COMMITTEE OF THREE
DECISIONS REACHED DURING MEETINGS HELD
ON 20th-22nd JUNE, 1956, AT THE
PALAIS DE CHAILLOT, PARIS

(1) A questionnaire (CT-D/1) will be circulated to all countries as soon as possible with the request that replies be sent to the Secretary General by 20th August.

(2) A Memorandum containing guidance and explanatory notes to assist countries in the preparation of their replies to some of the questions will be circulated as soon as possible after the issuance of the questionnaire.

(3) The Committee will hold its second session beginning September 10th and possibly lasting for two weeks, to consider the replies received, to consult with Governments, individually or in the Council, and to start with the drafting of the Report.

(4) In order to assist in the analysis of the replies to the questionnaire, an advance party will meet in Paris during the week beginning 3rd September.

(5) In order to assist the Committee in the preparation of its Report a few highly qualified experts will be approached to serve as consultants on particular questions. In this connection it was suggested that Mr. Lange ask the Head of the Norwegian Research Council for a suggestion as to a possible consultant on scientific education; that Mr. Pearson approach Professor Lincoln Gordon of Harvard University to serve as a consultant on economic questions; that Dr. Martino approach Professor Carli on the same subject; and finally that Mr. Marjolin might also be approached on behalf of the Committee of Three.

The Terms of Reference of these consultants will be determined by the Committee. After their provisional agreement has been obtained they will be invited officially in writing by the Secretary General, on behalf of the Committee, to serve as consultants for a period of about 2 months beginning in August. The Secretary General is to specify, furthermore, that NATO will reimburse travel expenses and will pay a daily allowance of an amount which will be settled later.

(6) The International Staff is to prepare a chapter of a chapter for the Report on what NATO has done so far in the non-military field.

(7) The International Staff is to prepare as a background document for the work of the Committee a list of political and economic questions which have been put before the Council in the past, and of the results achieved. This list is to be divided into:
(a) questions submitted purely for the purpose of information,
(b) questions submitted for information and discussion, and
(c) questions on which action was taken after discussion.

(8) The International Staff is to prepare a study of the machinery for settlement of disputes between States as it exists in other organizations, with particular reference to the Organization of American States.

(9) The International Staff is to prepare a study of the possible implications for NATO if it were to become a regional organization in the terms of Chapter 8 of the United Nations Charter.

(10) The Committee's activities will, as far as possible, be concentrated in Paris. The Committee do not intend to travel to the different capitals as had originally been suggested.

(11) Members of the Committee will informally contact Governments of those countries which are members of OEEC but not of NATO, in the following manner:

Mr. Pearson will contact the Irish Government.
Mr. Lange will contact the Swedish Government.
Dr. Martino will contact the Governments of Austria and Switzerland, and the Government of Spain as a prospective member of OEEC.

(12) Dr. Martino and Mr. Pearson will contact the Secretary of the NATO Parliamentary Committee in London during the week beginning 25th June.

(13) During their meeting in September the Committee will not hear individuals or associations but will consider any suggestions which are submitted in writing.

(14) The Secretary is to write a letter in the name of the Committee of Three to the Secretary General of the Atlantic Treaty Association, on the occasion of its meeting in Milan 11th-15th September, indicating that the Committee would welcome any suggestions which might come out of the Association's meeting, especially in the field of cultural co-operation and information and which might be considered by the Committee when drafting its report.

(15) The Committee of Three has been approached by the Director of the International Refugee Organization with the request that the Committee consider recommending an increase in the contribution of NATO countries to IRO. It was agreed that the Committee would consider this question favourably.

(16) It was provisionally agreed that the outline of the Report should be as set out at annex.

(17) For the preparation of the chapter on cultural relations, the results of the meeting of Heads of Cultural Departments, which is to take place in July, will have to be taken into account.

* See note 5/1/56 attached to this document*
(18) The Report will be submitted to the Council in Permanent Session in November. A special meeting of Foreign Ministers to receive the report is not deemed necessary. The Report is to be discussed by the Council during its Ministerial Session in December; two days might be devoted to this discussion.
DRAFT OUTLINE OF THE REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE OF THREE

I. INTRODUCTION
   (The political aims of the Alliance to be drafted by Mr. Pearson.)

II. SURVEY OF NON-MILITARY CO-OPERATION AS CARRIED OUT BY NATO IN THE PAST
   (To be prepared by the Secretariat.)

III. MACHINERY OF NATO
   (A discussion on the question whether the present machinery is adequate and what improvements could be envisaged.)

IV. CONSULTATION IN THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FIELD

V. THE RELATION TO OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

VI. CO-OPERATION IN THE FIELD OF CULTURAL RELATIONS AND INFORMATION

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

COMITE DES TROIS

DECISIONS PRIS EN COURS DES REUNIONS QUI SE SONT TENUES AU
PALAIS DE CHAILLOT, PARIS, DU 20 AU 22 JUIN 1956

(1) Un questionnaire (CT-D/1) sera distribué dès que possible
à tous les pays, qui seront priés d'envoyer leurs réponses
au Secrétaire Général avant le 20 août.

(2) Un mémorandum contenant des directives et des notes explica-
tives destinées à aider les pays à préparer leurs réponses à
certaines questions sera diffusé dès que possible après la
distribution du questionnaire.

(3) Le Comité tiendra sa seconde session qui durera probablement
deux semaines à partir du 10 septembre, pour examiner les
réponses qu'il aura reçues, consulter les gouvernements indi-
viduellement ou au sein du Conseil, et commencer la rédaction
de son rapport.

(4) Avant cette session, un groupe se réunira à Paris, pendant
la semaine du 3 septembre pour commencer l'analyse des réponses
au questionnaire.

(5) Pour la préparation de son rapport, le Comité fera appel à
l'aide de quelques spécialistes hautement qualifiés, qui
feront fonction de consultants dans certains domaines. A cet
gard, il a été suggéré que M. Lange demande au Chef du Conseil
norvégien de la recherche scientifique de lui proposer le nom
d'un spécialiste de l'enseignement scientifique; que M. Pearson
demande au Professeur Lincoln Gordon, de l'Université Harvard,
de faire fonction de consultant pour les questions économiques,
que le Dr. Martino pressente le Professeur Carli dans le même
but et enfin que le Comité des Trois fasse également appel à
M. Marjolin.

Le Comité fixera le mandat de ces consultants. Lorsqu'ils
auront accepté en principe, le Secrétaire Général les invitera
par écrit, au nom du Comité, à faire fonction de consultants
pendant une période d'environ deux mois à partir du mois
daout. De plus, le Secrétaire Général précisera que l'OTAN
remboursera leurs frais de voyage et leur versera une indemni-
té journalière dont le montant sera fixé ultérieurement.

(6) Le Secrétariat International doit préparer, pour le rapport,
un projet de chapitre sur les réalisations de l'OTAN dans les
domaines non militaires.
Pour aider le Comité dans son travail, le Secrétariat International doit préparer une liste des questions politiques et économiques dont a été saisi le Conseil dans le passé, ainsi que des résultats obtenus. Cette liste comportera:

(a) les questions soumises uniquement à des fins d'information,
(b) les questions soumises pour information et examen,
(c) les questions dont l'examen a entraîné l'adoption de certaines mesures.

Le Secrétariat International doit préparer une étude sur la procédure suivie dans les autres organisations, particulièrement à l'Organisation des États américains pour le règlement des différends entre États.


Dans la mesure du possible le Comité poursuivra ses activités à Paris. Le Comité n'a pas l'intention de se rendre dans les différentes capitales, comme il avait été proposé à l'origine.

Les membres du Comité se mettront officieusement en rapport avec les gouvernements des pays qui sont membres de l'OCDE mais non de l'OTAN, de la façon suivante:

Mr. Pearson se mettra en rapport avec le gouvernement irlandais.
Mr. Lange avec le gouvernement suédois.
Le Dr. Martino avec les gouvernements autrichien et suisse, ainsi qu'avec le gouvernement espagnol en tant que membre éventuel de l'OCDE.

Le Dr. Martino et Mr. Pearson se mettront en rapport avec le Secrétaire de la Conférence des parlementaires de l'OTAN à Londres, au cours de la semaine du 25 juin.

Au cours de sa réunion du mois de septembre, le Comité n'accordera d'audience à aucun particulier ou association, mais examinera toutes les suggestions qui lui seront soumises par écrit.

