directly or indirectly relate to NATO.

The United Kingdom states that they could also make available for circulation Government White Papers, speeches by Ministers, etc.

In the opinion of the United States it might also be desirable to consider the more systematic sharing of other basic materials such as certain types of intelligence reports.
6. The suggestion has been made that a closer relationship might be established between NATO and the United Nations, possibly establishing the position of NATO as a regional organization in the terms of Chapter 8 of the United Nations Charter. What are the views of your Government on this question?

No Government appears to be in favour of formally establishing the position of NATO as a regional organization under the United Nations Charter.
CHAPTER I: POLITICAL CO-OPERATION

Introduction

In the light of the general considerations advanced in the preceding chapter, closer and more effective continuing consultation on political matters of common concern between member states and a resolute effort to reconcile dissensions between them stand out as the conditions precedent to the strengthening of NATO in the political field and the further development of the Atlantic Community.

If there is to be vitality in the concept of the Atlantic Community, then NATO through its member governments must demonstrate that this international organization has something special to offer to its members which is not available to them in the United Nations or other international associations and this without in any way weakening the United Nations or these other organizations. The solid foundation of NATO is and remains the solemn basic obligation of its members to consider that an attack on one is an attack on all which will be met by the collective action of all. This commitment and the defence activities which flow from it serve to provide protection for member states and to maintain the conditions of peace and security in which international co-operation can prosper. NATO, based as it is on the developing concept of the Atlantic Community, provides in addition the means for closer co-operation in many fields other than defence.
This closer political co-operation should aim at the maintenance of the unity of the Alliance, including closer relationships in Western Europe, at a time when international tensions and the fear of military aggression may be less severe than in recent years; the development of policies which will strengthen relationships and understanding between NATO and non-NATO countries including the "uncommitted" ones; finding an effective basis of action for the Western world in the face of the continuing and complex challenge of international communism.

Any effective international co-operation requires common approaches to the solution of common problems. This ought to be easier for members of the Atlantic Community, because of the special ties between them. But this will not happen except to the extent to which member governments develop the habit of consulting one another before taking action.

Consultation will not be made more effective by declarations of intent to consult, but only by demonstrations of the will to consult through tackling of specific problems which now confront the Alliance and a willingness to re-examine purely national interests when the occasion requires in relation to the common interests of the Alliance. By the steady and persistent, if gradual development of effective procedures and habits of consultation, NATO can best achieve an effective basis for developing a common foreign policy for the Alliance in important areas of common concern.

The recommendations that follow are to be interpreted in this light: not as rigid rules but as indications by the Committee of how, in their judgment, the habit of consultation can be further developed. Their effectiveness will be judged by the extent to which they are applied to specific cases to give greater unity and strength to the Alliance.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

I. Consultation

(A) Types of Consultation

The types of consultations in NATO should include:
(1) exchange of information on any matter which any
member or the Secretary General considers of general
interest or common concern to the Alliance;

(2) exchanging views and providing material for apprecia-
tion of current political developments;

(3) consulting with other members with a view to arriv-
ing at a general consensus in the light of which
member governments would draw their own conclusions
and determine national policies;

(4) consulting in certain fields of common concern to
current policies and agreed action.

(B) Implementation

(1) In addition to the general understanding that member
governments should inform one another on matters of common concern
and interest to the Alliance, they should in particular accept the
responsibility of informing the Council of any developments in their
policies or positions which may significantly affect member countries
or the Alliance as a whole.

(2) For the effective implementation of political consultation,
the right to raise for discussion in the Council or in any subordinate
body any subject from the point of view of the interests of NATO
needs to be fully accepted.

(3) Member governments should not adopt firm policies in
matters of concern to the whole Alliance without early advance con-
sultation with the other members of the Alliance.

(4) Member governments should seek to develop their national
policies in the light of the interests and views of other NATO
governments as expressed in consultations even where no consensus
or recommendations have been reached.

(5) Where a consensus has been reached, this should be taken
into account in formulating national policy: when for national
reasons the consensus is not followed, the government concerned
should explain its reasons to the Council.
(6) Where agreement on specific policies or courses of action is reached, the Council has to proceed by way of recommendations to governments. To share in such consultation places the responsibility on all governments to see to it that full weight is given to such recommendations in arriving at their final national decisions and policies.

(7) When a major statement of an international political character may significantly affect the Alliance as a whole or some of its members, the government making or responsible for such a statement should endeavour to consult in advance through the Council.

(8) Limitations

It should be recognised that the various forms of consultation outlined above would operate in practice under certain limitations such as:

(1) that the desirability of advance consultation in NATO should not hamper prompt action in real emergencies;

(2) that the ultimate responsibility for making national policies and decisions must inevitably rest with the individual member government, taking into account the broader interests of the partnership;

(3) that consultation on domestic affairs may appropriately take place only with the agreement of the country most directly concerned, and only on those aspects which may significantly affect other members of the Alliance;

(4) that although NATO is non-universal in character, and the obligations under the Treaty do not extend beyond the NATO area, geographical considerations should not preclude discussion of questions relating to non-NATO areas when such questions concern the general interests of the Alliance;

(5) that the agenda of the Council should not be so overburdened by discussions of subsidiary political questions that consultation is delayed or hampered on matters of primary importance to the unity and common interest of the Alliance;
(D) Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

Members of NATO have undertaken under Article 1 of the Treaty the obligation to "settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means". Current disputes between member governments seriously threaten the unity of the Alliance. If political co-operation in NATO is to develop effectively it is of crucial importance to make progress in settling these disputes. Unless this progress is made, whether by direct negotiations between the parties concerned or within the framework of NATO, generalised recommendations on possible procedures for dealing with inter-member disputes will inevitably seem academic and serve only to draw attention to the existence of unresolved disputes. In view of the wide range of suggested procedures put forward in the replies to the questionnaire, it will be necessary for the Committee of Three to examine this question in detail in discussion with their colleagues, in order to clarify the possible procedures and to find a common basis for agreement. A possible basis may be found in the following proposals.

(1) A resolution under Article 1 of the Treaty, and in accordance with Article 33 of the UN Charter, to declare the intention of NATO governments to submit in the first instance any inter-member dispute for settlement within the NATO framework.

(2) A special Committee of the Council to take cognisance of any such dispute and to apply "good offices"; it would be mainly concerned with procedures and "fact-finding" without entering into substantive questions except at the request of the parties concerned.

(3) A "Panel of Atlantic Community Arbitrators" composed of eminent persons and available to member governments on request of the interested parties.

(4) Where appropriate and necessary, NATO to sponsor proposals for a settlement; to give general or specific support to it; or to assume definite obligations in connection with the implementation or maintenance of the settlement.
As an alternative to these proposals, the Committee recommends that the Council should without delay set up an expert Working Group in which all member governments would be asked to participate, in order to consider and draw up specific proposals on such procedures to deal with inter-member differences and disputes as may be immediately applicable to current disputes as well as to disputes which may arise in the future. The Working Group would submit its findings to the Committee of Three.

Pending the results of the study suggested above and consideration of their application to current differences, it is recommended that in the interests of the Alliance as a whole recourse should not be made to international machinery outside NATO in inter-member disputes.

(E) Parliamentary associations and Parliamentary Conference

It is recognised that the formation of national Parliamentary associations and the activities of the Parliamentary Conference contribute to the development of public support for NATO and solidarity among its members. The following measures are therefore recommended for bringing these bodies into closer relationship with the Council of NATO:

(1) That the Council continue to place the facilities of NATO headquarters at the disposal of Parliamentary meetings and to give all possible help with arrangements for such meetings.

(2) That Parliamentary Conferences might be attended for speeches and discussion periods, by invited representatives of member governments, by the Secretary General and other senior representatives of NATO civil and military authorities. In this way the parliamentarians would be informed on the state of the Alliance and the problems before it, and so enabled to hold useful discussions.

(3) That while any Parliamentary meeting might submit a report of its discussions to the Council, for the present it should be discouraged from addressing resolutions to the Council.
CHAPTER II: CO-OPERATION IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD

Introduction

1. The economic interests shared in common by the members of NATO fall into three major categories:

(a) an interest in the economic health and growth of the member nations themselves and in harmonious relations among them which is essential to the welfare and self-confidence of the Atlantic peoples as well as to an adequate defence effort;

(b) an interest in the successful economic development of the world's under-developed areas which is desirable as an end in itself and is essential to the Atlantic Community's own welfare, to the maintenance of freedom, and to stable and fruitful relations between these regions and the Atlantic world; and

(c) an interest in countering and frustrating, and if possible anticipating and forestalling, those Soviet initiatives in the economic field which are intended to create division within the Alliance to subvert freedom or to strengthen Soviet political and economic influence in non-member countries.
In contrast with the military and political fields, the common economic interests of NATO members, where they require international co-operation, can be and are being pursued through other organizations whose membership generally is well adapted to the desired forms of co-operation. The outstanding instances are the OEEC (which includes all NATO countries as full or associate members and four others); the GATT; the IMF; the IBRD and the IFG, and the various United Nations specialised agencies including the Economic Commission for Europe. The work of GATT would be assisted by bringing into existence the proposed OTC. Several NATO members participate actively in the Colombo Plan for promoting economic development for Asia. Most members are taking an active part in technical assistance programmes and are also participating in discussions of proposals for the creation of a SUNFED. There are also institutions for close economic co-operation among smaller groupings of the European member nations.

3. It would not serve the interests of the Atlantic Community for NATO to take over the operating functions of any of these cooperative organizations, in all of which NATO members play a major part. Nor, in the Committee's view, do there now appear to be significant new areas for common economic action requiring execution by NATO itself. The Committee believes, however, that the community of economic interest, and indeed the long run security of the North Atlantic area broadly conceived, require a substantial expansion of exchange of information and of consultation in the economic as well as in the political field. Especially where economic matters are clearly related to the political and security interests of NATO, such consultation should seek to secure a common approach on the part of member governments.
The resulting action, however, should normally be taken either bilaterally or through other international organizations.

(B) Areas for Economic Consultation

4. Just as in the political field, NATO's arrangements for expanded economic consultation should permit any member, or the Secretary General, to raise in the Council at any time any economic matter felt to be of significance to the Alliance. Apart from this "open agenda" principle, there are areas where the Alliance requires at a minimum a regular interchange of information and of governmental attitudes, and in certain cases a concerted effort to harmonise views and to agree on a common course of action.

Strengthening Members' Economies and Promoting their Economic Co-operation

5. There now exists adequate provision for a regular assessment of each member country's general economic position, prospects and problems through the OECD and NATO Annual Reviews. The basic requirements for economic health and growth, which are vital to the Alliance, are sound internal economic policies and organized co-operation to promote the greatest possible freedom in trade, payments, and the movements of manpower and long-term capital.

While there remains a great deal to be accomplished in these respects, the requisite machinery for co-operation among NATO members exists in other organizations. This is not felt to be an appropriate field for new NATO arrangements.

6. On the other hand, issues may arise, affecting the economic health of the Atlantic Community, where NATO may be the only effective organization for consultation because of their partially political nature or because of their relation to the...
common defence. On both these counts NATO might be properly concerned, for example, with the assurance of oil supplies for Western Europe and with the adequacy of action for the development of atomic power. Economic aspects of defence, including questions of economic mobilisation and stockpiling of civilian supplies are already under review in NATO; such matters should continue to be a regular concern of the organization.

7. One important new area of this type, especially appropriate for NATO consultation, is the field of scientific and technical co-operation. This includes not only the problem of adequate recruitment and training of scientists and technicians, but also the exchange of scientific information and co-operation in scientific research. The Committee recommends:

(to be completed on the basis of Dr. Major's report).

Conflicts in Economic Policies of Member Countries

8. The Committee distinguishes between disagreements on economic policy which are normal subject of bilateral negotiation or multilateral discussion in other organizations, and economic disputes which may have political or strategic repercussions damaging to the Alliance. Nothing would be gained by merely having repeated in NATO the same arguments made in other and more technically qualified organizations; to do so might even weaken the effectiveness of NATO in seeking to resolve disputes of genuine political or strategic importance. On the other hand, it should be open to members to raise for discussion in NATO issues on which they feel consideration elsewhere is not making adequate progress and NATO consultation might facilitate solutions contributing to the objectives of the Atlantic Community.
9. The Committee recommends, moreover, that whenever an aggrieved member or the Secretary General is of the view that an unresolved dispute in the economic field may involve dangerous political or strategic consequences for NATO as a whole, the procedures for peaceful settlement under NATO auspices as described above, should be applicable.

Relations with Under-Developed Areas

10. It is a matter of common consent that the Atlantic Community has a major positive concern with the assurance of political stability and freedom in the under-developed areas and consequently with their healthy and accelerated economic development. It is likewise agreed that NATO is not an appropriate agency for administering programmes of assistance for economic development or even for generallyconcerting the relevant policies of member nations. The Committee recommends that member countries keep each other and the Organization informed of their programmes and policies in this field, and that there be occasional discussion in NATO of the adequacy of existing action in relation to the interests of the Alliance, including the degree of priority which should be given to areas of particular concern to the Atlantic Community.

Soviet Economic Initiatives

11. Because of its unique political basis, NATO is the only major international organization in which governments can exchange information and views freely and frankly on Soviet economic initiatives. The recent tendency of Soviet policy to use economic measures as a deliberate means of weakening the Western Alliance, or of creating in neutral areas a dangerous degree of dependence on the Soviet world, makes it especially important that NATO undertake systematic consultation in this field.
12. The Committee recommends that NATO continue its regular reporting on economic trends in Soviet countries (including the comparison with member countries) and trends in Soviet economic policy. To this end, governments should undertake to report relevant information regularly, and there should be periodic meetings of experts on Soviet economic affairs drawn from the various capitals. In addition to the exchange of information, there should be periodic discussion of the implications of such trends for the Alliance and of possible lines of action which might be taken by member governments individually or co-operatively.

Where general Soviet initiatives are made in the field of economic policy (as in the case of the proposal for "all-European economic co-operation" presented to the WECC in Geneva last April), there should be NATO consultation concerning the possible lines of response by member countries.

13. With respect to Soviet commercial relations with member countries, arrangements should be made for periodic meetings of officials involved in Soviet bloc commercial negotiations for an exchange of information and views. In the case of an important new Soviet commercial or financial proposal to any member country, with possible political implications, it would be desirable for the member concerned to bring it to the attention of the Council. In connection with strategic controls on East-West and China, it would be desirable to review in NATO from time to time the broader political and strategic aspects of the control arrangements and to seek agreement on the lines of action in this area most conducive to the welfare of the Atlantic Community.

14. The Alliance also has a positive interest in the more complex and difficult field of Soviet economic relations with non-members, especially the under-developed countries. The Committee welcomes the first steps in the exchange of information on this
The Committee of Three: from left to right, Mr Halvard Lange, Prof. Gaetano Makino, and Mr L. B. Pearson.

Topic in the Committee on Soviet Economic Policy, and believes that exchange of information in this field should be a continuing function of NATO. Whether a particular Soviet initiative should be countered by member countries is a matter for ad hoc consideration on which no attempt at advance generalisation is possible. It would clearly not be desirable to engage in indiscriminate competition with the Soviets, but in any event NATO consultation in this field would be highly advantageous to the Alliance. Member governments and the Secretary General should bring to the Council's attention any case in which they feel that failure to respond to, or to forestall, a Soviet initiative may significantly contribute to Soviet penetration or diminished independence in any area important to the Atlantic Community. Governments may then exchange views and consider the possibility of positive action, even if this requires an exceptional departure from the basic foreign economic policies of the West. In this as in other economic fields, however, any indicated action would be undertaken not by NATO as such, but by individual governments or appropriate organizations.

(C) Relations with Other Organizations

15. For reasons already outlined, the co-operative economic actions required by members in the interests of the Atlantic Alliance are best carried out through organizations other than NATO itself. NATO should not, as such, seek to establish formal relations with these other organizations and the harmonising of attitudes and of action should rather be left to member governments. With respect to the organizations composed wholly of free countries, it is neither necessary nor desirable for NATO members to seek to form a common policy front. Creation of a "NATO bloc" within such organizations would be positively harmful and tend to alienate the other members. Exceptional issues arising in such
organizations, with special political or strategic interest to
NATO, may be raised for discussion by any member or the Secretary
General. With respect to international economic organizations
in which the Soviets participate, notably the
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the Economic
Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, and the Economic
and Social Council - the Committee recommends that consultation be scheduled by the Secretary General in advance of each
meeting to review the agenda, identify points in which Atlantic
interests may be attacked or endangered, consider possible Western
initiatives, and where appropriate, establish a general community
of attitude. Western tactics, as distinct from broad policies,
should be concerted by national delegations at the respective
organizations; in suitable cases this may include free nations
not members of NATO. There should be neither the fact nor the
appearance of a formal NATO bloc, and there should certainly be
no attempt to direct Western tactics in such organizations from
the Palais de Chaillot. On the other hand, consultations in
NATO should go sufficiently far to assure the frustration of
Soviet tactics deliberately designed to divide or weaken the
Alliance.

(D) NATO Machinery for Economic Consultation

There has been, in recent months, a considerable
evolution in NATO's machinery for economic consultation, notably
in the work on Soviet economic trends and policies, including
Soviet economic penetration in under-developed countries and the
creation of the Committee of Technical Advisers. In addition, a
number of economic matters have been brought before the Council for
consideration on an ad hoc basis. No substantial new machinery
in this field is called for. However, in view of the extended
range of topics for regular exchange of information and consultation
described above the Committee recommends Council consideration of establishing on a permanent basis a Committee of the Council under some such title as "Economic Advisory Committee". This Committee if established would be entrusted with the regular exchange of information and preliminary discussion, in those areas of systematic consultation outlined above, together with such ad hoc projects as might be initiated by the Council or approved by the Council at the Committee's request. Any continuing function of the Committee of Technical Advisers would be absorbed by the Economic Advisory Committee. Membership should be flexible, governments being represented by highly qualified specialists as the topics under consideration may require. The highly specialised character of Soviet economic studies might make it desirable to retain this responsibility with the Committee on Soviet Economic Policy. In any event, whether or not an Economic Advisory Committee is established, arrangements should be made for more meetings of officials who are dealing currently with various economic matters important to the Alliance, such as Soviet commercial negotiations, trends in under-developed countries, scientific and technical cooperation, and the like. Informal discussion among officials with corresponding specialised responsibilities is a particularly valuable means of concerting governmental attitudes in the earliest stages of policy formation.

(B) Conclusion

The Committee has carefully reviewed the question of whether the obligations of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty call for additional action by NATO as such. The Committee regards the objectives of Article 2 as of basic importance to the stability and well-being not only of the North Atlantic area but of the entire free world. In their considered judgment, however, these objectives will best be fostered by continued and enhanced economic collaboration both bilaterally and through organizations other than NATO, but reinforced by NATO consultation where the interests of the Alliance are involved. It is a misconstruction of Article 2 to believe that its purpose can be achieved only through NATO action. The Organization should make clear to the world how vigorously these objectives are being pursued by its members and how NATO's action effectively complements their action through other channels.
CHAPTER III: CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

Introduction

Durable unity within the Atlantic Alliance can be constructed and will be maintained only on the firm foundation of strong popular support throughout the NATO area. A sense of community must bind the people as well as the institutions of the Atlantic nations and this sense of community will exist in the measure that there is a realisation of their common cultural heritage, institutions and modes of thought. The Committee therefore considers it indispensable for the NATO countries to seek all practical means to promote cultural co-operation among their peoples in order to strengthen their relations and to develop maximum support for the Atlantic Alliance. In view of the geographical characteristics of the NATO area, it is particularly important to ensure that the Community's cultural activities should be strongly trans-Atlantic in nature, although this should not preclude member governments from acting on a multilateral or bilateral basis, to strengthen their own cultural relations within the broader Atlantic framework.

The Committee welcomes the cultural activities which have been initiated by private individuals and non-governmental groups. The Committee considers it essential that those sources of initiative be encouraged to pursue and increase their activities. Care should be exercised to avoid government initiative duplicating or dominating cultural activities by non-governmental groups. Both have important rôles to play, with government activities supporting and supplementing private efforts.

Recommendations

(A) General Principles

To promote effective cultural collaboration within the Atlantic Alliance, the Committee suggests that member governments
should be guided by the following general principles:

(1) In advocating and implementing cultural projects, member governments should make the most effective use of existing resources and concentrate on projects not already adequately covered from the NATO point of view.

(2) As distinct from action by national governments or private groups, member governments should give priority to those projects which require joint NATO action, and thus contribute to a developing sense of community.

(3) Member governments should give special emphasis to cultural projects which will tend to generate similar initiatives by private groups and institutions in other NATO countries.

(4) In their consideration of all proposed cultural projects, member governments should include a realistic appreciation of the financial implications. To the extent that agreement can be reached within the Alliance on useful cultural projects, based on practical and equitable financial and administrative arrangements, member governments should at the same time be prepared to pay their fair share of the cost of such projects.

(B) Specific Proposals

1. In order to develop public awareness and knowledge of the Atlantic Community, and to provide a link between the institutions of the Atlantic area and public opinion, member governments should support the principle of the establishment of a common research institute for Atlantic Community studies. This type of undertaking requires thorough study; member governments should therefore seek
This year, for the first time, NATO helped to finance undertakings initiated by a member government or a private organization (the Oxford University seminar, and the Study Conference on "The Role of the School in the Atlantic Community"). This method of joint financing NATO cultural projects proved to be useful and should be used more extensively.
CHAPTER IV: CO-OPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD

Introduction and General Principles

Wide popular support throughout the Atlantic area is the indispensable basis for the strength and cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance. The maintenance and growth of this favourable public opinion depend mainly on the existence at all times of a clear understanding of NATO's aspirations and accomplishments in every field of its activities. The Committee hopes that its recommendations on political and economic consultations will lead to greater opportunities for expanding NATO information work and for widening NATO appeal to public opinion.

In particular the Committee invites the attention of member governments to the following principles which appear basic for effective NATO information activities:

(a) the primary objective of NATO information activities must be public opinion in the NATO area. The attitude taken towards NATO in non-NATO areas will be influenced to the extent that the peoples of the Alliance have themselves firm conviction about NATO's purposes and accomplishments;

(b) the maintenance of a loyal and favourable public opinion in NATO countries greatly depends on the degree of agreement which is found in member states on the basic concepts and objectives of NATO co-operation.

The understanding of NATO objectives is necessary outside the NATO area if the efforts of member governments towards the fulfilment of the aims and purposes of the Alliance are to be viewed sympathetically, and if their political and economic co-operation is not to be misinterpreted by governments not members of the Organization.
Positive action by NATO to counter communist propaganda will help to develop better mutual understanding within and outside the Atlantic area. The Committee believes there is scope in this particular field for improving liaison between member governments on all matters of information dealing with the Soviet and satellite countries, comparable to the current exchange of information on the subject of contacts with Soviet and satellite countries.

NATO information activities should not extend into fields which more appropriately belong to national information services of member governments. The task of explaining and reporting on NATO activities on the basis of factual information rests primarily with national information services of each member government. Publicity, however, for the bonds and common traditions which unite them is a field which NATO should jointly cultivate with members of the Alliance.

The Committee appreciates that no rigid dividing line is possible and that national requirements and practices have to be taken fully into account. The formulation of national information policies, however, should provide enough scope and range to enable member governments to discharge effectively their commitments and responsibilities towards NATO.

**Specific Proposals**

1. The Information Division of NATO should not concern itself exclusively with the presentation of factual information about the Organization but should, when required, provide national services with special studies on matters of common interest to member governments, although these studies may not necessarily deal with NATO.
Further study should be given to ways and means of improving co-ordination of efforts by individual governments in the propaganda field, both in regard to the uncommitted countries and the Soviet and satellite countries.

Member governments should now direct their attention to informing the peoples of the uncommitted countries of the defensive, as well as the non-military, aspects of the Atlantic Community. This might be achieved by information activities conducted by the diplomatic missions of the various NATO governments in these countries, and designed to remove mistaken impressions about NATO.

NATO governments should also pool their experience relating to the dissemination of information aimed at Soviet and satellite countries. The Committee on Information and Cultural Relations could be used for this purpose.

2. Member governments are already doing valuable work on a bilateral basis in sponsoring visits of professional groups. In this connection, special mention may be made of the United States' Technical Assistance Programme which has enabled an important number of European technicians and skilled workers to acquaint themselves with the United States and working conditions there. Indirectly, such visits serve to develop a feeling of community between the peoples of the countries concerned. Member governments should recognise the need to develop such bilateral exchanges and, whenever possible, give them a NATO flavour.

It is generally recognised that great benefit has accrued to NATO through the Journalists' Tours sponsored by the Organization. These tours should, therefore, be continued but their character, it is felt, should now be changed. They should no longer be confined to journalists but should include trade union
NATO should also organize conferences of a few days' duration for a wider variety of professional groups.

The success of undertakings of this kind largely depends on the quality of participants. Governments are therefore urged to pay special attention to the selection of suitably qualified representatives.

3. The Committee on Information and Cultural Relations is being increasingly used to achieve closer co-operation between the NATO Information Division and national information services.

To further co-operation in the information field, the following additional practical measures are suggested:

(1) An officer should be designated by national information services to maintain liaison with NATO and to be responsible for the dissemination of NATO information material;

(2) governments should report to NATO the information programmes which they plan to implement, with a view to subjecting these programmes to review and discussion in the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations. Representatives of national information services from capitals might usefully be encouraged to take part in these discussions and to attend normal meetings of the Committee;

(3) governments should actively consider making practical use of and give financial aid, if necessary, to private organizations supporting NATO. They should encourage the establishment of closer relations between such organizations and the NATO Information Division;

(4) within the Information Division budget, provision should be made for a translation fund so that NATO information material can be translated into the non-official languages of the Alliance, according to reasonable requirements of the member governments.

4. Widespread public understanding of the implications of political consultation within NATO is essential if NATO is to be considered more than a military alliance.

It will always be a question of judgment, however, to determine the extent to which information should be given regarding the political activities of the Alliance, as the advantages of publicity must be balanced against security requirements.

Insofar as possible, NATO should inform the public when a collective view is reached or when an important decision has been taken. When appropriate, more use should be made in Ministerial statements to national parliaments of the phrase "consultation with our NATO Allies."
CHAPTER V: ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

Introduction

The Committee considers that the structure of NATO is generally capable of performing the tasks expected of it. The Committee is not therefore proposing any basic structural changes, but has certain procedural measures to suggest to the Secretary General and to member governments to facilitate the implementation of its recommendations.

One primary consideration for the development of fuller and franker consultations is respect for their confidential character, and the observation of strict security measures.

Meetings at Ministerial Level

(1) More time should be allowed at the Ministerial meetings in order to permit thorough consideration of the important issues on the agenda.

(2) Efforts should be made to encourage discussion rather than declarations of policy prepared in advance. The discussions of Ministers possibly some cases of the two official languages' rules may be needed on occasion.

