

**The Communication of Mutual Security:
Frameworks for European-Mediterranean
Intelligence Sharing**

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Abstract

This paper examines the issue of intelligence cooperation between NATO and Mediterranean non-member countries (Med). The paper is divided into four parts: The first part examines the development of intelligence cooperation frameworks in Europe and the Mediterranean region; The second part analyses major problems and issues relating to NATO-Med intelligence cooperation; The third part examines NATO's intelligence requirements in the Mediterranean, at four distinct phases in NATO-Med cooperation; The fourth part explores policy options aimed at enhancing frameworks for NATO-Med intelligence cooperation.

The paper argues that NATO policy in the Mediterranean region requires the development of institutionalised frameworks for intelligence cooperation with its Mediterranean neighbours. NATO experience over the past decade, including the events in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia, present the Mediterranean as a potential area of extensive NATO operations in the future. NATO intelligence structures, however, suffer from an 'intelligence deficit' over the Mediterranean. Over four decades of Cold War, NATO intelligence structures concentrated on Eastern Europe, while the Mediterranean region was allocated only secondary importance in the collection and processing of information. As a result, NATO often lacked intelligence information required for successful operations in the Mediterranean area. This lack of information could be reduced by more effective cooperation with local intelligence services of non-member Mediterranean countries, including Israel, Egypt, Morocco, Cyprus and Malta. This paper analyses the difficulties hindering NATO external intelligence cooperation and examines the alliance's intelligence requirements in the

Mediterranean. It also explores policy options for the creation of intelligence cooperation frameworks aimed at enhancing NATO operations in the region.

The paper concludes that, despite some progress being made following the Kosovo campaign, NATO still has a long way to go in creating and maintaining regular and effective frameworks for intelligence cooperation with Mediterranean countries. Such frameworks could enhance NATO operations and European Union policy in this volatile region. They could also serve to stabilise regional security and encourage security cooperation among Mediterranean countries facing similar security threats.

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1 Introduction

As the World reels from the effects of the 11th November terror attacks in the United States, intelligence cooperation is again perceived by many decision-makers as an essential element in the global fight against international terrorism. Intelligence has gained in importance as means for collecting information critical for national and indeed global security. The worldwide effects of the 11th September attacks and the US-led coalition military action in Afghanistan significantly alter the intelligence requirements of western intelligence services. As the primary western military alliance, NATO could stand at the forefront of the anti-terror campaign, especially if mass terror activities spread to Europe. Intelligence cooperation with non-alliance countries must now be awarded a higher priority.

Intelligence services and intelligence activities are inherently of a secret nature. Intelligence secrets have traditionally been highly classified on the national level, making the sharing of intelligence information not only an operational expedient but also often a foreign policy issue. Indeed, intelligence cooperation has developed since WWII into an effective part of foreign policy, enabling countries with common security interests to share confidential information required for national security. Examples of the role of intelligence cooperation in overall bilateral relations between countries can be seen in the importance of the 'special relations' between the United States and Britain and in the intelligence relations during the Cold War between the Soviet Union and member states of the Warsaw Pact.

In a world of complex technologies and communications, no single intelligence service can hope to achieve complete global coverage on a level required by political and security decision-makers. As Michael Herman aptly notes “there is always more information potentially available than any agency can collect by itself”.¹ Even the intelligence services of the US, which enjoy the highest budgets in the world, are often forced to request the assistance of local intelligence services in different countries. Intelligence services of numerous countries, even Western European ones, must often be content with covering their own region, fulfilling everyday political and security needs. For extensive information on other regions, which could arise due to a crisis or involvement in multilateral security operations, they are dependant to an extent on cooperation with larger services or with those located in the required region. Such cooperation is, in most cases, conducted traditionally on a bilateral level.

Two main interests motivate the need for increased intelligence cooperation. The first is the spiralling cost of intelligence operations, the second is the ability of some services to operate better in certain regions or locations, often referred to as ‘country-role specialisation’. The cost of intelligence work has been greatly increased over the past four decades. This element is especially evident in the field of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), which includes the technological monitoring of communications and satellite imagery. Very few countries can afford to launch and maintain intelligence satellites². Few can also afford communication-monitoring stations scattered around the globe. By cooperating and sharing resources, less-funded services enjoy access to expensive facilities and capabilities without impossible financial burdens or loss of authority. Indeed, Becher notes that the joint

usage of intelligence resources enhances capacities without having to change national structures or responsibilities³.

Country-role specialisation refers to the ability of certain intelligence services to achieve high capabilities in their own region or over specific issues. In essence, smaller intelligence services can ‘specialise’, either geographically or topically, and achieve exceptional coverage unmatched by the larger services that aim for global coverage. Especially in the field of Human Intelligence (HUMINT), the running of agents requires linguistic and cultural skills that are difficult to train externally. Often only native-born people could carry out certain intelligence missions, making it easier for services in that region to operate well on the ground where US or European services could not. Country-role specialisation is often the ‘currency’ that small intelligence services offer in exchange for cooperation with much larger and better-equipped ones.