Le Secrétaire doit écrire au nom du Comité des Trois au Secrétaire Général de l'Association du Traité de l'Atlantique, à l'occasion de la réunion qui aura lieu à Milan du 11 au 15 septembre, pour lui faire savoir que le Comité accueillerait avec plaisir toute suggestion que lui ferait l'Association à la suite de sa réunion, notamment dans le domaine de la coopération culturelle et de l'Information et qui serait susceptible d'être prise en considération par le Comité au cours de la préparation de son rapport.

Le Directeur de l'Organisation internationale des Réfugiés a demandé au Comité des Trois d'envisager de recommander une augmentation des contributions versées par les pays de l'OTAN à l'OIR. Le Comité a décidé qu'il examinerait cette demande avec bienveillance.
(16) Il est décidé provisoirement que le rapport suivra le plan indiqué en annexe.

(17) Pour la préparation du chapitre sur les relations culturelles, le Comité devra tenir compte des résultats de la réunion des chefs des Services Culturels qui doit avoir lieu au mois de juillet.

(18) Le rapport sera soumis au Conseil en session permanente au mois de novembre. Il est jugé inutile de présenter le rapport à une réunion spéciale des ministres des Affaires étrangères. Le rapport doit être discuté par le Conseil au cours de sa session ministérielle au mois de décembre. Deux jours pourraient être consacrés à cet examen.

Palais de Chaillot, Paris, XVIe.
COMMITTEE OF THREE MEETING WITH THE STANDING
COMMITTEE OF THE CONFERENCE OF MEMBERS
OF PARLIAMENT FROM THE NATO COUNTRIES HELD ON
WEDNESDAY, 12TH SEPTEMBER, 1956 at 10 a.m.

List of members of the Standing Committee:

Mr. Frans Van, Cauwelaert (Belgium) Mr. J.J. Pens (Netherlands)
Mr. A. de Meeler (Belgium) Mr. J.L. Kranenburg (Netherlands)
Mr. E.A. Vermeer

Senator The Hon Wishart, McL. Robertson, P.C., (Canada) Colonel Seyfi Kurtbek (Turkey)
Mr. M. Schumann (France) Colonel Walter Elliot, C.H., M.C., M.P. (United Kingdom)
Mr. F. Berendsen (Germany) Congressman Wayne L. Hays (United States)
Dr. Richard Jaeger (Germany) Mr. Billings (United States)

Executive Secretary: Mr. Douglas Robinson

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1. After a world of welcome from Mr. Lange, Senator ROBERTSON, in an introductory statement, proposed a discussion on the following three points:

(1) the role of parliament in relation to NATO;
(2) political consultation within NATO;
(3) economic co-operation within NATO;

2. The meeting had before it a memorandum as requested by the Committee of Three from the Standing Committee. He went on to say that he hoped that the Committee of Three would recommend in their report that steps be taken to ensure the fullest possible support of the Conference of Members of Parliament by NATO.

I. THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS IN RELATION TO NATO

3. Mr. VAN CAUWELAERT (Belgium) noted that as the military threat had, at present, decreased, it would be more difficult to obtain parliamentary support for NATO. Since this support remained, nevertheless, essential, he was strongly in favour of a more formal recognition of the Conference of Parliamentarians, and of its continuance as a permanent body. He also urged that NATO give more assistance to the work of the Conference.

4. Mr. HAYS (United States) stated that the United States Congress was at present cooling off in its enthusiasm for NATO, as well as for other overseas commitments, and replies to the questionnaire sent out by the Standing Committee had been poor. The opinion was being expressed publicly that NATO was dying. He believed that the present conference should establish closer liaison between parliaments and NATO in order to impress upon parliamentarians that NATO was still very much alive.

5. Colonel KURTEK (Turkey), speaking as the representative of one of the countries most exposed to the Communist threat, emphasised the need for a formal, permanent and realistic liaison between parliaments and NATO, in order that NATO might have the fullest support from public opinion.

6. Mr. BERENDSEN (Germany) felt that closer contact between NATO and the parliamentarians of member countries would be most useful. Discussions on NATO matters should take place among parliamentarians before, and in preparation for, parliamentary discussions. In addition to the Annual Review stock-taking of the military situation, it would be useful for NATO to have an annual report on political questions. Member countries should aim at co-ordinating their policies in fighting Communism.

7. Colonel WALTER ELLIOT (United Kingdom) supported the proposals by previous speakers. He noted that the conference had governmental backing to the extent that all those attending it had been chosen by the presidents of their national legislatures. NATO had so far neglected to ensure support from public opinion, to which the national legislatures were responsible; it was time for NATO to educate public opinion in the importance of the Organization. He would like to see close liaison between
parliamentarians and the NATO Secretariat. For example, a request for a report by the Secretariat on the comparative economic position of the NATO and Soviet blocs had been refused for security reasons, but he thought that it should be possible to provide a report to parliamentarians which would avoid these difficulties. Similarly, a report would be useful on the comparative position in the two blocs regarding cultural facilities and exchanges. In conclusion, he asked whether the Committee of Three would consider recommending that NATO give modest financial help to the annual Conference of Parliamentarians, who represented valuable "public relations officers" for NATO in their constituencies.

8. Mr. LANGE said that the Committee would consider this point.

II. POLITICAL CONSULTATION WITHIN NATO

9. Mr. FENS (Netherlands) thought it essential that the NATO block should evolve a common foreign policy in the international field and that NATO should become a political unity.

10. Mr. SCHUMANN (France) said that, though replies to the questionnaire circulated in January 1956 showed that the majority of French parliamentarians supported NATO, it was clear that the electorate's interest in NATO was waning. Public opinion was not adequately informed about NATO. Political consultation within NATO on questions of common interest was still insufficient. He suggested that the Council should act as a permanent intermediary between governments and public opinion in member countries; that its members should have direct political responsibility; that all questions concerning the alliance should be brought before the Council for discussion, and that the public should be informed when such questions were discussed.

11. Colonel WALTER ELLIOT (United Kingdom) noted that in the United Kingdom the desirability of a common NATO foreign policy had been recognised by 60% of the parliamentarians who replied to the questionnaire. He emphasised the usefulness of parliamentary discussion in spreading information about NATO.

12. In conclusion, it was noted that the development of political consultation within NATO would be one of the primary recommendations to be made by the Committee of Three.

III. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION WITHIN NATO

13. Senator ROBERTSON thought that the existence of other international organizations concerned with economic co-operation was no bar to the development of economic co-operation within NATO, since the element of economic interdependence among NATO countries was strong. A number of political problems facing the Alliance were, in origin, economic. It was the collective responsibility of the NATO countries to ensure the highest possible degree of prosperity in each member country.

14. Mr. BERNSTEIN (Germany) emphasised the need for closer economic co-operation, both in the military field, as regards the maintenance of equipment, and in the civilian field.
15. Mr. VAN CAUWELAERT (Belgium) pointed out that the economic policies of the Soviet bloc made it necessary for the NATO countries also to adopt a common economic policy. If Communism were found to produce greater prosperity than the free Western system, public opinion in the West would be seriously affected. The Atlantic community should express itself in a common economic policy with objectives in the following order of priority:

(1) aid for underdeveloped NATO countries;
(2) the common development of Central Africa;
(3) the development of nuclear energy in the civilian field;
(4) the education of technicians, including exchanges of personnel and students. For this purpose, NATO might call together a conference of educationalists. It might also prove necessary to set up new agencies for this purpose.

16. Colonel WALTER ELLIOT (United Kingdom) thought that while it might not be necessary for NATO itself to organize joint economic activities, it should be recognized that economic cooperation was an integral part of the task of the Alliance. The question was therefore one of organization in the international field. Since the resources of NATO member countries were not unlimited, a degree of selection would be necessary in the aid to underdeveloped countries. A survey should be made of the trained personnel available in the NATO area, as compared with the Soviet bloc; also of NATO and Soviet economic resources, bearing in mind, for example, such points as the fact that the Soviet bloc disposed of a fuel surplus, whereas NATO had to import fuel from outside the NATO area. Finally, NATO should study the possibility of making corresponding university degrees and diplomas interchangeable.

17. Mr. HAYS (United States) agreed that the NATO countries should try to make the best joint use of their economic resources.

18. Colonel KURTKBEK (Turkey) emphasized the need for economic aid as regards the replacement of equipment, and suggested that NATO might set up special agencies to deal with economic problems, in particular, economic warfare.

19. Mr. VERMEER (Netherlands) thought that there should be an Atlantic programme of investment in underdeveloped non-NATO countries, aimed at promoting stability and peace. Such activities would help to give NATO much-needed publicity.

20. In conclusion, it was noted that there was general agreement on the need for closer economic cooperation among member countries, either within NATO, or in other existing international organizations.
21. Mr. Lange and Mr. Pearson thanked the Members of Parliament for their valuable suggestions, which would be of great help in the Committee's work.