(3) Foreign Ministers should meet more frequently. Certain of these meetings might be held from time to time in other NATO countries. They should also more frequently participate in regular Council meetings, even though not all may find it convenient to attend such meetings at the same time.

Meetings of Permanent Representatives

(1) Problems on the agenda of Ministerial meetings should be thoroughly and frankly examined and relevant proposals prepared before Ministers meet. For this purpose it may be found necessary for governments to send senior experts ad hoc to consult on agenda items.
(2) In the case of consultations on special subjects, more use should be made of senior experts to assist permanent delegations by calling them, on an ad hoc basis, to do preparatory work.

(3) Consideration might be given to the possibility of occasional meetings of the Council with the participation of the permanent official heads of foreign ministries or "ministerial delegates".

(4) Governments may wish to review their arrangements for more effective presentation of their policies and views in these meetings, and for follow-up action in the different national capitals, in the light of their varying governmental practices.

(5) More frequent meetings will presumably be necessary to discharge the additional responsibilities suggested in this report. It may be found desirable to separate their consultations on important questions from the routine aspects of their work.

(6) Political questions for discussion in the Council should be previously reviewed and discussed in the Working Group on Soviet Trends, the role of which should be extended accordingly and supported by further ad hoc experts. The Chairman of the Working Group should be responsible for contacts with delegations to ensure the orderly selection of subjects for discussion, to enable governments to be informed in advance, and to give them time to formulate their considered views.

(7) Member governments should in the general interest of the Alliance make available "basic position material" to one another through NATO for background information. This would help the Alliance as a whole in the consideration of problems of common concern and would assist individual governments to understand more fully the reasons for the position adopted by any member country on a particular issue which might be its special concern, but which might also affect in varying degrees other members of NATO.
The Secretary General and the Staff

To provide continuity and assistance in the development of a common NATO perspective the role of the Secretary General and the staff needs to be enhanced. In particular:

1. The Secretary General should be free to propose items for the agenda of the Council.

2. The Secretary General should be responsible for directing consultations (with the Deputy Secretary General and the Assistant Secretaries General for Political and Economic Affairs and his advisers and assistants in this work) in view of his responsibilities.

Member governments should undertake to keep the Secretary General and his advisers fully informed through their permanent delegations of their governments' thinking on questions of common concern to the Alliance, if possible in advance of Council discussions.

3. Through periodic visits to member governments and through personal consultations, the Secretary General should be encouraged to use his good offices, on an informal basis, whenever this might be helpful for reconciling diverging interests.

4. Member governments should invite the Secretary General to submit to the Council in Ministerial Session an annual report on the "state of the Alliance", designed to provide member governments with a frank critical assessment of the progress and present and potential problems of the Alliance.

5. The Secretary General, with the co-operation of member governments should make the appropriate staff arrangements for the effective implementation of the recommendations in this report.
INTRODUCTION

Closer and more effective continuing consultation on political matters of common concern between member states and a resolute effort to reconcile dissensions between them stand out as the conditions precedent to the strengthening of NATO in the political field and the further development of the Atlantic Community.

If there is to be vitality in the concept of the Atlantic Community, then NATO through its member governments must demonstrate that this international organization has something special to offer to its members which is not available to them in the United Nations or other international associations and this without in any way weakening the United Nations or these other organizations. The solid foundation of NATO is and remains the solemn basic obligation of its members to consider that an attack on one is an attack on all which will be met by the collective action of all. This commitment and the defence activities which flow from it serve to provide protection for member states and to maintain the conditions of peace and security in which international co-operation can prosper. NATO, based as it is on the developing concept of the Atlantic Community, provides in addition the means for closer co-operation in many fields other than defence.
This closer political co-operation should aim at the maintenance of the unity of the Alliance, including closer relationships in Western Europe, at a time when international tensions and the fear of military aggression may be less severe than in recent years; the development of policies which will strengthen relationships and understanding between NATO and non-NATO countries including the "uncommitted" ones; finding an effective basis of action for the Western world in the face of the continuing and complex challenge of international communism.

Any effective international co-operation requires common approaches to the solution of common problems. This ought to be easier for members of the Atlantic Community, because of the special ties between them. But this will not happen except to the extent to which member governments develop the habit of consulting one another before taking action.

Consultation will not be made more effective by declarations of intent to consult, but only by demonstrations of the will to consult through tackling of specific problems which now confront the Alliance and a willingness to re-examine purely national interests when the occasion requires in relation to the common interests of the Alliance. By the steady and persistent, if gradual development of effective procedures and habits of consultation, NATO can best achieve an effective basis for developing a common foreign policy for the Alliance in important areas of common concern.

The recommendations that follow are to be interpreted in this light: not as rigid rules but as indications by the Committee of how, in their judgment, the habit of consultation can be further developed. Their effectiveness will be judged by the extent to which they are applied to specific cases to give greater unity and strength to the Alliance.

RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Consultation

(A) Types of Consultation

The types of consultations in NATO should include:
(1) exchange of information on any matter which any member or the Secretary General considers of general interest or common concern to the Alliance;

(2) exchanging views and providing material for appreciation of current political developments;

(3) consulting with other members with a view to arriving at a general consensus in the light of which member governments would draw their own conclusions and determine national policies;

(4) consulting in certain fields of common concern to co-ordinate lines of policy and agreed action.

(B) Implementation

(1) In addition to the general understanding that member governments should inform one another on matters of common concern and interest to the Alliance, they should in particular accept the responsibility of informing the Council of any developments in their policies or positions which may significantly affect member countries or the Alliance as a whole.

(2) For the effective implementation of political consultation, the right to raise for discussion in the Council or in any subordinate body any subject from the point of view of the interests of NATO needs to be fully accepted.

(3) Member governments should not adopt firm policies in matters of concern to the whole Alliance without early advance consultation with the other members of the Alliance.

(4) Member governments should seek to develop their national policies in the light of the interests and views of other NATO governments as expressed in consultations even where no consensus or recommendations have been reached.

(5) Where a consensus has been reached, this should be taken into account in formulating national policy: when for national reasons the consensus is not followed, the government concerned should explain its reasons to the Council.
(6) Where agreement on specific policies or courses of action is reached, the Council has to proceed by way of recommendations to governments. To share in such consultation places the responsibility on all governments to see to it that full weight is given to such recommendations in arriving at their final national decisions and policies.

(7) When a major statement of an international political character may significantly affect the Alliance as a whole or some of its members, the government making or responsible for such a statement should endeavour to consult in advance through the Council.

(C) Limitations

It should be recognised that the various forms of consultation outlined above would operate in practice under certain limitations such as:

(1) that the desirability of advance consultation in NATO should not hamper prompt action in real emergencies;

(2) that the ultimate responsibility for making national policies and decisions must inevitably rest with the individual member government, taking into account the broader interests of the partnership;

(3) that consultation on domestic affairs may appropriately take place only with the agreement of the country most directly concerned, and only on those aspects which may significantly affect other members of the Alliance;

(4) that although NATO is non-universal in character, and the obligations under the Treaty do not extend beyond the NATO area, geographical considerations should not preclude discussion of questions relating to non-NATO areas when such questions concern the general interests of the Alliance;

(5) that the agenda of the Council should not be so overburdened by discussions of subsidiary political questions that consultation is delayed or hampered on matters of primary importance to the unity and common interest of the Alliance;

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II. **Peaceful Settlement of Disputes**

Members of NATO have undertaken under Article 1 of the Treaty the obligation to "settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means". Current disputes between member governments seriously threaten the unity of the Alliance. If political co-operation in NATO is to develop effectively it is of crucial importance to make progress in settling these disputes. Unless this progress is made, whether by direct negotiations between the parties concerned or within the framework of NATO, generalised recommendations on possible procedures for dealing with inter-member disputes will inevitably seem academic and serve only to draw attention to the existence of unresolved disputes. In view of the wide range of suggested procedures put forward in the replies to the questionnaire, it will be necessary for the Committee of Three to examine this question in detail in discussion with their colleagues, in order to clarify the possible procedures and to find a common basis for agreement. A possible basis may be found in the following proposals.

(1) A resolution under Article 1 of the Treaty, and in accordance with Article 33 of the UN Charter, to declare the intention of NATO governments to submit in the first instance any inter-member dispute for settlement within the NATO framework.

(2) A special Committee of the Council to take cognizance of any such dispute and to apply "good offices"; it would be mainly concerned with procedures and "fact-finding" without entering into substantive questions except at the request of the parties concerned.

(3) A "Panel of Atlantic Community Arbitrators" composed of eminent persons and available to member governments on request of the interested parties.

(4) Where appropriate and necessary, NATO to sponsor proposals for a settlement; to give general or specific support to such a settlement; or to assume definite obligations in connection with its implementation or maintenance of the settlement.
If the above proposals do not provide an acceptable basis the Committee recommends that the Council should without delay set up an expert Working Group in which all member governments would be asked to participate, in order to consider and draw up specific proposals on procedures to deal with inter-member differences and disputes which would be immediately applicable to current disputes as well as to more which may arise in the future. The Working Group would submit its findings to the Committee of Three.

Pending action on these proposals and consideration of their application to current differences, it is recommended that in the interests of the Alliance as a whole recourse should not be made to international machinery outside NATO in inter-member disputes.

III. Parliamentary associations and Parliamentary Conference

It is recognised that the formation of national Parliamentary associations and the activities of the Parliamentary Conference contribute to the development of public support for NATO and solidarity among its members. The following measures are therefore recommended for bringing these bodies into closer relationship with the Council of NATO:

(1) That the Council continue to place the facilities of NATO headquarters at the disposal of Parliamentary meetings and to give all possible help with arrangements for such meetings.

(2) That Parliamentary Conferences might be attended (for speeches and discussion periods) by invited representatives of member governments and by the Secretary General and other senior representatives of NATO civil and military authorities. In this way the parliamentarians would be informed on the state of the Alliance and the problems before it, and so enabled to hold useful discussions.
(3) That while any Parliamentary meeting might submit a report of its discussions to the Council, for the present it should be discouraged from addressing resolutions to the Council.
CHAPTER II: CO-OPERATION IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD

(A) INTRODUCTION

1. The economic interests shared in common by the members of NATO fall into three major categories:

(a) an interest in the economic health and growth of the member nations themselves and in harmonious relations among them which are essential to the well-being and self-confidence of the Atlantic peoples as well as to an adequate defence effort;

(b) an interest in the successful economic development of the world's underdeveloped areas which is desirable as an end in itself and is essential to the Atlantic Community's own welfare, to the maintenance of freedom, and to stable and fruitful relations between these regions and the Atlantic world; and

(c) an interest in countering and frustrating, and if possible anticipating and forestalling, those Soviet initiatives in the economic field which are intended to create division within the Alliance, to subvert freedom, or to strengthen Soviet political and economic influence in non-member countries.
2. In contrast with the military and political fields, the common economic interests of NATO members, where they require international co-operation, can be and are being pursued through other organizations whose membership generally is well adapted to the desired forms of co-operation. The outstanding instances are the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) (which includes all NATO countries as full or associate members and four others); the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the various United Nations specialised agencies including the Economic Commission for Europe. The work of GATT would be assisted by the establishment of the proposed Organization for Trade Co-operation (OTC). Several NATO members participate actively in the Colombo Plan for promoting economic development for Asia. Most members are taking an active part in technical assistance programmes and are also participating in discussions of proposals for the creation of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED). There are also institutions for close economic co-operation among smaller groupings of the European member nations.

3. It would not serve the interests of the Atlantic Community for NATO to take over or duplicate the operating functions of any of these organizations, in all of which NATO members play a major part. Nor, in the Committee's view, do there now appear to be significant new areas for common economic action requiring execution by NATO itself. The Committee believes, however, that the community of economic interest, and indeed the long run security of the North Atlantic area broadly conceived, require a substantial expansion of exchange of information and of consultation in the economic as well as in the political field. Especially where economic matters are clearly related to the political and security interests of NATO, such consultation should seek to secure a common approach on the part of member governments.
The resulting action, however, should normally be taken by Governments either directly or through other international organizations.

(B) AREAS FOR ECONOMIC CONSULTATION.

4. Just as in the political field, NATO's arrangements for expanded economic consultation should permit any member, or the Secretary General, to raise in the Council at any time any economic matter felt to be of significance to the Alliance. Apart from this "open agenda" principle, there are areas where the Alliance requires at least a regular interchange of information and views and in certain cases a concerted effort to reach a consensus on a common course of action.

Strengthening Members' Economics and Promoting their Economic Co-operation

5. There now exists adequate provision for a regular assessment of each member country's general economic position, prospects and problems through the OEEC and NATO Annual Reviews. The basic requirements for economic health and growth, which are vital to the Alliance, are sound internal economic policies and organized co-operation to promote the greatest possible freedom in trade and payments and in the movements of manpower and long-term capital. While there remains a great deal to be accomplished in these respects, the requisite machinery for co-operation among NATO members exists in other organizations. This is not felt to be an appropriate field for new NATO arrangements.

6. On the other hand, issues may arise, affecting the economic health of the Atlantic Community, where NATO may be the only effective organization for consultation because of their political implications or because of their relation to the
common defence. On both these counts NATO might be properly concerned, for example, with the assurance of oil supplies for Western Europe and with the adequacy of action for the development of atomic power. Economic aspects of defence, including questions of economic mobilisation and stockpiling of civilian supplies are already receiving some attention in NATO; such matters should continue to be a regular concern of the organization.

7. One important new area, especially appropriate for NATO consultation, is the field of scientific and technical co-operation. This includes not only the problem of adequate recruitment and training of scientists and technicians, but also the exchange of scientific information and co-operation in scientific research. The Committee recommends:

(to be completed in an addendum)

Conflicts in Economic Policies of Member Countries

8. The Committee distinguishes between disagreements on economic policy which are normally dealt with through bilateral negotiation or multilateral discussion in other organizations, and on the other hand economic disputes which may have political or strategic repercussions damaging to the Alliance. Nothing would be gained by merely having repeated in NATO the same arguments made in other and more technically specialised organizations; to do so might even weaken the effectiveness of NATO in seeking to resolve disputes of genuine political or strategic importance. It should however be open to members to raise for discussion in NATO issues on which they feel that consideration elsewhere is not making adequate progress and that NATO consultation might facilitate solutions contributing to the objectives of the Atlantic Community.
9. Whenever an aggrieved member government or the Secretary General considers that an unresolved dispute in the economic field may involve dangerous political or strategic consequences for NATO as a whole, the procedures for peaceful settlement under NATO auspices as described under Section II of Chapter I, should be applicable.

Relations with Under-Developed Areas

10. It is a matter of common consent that the Atlantic Community has a major positive concern with the assurance of political stability and freedom in the under-developed areas and consequently with their healthy and accelerated economic development. It is likewise agreed that NATO is not an appropriate agency for administering programmes of assistance for economic development or even for systematically concerting the relevant policies of member nations. The Committee recommends that member countries keep each other and the Organization informed of their programmes and policies in this field, and that there be occasional discussion in NATO of the adequacy of existing action in relation to the interests of the Alliance, including the degree of priority which should be given to areas of particular concern to the Atlantic Community.

Soviet Economic Initiatives

11. Because of its unique political basis, NATO is the only major international organization in which governments can exchange information and views freely and frankly on Soviet economic initiatives. The recent tendency of Soviet policy to use economic measures as a deliberate means of weakening the Western Alliance, or of creating in neutral areas a dangerous degree of dependence on the Soviet world, it makes it especially important that NATO undertake systematic consultation in this field.
12. The Committee recommends that NATO continue its regular reporting on economic trends in Soviet countries (including the comparison with member countries) and developments in Soviet economic policy. To this end, governments should undertake to report relevant information regularly, and there should be periodic meetings of experts on Soviet economic affairs drawn from the various capitals. In addition to the exchange of information, there should be periodic discussion of the implications of such trends for the Alliance and of possible lines of action which might be taken by member governments individually or co-operatively. Where general Soviet initiatives are made in the field of economic policy (as in the case of the proposal for "all-European economic co-operation" presented to the ECE in Geneva last April), there should be NATO consultation concerning the possible lines of response by member countries.

13. With respect to Soviet commercial relations with member countries, arrangements should be made for periodic meetings of officials involved in Soviet bloc commercial negotiations for an exchange of information and views. In the case of an important new Soviet commercial or financial proposal to any member country, with possible political implications, it would be desirable for the member concerned to bring it to the attention of the Council. In connection with strategic controls on trade with the Soviet bloc and Communist China, it would be desirable to review in NATO from time to time the broader aspects of the control arrangements and to seek agreement on the lines of action in this area most conducive to the security and welfare of the Atlantic Community.

14. The Alliance also has a positive interest in the more complex and difficult field of Soviet economic relations with non-members, especially the under-developed countries. The Committee welcomes the first steps in the exchange of information on this
topic in the Committee on Soviet Economic Policy, and believes that exchange of information in this field should be a continuing function of NATO. Whether a particular Soviet initiative should be countered by member countries is a matter for ad hoc consideration on which no attempt at advance generalisation is possible. It would clearly not be desirable to engage in indiscriminate competition with the Soviets, but in any event NATO consultation in this field would be highly advantageous to the Alliance. Member governments and the Secretary General should bring to the Council's attention any case in which they consider that failure to respond to, or to forestall, a Soviet initiative may significantly contribute to Soviet penetration or to diminished independence in any area important to the Atlantic Community. Governments may then exchange views and consider the possibility of positive action, even if this requires an exceptional departure from the basic foreign economic policies of the West. In this as in other economic fields, however, any indicated action would be undertaken not by NATO as such, but by individual governments or appropriate organizations.

(C) RELATIONS WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

15. For reasons already outlined, the co-operative economic actions required by members in the interests of the Atlantic Alliance are best carried out through organizations other than NATO itself. NATO should not, as such, seek to establish formal relations with these other organizations and the harmonising of attitudes and of action should rather be left to member governments. With respect to the organizations composed wholly of free countries, it is neither necessary nor desirable for NATO members to seek to form a common policy front. Creation of a "NATO bloc" within such organizations would be positively harmful and tend to alienate the other members. Exceptional issues arising in such
organizations, with special political or strategic interest to
NATO, may be raised for discussion by any member or the Secretary
General.

16. On the other hand with respect to international economic
organizations in which the Soviets participate - notably the United
Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the Economic
Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, and the Economic
and Social Council - the Committee recommends that consultation
be scheduled by the Secretary General in advance of each
meeting to review the agenda, identify points in which Atlantic
interests may be attacked or endangered, consider possible Western
initiatives, and where appropriate, establish a general community
of attitude. Western tactics, as distinct from broad policies,
should be concerted by national delegations at the respective
organizations; in suitable cases this may include free nations
not members of NATO. There should be neither the fact nor the
appearance of a formal NATO bloc, and there should certainly be
no attempt to direct Western tactics in such organizations from
the Palais de Chaillot. On the other hand, consultations in
NATO should go sufficiently far to assure the frustration of
Soviet tactics deliberately designed to divide or weaken the
Alliance.

(3) NATO MACHINERY FOR ECONOMIC CONSULTATION

17. There has been, in recent months, a considerable
evolution in NATO's machinery for economic consultation, notably
in the work on Soviet economic trends and policies, including
Soviet economic penetration in under-developed countries and the
creation of the Committee of Technical Advisers. In addition, a
number of economic matters have been brought before the Council for
consideration on an ad hoc basis. No substantial new machinery in
this field is called for. However, in view of the extended
range of topics for regular exchange of information and consultation
CHAPTER III: CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

INTRODUCTION

Durable unity within the Atlantic Alliance can be constructed and will be maintained only on the firm foundation of strong popular support throughout the NATO area. A sense of community must bind the people as well as the institutions of the Atlantic nations and this sense of community will exist in the measure that there is a realisation of their common cultural heritage, institutions and modes of thought. The Committee therefore considers it indispensable for the NATO countries to seek all practical means to promote cultural co-operation among their peoples in order to strengthen their relations and to develop maximum support for the Atlantic Alliance. In view of the geographical characteristics of the NATO area, it is particularly important to ensure that the Community's cultural activities should be strongly trans-Atlantic in nature, although this should not preclude member governments from acting on a multilateral or bilateral basis, to strengthen their own cultural relations within the broader Atlantic framework.

The Committee welcomes the cultural activities which have been initiated by private individuals and non-governmental groups. The Committee considers it essential that those sources of initiative be encouraged to pursue and increase their activities. Care should be exercised to avoid government initiative duplicating cultural activities by non-governmental groups. Both have important roles to play, with government activities supporting and supplementing private efforts.

RECOMMENDATIONS

(A) General Principles

To promote effective cultural collaboration within the Atlantic Alliance, the Committee suggests that member governments
should be guided by the following general principles:

(1) In advocating and implementing new cultural projects, member governments should make the most effective use of existing resources and concentrate on projects not already adequately covered from the NATO point of view.

(2) Member governments should give priority to those projects which require joint NATO action, and thus contribute to a developing sense of community.

(3) Member governments should encourage initiatives by private groups and institutions which will stimulate like action in other NATO countries.

(4) In their consideration of proposed cultural projects in NATO member governments should include a realistic appreciation of the financial implications. To the extent that agreement can be reached within the Alliance on useful cultural projects, member governments should be prepared to join in effective and administrative arrangements, and to pay their fair share of the costs.

(B) Specific Proposals

1. In order to develop public awareness and understanding of the Atlantic Community, and to provide a link between the institutions of the Atlantic area and public opinion, member governments should consider the establishment of a Common Research Institute for Atlantic Community Studies. This type of undertaking requires thorough study; member governments should therefore seek the advice of a panel of competent experts to examine the most useful form for such an Institute and the means of organizing it. Consideration should at the same time be given to the desirability of admitting to the NATO Defence College teachers, journalists, and others in a
position to influence public opinion. This would involve broadening the basis of the College and adjusting its curriculum.

2. Youth movements being voluntary in character, cooperation between youth organizations of member countries is the responsibility of the organizations themselves. Governments should, however, actively promote closer relations between NATO and youth organizations. The recent Conference of Representatives of youth organizations of member countries held in Paris in July under NATO auspices, served a useful purpose from the point of view of the Organization. NATO should sponsor such gatherings annually. Liaison between NATO and youth organizations would be facilitated by the creation of a post of "Youth Specialist" within the International Staff.

3. The latest NATO study on co-operation in the cultural field(1) shows that there are a number of areas which could be usefully explored, especially with respect to education. The proposals put forward are, it is felt, susceptible of developing a better appreciation of the aims of the Alliance, and are worthy of support by member governments and NATO.

(1) Report of the Meeting of Senior Officers concerned with Government-sponsored Cultural Activities, document AC/52-D/178
4. Examples of educational and related activities which NATO or member governments might appropriately support, are listed below:

(1) Summer schools or seminars along the lines of the course held this summer at Oxford University, aimed at attracting nationals from member countries in a position to influence public opinion.

(2) Visiting Professorships.

(3) The creation of university chairs of Atlantic studies.

(4) The use of NATO Information material in the schools.

(5) The establishment of special NATO awards for students.

(6) Exchange of persons programmes designed particularly to strengthen trans-Atlantic ties.

5. Governments might also review their financial and other policies affecting travel between different parts of the Atlantic area in the light of the importance attached to easier and more frequent contacts among the peoples of the various member countries.

6. In view of the importance of promoting better understanding and goodwill between NATO service personnel, it would be desirable to extend exchanges of such personnel beyond the limits of normal training programmes. Since such schemes involve practical difficulties, they might, as a first step, be developed by governments on a bilateral basis. In addition, member governments should try to enlist the support of the Atlantic Treaty Association and other voluntary organizations, for any exchange of service personnel programmes that might be developed. NATO military authorities could give considerable assistance in implementing schemes of this kind.

7. The method of financing NATO cultural projects depends primarily on the nature and objective of these specific undertakings. Cultural projects, however, which, by their very nature, benefit the Alliance as a whole should normally be commonly financed.
This year, for the first time, NATO helped to finance undertakings initiated by a member government or a private organization (the Oxford University seminar, and the Study Conference on "The Role of the School in the Atlantic Community"). This method of jointly financing NATO cultural projects proved to be useful and should be used more extensively.
CHAPTER IV: CO-OPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD

A. INTRODUCTION

1. The maintenance and growth of a public opinion favourable to NATO depend on the existence of a clear understanding of the aspirations and accomplishments of the Organization in every field of its activities. The Committee believes that action on its recommendations on political and economic consultation, as well as on cultural activities will provide substance for a more effective NATO information programme and widen NATO's appeal to public opinion. The maintenance of a favourable public opinion in NATO countries greatly depends on the degree of agreement which is found in member states on the basic concepts and objectives of NATO co-operation.

2. NATO information activities should be directed primarily to public opinion in the NATO area. At the same time, the understanding outside the NATO area of NATO objectives is necessary if the efforts of member governments towards the fulfilment of the aims and purposes of the Alliance are to be viewed sympathetically, and if their political and economic co-operation is not to be misinterpreted by governments not members of the Organization.

Attitudes in non-NATO areas will be influenced by the extent to which the peoples of the Alliance have themselves firm convictions about NATO's purposes and accomplishments.

3. NATO information activities should not extend into fields which more appropriately belong to national information services of member governments. The task of explaining and reporting on NATO activities on the basis of factual information rests primarily with national information services of each member government. There is, however, no sharp dividing line. In particular, the promotion of public understanding of the bonds and common traditions which form the Atlantic Community is a field which should be cultivated jointly.
by NATO and member governments. In the formulation of their national information programmes, member governments should provide enough scope and range to enable their information services to discharge effectively their commitments and responsibilities towards NATO.

B. SPECIFIC PROPOSALS

4. To improve co-operation between the NATO Information Division and national information services, the following measures are suggested:

(1) An officer should be designated by each national information service to maintain liaison with NATO and to be responsible for the dissemination of NATO information material;

(2) governments should submit to NATO the relevant information programmes which they plan to implement, for discussion in the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations. Representatives of national information services from capitals might usefully be encouraged to take part in these discussions and to attend meetings of the Committee;

(3) within the Information Division budget, provision should be made for a translation fund so that NATO information material can be translated into the non-official languages of the Alliance, according to reasonable requirements of the member governments.

5. The Information Division of NATO should, when required, provide national services with special studies on matters of common interest to member governments, although these studies may not necessarily deal with NATO.

6. Further study should be given to ways and means of improving co-ordination of efforts by individual governments in countering Soviet propaganda, both within their countries and in
relation to the uncommitted countries and the Soviet and satellite countries.

7. Member governments should take steps to inform the peoples of the uncommitted countries of the defensive character, as well as the non-military, aspects of the Atlantic Community. This might be achieved through information activities of the diplomatic missions of the various NATO governments in those countries, and by other means.

8. NATO governments should pool their experiences relating to the dissemination of information aimed at Soviet and satellite countries. It would be particularly useful for member governments to exchange views on the lines to be adopted by their international broadcasting services on issues of common concern to NATO. The Committee on Information and Cultural Relations could be used for this purpose.

