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Part 1
Chapter 2
by
Lord Ismay
Secretary General
of NATO
(1952-1957)
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The North
Atlantic Treaty
The North Atlantic Treaty (1) is a short
document which expresses the practical resolution and the idealism of
the nations which have signed it. By its terms they have pledged themselves,
in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, to maintain international
peace and security and to promote stability and well-being in the North
Atlantic area.
Link
with the United Nations Charter
The Treaty was written within the framework of the United
Nations Charter and was based on Article 51 of Chapter VII which stipulates:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member
of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken
by members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order
to maintain and restore international peace and security.
This article was included in the Charter on the proposal of the United
States who wished the fundamental right of self-defence to be specifically
expressed. All states possess this 'inherent' right, whether members
of the United Nations or not: it is important to remember this since
two of the NATO countries, Italy and Portugal, are not members of the
United Nations. Furthermore, it was pointed out by one of the United
States delegates at the San Francisco Conference, Senator Vandenberg,
that a community of interests could exist between nations not situated
in the same geographic area, and that the Charter should sanction the
establishment of such communities, which may not be strictly 'Regional
Arrangements', as provided under Article 53 of Chapter VIII of the Charter.
The failure to distinguish between associations of nations linked by
a community of interests on the one hand, and the regional associations
determined primarily by geographic considerations on the other, has
led to misunderstanding in the past, and is still the cause of some
confusion. The distinction is that under the Charter measures of self-defence,
whether individual or collective, do not require the prior authorisation
of the Security Council, while, on the other hand, enforcement actions
by regional agencies (as contemplated under Article 53 of Chapter VIII)
do require this authorisation. The Atlantic Treaty provides insurance
against a situation which the Security Council might be unable to control,
but it in no manner impugns the Council's authority. It recognises (in
Article 7) 'the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the
maintenance of international peace and security', and it states (in
Article 5) that any measures taken by the NATO countries as the result
of an armed attack upon them 'shall be terminated when the Security
Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international
peace and security'.
It is thought unnecessary in this survey to embark on a detailed analysis
of the North Atlantic Treaty. This is more properly a task for international
lawyers. On the other hand, a brief commentary on the practical effects
of some of the more important articles of the Treaty may serve as a
useful introduction to the story of NATO.
The
essential clause
Let us look first at Article 5. This is the core. By
its terms 'the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more
of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against
them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack
occurs, each of them... will assist the Party or Parties so attacked
by taking forthwith... such action as it deems necessary, including
the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the
North Atlantic area'.
There is a wealth of meaning behind those short, simple phrases. They
make clear to any would-be aggressor that his attack would be met by
the combined resistance of all the member states. They mean that the
United States has in set terms abandoned its traditional peacetime isolationism
from the affairs of Europe and has linked its fate to that of the free
countries of Europe for mutual self-defence. Article 5 also means that
some of the European countries have abandoned the habit of mind which
in the past led them to refrain up to the last moment from committing
themselves in advance to joint defence policies.
The formal obligation under Article 5 of the Treaty is to take action
- individually and in concert - but the kind of action is left to the
judgment of each member state in relation to the facts of the situation.
Speaking to the United States Senate on the 6th July, 1949, Senator
Vandenberg defined the obligation this way: 'The pledge dependably means
that whoever is attacked will have dependable allies who will do their
dependable part, by constitutional process, as swiftly as possible to
defeat the aggressor by whatever means it deems necessary'.
Mutual
aid and consultation
But a promise to stand together in the event of an armed
attack is no real deterrent to an aggressor unless it is backed by armed
strength. There lies the reason for Article 3 of the Treaty, which provides
that 'the Parties separately and jointly, by means of continuous and
effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their
individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack'.
The expression 'mutual aid' requires explanation. It was intended by
the negotiators of the Treaty to mean the contribution by each state,
taking into account its geographic location, resources and economic
capabilities, of such mutual aid as it could reasonably be expected
to furnish in whatever form it would be most effective - for instance,
manpower, productive capacity, logistical facilities or military equipment.
It was not very long before it became obvious that collective capacity
to resist armed attack could not be effectively developed unless there
were unity of command, unified planning and uniformity of military training,
procedure and, as far as possible, equipment. And so it came about that
by the end of 1950, sovereign states were to entrust their forces to
international commanders, assisted by international staffs. Never in
history have the principles of alliance been carried to such a pitch
in time of peace.