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.
MEETING BETWEEN NATO's COMMITTEE OF THREE FOREIGN MINISTERS
and the
STANDING COMMITTEE of the
CONFERENCE OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT FROM THE NATO COUNTRIES

MEMORANDUM

requested by the Committee of Three from the
Standing Committee of the Conference of Members
of Parliament from the NATO Countries

PREFACE

In the interests of brevity, the Standing Committee in
the preparation of this Memorandum has put down its suggestions on
only those matters to which, in the comparatively short time which
has been available, it has been able to give some consideration
and formulate certain proposals.

The Committee hopes, however, that it may make its views
known to the Ministers verbally on a number of other aspects, rele-
ant to the terms of reference given the Ministers, on which its
views do not appear in this Memorandum, or of which only brief
mention has been made.

The Committee has not had an opportunity to study the
analysis of the replies to its Survey of Parliamentary Opinion in
the NATO Countries, copies of which have been sent separately to
the Committee of Three. In the light of study of the report of
the Survey the Committee might wish to amend or add to their
remarks and proposals contained in this Memorandum at a later date.

INTRODUCTION

NATO and UNO

The Committee felt that the task of preparing a report
on the development of closer economic and political unity given to
the Committee of Three, gives an opportunity to stress again that
NATO is fully compatible with the aims of the Charter of the United
Nations Organization - indeed, that in a sense it is already a
regional organization.

The North Atlantic Council

On ways and means of making the North Atlantic Council
more effective the Committee expresses the hope that the question
is one which is receiving the attention of the three Ministers,
and that among the ways and means they may consider will be more
frequent meetings of the Council at Ministerial level, an increase
in the calibre and/or rank of the present permanent representatives
if they see fit and all other methods of increasing the authority
of the Council.
SECTION ONE - THE PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE

The Committee would like to discuss with the Ministers how "more formal recognition" can be given to the Conference of Members of Parliament from the NATO countries.

Some indication of permanence and a more realistic income is regarded as essential to the effective working of the Conference now and in the future.

In particular some financial arrangement permitting of relatively modest but planned expenditure over a period of say, three years, would be helpful to the Standing Committee of the Conference and enable it to achieve maximum effectiveness at the lowest overall cost.

Another form of recognition could be given if the North Atlantic Council passed a resolution welcoming and acknowledging the Conference, its aims and activities, and charging the NATO Secretariat to grant every facility to the Conference, its Officers and Committees.

(See also last paragraph, Section Three - Economic).

Annual Report

The Committee felt that the NATO Parliamentarians should receive an Annual Report prepared by the NATO Secretariat, which could serve as a basis for an informed and intelligent debate on the activities and problems of NATO, at their annual Conference.

For both the Conference and the Standing Committee it is felt that more information than that given the Press should be made available concerning the NATO activities, problems and its future.

SECTION TWO - POLITICAL

Prior Consultation

The Standing Committee favours greater use of the Council as a forum for early discussion of questions of common concern and especially those likely to be raised in wider international forums, e.g. the United Nations Organization, where representatives of Communist countries are also present.

Settlement of Disputes

The Committee would hope that prior discussion in the Council would lead to the settlement of disputes between member countries, if not through the discussions themselves, then through an agreement resulting from them that the case in question be considered by the appropriate international body, notably the International Court of Justice at The Hague.

A particular reason - among many others - why the North Atlantic Council should be used for such purposes is that Germany for instance is not yet a Member of the United Nations and needs an international forum in which she may discuss problems common to her and nations with which she has close economic, political and military ties.
SECTION THREE - ECONOMIC

Objectives of closer economic co-operation within the North Atlantic Community need not, in the view of the Committee, imply new organizations.

Before considering means, however, the Committee felt it should suggest certain principles which might be followed when considering the possibilities of greater economic co-operation between the NATO countries.

**Principles**

Practical acknowledgement should be made of the principle of utilising best and co-ordinating most effectively the combined economic resources of the NATO group of countries.

Due consideration should be given at the same time to strategic interests of the NATO community.

In considering the role NATO countries might play as a group towards underdeveloped territories, first consideration should be given to such areas within the North Atlantic Community.

When this has been done then consideration should be given as to what joint action member states can take towards meeting the needs of underdeveloped areas outside the confines of the North Atlantic group, though, if any such action were agreed, it should, in the view of the Committee, be undertaken through the appropriate existing bodies such as the specialised agencies of the United Nations.

The NATO countries as a group should not allow the initiative in economic as in political matters always to be the monopoly of the Soviet; neither, however, should they be tempted into matching each Soviet offer of economic aid with a similar or larger offer without regard to the economic soundness of the project in question or to the inevitable diversion of resources from the development of NATO countries which such economic aid involves.

The Committee feels strongly that there are several objectives which should be the aim of member countries of the North Atlantic Community and for which fresh approaches should be tried, or study of existing lines of approach intensified.

Among them should be:

(1) Convertibility
(2) Eventual full freedom of trade
(3) Mobility of labour
(4) Development of a "North Atlantic Low Tariff Club"
(5) The setting up of a Joint Programme for the development of underdeveloped territories.

**Means**

OECD

Among the many points raised at the meeting of Officers of the Standing Committee on the means available for obtaining closer economic co-operation between member countries of the North Atlantic Community, the Committee felt it should suggest certain principles which might be followed when considering the possibilities of greater economic co-operation between the NATO countries.
Atlantic Community were (i) the effectiveness, suitability or otherwise of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation as the medium for meeting the economic purposes of Article Two of the North Atlantic Treaty, and (ii) the adequacy or otherwise of the associate membership of the United States and Canada in OEEC. While the Standing Committee recognises that the Committee of Three may not be in a position to concern themselves with OEEC, its effectiveness or its composition, it was unanimous in its view that, in respect of the economic needs and potentialities of the North Atlantic Community, the present associate membership status of the United States and Canada in OEEC is unsatisfactory and that OEEC itself is inadequate to meet fully current requirements and the potential of the North Atlantic Community.

Irrespective, however, of whether the possibility exists or not for the Ministers to make recommendations touching upon OEEC and regardless of whether the present services of OEEC could or could not be utilised, the Committee considers that among the "means" or lines of approach to the objectives outlined above - and means and objectives in one or two cases overlap - are the following:

(a) Co-ordination by the NATO countries of their policies in the various international organizations, economic and otherwise, to which they belong;

(b) drawing up of a list of areas, both within and outside the North Atlantic Community, to which priority would be given for investments and economic aid;

(c) consideration of ways and means of pooling capital resources of the NATO countries for joint investments within the North Atlantic Community;

(d) creation of a joint programme for economic aid and investment in underdeveloped areas to be carried out through the appropriate existing institutions;

(e) the setting up of teams of technicians, scientists and qualified and experienced administrators to assist in the development of those areas in which joint action is undertaken by member countries;

(f) the setting up of an exchange equalisation fund for the NATO countries;

(g) a series of treaties covering, for instance, (i) trade and currency, (ii) investment and development, (iii) commodities;

(h) an international buffer stock scheme for primary products.

It is appreciated that each of these suggestions is highly technical and carries implications which require expert study and that the list is by no means complete.

The Committee would like to discuss with the Ministers the role that it believes the Conference and the Standing
The Committee might play in the months ahead in exploring these and other possible avenues of progress further, and which might be provided for in connection with the more formal recognition of the Conference and Committee referred to earlier in this Memorandum.

GENERAL

The Committee is in agreement that greater emphasis should be put on the role NATO can play in developing closer intellectual ties between the member countries of NATO.

There should be regular visits of Members of Parliament between North America and Western Europe.

More and larger exchanges should be arranged between journalists, broadcasters and between those professionally concerned with the teaching of international relations.

Propaganda in the armed forces of each NATO country informing their members of NATO, its worth and purpose and the principles of the countries and civilisation which it seeks to defend, should be increased and should be more co-ordinated.

In propaganda, films, literature and so on, about NATO and the North Atlantic Community, greater emphasis should be placed upon the positive and peaceful benefits of closer co-operation between the NATO countries, in addition to stressing the value of their co-operation for purposes of defence. Stress should be laid on the potential of the North Atlantic Community as a force for peace given increasing unity in purpose and action.

CONCLUSION

The aim of the Standing Committee in its discussions leading to the preparation of this Memorandum has been to put forward possible solutions or possible lines of action, which, in the belief of the Committee, are neither too visionary nor too staid to go unheeded in the parliaments which, in the final analysis, would be asked to sanction them.