9. It is generally recognised that great benefit has accrued to NATO through the Journalists' Tours sponsored by the Organization. These tours should, therefore, be continued but their character, it is felt, should now be changed. They should no longer be confined to journalists but should include such others in a position to influence public opinion as trade union and youth leaders, teachers and lecturers. NATO should also organize conferences of a few days' duration for a wider variety of professional groups. The success of undertakings of this kind largely depends on the quality of participants. Governments are therefore urged to pay special attention to the selection of suitably qualified representatives.

10. Governments should consider making practical use of and giving financial aid, if necessary, to private organizations supporting NATO. They should encourage the establishment of closer relations between such organizations and the NATO Information Division.
11. Insofar as possible, NATO should inform the public when a collective view is reached or when an important decision has been taken. When appropriate, more use should be made in Ministerial statements to national parliaments of the phrase "after consultation with our NATO Allies".
CHAPTER V: ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

Introduction

The Committee considers that the structure of NATO is generally capable of performing the tasks expected of it. The Committee is not therefore proposing any basic structural changes, but has certain procedural measures to suggest to the Secretary General and to member governments to facilitate the implementation of its recommendations.

One primary consideration for the development of fuller and franker consultations is respect for their confidential character, and the observation of strict security measures.

Meetings at Ministerial Level

1. More time should be allowed at the Ministerial meetings in order to permit thorough consideration of the important issues on the agenda.

2. Efforts should be made to encourage discussion rather than declarations of policy prepared in advance. Arrangements for meetings should be made with this aim in view.

3. Foreign Ministers should meet more frequently. Certain of these meetings might be held from time to time in other NATO countries. The Ministers might also more frequently participate in regular Council meetings, even though not all of them may find it convenient to attend such meetings at the same time.

Meetings of Permanent Representatives

1. Problems on the agenda of Ministerial meetings should be thoroughly and frankly examined by permanent representatives and relevant proposals prepared before Ministers meet. For this purpose it may be found necessary for governments to send senior experts ad hoc to consult on agenda items.
(2) In the case of consultations on special subjects, more use should be made of senior experts to assist permanent delegations by calling them, on an ad hoc basis, to do preparatory work.

(3) Consideration might be given to the possibility of occasional meetings of the Council with the participation of the permanent official heads of foreign ministries or "ministerial delegates".

(4) Governments may wish to review their arrangements to achieve effective presentation of their policies and views in these meetings, and for follow-up action in the different national capitals, in the light of their varying governmental practices.

(5) Since more frequent meetings will presumably be necessary to discharge the additional responsibilities suggested in this report, it may be found desirable to separate their consultations on important questions from the routine aspects of their work.

(6) Political questions for discussion in the Council should as far as practicable be previously reviewed and discussed in an appropriate Committee, with respect to economic matters, proposals on organization are contained in Chapter II, paragraph 16. The Chairman should be responsible for contacts with delegations to ensure the orderly selection of subjects for discussion, to enable governments to be informed in advance, and to give them time to formulate their considered views.

(7) Member governments should in the general interest of the Alliance make available "basic position material" to one another through NATO for background information. This would help the Alliance as a whole in the consideration of problems of common concern and would assist individual governments to understand more fully the reasons for the position adopted by any member country on a particular issue which might be its special concern, but which might also affect in varying degrees other members of NATO.
The Secretary General and the Staff

To provide continuity and assistance in the development of a common NATO perspective the role of the Secretary General and the staff needs to be enhanced. In particular:

(1) The Secretary General should be encouraged to propose items for NATO consultation in the fields covered by this report and should be responsible for directing all such consultations.

(2) In view of these responsibilities, member governments should undertake to keep the Secretary General fully and currently informed through their permanent delegations of their governments' thinking on questions of common concern to the Alliance.

(3) Through periodic visits to member governments and through personal consultations, the Secretary General should be encouraged to use his good offices, on an informal basis, whenever this might be helpful for reconciling diverging interests.

(4) The Secretary General should be invited to submit in addition to his progress reports, an annual report on the "state of the Alliance", designed to provide member governments with a frank assessment of the progress and present and potential problems of the Alliance. This report should be discussed by the Council in Ministerial Session.

(5) The Secretary General should be enabled to make the appropriate staff arrangements for the effective implementation of the recommendations in this report.
I. Consultation

(A) Possible Types of Consultation

(1) exchanging information on any matter which any member or the Secretary-General considers of general interest or common concern to the Alliance;

(2) exchanging views and providing material for appreciation of current political developments;

(3) consulting with a view to arriving at a general consensus in the light of which member governments would draw their own conclusions and determine national policies;

(4) consulting in certain fields of common concern to co-ordinate lines of policy and agreed action.

(B) Implementation by Member Governments

(1) Keeping other member governments informed on matters of common concern to the Alliance (essential preliminary to consultation).

(2) Accepting the responsibility of informing the Council of any developments in Member Governments' policies or positions which may significantly affect member countries or the Alliance as a whole.

(3) Recognising the right of any member to raise for discussion any subject from the point of view of the interests of NATO.
(4) Agreeing not to adopt firm policies on matters of common concern without early advance consultation.

(5) In developing national policies, taking into account the interests and views of other NATO governments as expressed in consultations, even where no consensus has been reached or recommendations have been made.

(6) Taking any consensus into account in formulating national policy: when for national reasons the consensus is not followed, the government concerned to explain its reasons to the Council.

(7) Giving full weight to Council recommendations in arriving at final national decisions and policies.

(8) Endeavouring to consult with the Council before any major statement is made of an international political character which may affect the Alliance as a whole or some of its members.

(C) Limitations

(1) The need for prompt action in real emergencies;

(2) retention of ultimate responsibility for making national policies and decisions with the individual member government, taking into account the broader interests of the partnership;

(3) consultation on domestic affairs only with the agreement of the country most directly concerned, and only on those aspects which may significantly affect other members of the Alliance;

(4) recognition of the non-universal character of NATO; but permitting discussion of questions relating to non-NATO areas when such questions concern the general interests of the Alliance;
(5) not overburdening the Council Agenda with consultations on minor questions;
(6) the need to respect the confidential nature of discussions and to achieve strict security.

II. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

Because of the great importance and urgency of this matter, and the wide range of views put forward in the replies to the questionnaire, it will be especially necessary for the Committee of Three to examine this question in detail in discussion with their colleagues. One proposal which has been put forward may be summarised as follows:

(1) A resolution under Article 1 of the Treaty, and in accordance with Article 33 of the UN Charter, to declare the intention of NATO governments to submit any inter-member dispute for settlement within the NATO framework before resorting to any other international agency.

(2) Establishment of a special Committee of the Council to take cognisance of any such dispute and to apply "good offices"; it would be mainly concerned with procedures and "fact-finding" without entering into substantive questions except at the request of the parties concerned.

(3) Establishment of a "Panel of Atlantic Community Arbitrators" composed of eminent persons and available to member governments on request of the interested parties.

(4) Where appropriate and necessary, NATO to sponsor proposals for a settlement: to give general or specific support to such a settlement; or to assume definite obligations in connection with the implementation or maintenance of the settlement.
Presumably any procedure adopted would be immediately applicable to current disputes as well as to any which may arise in the future.

Pending action in this field, and consideration of the application of any proposals to current differences, agreement might be reached that recourse should not be made to international machinery outside NATO in inter-member disputes.

III. Parliamentary associations and Parliamentary Conference

No formal relationship, but practical arrangements to improve the contact of these bodies with the Council.
SECTION 2
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

I. General

Economic objectives to be fostered by continued and enhanced collaboration both bilaterally and through organizations other than NATO, but reinforced by NATO consultation where the interests of the Alliance are involved. Recognition that Article 2 purposes need not be achieved only through NATO.

II. Economic Consultation

(A) Any member, or the Secretary General, to have the right to raise at any time any economic matter felt to be of significance to the Alliance including matters of this type on which inadequate progress is being made elsewhere;

(B) Regular interchange of information and views on economic matters clearly related to the political or security interests of NATO, e.g. economic aspects of defence; oil supplies for Western Europe; adequacy of action for development of atomic power;

(C) In certain cases an effort to agree on a common course of action.

III. Conflicts in Economic Policies of Member Countries

Where dangerous political or strategic consequences might be involved, any procedures for peaceful settlement of political disputes to be made applicable to disputes in the economic field.

IV. Relations with Under-Developed Areas

(A) Recognition that NATO is not an appropriate agency for administering programmes of assistance for economic development or for systematicallyconcerting the relevant policies of member countries.
(B) Members to keep each other and NATO informed of programmes and policies in this field, with occasional discussion in NATO of the adequacy of existing action in relation to the interests of the Alliance, including the degree of priority which should be given to areas of particular concern to the Atlantic Community.

V. Soviet Economic Developments and Initiatives

(A) Periodic meetings of experts on Soviet economic affairs drawn from the various capitals to exchange information and views on trends in Soviet bloc economies, including comparison with member countries, and Soviet economic policies. In addition, continued periodic discussion of the implications of such trends for the Alliance and possible lines of action to be taken individually or co-operatively.
(B) Where general Soviet initiatives are made in the field of economic policy (as in the case of the proposal for "all-European economic co-operation" presented to the ECE in Geneva last April), possible NATO consultation concerning lines of response by member countries.

(C) Periodic meetings of officials involved in Soviet bloc commercial negotiations for an exchange of information and views.

(D) Notification to the Council of any important new Soviet commercial or financial proposal, with possible political implications, made to any member country.

(E) Possible NATO review from time to time of broader aspects of strategic export control arrangements with a view to agreement on the lines of action most conclusive to the security and welfare of the Atlantic Community.

(F) Ad hoc consideration of whether Soviet initiatives in economic relations with non-members, especially underdeveloped countries, should be countered by member countries individually or through other organizations. No indiscriminate competition with the Soviets, but NATO consultation wherever there is a serious risk of Soviet penetration in any area important to the Atlantic Community. Consideration of possible action in serious cases, even if requiring exceptional departure from basic foreign economic policies of the West.

VI. Relations with other organizations

(A) No attempt to create a "NATO bloc" in organizations composed wholly of free countries. Discussion in NATO of exceptional issues, arising in such organizations, of special political or strategic interest to NATO.
B With respect to international economic organizations in which the Soviets participate—notably the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the Economic Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, and the Economic and Social Council—consultation to be scheduled in advance of each meeting to review the agenda, identify points in which Atlantic interests may be attacked or endangered, consider possible Western initiatives, and where appropriate, establish a general community of attitude.

VII. Scientific and Technical Co-operation

Progress in this field is so crucial to the future of the Atlantic Community that it seems proper for NATO to ensure that no possibilities of fruitful co-operation are left unexplored. NATO might convene a conference composed of one or, at the most, two outstanding authorities, private or governmental, from each member country in order:

(A) to exchange information and views among the participants concerning their most urgent problems in the recruitment, training and utilization of scientists, engineers and technicians, and the best means of solving these problems;

(B) to foster closer relations among the participants with a view to continuing future interchange of experience and stimulation of constructive work in member countries;

(C) and to propose, for consideration by the North Atlantic Council, specific measures for future international co-operation in this field, whether through NATO or other international organizations.
VIII. NATO machinery for economic consultations

(A) The possible establishment of an Economic Advisory Committee on a permanent basis as a Committee of the Council, entrusted with the regular exchange of information and preliminary discussion in areas requiring systematic consultation, together with any ad hoc projects assigned to it. Any continuing function of the Committee of Technical Advisers would be absorbed by the Economic Advisory Committee. Membership would be flexible, governments being represented by highly qualified specialists as to the topics under consideration might require.

(B) Whether or not an Economic Advisory Committee is established, arrangements to be made for more meetings of officials dealing currently with various economic matters important to the Alliance, such as Soviet commercial negotiations, trends in under-developed countries, scientific and technical co-operation, and the like.
SECTION 3
CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

I. General
(A) Making the most effective use of existing resources and concentrating on projects not adequately covered from the NATO point of view.
(B) Giving priority to those projects which require joint NATO action.
(C) Encouraging initiatives by private groups and institutions which will stimulate like action in other NATO countries.
(D) Making a realistic appreciation of the financial implications of proposed cultural projects.

II. NATO Institutions
(A) The possible establishment of a Common Research Institute for Atlantic Community Studies, this proposal to be considered by member governments with the assistance of competent experts.
(B) Consideration to be given simultaneously to broadening the basis of the NATO Defence College by admitting teachers, journalists, and others in a position to influence public opinion, and adjusting the curriculum accordingly.

III. Youth Movements
Co-operation between youth organizations of member countries is the responsibility of the organizations themselves. NATO might, nevertheless, promote closer relations with youth organizations. To this end, NATO might sponsor annually gatherings such as the recent conference of Representatives of youth organizations of member countries and might create a post of "Youth Specialist" within the International Staff to maintain liaison with such organizations.
IV. Educational and related activities

(A) Encouragement of Summer schools or seminars along the lines of the course held this summer at Oxford University, aimed at attracting nationals from member countries in a position to influence public opinion.

(B) Support of arrangements for visiting Professorships

(C) Creation of university chairs of Atlantic studies.

(D) Use of NATO information material in schools.

(E) Establishment of special NATO awards for students.

(F) Exchange of persons programmes designed particularly to strengthen transatlantic ties.

V. Private Travel

Review by governments of foreign exchange and other policies affecting private travel between different parts of the Atlantic area, in light of the importance of easier and more frequent contacts among the Atlantic peoples.

VI. Exchanges of Service Personnel

(A) Possible extension of exchanges of service personnel on a bilateral basis beyond the limits of normal training programmes.

(B) Enlisting the support of voluntary organizations for such exchanges. NATO military authorities could give considerable assistance in implementing schemes of this kind.

VII. Financing

(A) The method of financing NATO cultural projects depends primarily on the nature and objective of these specific undertakings. Cultural projects benefiting the Alliance as a whole to be commonly financed.

(B) For agreed NATO cultural projects initiated by a member government or a private organization, NATO financial support jointly with the sponsor to be used more extensively when necessary to supplement national resources.
SECTION 4
CO-OPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD

I. General
(A) NATO information activities should not extend into fields which more appropriately belong to national information services of member governments. There is, however, no sharp dividing line, and the promotion of public understanding of the bonds and common traditions which form the Atlantic Community might be undertaken jointly by NATO and member governments.

(B) Member governments to provide adequate support for their information services to discharge their NATO responsibilities.

(C) Whenever possible, NATO to inform the public when a collective view is reached or when an important decision has been taken.

(D) When appropriate, more use to be made in Ministerial statements to national parliaments of the phrase "after consultation with our NATO Allies".

II. Co-operation between NATO and National Information Services
(A) Designation of an officer in each national information service to maintain liaison with NATO.

(B) Submission to NATO of relevant information programmes which governments plan to implement, for discussion in the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations.

(C) Representatives of national information services from capitals to be encouraged to take part in these discussions and from time to time to attend regular meetings of the Committee.
(D) Provision of a fund for translating NATO information material into the non-official languages.

(E) Additional steps by member governments through their diplomatic missions and otherwise to inform peoples of the non-member countries of the defensive character, as well as the non-military aspects, of the Atlantic Community.

III. Information problems in relation to the Soviet Bloc

(A) Improved co-ordination of efforts by individual governments in countering Soviet propaganda.

(B) Pooling of experiences on the dissemination of information aimed at Soviet and satellite countries and consultation on the lines to be adopted by broadcasting services on issues of common concern to NATO.

IV. NATO Tours and Conferences for Professional Groups

(A) Journalists' Tours to be continued, but broadened to include others in a position to influence public opinion such as trade union and youth leaders, teachers, and lecturers.

(B) Conferences of a few days' duration for a wider variety of professional groups.

V. Financial Aid to Private Organizations

Possible financial aid to private organizations supporting NATO.
SECTION 5
ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

I. General
No basic structural changes, but certain procedural measures to be considered.

II. Meetings at Ministerial Level
(A) More time for Ministerial Meetings to permit thorough consideration of the important issues on the agenda.
(B) Making arrangements to encourage discussion rather than presentation of prepared declarations of policy.
(C) Meetings of Foreign Ministers to be held more frequently, occasionally in other NATO countries, and individual Foreign Ministers to participate more frequently in regular Council meetings.

III. Meetings of Permanent Representatives
(A) More thorough preparation of the agenda and proposals for Ministerial Meetings.
(B) Use of national senior experts to help in this preparatory work and assist permanent delegations in consultations on special subjects.
(C) Arrangements for review of political and economic questions in advance of Council meetings through discussing in appropriate Committees.
(D) Review by governments of their arrangements for making their representation on the Council as authoritative as possible, for providing maximum effectiveness in the presentation of their views and policies and for ensuring follow-up action.
(E) Occasional meetings of the Council with the participation of the permanent official heads of foreign ministries or "ministerial delegates".

(F) Circulation by member governments of "basic position material" for background information.

(G) Separating consultations on important questions from routine business.

IV. **Enhancing the Role of the Secretary General and his Staff**

(A) The Secretary General to be encouraged to propose items for NATO consultation, and to promote the process of consultation.

(B) Member governments to keep the Secretary General fully and currently informed through their permanent delegations of their thinking on questions of common concern to the Alliance.

(C) The Secretary General to be encouraged to make available his good offices, on an informal basis, through periodic visits to member governments and through personal consultations, whenever this might be helpful for reconciling diverging interests.

(D) The Secretary General to submit, in addition to his progress reports on the Organization as such, an annual report on the "State of the Alliance", designed to provide member governments with a frank assessment of its conditions and present and potential problems; this report to be discussed by the Council in Ministerial Session.

(E) The Secretary General to be enabled to make the appropriate staff arrangements for effective implementation of any new tasks assigned to NATO.
COMMITTEE OF THREE
PRELIMINARY WORKING PAPER
SECTION 1
POLITICAL CO-OPERATION

I. Consultation

(A) Requirements for Consultation by Member Governments

1. Keeping other member governments informed on matters of common concern to the Alliance (essential preliminary to consultation).

2. Accepting the responsibility of informing the Council of any developments in Member Governments' policies or positions which may significantly affect member countries or the Alliance as a whole.

3. Recognising the right of any member to raise for discussion any subject from the point of view of the interests of NATO.

4. Agreeing not to adopt firm policies on matters of common concern without early advance consultation.

5. In developing national policies, taking into account the interests and views of other NATO governments as expressed in consultations, even where no consensus has been reached or recommendations have been made.

6. Taking any consensus into account in formulating national policy: when for national reasons the consensus is not followed, the government concerned to explain its reasons to the Council.

7. Giving full weight to Council recommendations in arriving at final national decisions and policies.

8. Endeavouring to consult with the Council before any major statement is made of an international political character which may affect the Alliance as a whole or some of its members.

(B) Limitations

1. The need for prompt action in real emergencies;
II. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

Because of the great importance and urgency of this matter, and the wide range of views put forward in the replies to the questionnaire, it will be especially necessary for the Committee of Three to examine this question in detail in discussion with their colleagues. One proposal which has been put forward may be summarised as follows:

(1) A resolution under Article 1 of the Treaty, and in accordance with Article 33 of the UN Charter, to declare the intention of NATO governments, in the case of any dispute which has not proved capable of settlement through direct discussion and negotiation, to submit such dispute for settlement within the NATO framework before resorting to any other international agency.

(2) Establishment of a special committee of the Council, perhaps composed of three to five Permanent Representatives serving in rotation, to take cognisance of any such dispute and to apply "good offices". It would be mainly concerned with procedures, and would deal with substantive aspects only at the request of the parties concerned. Its chief purpose would be to assist the parties to achieve an amicable agreement.

(3) Establishment of a "Panel of Atlantic Community Arbitrators" composed of eminent persons and available to member governments on request of the interested parties.

(4) Where appropriate and necessary, the association of NATO with the settlement of such disputes through its sponsorship of proposals for a settlement, the general or specific support that it might lend to such a settlement, or the assumption of definite obligations in connection with the implementation or maintenance of the settlement.
The question is also raised of the immediate applicability of any agreed procedure to current disputes as well as to any which may arise in the future.

III. Parliamentary associations and Parliamentary Conference

No formal relationship, but practical arrangements to improve the contact of these bodies with the Council.
SECTION 2
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

I. General

(A) Recognition of common economic interests on the following lines:

(1) Economic health and growth of the member nations themselves and harmonious relations among them, (including the relevance thereto of European economic integration as well as co-operation on a wider basis);

(2) Successful economic development of the world's underdeveloped areas; and

(3) Preventing Soviet initiatives in the economic field from creating division within the Alliance or subverting freedom.

(B) Economic objectives to be fostered by continued and enhanced collaboration both bilaterally and through organizations other than NATO, but reinforced by NATO consultation where the interests of the Alliance are involved. Recognition that Article 2 purposes need not be achieved only through NATO.

II. Economic Consultation

(A) Any member, or the Secretary General, to have the right to raise at any time any economic matter felt to be of significance to the Alliance including matters of this type on which inadequate progress is being made elsewhere;

(B) Regular interchange of information and views on economic matters of special concern to NATO, e.g. economic aspects of defence; oil supplies for Western Europe; adequacy of action for development of atomic power;

(C) An effort to agree on a common course of action where economic matters are clearly related to the political or security interests of NATO.

III. Conflicts in Economic Policies of Member Countries

Where dangerous political or strategic consequences might be involved, any procedures for peaceful settlement of political disputes to be made applicable to disputes in the economic field.

IV. Relations with Underdeveloped Areas

(A) Recognition that the Atlantic Community has a major positive concern with their political stability and freedom, and consequently their healthy and accelerated economic development, but that NATO is not an appropriate agency for administering programmes of assistance for economic development or for systematically concerted the relevant policies of member countries.
(E) Members to keep each other and NATO informed of programmes and policies in this field, with occasional discussion in NATO of the adequacy of existing action in relation to the interests of the Alliance, including the degree of priority which should be given to areas of particular concern to the Atlantic Community.

V. Soviet Economic Developments and Initiatives

(A) Where general Soviet initiatives are made in the field of economic policy (as in the case of the proposal for "all-European economic co-operation" presented to the ECE in Geneva last April), possible NATO consultation concerning lines of response by member countries.

(B) Notification to the Council of any important new Soviet commercial or financial proposal, with possible political implications, made to any member country and periodic meetings of officials involved in Soviet bloc commercial negotiations for an exchange of information and views.

(C) Possible NATO review from time to time of broader aspects of strategic export control arrangements with a view to agreement on the lines of action most conducive to the security and welfare of the Atlantic Community.

(D) Ad hoc consideration of whether Soviet initiatives in economic relations with non-members, especially underdeveloped countries, should be countered by member countries individually or through other organizations. No indiscriminate competition with the Soviets, but NATO consultation wherever there is a threat to the independence of any area important to the Atlantic Community. Consideration of possible action in serious cases, even if requiring exceptional departure from basic foreign economic policies of the West.

VI. Relations with other organizations

(A) Certainly no attempt to create a "NATO bloc" in organizations composed wholly of free countries. Discussion in NATO of exceptional issues, arising in such organizations, of special political or strategic interest to NATO.

(B) With respect to international economic organizations in which the Soviets participate - notably the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the Economic Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, and the Economic and Social Council - consultation to be scheduled in advance of each meeting to review the agenda, identify points in which Atlantic interests may be attacked or endangered, consider possible Western initiatives, and where appropriate, establish a general community of attitude, without however creating a "NATO bloc".
VII. Scientific and Technical Co-operation

Progress in this field is so crucial to the future of the Atlantic Community that it seems proper for NATO to ensure that no possibilities of fruitful co-operation are left unexplored. NATO might convene a conference composed of one or, at the most, two outstanding authorities, private or governmental, from each member country in order:

(A) to exchange information and views among the participants concerning their most urgent problems in the recruitment, training and utilisation of scientists, engineers and technicians, and the best means of solving these problems;

(B) to foster closer relations among the participants with a view to continuing future interchange of experience and stimulation of constructive work in member countries;

(C) and to propose, for consideration by the North Atlantic Council, specific measures for future international co-operation in this field, whether through NATO or other international organizations.

VIII. NATO machinery for economic consultations

(A) The possible establishment of an Economic Advisory Committee on a permanent basis as a Committee of the Council, entrusted with the regular exchange of information and preliminary discussion in areas requiring systematic consultation, together with any ad hoc projects assigned to it. Any continuing function of the Committee of Technical Advisers would be absorbed by the Economic Advisory Committee. Membership would be flexible, governments being represented by highly qualified specialists as the topics under consideration might require.

(B) Whether or not an Economic Advisory Committee is established, arrangements to be made for more meetings of officials dealing currently with various economic matters important to the Alliance, such as Soviet commercial negotiations, trends in under-developed countries and scientific and technical co-operation.
SECTION 3
CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

I. NATO Institutions

(A) The possible establishment of a Common Research Institute for Atlantic Community Studies, this proposal to be considered by member governments with the assistance of competent experts.

(B) Consideration to be given simultaneously to broadening the basis of the NATO Defence College by admitting teachers, journalists, and others in a position to influence public opinion, and adjusting the curriculum accordingly.

II. Youth Movements

NATO to promote closer relations with youth organizations.

III. Educational Activities

Encouragement of Atlantic Community projects in specific fields which are not already adequately covered, such as summer schools or seminars; visiting professorships; university chairs of Atlantic studies; and special NATO awards for students.

IV. Exchange of persons and facilitation of private travel

(A) Exchange of persons programmes designed particularly to strengthen trans-Atlantic ties;

(B) Review by governments of foreign exchange and other policies affecting private travel between different parts of the Atlantic area.

V. Exchanges of Service Personnel

Possible extension of exchanges of service personnel beyond the limits of normal training programmes, with the help of voluntary organizations and the NATO military authorities.

VI. Financing

(A) Cultural Projects benefiting the Alliance as a whole to be commonly financed on the basis of a realistic appreciation of their financial implications;

(B) For agreed NATO cultural projects initiated by a member government or a private organization, NATO financial support jointly with the sponsor to be used more extensively when necessary to supplement national resources.
SECTION 4

CO-OPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD

I. Information Activities in Relation to NATO Countries

(A) NATO information activities should not extend into fields which more appropriately belong to national information services of member governments. There is, however, no sharp dividing line. Promotion of public understanding of the bonds and common traditions which form the Atlantic Community to be undertaken jointly by NATO and member governments.

(B) Member governments to provide adequate support for agreed information activities of NATO interest.

(C) Strengthening the co-operation between NATO and national information services.

(D) Broadening the character of participation in NATO tours and promoting conferences of professional groups.

(E) Possible financial aid to private organizations supporting NATO.

II. Information problems in relation to the Soviet Bloc

(A) Improved co-ordination of efforts by individual governments in countering Soviet propaganda.

(B) Pooling of experiences on the dissemination of information aimed at Soviet and satellite countries and consultation on the lines to be adopted by broadcasting services on issues of common concern to NATO.