With the possible exception of Israel and Turkey, the intelligence services of Mediterranean countries cannot afford extensive global coverage. Some even lack regional signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities. Many of those smaller services, however, possess the capabilities to train and operate agents throughout the region in a better way than the US intelligence community or many of their European counterparts. This paper examines how and when could NATO benefit through cooperation from the skills and capabilities of those potential Mediterranean partners.

1.1 Intelligence Framework

For the purpose of this research, a ‘framework’ for intelligence cooperation is defined as an institutional set of working norms maintained over a longer period of time. While not a fully-fledged institution, a framework is a more flexible form of arrangement while maintaining its longevity and official status. Different frameworks could include different components, adjusting for the intensity and cost of operation. Typical frameworks could include components such as regular periodical meetings, standardised means of communication, liaison personnel, dedicated facilities, joint planning, common training, common classification standards and accepted security clearances. Longevity is an essential element of a framework, and therefore the definition of framework used here does not include ad hoc arrangements set up due to an impending contingency or crisis with the aim of dismantling them once that crisis is over.

1.2 Methodology and Sources

Intelligence cooperation is a highly sensitive and confidential part of government policy. In order to overcome the problem of classification and the reluctance of officials to discuss matters relating to intelligence, the methodology adopted for this research was based on a twofold approach: open sources relating to past and present intelligence cooperation enabled critical examination of past efforts, while discussions with experts, former security officials and diplomats enabled analysis of problems and requirements for effective NATO-Mediterranean intelligence cooperation. These discussions also illuminated the perceptions held by different nations involved of such cooperation. The interviews were conducted by the author on a non-attributable basis, since many of the interviewed persons were extremely reluctant to be named on this

subject. Discussions were conducted with experts from Greece, Turkey, Israel, Germany and Britain, as well as at NATO headquarters in Brussels.

The issue of interviews became even more problematic after the September 2000 outbreak of violence in Israel and the Palestinian Authority are, often referred to as the 'El Aksa Intifada'. Following this outbreak, many Arab countries broke off or scaled down their relations with Israel. As a result, officials and experts from Arab countries were reluctant to discuss the issues relating to intelligence cooperation with the author. However, these countries are included in the research as potential NATO cooperation partners and in the policy options part as well.

The situation changed further shortly after the completion of this research, following the 11th September 2001 terror attacks in the US. Intelligence cooperation, usually conducted in secret, was propelled to media highlights as a potential weapon in the global struggle against terrorism. Although the core elements of this research are as applicable to counter-terrorist warfare as to interstate conflicts, the project was adapted to accommodate the recent global developments.

1.3 National Intelligence and Multinational Cooperation

One the main barriers to wider European intelligence cooperation is the fact that intelligence in Europe is conducted almost exclusively on the national level. There is no centralized European organization that deals with intelligence on the EU level. The multiplicity of intelligence organizations and agencies not only make cooperation and liaison very difficult, but also assures that most cooperation efforts with non-European countries remain on a bilateral basis.

The idea of a European intelligence agency is not a new one. As early as the 1960s, some NATO officials were pushing towards a more coordinated form of intelligence sharing in Europe. However, Cold War interests and differences of opinion between the U.S. and France prevented this idea from gaining any ground. Following the end of the Cold War, several strategic thinkers concluded that Europe had to develop a unified form of intelligence mechanism. Klaus Becher identifies the importance of intelligence cooperation in multinational military operations and analysed intelligence cooperation within the WEU as a nascent European intelligence identity⁴. He lists four basic requirements for European intelligence integration: effective political and parliamentary controls; clear divisions between intelligence and law enforcement work; separation between foreign espionage and internal security; and a defined role for intelligence analysis in political decision-making. Becher concluded that despite operational necessity and political goodwill, a clear political effort is required to advance the issue of intelligence cooperation on the European level. However, despite problems relating to political control, information security and privacy, the EU could not afford to ignore this important capability.

Alessandro Politi examines the necessity of a European intelligence policy. He notes that intelligence is more important now than during the Cold War⁵. The change in threats for European security is accompanied by a change in intelligence requirements, which make much of the systems set up for Cold War intelligence collection outdated. He also examines the political, economic and professional advantages such a policy could produce. Frederic Oberson examines nascent European intelligence structures at the WEU, including the WEU Intelligence Section

and the WEU Situation Centre⁶. He concludes that a higher priority must be given to reinforcing the mechanisms of intelligence exchange with NATO as a core element in expanding WEU intelligence capabilities. When examining the development of the European intelligence satellite system HELIOS, Bernard Molard examines WEU intelligence policy as a complementary element to NATO and EU policies. He concludes that the HELIOS system and the Satellite Centre, based at Torrejon in Spain, represent a first stage in establishing an independent European intelligence assessment capability. He asserts that this expansion in European intelligence capabilities enhance NATO's capacities, opening the way for a more active intelligence cooperation between NATO and the EU, beneficial to both⁷.