The Committee looks forward to its meeting with the Committee of Three and submits, at their request, this Memorandum for the prior attention and convenience of the Ministers.
ENGLISH ONLY
14th September, 1956

NATO CONFIDENTIAL
CT-R/3

COMMITTEE OF THREE

Report on the Consultation with Iceland on Wednesday, 12th September, 1956 at noon

Representatives of Iceland: Mr. H.G. Andersen
                          Mr. H. Helgason

The Icelandic Representative made a general statement to the effect that his Government fully agreed with the endeavour to strengthen the co-operation within NATO and would give its full support to the recommendations which the Committee of Three would make. He particularly stressed the importance of better co-operation in the economic field citing as an example the fact that since it had become more and more difficult for his country to find export markets for its products, the Icelandic economy had become more and more dependent on commercial relations with Soviet areas. As a result the Soviet Union was now the biggest customer of Icelandic products and although this was regretted in Iceland, certain repercussions in the political and cultural field had been inevitable. In reply to specific questions the Icelandic Representative made the following points:

1. Political Consultation: The case of Iceland is a typical example for the need for better and more timely consultation.

2. Consultation about Economic Questions treated in other Organizations: Although the Icelandic fishery dispute has been discussed in OEEC, discussion in NATO, taking into account the political aspects of the problem, might have been more successful.
ENGLISH ONLY
11th September, 1956

COMMITTEE OF THREE

Report on the consultation with Turkey on Wednesday, 12th September, 1956 at 4 p.m. and Thursday, 13th September at noon

Representatives of Turkey: Mr. N. Birgi
Mr. M. A. Tiney
Mr. M. E. E. Esenbel

The Turkish Representative made the following points:

I - POLITICAL CO-OPERATION

1. Consultation. As regards the Council recommendations referred to in sub-paragraph (A) (7), the intention is not that there should be any formal recommendation or vote which, according to established procedure, would require unanimity, but simply that, through discussion, a general agreement would emerge by which member governments would be guided in making national decisions. Turkey can accept this requirement.

2. Peaceful settlement of disputes. Turkey affirms the need for political consultation, and recommends that member countries should inform the Council before taking any step which might affect another member country. Turkey is not, however, in favour of creating the machinery proposed in sub-paragraphs (2) and (3), for the reason that the institution of such machinery, even though there would be no legal obligation on member countries to use it, would create a moral obligation, with the result that should disputes arise and member countries be unwilling to refer them to the bodies proposed, the authority of NATO would be weakened in the eyes of the outside world. The creation of such machinery might therefore, in fact, be harmful to NATO. Turkey is in favour of a more flexible solution whereby it should be left to the Council to decide how disputes brought before it should be dealt with.

Turkey can accept the obligation not to resort to any other international agency without having first submitted the question to NATO on the understanding that this does not imply the creation of any special machinery.

II - ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

1. Aid to underdeveloped areas. Turkey would like a specific reference (in paragraphs 1, A(1) and (2) of the Economic Section of CT-WP(5)Revised) to the granting of priority to the development of underdeveloped countries within NATO.

2. Civilian Public Works. NATO should develop public works in the civilian field. One example would be the construction of roads linking the different member countries. A more elastic system of common infrastructure than the present military concept could be envisaged.
3. As regards Turkey's suggestion that NATO study the exploitation and transport of certain products of primary economic and strategic importance, a specific example would be petroleum supplies and pipelines.

4. Canada and the USA should be more closely associated with the work of the OEEC.

5. Relationship with other regional organizations. There should be a close relationship with the Economic Committee of the Baghdad Pact with a view to co-ordinating aid by NATO countries to underdeveloped regions in the Middle East. Provision has been made for countries which are not members of the Baghdad Pact to accede to the Economic Committee of that Pact. This would make it possible for NATO to establish a link with the Pact, and for economic aid to be provided to uncommitted countries, (which might include, for example, Colombo Plan countries). If a NATO Economic Advisory Committee is set up, this Committee should establish liaison with the Baghdad Pact Committee.

6. Soviet Economic Initiatives. The initiative for action in the commercial and economic field, planned to seize initiative from the Soviet bloc, might be taken:

(1) by the Council;

(2) by the Committee on Soviet Economic Policy, which could also act in an advisory capacity to individual member countries;

(3) by individual member countries after consultation within the Council or the Committee on Soviet Economic Policy whereas the ultimate policy would remain the responsibility of individual governments. NATO should study these problems and give advice on them.

7. The proposals on Technical and Scientific Co-operation are acceptable to Turkey.

8. NATO machinery for economic consultations. Turkey does not favour, at least at this stage, the creation of special machinery within NATO for economic consultations. Procedure for consultations should remain flexible.

IV - CO-OPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD

Wherever possible, it is desirable to inform public opinion when major problems are discussed in the Council, while avoiding mentioning facts or names which would give rise to the possibility of "propaganda campaigns" while decisions are still pending. Publicity should be given in an active way, i.e. with the object of guiding public opinion.

V - ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

1. The Secretary General's right of initiative in the field of political consultations should be limited in order to avoid the Secretary General finding himself in a difficult position.
2. Turkey supports the proposals that the Secretary General should prepare an annual report on the state of the Alliance and that a political Annual Review be established.

3. More frequent ministerial meetings should be held. These need not be on a large scale; meetings of Foreign Ministers alone, each time in a different NATO capital, would help to impress public opinion with the effectiveness of NATO as a political alliance.
ENGLISH ONLY
14th September, 1956

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

COMMITTEE OF THREE

Report on the consultation with the Netherlands on Thursday, 13th September, 1956 at 10 a.m.

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NETHERLANDS

Mr. J.W. Beyen
Mr. H.E. Van der Beugel
Mr. Eszauchier
Mr. Both
Mr. M.F. Vigeveno

The Netherlands Representative made the following points:

I. POLITICAL CONSULTATION

1. Political Consultation in General. NATO should not be apologetic about the military aspect of its work, but the task before NATO has now changed and broadened, and the organization must be adapted to meet this new task. Political consultation should begin in time, i.e., before questions are already in the public eye, and all member countries, large and small, should use the NATO forum for consultation as early and as frequently as possible. An example of a problem on which consultation would be useful is the anti-western attitude of the Asian and African countries who were represented at the Bandung Conference.

2. Inter-member Disputes. The usefulness of formalising procedures for the settlement of disputes is to be doubted, although there may be certain advantages in such a formalisation. Formal measures for consultation are ineffective unless backed by a genuine desire for agreement. While it is necessary to reinforce NATO as a political forum, there is no point in creating machinery solely with the view of impressing public opinion.

3. The Netherlands is not in favour of NATO's conducting a Political Annual Review, or of the Secretary General's preparing an annual political report.

4. The link with Parliamentarians is still the best approach to public opinion. Recognition of the Parliamentary Conference would make it possible to determine and delimitate the fields to be covered by the Conference. The dangers in giving such formal recognition are recognised, however, and that it may be preferable for NATO to limit itself to giving financial assistance and to making use of Parliamentarians in order to inform public opinion about NATO.
II. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

1. The Netherlands objects to a formalised common NATO policy in other international organizations for the reason that this might lead other countries to think that the NATO countries were "ganging up" against them. There should, however, be informal talks within the NATO Council about the policies to be adopted in such organizations.

2. Countering Soviet economic offensives. NATO should not enter into economic warfare with the Soviet bloc, but the Council could discuss the political aspects of Soviet economic initiatives with serious repercussions for the Alliance.

The proposal that countries abstain from bilateral financial and commercial transactions with the Soviet bloc is unrealistic.

3. Economic co-operation related to defence. The direct economic consequences of the defence effort should be more fully studied. In particular, the Defence Production Committee should be enabled to make more concrete progress than at present on standardisation.

4. Economic Advisory Committee. It would be preferable to increase the personnel of the Secretariat dealing with economic questions, rather than to create a new body.

5. Scientific and technical co-operation. This is already dealt with in other international organizations and the question may be asked: What NATO could usefully do in this field. However, the Netherlands are not opposed to the proposal contained in the Working Paper.

6. The association of Canada and the United States with the OECD. The existing arrangement works satisfactorily, and a more formal association would raise more problems than it would solve.

III. CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

The Council should study the possibility of creating courses of 4 to 6 weeks for teachers, journalists, trade union leaders and others in a position to influence public opinion. The intention is that these courses should take place at the NATO Defence College, which should be expanded by an increase of the civilian elements on the staff.

IV. CO-OPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD

1. In order to facilitate free and frank discussion, little publicity should be given to the discussions in the Permanent Council. At Ministerial Meetings, however, press communiqués should continue to be made.