III. Information problems in relation to non-member Countries generally

(A) Additional steps by member governments through their diplomatic missions and otherwise to inform peoples of the non-member countries of the defensive character, as well as the non-military aspects, of the Atlantic Community.
SECTION 5
ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

I. General

No basic structural changes, but certain procedural measures to be considered.

II. Meetings at Ministerial Level

(A) More time for Ministerial Meetings to permit thorough consideration of the important issues on the agenda.

(B) Making arrangements to encourage discussion rather than presentation of prepared declarations of policy.

(C) Meetings of Foreign Ministers to be held more frequently, occasionally in other NATO countries, and individual Foreign Ministers to participate more frequently in regular Council meetings.

III. Meetings of Permanent Representatives

(A) More thorough preparation of the agenda and proposals for Ministerial Meetings.

(B) Use of national senior experts to help in this preparatory work and assist permanent delegations in consultations on special subjects.

(C) Arrangements for review of political and economic questions in advance of Council meetings through discussion in appropriate Committees.

(D) Review by governments of their arrangements for making their representation on the Council as authoritative as possible, for providing maximum effectiveness in the presentation of their views and policies and for ensuring follow-up action.

(E) Occasional meetings of the Council with the participation of the permanent official heads of foreign ministries or "ministerial delegates".

(F) Circulation by member governments of "basic position material" for background information.

(G) Separating consultations on important questions from routine business.

IV. Enhancing the Role of the Secretary General and his Staff

(A) The Secretary General to be encouraged to propose items for NATO consultation, and to promote the process of consultation.

(B) Member governments to keep the Secretary General fully and currently informed through their permanent
delegations of their thinking on questions of common concern to the Alliance.

(C) The Secretary General to be encouraged to make available his good offices, on an informal basis, through periodic visits to member governments and through personal consultations, whenever this might be helpful for reconciling diverging interests.

(D) The Secretary General to submit, in addition to his progress reports on the Organization as such, an annual report on the "State of the Alliance", designed to provide member governments with a frank assessment of its conditions and present and potential problems; this report to be discussed by the Council in Ministerial Session.

(E) The Secretary General to be enabled to make the appropriate staff arrangements for effective implementation of any new tasks assigned to NATO.
COMITE DES TROIS

AVANT-PROJET DE DOCUMENT DE TRAVAIL

SECTION 1

COORDINATION POLITIQUE

I. Consultations

(A) Ce que les consultations requièrent des gouvernements des pays membres

(1) Tenir les gouvernements des autres pays membres informés en ce qui concerne les questions d'intérêt commun pour l'Alliance (préalable essentiel aux consultations).

(2) Accepter la responsabilité d'informer le Conseil de tout ce qui, dans leurs politiques ou prises de position, peut avoir des incidences sérieuses pour d'autres pays membres ou pour l'Alliance dans son ensemble.

(3) Reconnaître à chaque pays membre le droit de demander la discussion de toute question du point de vue des intérêts de l'OTAN.

(4) Accepter de ne pas adopter de politiques définitives sur des questions d'intérêt commun sans consultation préalable suffisamment à l'avance.

(5) Tenir compte, dans l'élaboration de leurs politiques nationales, des intérêts et des vues que les autres pays de l'OTAN ont fait valoir lors des consultations, même si aucun accord n'a été atteint ou s'il n'a pas été formulé de recommandations.

(6) Tenir compte de tout accord dans la déclaration de leur politique nationale; au cas où des considérations d'ordre national entraîneraient un gouvernement à faire exception à cette règle, celui-ci devrait en expliquer les raisons au Conseil.

(7) Donner leur plein effet aux recommandations du Conseil dans les décisions et politiques nationales définitivement adoptées.

(8) S'efforcer de consulter le Conseil avant de faire toute déclaration importante d'une portée politique internationale qui soit susceptible d'avoir des conséquences pour l'Alliance dans son ensemble ou pour certains de ses membres.
(B) Limitations

1. Nécessité d'une action rapide en cas de crise réelle.

2. Réserve du droit, pour chaque gouvernement membre, d'arrêter en dernier ressort les politiques et décisions nationales en tenant compte des intérêts généraux de la communauté.

3. Subordination de toute consultation sur des affaires d'ordre intérieur à l'acceptation du pays le plus directement intéressé, et limitation de ces consultations aux éléments de ces affaires qui peuvent avoir des incidences sérieuses pour les autres membres de l'Alliance.

4. Reconnaissance de la non-universalité de la compétence de l'OTAN, la discussion de questions relatives à des régions extérieures à l'OTAN restant toutefois permise quand les intérêts généraux de l'Alliance sont en cause.


6. Nécessité de respecter le caractère confidéntiel des discussions et d'en assurer rigoureusement la sécurité.

II. Règlement pacifique des différends

Etant donné la grande importance du problème, la spéciale urgence de sa solution et la diversité des vues qui ont été exprimées dans les réponses au questionnaire, il sera particulièrement nécessaire que le Comité des Trois examine la question en détail avec les autres ministres. Le Comité a reçu une proposition que l'on peut résumer comme il suit:

1. Le Conseil adopterait une résolution fondée sur l'Article 1 du Traité, et conforme à l'Article 33 de la Charte des Nations Unies. Les gouvernements des pays de l'OTAN déclareraient qu'au cas où un différend n'aurait pas pu être réglé par le moyen de discussions et de négociations directes, ils entendaient s'efforcer d'en obtenir le règlement dans le cadre de l'OTAN avant de recourir à toute autre institution internationale.

2. On crérait un Comité spécial du Conseil, que pourraient peut-être former de trois à cinq représentants permanents dont le remplacement s'effectuerait par rotation, pour connaître de tels différends et exercer ses "bons offices" en vue de leur règlement. Ce Comité s'occuperait surtout de questions de procédure et ne traiterait de problèmes concrets qu'à la requête des parties intéressées. Son principal objectif serait d'aider ces dernières à parvenir à un accord amiable.

3. On créerait un "Bureau Arbitral de la Communauté Atlantique", qui serait composé de personnalités éminentes et mettrait ses services à la disposition des gouvernements membres à la requête des parties intéressées.
(4) Chaque fois que cela serait nécessaire et approprié, l’OTAN s’associerait au règlement des différends en présentant des propositions de règlement, en donnant, selon ses possibilités, un appui général ou particulier au règlement envisagé, ou même prenant des engagements précis quant à la mise en œuvre ou à la sauvegarde de l’accord de règlement.

Est en outre posée la question d’une immédiate application de toute procédure adoptée aux différends pendants, ainsi qu’à tous les différends qui pourraient surgir à l’avenir.

III. Associations de parlementaires et Conférence des parlementaires

Pas de relations officielles, mais des arrangements pratiques pour améliorer les rapports de ces organismes avec le Conseil.
SECTION 2

COOPERATION ECONOMIQUE

I. Dispositions générales

(A) Reconnaissance d'une communauté d'intérêts économiques couvrant ce qui suit:

(1) Santé et développement économiques des divers pays membres, et maintien de relations harmonieuses entre ceux-ci (y compris l'intégration économique européenne et l'extension de la coopération qui leur sont liées);

(2) Efficace développement économique des régions sous-développées du monde; et

(3) Echec aux initiatives prises par les Soviets dans le domaine économique en vue de diviser les pays de l'Alliance ou de porter atteinte à la liberté.

(B) Pour la poursuite de ces objectifs économiques, les pays maintiendraient entre eux une collaboration permanente et accrue, tant bilatéralement que dans le cadre d'organisations autres que l'OTAN, cet effort étant complété par des consultations au sein de l'OTAN chaque fois que les intérêts de l'Alliance seraient en jeu. Il n'est pas indispensable de limiter au cadre de l'OTAN les efforts en vue d'atteindre les buts énoncés à l'Article 2.

II. Consultations économiques

(A) Tout pays membre, ou le Secrétaire Général, aurait le droit de soulever à tout moment toute question économique jugée importante pour l'Alliance, y compris les questions de cet ordre pour lesquelles on n'enregistrerait que des progrès insuffisants par ailleurs;

(B) Institution d'échanges réguliers d'informations et de vues sur les questions économiques d'une particulière importance pour l'OTAN : aspects économiques de l'organisation de la défense, approvisionnement pétrolier de l'Europe occidentale, efficacité des mesures prises pour le développement des utilisations de l'énergie atomique;

(C) Effort pour adopter une ligne d'action commune s'agissant de questions économiques nettement liées aux intérêts politiques et à la sécurité de l'OTAN.

III. Conflits entre les politiques économiques de pays membres

Quant une situation serait de nature à avoir des répercussions politiques ou stratégiques dangereuses, toute procédure adoptée pour le règlement pacifique des différends politiques serait rendue applicable aux différends surgis dans le domaine économique.

IV. Relations avec les régions sous-développées

(A) Reconnaissance que la Communauté Atlantique a un intérêt positif majeur à voir ces régions demeurer politiquement
stables et libres, et, par conséquent, à ce que leur économie progresse rapidement et de façon saine, étant toutefois précisé que l'OTAN n'est pas un organisme qui puisse gérer des programmes d'assistance conçus en vue du développement économique ou de la coordination systématique des politiques des pays membres en la matière;

(B) Les pays membres se tiendraient mutuellement au courant et tiendraient l'OTAN informée des programmes et politiques adoptés par eux dans ce domaine et procéderaient de temps à autre à des discussions sur l'opportunité des mesures prises, ceci du point de vue des intérêts de l'Alliance et en examinant, entre autres, quelle priorité reconnaitre aux régions qui ont une importance particulière pour la Communauté Atlantique.

V. Evolution de la situation économique en URSS et initiatives prises par ce pays dans ce domaine

(A) Chaque fois que les Soviets prendront des initiatives de portée générale en matière de politique économique (telle la proposition de "coopération économique pan-européenne" faite à la Commission économique pour l'Europe, à Genève, en avril dernier), des consultations pourraient avoir lieu à l'OTAN relativement à l'attitude que les pays membres devraient adopter.

(B) Le Conseil serait informé de toutes nouvelles propositions commerciales ou financières importantes faites par les Soviets à tout pays membre ainsi que des conséquences possibles de telles propositions, et des réunions périodiques seraient tenues par les hauts fonctionnaires chargés des négociations commerciales avec les pays du bloc soviétique, aux fins d'échanges de renseignements et de vues.

(C) L'OTAN pourrait effectuer périodiquement un examen des principaux aspects des dispositions prises pour le contrôle des exportations stratégiques, en vue de décider des mesures les plus propres à garantir la sécurité et le bien-être de la Communauté Atlantique.

(D) On examinera, selon les besoins dans chaque cas, si c'est individuellement ou dans le cadre d'autres organisations que les pays membres doivent s'efforcer de faire écho aux initiatives prises par les Soviets dans leurs relations économiques avec des pays non-membres, et, en particulier, avec des pays sous développés. Il ne s'agirait pas d'entrer sans discernement en concurrence avec les Soviets, mais l'OTAN entreprendrait des consultations chaque fois que l'indépendance d'une région importante pour la Communauté Atlantique serait menacée. Les mesures qui pourraient être prises dans les cas graves seraient examinées, même si celles-ci impliquaient une exceptionnelle dérogation aux politiques fondamentales des Occidentaux en matière de rapports économiques internationaux.

VI. Relations avec les autres organisations

(A) Il ne devrait certainement y avoir aucune tentative pour constituer un "bloc OTAN" au sein d'organisations entièrement composées de pays libres. Mais l'OTAN pourrait discuter des problèmes exceptionnels, d'une importance politique
ou stratégique spéciale pour l'OTAN, qui se trouveraient soulevés dans ces organisations.

(B) En ce qui concerne les organisations économiques internationales dont l'URSS est membre - et, notamment, la Commission Economique pour l'Europe des Nations Unies, la Commission Economique de l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies et le Conseil Economique et Social - des consultations seraient organisées avant chaque réunion pour en étudier l'ordre du jour, pour déterminer les points sur lesquels les intérêts atlantiques pourraient être attaqués ou menacés, pour considérer les initiatives que les Occidentaux pourraient prendre et, chaque fois que de besoin, pour décider d'une communauté générale d'attitude, sans cependant créer de "bloc OTAN".

VII. Coopération scientifique et technique

Des progrès dans ce domaine sont si décisifs pour l'avenir de la Communauté Atlantique qu'il semble être du devoir de l'OTAN de veiller à ne laisser aucune possibilité de coopération fructueuse sans examen. L'OTAN pourrait convoquer une conférence à laquelle chaque pays serait représenté par une ou, au maximum, deux personnalités jouissant d'une exceptionnelle autorité :

(A) pour permettre un échange de renseignements et de vues entre les participants sur leurs problèmes les plus pressants concernant le recrutement, la formation et l'utilisation des savants, ingénieurs et techniciens et sur les meilleures mesures à prendre pour résoudre ces problèmes;

(B) pour établir des relations plus étroites entre les participants en vue d'une poursuite de cette coopération fructueuse sans examen congenial, les pays membres à travailler de façon constructive;

(C) pour que les participants puissent soumettre à l'examen du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord les mesures définies qu'ils proposent de prendre pour développer la coopération internationale dans ce domaine, que celles-ci doivent être mises en œuvre par l'intermédiaire de l'OTAN ou par les soins de toute autre organisation internationale.

VIII. Dispositif OTAN pour les consultations économiques

(A) On pourrait créer un Comité Économique Consultatif permanent dépendant directement du Conseil, qui serait chargé d'assurer un échange régulier de renseignements et les discussions préliminaires voulues dans les domaines où des consultations systématiques sont nécessaires, en même temps que d'étudier tout projet spécial qui lui serait décrété. Toute fonction permanente du Comité des Conseillers Techniques serait transférée au Comité Économique Consultatif. La composition de celui-ci serait variable, les gouvernements y étant représentés par les spécialistes hautement qualifiés dont les questions à l'étude pourraient requérir la présence.

(B) Qu'un Comité Consultatif soit ou non créé, des dispositions seraient prises pour multiplier les réunions des hauts fonctionnaires normalement chargés de questions économiques importantes pour l'Alliance comme les négociations commerciales avec les Soviets, la situation dans les pays sous-développés et la coopération scientifique et technique.
I. Institutions OTAN

(A) On pourrait envisager la création d'un Institut Commun de Recherche pour l'Étude sur la Communauté Atlantique - l'examen de cette proposition étant effectué par les gouvernements des pays membres avec l'assistance d'experts compétents;

(B) On pourrait en même temps étudier l'élargissement des bases sur lesquelles repose le Collège de Défense de l'OTAN, par l'admission, à ses cours et conférences, de membres de l'enseignement, de journalistes et d'autres personnes en mesure d'influencer sur l'opinion du public, les programmes du Collège étant modifiés en conséquence.

II. Mouvemments de jeunesse

L'OTAN pourrait resserrer ses liens avec les organisations de jeunesse.

III. Activités éducatives

Encourager la mise sur pied de projets propres à la Communauté Atlantique dans les domaines qui ne se trouvent pas encore convenablement couverts : cours ou réunions d'été, création de chaires temporaires pour des professeurs étrangers, institution de chaires universitaires d'étude atlantiques, attribution de prix spéciaux OTAN à des étudiants, etc.

IV. Échange de personnes et facilitation des voyages privés

(A) Mise sur pied de programmes d'échange de personnes dans le but particulier de renforcer les liens transatlantiques;

(B) Examen, par les gouvernements, des mesures appliquées par eux en matière de change et de toutes autres dispositions qui affecteraient les voyages des particuliers entre les diverses parties de la région atlantique.

V. Échange de militaires

On pourrait développer les échanges de militaires au-delà des limites des programmes normaux d'entraînement, avec l'aide d'organisations bénévoles et des autorités militaires de l'OTAN.

VI. Financement

(A) Les projets culturels bénéficiant à l'ensemble de l'Alliance seraient l'objet d'un financement en commun fondé sur une appréciation réaliste de leurs incidences financières;
(b) Pour les projets culturels approuvés par l’OTAN à l’initiative d’un gouvernement membre ou d’une institution privée, l’OTAN pourrait fournir un plus large concours financier aux auteurs des projets quand cela serait nécessaire pour compléter les moyens dégagés dans les budgets des pays intéressés.
SECTION 4

COOPERATION EN MATIÈRE D’INFORMATION

I. Activités en matière d’information en ce qui concerne les pays de l’OTAN

(A) Les activités de l’OTAN dans le domaine de l’information ne devraient pas s’étendre à des domaines qui appartiennent plutôt aux services nationaux d’information des gouvernements membres. On ne peut cependant pas établir ici de ligne rigide de partage. Les efforts nécessaires pour faire comprendre au public les liens et traditions communes qui font la communauté atlantique pourraient être poursuivis en commun par l’OTAN et les gouvernements membres.

(B) Les gouvernements membres pourraient fournir l’assistance financière appropriée pour les activités agréées en matière d’information qui revêtent un intérêt pour l’OTAN.

(C) Renforcement de la coopération entre l’OTAN et les services nationaux d’information.

(D) Elargir la formule de participation aux voyages OTAN et encourager l’organisation de conférences de groupes professionnels.

(E) On pourrait envisager l’octroi de subventions aux organisations privées qui soutiennent l’OTAN.

II. Problèmes que pose le bloc soviétique en matière d’information

(A) Améliorer la coordination des efforts poursuivis par les divers gouvernements pour faire échec à la propagande soviétique.

(B) Mettre en commun l’expérience accumulée relativement à la diffusion d’informations à l’intention de l’URSS et des pays satellites, et organiser des consultations sur l’attitude que les services de radiodiffusion devraient adopter à propos de questions d’intérêt commun pour l’OTAN.

III. Problèmes posés en matière d’information en ce qui concerne généralement les pays non-membres de l’OTAN

(A) Les gouvernements des pays membres pourraient prendre de nouvelles mesures, faisant appel à leurs missions diplomatiques ou à tous autres moyens, pour informer les peuples des pays non-membres tant du caractère défensif que des aspects non militaires de la Communauté Atlantique.
SECTION 5

ORGANISATION ET FONCTIONS

I. Organisation générale
Pas de changement fondamental de structure, mais certaines dispositions de procédure à étudier.

II. Réunions à l'échelon ministériel

(A) Accroître la durée des sessions ministérielles pour permettre un examen approfondi des questions importantes à l'ordre du jour.

(B) Prendre les dispositions voulues pour encourager les membres du Conseil à procéder à des discussions au lieu de formuler des déclarations de principe préparées à l'avance.

(C) Accroître la fréquence des réunions de ministres des affaires étrangères, qui se tiendraient à l'occasion dans d'autres pays de l'OTAN, et amener les divers ministres des affaires étrangères à venir plus fréquemment prendre part aux réunions ordinaires du Conseil.

III. Réunions du Conseil Permanent

(A) Préparation plus complète de l'ordre du jour et des réunions prévues à l'échelon ministériel.

(B) Recours à des experts nationaux hautement qualifiés pour aider à effectuer ce travail préparatoire et pour assister les délégations permanentes dans leurs consultations sur des questions spéciales.

(C) Organisation de discussions dans les comités appropriés de manière à assurer une étude des questions politiques et économiques posées avant les réunions du Conseil.

(D) Révision de leurs arrangements respectifs par les divers gouvernements, en vue de conférer le plus d'autorité possible à leurs représentants au Conseil, de donner le maximum d'efficacité à l'exposition de leurs vues et politiques et de garantir l'adoption des mesures nécessaires.

(E) Organisation périodique de réunions du Conseil auxquelles participeraient les hauts fonctionnaires permanents qui assurent la direction des ministères des affaires étrangères, ou des "délégués ministériels".

(F) Distribution, par les gouvernements des pays membres, de documents "de base" fournissant les éléments d'information accessoires nécessaires.

(G) Établissement d'une séparation entre consultations sur des questions importantes et travail courant.
IV. Renforcement du rôle du Secrétaire général et de ses Services

(A) Le Secrétaire général serait encouragé à proposer l’examen de certaines questions dans le cadre des consultations OTAN et à s’efforcer de développer celles-ci.

(B) Les gouvernements des pays membres tiendraient le Secrétaire général pleinement et régulièrement informé de leur avis sur les questions d’intérêt commun pour l’Alliance par l’intermédiaire de leurs délégations permanentes.

(C) Le Secrétaire général serait encouragé à exercer ses bons offices - à titre non-officiels - chaque fois que cela pourrait contribuer à la mise en accord d’intérêts divergents; il pourrait s’y employer au cours de ses visites périodiques aux gouvernements des pays membres et dans des consultations personnelles.

(D) Outre ses rapports sur l’activité de l’Organisation elle-même, le Secrétaire général ferait chaque année un rapport sur "l’état de l’Alliance", dans lequel il dresserait, au bénéfice des gouvernements des pays membres, un franc tableau de la situation au sein de l’Alliance, des problèmes qui se posent à celle-ci et des problèmes auxquels elle pourrait avoir à faire face; ce rapport serait examiné par le Conseil en session ministérielle.

(E) Le Secrétaire général serait mis à même de prendre les dispositions voulues en matière de personnel pour que l’OTAN puisse convenablement assumer toute nouvelle tâche qui lui serait assignée.
ENGLISH ONLY
12th September, 1956

LIST OF CERTAIN PROPOSALS NOT CONTAINED IN THE
PRELIMINARY WORKING PAPER (CT-WP/5(Revised))
BUT WHICH MIGHT BE RAISED IN ALL CONSULTATIONS
TO ELICIT COUNTRIES' REACTIONS

1. Any member to have right to raise for discussion in the Council
an inter-member dispute on which it believes it has exhausted
the possibilities of direct negotiation. The Council could
then set up a "Fact Finding Committee", the report of this
Committee to be discussed in the Council in order to try and
find a basis for conciliation (Greece). This proposal might
be examined in relation to Stage 2 of the US proposal.

2. A "Political Annual Review", for which governments would supply
information, to be made in the form of a report (Germany).

3. Member countries should adhere to the principle of multilateral
trade with the Eastern bloc. They should undertake not to
conclude new bilateral payments agreements with Eastern bloc
states and to allow those already in existence to expire. NATO
countries should also agree not to buy transit goods originating
in under-developed countries from Eastern bloc countries
(Germany).

4. Common action within the NATO framework by capital-exporting
countries might bring about a relaxation of the conditions
under which the IMF and the IBRD would grant aid to certain
under-developed countries (Luxembourg, France, Turkey).

5. With respect to co-operation in the field of information,
countries' opinions might be asked about the question how to
strike a balance between the needs of NATO security and of
safeguarding the confidential nature of the Council's
discussions on the one hand and the need to inform public
opinion about positive results achieved by consultation in NATO
on political subjects on the other.

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.
CHAPTER II. CO-OPERATION IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD

(A) **INTRODUCTION**

Political co-operation and economic conflict are not reconcilable. Therefore, in the economic field also there must be a genuine desire among the members to work together, and to consult on questions of common concern; a desire based on the recognition of common interests.

2. The economic interests shared by the members of NATO call for:

   (a) co-operative and individual action to achieve healthy and developing economies both for the well-being and confidence of the Atlantic peoples and as the essential support for an adequate defence effort;

   (b) assistance to economically underdeveloped areas for reasons of enlightened self-interest and to promote better relations between peoples;

   (c) the promotion of human welfare and economic progress as the best protection against the subversive forces of communism.

3. A recognition of these common NATO interests, and collective and individual effort to promote them, need not in any way prejudice close and co-operative economic relations; or, in certain circumstances, special economic arrangements with non-NATO countries. Economic co-operation, as is the case with political co-operation, is and must remain wider than NATO. At the same time the countries of the Atlantic Community also have an interest in arrangements for especially close economic co-operation among
smaller groupings of European member nations and it should be possible for the development of such arrangements to promote rather than conflict with the wider objectives of the Atlantic Community and the rest of the non-Communist world.

(B) ARTICLE 2, NATO, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

4. The objectives of Article 2 are of basic importance to the stability and well-being not only of the North Atlantic area but of the entire non-Communist world. It is not, however, necessary that member countries pursue the purposes of Article 2 only through action in NATO itself. It would not serve the interests of the Atlantic Community for NATO to take over or duplicate the operating functions of international organizations designed for various forms of economic co-operation (1). NATO members play a major part in all these agencies, and their membership is generally well adapted to their special purposes.

5. Nor, in the Committee's view do there now appear to be significant new areas for common economic action requiring execution by NATO itself. The common economic concerns of the member nations will rather best be fostered by continued and enhanced collaboration both directly and through organizations other than NATO, but reinforced by NATO consultation where the interests of the Alliance are involved. This requires a substantial expansion of exchange of information and views in the economic as well as in the political field. Especially where economic matters are clearly related to the political and security interests of NATO, such consultations should seek to secure a common approach on the part of member governments. The resulting action, however, should normally be taken by governments either directly or through other international organizations.

(1) The outstanding instances are the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OECD) (which includes all NATO countries as full or associate members and four others); the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); the International
(Footnote continued)
Monetary Fund (IMF); the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC); and the various United Nations specialised agencies including the Economic Commission for Europe. Several NATO members participate actively in the Colombo Plan for promoting economic development for Asia. Most members are taking an active part in technical assistance programmes and are also participating in discussions of proposals for the creation of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED).
C) AREAS FOR ECONOMIC CONSULTATION

Strengthening members' economies and promoting their economic co-operation

6. There now exists adequate provision for a regular assessment of each member country's general economic position, prospects and problems through the OEEC and NATO Annual Reviews. Economic growth and health, which are vital to the Alliance, require expanding economies based on sound policies and organized co-operation to promote the greatest possible freedom in trade and payments and in the movements of manpower and long-term capital. While there remains a great deal to be accomplished in these respects, the requisite machinery for co-operation among NATO members exists in other organizations.

7. At the same time, issues may arise, affecting the economic health of the Atlantic Community, where NATO may be the most effective organization for consultation because of their political implications or because of their relation to the common defence. Possibly in Cover Note: On both these counts NATO might be properly concerned, for example, with the assurance of oil supplies for Western Europe and with the adequacy of action for the development of atomic power. Economic aspects of defence, including questions of economic mobilisation and stockpiling of civilian supplies, are already receiving some attention in NATO; such matters should continue to be a regular concern of the organization.

Scientific and Technical Co-operation

8. One area of special importance to the Atlantic Community is the field of science and technology. During the last decade, it has become ever clearer that the ability to hold the lead in science and engineering can be decisive in determining the position of nations in world affairs.
future security and welfare of the Atlantic Community are as dependent on effective progress in this field as on the maintenance of an adequate collective defence, which itself requires continued technological superiority. Such progress is also vital if the NATO countries are to play their proper role in relation to underdeveloped areas.

9. Within the general field of science and technology, one especially urgent need is that appropriate measures be taken to improve the quality and to increase the supply of scientists, engineers and technicians. Responsibility for recruitment, training and utilisation of scientific and technical personnel is primarily a national rather than an international matter. Nor is it a responsibility solely of national governments. In the member countries with Federal systems, State and Provincial Governments play the major part, and many of the universities and institutes of higher learning in the Atlantic area are independent institutions free from detailed control by governments. At the same time, properly designed measures of international co-operation could stimulate individual member countries to adopt more positive policies and, in some cases, help guide them into the most constructive channels.