Over the past four decades, several multinational initiatives attempted to address the issue of intelligence cooperation on a wider level. The following chapter examines the development of different frameworks of European and European-Mediterranean intelligence cooperation and analyses the motivating interests and characteristics of each framework.

2 The Development of European-Mediterranean intelligence Cooperation

Cooperation between European and Mediterranean intelligence services is not a new phenomenon. As early as the 19th Century, the Imperial German Intelligence service cooperated closely with its Egyptian and Ottoman counterparts over the politically sensitive visit of Kaiser Wilhelm II in Palestine in 1892⁸. However, such cooperation efforts were carried out in an ad hoc manner, aimed at solving pertinent and immediate problems and petered out once those problems were gone. Only in the

1950s did major efforts at creating intelligence cooperation frameworks in the Mediterranean region get underway.

This chapter examines the development of several intelligence cooperation frameworks in Europe and the Mediterranean regions which operated on a long-term institutional form. Rather than present an exhaustive historical account, the chapter examines the salient features of each attempt at creating intelligence cooperation frameworks and analyses those features relevant to NATO's intelligence relations with Mediterranean countries.

Until the Second World War, the traditional domain of intelligence services was the collection of information abroad to assist policy-makers in conducting more effective policies⁹. Intelligence was viewed as an extension to a state's sovereignty, which in other aspects was restricted by the geographical limits of that country. The gathering of intelligence information by clandestine means, in those days more often referred to as espionage, was perceived as a legitimate function of rulers and governments as long as it remained secret. Although many politicians openly maintained that intelligence was an un-gentlemanly practice more fitting to 'other people', such as Lord Grey's immortal assertion that "*Gentlemen do not read other people's mail*", by the outbreak of the First World War most European countries developed institutionalised services for secretly collecting information abroad. These services, and material produced by them, were held to be national secrets, protected by legislation from being passed onto any third party. Information was exchanged between intelligence services from different countries on an ad hoc basis, often the product of personal relations between officials rather than co-ordinated policy.

It was during the Second World War that the active exchange of secret information between intelligence services in Europe developed into institutionalised forms. Due to early German successes in the war, many intelligence organisations from occupied countries escaped to London, where they developed extensive working relations with British intelligence. When the United States entered the war in 1941, its intelligence chiefs quickly realised the potential for sharing secrets, and even funding other services' operations. Throughout the war, the intensive exchange of information eroded the notion that intelligence was strictly a non-shareable national asset, as the interests of services and countries converged on many issues¹⁰.

The Anglo-American wartime cooperation in the field of enemy communication interception later developed into one of the most important institutionalised forms of intelligence co-operation during the Cold War. The UKUSA Treaty was signed by the United Kingdom and the United States (hence its name) in 1947.¹¹ Later on Canada, Australia and New Zealand became signatories of the treaty as well. UKUSA regulates with the exchange of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) - information obtained by technological means, i.e. through the interception of all forms of communications. The Treaty divided the world into several sectors and each member state was made responsible for collecting SIGINT in its sector. In practice, the Americans soon took over the running and funding of most of UKUSA's operations, but the institutionalised arrangements such as assigning liaison officers, joint working groups and committees, remained multilateral.¹² The existence of UKUSA was strongly denied by its signatory states throughout the Cold War, setting a pattern for later intelligence co-operation forms to be totally kept out of the public eye.

In his analysis of European police cooperation, John Benyon defines three interrelated levels of cooperation - the *macro* level, which is based on international agreements or treaties, the *meso* level, which is concerned with operational practices and procedures, and the *micro* level, which deals with individual investigations or actions over a specific case.¹³ The same levels of analysis are relevant to the cooperation between intelligence services. The macro level deals with multinational agreements set for the purpose of establishing existing or new frameworks for the multilateral exchange of information, or other forms of active cooperation, between intelligence services.¹⁴ The meso level encompasses the standardising of communication methods, reporting formats, regular periodical meetings at different levels and permanent liaison personnel. The micro level refers to cooperation or the provision of information over a specific case, a situation which would often be decided upon on a lower level, ad-hoc basis.

When discussing institutionalised forms of intelligence cooperation it is important to distinguish their functional characteristics, which differ greatly from those of other, open international cooperation bodies. Despite their often-dramatic names, these intelligence frameworks lack a permanent structure of their own, being dependent on the participating services to provide the necessary budgets, secretariat, facilities etc. Most organisations discussed here lacked a permanent staff or headquarters, due to the elements of secrecy and political risk involved, but their activities reached a high level of institutionalisation even without these centralised control positions. Their main operational characteristics were standardised forms of communications, regular meetings and permanent liaison, making information of common interest available on

a multilateral basis. Due to the secrecy surrounding the activities of these frameworks it is hard to catalogue their exact development and modes of operation, but sufficient information enables overall trends and methods to be explored.