2. Closer contact between NATO and national information services is desirable.

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.
The Greek Representative made the following points:

I. POLITICAL CONSULTATION

1. Consultations. In view of the changed tactics of the Soviet Union amounting to "peaceful aggression", political consultations have taken on greatly increased importance. Greece agrees with the principles on this subject set out in the Working Paper.

2. Settlement of Disputes. Although the proposal for the settlement of disputes, as contained in the Working Paper, might improve the present situation it has the serious weakness that the proposed measures are not obligatory in character but dependent on the agreement of the parties concerned. It would be preferable to establish an obligatory procedure even if its scope was more modest than the proposals under consideration. Greece, for this reason, had proposed only a Fact Finding Committee the functioning of which would, however, be obligatory. The work of such a Committee would by itself have a strong impact on the parties in a dispute. Greece would furthermore be in favour of arbitration by NATO in all cases provided parties would be bound by the decisions reached by the panel. It is believed that this could be established without the necessity for amending the Treaty (a note developing this argument will be submitted by the Greek Delegation separately).

3. On the other hand, Greece believes that the institution of non-obligatory procedures would weaken rather than strengthen the Alliance, since such machinery would not be used in cases of serious conflict, which would have a bad effect on the prestige of NATO.

II. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

1. Relations with Underdeveloped Countries. While agreeing to the proposals on this subject contained in the Working Paper, Greece is of the opinion that NATO should, in the first place
assist in the economic development of its own member countries. This would strengthen the confidence and the feeling of cohesion in the Alliance. There is a very real danger that otherwise the Soviet Union may try to gain a hold on certain member countries by extensive economic aid which, in particular circumstances, it might be difficult to refuse. Aid to underdeveloped areas outside NATO should be undertaken with the greatest possible caution in view of undesirable political consequences which, in the past, have resulted in certain cases.

III. CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

1. Greece is in favour of all measures designed to strengthen the cultural co-operation in NATO.

IV. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

1. The proposals contained in the Working Paper are acceptable. The authority and the right of initiative of the Secretary General should be increased and it should be left to his judgment and discretion to decide which questions he should bring up for discussion. Member governments should provide the Secretary General and the Political Division with all the documentation they need for their task.

2. Publicity. On the question of publicity to be given to consultations in the Council, no hard and fast rules can be developed. It will have to be decided on a case by case basis how much publicity should be given to the results of a particular discussion.

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.
ENGLISH ONLY
12th September, 1956

REPORT OF THREE

Report on the Consultation with Belgium on Friday, 12th September, 1956, at 10 a.m.

Representatives of Belgium: Mr. P.H. Spaak
Mr. A. de Staercke
Baron J. Papeiane de Morschoven
Baron de Selys Longchamp
Mr. Rothschild

The Belgian Representative made the following points.

I. POLITICAL CO-OPERATION

1. Consultation. While being fully in agreement with the principles of increased political consultation as outlined in the Working Paper, Mr. Spaak objected to the limitations of political consultation contained in sub-paragraphs (3) and (4) of paragraph I (B) of the Working Paper. Countries should not be allowed to refuse consultation on subjects of interest to NATO; on the contrary there should be a moral obligation on the part of all member countries to consult on every question affecting the interests of the Alliance. Furthermore, the non-universal character of NATO should not be used as a pretext to exclude certain subjects from discussion in the Council: the most important political issues in recent years had arisen outside the NATO area. It would be regrettable if the members of the Alliance would co-ordinate their policy only within the artificially established geographical area covered by the Treaty. Although formation of an official NATO bloc in other organizations should be avoided it would be desirable to have preliminary consultations before member countries took definite positions in other organizations on questions of importance for the Alliance.

2. The confidential character of consultations in the NATO Council should be safeguarded. This action depends entirely on the will of the participants.

3. Meetings of Foreign Ministers. Council meetings at Ministerial level would be preferable to mixed meetings of Ministers and Permanent Representatives since only the responsible politicians could in a negotiation come to concrete results.


5. Belgium is not in favour of a Political Annual Review since this would be of too hypothetical a nature.
6. **Conference of Parliamentarians.** Contacts between parliamentarians of different member countries, particularly from the two sides of the Atlantic, should be encouraged but the creation of a new Parliamentary Assembly should be avoided since assemblies without the power of decision create many difficulties. The annual conference in Paris, however, should be continued.

II. **ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION**

1. **Aid to Underdeveloped Countries** should be carefully studied both from its political and from its economic aspects and indiscriminate assistance to countries that may use their strengthened economic position against the interest of those who have assisted them should be avoided. In any case, aid by the West should not wear a NATO label. The political aspects of this subject could, however, well be discussed in NATO before countries determined their policy in this field. In this connection the West should be careful not to be misled by Soviet promises of aid to underdeveloped countries which to a large extent may prove to be nothing but bluff and blackmail.

2. **Trade Relations with the Soviets.** It would not be desirable to adopt a collective trade policy towards the Soviet Union only. On the whole Mr. Spaak thought that the text as now written was too exclusively pointed towards action against the Soviet Union. He thought that in the presentation of the final report it should be avoided.

3. **Association of Canada and the United States in OEEC.** Economic association of Canada and the United States with their European partners would certainly be desirable from a European point of view; this, however, depends on how far the North American countries want to go and it would seem difficult for them to agree to full membership in OEEC.

4. **Scientific and Technical Co-operation**

III. **CULTURAL CO-OPERATION AND INFORMATION ACTIVITIES**

1. Careful distinction should be made between cultural activities on the one hand and information and propaganda on the other. As to the first, it is doubtful whether NATO can do much useful work without duplicating the activities of such organizations as UNESCO. On the other hand, efforts in the fields of information and even propaganda should be very much more developed.

V. **ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS**

1. No changes in the present set-up are required but the proposals for setting up a Committee on Inter-member Disputes or an Arbitration Panel should be further explored.

2. There is no need for the establishment of a Permanent Economic Advisory Committee. It would be preferable to reinforce the economic side of the International Staff if necessary.
The German Representative made the following points:

I. GENERAL

(1) It is essential to ensure real and permanent consultation in the Council as a means towards bringing about the adoption of a common, active, global policy. To this end, the German Government suggests the creation of a "political annual review".

(2) Institutional changes are not in themselves sufficient. Decisions might, however, have to be taken on the competence of the Council. Furthermore, the organization must be adapted to the tasks now facing the Alliance, and the powers of the Secretary General should be strengthened.

Germany emphasises the importance and urgency of settling inter-member disputes. The Secretary General should be empowered and requested to play a more specific and active role. In this respect, Germany would not object to his assuming supranational functions.

(3) The political aspects of economic problems must be recognised, and in this field NATO has a role to play.

II. POLITICAL CO-OPERATION

Political Annual Review.* In the view of the German Government such a review would strengthen among members the feeling of moral responsibility to consult the Council on major questions and leave it to the adoption of a common political line. It would also enable the Council to:

(a) establish the extent to which member countries had lived up to their obligations to consult their Allies;

* A memorandum on this subject was given to members of the Committee.
(b) evaluate the existing situation.
(c) identify main objectives and possibly determine political priorities and targets. The latter should, of course, be flexible and subject to change.
(d) encourage the Alliance to adopt an active policy, thus forcing the Soviet bloc into a defensive position.

Germany believes that if such a review were instituted each country would, before taking any significant action in the international field, examine the possible repercussions on other member countries.

Germany recognises the right of any member to raise for discussion any subject from the point of view of the interests of NATO. Believing that an international organization can only be as effective as its own permanent machinery, Germany suggests that the Secretary General should be entitled to initiate discussions.

Germany agrees that full weight should be given to Council recommendations in arriving at final national decisions and policies. It is suggested that these recommendations could be given to countries as a result of the proposed political annual review.

Germany agrees that governments should, wherever possible, consult with the Council before making any major statement of an international political character which may affect the Alliance. Such consultation should not take the form merely of last minute information, but should be real consultation allowing of the possibility of modification in the policy of that government.

Inter-member disputes. Germany is prepared to accept the obligation to submit disputes for settlement within the NATO framework before resorting to any other international agency.

As regards the establishment of a special Committee of the Council, Germany does not consider that the proposed system of rotation would be practicable.

As regards the establishment of a "panel of Atlantic Community arbitrators", Germany would prefer a solution in which the Secretary General would be an initiator and moving force in reconciling the parties at dispute. Certain discretionary authority should be allowed to the Secretary General. He would not, for example, be obliged to set up a Committee at the request of only one party concerned in a dispute. In addition, Germany considers that a Committee of the Council convened by the Secretary General should be empowered to make substantive recommendations to the countries at dispute.

II. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

Germany agrees with the requirements and limitations set out in the Working Paper.

Germany agrees that NATO should counteract the Soviet bloc offensive in developing the world's underdeveloped areas.
The Soviet bloc tries to bind the underdeveloped countries to it by long-term bilateral agreement. The Western philosophy is that of economic partnership and multilateral agreements. Germany suggested that NATO should counter Soviet tactics and should try to impose on the Soviet bloc the rules of liberal multilateral trade. To achieve this NATO should try to convince the underdeveloped countries that multilateral trade with the Western countries is more advantageous than bilateral links with the economic system of the Eastern bloc.

As regards scientific and technical co-operation, Germany is in favour of the proposed NATO ad hoc conference.

As regards the machinery of economic consultations, the views of Germany are in line with those of the Committee of Three. Germany envisions a Committee of government experts at high level.

As regards public works in the civilian field, Germany is only in favour of NATO undertaking public works in cases where civilian emergency planning is concerned.

III. CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

Germany is not in favour of the proposed establishment of a common research institute for Atlantic Community studies.

IV. CO-OPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD

Germany has had excellent co-operation from the Information Division. Overall co-operation might be facilitated by periodic meetings of the heads of national information services, to exchange views and plans for the future. In this way a kind of public relation planning centre would be created.

As regards broadcasting services, Germany points out that the system in Germany is completely autonomous and not subject to influence by the Federal Government, but in principle, is in favour of the suggestion in the Working Paper.

Germany attaches great importance to information problems in relation to non-member countries generally, and supports the suggestion that the question should be studied.

V. ORGANIZATION OF FUNCTIONS

Germany considers that frequent meetings of the Council should be with the participation of national officials, e.g., permanent heads of foreign ministries. Such meetings would accustom officials in their daily work to bear in mind the need for consultation.

As regards the proposal for a "state of the Alliance", progress reports by the Secretary General, Germany notes that this is in line with the German proposal for a political annual review, but that it would in fact represent only the first state of such a review.
Report on the Consultation with Luxembourg on Monday, 17th September 1956, at 10 a.m.

The LUXEMBOURG REPRESENTATIVE made the following points:

Opening General Remarks

In spite of the new problems which the changed international situation has posed, NATO's primary objective should remain the security of its members. A reduction in arms or a retreat of troops from the Continent would have disastrous political effects. The Soviet threat remains, but is now psychologically more dangerous than before. The Organization should beware of following too many diversified aims, which would weaken its effectiveness in countering the Soviet threat. Luxembourg doubts whether the political and economic potential of the Alliance could be increased by structural reforms within the Organization.

I. POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS

Luxembourg is in general agreement with the proposals put forward. As regards inter-member disputes, Luxembourg would not oppose the creation of the machinery proposed, but is sceptical as to its effectiveness. Experience has shown that the essential factor in the settlement of inter-member disputes is the will of the countries concerned to bring these matters before NATO for settlement. If machinery is set up which fails in its purpose, or which is not used by member countries, this would weaken the authority of NATO.

II. ECONOMIC CONSULTATION

Luxembourg considers that NATO should not become an operating agency in the economic sphere, and that NATO's economic role should be confined to discussing the military and political implications of economic problems. It would be useful to have NATO support for European integration in the economic sphere; the development of a common European market would create a natural community of interests and a solidarity which would prevent the Soviets from exploiting discords between western countries.
III. CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

Luxembourg is in general agreement with the proposals put forward, and particularly emphasises that instruction on NATO should be given in schools.

IV. CO-OPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD

Luxembourg considers that the more NATO can achieve in the information sphere the better. NATO should aim at maintaining continuous contact with youth movements and private organizations, who should be used to spread information about NATO.

V. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

Luxembourg is in general agreement with the proposals put forward, and considers that the present organizational structure is adequate. Luxembourg would agree that the Secretary General should have the right to propose items for NATO consultation, and would support the idea of a political annual review.
Report on the Consultation with France on Monday, 17th September, 1956 at 11 a.m.

Representatives of France: Mr. C. Pineau
Mr. A. Parodi

In the absence of Mr. Lange and Mr. Martino, Mr. Boyesen and Mr. Alessandrinii represented Norway and Italy on the Committee of Three.

I. POLITICAL CONSULTATION

1. France agrees generally with the requirements for consultation suggested by the Committee of Three. Member governments should inform the Council of any developments in their policies which may significantly affect member countries or the Alliance as a whole. In order, however, that this information may be used effectively, certain modifications will be necessary in the operation of the organization, as proposed below.

2. France recognises the right of any country to raise for discussion any subject of interest to NATO, but suggests that the Secretariat, reinforced if necessary, should examine whether a subject is of sufficient interest to the Alliance as a whole, for discussion.

3. France agrees that, wherever possible, member countries should not adopt firm policies on matters of common concern without early advance consultation. Similarly, countries should consult with the Council wherever possible before making any major statement likely to affect the Alliance as a whole.

4. While recognising the non-universal character of NATO, this limitation should not be given too definite an interpretation, and France would not exclude the possibility of discussion within NATO of world-wide problems concerning all the members of the Alliance.

5. Peaceful settlement of disputes. France notes that experience has shown that disputes may arise which it is difficult to settle within NATO. France considers that the proposed special Committee of the Council, and the "Panel of Atlantic Community Arbitrators", would be useful, provided that their functions and the nature of the questions which might be brought before them are clearly defined. The Panel should be presided by the Secretary General, and its primary rôle should be one of conciliation. Only major questions which might affect the unity of the Alliance should be referred to it, and it should be composed of countries not involved in the dispute. In the last resort it should refer to the Council. Only political questions and not purely legal disputes should be submitted to this procedure, the latter belonging to the competence of the International Court of Justice.
6. As regards disputes involving one or more member countries vis-à-vis a non-NATO country, NATO should only be associated with the settlement of such disputes if this appears politically desirable.

7. As regards parliamentary associations, France considers that there should be no formal relationship, but that practical arrangements should be made for liaison with the Council.

II. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

1. Subject to the comments below, closer economic co-operation would be of great use to NATO at this stage. France endorses recognition of NATO common economic interests on the lines suggested by the Committee of Three.

2. Economic consultation. It is essential to avoid duplication of work by NATO and the OEEC; NATO should discuss only those economic questions which have important political aspects. The examples given in paragraph II (B) are excellent. As regards the development of atomic power, a decision has still to be taken on the relative fields of responsibility of different international organizations which have been set up in this field, before a decision on NATO's activities is taken.

3. Conflicts in Economic Policies. Here again it should be noted that certain conflicts in economic policies may have to be settled within other organizations, such as the OEEC, or GATT, though there should be continuous exchanges of information within NATO.

4. Relations with underdeveloped areas. France agrees that NATO should not become an operating agency for administering programmes of economic aid. There should, however, be discussion in the Council, with the object of adopting a common NATO line in other international organizations. The general policy to be followed with respect to underdeveloped areas should be also discussed (example: the cancellation by Indonesia of its debt to the Netherlands). Other subjects for discussion would be the construction of great works for civilian use, and the policy to be followed regarding the disposal of surpluses of raw materials.

5. Soviet economic developments and initiatives. France emphasises that it is not enough in this sphere to attempt to counter Soviet initiatives; NATO must itself take the initiative and by means of discussion evolve a positive common policy in order to demonstrate to the world and, in particular, to underdeveloped countries, that the initiatives of the West are better.

6. As regards relations with other organizations, while there should be no attempt to create a "NATO bloc" in organizations composed wholly of free countries, it is desirable to evolve as far as possible a common NATO line in other international organizations. Positive, and not merely counteracting, policies should be adopted in international organizations in which the Soviets participate.

7. Scientific and technical co-operation. France is in favour of convening a conference at a high level on the lines proposed, provided that a clearly defined agenda is drawn up. The conference should study general organizational problems, and should then possibly be succeeded by sub-groups to study particular technical aspects. It may be necessary to set up a documentation centre for technical information.
8. NATO machinery for economic consultations. France supports the establishment of an Economic Advisory Committee, which might act as a filter for the exchange of economic information among member countries recommended above. Meetings of high officials would also be commendable provided the agenda for such meetings cover specific points.

III. CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

1. The proposal for the establishment of a Common Research Institute is an interesting one, but its functions and subjects of study should be more clearly defined. It would also be useful to broaden the basis of the NATO Defence College as suggested, provided that suitable precautions are taken to safeguard the security element involved.

2. Exchange of persons. Here again, the division of responsibility between NATO and the OECD should be respected.

IV. CO-OPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD

1. France would support a strengthening of the NATO Information Services, and improved liaison with national information services. It is obvious that some difficulties will have to be overcome, for example, national information services vary from country to country in their degree of dependence from national governments.