10. Certain activities in this connection are already being carried out by other organizations. Progress in this field, however, is so crucial to the future of the Atlantic Community that NATO members should ensure that no possibilities of fruitful co-operation are left unexplored. As a first concrete step, therefore, it is recommended that a conference be convened (either by NATO or on the initiative of member governments through another appropriate Organization), composed of one or, at the most, two outstanding authorities, private or governmental, from each country in order:
(a) to exchange information and views among the participants concerning their most urgent problems in the recruitment, training and utilisation of scientists, engineers and technicians, and the best means, both long-term and short-term, of solving these problems;

(b) to foster closer relations among the participants with a view to continuing future interchange of experience and stimulation of constructive work in member countries; and

(c) to propose specific measures for future international co-operation in this field, whether through NATO or other international organizations.

Conflicts in Economic Policies of Member Countries

The Committee distinguishes between disagreements on economic policy which are normally dealt with through direct negotiation or multilateral discussion in other organizations, and economic disputes which may have political or strategic repercussions damaging to the Alliance. Nothing would be gained by merely having repeated in NATO the same arguments made in other and more technically qualified organizations. It should, however, be open to any member or to the Secretary General to raise for discussion in NATO issues on which they feel that consideration elsewhere is not making adequate progress and that NATO consultation might facilitate solutions contributing to the objectives of the Atlantic Community. The principles for peaceful settlement discussed in the previous Chapter should, of course, be applicable to major disputes of an economic as well as a purely political character.
Relations with Underdeveloped Areas

12. It is a matter of common consent that the Atlantic Community has a major positive concern with the healthy and accelerated economic development in the underdeveloped areas. It is likewise agreed that NATO is not an appropriate agency for administering programmes of assistance for economic development or even for systematically conciling the relevant policies of member nations. The Committee recommends that member countries keep each other and the Organization informed of their programmes and policies in this field, and that there be occasional discussion in NATO of the adequacy of existing action in relation to the interests of the Alliance. [Possibly in Cover Note: including the degree of priority which should be given to areas of particular concern to the Atlantic Community, both inside and outside the North Atlantic Area.]

13. The Alliance also has a positive interest in the more complex and difficult field of Soviet economic relations with non-members, especially the underdeveloped countries. The Committee welcomes the first steps in the exchange of information on this topic in the Committee on Soviet Economic Policy, and believes that this should be a continuing function of NATO. The Atlantic Community has no interest in disturbing normal economic relations between underdeveloped areas and the Soviet countries, but it should be concerned with cases where Soviet action appears calculated to foster Communist political penetration or to reduce the freedom of other countries to maintain healthy economic relations with the NATO members. It would clearly not be desirable to engage in indiscriminate competition with the Soviets in this field, in which the main endeavour of member governments should be to cultivate affirmatively their mutual interests with the
underdeveloped areas. At the same time, NATO consultation in particular cases might, on occasion, suggest the need for special action, even if this requires an exceptional departure from the basic foreign economic policies of member governments. In this as in other economic fields, however, any indicated action would be undertaken not by NATO as such but by individual governments or appropriate international organizations.
Soviet Economic Activities

14. The recent tendency of Soviet policy to use economic measures which may have the effect of weakening the Western Alliance, or of creating in other areas a dangerous degree of dependence on the Soviet world, makes it especially important that NATO undertake systematic consultation in this field. What is needed now generally on the part of NATO countries is a progressive development of their commercial and financial policies. In particular, they should avoid creating situations of which the Soviets might take advantage to the detriment of the Atlantic Community and of other non-Communist countries. In any event it is desirable that member countries should be in a position to determine their course deliberately and with the fullest possible knowledge.

15. The Committee recommends that NATO continue its regular reporting on economic trends in Soviet countries (including the comparison with member countries) and developments in Soviet economic policy. To this end, governments should undertake to report relevant information regularly, and there should be periodic meetings of experts on Soviet economic affairs drawn from the various capitals. Where general Soviet initiatives are made in the field of economic policy, there should be NATO consultation concerning the possible lines of response by member countries.

16. With respect to Soviet commercial relations with member countries, arrangements should be made for periodic meetings of officials involved in Soviet bloc commercial negotiations for an exchange of information and views. [Possibly in Cover Note: In the case of an important new Soviet commercial or financial proposal to any member country, with possible political implications, it would be desirable for the member concerned to bring it to the attention of the Council. In connection with strategic controls]
on trade with the Soviet bloc and Communist China, it would be desirable to review in NATO from time to time the broader aspects of the control arrangements and to seek agreement on the lines of action in this area most conducive to the security and welfare of the Atlantic Community.

(D) RELATIONS WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

17. NATO, as such, should not seek to establish formal relations with international economic organizations, and the harmonising of attitudes and actions should be left to the representatives of the NATO governments therein.

Not is it necessary or desirable for NATO members to seek a common policy front, or bloc, in such organizations. This would only alienate other and friendly governments, with harmful results.

When, however, in other organizations economic issues arise which have a special political or strategic interest to NATO, they should be discussed in the NATO Council. There should also be NATO consultation prior to the meetings of international economic agencies when interests of the Atlantic Community may be subject to attempts in those agencies to divide and weaken the Alliance. Here again NATO discussions do not preclude wider consultation when that is practicable and desirable.

(E) NATO MACHINERY FOR ECONOMIC CONSULTATION

16. There has been, in recent months, a considerable evolution in NATO's machinery for regular economic consultation. In addition, a number of economic matters have been brought before the Council for consideration on an ad hoc basis. No substantial new machinery in this field is called for. However, in view of the extended range of topics for regular exchange of information and consultation described above, the Committee
The Committee of Three: from left to right, Mr Halvard Lange, Prof. Gaetano Makino, and Mr L.B. Pearson. The Committee of Three recommends the establishment under the Council of a Committee of Economic Advisers. This group would be entrusted with the regular exchange of information and preliminary discussion in those areas of systematic consultation outlined above, together with such ad hoc projects as might be initiated by the Council or approved by the Council at the Committee's request. It would absorb any continuing function of the Committee of Technical Advisers. Since its duties would be far less than full-time, member governments would presumably wish to be represented normally by officials mainly concerned with the work of other economic organizations, but membership should be flexible, the Committee being composed when appropriate of specialists from the capitals on particular topics under consideration. In any event, whether or not such a Committee is established, arrangements should be made for more meetings of officials dealing currently with various economic matters important to the Alliance, such as Soviet commercial negotiations, trends in underdeveloped countries, scientific and technical co-operation and the like. Informal discussion among officials with corresponding specialised responsibilities is a particularly valuable means of concerting governmental attitudes in the earliest stages of policy formation.
CHAPTER 1: POLITICAL CO-OPERATION

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   A. Scope and Character of Political Consultation
   B. Annual Political Appraisal
   C. Preparation of Political Consultation

III. PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF INTER-MEMBER DISPUTES

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CHAPTER 2: ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. If there is to be vitality and growth in the concept of the Atlantic Community, the relations between the members of NATO must rest on a solid basis of confidence and understanding. Without this there cannot be the kind of political co-operation which, with collective security, constitutes the special value of NATO for its members.

2. The deepening and strengthening of this political co-operation does not imply the weakening of the ties of NATO members with other international associations, such as the United Nations, or of their friendly relations with other countries. Support for NATO is not exclusive or restrictive. Nor should the evolution of the Atlantic Community through NATO prevent the formation of even closer relationships among some members, for instance within groups of European countries. The moves toward Atlantic co-operation and European unity can be parallel and complementary and need not be competitive or conflicting.

3. Effective and constructive international co-operation requires a resolve to work together for the solution of common problems. There are special ties between NATO members, special incentives and security interests, which should make this task easier. But its successful accomplishment will depend largely on
the extent to which member governments, in their own policies and actions, take into consideration the interests of the Alliance. This requires not only the acceptance of the obligation of consultation and co-operation whenever necessary, but also the development of practices by which the discharge of this obligation becomes a normal part of governmental activity.

4. It is easy to profess devotion to the principle of political - or economic - consultation in NATO. It is difficult to convert the profession into practice. Consultation within an alliance means more than exchange of information, though that is necessary. It means more than letting the Council of NATO know about decisions that have already been taken, or merely trying to enlist support for national policy. It means the discussion of problems collectively, in the early stages of policy formation, before national positions become set. At its best, this will result in collective decisions on matters of common interest affecting the Alliance. At the least, it will ensure that no action is taken by one member without a knowledge of the views of the others.

II. CONSULTATION ON FOREIGN POLICIES

A. Scope and Character of Political Consultation

5. The essential rôle of consultation in fostering political co-operation was clearly defined by the earlier Committee on the North Atlantic Community in 1951:

"... The achievement of a closer degree of co-ordination of the foreign policies of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty, through the development of the 'habit of consultation' on matters of common concern, would greatly strengthen the solidarity of the North Atlantic Community and increase the individual and collective capacity of its members to serve the peaceful purposes for which
NATO was established. ... In the political field, this means that while each North Atlantic Government retains full freedom of action and decision with respect to its own policy, the aim should be to achieve, through exchanging information and views, as wide an area of agreement as possible in the formulation of policies affecting the North Atlantic Community as a whole. "Special attention must be paid, as explicitly recognised in Article 4 of the Treaty, to matters of urgent and immediate importance to the members of NATO, and to 'emergency' situations where it may be necessary to consult closely on national lines of conduct affecting the interests of members of NATO as a whole. There is a continuing need, however, for effective consultation at an early stage on current problems, in order that national policies may be developed and action taken on the basis of a full awareness of the attitudes and interests of all the members of NATO. While all members of NATO have a responsibility to consult with their partners on appropriate matters, a large share of responsibility for such consultation necessarily rests on the more powerful members of the Community."

6. Those words were written five years ago. They still hold true. Nor have they been ignored by NATO. The practice of consulting together has developed in the NATO Council in recent years and it has contributed to co-operation in the Alliance. But there is ample room for improvement - for broadening the scope and deepening the character of consultation.

7. It should, however, be remembered that collective discussion is not an end in itself, but a means to the end of securing
the maximum possible agreement on policy and action on all matters that concern the common interests of the Atlantic Community.

8. Such agreement, even with the closest possible co-operation and consultation, is not easy to secure. But it is essential to the Atlantic Alliance that steady and continuous effort be made to bring it about, for there cannot be solidarity in defence and cleavage in foreign policy.

9. There are, of course, certain practical limitations to consultation. They are sufficiently obvious in fact to make it unnecessary to emphasise them in words. Indeed the danger is less that they will be minimised or evaded than that they will be exaggerated and used to justify practices which ignore the common interest.

10. One of these limitations is the fact that the ultimate responsibility for decision and action still rests on national governments; in a situation of emergency, therefore, action may be required by one government before consultation is possible with the others.

11. Another limitation is the difficulty and the un-sentiment of trying to specify in advance the subjects and the situations where consultation is necessary; to separate by area or by subject the matters of NATO concern from those of purely national concern; to define in detail obligations and duties. Those things have to work themselves out in practice. In this process, experience is a better guide than fixed rules.

12. The essential thing is that on all occasions and in all circumstances member governments before acting or even before pronouncing, should keep the interests and the requirements of the Alliance in mind. If they have not the desire and the will to do this, no resolutions or recommendations or declarations will be of any value.
13. On the justifiable assumption, however, that this will and this desire do exist, the following principles and practices in the field of political consultation are submitted for acceptance:

(a) Members should inform the Council of any development which significantly affects the Alliance. They should do this, not merely as a formality but as a preliminary to effective political consultation.

(b) Both individual member governments and the Secretary General should have the right to raise for discussion in the Council any subject which is of common NATO interest and not of a purely domestic character.

(c) A member government should not, without adequate advance consultation, adopt firm policies or make major political pronouncements on matters which affect the Alliance or any of its members in a significant way, unless circumstances make such prior consultation demonstrably impossible.

(d) Members should seek to develop their national policies in the light of the interests and views of other governments as expressed in NATO consultation, even where no community of view or consensus has been reached in the Council.

(e) Where a consensus has been reached, it should be reflected in the formation of national policies. When for national reasons the consensus is not followed, the government concerned should offer an explanation to the Council. It is even more
important that where an agreed recommendation has emerged from the Council discussions, governments should give it full weight in any national actions or policies related to the subject of that recommendation.

B. Annual Political Appraisal

14. To strengthen the process of consultation, it is recommended that Foreign Ministers, at their Spring meeting, make an appraisal of the political progress of the Alliance and consider the lines along which it should advance.

15. To prepare for this discussion, the Secretary General should submit a report:

(a) analysing the major political problems of the Alliance;
(b) reviewing the extent to which member governments have consulted and co-operated on such problems, or failed to do so;
(c) indicating the problems and potential developments which may require future consultation in order to resolve difficulties and work out positive and constructive initiatives.

16. Member governments, through their Permanent Representatives, should give the Secretary General such information and assistance, including that of technical experts, as he may require in preparing his report.

C. Preparation of Political Consultation

17. Effective consultation also requires careful planning and preparation of the agenda for meetings of the Council both in Ministerial and permanent session. Political questions coming up for discussion in the Council should as far as practicable be
previously reviewed and discussed, so that representatives may have background information on the thinking both of their own and of other governments. When appropriate, drafts of resolutions should be prepared in advance as a basis for discussion. Additional preparatory work will also be required for the annual political appraisal referred to in the preceding section.

18. To assist the Permanent Representatives and the Secretary General in discharging their responsibilities for political consultation, there should be constituted under the Council a committee of political advisers from each delegation, aided when necessary by specialists from the capitals. It would meet under the chairmanship of a member of the International Staff appointed by the Secretary General, and would include among its responsibilities current studies such as those on trends of Soviet policy.

III. PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF INTER-MEMBER DISPUTES

19. In the development of effective political co-operation in NATO, it is of crucial importance to avoid serious inter-member disputes and to settle them quickly and satisfactorily when they occur. The settlement of such disputes is in the first place the direct responsibility of the member governments concerned, under both the Charter of the United Nations (Article 33) and the North Atlantic Treaty (Article 1). To facilitate the carrying out of these obligations, it is recommended that the Council adopt a resolution under Article 1 of the Treaty on the following lines:

(a) reaffirming the obligation of members to settle by peaceful means any dispute between themselves;
(b) declaring their intention to submit any such disputes, which have not proved capable
of settlement directly, to good offices procedures within the NATO framework before resorting to any other international agency; except for disputes of a legal character appropriate for submission to a judicial tribunal, and those disputes of an economic character for which attempts at settlement might best be made initially in the appropriate specialised economic organization;

(c) recognising the right and duty of member governments and of the Secretary General to bring to the attention of the Council matters which in their opinion may threaten the solidarity or effectiveness of the Alliance;

(d) empowering the Secretary General to offer his good offices informally at any time to the parties in dispute, and with their consent to initiate or facilitate procedures of enquiry, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration; and

(e) empowering the Secretary General, where he deems it appropriate for these purposes, to use the assistance of not more than three Permanent Representatives chosen by him in each instance.

IV. PARLIAMENTARY ASSOCIATIONS AND THE PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE

20. Among the best supporters of NATO and its purposes are those Members of Parliament who have had a chance to see at first hand some of its activities and problems, and to exchange views with their colleagues from other parliaments. In particular, the formation of national Parliamentary Associations and the activities
of the Conference of Members of Parliament from NATO countries have contributed to the development of public support for NATO and solidarity among its members.

21. The following arrangements are therefore recommended to maintain a close relationship with NATO:

(a) That the Secretary General continue to place the facilities of NATO headquarters at the disposal of Parliamentary Conference and give all possible help with arrangements for its meetings.

(b) That invited representatives of member governments and the Secretary General and other senior NATO civil and military officers attend these meetings for speeches and discussion periods. In this way the parliamentarians would be informed on the state of the Alliance and the problems before it, and the value of their discussions would be increased.
CHAPTER 2: ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

I. INTRODUCTION

Political co-operation and economic conflict are not reconcilable. Therefore, in the economic as well as in the political field there must be a genuine desire among the members to work together and a readiness to consult on questions of common concern based on the recognition of common interests.

2. The economic interests shared by the members of NATO call for:

(a) co-operative and individual action to achieve healthy and developing economies, both to promote the well-being and self-confidence of the Atlantic peoples and to serve as the essential support for an adequate defence effort;

(b) assistance to economically underdeveloped areas for reasons of enlightened self-interest and to promote better relations among peoples; and

(c) demonstrating, under conditions of competitive coexistence, the superiority of free institutions in promoting human welfare and economic progress.

3. A recognition of these common NATO interests, and collective and individual effort to promote these economic aims, need not in any way prejudice close economic relations with non-NATO countries. Economic, like political co-operation, is and must remain wider than NATO. At the same time, the countries of the Atlantic Community have an interest in arrangements for especially close economic co-operation among groups of European member nations, and it should be possible for the development of such arrangements to promote rather than conflict with the wider objectives of the Atlantic Community and the rest of the non-Communist world.
II. NATO AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

4. The economic objectives of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty are of basic importance to the stability and well-being not only of the North Atlantic area but of the entire non-Communist world. It is not, however, necessary that member countries pursue the purposes of Article 2 only through action in NATO itself. It would not serve the interests of the Atlantic Community for NATO to duplicate the operating functions of other international organizations designed for various forms of economic co-operation (1). NATO members play a major part in all these agencies, whose membership is generally well adapted to the special purposes.

5. Nor do there now appear to be significant new areas for common economic action requiring execution by NATO itself. The common economic concerns of the member nations will best be fostered by continued and enhanced collaboration both directly and through organizations other than NATO. This should be reinforced, however, by NATO consultation where economic issues of special interest to the Alliance are involved. This, in turn, requires a substantial expansion of exchange of information and views in the economic as well as in the political field. Where economic matters are clearly related to the political and security interests of the Alliance, NATO consultation should seek to secure a common approach on the part of member governments. The resulting action,

(1) The outstanding instances are the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) (which includes all NATO countries as full or associate members and four others); the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); the International Finance Corporation (IFC); and the various United Nations specialised agencies including the Economic Commission for Europe. Several NATO members participate actively in the Colombo Plan for promoting economic development in Asia. Most members are taking an active part in technical assistance programmes and are also participating in discussions of proposals for the creation of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED).
however, should normally be taken by governments either directly or through other international organizations.

6. NATO, as such, should not seek to establish formal relations with these other organizations, and the harmonising of attitudes and actions should be left to the representatives of the NATO governments therein. Nor is it necessary or desirable for NATO members to form a "bloc" in such organizations. This would only alienate other friendly governments. There should, however, be NATO consultation when economic issues of special political or strategic interest to NATO arise in other organizations, and particularly before meetings of such organizations at which interests of the Atlantic Community may be subject to attempts to divide or weaken the Alliance.

III. Fields for Economic Consultation Within NATO

A. Strengthening members' economies and promoting their economic co-operation

7. Economic growth and health require expanding economies based on sound policies, and organized co-operation to promote the greatest possible freedom in trade and payments and in the movements of manpower and long-term capital. While there remains a great deal to be accomplished in these respects, the requisite machinery for co-operation among NATO members exists in other organizations.

8. There is now adequate provision for a regular assessment of each member country's general economic position, prospects and problems through the CEEC and NATO Annual Reviews. In addition, issues may arise affecting the economic health of the Atlantic Community, where NATO may be the most effective organization for consultation because of their political implications, or because of their relation to the common defence.

B. Resolving conflicts in Economic Policies of Member Countries

9. NATO has a positive interest in the resolution of
economic disputes which may have political or strategic repercussions damaging to the Alliance. These are to be distinguished from disagreements on economic policy which are normally dealt with through direct negotiations or multilateral discussion in other organizations. Nothing would be gained by merely having repeated in NATO the same arguments made in other and more technically qualified organizations. It should, however, be open to any member or to the Secretary General to raise for discussion in NATO issues on which they feel that consideration elsewhere is not making adequate progress and that NATO consultation might facilitate solutions contributing to the objectives of the Atlantic Community. The procedures for peaceful settlement discussed in the previous Chapter should be available for major disputes of an economic as well as a purely political character.

C. Scientific and Technical Co-operation

10. One area of special importance to the Atlantic Community is the field of science and technology. During the last decade, it has become ever clearer that progress in science and engineering can be decisive in determining the security of nations and their position in world affairs. Such progress is also vital if the Western world is to play its proper rôle in relation to economically underdeveloped areas.

11. Within the general field of science and technology, there is an especially urgent need to improve the quality and to increase the supply of scientists, engineers and technicians. Responsibility for recruitment, training and utilisation of scientific and technical personnel is primarily a national rather than an international matter. Nor is it a responsibility solely of national governments. In the member countries with federal systems, state and provincial governments play the major part, and
many of the universities and institutes of higher learning in the Atlantic area are independent institutions free from detailed control by governments. At the same time, properly designed measures of international co-operation could stimulate individual member countries to adopt more positive policies and, in some cases, help guide them in the most constructive directions.

12. Certain activities in this connection are already being carried out by other organizations. Progress in this field, however, is so crucial to the future of the Atlantic Community that NATO members should ensure that no possibilities of fruitful co-operation are left unexplored. As a first concrete step, therefore, it is recommended that a conference be convened (either by NATO or on the initiative of NATO member governments through another appropriate organization), composed of one or at the most two outstanding authorities, private or governmental, from each country in order:

(a) to exchange information and views concerning the most urgent problems in the recruitment, training and utilisation of scientists, engineers and technicians, and the best means, both long-term and short-term, of solving these problems;

(b) to foster closer relations among the participants with a view to continued interchange of experience and stimulation of constructive work in member countries; and

(c) to propose specific measures for future international co-operation in this field, through NATO or other international organizations.

D. Relations with Other Areas

13. It is a matter of common consent that the Atlantic Community has a major positive concern with healthy and accelerated
development in economically underdeveloped areas, both outside and within the NATO area. It is likewise agreed that NATO is not an appropriate agency for administering programmes of assistance for economic development, or even for systematically concerting the relevant policies of member nations. Member countries should, however, keep each other and the Organization informed of their programmes and policies in this field, and when required NATO should review the adequacy of existing action in relation to the interests of the Alliance.

14. The economic interests of the Atlantic Community cannot be considered in isolation from the activities and policies of the Soviet bloc. The Soviets are resorting all too often to the use of economic measures which may have the effect of weakening the Western Alliance, or of creating in other areas a dangerous degree of dependence on the Soviet world. In this situation it is more than ever important that NATO countries actively develop their own constructive commercial and financial policies. In particular, they should avoid creating situations of which the Soviets might take advantage to the detriment of the Atlantic Community and of other non-Communist countries. In this whole field member countries should consult together in order to determine their course deliberately and with the fullest possible knowledge.

15. NATO should continue its regular analysis of economic trends in Soviet countries (including the comparison with member countries) and developments in Soviet economic policy. To this end, governments should undertake to report relevant information regularly, and there should be periodic meetings of experts on Soviet economic affairs drawn from the various capitals whose discussions might be the basis for consultation in particular cases. Arrangements should also be made for periodic meetings of
officials from the national capitals involved in commercial negotiations with the Soviet bloc, for an exchange of information and views. In the case of an important new commercial or financial proposal from the Soviet bloc to any member country, with possible political implications, it would be desirable for the member concerned to bring it to the attention of the Council.

16. The Alliance also has a positive interest in the complex and difficult field of Soviet economic relations with the underdeveloped countries. NATO should be concerned with cases where Soviet economic action appears calculated to undermine sound relations between the underdeveloped countries and members of the Atlantic Community. Here the main endeavour of member governments should be to work co-operatively and constructively with the underdeveloped areas in promoting their economic development on a mutually satisfactory basis. It would clearly not be desirable to engage in indiscriminate competitive bidding with the Soviets in the field of assistance for development. At the same time, NATO consultation in certain cases might suggest the need for special efforts by members to assist underdeveloped countries in dealing with unusual problems, even if this requires an exceptional departure from ordinary commercial and financial practices.

IV. NATO ARRANGEMENTS FOR ECONOMIC CONSULTATION

17. There has been a considerable evolution in NATO's arrangements for regular economic consultation. In addition, a number of economic matters have been brought before the Council for consideration on an ad hoc basis. No substantial new machinery in this field is called for. However, in view of the extended range of topics for regular exchange of information and consultation described above, there should be established under the Council a Committee of Economic Advisers. This group should be
entrusted with the regular exchange of information and preliminary discussion in those areas of systematic consultation outlined above, together with such tasks as may be assigned by the Council or approved by the Council at the Committee's request. It would absorb any continuing function of the Committee of Technical Advisers. Since its duties would not be full-time, member governments would presumably wish to be represented normally by officials mainly concerned with the work of other economic organizations; but membership should be flexible, the Committee being composed, when appropriate, of specialists from the capitals on particular topics under consideration. In any event arrangements should be made for more meetings of officials dealing currently with various economic matters important to the Alliance, such as Soviet commercial negotiations, trends in underdeveloped countries, or scientific and technical co-operation.
CHAPTER 3: CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

1. A sense of community must bind the people as well as the institutions of the Atlantic nations. This will exist only to the extent that there is a realisation of their common cultural heritage and of the values of their free way of life and thought. It is important, therefore, for the NATO countries to promote cultural co-operation among their peoples by all practical means in order to strengthen their unity and develop maximum support for their alliance. It is particularly important that this cultural co-operation should be wider than continental. This, however, does not preclude particular governments from acting on a more limited multilateral or even bilateral basis to strengthen their own cultural relations within the broader Atlantic framework.

2. The Committee welcomes the measures for cultural co-operation within the Atlantic Community which have been initiated by private individuals and non-governmental groups. These should be encouraged and increased. To further cultural collaboration, the Committee suggests that member governments be guided by the following general principles:

(a) Government activities in this field should not duplicate but should support and supplement private efforts.

(b) Member governments should give priority to those projects which require joint NATO action, and thus contribute to a developing sense of community.

(c) In developing new activities in the cultural field, NATO can most fruitfully place the main emphasis on inspiring and promoting transatlantic contacts.

(d) There should be a realistic appreciation of the financial implications of cultural projects.
3. In order to develop public awareness and understanding of NATO and the Atlantic Community, the Council should work out arrangements for NATO courses and seminars for teachers, journalists and others in a position to influence public opinion.

4. NATO and its member governments should broaden their support of other educational and related activities such as the NATO Fellowship and Scholarship Programme; creation of university chairs of Atlantic studies; visiting professorships; government-sponsored programmes for the exchange of persons, especially on a transatlantic basis; use of NATO information materials in schools; and establishment of special NATO awards for students.

5. Governments should actively promote closer relations between NATO and youth organizations and a specialist should be added to the International Staff in this connection. Conferences under NATO auspices of representatives of youth organizations such as that of July, 1956, should be held from time to time.

