NATO Archives

Much of this survey has been devoted to the measures which have been and are being taken to build up the armed strength of the Alliance; but, as bitter experience has shown, modern war is not merely a matter for soldiers, sailors and airmen. The armed forces are, in fact, only the cutting edge of a mechanism which involves every single national activity. The skill of the Commanders, the valour of the troops, the excellence of their equipment will be of no avail if the home front cracks.

Prior to the First World War, there was no need for governments in time of peace to make extensive preparations for the stability of the home front. Since then, however, the total character of modem war, the dependence of armed forces on a continuous and high level of industrial production, the development of the submarine and mine, the advent of air power, and the dislocation caused by war to national economies, have brought the effects of war into the homes and working places of every single individual. Moreover, the dependence of nations at war on imported food, petrol and raw materials, many of which are often scarce and difficult to transport in wartime, makes it imperative for partners in any modem alliance to work together in the civilian field and thus to ensure the best possible distribution of these commodities amongst themselves, in order to feed their peoples and to maintain their industrial effort.

The members of the North Atlantic Alliance are pledged to 'maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack'. (1) In view of what has been said earlier in this survey, it is clear that this pledge will not be fully redeemed unless plans and preparations are made in peacetime by all member nations and, where necessary, jointly by nations, for the organization and protection of the civil population and for the direction of civilian activities in time of war. If the transition from peace to war is mishandled or carried out without proper co-ordination among governments, civilians may go short of food, their confidence in their leaders will be shaken, armament production will be impeded, and dislocation of the economic system may give rise to social unrest. Chaos can be caused by attacks from the air, and the side whose home front fails to stand the strain is lost.

Accordingly, it is the duty of all member governments to make plans and preparations to overcome the problems which might arise in the civilian field in time of war, and to make certain that, in parallel with the military build-up, the home front is prepared for all eventualities.

It is obviously impossible to work out in advance a complete master plan for all the action which would have to be undertaken in the civilian field by NATO as a whole, and by each individual member government, on the outbreak of war. Nevertheless, it is the duty of the Council to indicate to member governments the fields where action is both necessary and possible, and to make recommendations which are based on a firm and universally accepted concept of the purposes and techniques of preparing the civilian front.

In undertaking this work NATO provides a forum for the exchange of information and so enables countries with little experience of these problems to learn from those which have much. It can also judge whether each member government is doing all that it can, and if it is not doing so, stimulate it to do more. In addition, it ensures that separate national plans do not conflict with, but support, each other.

The measures that have been, and are being, taken by NATO, particularly in the fields of civil defence, refugees and evacuees, transport, both maritime and inland, and wartime commodity problems are summarised in the paragraphs that follow.

Civil organization in time of war

The last war proved that the existence of good civil defence arrangements can do a great deal to minimise the material damage of air attack and to sustain the morale, not only of the civilian populations, but also of their anxious relatives in the fighting line. Since then, the addition of the atom and hydrogen bombs to the terrifying and destructive power of the armouries of modem nations makes the provision of adequate protection against, and organization to deal with, air attack of even greater importance. Everything possible must be done to minimise the casualties and damage which can be created on an unprecedented scale by atomic bombardment due to blast, heat-flash, gamma radiation and residual radioactivity.

To meet these dangers, governments must take steps well in advance of an attack to provide shelters, to train mobile columns, fire fighters, rescue workers, decontamination squads, and to plan emergency medical services and feeding arrangements.

Many of us have vivid memories of the extent to which military operations in the last war were impeded, and indeed frustrated, by the unorganized movement of panic-stricken civilians fleeing from the enemy. Who can doubt that plans must be made in advance, in consultation with the military authorities, for the control of the movement of all civilian populations likely to find themselves in the areas of hostilities?

Fifth Column activities are another danger to be guarded against. In the event of Soviet aggression the danger of such activities would probably be even greater than in World War II. There are in every country important installations such as bridges, docks, munition factories and oil refineries which are vulnerable to sabotage. The most vital of these must clearly have special protection in time of war and the necessary arrangements for their protection must be made in advance. The problems of this nature which would face governments at the outbreak of war can be multiplied almost indefinitely.