2. Great care should be exercised in granting financial aid to private organizations supporting NATO.

3. Information problems in relation to the Soviet bloc. France considers that NATO should review its information policy in relation to the Soviet bloc, and should develop a positive, instead of a defensive, propaganda line.

V. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

France considers this part of the document to be the most interesting. NATO can play a more important role in the future, provided the structure of the organization is reinforced. The following three proposals are put forward:

(1) It is essential that foreign ministers should participate more frequently in regular Council meetings. Where a Council meeting with attendance of foreign ministers is planned, all foreign ministers should attend, unless exceptional circumstances prevent them.

(2) The authority of permanent representatives should be increased. At present permanent representatives do not have the authority which, for example, United Nations government representatives have.

(3) The authority of the Secretary General should be increased, on the lines of the Secretary General of the United Nations.

As regards the proposal for a political annual review, France would support such a review, provided the subjects it covered were carefully selected in order that the discussion at ministerial meetings should cover precisely defined questions.
ENGLISH ONLY
19th September, 1956

COMMITTEE OF THREE

Report on the Consultation with the United States on Monday, 17th September, 1956, at 3 p.m.

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES

Senator George
Mr. Holmes
Mr. Perkins
Mr. Nolting

The United States Representative made the following points:

Opening General Remarks

The United States believes there is an urgent need for increased unity of purpose and action among the nations of the Atlantic Community. This need can be met within the scope of the present NATO treaty and of other existing organizations within the Atlantic area, provided that all member countries are dedicated to finding better ways for obviating dissensions among themselves and to bringing their foreign policies into a larger degree of harmony. The United States will cooperate to impart new vigour to the institutions of the NATO Community through consultation and common action, and to develop a closer association of free nations to meet the demands of situations which transcend the capacity of each government acting singly. At the same time, the United States cannot ignore the vital interests and responsibilities which it and certain other members have outside the Atlantic Area; the fulfilment of these responsibilities, which may involve treaty obligations or impose occasional need for emergency action, must not be hampered by exclusive involvement in NATO commitments.

I. POLITICAL CO-OPERATION

1. Consultation in general. The United States would welcome a wider range of topics for discussion among the Atlantic Pact partners and more authoritative consultations. It believes that the precise scope and nature of consultation will best develop on a pragmatic basis, and that it would be inadvisable to attempt to formulate rigid rules to govern the conduct of consultations. The United States proposes that the existing arrangements for consultation in the NATO Council be supplemented by providing for a new type of occasional consultations conducted by representatives ("Ministerial Delegates") who have high rank and influence within their respective governments who are intimately acquainted with governmental policies and the considerations underlying these policies, and who are therefore particularly qualified to discuss a wide range of common problems with both knowledge and authority. (A more detailed description of this proposal has been submitted to the Committee of Three.)
2. The United States favours the principle of an open agenda, and would not exclude from consideration any topic in which NATO members feel a substantial interest, though NATO should concern itself primarily with problems directly affecting the Treaty Area. The extent to which NATO members might seek to progress from a simple exchange of views to efforts to achieve co-ordinated or unified policies can be expected to emerge in the course of each consultation.

3. As regards the requirements for consultation by member governments, the United States is opposed to trying to define precisely those matters on which NATO consultations should be held, and the scope, depth and timing of such consultations. The United States hopes that the final report of the Committee of Three will be couched in terms which are less rigid than in their working paper, and that the limitations on consultation will be more directly linked to the requirements.

4. Settlement of disputes. It is better that inter-member disputes should be settled within the NATO family, rather than be allowed to go to other forums such as the United Nations, NATO itself does not now possess adequate procedural arrangements for the settlement of disputes between members. Arrangements should be made for informal machinery to deal with disputes from the moment that they arise. Such arrangements should apply to possible future disputes, and not to current ones, unless the members involved so choose. The proposed Special Committee of the Council should have the right to take the initiative in approaching member governments involved in the dispute. The Secretary General should be an ex-officio member of the Committee. The Panel of Arbitrators should consist of people of the highest reputation whose prestige would incite parties to have recourse to arbitrators. The United States feels that if machinery exists for the settlement of disputes, member countries will be more inclined to bring their disputes to NATO than if no such machinery exists.

5. Parliamentary Associations. The present relation between NATO and parliamentary associations should be continued. The United States would not be opposed to NATO granting a small subsidy to the annual Parliamentary Conference in cases where it was not possible for the NATO Secretariate to provide the Conference with services such as translation. The appropriation granted by the U.S. Congress for the NATO Parliamentary Committee might, however, help in the solution of this problem.

6. As regards the proposed political annual review, the United States considers that this proposal merits further study. It is complementary to the United States' proposal for an annual "state of the Alliance" report by the Secretary General, which was meant to be not only factual but also critical, and was to include a preview of the immediate future for the purpose of discussion by the Council. This might have a persuasive influence on member governments' policies, and help NATO governments to proceed beyond the consultative stage to the evolution of a common policy consistent with their Treaty obligations. The report might also serve the purpose of adequate detailed preparation of the agenda for ministerial meetings.
II. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

1. NATO should not become an operating economic agency, but should limit itself to consultation concerning the economic policies of member countries in other international agencies, particularly with reference to the Communist bloc and to the underdeveloped countries of the free world.

2. The interchange of information and views mentioned in paragraph II(b) should be limited to those cases in which results achieved in other organizations do not adequately cover the political aspects of interest to the Alliance. Paragraph II(B) should refer to a common policy rather than to a common course of action.

3. Scientific and technical co-operation. The problem of scientific and technical co-operation is closely linked with the educational requirements of the Atlantic Community. The proposed Conference should have a free hand in considering these requirements.

III. CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

1. Co-operation in this field is mainly a function of private organizations and groups rather than of governments. Governments should concern themselves with cultural, scientific and educational activities to the degree that such action seems necessary to stimulate private initiative or to achieve paramount common objectives as, for instance, the preservation of the West's scientific and technological superiority. Specific NATO projects should be judged strictly in terms of their essentiality and feasibility; they should not be conceived as ends in themselves, but as ancillary to the major political purposes of the Alliance.

2. The United States is opposed to broadening the basis of the NATO Defence College, since it feels that this would defeat the primary purpose of the College, which is to train important government officials. The United States would, however, support a civilian college alongside, and independent of, the Defence College, which would provide short courses for, e.g., teachers and journalists.

3. As regards youth organizations, the United States is in favour of holding meetings for the leaders of such organizations, but not of mass meetings.

IV. CO-OPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD

1. There is need for a wider exchange of information throughout the Atlantic area. Co-operation in this field should also be directed toward countering Communist propaganda.

2. The United States agrees that NATO should aim at co-ordinating the policies to be adopted by broadcasting services on issues of common concern to NATO.

V. ORGANIZATIONS AND FUNCTIONS

1. The policy of sending expert advisers to Council meetings, to assist the permanent representatives or to serve on ad hoc working groups, should be expanded.
2. It would be useful to have individual exchanges of military personnel among NATO, ANZUS, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact countries in order that they might better appreciate their common aims. These exchanges should in each case be limited to a few officers only.

3. The establishment of a formal relationship between NATO and the United Nations is unnecessary and undesirable.
ENGLISH ONLY
20th September, 1956

COMMITTEE OF THREE

Report on the consultation with Portugal on Monday, 17th September, 1956 at 5 p.m.

Representatives of Portugal: Mr. T. Cunha
Count de Tovar
Mr. A. Novais Machado
Mr. J. de Freitas-Cruz

The Portuguese Representative made the following points:

I. POLITICAL CO-OPERATION

1. Consultation. Whilst being in favour of increased political consultations within NATO, Mr. Cunha felt that this could be useful only if consultations were conducted with complete mutual confidence in the safeguarding of secrecy. Furthermore, member countries would need the assurance that political consultation would not result in any curtailing of national liberty of action. He believed that when the issue was of direct concern to one member country no consultation should be initiated without the consent of this country. If a reluctant country were under legal obligation to accept consultation on the matter at hand, the necessary spirit of confidence would be lacking and the object of the exercise would be defeated.

2. With reference to II(4) of the working paper, Mr. Cunha felt that matters outside the geographical area of NATO should not be excluded from discussion in the Council, but that with respect to such matters greater flexibility should be preserved, and consultation should only be undertaken after careful consideration.

3. Reliance should be placed on the free will of governments to accept consultation and on the practical development of consultations; the setting up of firm rules should be avoided.