6. In the interests of promoting easier and more frequent contacts among the NATO peoples, governments should review and, if possible, revise their foreign exchange and other policies which restrict travel.

7. In view of the importance of promoting better understanding and goodwill between NATO service personnel, it would be desirable, in co-operation with the military authorities, to extend exchanges of such personnel beyond the limits of normal training programmes. Such exchanges might, as a first step, be developed by governments on a bilateral basis. In addition, member governments should seek the assistance of the Atlantic Treaty Association and other voluntary organizations in the further development of such exchanges.
8. Cultural projects which have a common benefit should be commonly financed. Agreed cultural projects initiated by a single member government or a private organization, such as the recent seminar held at Oxford or the Study Conference sponsored by the Atlantic Treaty Association on "The Role of the School in the Atlantic Community", should receive financial support from NATO where that is necessary to supplement national resources.
CHAPTER 4: CO-OPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD

1. The people of the member countries must know about NATO if they are to support it. Therefore they must be informed not only of NATO's aspirations, but of its achievements. There must be substance for an effective NATO information programme and resources to carry it out. The public should be informed to the greatest possible extent of significant results achieved through NATO consultation.

2. NATO information activities should be directed primarily to public opinion in the NATO area. At the same time, an understanding outside the NATO area of the objectives and accomplishments of the Organization is necessary if it is to be viewed sympathetically, and if its activities are not to be misinterpreted.

3. The important task of explaining and reporting NATO activities rests primarily on national information services. They cannot discharge this task if member governments do not make adequate provision in their national programmes for that purpose. It is essential, therefore, that such provision be made. NATO can and should assist governments in this work. The promotion of information about and public understanding of NATO and the Atlantic community should, in fact, be a joint endeavour by the Organization and its members.

4. One of NATO's functions should be to co-ordinate the work of national information services in fields of common interest. Governments should pool their experiences and views in NATO to avoid differences in evaluation and emphasis. This is particularly important in the dissemination of information about NATO to
other countries. Co-ordinated policy should underlie the
defensive character of our Alliance and the importance of its
non-military aspects. It should cover also replies to
anti-NATO propaganda and the analysis of communist moves and
statements which affect NATO.

5. In its turn, the NATO Information Division must be given
the resources by and the support from governments without which
they could not discharge these new tasks - and should not be
asked to do so.

6. In order to facilitate co-operation between the NATO
Information Division and national information services, the
following specific measures are recommended:

(a) An officer should be designated by each national
information service to maintain liaison with NATO
and to be responsible for the dissemination of
NATO information material;

(b) governments should submit to NATO the relevant
information programmes which they plan to implement,
for discussion in the Committee on Information and
Cultural Relations. Representatives of national
information services should take part in these
discussions;

(c) within the NATO Information Division budget, pro-
vision should be made for a translation fund so
that NATO information material can be translated
into the non-official languages of the Alliance,
according to reasonable requirements of the
member governments;
(d) NATO should, on request, provide national services with special studies on matters of common interest.

7. The journalists' tours sponsored by NATO should be broadened to include others in a position to influence public opinion, such as trade union and youth leaders, teachers and lecturers. Closer relations between private organizations supporting NATO and the NATO Information Division should also be encouraged.
CHAPTER 5: ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

1. The Committee considers that NATO in its present form is capable of discharging the functions required of it. Structural changes are not needed. The machine is basically satisfactory provided that governments make use of it.

2. At the same time, certain improvements in the procedures and functioning of the Organization will be required if the recommendations of this report are to be fully implemented. The proposals in this Chapter are submitted for this purpose.

A. Security

3. There must be a strict observance of security measures and unqualified respect for the confidential character of meetings. Otherwise there cannot be the type of full and frank consultation which the Committee regards as essential.

B. Meetings of the Council

4. More time should be allowed for Ministerial Meetings. Experience has shown that, without more time, important issues on the agenda cannot be adequately considered. Decisions concerning some of them will not be reached at all, or will be reached only in an unclear form.

5. Efforts should be made to encourage discussion rather than simply declarations of policy prepared in advance. Arrangements for meetings should be made with this aim in view. For most sessions, the numbers present should be sharply restricted. In order to facilitate free discussion, when Ministers wish to speak in a language other than French or English, consecutive translation into one of these official languages should be provided by interpreters from their own delegations.

6. Meetings of Foreign Ministers should be held whenever required, and occasionally in locations other than NATO
Headquarters. Ministers might also participate more frequently in regular Council meetings, even though not all of them may find it possible to attend such meetings at the same time. There should be no firm or formal line between Ministerial and other meetings of the Council.

C. Strengthening the links between the Council and member governments

7. Governments should ensure that their representation on the Council is as authoritative as possible, should provide for maximum effectiveness in the presentation of their views and policies, and should see to it that the necessary follow-up action is taken.

8. It is indispensable to the kind of consultations envisaged in this report that Permanent Representatives should be in a position to speak authoritatively and to reflect the current thinking of their governments. Differences in location and in constitutional organization make impossible any uniform arrangements in all member governments. In some cases it might be desirable to designate a high official in the national capital to be concerned primarily with NATO affairs. The purpose would be to help both in fostering NATO consultations whenever national policies impinge on the common interests of the Atlantic Community, and in translating the results of such consultations into effective action within the national governments.

9. To ensure the closest possible tie between current thinking in the governments and consultations in the Council, there might be occasional Council meetings with the participation of such specially designated officials or the permanent official heads of foreign ministries.
D. Preparation for Council meetings

10. Items on the Agenda of Ministerial meetings should be thoroughly examined by Permanent Representatives and relevant proposals prepared before Ministers meet. For this purpose it may be found desirable for governments to send senior experts to consult on agenda items before the meetings take place.

11. The preparation of questions for discussion in the Council should be assisted by appropriate use of the Council's Committees of Political and Economic Advisers. (Recommendations on the establishment of these Committees are set forth in Chapter 1, paragraph 18, and Chapter 2, paragraph 17).

12. In the case of consultations on special subjects, more use should be made of senior experts from national capitals to assist permanent delegations by calling them, on an ad hoc basis, to do preparatory work. Informal discussion among specialists with corresponding responsibilities is a particularly valuable means of concerting governmental attitudes in the early stages of policy formation.

13. Member governments should make available "basic position material" to one another through NATO for background information. This would help the Alliance as a whole in the consideration of problems of common concern and would assist individual governments to understand more fully the reasons for the position adopted by any member country on a particular issue which might be its special concern, but which might also affect in varying degrees other members of NATO.

E. The Secretary General and the International Staff

14. To enable the Organization to make its full contribution, the role of the Secretary General and the International Staff needs to be enhanced.
15. It is recommended that the Secretary General preside over meetings of the Council in Ministerial, as he does now in permanent sessions. Such a change with respect to the conduct of the Council's business would follow naturally from the new responsibilities of the Secretary General and his even closer relationship to the Council, arising out of the recommendations of this report. It is also warranted by the Secretary General's unique opportunities for becoming familiar with the problems and the activities of the Alliance as a whole.

16. It would, however, still be desirable to have one Minister chosen each year as President of the Council in accordance with the present practice of alphabetical rotation. This Minister, as President, would continue to have especially close contact with the Secretary General during and between Ministerial Meetings, and would, as at present, act as the spokesman of the Council on all formal occasions. He would also preside at the formal opening and closing of Ministerial sessions of the Council.

17. In addition:

(a) The Secretary General should be encouraged to propose items for NATO consultation in the fields covered by this report and should be responsible for promoting and directing the process of consultation.

(b) In view of these responsibilities, member governments should undertake to keep the Secretary General fully and currently informed through their permanent delegations of their governments' thinking on questions of common concern to the Alliance.

(c) Attention is also called to the additional responsibilities of the Secretary General,
recommended in connection with the annual political appraisal (Chapter 1, paragraph 15) and the peaceful settlement of disputes (Chapter 1, paragraph 19).

18. The effective functioning of NATO depends in large measure on its Staff. Acceptance of the recommendations in this report would impose on it new duties and responsibilities. Governments must be prepared to give the International Staff the necessary support, both in finance and personnel.
(DRAFT) REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE
OF THREE
ON
NON-MILITARY
CO-OPERATION
IN
NATO

Gaetano Martino: Foreign Minister of Italy
Halvard Lange: Foreign Minister of Norway
L.B. Pearson: Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada
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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The Committee on Non-Military Co-operation, set up by the Council of NATO at its session of May, 1956, was requested: "to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community".

2. The Committee has interpreted these terms of reference as requiring it (1) to examine and re-define the objectives and needs of the Alliance, especially in the light of current international developments; and (2) to make recommendations for strengthening its internal solidarity, cohesion and unity.

3. The Committee hopes that the report and recommendations which it now submits will make NATO's purely defensive and constructive purposes better understood in non-NATO countries; that it will facilitate and encourage steps to lessen international tension; and that it will assist in the effort to achieve a durable and honourable basis for competitive and ultimately for cooperative co-existence with the Communist world.

4. The foundation of NATO, on which alone a strong superstructure can be built, is the political obligation that its members have taken for collective defence; to consider that an attack on one is an attack on all, which will be met by the collective action of all. There is a tendency at times to overlook the far-reaching importance of this commitment; especially during those periods when the danger of having to invoke it may seem to recede.
5. With this political commitment for collective defence as the cornerstone of the foreign and defence policies of its members, NATO has a solid basis for existence. It is true, of course, that the ways and means by which the obligation is to be discharged may alter as political or strategic conditions alter; as the threat to peace changes its character or its direction. However, any variations in plans and strategic policies which may be required need not weaken NATO or the confidence of its members in NATO and in each other; providing, and the proviso is decisive, that each member retains its will and its capacity to play its full part in discharging the political commitment for collective action against aggression which it undertook when it signed the Pact; providing also - and this is equally important - that any changes in national strategy or policy which affect the coalition are made only after collective discussion and agreement.

6. The first essential, then, of a healthy and developing NATO lies in the whole-hearted acceptance by all its members of the political commitment for collective defence, and in the confidence which each has in the will and ability of the others to honour that commitment if aggression should take place.

7. This is our best present deterrent against aggression; and consequently the best assurance that the commitment undertaken will not be engaged. In this way, NATO provides a strong guarantee of peace.

8. This peace-ensuring role of NATO, however, based on solidarity and strength, can be discharged only if the political and economic relations between its...
members are co-operative and close. An Alliance in which
the members ignore each other's interests or engage in
political or economic conflict, or harbour suspicions of
each other, cannot be effective either for deterrence or
defence.

9. It is useful, in searching for ways and means
of strengthening NATO unity and understanding, to recall
the origin and the aims of the Organization.

10. The Treaty which was signed in Washington in
1949 was a collective response - we had learned that a
purely national response was insufficient for security - to
the fear of military aggression by the forces of the USSR
and its allies. These forces were of overwhelming strength.
The threat to Greece, the capture of Czechoslovakia, the
Blockade of Berlin, and the pressure against Yugoslavia
showed that they were also aggressive.

11. While fear may have been the main urge for the
creation of NATO, there was also the realization -
conscious or instinctive - that in a shrinking nuclear
world it was wise and timely to bring about a closer
association of kindred Atlantic and Western European
nations for other than defence purposes alone; that a
partial pooling of sovereignty for mutual protection
should also promote progress and co-operation generally.
There was a feeling among the governments and peoples
concerned, that this closer unity was both natural and
desirable; that the common cultural traditions, free
institutions and democratic concepts which were being
challenged, and were marked for destruction by those who
challenged them, were things which should also bring the
NATO nations closer together, not only for their defence
but for their development. There was, in short, a
sense of Atlantic Community, alongside the realization of an immediate common danger.

12. Any such feeling was certainly not the decisive, or even the main impulse in the creation of NATO. Nevertheless, it gave birth to the hope that NATO would grow beyond and above the emergency which brought it into being.

13. The expression of this hope is found in the Preamble and in Articles 2 and 4 of the Treaty. These two Articles, limited in their terms but with at least the promise of the grand design of an Atlantic Community, were included because of this insistent feeling that NATO must become more than a military alliance. They reflected the very real anxiety that if NATO failed to meet this test, it would disappear with the immediate crisis which produced it, even though the need for it might be as great as ever.

14. From the very beginning of NATO, then, it was recognized that while defence co-operation was the first and most urgent requirement, this was not enough. It has also become increasingly realized since the Treaty was signed that security is today far more than a military matter. The strengthening of political consultation and economic co-operation, the development of resources, progress in education and public understanding, all these can be as important, or even more important, for the protection of the security of a nation, or an alliance, as the building of a battleship or the equipping of an army.

15. These two aspects of security - civil and military - can no longer safely be considered in watertight compartments; either within or between nations.
Perhaps NATO has not yet fully recognized their essential inter-relationship, or done enough to bring about that close and continuous contact between its civil and military sides which is essential if it is to be strong and enduring.

16. North Atlantic political and economic cooperation, however, let alone unity, will not be brought about in a day or by a declaration, but by creating over the years and through a whole series of national acts and policies, the habits and traditions and precedents for such co-operation and unity. The process will be a slow and gradual one at best; slower than we might wish. We can be satisfied if it is steady and sure. This will not be the case, however, unless the member governments - especially the more powerful ones - work with and through NATO for more than purposes of collective military defence.

17. While the members of NATO have already developed various forms of non-military co-operation between themselves and have been among the most active and constructive participants in various international organizations, NATO as such has been hesitant in entering this field, particularly in regard to economic matters. Its members have been rightly concerned to avoid duplication and to do, through other existing international organizations, the things which can best be done in that way.

18. Recently, however, the members of NATO have been examining and re-assessing the purposes and the needs of the Organization under the impetus provided by certain changes in Soviet tactics and policies which have taken place since the death of Stalin. These changes have faced NATO with an additional challenge, this time largely non-military in character; that of competitive co-existence with the Sino-Soviet bloc of
nations. They have also removed - that may have been their main international purpose - some of the immediate fear of large-scale military aggression against Western Europe; a process facilitated by the evidence that the Kremlin now realizes that any such all-out aggression would be met by a sure, swift and devastating retaliation; that there could be no victor in a war of this kind with nuclear weapons on both sides.

19. As the danger of total military aggression may seem somewhat to recede and the atmosphere of anxiety to lighten, questions arise more insistently regarding NATO's ability to meet effectively this new situation of competitive co-existence, with its emphasis on conflict without catastrophe. There is also an increased realization that non-military ties have to be strengthened if NATO is to grow; or even perhaps to survive.

20. Certain questions now take on a new urgency. Have NATO's needs and objectives changed, or should they be changed? Is the organization operating satisfactorily in the altered circumstances of 1956? If not, what can be done about it? There is the even more far-reaching question: "Can a loose association of sovereign states hold together at all without the common binding force of fear?"

21. The Committee has been examining these questions in the light of its firm conviction that the objectives which governments had in mind when the Pact was signed remain valid; that NATO is as important now to its member states as it was at that time.

22. The first of these objectives - as has already been pointed out - is security, based on collective action with adequate armed forces both for deterrence and defence.
23. Certainly NATO unity and strength in the pursuit of this objective remains as essential as it was in 1949. Soviet tactics may have changed. But Soviet armed strength remains unchanged. Therefore that of NATO must not be reduced, though its character and capabilities should be constantly adapted to changing circumstances. Strengthening the political and economic side of NATO is an essential complement to - not a substitute for - continuous co-operation in defence.

24. The new tactics of Soviet leaders may place greater emphasis on political, economic and propaganda action. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that this will be permitted to prejudice in any way the maintenance of a high level of military power in its most modern form as a base for Soviet activity in these other fields.

25. We should welcome changes in tactics and policies that have taken place - or may take place - in Moscow if they are genuinely designed to ease international tensions. But we must remain on guard so long as Soviet leaders persist in their determination to maintain a preponderance of military power for the achievement of their own political objectives and those of their allies.

26. We must also remember that the weakening and eventual dissolution of NATO remains a major communist goal. Threats having failed, more subtle, softer methods are being attempted. Efforts to weaken NATO in various non-military ways, economic and political, are being pushed with energy and skill. They embody challenges which require policies that are not only firm but positive. Therefore, while NATO must not be cajoled into military weakness, it must also develop
to a far greater degree than formerly, co-operation and unity as well as flexibility of diplomatic action.

27. This brings us again to the second and long-term aim of NATO: the development of an Atlantic Community whose roots are deeper even than the necessity for common defence. This implies nothing less than the permanent association of the free Atlantic peoples for the promotion of their greater unity and the protection and the advancement of the interests which, as free democracies, they have in common.

28. If we are to secure this long-term aim, we must prevent the centrifugal forces of opposition or indifference from weakening the alliance. NATO has not been destroyed, or even weakened, by the threats or attacks of its enemies. It can be destroyed by the lethargy or complacency of its members; by dissension or division between them; by putting narrow national considerations above the collective interest. There are signs that these things are happening. To avoid them, NATO must be used by its members, more than it has been used, for sincere and genuine consultation and co-operation on questions of common concern. For this purpose, resolution is more important than resolutions; will, than words.

29. The problem, however, goes deeper than this. NATO countries are faced by a political as well as a military threat. It comes from the revolutionary doctrines of communism which have by careful design of the Communist leaders over many years been sowing seeds of falsehood concerning our free and democratic way of life. The best answer to such falsehoods is a continuing demonstration of the superiority of our own institutions.
over communist ones. We can show by word and deed that we welcome political progress, economic advancement and orderly social change and that the real reactionaries of this day are these communist regimes which, adhering to an inflexible pattern of economic and political doctrine, have been more successful in destroying freedom than in promoting it.

30. We must however realize that falsehoods concerning our institutions have sometimes been accepted at face value and that there are those, even in the non-communist world, who under the systematic influence of communist propaganda, do not accept our own analysis of NATO's aims and values. They believe that while NATO may have served a useful defensive and deterrent role in the Stalinist era, it is no longer necessary, even for the security of its members; that it is tending now to become an agency for the pooling of the strength and resources of the 'colonial' powers in defence of imperial privileges, racial superiority, and Atlantic hegemony under the leadership of the United States. The fact that we know these views to be false and unjustified does not mean that NATO and its governments should not do everything they can to correct and counteract them.

31. NATO should not forget that the influence and interests of its members are not confined to the area covered by the Treaty. Therefore, while striving to improve their relations with each other, and to strengthen and deepen their own unity, they should also be concerned to ensure that their activities harmonize with the broader interests of the whole international community; particularly in working through the United Nations and elsewhere for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the solution of the problems that now
32. In following this course, NATO can show that it is more than a defence organization acting and reacting to the ebb and flow of the fears and dangers arising out of Soviet policy. It can prove its desire to co-operate fully with other members of the international community in bringing to reality the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It can show that it is not merely concerned with preventing the cold war from deteriorating into a shooting one; or with defending itself if such a tragedy should take place; but that it is even more concerned with seizing the political initiative to bring about a secure peace for all nations; with replacing competitive by co-operative co-existence.

33. Our caution in accepting without question the pacific character of certain Soviet moves; our refusal to dismantle our defences before we are convinced that conditions of international confidence have been restored, will be understood by all people of sincerity and goodwill. What would not be understood is any lack of interest or effort on our part in breaking down the barriers with a view to establishing such confidence.

34. We must above all reject the temptation to play up fears and suspicions merely because they help to keep the NATO coalition together. That would indeed be a sterile and defeatist attitude.

35. The coming together of the Atlantic nations for good and constructive purposes - which is the basic principle and ideal underlying the NATO concept - must rest on and grow from deeper and more permanent factors than the divisions and dangers of the last ten years. It is a historical, rather than a contemporary develop-
ment and if it is to achieve its real purpose, it must be considered in that light and the necessary conclusions drawn. A short-range view will not suffice.

36. The fundamental historical fact underlying this development, as two world wars have now demonstrated, is that the nation state, by itself and relying exclusively on national policy and national power, is inadequate for progress or even for survival in the nuclear age. As the founders of the North Atlantic Treaty foresaw, the growing interdependence of states, politically and economically as well as militarily, calls for an ever-increasing measure of international cohesion and co-operation. Some states may be able to enjoy a degree of political and economic independence when things are going well. No state, however powerful, can guarantee its security and its welfare by national action alone.

37. This conviction underlies our report and the recommendations contained therein which appear in the subsequent chapters.

38. It has not been difficult to make these recommendations. It will be far more difficult for the member governments to carry them into effect. This will require, on their part, the firm conviction that the transformation of the Atlantic Community into a vital and vigorous political reality is as important as any purely national purpose. It will require above all, the will to carry this conviction into the realm of practical governmental policy.
CHAPTER 2: POLITICAL CO-OPERATION

I. INTRODUCTION

1. If there is to be vitality and growth in the concept of the Atlantic Community, the relations between the members of NATO must rest on a solid basis of confidence and understanding. Without this there cannot be constructive or solid political co-operation.

2. The deepening and strengthening of this political co-operation does not imply the weakening of the ties of NATO members with other friendly countries or with other international associations, particularly the United Nations. Adherence to NATO is not exclusive or restrictive. Nor should the evolution of the Atlantic Community through NATO prevent the formation of even closer relationships among some of its members; for instance within groups of European countries. The moves toward Atlantic co-operation and European unity should be parallel and complementary, not competitive or conflicting.

3. Effective and constructive international co-operation requires a resolve to work together for the solution of common problems. There are special ties between NATO members, special incentives and security interests, which should make this task easier than it otherwise would be. But its successful accomplishment will depend largely on the extent to which member governments, in their own policies and actions, take into consideration the interests of the Alliance. This requires not only the acceptance of the obligation of consultation and co-operation whenever necessary, but also the development of practices by which the discharge of this obligation becomes a normal part of governmental activity.
4. It is easy to profess devotion to the principle of political - or economic - consultation in NATO. It is difficult to convert the profession into practice. Consultation within an alliance means more than exchange of information, though that is necessary. It means more than letting the NATO Council know about national decisions that have already been taken; or trying to enlist support for those decisions. It means the discussion of problems collectively, in the early stages of policy formation, and before national positions become fixed. At best, this will result in collective decisions on matters of common interest affecting the Alliance. At the least, it will ensure that no action is taken by one member without a knowledge of the views of the others.

II. CONSULTATION ON FOREIGN POLICIES

A. Scope and Character of Political Consultation

5. The essential role of consultation in fostering political co-operation was clearly defined by an earlier NATO Committee on the North Atlantic Community in 1951:

"... The achievement of a closer degree of co-ordination of the foreign policies of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty, through the development of the 'habit of consultation' on matters of common concern, would greatly strengthen the solidarity of the North Atlantic Community and increase the individual and collective capacity of its members to serve the peaceful purposes for which NATO was established. ... In the political field, this means that while each North Atlantic Government retains full freedom of action and decision with respect to its own policy, the aim should be to achieve, through exchanging information and views, as wide an area of agreement as possible in
in the formulation of policies as a whole

"Special attention must be paid, as explicitly recognised in Article 4 of the Treaty, to matters of urgent and immediate importance to the members of NATO, and to 'emergency' situations where it may be necessary to consult closely on national lines of conduct affecting the interests of members of NATO as a whole. There is a continuing need, however, for effective consultation at an early stage on current problems, in order that national policies may be developed and action taken on the basis of a full awareness of the attitudes and interests of all the members of NATO. While all members of NATO have a responsibility to consult with their partners on appropriate matters, a large share of responsibility for such consultation necessarily rests on the more powerful members of the Community."

6. Those words were written five years ago. They still hold true. Nor have they been ignored by NATO. The practice of consulting together has grown in the NATO Council in recent years and it has contributed to cooperation in the Alliance. But there is ample room for improvement— for broadening the scope and deepening the character of consultation.

7. It should, however, be remembered that collective discussion is not an end in itself, but a means to the end of securing the maximum possible agreement on policy and action on all matters that concern the common interests of the Atlantic Community.
8. Such agreement, even with the closest possible co-operation and consultation, is not easy to secure. But it is essential to the Atlantic Alliance that a steady and continuous effort be made to bring it about. There cannot be unity in defence and disunity in foreign policy.

9. There are, of course, certain practical limitations to consultation in this field. They are sufficiently obvious in fact to make it unnecessary to emphasise them in words. Indeed the danger is less that they will be minimised or evaded than that they will be exaggerated and used to justify practices which unnecessarily ignore the common interest.

10. One of these limitations is the hard fact that ultimate responsibility for decision and action still rests on national governments. In a situation of emergency, therefore, action may have to be taken by one government before consultation is possible with the others.

11. Another limitation is the difficulty, and indeed the unwisdom of trying to specify in advance all the subjects and all the situations where consultation is necessary; to separate by area or by subject the matters of NATO concern from those of purely national concern; to define in detail the obligations and duties of consultation. These things have to work themselves out in practice. In this process, experience is a better guide than dogma.

12. The essential thing is that on all occasions and in all circumstances member governments before acting or even before pronouncing, should keep the interests and the requirements of the Alliance in mind. If they have not the desire and the will to do this, no resolutions or recommendations or declarations by the Council or any Committee of the Council will be of any great value.
On the assumption, however, that this will and this desire do exist, the following principles and practices in the field of political consultation are recommended:

(a) Members should inform the Council of any development which significantly affects the Alliance. They should do this, not merely as a formality but as a preliminary to effective political consultation.

(b) Both individual member governments and the Secretary General should have the right to raise for discussion in the Council any subject which is of common NATO interest and not of a purely domestic character.

(c) A member government should not, without adequate advance consultation, adopt firm policies or make major political pronouncements on matters which significantly affect the Alliance or any of its members, unless circumstances make such prior consultation obviously and demonstrably impossible.

(d) In developing their national policies, members should take into consideration the interests and views of other governments, particularly those most directly concerned, as expressed in NATO consultation, even where no community of view or consensus has been reached in the Council.

(e) Where a consensus has been reached, it should be reflected in the formation of national policies. When for national reasons the consensus is not followed, the government concerned should offer an explanation to the Council. It is even more important that where an agreed and formal recommendation has emerged from the Council discussions, governments should give it full weight in any
B. Annual Political Appraisal

14. To strengthen the process of consultation, it is recommended that Foreign Ministers, at each Spring meeting, should make an appraisal of the political progress of the Alliance and consider the lines along which it should advance.

15. To prepare for this discussion, the Secretary General should submit an annual report:

(a) analysing the major political problems of the Alliance;

(b) reviewing the extent to which member governments have consulted and co-operated on such problems, or failed to do so;

(c) indicating the problems and possible developments which may require future consultation, so that difficulties might be resolved and positive and constructive initiatives taken.

16. Member governments, through their Permanent Representatives, should give the Secretary General such information and assistance, including that of technical experts, as he may require in preparing his report.

C. Preparation for Political Consultation

17. Effective consultation also requires careful planning and preparation of the agenda for meetings of the Council both in Ministerial and permanent session. Political questions coming up for discussion in the Council should so far as practicable be previously reviewed and discussed, so that representatives may have background information on the thinking both of their own and of other governments.
appropriate, drafts of resolutions should be prepared in advance as a basis for discussion. Additional preparatory work will also be required for the annual political appraisal referred to in the preceding section.