One of the first acts of the Council after the move to Paris was to set up a Committee on Civil Organization in Time of War. The preliminary studies of this Committee led it to give priority to two problems: the defence of the civilian population and of their homes and work places from air attack; and the organization of refugees and evacuees. Accordingly, they set up a Civil Defence Committee and a Committee on Refugees and Evacuees, both composed of experts in their respective fields. In addition, a Special Civil Defence Committee was created to provide a forum in which the experts of NATO member governments can meet those from the Federal Republic of Western Germany to exchange ideas on civil defence matters in which there is a common interest.(2)

The information which has been collected is being sifted and edited and will be issued to governments in the form of handbooks. Two civil defence experts have been engaged to work full time on these and analogous problems.

NATO's task in the civil defence field is to ensure that all governments are aware of the most modem techniques in defending their civilian populations against air attack; to underline those problems which can be best solved by mutual co-operation and arrangements between neighbouring countries; and to ensure that the civilian and military authorities work closely together. The Civil Defence Committee has found that in some countries planning is far advanced and significant practical steps have been taken; in others, that governments, beset by financial difficulties and handicapped by lack of technical and practical knowledge, have made very little headway in making the necessary preparations.

Some of the measures which should be taken, such as the construction of air raid shelters, cost money. Most countries can ill afford this additional expenditure since money spent on such expensive projects must often be at the expense of the military build-up. On the other hand, there are many civil defence measures which can be taken at very small cost: for example the training of first-aid workers, fire fighters and home guards, the listing of emergency water supplies and so forth. All measures have this in common: they cannot be improvised at the last moment.

The Committee on Refugees and Evacuees, in close collaboration with the military authorities, has considered such questions as the establishment and organization of hospital or safety zones in accordance with the Geneva Convention;

evacuation of certain categories of persons from the operational and combat zones; the temporary residence during wartime of refugees and evacuees in a foreign country; specialised services for the preparation and implementation of all aspects of evacuation plans; the control of mass movements of persons anxious to escape from threatened bombardment or the menace of enemy occupation. The Council will make recommendations for inter-governmental action where necessary.

In addition to making broad recommendations based on the conclusions of the Committee on Civil Defence and on those of the Committee on Refugees and Evacuees, the Committee on Civil Organization in Time of War has examined the protection of vital industrial installations, the control of civilian travel in wartime and measures to deal with enemy shipping and aircraft in NATO harbours and airports at the outbreak of war. The aim of these studies is not to produce any hard and fast plans but to acquaint governments with the problems they may have to face and to suggest various methods by which they may be dealt with.

Transportation

In war it is the actual fighting which most excites the imagination. The long line of communications and the intricate complications of supply often go unnoticed. Yet they are of primary importance: particularly when members of a coalition are separated by an ocean. As Sir Winston Churchill said in his book 'The River War'; 'Victory is the beautiful, bright-coloured flower. Transport is the stem without which it could never have blossomed'. No matter how well strategy is planned, how brilliant the tactical moves, all is of no avail if supplies and materials in sufficient quantities do not arrive when and where they are wanted.

The Planning Board for Ocean Shipping

The North Atlantic Council turned their attention to these matters soon after they were established. In May 1950, they created the Planning Board for Ocean Shipping (PBOS) and gave it the task of working out plans to ensure the most efficient use of the available shipping resources in time of emergency. PBOS was the only civilian NATO agency to survive the Lisbon reorganization in its original form. Even after the Council moved to Paris the Planning Board has continued to operate from London and Washington. The Board, unlike other NATO agencies, is not served by an International Secretariat paid out of common funds. Its work is carried on chiefly by a small group of British and American civil servants who, with the co-operation of shipping experts from other member governments, prepare papers for the Planning Board's consideration.

The most important principle on which the Planning Board has agreed is that, in order to diminish the effects of a shortage of sea transport at the outbreak of war, the great bulk of ocean-going merchant ships under the flags of NATO countries would be pooled and, for allocation purposes, put at the disposal of an inter-allied body to be called the Defence Shipping Authority. This Authority will be responsible for the allocation of ocean-going shipping throughout the whole area controlled by and friendly towards the member governments of NATO, its allies and partners.

The Board has agreed on the general lines of the organization of the proposed Authority. It will consist of a Defence Shipping Council and a Defence Shipping Executive Board (DSEB). The main duty of the Defence Shipping Council will be to formulate general shipping policy in accordance with overall strategy. The Executive Board will administer the central pool and for the purpose of day-today operation will have two branches, one in Washington and one in London, each with subordinate committees.

The Board has agreed on the arrangements for the setting up of the two branches, and has decided that the initial steps to bring the branches into being should be taken early enough to ensure that the Executive Board is fully operative at the outbreak of war, or as soon as possible after it. To this end, steps have been taken for assembling the key personnel, including national shipping representatives, of member countries.