4. On inter-member disputes, Mr. Cunha expressed agreement on II(3) of the working paper. On (2) he stated that generally speaking his Government was not in favour of the establishment of new intricate machinery. However, he would not object to providing for some very simple organ such as a special good offices committee of the Council. He would not object either to the setting up of a panel of arbitrators provided this was co-ordinated with existing bilateral panels. On (4) he was unable to express agreement without further consultation with his colleagues on the Portuguese Government and further clarification of the obligations NATO would undertake in connection with the implementation or maintenance of the settlement.

5. The Portuguese Government is not in favour of formal recognition of the Parliamentary Conference.
II. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

6. Portugal is in general agreement with this section of the working paper. However, concrete projects should not be handled by NATO but efforts should be directed towards the co-ordination of economic policies of member countries. The establishment within NATO of a permanent economic organ should be avoided; this would tend to bring about a degree of overlapping with OEEC. Nevertheless, it might be useful for a group of experts within NATO to prepare the work in advance of economic consultation.

7. It would be extremely useful to undertake a study on the present situation as regards the recruitment, training and utilisation of scientists and technicians.

III. CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

8. The Portuguese Government was in agreement with the working paper in this connection except as regards the promotion of closer relations with youth organizations.

V. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

9. The activity of the Secretary General could indeed be developed, but his present status should be maintained. Mr. Cunha was unable to express an opinion as to the proposals in the working paper for enhancing the role of the Secretary General and for changing his status to that of president of the Council also at ministerial meetings. He would report to his Government and reply shortly.
ENGLISH ONLY
20th September, 1956

NATO CONFIDENTIAL
SUMMARY RECORD
CT-3/13

COMMITTEE OF THREE

Report on the Consultation with Denmark on
Tuesday, 18th September, 1956, at 10 a.m.

Representatives of Denmark: Mr. Christiansen
Mr. Wassard
Mr. Sandager Jeppesen
Mr. Hesselund Jensen

The Danish Representatives made the following points:

I. POLITICAL CO-OPERATION

1. Consultation. Denmark approves in general the principles

   2. With regard to the settlement of inter-member disputes,
      Denmark questions whether the Alliance could bear the strain if it
      were to become a regular forum for such disputes. It would be
      preferable to rely on the amiable spirit existing in the Council.
      The Council should only intervene in inter-member disputes at the
      request of the parties involved and no fixed rules of procedure
      should be set up. Denmark agrees, however, that disputes should
      be submitted to NATO before being brought to the United Nations, and
      would also be favourable to the Secretary General taking the initia-
      tive to try to conciliate in disputes between members.

   3. The proposed Political Annual Review is an interesting
      idea and the Danish Government would like to think further about it.

   4. The importance of the role of Parliamentarians is realised
      and the contact with them should be improved but their conference
      should not be given formal recognition. On the other hand, Denmark
      would agree that the Secretary General assist their meetings as much
      as possible and even to a certain extent financially.

II. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

   1. NATO should not take up economic questions as a new
      function independent from its political and military task. It would
      have a bad effect on public opinion if it were announced that NATO
      had taken on certain economic functions and that afterwards this
      proved to be an empty shell. But Denmark would approve of NATO
      discussing important economic questions with political and military
      implications. It should be publicly stated, however, that NATO is
      not to become an operative agency in the economic field.

   2. There would be no useful purpose in meetings of officials
      dealing with East/West trade, but the political aspects of this trade
      might well be discussed by the Council. A closer contact between
The NATO Secretariat and COCOM could also be envisaged. Political aspects of COCOM's work could well be discussed in NATO but should be limited to general principles of policy and not go into details.

3. Denmark is not in favour of setting up an Economic Advisory Committee but stresses that any country should be able to take up economic questions of importance in its relations with other member countries. An example is the question of civil aviation, which could also take on strategic importance in wartime. Strengthening the Secretariat to enable it to act as a "watchdog" to follow discussion in other organizations might be envisaged, although Denmark would not be enthusiastic about such a measure.

4. Denmark is in favour of the proposals contained in the Working Paper concerning technical education.

III. CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

1. If the Danish/Norwegian proposal for a common research institute for Atlantic Community studies is not accepted, the task of the NATO Defence College might be extended, but in that case the NATO Defence College would have to be placed under the authority of the Council instead of the Standing Group, as at present.

2. Denmark is strongly in favour of increasing contacts between Youth Organizations, in particular between the two sides of the Atlantic.

IV. INFORMATION

1. The proposals contained in the Working Paper are acceptable. Denmark stresses, however, that propaganda should be left to the individual governments and that NATO's rôle should be limited to serving national governments for this purpose.

V. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

1. The power of initiative of the Secretary General should be in no way restricted. His rôle in political consultation should be strengthened.

2. Denmark is in favour of meetings of Foreign Ministers to be held in other capitals provided such meetings do not entail very great expense.

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.
ENGLISH ONLY
21st September, 1956

COMMITTEE OF THREE

Report on the consultation with the United Kingdom on Tuesday, 18th September, 1956, at 2.30 p.m.

Representatives of United Kingdom: Mr. Anthony Nutting
Lord Hood
Mr. Stevenson
Mr. Cheetham

The Representatives of the United Kingdom made the following points:

I. POLITICAL CO-OPERATION

NATO should never lose sight of, or apologise for the fact that it is primarily a military Alliance. However, an improvement is needed in the political consultation and in the economic co-operation in NATO, particularly with regard to its relations with the Soviet bloc. It is preferable, however, to develop the habit of consultation rather than to set up machinery for it.

2. The work of the Council should be developed. Permanent Representatives should regard their position as similar to that of Ministers in a Cabinet. They should continuously report to NATO the policies of their governments, whenever possible before these policies have taken definite shape. The proposal of a meeting of "Ministerial Delegates" should not be followed since it would lead to a depreciation of the Council. On the other hand, the Permanent Representatives should be kept fully informed and in very close touch with developments in their home countries.

3. The requirement set forth in paragraph I(8) can be followed only insofar as possible, i.e. not in an emergency, particularly one arising in an area outside NATO. The principle of the open agenda contained in I(3) is fully acceptable.

4. The limitations on the requirements for consultation are very important and should be studied in close connection with those requirements.

5. With respect to the settlement of disputes, the United Kingdom would hesitate to agree definitely to the idea that such disputes should be brought to NATO before being submitted to other international organizations. In general, this would be acceptable but there might very well be exceptions to this rule. The proposed conciliation committee is not seen with much favour. In particular, the United Kingdom objects to the proposal that this Committee...
would have the right "to take cognisance" of disputes. There does not seem to be the need for a special committee since the Council could in any case discuss disputes between member countries with the consent of the parties involved. It would be bad to create the impression that machinery was being set up to do more than NATO can in fact do. The United Kingdom equalled objects to the setting up of a panel of arbitrators; arbitration should only be applied in legal disputes and these do not primarily belong to the competence of NATO.

6. The United Kingdom is in favour of close contact between NATO and Parliamentarians but is definitely opposed to the setting up of a consultative parliamentary assembly.

7. The "Political Annual Review" is considered a very interesting proposition which deserves further study. Its contents should not be made too complicated and subjects should be selected which could be fully and leisurely studied during the next year. An example would be a study on the political situation in the Middle East.

II. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

The United Kingdom is in general agreement with the proposals contained in the Working Paper.

2. It is stressed that aid to underdeveloped countries should never bear a NATO label.

3. The proposal contained in paragraph V(B) that there be periodic meetings of officials involved in Soviet bloc commercial negotiations is considered to be of doubtful value since these officials would presumably not be competent to discuss the political implications of such negotiations.

4. On the subject of technical education, the United Kingdom prefers to withhold its judgement to a later date.

5. The setting up of an Economic Advisory Committee would not appear to be advisable as there would be a danger of overlapping between this Committee and OEEC. The United Kingdom would not be opposed, however, to a Committee of experts with adaptable personnel which could be called together whenever the need arose.

III. CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

The United Kingdom would be in favour of broadening the NATO Defence College.

2. No solution has yet been found for the foreign exchange difficulties connected with trans-Atlantic travel.

3. The possibility of an exchange of service personnel is being studied in the United Kingdom and it is hoped that a contribution to this undertaking can be made.
IV. INFORMATION

The United Kingdom is much in favour of the proposals in the Working Paper aiming at a better co-ordination of information activities.

V. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

As it would be difficult to hold more Ministerial Meetings than is the habit at present, it would be preferable for foreign ministers to attend meetings of the Council in Permanent Session from time to time. Express obligations should not be established in this connection. It is very important, however, that more time should be devoted to meetings of the Council in Ministerial Session and that the discussions should be more adequately prepared.

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.