18. To assist the Permanent Representatives and the Secretary General in discharging their responsibilities for political consultation, there should be constituted under the Council a committee of political advisers from each delegation, aided when necessary by specialists from the capitals. It would meet under the chairmanship of a member of the International Staff appointed by the Secretary General, and would include among its responsibilities current studies such as those on trends of Soviet policy.

III PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF INTER-MEMBER DISPUTES

19. In the development of effective political cooperation in NATO, it is of crucial importance to avoid serious inter-member disputes and to settle them quickly and satisfactorily when they occur. The settlement of such disputes is in the first place the direct responsibility of the member governments concerned, under both the Charter of the United Nations (Article 33) and the North Atlantic Treaty (Article 1). To clarify NATO's responsibilities in dealing with disputes which have not proved capable of settlement directly and to enable NATO, if necessary, to help in the settlement of such disputes, the Committee recommends that the Council adopt a resolution under Article 1 of the Treaty on the following lines:

(a) reaffirming the obligation of members to settle by peaceful means any dispute between themselves;

(b) declaring their intention to submit any such disputes, which have not proved capable of
settlement directly, to good offices procedures within the NATO framework before resorting to any other international agency; except for disputes of a legal character appropriate for submission to a judicial tribunal, and those disputes of an economic character for which attempts at settlement might best be made initially in the appropriate specialised economic organization;

(c) recognising the right and duty of member governments and of the Secretary General to bring to the attention of the Council matters which in their opinion may threaten the solidarity or effectiveness of the Alliance;

(d) empowering the Secretary General to offer his good offices informally at any time to the parties in dispute, and with their consent to initiate or facilitate procedures of enquiry, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration; and

(e) empowering the Secretary General, where he deems it appropriate for the purpose outlined in (d) above, to use the assistance of not more than three Permanent Representatives chosen by him in each instance.

IV. PARLIAMENTARY ASSOCIATIONS AND THE PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE

20. Among the best supporters of NATO and its purposes are those Members of Parliament who have had a chance at first hand to see some of its activities and to learn of its problems, and to exchange views with their colleagues from other parliaments. In particular, the formation of national Parliamentary Associations and the activities of the Conference of Members of Parliament from NATO countries have
contributed to the development of public support for NATO and solidarity among its members.

21. In order to maintain a close relationship of Parliamentarians with NATO, the following arrangements are recommended:

(a) That the Secretary General continue to place the facilities of NATO headquarters at the disposal of Parliamentary Conferences and give all possible help with arrangements for their meetings.

(b) That invited representatives of member governments and the Secretary General and other senior NATO civil and military officers attend these meetings. In this way the parliamentarians would be informed on the state of the Alliance and the problems before it, and the value of their discussions would be increased.
CHAPTER 3: ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

I. INTRODUCTION

Political co-operation and economic conflict are not reconcilable. Therefore, in the economic as well as in the political field there must be a genuine desire among the members to work together and a readiness to consult on questions of common concern based on the recognition of common interests.

2. These common economic interests shared by the members of NATO call for:

(a) co-operative and national action to achieve healthy and expanding economies, both to promote the well-being and self-confidence of the Atlantic peoples and to serve as the essential support for an adequate defence effort;

(b) the greatest possible freedom in trade and payments and in the movement of manpower and long term capital;

(c) assistance to economically underdeveloped areas for reasons of enlightened self-interest and to promote better relations among peoples; and

(d) policies which will demonstrate the superiority of free institutions in promoting human welfare and economic progress under conditions of competitive coexistence.

3. A recognition of these common NATO interests, and collective and individual effort to promote them, need not in any way prejudice close economic relations with non-NATO countries. Economic, like political co-operation, is and must remain wider than NATO. At the same time, the NATO countries have an interest in any arrangements for especially close economic co-operation among groups of European member nations. It should be possible as it is desirable - for such special arrangements to promote rather than conflict with the wider objectives of Article 2 of...
our Treaty, which are of basic importance to the stability and well being, not only of the North Atlantic area, but of the whole non-communist world.

II. NATO AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

4. While the purposes and principles of Article 2 are of vital importance, it is not necessary that member countries pursue them only through action in NATO itself. It would not serve the interests of the Atlantic Community for NATO to duplicate the operating functions of other international organizations designed for various forms of economic cooperation (1). NATO members play a major part in all these agencies, whose membership is generally well adapted to the purposes they serve.

5. Nor do there now appear to be significant new areas for collective economic action requiring execution by NATO itself. In fact, the common economic concerns of the member nations will often best be fostered by continued and increased collaboration both bilaterally and through organizations other than NATO. This collaboration should be reinforced, however, by NATO consultation whenever economic issues of special interest to the Alliance are involved; particularly those which have political or defence implications or affect the economic health of the Atlantic Community as a whole. This, in turn, requires a substantial expansion of exchange of information and views in NATO in the economic as well as in the political field. Such economic consultation should seek to secure a common approach on the part of member governments where the ques-

(1) The outstanding instances are the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC)(which includes all NATO countries as full or associate members and four others); the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); the International Finance Corporation (IFC); and the various United Nations specialised agencies including the Economic Commission for Europe. Several NATO members participate actively in the Colombo Plan for promoting economic development in Asia. Most members are taking an active part in technical assistance programmes and are also participating in discussions of proposals for the creation of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED).
tions are clearly related to the political and security interests of the Alliance. Action resulting from such a common approach, however, should normally be taken by governments either directly or through other international organizations.

6. NATO, as such, should not seek to establish formal relations with these other organizations, and the harmonising of attitudes and actions should be left to the representatives of the NATO governments therein. Nor is it necessary or desirable for NATO members to form a "bloc" in such organizations. This would only alienate other friendly governments. It would be sufficient if the representatives of NATO countries in these other organizations consult together when economic issues of special political or strategic interest to NATO arise; and in particular before meetings at which there may be attempts to divide or weaken the Atlantic Alliance, or prejudice its interests.

III. CONFLICTS IN ECONOMIC POLICIES OF NATO COUNTRIES

7. NATO has a positive interest in the resolution of economic disputes which may have political or strategic repercussions damaging to the Alliance. These are to be distinguished from disagreements on economic policy which are normally dealt with through direct negotiations or by multilateral discussions in other organizations. Nothing would be gained by merely having repeated in NATO the same arguments made in other and more technically qualified organizations. It should, however, be open to any member or to the Secretary General to raise in NATO issues on which they feel that consideration elsewhere is not making adequate progress and that NATO consultation might facilitate solutions contributing to the objectives of the Atlantic Community.

The procedures for peaceful settlement of political disputes discussed in the previous Chapter should also be available for major disputes of an economic character which are appropriate for NATO consideration.

IV. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

8. One area of special importance to the Atlantic Community is that of science and technology. During the last decade, it
has become ever clearer that progress in this field can be decisive in determining the security of nations and their position in world affairs. Such progress is also vital if the Western world is to play its proper role in relation to economically underdeveloped areas.

9. Within the general field of science and technology, there is an especially urgent need to improve the quality and to increase the supply of scientists, engineers and technicians. Responsibility for recruitment, training and utilisation of scientific and technical personnel is primarily a national rather than an international matter. Nor is it a responsibility solely of national governments. In the member countries with federal systems, state and provincial governments play the major part, and many of the universities and institutes of higher learning in the Atlantic area are independent institutions free from detailed control by governments. At the same time, properly designed measures of international co-operation could stimulate individual member countries to adopt more positive policies and, in some cases, help guide them in the most constructive directions.

10. Certain activities in this connection are already being carried out by other organizations. Progress in this field, however, is so crucial to the future of the Atlantic Community that NATO members should ensure that every possibility of fruitful co-operation is examined. As a first concrete step, therefore it is recommended that a conference be convened (either by NATO or on the initiative of NATO member governments through another appropriate organization), composed of one or at the most two outstanding authorities, private or governmental, from each country in order:

(a) to exchange information and views concerning the most urgent problems in the recruitment, training and utilisation of scientists, engineers and technicians, and the best means,
both long-term and short-term, of solving these problems;
(b) to foster closer relations among the participants with a view to continued interchange of experience and stimulation of constructive work in member countries; and
(c) to propose specific measures for future international co-operation in this field, through NATO or other international organizations.

V. CONSULTATION ON ECONOMIC PROBLEMS BEYOND THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA

11. It is agreed that the Atlantic Community has a positive concern with healthy and accelerated development in economically underdeveloped areas, both inside and outside the NATO area. The Committee feels however that NATO is not an appropriate agency for administering programmes of assistance for economic development, or even for systematically concerting the relevant policies of member nations. What member countries can and should do is to keep each other and the Organization informed of their programmes and policies in this field. When required NATO should review the adequacy of existing action in relation to the interests of the Alliance.

12. The economic interests of the Atlantic Community cannot be considered in isolation from the activities and policies of the Soviet bloc. The Soviets are resorting all too often to the use of economic measures designed to weaken the Western Alliance, or to create in other areas a high degree of dependence on the Soviet world. In this situation it is more than ever important that NATO countries actively develop their own constructive commercial and financial policies. In particular, they should avoid creating situations of which the Soviets might take advantage to the detriment of the Atlantic Community and of other non-Communist countries. In this whole field of competitive economic coexistence member countries should consult together more fully in order to determine their course deliberately and with the fullest possible knowledge.
13. NATO should continue its regular analysis of economic trends in Soviet countries and developments in Soviet economic policy. To this end, governments should undertake to report relevant information regularly. There should also be periodic meetings of experts on Soviet economic affairs drawn from the various capitals whose discussions might be the basis for consultation in particular cases. Arrangements should also be made for periodic meetings of officials from the national capitals involved in commercial negotiations with the Soviet bloc, for an exchange of information and views. In the case of an important new commercial or financial proposal from the Soviet bloc to any member country, with possible political implications, it would be desirable for the member concerned to bring it to the attention of the Council before action is taken.

14. The Alliance also has a positive interest in the complex and difficult field of Soviet economic relations with the economically underdeveloped countries. NATO should be concerned with cases where Soviet economic action appears calculated to undermine sound and friendly relations between these and members of the Atlantic Community. Here the main endeavour of member governments should be to work co-operatively and constructively with the underdeveloped areas in promoting their economic development on a mutually satisfactory basis. It would clearly not be desirable to engage in indiscriminate competitive bidding with the Soviets in the field of assistance for development. At the same time, NATO consultation in certain cases might suggest the need for special efforts by members to assist underdeveloped countries in dealing with unusual problems, even if this requires an exceptional departure from ordinary commercial and financial practices.

VI. NATO ARRANGEMENTS FOR ECONOMIC CONSULTATION

15. There has been a considerable evolution in NATO's arrangements for regular economic consultation. In addition, a number of economic matters have been brought before the Council.
for consideration on an ad hoc basis. No substantial new machinery in this field is called for. However, in view of the extended range of topics for regular exchange of information and consultation described above, there should be established under the Council a Committee of Economic Advisers. This group should be entrusted with the regular exchange of information and preliminary discussion in those areas of systematic consultation outlined above, together with such tasks as may be assigned by the Council or approved by the Council at the Committee's request. It would absorb any continuing function of the Committee of Technical Advisers. Since its duties would not be full-time, member governments could be represented normally by officials mainly concerned with the work of other international economic organizations.

Membership however should be flexible, the Committee being composed, when appropriate, of specialists from the capitals on particular topics under consideration.
CHAPTER 4: CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

1. A sense of community must bind the people as well as the institutions of the Atlantic nations. This will exist only to the extent that there is a realisation of their common cultural heritage and of the values of their free way of life and thought. It is important, therefore, for the NATO countries to promote cultural co-operation among their peoples by all practical means in order to strengthen their unity and develop maximum support for the alliance. It is particularly important that this cultural co-operation should be wider than continental. This, however, does not preclude particular governments from acting on a more limited multilateral or even bilateral basis to strengthen their own cultural relations within the broader Atlantic framework. The Committee welcomes the measures for cultural co-operation within the Atlantic Community which have been initiated by private individuals and non-governmental groups. These should be encouraged and increased.

2. To further cultural collaboration, the Committee suggests that member governments be guided by the following general principles:

(a) Government activities in this field should not duplicate but should support and supplement private efforts.

(b) Member governments should give priority to those projects which require joint NATO action, and thus contribute to a developing sense of community.

(c) In developing new activities in the cultural field, NATO can most fruitfully place the main emphasis on inspiring and promoting transatlantic contacts.

(d) There should be a realistic appreciation of the financial implications of cultural projects.
3. In order to develop public awareness and understanding of NATO and the Atlantic Community, the Council should work out arrangements for NATO courses and seminars for teachers, journalists and others in a position to influence public opinion.

4. NATO and its member governments should broaden their support of other educational and related activities such as the NATO Fellowship and Scholarship Programme; creation of university chairs of Atlantic studies; visiting professorships; government-sponsored programmes for the exchange of persons, especially on a transatlantic basis; use of NATO information materials in schools; and establishment of special NATO awards for students.

5. Governments should actively promote closer relations between NATO and youth organizations and a specialist should be added to the International Staff in this connection. Conferences under NATO auspices of representatives of youth organizations such as that of July, 1956, should be held from time to time.

6. In the interests of promoting easier and more frequent contacts among the NATO peoples, governments should review and, if possible, revise their foreign exchange and other policies which restrict travel.

7. In view of the importance of promoting better understanding and goodwill between NATO service personnel, it would be desirable, in co-operation with the military authorities, to extend exchanges of such personnel beyond the limits of normal training programmes. Such exchanges might, as a first step, be developed by governments on a bilateral basis. In addition, member governments should seek the assistance of the Atlantic Treaty Association and other voluntary organizations in the further development of such exchanges.
8. Cultural projects which have a common benefit should be commonly financed. Agreed cultural projects initiated by a single member government or a private organization, such as the recent seminar held at Oxford or the Study Conference sponsored by the Atlantic Treaty Association on "The Role of the School in the Atlantic Community", should receive financial support from NATO where that is necessary to supplement national resources.
CHAPTER 5: CO-OPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD

1. The people of the member countries must know about NATO if they are to support it. Therefore they must be informed not only of NATO's aspirations, but of its achievements. There must be substance for an effective NATO information programme and resources to carry it out. The public should be informed to the greatest possible extent of significant results achieved through NATO consultation.

2. NATO information activities should be directed primarily to public opinion in the NATO area. At the same time, an understanding outside the NATO area of the objectives and accomplishments of the Organization is necessary if it is to be viewed sympathetically, and if its activities are not to be misinterpreted.

3. The important task of explaining and reporting NATO activities rests primarily on national information services. They cannot discharge this task if member governments do not make adequate provision in their national programmes for that purpose. It is essential, therefore, that such provision be made. NATO can and should assist national governments in this work. The promotion of information about and public understanding of NATO and the Atlantic community should, in fact, be a joint endeavour by the Organization and its members.

4. One of NATO's functions should be to co-ordinate the work of national information services in fields of common interest. Governments should pool their experiences and views in NATO to avoid differences in evaluation and emphasis. This is particularly important in the dissemination of information about NATO to other countries. Co-ordinated policy should underlie the defensive character of our Alliance and the importance of its non-military aspects. It should cover also replies to anti-NATO propaganda and the analysis of communist moves and
statements which affect NATO.

5. In its turn, the NATO Information Division must be given the resources by governments as well as their support, without which it could not discharge these new tasks - and should not be asked to do so.

6. In order to facilitate co-operation between the NATO Information Division and national information services, the following specific measures are recommended:

(a) An officer should be designated by each national information service to maintain liaison with NATO and to be responsible for the dissemination of NATO information material;

(b) governments should submit to NATO the relevant information programmes which they plan to implement, for discussion in the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations. Representatives of national information services should take part in these discussions;

(c) within the NATO Information Division budget, provision should be made for a translation fund so that NATO information material can be translated into the non-official languages of the Alliance, according to reasonable requirements of the member governments;

(d) NATO should, on request, provide national services with special studies on matters of common interest.

7. The journalists' tours sponsored by NATO should be broadened to include others in a position to influence public opinion, such as trade union and youth leaders, teachers and lecturers. Closer relations between private organizations supporting NATO and the NATO Information Division should also be encouraged.
CHAPTER 6: ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

1. The Committee considers that NATO in its present form is capable of discharging the non-military functions required of it. Structural changes are not needed. The machine is basically satisfactory. It is for governments to make use of it.

2. At the same time, certain improvements in the procedures and functioning of the Organization will be required if the recommendations of this report are to be fully implemented. The proposals in this Chapter are submitted for this purpose.

A. Security

3. There must be a strict observance of security measures and unqualified respect for the confidential character of meetings. Otherwise there cannot be the type of full and frank consultation which the Committee regards as essential.

B. Meetings of the Council

4. More time should be allowed for Ministerial Meetings. Experience has shown that, without more time, important issues on the agenda cannot be adequately considered. Decisions concerning some of them will not be reached at all, or will be reached only in an unclear form.

5. Efforts should be made to encourage discussion rather than simply declarations of policy prepared in advance. Arrangements for meetings should be made with this aim in view. For most sessions, the numbers present should be sharply restricted. In order to facilitate free discussion, when Ministers wish to speak in a language other than French or English, consecutive translation into one of these official languages should be provided by interpreters from their own delegations.

6. Meetings of Foreign Ministers should be held whenever required, and occasionally in locations other than NATO.
headquarters. Ministers might also participate more frequently in regular Council meetings, even though not all of them may find it possible to attend such meetings at the same time. The Council of Permanent Representatives, has powers of effective decision: in other words, the authority of the Council as such is the same whether governments are represented by Ministers or by their Permanent Representatives. Thus there should be no firm or formal line between Ministerial and other meetings of the Council.

C. Strengthening the links between the Council and member governments

7. It is indispensable to the kind of consultations envisaged in this report that Permanent Representatives should be in a position to speak authoritatively and to reflect the current thinking of their governments. Differences in location and in constitutional organization make impossible any uniform arrangements in all member governments. In some cases it might be desirable to designate a high official in the national capital to be concerned primarily with NATO affairs. The purpose would be to help both in fostering NATO consultations whenever national policies impinge on the common interests of the Atlantic Community, and in translating the results of such consultations into effective action within the national governments.

8. To ensure the closest possible connection between current thinking in the governments and consultations in the Council, there might be occasional Council meetings with the participation of specially designated officials or the permanent official heads of foreign ministries.
D. Preparation for Council Meetings

9. Items on the Agenda of Ministerial meetings should be thoroughly examined by Permanent Representatives and relevant proposals prepared before Ministers meet. For this purpose it may be found desirable for governments to send senior experts to consult on agenda items before the meetings take place.

10. The preparation of questions for discussion in the Council should be assisted by appropriate use of the Council's Committees of Political and Economic Advisers. (Recommendations on the establishment of these Committees are set forth in Chapter 2, paragraph 18, and Chapter 3, paragraph 7).

11. In the case of consultations on special subjects, more use should be made of senior experts from national capitals to assist permanent delegations by calling them, on an ad hoc basis, to do preparatory work. Informal discussion among specialists with corresponding responsibilities is a particularly valuable means of concerting governmental attitudes in the early stages of policy formation.

12. Member governments should make available to one another through NATO "basic position material" for background information. This would help the Alliance as a whole in the consideration of problems of common concern and would assist individual governments to understand more fully the reasons for the position adopted by any member country on a particular issue which might be its special concern, but which might also affect in varying degrees other members of NATO.

E. The Secretary General and the International Staff

13. To enable the Organization to make its full contribution, the role of the Secretary General and the International Staff needs to be enhanced.
14. It is recommended that the Secretary General preside over meetings of the Council in Ministerial, as he does now in other sessions. Such a change with respect to the conduct of the Council's business would follow naturally from the new responsibilities of the Secretary General and his even closer relationship to the Council, arising out of the recommendations of this report. It is also warranted by the Secretary General's unique opportunities for becoming familiar with the problems and the activities of the Alliance as a whole.

15. It would, however, still be desirable to have one Minister chosen each year as President of the Council in accordance with the present practice of alphabetical rotation. This Minister, as President, would continue to have especially close contact with the Secretary General during and between Ministerial Meetings, and would, as at present, act as the spokesman of the Council on all formal occasions. He would also preside at the formal opening and closing of Ministerial sessions of the Council.

16. In addition:

(a) The Secretary General should be encouraged to propose items for NATO consultation in the fields covered by this report and should be responsible for promoting and directing the process of consultation.

(b) In view of these responsibilities, member governments should undertake to keep the Secretary General fully and currently informed through their permanent delegations of their governments' thinking on questions of common concern to the Alliance.

(c) Attention is also called to the additional responsibilities of the Secretary General,
17. The effective functioning of NATO depends in large
measure on the efficiency, devotion and morale of its
Secretariat. Acceptance of the recommendations in this re-
port would impose on the Secretariat new duties and responsi-
bilities. Governments must, therefore, be prepared to give the
International Staff all necessary support, both in finance
and personnel. If this is not done, the recommendations of
the report, even if accepted by governments, will not be
satisfactorily carried out.
CORRIGENDUM

to

CT-JP/7(Revised)
(dated 20th September, 1956)

Page 22, (Chapter IV, Introduction)

Paragraph 3

Add the following sentence at the end of the paragraph:

"Whenever possible the public should be informed of significant results achieved through NATO consultation."

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.
CHAPTER V. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

INTRODUCTION

1. The Committee considers that NATO in its present general form is capable of discharging the functions entrusted to it. Structural changes are not required. The machine is basically satisfactory provided that governments make use of it.

2. At the same time, certain improvements in the procedures and the functioning of the organization will be required if the recommendations of this report are to be implemented. The proposals in this Chapter are submitted for this purpose.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Security

3. There must be a strict observance of security measures and unqualified respect for the confidential character of meetings. Otherwise there cannot be the type of full and frank political and economic consultation which the Committee regards as essential.

Meetings of the Council

4. More time should be allowed for Ministerial Meetings. Experience has shown that, without more time, important issues on the agenda cannot be adequately considered. Decisions concerning some of them will not be reached at all, or will be reached only in an unclear form.

5. Efforts should be made to encourage discussion rather than simply declarations of policy prepared in advance. Arrangements for meetings should be made with this aim in view. For most sessions, the numbers present should be sharply restricted.
Where it would help in free discussion, Ministers should be permitted to speak in a non-official language, with consecutive translation into one of the official languages provided by interpreters from their own delegations.

6. Meetings of Foreign Ministers should be held whenever required, and occasionally in other NATO countries. Ministers might also participate more frequently in regular Council meetings, even though not all of them may find it possible to attend such meetings at the same time. There should be no firm or formal line between Ministerial and other meetings of the Council.

Strengthening the links between the Council and member governments

7. Governments should ensure that their representation on the Council is as authoritative as possible, should provide for maximum effectiveness in the presentation of their views and policies, and should see to it that the necessary follow-up action is taken.

It is inadmissible to the kind of consultations envisaged in this report that Permanent Representatives should be in a position to speak authoritatively and to reflect the current thinking of their governments before it is crystallised into definite positions. Differences in location and in constitutional organization make impossible any uniform pattern for all member governments. In some cases it might be desirable to designate a high official in the national capital concerned primarily with NATO affairs, to help both in the development of NATO consultations whenever national policies impinge.
on the common interests of the Atlantic Community, and in translating the results of such consultations into effective action within the national governments.

9. To ensure the closest possible tie between current thinking in the governments and consultations in the Council, there might be occasional Council meetings with the participation of such specially designated officials or with the permanent official heads of foreign ministries.

Preparation for Council meetings

10. Items on the Agenda of ministerial meetings should be thoroughly examined by Permanent Representatives and relevant proposals prepared before Ministers meet. For this purpose it may be found desirable for governments to send senior experts to consult on agenda items before the meetings take place.

11. The preparation of questions for discussion in the Council should be assisted by appropriate use of the Council's Committees of Political and Economic Advisers. (Recommendations on the establishment of these Committees are set forth in Chapter I, paragraph 19, and Chapter II, paragraph 18)

12. In the case of consultations on special subjects, more use should be made of senior experts from national capitals to assist permanent delegations by calling them, on an ad hoc basis, to do preparatory work. Informal discussion among specialists with corresponding responsibilities is a particularly valuable means of concerting governmental attitudes in the early stages of policy formation.

13. Member governments should make available "basic
position material" to one another through NATO for background information. This would help the Alliance as a whole in the consideration of problems of common concern and would assist individual governments to understand more fully the reasons for the position adopted by any member country on a particular issue which might be its special concern, but which might also affect in varying degrees other members of NATO.

The International Staff

14. The effective functioning of NATO depends in large measure on the strength of its staff. Acceptance of the recommendations in this report would impose on it new duties and responsibilities. Governments must be prepared to give the International Staff the necessary support, both in finance and personnel.

15. To enable the Organization to make its full contribution, the role of the Secretary General and the International Staff needs to be enhanced. In particular:

(1) The Secretary General should be encouraged to propose items for NATO consultation in the fields covered by this report and should be responsible for promoting the process of consultation.

(2) In view of these responsibilities, member governments should undertake to keep the Secretary General fully and currently informed through their permanent delegations of their governments' thinking on questions of common concern to the Alliance.

(3) As a basis for the proposed annual political appraisal, the Secretary General should prepare each year a report on the lines set out in Chapter I, paragraph 17.
(4) The Secretary General should be given new responsibilities for promoting the peaceful settlement of inter-nation disputes on the lines recommended in Chapter I, paragraph 21.
CHAPTER 1: POLITICAL CO-OPERATION

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CHAPTER 1: POLITICAL CO-OPERATION

I. INTRODUCTION

1. If there is to be vitality and growth in the concept of the Atlantic Community, the relations between the members of NATO must rest on a solid basis of confidence and understanding. Without this there cannot be the kind of political co-operation which, with collective security, constitutes the special value of NATO for its members.

2. The deepening and strengthening of this political co-operation does not imply the weakening of ties of NATO members with other international associations, such as the United Nations, or their friendly relations with other countries. Support for NATO is not exclusive or restrictive. Nor should the evolution of the Atlantic Community through NATO prevent the formation of even closer relationships among some members, for instance within groups of European countries. The moves toward Atlantic co-operation and European unity can be parallel and complementary and need not be competitive or conflicting.

3. Effective and constructive international co-operation requires a resolve to work together for the solution of common problems. There are special ties between NATO members, special incentives and security interests, which should make this task easier. But its successful accomplishment will depend largely on
the extent to which member governments, in their own policies and actions, take into consideration the interests of the Alliance. This requires not only the acceptance of the obligation of consultation and co-operation whenever necessary, but also the development of practices by which the discharge of this obligation becomes a normal part of governmental activity.