In addition, governments have prepared for PBOS individual cards showing the characteristics of each of their ocean-going ships. This should enable the work of the allocation of merchant shipping to go forward without undue delay if it becomes necessary.

A rapid turn-round of ships can only be achieved if vessels can be loaded and unloaded speedily in ports which are free from congestion. To this end, in each country in Western Europe, 'Ship Destination Rooms' have been set up. The role of this Organization in an emergency would be to decide the destination ports for ships before the sailing of convoys, and the diversion of ships in convoy to other ports, if the original destination port became unable to receive them. It is also important to have, in wartime, day-to-day information on the arrival of ships, so that internal transport by rail, road or inland waterways, can be expeditiously and economically used.

PBOS is carrying out a statistical and general survey of the present, and possibly emergency, employment of European coasting and short sea shipping. It is also studying the emergency anchorage requirements for shipping of this kind.

Planning Board for European Inland Surface Transport

The task of adequately supplying Western Europe is not finished when ships have been convoyed successfully across the Atlantic. The problem is then to transport their cargoes to the armed forces, to industry and to the civilian populations. To achieve this successfully roads must be in good repair, railway equipment must be sufficient and of the types required, port installations must be capable of handling the vast quantities of military equipment and civilian supplies which will be off-loaded, and emergency ports must be earmarked and prepared. All these need protection against sabotage and air attack.

In June 1952 a Planning Board for European Inland Surface Transport (PBEIST) was set up by the Council to plan the co-ordination in time of crisis of the use of the roads, railways, canals and ports of Western Europe. This Board is obtaining information concerning the amount of inland surface transport which will be required to meet the military and civilian requirements in time of an emergency, and is comparing these requirements with the present availability of transport. Later, it will estimate the deficiencies which might affect the NATO defence effort and, where possible, will suggest means of minimising their effect.
The work which the Planning Board has accomplished can be divided into two parts: the first consists in collecting data on the present stage of the transport system in the NATO European area; the second consists in reviewing national transport organizations and in drafting the constitution of an agency to co-ordinate transport between various countries in time of war. To accomplish this work PBEIST has set up six working groups dealing with road transport, rail transport, inland water transport, ports and beaches, port emergency planning and the inland transport of bulk petroleum products. Within the framework of these groups, military sub-groups have been set up on a geographical basis (corresponding to the areas covered by the Northern, Southern and Central Commands) to study these questions of inland surface transport which, from the operational and often the regional standpoint, are of particular military significance.

The Planning Board directed its working groups to consider in the first place how, within the limitations of the transport system, it would be possible in the early months of a war to meet the military requirements on the basis of the following assumptions:

The working groups were also asked to study a large number of technical matters, including the administration of transport arrangements, the maintenance, protection, repair of the inland transport system.

The inland surface transport in each country in Europe has inevitably developed in different fashions, technically and administratively, and was not planned to cope with the demands which might be made should military operations start in Western Europe. PBEIST and its working groups have therefore had to spend much time in finding out the facts, and in discussing what changes need to be made in the various national transport systems, and in the various modes of transport, to make them capable of standing up to the heavy demands of modem warfare.

In planning a stand-by organization PBEIST has worked on the assumption that, as the control of the various forms of transport in time of war is likely to vary from country to country, each member government of NATO must continue to exercise direct authority over its own transport system. In order, however, to ensure the maximum flexibility and the best use of the available transport resources, efficient co-ordination between national systems is essential. Even when movement takes place entirely within a single country, some measure of co-ordination is necessary in view of its indirect impact on international traffic and its consequences for the military authorities.

PBEIST has therefore endeavoured to draft arrangements which will effectively combine national control of the detailed short-term movement of transport with international long-term planning. In 1954, the Council approved the terms of reference of an Authority for the International Co-ordination of European Inland Surface Transport in the Central European areas. The Council will in due course receive from PBEIST proposals for the co-ordination of transport movements in the Northern and the Southern European areas.

Wartime commodity problems

In June 1951 the Council Deputies, acting on the advice of the Planning Board for Ocean Shipping that there would be a serious deficiency in shipping tonnage in time of a crisis, asked the Financial and Economic Board (FEB) to report on:

1. the feasibility of a realistic examination of civilian sea-borne import requirements for commodities, especially bulky commodities, in tune of war, on a strict austerity basis; and
2. the nature and functions of any stand-by organization which might be established within NATO to provide the wartime shipping authorities with agreed programmes of civilian imports for NATO countries.