The mutual guarantees provided by Articles 3 and 5 are strengthened
by Article 4, under which the Parties undertake to consult whenever
one of them considers that there is a threat to the territorial integrity,
political independence or security of any of them. This Article provides
for consultation before an armed attack has taken place. It applies
if the security of one or more of the NATO countries is threatened.
The
NATO area
The NATO area is defined in Article 6 (as amended after
Greece and Turkey joined NATO, by Article II of the Greece-Turkey Protocol).
It provides that Article 5 would come into force in case of an armed
attack:
-
on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or
North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory
of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties
in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
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on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the
Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe
in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on
the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea
or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer'. As has
already been pointed out, NATO is not a regional organization in the
strict sense of the term. Nor is the NATO area a geographical entity,
since by no means all the countries border on the North Atlantic or
its inlets. To quote a legal expert on the Treaty: 'Insofar as there
is a regional character at all in the North Atlantic Treaty, it lies
in common interest in the peace and security of a certain area, and
not necessarily in the possession of territory within a certain area
( 2).
Organizational
clauses
In Article 9 provision is made for creating machinery to plan defence
and assist the NATO countries to fulfil their Treaty obligations.
This Article establishes a North Atlantic Council on which each member
state is represented, so organized as to be able to meet promptly
at any time' and empowered to 'set up such subsidiary bodies' as may
be necessary to implement the terms of the Treaty. In view of the
novel character of the experiment on which the Parties had embarked,
and the consequent absence of any precedents which could be taken
as a guide, this machinery has had to be evolved step by step in the
light of experience.
It is to be noted from Article 10 that membership of the North Atlantic
Alliance is not exclusive. This Article says that any European state
may be invited to join the Treaty if all the members agree that it
is in a position to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic
area. It was under this provision that invitations were extended to
Greece and Turkey in 1951.
Articles 12 and 13 deal with the duration of the Treaty and its review.
In point of fact, no definite term is laid down, but it is provided
that after twenty years, i.e. in 1969, any Party may withdraw from
the Treaty by giving one year's notice of its intention to do so.
The idea of the member governments was that the Treaty should last
as long as it was useful and that from co-operation for defence should
develop a durable co-operation in wider fields of human endeavour.
Broader
aims
From what has been said above, it might be thought that the Treaty
is exclusively a military alliance. This is not the case. It is, of
course, true that the Treaty was born of collective insecurity and
that the energies of the Treaty Powers have hitherto been primarily
directed to strengthening their collective defence against aggression.
Nevertheless, the Preamble and the first two articles of the Treaty
make it crystal clear that the member countries believe they belong
to a community of nations within which co-operation should be developed
not only for defence, but in all fields. In the Preamble, they affirm
'their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments',
and in Article 1, to abide by the principles of the Charter and to
refrain from the use of force in any way not consistent with the purposes
of the United Nations.
Article 2 proclaims the will of the Parties to strengthen their free
institutions and promote conditions 'of stability and well-being'.
Peace is not merely the absence of war: its maintenance requires continuous
co-operation by governments in the economic, social and cultural as
well as in the military field.
Some member governments attached great importance to the inclusion
in the Treaty of a positive provision of this kind. The purpose of
a North Atlantic association, said Mr. St. Laurent as early as April,
1948, 'would not be merely negative. It would create the dynamic counter-attraction
to Communism - the dynamic attraction of a free, prosperous and progressive
society, as opposed to the totalitarian and reactionary society of
the Communist world (3). The steps that have been
and are being taken to implement Article 2 are described in Chapter
XIV.
Conclusion
When five years ago the Foreign Ministers of the founder
countries met in Washington to sign the North Atlantic Treaty, they
started an experiment in international relations unprecedented in
peacetime. The Treaty has become the framework for the common defence
of over 380 million people on both sides of the Atlantic. Is it going
too far to claim that if any comparable arrangement had existed in
1914 or 1939, the history of the twentieth century would have taken
another course, and the world would have been spared the carnage and
waste of two world wars?
- For the text of the Treaty see Annex A, page 17 and for the text
of the Protocol on the accession of Greece and Turkey see Annex B, page
20.
- Sir W. Eric Beckett: 'The North Atlantic Treaty,
the Brussels Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations' p. 30.
- Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1948, IV, 3449.
- For the full text of the Vandenberg Resolution
see Appendix III, page 171.
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