The early years of the European integration process saw also the emergence of the first two post-WWII intelligence cooperation frameworks, NATO's intelligence sharing mechanisms and TRIDENT.

Within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, mechanisms were developed for the exchange of information, mostly of a military nature, between member states. NATO's Current Intelligence Group provided a forum for shared information to be disseminated among all member states. It had the permanent staff and facilities to make information available to the smaller members, who did not possess the expertise or funds to develop sufficient intelligence collection efforts behind the Iron Curtain. But NATO's political character, especially following France's withdrawal from NATO's military structures in 1965, diminished the importance and scope of multinational intelligence sharing within NATO. This erosion was compounded by scandals of espionage and leaks in some smaller member states that were more on the receiving end of secrets from the larger NATO members. Due to a growing reluctance on behalf of American intelligence agencies to share their secrets with all of NATO's members, some of whom had strongly opposing interests, a practice developed whereas several informal "working groups", each comprising representatives of several countries, would receive different levels of material on the basis of a "need-to-know". Through this informal arrangement the US, and to a lesser

extent Britain, sought to keep NATO's intelligence-sharing function alive while maintaining effective secrecy.

The macro level of the NATO intelligence exchange mechanism was the North Atlantic Treaty and the NATO Council, which had the ultimate responsibility for the functioning of the treaty. On the meso level standard communications were institutionalised, and regular meetings enabled the smooth flow of information. On the macro level information could be provided by members in individual cases even when these cases concerned conflicts outside NATO's area-of-operations, as defined by the NATO treaty. One working example of this was information provided by the US and other NATO members to Britain during the Falklands War in 1982¹⁵.

2.1 Trident

The second intelligence cooperation framework formed in the late 1950's was TRIDENT, also known as the "Treaty of the Periphery".¹⁶ TRIDENT was initiated in 1958 by the intelligence services of Israel, Turkey and Iran, and was later joined by Ethiopia.¹⁷ Although not formally a European group, almost each of the TRIDENT members was supported or 'sponsored' to some extent by European and American intelligence services, which were driving force behind its operation.

TRIDENT was based on the concept of 'Periphery' in the Middle East region. This political concept maintained that Arab nationalism was the main threat or cause of instability in the region and should therefore bring together the non-Arab countries of the region into closer cooperation. The aim of TRIDENT was to provide intelligence cooperation against the rising tide of Arab nationalism. Britain, which two years

previously had lost the Suez Canal to Egypt's president Nasser in the disastrous Suez campaign, sought to maintain its influence and intelligence capabilities in the Middle East through TRIDENT. The Turkish and Iranian intelligence services enjoyed close connections with the intelligence services of several European states, while the US was pushing into closer co-operation in the hope of exerting influence in a region where it formerly had few political, and intelligence, assets. TRIDENT was also supported to some extent by the intelligence services of France, which at the time was embroiled in the civil war in Algeria, since Algerian rebels were supplied and trained by Egypt and other Arab states.

TRIDENT institutionalised many aspects of the exchange of information between its member services. On the macro level, the agreement gave the political legitimisation for the framework, which was directed by semi-annual meetings of the service chiefs, to co-ordinate policy and priorities. But the real process of institutionalisation was conducted on the meso level - the everyday work of the various agencies, which created standard forms of communications and assigned liaison officers, enabling members of one organisation to have access to services, technology or training facilities of another.¹⁸ Although its level of intensity fluctuated, intelligence cooperation under TRIDENT was maintained until the 1979 revolution in Iran, and made a distinct contribution towards closer security relations between the participating countries in the Eastern Mediterranean.

2.2 Kilowatt

In the early 1970's the activities of international terrorism increased dramatically in Western Europe. At a secret conference conducted in the Badawi refugee camp in Lebanon in May 1971, representatives of terrorist groups from all over Europe met to co-ordinate activities and targets. The main working principle agreed upon at Badawi was to have members of one terror group carry out terror attacks in other states, to foil police efforts that would concentrate on local groups. This agreement brought about several spectacular terrorist coups, including the kidnapping of OPEC oil ministers in Vienna (1975), the hijacking of planes to Entebbe (1976) and Mogadishu (1977), as well as numerous assassinations of leading political and economic figures in Germany and Spain.¹⁹

In response to the new threat of international terrorism, a new multilateral intelligence framework was formed, code named KILOWATT. KILOWATT was the first truly European intelligence forum, comprising representatives of intelligence services from Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, Ireland, Norway and Israel.²⁰ Its main purpose was to provide exchange of information on the activities of Palestinian and international terrorists. Few details are available on the activities of KILOWATT, but intelligence sources confirmed that the multilateral exchange of information through KILOWATT was an effective tool in reducing the level of terrorist activities in Western Europe in the late 1970's.²¹ From what little information available it seems that KILOWATT was not based on a macro-level formal treaty, but rather an expansion of meso-level bilateral arrangements, which began as early as 1972 on a bilateral basis, into a multilateral framework.