4. It is easy to profess devotion to the principle of political - or economic - consultation in NATO. It is difficult to convert the profession into practice. Consultation within an alliance means more than exchange of information, though that is necessary. It means more than letting the Council of NATO know about decisions that have already been taken, or merely trying to enlist support for national policy. It means the discussion of problems collectively, in the early stages of policy formation, before national positions become set. At its best, this will result in collective decisions on matters of common interest affecting the Alliance. At the least, it will ensure that no action is taken by one member without a knowledge of the views of the others.

II. CONSULTATION ON FOREIGN POLICIES

A. Scope and Character of Political Consultation

5. The essential role of consultation in fostering political co-operation was clearly defined by the earlier Committee on the North Atlantic Community in 1951:

"... The achievement of a closer degree of co-ordination of the foreign policies of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty, through the development of the 'habit of consultation' on matters of common concern, would greatly strengthen the solidarity of the North Atlantic Community and increase the individual and collective capacity of its members to serve the peaceful purposes for which
NATO was established, ... In the political field, this means that while each North Atlantic Government retains full freedom of action and decision with respect to its own policy, the aim should be to achieve, through exchanging information and views, as wide an area of agreement as possible in the formulation of policies affecting the North Atlantic Community as a whole.

"Special attention must be paid, as explicitly recognised in Article 4 of the Treaty, to matters of urgent and immediate importance to the members of NATO, and to 'emergency' situations where it may be necessary to consult closely on national lines of conduct affecting the interests of members of NATO as a whole. There is a continuing need, however, for effective consultation at an early stage on current problems, in order that national policies may be developed and action taken on the basis of a full awareness of the attitudes and interests of all the members of NATO. While all members of NATO have a responsibility to consult with their partners on appropriate matters, a large share of responsibility for such consultation necessarily rests on the more powerful members of the Community."

6. These words were written five years ago. They still hold true. Nor have they been ignored by NATO. The practice of consulting together has developed in the NATO Council in recent years and it has contributed to co-operation in the Alliance. But there is ample room for improvement - for broadening the scope and deepening the character of consultation.

7. It should, however, be remembered that collective discussion is not an end in itself, but a means to the end of securing...
the maximum possible agreement on policy and action on all matters that concern the common interests of the Atlantic Community.

8. Such agreement, even with the closest possible cooperation and consultation, is not easy to secure. But it is essential to the Atlantic Alliance that steady and continuous effort be made to bring it about, for there cannot be solidarity in defence and cleavage in foreign policy.

9. There are, of course, certain practical limitations to consultation. They are sufficiently obvious in fact to make it unnecessary to emphasise them in words. Indeed the danger is less that they will be minimised or evaded than that they will be exaggerated and used to justify practices which ignore the common interest.

10. One of these limitations is the fact that the ultimate responsibility for decision and action still rests on national governments; in a situation of emergency, therefore, action may be required by one government before consultation is possible with the others.

11. Another limitation is the difficulty and the un-wisdom of trying to specify in advance the subjects and the situations where consultation is necessary; to separate by area or by subject the matters of NATO concern from those of purely national concern; to define in detail obligations and duties. These things have to work themselves out in practice. In this process, experience is a better guide than fixed rules.

12. The essential thing is that on all occasions and in all circumstances member governments before acting or even before pronouncing, should keep the interests and the requirements of the Alliance in mind. If they have not the desire and the will to do this, no resolutions or recommendations or declarations will be of any value.
13. On the justifiable assumption, however, that this will and this desire do exist, the following principles and practices in the field of political consultation are submitted for acceptance:

(a) Members should inform the Council of any development which significantly affects the Alliance. They should do this, not merely as a formality but as a preliminary to effective political consultation.

(b) Both individual member governments and the Secretary General should have the right to raise for discussion in the Council any subject which is of common NATO interest and not of a purely domestic character.

(c) A member government should not, without adequate advance consultation, adopt firm policies or make major political pronouncements on matters which affect the Alliance or any of its members in a significant way, unless circumstances make such prior consultation demonstrably impossible.

(d) Members should seek to develop their national policies in the light of the interests and views of other governments as expressed in NATO consultation, even where no community of view or consensus has been reached in the Council.

(e) Where a consensus has been reached, it should be reflected in the formation of national policies. When for national reasons the consensus is not followed, the government concerned should offer an explanation to the Council. It is even more
important that where an agreed recommendation has emerged from the Council discussions, governments should give it full weight in any national actions or policies related to the subject of that recommendation.

B. Annual Political Appraisal

14. To strengthen the process of consultation, it is recommended that Foreign Ministers at their Spring meeting, make an appraisal of the political progress of the Alliance and consider the lines along which it should advance.

15. To prepare for this discussion, the Secretary General should submit a report:

(a) analysing the problems which bear on the political effectiveness of the Alliance;
(b) reviewing the extent to which member governments have consulted and co-operated on such problems, or failed to do so;
(c) indicating the problems and potential developments which may require future consultation in order to resolve difficulties and work out positive and constructive initiatives.

16. Member governments, through their Permanent Representatives, should give the Secretary General such information and assistance, including that of technical experts, as he may require for this task.

C. Committee of Political Advisers

17. Effective consultation also requires careful planning and preparation of the agenda for meetings of the Council both in Ministerial and permanent session, so that governments may provide the necessary information and guidance to their representatives. Political questions coming up for discussion in the Council should
as far as practicable be previously reviewed and discussed, so that representatives may have background information on the thinking both of their own and of other governments. When appropriate, drafts of resolutions should also be prepared in advance, as a basis for discussion. Additional preparatory work will also be required for the annual political appraisal referred to in the preceding section.

18. The responsibility for this preparatory work for the Council meetings falls upon the Permanent Representatives and the Secretary General. To assist in this work there should be constituted under the Council a committee of political advisers from each delegation, aided when necessary by specialists from the capitals. It would meet under the chairmanship of a member of the International Staff appointed by the Secretary General, and would include among its responsibilities current studies such as those on trends of Soviet policy.

III. PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF INTER-MEMBER DISPUTES

19. In the development of effective political co-operation in NATO, it is of crucial importance to avoid serious inter-member disputes and to settle them quickly and satisfactorily when they occur. The settlement of such disputes is in the first place the direct responsibility of the member governments concerned, under both the Charter of the United Nations (Article 33) and the North Atlantic Treaty (Article 1). To facilitate the carrying out of the obligations under Article 1 of the Treaty, it is recommended that the Council adopt a resolution on the following lines:

(a) reaffirming the obligation of members to settle by peaceful means any dispute between themselves;

(b) declaring their intention to submit any such disputes which have not proved capable
of settlement directly, to good offices procedures within the NATO framework before resorting to any other international agency; except for disputes of a legal character appropriate for submission to a judicial tribunal, and those disputes of an economic character for which attempts at settlement might best be made initially in the appropriate specialised economic organization;

(c) recognising the right and duty of member governments and of the Secretary General to bring to the attention of the Council matters which in their opinion may threaten the solidarity or effectiveness of the Alliance;

(d) empowering the Secretary General to offer his good offices informally at any time to the parties in dispute; and with their consent to initiate or facilitate procedures of enquiry, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration; and

(e) empowering the Secretary General, where he deems appropriate for these purposes, to use the assistance of not more than three Permanent Representatives chosen by him in each instance.

IV. PARLIAMENTARY ASSOCIATIONS AND THE PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE

20. Among the best supporters of NATO and its purposes are those Members of Parliament who have had a chance to see at first hand some of its activities and problems, and to exchange views with their colleagues from other parliaments. In particular, the formation of national Parliamentary Associations and the activities...
of the Conference of Members of Parliament from NATO countries have contributed to the development of public support for NATO and solidarity among its members.

21. The following arrangements are therefore recommended to facilitate a continued close relationship with NATO:

(1) That the Secretary General continue to place the facilities of NATO headquarters at the disposal of Parliamentary Conference and give all possible help with arrangements for its meetings.

(2) That invited representatives of member governments and the Secretary General and other senior representatives of NATO civil and military authorities attend these meetings for speeches and discussion periods. In this way the parliamentarians would be informed on the state of the Alliance and the problems before it, and the value of their discussion would be increased.
CHAPTER 2: ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

I. INTRODUCTION

Political co-operation and economic conflict are not reconcilable. Therefore, in the economic as well as in the political field there must be a genuine desire among the members to work together and a readiness to consult on questions of common concern based on the recognition of common interests.

2. The economic interests shared by the members of NATO call for:

(a) co-operative and individual action to achieve healthy and developing economies, both to promote the well-being and self-confidence of the Atlantic peoples and to serve as the essential support for an adequate defence effort;

(b) assistance to economically underdeveloped areas for reasons of enlightened self-interest and to promote better relations among peoples; demonstrating the superiority of free institutions in promoting human welfare and economic progress under conditions of competitive coexistence.

3. A recognition of these common NATO interests and collective and individual effort to promote these economic aims, need not in any way prejudice close and co-operative economic relations with non-NATO countries. Economic, like political co-operation, is and must remain wider than NATO. At the same time, the countries of the Atlantic Community have an interest in arrangements for especially close economic co-operation among groups of European member nations, and it should be possible for the development of such arrangements to promote rather than conflict with the wider objectives of the Atlantic Community and the rest of the non-Communist world.
II. NATO AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

4. The economic objectives of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty are of basic importance to the stability and well-being not only of the North Atlantic area but of the entire non-Communist world. It is not, however, necessary that member countries pursue the purposes of Article 2 only through action in NATO itself. It would not serve the interests of the Atlantic Community for NATO to duplicate the operating functions of other international organizations designed for various forms of economic co-operation (1). NATO members play a major part in all these agencies, and their membership is generally well adapted to the special purposes of those agencies.

5. Nor do there now appear to be significant new areas for common economic action requiring execution by NATO itself. The common economic concerns of the member nations will best be fostered by continued and enhanced collaboration both directly and through organizations other than NATO. This should be reinforced, however, by NATO consultation where the economic issues of special interest to the Alliance are involved. This, in turn, requires a substantial expansion of exchange of information and views in the economic as well as in the political field. Where economic matters are clearly related to the political and security interests of the Alliance, NATO consultation should seek to secure a common approach on the part of member governments. The resulting action,

(1) The outstanding instances are the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) (which includes all NATO countries as full or associate members and four others); the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); the International Finance Corporation (IFC); and the various United Nations specialised agencies including the Economic Commission for Europe. Several NATO members participate actively in the Colombo Plan for promoting economic development in Asia. Most members are taking an active part in technical assistance programmes and are also participating in discussions of proposals for the creation of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SURFED).
however, should normally be taken by governments either directly or through other international organizations.

6. NATO, as such, should not seek to establish formal relations with these other organizations, and the harmonising of attitudes and actions should be left to the representatives of the NATO governments therein. Nor is it necessary or desirable for NATO members to form a "bloc", in such organizations. This would only alienate other and friendly governments, with harmful results. There should, however, be NATO consultation prior to the meetings of international economic agencies when interests of the Atlantic Community may be subject to attempts in those agencies to divide or weaken the Alliance.

III. FIELDS FOR ECONOMIC CONSULTATION WITHIN NATO

A. Strengthening members' economies and promoting their economic co-operation

7. Economic growth and health require expanding economies based on sound policies and organized co-operation to promote the greatest possible freedom in trade and payments and in the movements of manpower and long-term capital. While there remains a great deal to be accomplished in these respects, the requisite machinery for co-operation among NATO members exists in other organizations.

8. There is now adequate provision for a regular assessment of each member country's general economic position, prospects and problems through the OEEC and NATO Annual Reviews. In addition, issues may arise affecting the economic health of the Atlantic Community, where NATO may be the most effective organization for consultation because of their political implications or because of their relation to the common defence.

B. Resolving conflicts in Economic Policies of Member Countries

9. NATO has a positive interest in the resolution of
economic disputes which may have political or strategic repercussions damaging to the Alliance. These are to be distinguished from disagreements on economic policy which are normally dealt with through direct negotiations of multilateral discussion in other organizations. Nothing would be gained by merely having repeated in NATO the same arguments made in other and more technically qualified organizations. It should, however, be open to any member or to the Secretary General to raise for discussion in NATO issues on which they feel that consideration elsewhere is not making adequate progress and that NATO consultation might facilitate solutions contributing to the objectives of the Atlantic Community. The procedures for peaceful settlement discussed in the previous Chapter should be available for major disputes of an economic as well as a purely political character.

C. Scientific and Technical Co-operation

10. One area of special importance to the Atlantic Community is the field of science and technology. During the last decade, it has become ever clearer that progress in science and engineering can be decisive in determining the security of nations and their position in world affairs. Such progress is also vital if the Western world is to play its proper rôle in relation to economically underdeveloped areas.

11. Within the general field of science and technology, there is an especially urgent need to improve the quality and to increase the supply of scientists, engineers and technicians. Responsibility for recruitment, training and utilisation of scientific and technical personnel is primarily a national rather than an international matter. Nor is it a responsibility solely of national governments. In the member countries with federal systems, state and provincial governments play the major part, and
many of the universities and institutes of higher learning in the Atlantic area are independent institutions free from detailed control by governments. At the same time, properly designed measures of international co-operation could stimulate individual member countries to adopt more positive policies and, in some cases, help guide them in the most constructive directions.

12. Certain activities in this connection are already being carried out by other organizations. Progress in this field, however, is so crucial to the future of the Atlantic Community that NATO members should ensure that no possibilities of fruitful co-operation are left unexplored. As a first concrete step, therefore, it is recommended that a conference be convened (either by NATO or on the initiative of NATO member governments through another appropriate organization), composed of one or at the most two outstanding authorities, private or governmental, from each country in order:

(a) to exchange information and views concerning the most urgent problems in the recruitment, training and utilisation of scientists, engineers and technicians, and the best means, both long-term and short-term, of solving these problems;

(b) to foster closer relations among the participants with a view to continued interchange of experience and stimulation of constructive work in member countries; and

(c) to propose specific measures for future international co-operation in this field, through NATO or other international organizations.

D. Relations with Other Areas

13. It is a matter of common consent that the Atlantic Community has a major positive concern with healthy and accelerated
development in economically underdeveloped areas, both outside and within the NATO area. It is likewise agreed that NATO is not an appropriate agency for administering programmes of assistance for economic development or even for systematically co-ordinating the relevant policies of member nations. Member countries should however keep each other and the Organization informed of their programmes and policies in this field, and when required NATO should review the adequacy of existing action in relation to the interests of the Alliance.

14. The economic interests of the Atlantic Community cannot be considered in isolation from the activities and policies of the Soviet bloc. The Soviets are resorting all too often to the use of economic measures which may have the effect of weakening the Western Alliance, or of creating in other areas a dangerous degree of dependence on the Soviet world. In this situation it is more than ever important that NATO countries actively develop their own constructive commercial and financial policies. In particular, they should avoid creating situations of which the Soviets might take advantage to the detriment of the Atlantic Community and of other non-Communist countries. In this whole field member countries should consult together in order to determine their course deliberately and with the fullest possible knowledge.

15. NATO should continue its regular reporting on economic trends in Soviet countries (including the comparison with member countries) and developments in Soviet economic policy. To this end, governments should undertake to report relevant information regularly, and there should be periodic meetings of experts on Soviet economic affairs drawn from the various capitals whose discussions might be the basis for consultation in particular cases. Arrangements should also be made for periodic meetings of
officials from the national capitals involved in commercial negotiations with the Soviet bloc, for an exchange of information and views. In the case of an important new commercial or financial proposal from the Soviet bloc to any member country, with possible political implications, it would be desirable for the member concerned to bring it to the attention of the Council.

16. The Alliance also has a positive interest in the complex and difficult field of Soviet economic relations, with the underdeveloped countries. NATO should be concerned with cases where Soviet economic action appears calculated to undermine sound relations between the underdeveloped countries and members of the Atlantic Community. Here the main endeavour of member governments should be to work co-operatively and constructively with the underdeveloped areas in promoting their economic development on a mutually satisfactory basis. It would clearly not be desirable to engage in indiscriminate competitive bidding with the Soviets in the field of assistance for development. At the same time, NATO consultation in certain cases might suggest the need for special efforts by members to assist underdeveloped countries in dealing with unusual problems, even if this requires an exceptional departure from ordinary commercial and financial practices.

IV. NATO ARRANGEMENTS FOR ECONOMIC CONSULTATION

17. There has been a considerable evolution in NATO's arrangements for regular economic consultation. In addition, a number of economic matters have been brought before the Council for consideration on an ad hoc basis. No substantial new machinery in this field is called for. However, in view of the extended range of topics for regular exchange of information and consultation described above, there should be established under the Council a Committee of Economic Advisers. This group should be
entrusted with the regular exchange of information and preliminary discussion in those areas of systematic consultation outlined above, together with such ad hoc tasks as may be assigned by the Council or approved by the Council at the Committee's request. It would absorb any continuing function of the Committee of Technical Advisers. Since its duties would not be full-time, member governments would presumably wish to be represented normally by officials mainly concerned with the work of other economic organizations; but membership should be flexible, the Committee being composed, when appropriate, of specialists from the capitals on particular topics under consideration. In any event arrangements should be made for more meetings of officials dealing currently with various economic matters important to the Alliance, such as Soviet commercial negotiations, trends in underdeveloped countries, or scientific and technical co-operation.
CHAPTER 3: CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

1. A sense of community must bind the people as well as the institutions of the Atlantic nations. This will exist only to the extent that there is a realisation of their common cultural heritage and of the values of their free way of life and thought. It is important, therefore, for the NATO countries to promote cultural co-operation among their peoples by all practical means in order to strengthen their unity and develop maximum support for their alliance. It is particularly important that this cultural co-operation should be wider than continental. This, however, does not preclude particular governments from acting on a more limited multilateral or even bilateral basis to strengthen their own cultural relations within the broader Atlantic framework.

2. The Committee welcomes the measures for cultural co-operation within the Atlantic Community which have been initiated by private individuals and non-governmental groups. These should be encouraged and increased. To promote further cultural collaboration within the Atlantic Alliance, the Committee suggests that member governments should be guided by the following general principles:

(a) Government activities in this field should not duplicate but should support and supplement private efforts.

(b) Member governments should give priority to those projects which require joint NATO action, and thus contribute to a developing sense of community.

(c) In developing new activities in the cultural field, NATO can most fruitfully place the main emphasis on inspiring and promoting trans-Atlantic contacts.

(d) There should be a realistic appreciation of the financial implications of cultural projects.
3. In order to develop public awareness and understanding of NATO and the Atlantic Community, the Council should work out arrangements for courses and seminars for teachers, journalists and others in a position to influence public opinion.

4. NATO and its member governments should broaden their support of other educational and related activities such as the NATO Fellowship and Scholarship Programme, the creation of university chairs of Atlantic studies; visiting professorships; government-sponsored programmes for the exchange of persons, especially on a transatlantic basis; the use of NATO information materials in schools; and the establishment of special NATO awards for students.

5. Governments should actively promote closer relations between NATO and youth organizations and a specialist should be added to the International Staff in this connection. Conferences under NATO auspices of representatives of youth organizations such as that of July, 1956, should be held from time to time.

6. In the interests of promoting easier and more frequent contacts among the NATO peoples, governments should review and, if possible, revise their foreign exchange and other policies which restrict travel.

7. In view of the importance of promoting better understanding and goodwill between NATO service personnel, it would be desirable, in co-operation with the military authorities, to extend exchanges of such personnel beyond the limits of normal training programmes. They might, as a first step, be developed by governments on a bilateral basis. In addition, member governments should seek the support of the Atlantic Treaty Association and other voluntary organizations for any programmes that might be developed for the exchange of service personnel.
3. Cultural projects which have a common benefit should be commonly financed. Agreed cultural projects initiated by a single member government or a private organization, such as the recent seminar held at Oxford or the Study Conference sponsored by the Atlantic Treaty Association on "The Role of the School in the Atlantic Community", should receive financial support from NATO where that is necessary to supplement national resources.
CHAPTER 4: CO-OPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD

1. The people of the member countries must know about NATO if they are to support it. Therefore they must be informed not only of NATO's aspirations, but of its achievements. There must be substance for an effective NATO information programme and resources to carry it out. The public should be informed to the greatest possible extent of significant results achieved through NATO consultation.

2. NATO information activities should be directed primarily to public opinion in the NATO area. At the same time, understanding outside the NATO area of the objectives and accomplishments of the Organization is necessary if it is to be viewed sympathetically, and if its activities are not to be misinterpreted.

3. The important task of explaining and reporting NATO activities rests primarily on national information services. They cannot discharge this task if member governments do not make adequate provision in their national programmes for that purpose. It is essential, therefore, that such provision be made. NATO can and should assist governments in this work. The promotion of information about and public understanding of NATO and the Atlantic community should, in fact, be a joint endeavour by the Organization and its members.

4. One of NATO's functions should be to co-ordinate the work of national information services in fields of common interest. Governments should pool their experiences and views in NATO to avoid differences in evaluation and emphasis. This is particularly important in the dissemination of information about NATO to
other countries. Co-ordinated policy should stress the
defensive character of our Alliance and the importance of its
non-military aspects. It should cover also replies to communist
anti-NATO propaganda and the analysis of communist moves and
statements which affect NATO.

5. In its turn, the NATO Information Division must be given
the resources by and the support from governments without which
they could not discharge these new tasks - and should not be
asked to do so.

6. In order to facilitate co-operation between the NATO
Information Division and national information services, the
following specific measures are recommended:

(a) An officer should be designated by each national
information service to maintain liaison with NATO
and to be responsible for the dissemination of
NATO information material;

(b) Governments should submit to NATO the relevant
information programmes which they plan to implement,
for discussion in the Committee on Information and
Cultural Relations. Representatives of national
information services should take part in these
discussions;

(c) within the NATO Information Division budget, pro-
vision should be made for a translation fund so
that NATO information material can be translated
into the non-official languages of the Alliance,
according to reasonable requirements of the
member governments;
(d) NATO should, on request, provide national services with special studies on matters of common interest.

7. Journalists' tours, sponsored by NATO, and which have been most beneficial, should be broadened to include others in a position to influence public opinion, such as trade union and youth leaders, teachers and lecturers. Closer relations between private organizations supporting NATO and the NATO Information Division should also be encouraged.
CHAPTER 5: ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

A. Introduction

1. The Committee considers that NATO in its present form is capable of discharging the functions required of it. Structural changes are not needed. The machine is basically satisfactory provided that governments make use of it.

2. At the same time, certain improvements in the procedures and functioning of the Organization will be required if the recommendations of this report are to be implemented. The proposals in this Chapter are submitted for this purpose.

B. Security

3. There must be a strict observance of security measures and unqualified respect for the confidential character of meetings. Otherwise there cannot be the type of full and frank consultation which the Committee regards as essential.

C. Meetings of the Council

4. More time should be allowed for Ministerial Meetings. Experience has shown that, without more time, important issues on the agenda cannot be adequately considered. Decisions concerning some of them will not be reached at all, or will be reached only in an unclear form.

5. Efforts should be made to encourage discussion rather than simply declarations of policy prepared in advance. Arrangements for meetings should be made with this aim in view. For most sessions, the numbers present should be sharply restricted. In order to facilitate free discussion, when Ministers wish to speak in a language other than French or English, consecutive translation into one of these official languages should be provided by interpreters from their own delegations.

6. Meetings of Foreign Ministers should be held whenever required, and occasionally in locations other than NATO
Headquarters. Ministers might also participate more frequently in regular Council meetings, even though not all of them may find it possible to attend such meetings at the same time. There should be no firm or formal line between Ministerial and other meetings of the Council.

D. Strengthening the links between the Council and member governments

7. Governments should ensure that their representation on the Council is as authoritative as possible, should provide for maximum effectiveness in the presentation of their views and policies, and should see to it that the necessary follow-up action is taken.

8. It is indispensable to the kind of consultations envisaged in this report that Permanent Representatives should be in a position to speak authoritatively and to reflect the current thinking of their governments. Differences in location and in constitutional organization make impossible any uniform arrangements in all member governments. In some cases it might be desirable to designate a high official in the national capital to be concerned primarily with NATO affairs in order to help both in the development of NATO consultations whenever national policies impinge on the common interests of the Atlantic Community, and in translating the results of such consultations into effective action within the national governments.

9. To ensure the closest possible tie between current thinking in the governments and consultations in the Council, there might be occasional Council meetings with the participation of such specially designated officials or with the permanent official heads of foreign ministries.
E. Preparation for Council meetings

10. Items on the Agenda of Ministerial meetings should be thoroughly examined by Permanent Representatives and relevant proposals prepared before Ministers meet. For this purpose it may be found desirable for governments to send senior experts to consult on agenda items before the meetings take place.

11. The preparation of questions for discussion in the Council should be assisted by appropriate use of the Council’s Committees of Political and Economic Advisers. (Recommendations on the establishment of these Committees are set forth in Chapter 1, paragraph 18, and Chapter 2, paragraph 17).

12. In the case of consultations on special subjects, more use should be made of senior experts from national capitals to assist permanent delegations by calling them, on an ad hoc basis, to do preparatory work. Informal discussion among specialists with corresponding responsibilities is a particularly valuable means of converting governmental attitudes in the early stages of policy formation.

13. Number governments should make available “basic position material” to one another through NATO for background information. This would help the Alliance as a whole in the consideration of problems of common concern and would assist individual governments to understand more fully the reasons for the position adopted by any member country on a particular issue which might be its special concern, but which might also affect in varying degrees other members of NATO.

F. The Secretary General and the International Staff

14. To enable the Organization to make its full contribution, the role of the Secretary General and the International Staff needs to be enhanced.
15. The Committee recommends that the Secretary General should preside over meetings of the Council in Ministerial, as he does now in permanent sessions. Such a change with respect to the conduct of the Council's business would follow naturally from the new responsibilities of the Secretary General and his even closer relationship to the Council, arising out of the recommendations of this report. It is also warranted by the Secretary General's unique opportunities for becoming familiar with the problems and the activities of the Alliance as a whole.

16. It would, however, still be desirable to have one Minister chosen each year as President of the Council in accordance with the present practice of alphabetical rotation. This Minister, as President, would continue to have especially close contact with the Secretary General during and between Ministerial Meetings, and would, as at present, act as the spokesman of the Council on all formal occasions. Furthermore, this Minister would preside at the formal opening and closing of Ministerial sessions of the Council.

17. In addition:

(a) The Secretary General should be encouraged to propose items for NATO consultation in the fields covered by this report and should be responsible for promoting and directing the process of consultation.

(b) In view of these responsibilities, member governments should undertake to keep the Secretary General fully and currently informed through their permanent delegations of their governments' thinking on questions of common concern to the Alliance.

(c) Attention is also called to the additional responsibilities of the Secretary General,
recommended in connection with the Annual Political Appraisal (Chapter 1, paragraph 15) and the peaceful settlement of disputes (Chapter 1, paragraph 19).

18. The effective functioning of NATO depends in large measure on its Staff. Acceptance of the recommendations in this report would impose on it new duties and responsibilities. Governments must be prepared to give the International Staff the necessary support, both in finance and personnel.