The FEB's report was considered by the Council in June, 1952. The Council accepted the Board's view that for the time being it was not feasible to attempt to establish the principles on which wartime import requirements should be calculated, since it would entail making assumptions, for which there were no acceptable bases, about the general level of "wartime economic activity in member countries and, in particular, about levels of consumption. Consequently, the Council decided that it would be premature to consider the form and functions of any wartime organization which "was to draw up agreed programmes of civilian import requirements. They did, however, approve the FEB'S conclusion that some progress could be made toward a useful estimate of wartime import requirements by collecting and studying statistics of total sea borne imports of important commodities in a typical year together with information concerning their origin.

To obtain this information the Council set up a Food and Agriculture Planning Committee, a Coal and Steel Planning Committee and an Industrial Raw Materials Planning Committee. The work of these Committees is co-ordinated by a Committee on Wartime Commodity Problems, which has also assumed responsibility for co-ordinating the work of the Petroleum Planning Committee set up by the Council Deputies in January 1952.

These Planning Committees have been instructed to study the difficulties which might arise in their particular commodity field during the first year of a war, and to recommend what measures can be usefully taken in advance to overcome, or at least to minimise them.

After having dealt with the domestic plans and preparations of each country, these Committees will go on to consider whether national measures can be made more effective in some spheres by setting up international machinery for the control and distribution of any particular group of commodities. Progress in this field will of course be limited by the fact that large quantities of the commodities under study by the Planning Committees are produced outside the NATO area.

All these Committees have made some progress in studying wartime requirements and availabilities. They have not so far attempted to draw up anything like wartime import programmes. They conduct their work on the basis of a series of hypotheses. In making plans and preparations the assessment of the broad effect of the assumptions is more important in this field than the precise calculation of figures. The incidental value of the studies which the Committees have undertaken is that it brings together responsible experts from the various NATO capitals and provides training and educational material for the individuals and administrative machines likely to be called upon to deal -with these problems if war should break out. The lessons learnt should then be applied in time of crises in the same way as lessons learnt by soldiers in the course of military manoeuvres and staff exercises.

By way of example let us now look at some of the work which has been done by the Planning Committees.

The Petroleum Planning Committee has estimated the military, and the minimum essential civilian, requirements for petroleum products necessary, in wartime, to maintain the economy of each country at full production. It has also estimated the likely availabilities of crude oil and refined products, and has examined the rationing plans which countries have ready to bring into force if the necessity arises.

The Coal and Steel Planning Committee has studied the vulnerable and distant sources of supply of coal and steel. It has asked the principal coal-producing NATO countries of Europe for information about the steps they are taking to maintain their labour force in war. The Committee is giving consideration to the availability in war of the raw materials necessary for steel production in Western Europe.

The Food and Agriculture Planning Committee has examined imports of the various countries over the past few years and has drawn attention to the supplies which are likely to be lost on the outbreak of war. It is also studying the effect of hypothetical cuts in sea-borne imports. The Committee has considered the changes which might be necessary in the pattern of wartime agriculture and is enquiring into the supply of agricultural machinery, fuel fertilisers and other requisites essential to the maintenance of an increased production in an emergency.

The Industrial Raw Materials Planning Committee has so far concentrated on the problems which would arise from the loss of commodities from vulnerable sources, from the need to reduce the import of bulky commodities owing to a shortage of shipping, and from the scarcity of certain commodities owing to increased demands in war.

The Food and Agriculture and the Industrial Raw Materials Planning Committees are giving particular attention to stockpiling. They are studying such problems as what commodities should be stocked, the best size and form of the stockpile, the method of procurement, custody and storage, turnover and replacement. Serious financial problems arise, since countries are naturally reluctant to spend money on stockpiling and thus aggravate their balance of payments difficulties.

In addition to the subjects now being examined and dealt with by the North Atlantic Council's Committees on Emergency Planning, there are a host of others, perhaps no less important, which have yet to be taken up. They will be examined in order of priority with the minimum of delay. In this vital matter of assuring the security, supply and efficient administration of the home front in time of war, the Council are still upon the threshold of a task whose urgency and importance are second to none.

Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
On the 14th September 1954 a Medical Committee was set up to review medical manpower in each country and to recommend plans for the solution of civilian and military problems which may arise in wartime.