Even less is known about the activities of MEGATONNE, reported as a framework for sharing intelligence on the activities of radical Islamic terrorists in Europe²². MEGATTONNE was apparently sponsored by France and aimed mainly at countering the threat of Islamic Algerian terrorists in the European mainland, activities that escalated in the early 1990s. One of MEGATTONNE's successes was reported to be the arrest of the terrorist Ali Hamade at Frankfurt airport in January 1987.

Two more cooperation frameworks are included in this analysis although one was not strictly an arrangement between intelligence services but rather more a political and law-enforcement structure. These are the Trevi Group and the Brenner Club.

2.3 Trevi

The Trevi Group was officially formed at a meeting of EC Ministers of Justice and Internal Affairs in Luxembourg, in June 1976. At the height of international terror activities in Europe, EC member states sought to create a formal framework for police cooperation within Europe. The agreement reached established a multinational body within the EC, but not part of any EC structure and over which the European Commission did not exert any significant influence, to co-ordinate and enhance police cooperation in specific matters of common interest and against common threats.²³

On the macro level, Trevi was presided over by an official nominated by the EC member-state holding the current ordinary EC presidency, which rotated every six months. Its highest forum was regular half-yearly meeting of EC Ministers of Internal Affairs. A secretariat for Trevi was drawn from the state holding the presidency, which was responsible for organising the ministerial meetings. But the real power of

Trevi lay in its so-called 'Group' - a forum of delegations from all twelve EC member states that comprised senior government officials and police officers. It was with this meso-level 'Trevi Group of Senior Officials' that Trevi's real power lay, since could convene working groups dealing with various specific issues of concern and issuing recommendations for action by the member states. The experts in the various working groups pooled their knowledge and experience and proposed workable, practical solutions to current problems.

Trevi formed four working groups; the first two were established in 1977, one to exchange information on terrorism, the second to examine wider issues of police cooperation such as public order, language difficulties, training etc. The issue of terrorism was closely linked to the ongoing counter-terrorist activities of intelligence services, and brought Trevi into contact with various intelligence agencies in Europe. Informal working patterns evolved out of these relations, which had direct bearing on Trevi's later work. A third working group was formed in 1985, to deal with cooperation over serious crime, defined mainly as drug-trafficking and organised crime, but also including computer crime, money laundering and crime analysis.²⁴ On the micro level, Trevi was successful in bringing together officials and officers from different participating countries for cooperation over specific cases.

A fourth working group, known as 'Trevi 1992', was initiated in 1988 to examine the consequences of abolishing internal border controls within the EU. The findings of this group formed the base for the 1990 Trevi Programme of Action, proposing measures to counter new threats of cross-border crime.²⁵ Many of Trevi's recommendations were implemented by the member states, the most important of

which being the establishment of National Drugs Intelligence Units. In several countries, including Britain and Italy, this unit formed a precedent as the first time outside the investigation of terrorism that information collected by different regional and local police forces was pooled together and available centrally on the national level. Trevi later posted Drugs Liaison Officers (DLO's) to countries outside Europe, to assist in assembling and disseminating information over drugs trafficking in producer countries throughout this new network of national police intelligence units.²⁶ Trevi's work formed the base upon which the German proposals for the creation of Europol, first circulated in 1991, were formed. After 1992 Trevi was integrated into the EU structure under a new name, the 'Co-ordination Committee for Justice and Internal Affairs (K-4)' and its functions expanded to regulation proposals over law enforcement and intelligence issues, including the interception of communications, information databases and privacy.

This trend of combining intelligence services and traditional law enforcement agencies against international crime was strengthened by intelligence legislation in many European countries, notably Britain and Germany²⁷. This legislation brought the intelligence services, previously limited to activities in the political and military fields, into the forefront of European law enforcement activities against international organised crime. Even the European Commission, which for many years avoided dealing with the issue of intelligence services, realised the potential of intelligence cooperation in countering crime that affects the economic interests of the EU. The Commission has established a link to intelligence services via 'Directorate F' of the Secretariat General, which deals with fraud prevention²⁸.

On the meso and micro levels, the strength of Trevi lay in its membership, a closed circle of officials from similar services following a common, though far from similar, agenda. The semi-secret nature of Trevi, as well as the ‘distance’ it maintained from the more open European institutions, enabled policy issues to be discussed and information shared in an informal and professional atmosphere, relatively disconnected from everyday political squabbles. Although Trevi-assigned officials represented, of course, the will and interests of their governments, the Trevi framework nevertheless succeeded in establishing numerous working norms and established ‘ground rules’ for intelligence exchange and cooperation. These norms and rules paved the way for the development of EUROPOL and the extensive law enforcement cooperation under the EU Third Pillar of today.

2.4 The ‘Brenner Club’

The Brenner Club is a cooperation framework among Western European internal security services. It is based on periodical meetings attended by the heads of the relevant security services, including the German BfV, the British MI-5, the French internal security services and those of other European countries. Although lacking a permanent secretariat or common offices, it is nevertheless a resilient framework that brings together heads and senior officials from internal security services of many countries, sharing common security interests and targets. The Brenner Club operates in an informal way, with meetings being conducted in different locations and organised by each host country in turn. In recent years meetings of the Brenner Club dealt with a range of internal security issues including terrorism, illegal immigration and cross boundary forms of organised crime.²⁹

The above sections examined past and present intelligence cooperation frameworks. The following chapter examines NATO potential intelligence requirements from such cooperation at four phases.

3 Variables and parameters for NATO-Med Intelligence Cooperation

This chapter examines the wide range of variables and parameters influencing NATO-Med intelligence cooperation. These variables and parameters are divided into six main categories, with each category presenting a specific policy area relevant to decision-making. The purpose of this analysis is to examine problem areas and potential friction points which needs addressing if NATO is to expand its intelligence cooperation with Mediterranean countries. The parameters examined will dictate or influence the level and type of cooperation formed.

3.1 Overall political situation

The first consideration to be taken into account when planning intelligence cooperation is the overall political situation. Bilateral and multilateral relations, both inside the Mediterranean region and with the NATO member states would feature prominently in such analysis. However, since NATO is a multinational organisation its operations tended to be based on coalitions comprising both NATO and non-NATO states. The experience of the past decade, and especially in former Yugoslavia, Albania and Macedonia demonstrates the importance of two key characteristics in coalitions: its composition and previous experience with the relevant country.

3.1.1 Composition of coalitions

The composition of a NATO-led coalition would have a significant impact on the level and type of intelligence cooperation with non-NATO potential partner states. A coalition would not essentially mean in this case the entire membership of NATO but rather those member states directly involved in military operations. First, the presence of countries sponsoring, or opposing, potential Mediterranean partner states would encourage or preclude such cooperation, respectively. For example, cooperation with Cyprus could be dependant on the participation of Greece, as a sponsor, or of Turkey, as opposition. Active participation of Israel could adversely affect the willingness of Arab Mediterranean countries, such as Egypt, to cooperate closer on intelligence matters with NATO.

3.1.2 Previous experience with partner country

Previous experience in intelligence and security cooperation could have a direct affect on the level of potential cooperation for the future. While this may sound rather obvious, previous experience is not always a determinant for political cooperation. Indeed, political changes could bring about radical changes in political willingness to cooperate. Such was the case, for example, with Serbia, which under the regime of Slobodan Milosevic was a political outcast. However, shortly after Milosevic's fall from power security cooperation developed between the European Union and the newly elected Serbian government. Yesterday's enemies found themselves around one table when it came to re-establishing Serbia's role in the Balkans.

Since intelligence relations are often dependent on closely nurtured interpersonal relations between key officials, there is a natural reluctance to cooperate with former enemies. This is especially apparent on the meso level. A case in point would be the security cooperation between the Israeli intelligence services and the PLO following

the 1993 Oslo Accords. Although the Accords established the political will and the institutional framework for this cooperation, security officials from both sides, who had spent a lifetime fighting one another in the shadowy war of terrorism and counter-terrorism, found it difficult to overcome past animosities and adjust to new political realities³⁰.

3.2 Policy directives of higher political authorities

NATO as an international organisation is dependant on the policies and decisions of the member states and has relatively little independence in high policymaking. The highest political authorities of the member states determine the policy direction NATO should follow, leaving the military and technical decisions to NATO's international military staff. In this regard, four key variables should be discussed: US policy and the dependency on US intelligence, policies of other key NATO members, treaties and other formal instruments, and the commitment of resources.

3.2.1 US policy

Despite recent progress made in the intelligence capacities of the larger European states, the United States remains an 'intelligence superpower' both in terms of capabilities and its scope of global coverage. Only the United States can afford the enormous costs of SIGINT development and procurement, including espionage satellites and global communication monitoring. Any effective NATO intelligence cooperation with Mediterranean states would consist, to a large part, of information originating within the US intelligence community. Therefore, the goodwill of US intelligence services and above all that of the CIA would be crucial for the development of effective intelligence cooperation frameworks.

3.2.2 Policies of other main intelligence powers in coalition

The dependency on US-provided information would increase during a conflict, when the time frame for obtaining intelligence information is very short and the military requirements at their widest. However, during peacetime or even pre-conflict phases, European intelligence services could still enhance multilateral intelligence exchange through their close contacts with specific services in the Mediterranean region. Almost each of the larger European intelligence services enjoy some forms of ‘special relations’ with equivalent services in the Mediterranean and could use those relations to push forward for expanded participation, and resources, being put into intelligence cooperation frameworks.

3.2.3 Treaties and agreements

Existing treaties or agreements could influence or restrict intelligence cooperation with Mediterranean countries if they deal with the extent of information sharing. The UKUSA agreement, for example, establishes a global framework for Sigint intelligence exchange between the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand³¹. However, much of the UKUSA output is restricted to its members and may not be shared with others without the agreement of the other participants, some of whom are not NATO members. In a similar way, any existing treaties or agreements within NATO dealing with intelligence sharing could restrict external intelligence cooperation and thus need to be addressed before wider cooperation with Mediterranean states could become a viable policy option.

3.2.4 Commitment of resources

Beyond political and official goodwill, intelligence cooperation requires the commitment of resources. These resources include funds, equipment, training and personnel. Although in relation to their potential benefits at times of conflict these costs are relatively low, experience with the development of NATO’s Mediterranean

Dialogue illustrated that it is often those small resources that are hardest to budget for at NATO planning and financial allocations. Obtaining the required information through intelligence cooperation is very often much cheaper than developing the capacity to obtain it independently. Of course, independent collection capabilities free NATO from having to pay a certain political price, but from an economic point of view, intelligence cooperation is a cheap and fast way of expanding intelligence capabilities.

3.3 Professional level of non-NATO intelligence services

The professional level of non-NATO intelligence services considered as potential cooperation partners exerts a significant influence on possible cooperation. As one former senior intelligence official bluntly stated “nobody wants to cooperate with partners who are no good at it”³². Militarily, NATO would strive to cooperate with those services having the capability to assist NATO operations in the region. However, cooperation with weaker services, while perhaps not of immediate intelligence value, could improve political relations and would also have a much higher impact on enhancing the capabilities of those partner services to a point where they, too, could be militarily useful.

3.3.1 Level of operational capabilities

The level of operational capabilities refers, at its most basic level, to the ability of intelligence services to obtain required information or achieve other policy targets. In the Mediterranean, the levels of operational capabilities differ markedly from country to country and from service to service. Some services are highly capable, possessing dedicated personnel and the required infrastructure for operations abroad. Other services, more concerned with internal security or the propping up of an undemocratic

regime, often concentrate their main efforts inside their country and are limited in their external capabilities.

3.3.2 Level of reliability

The level of reliability refers to the ability of specific services to keep information security. It is a sad fact that during the Cold War, numerous NATO secrets were compromised through the espionage activities of the Soviet Union and its recruitment of agents within NATO itself. Penetration of a rival intelligence service is one of the highest targets for espionage. In order to ensure the physical security of information provided, NATO officials must be convinced that a potential cooperating partner maintains a high level of reliability with regard to its personnel, physical facilities and communications. The NATO Office of Security, responsible for security and counterespionage inside NATO, could play together with national-level services an active role in evaluating the level of reliability maintained by potential Mediterranean partner services.

3.4 Reaction of opposition in target country

The reaction of the political opposition in each potential Mediterranean cooperation partner is crucial for the success of intelligence cooperation. While a political decision to cooperate with NATO over intelligence matters could often be kept away from public knowledge through media censorship, political norms may call for informing the parliamentary opposition of such a policy³³. Even if not informed officially, opposition parties often have their own sources within intelligence services and such cooperation would be almost impossible to keep away from their knowledge. Thought should therefore must be given to analysing the possible impact of such cooperation on the internal politics of the partner country, including the reaction of the opposition and that of the media.

The above sections examined issues and potential friction points in NATO-Mediterranean intelligence cooperation. The following chapter examines NATO's intelligence requirements in the region at four different phases of policy.

4 NATO Intelligence Requirements in the Mediterranean – Four Phases of Cooperation

NATO-Mediterranean intelligence cooperation could be divided into four time phases, each representing a policy situation. Each phase is characterised by distinct intelligence requirements, which influence cooperation substance and form. The different requirements and working parameters for each phase are presented within potential cooperation with Mediterranean non-member countries.

4.1 Peacetime phase

During peacetime, the main requirement of an intelligence cooperation framework is to develop solid relations, expand political and administrative goodwill and develop the mechanisms that could be put into affect during times of crisis. Peacetime intelligence cooperation often tends to be neglected, due to the perception that cooperation over specific, pressing issues is not really required at that time. However, peacetime could be just the right time to plan ahead and create long-term goodwill that could be later turned into hard intelligence assets. It is also much easier to reach agreement over operational issues through the necessary contacts and negotiations without the pressing time constraints of crisis.

Peacetime intelligence cooperation should be aimed at establishing the basic working parameters for operational exchange. It should thus concentrate on defining a set of requirements for cooperation with services outside NATO. These requirements include issues of communication, liaison, security clearance, information classification and information security.

4.2 Pre-conflict phase

The pre-conflict phase indicates a time span where military action becomes a viable policy option. The pre-conflict phase is often used for extensive political negotiations but also for coalition building, ensuring that a military operation can be mounted quickly and effectively.

From an intelligence point of view, pre-conflict time is a time of hectic activity. Intelligence deficiencies are quickly recognised and must be made good. New information is required on issues, political groups, leaders or military forces that may not have been previously considered to be of key importance. The pre-conflict phase is usually when officials and politicians become interested in the issue of intelligence cooperation. As the threat of military hostilities grow, friends are sought very quickly in an attempt to make up for lack of planning or for weak regional capabilities. The pre-conflict phase is also characterised by a high willingness to commit resources to intelligence cooperation, not only for gaining information but also as a political goodwill gesture.

The main type of intelligence required at the pre-conflict phase is political intelligence. Often this information is required to support negotiation or mediation

efforts. Intelligence requirements would encompass the policy positions of the other side and the positions of key individuals in the rival state or states. Personal and even psychological analysis of leaders can assist in estimating their reaction to specific policy options or crises. Such analysis was, for example, performed on Saddam Hussein after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991 to determine his attitude towards the use of chemical weapons against coalition forces.

Beyond political intelligence, a wide range of military information is required at this phase to gauge the enemy's ability to attack or withstand an attack. Enemy order of battle, force dispositions, air defences, troop moral, logistical infrastructure and communications would be of high priorities for the NATO military staff in planning possible scenarios and operations.

4.3 Conflict phase

Once armed hostilities commence, not only the type of intelligence required but also the timeframe for obtaining it change dramatically. Military operations require a wide range of intelligence information directly related to the application of force, and this information must be available on very short notice. Since enemy positions, plans and operations are liable to change constantly during a campaign, intelligence must be updated regularly and reliably throughout the conflict phase.

Conflict phase is a test case for previous intelligence cooperation conducted at a more serene pace. NATO forces operating in the Mediterranean region require information on the order of battle of local forces, their positions and strength, troops moral, logistics and supplies, command structure, plans, communication methods and last but

not least, the personality of leaders and military commanders on the other side. A comprehensive intelligence picture in the region would be almost impossible to achieve without close cooperation with non-NATO intelligence services in the region that enjoy a high level of country-region specialisation.

The NATO campaign in Kosovo illustrated the effectiveness of an aerial campaign when NATO forces enjoy air superiority. However, the success of such a campaign depends on accurate target location and identification. This element is especially important due to public opinion sensitivity over civilian casualties and attacks directed against wrong targets. The NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by error demonstrated how targeting error could become a public embarrassment and a policy impediment. Cooperation with local intelligence services could assist in accurate target identification and location as well as damage assessments.

Beyond military information, such cooperation could also assist in humanitarian issues. Information relating to the situation of refugees and civilians could be critical to mission success. This was amply demonstrated during the first weeks of the Kosovo campaign, as NATO strove to obtain information over the fate of hundred of thousand of Albanian refugees in Kosovo driven from their homes by the Serb forces. Intelligence services in the region, mainly through the use of human sources, could complement NATO's SIGINT and aerial/satellite monitoring activities regarding the plight of civilians in the conflict zones.

4.4 Post-conflict and Peace-building phase

Once hostilities have ceased, information directly relating to enemy forces gives way to information requirements aimed at enhancing peace efforts. These efforts include the monitoring of ceasefire agreements, treaty verification, collection of weapons, mine clearing, construction of infrastructure damaged during the fighting, refugee relief and re-establishing political and civil society institutions.

These peace-building activities require intelligence efforts that could become crucial to the stability of political settlements. Although post-conflict intelligence requirements carry a lower intensity and urgency than during the conflict, they nevertheless augment political and economic peace-building efforts.

A special issue in the post-conflict phase is the investigation of war crimes and the prosecution of war criminals. The establishment of the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague has illustrated the importance attached to this issue by NATO, which assisted in apprehending some of the most wanted people on the Tribunal's list. The investigation of war crimes is not only limited to forensic investigations at the crime scenes but goes deeper into the political and military leadership of a conflict, the conduct of politicians and commanders in the field, structure of command, unwritten orders and understandings. Such investigations could benefit enormously from cooperation of regional intelligence services with deep knowledge not only of the location of potential war criminals but also of the way the enemy was operating.

However, the investigation of war crimes is a highly sensitive issue for intelligence services that may perceive that policy as a double-edged sword. War crimes are often perceived as the 'victor's justice' and intelligence services which may themselves

engage in dirty tricks would be reluctant to cooperate over investigations which could, ultimately, expose wrongdoings within their own ranks as well. The wide media exposure of war crimes trials in The Hague illustrate the public importance attached to this issue, which will very likely keep it at the top of post-conflict efforts for the foreseeable future.

An additional issue relating to war crimes is the theft of national heritage and art treasures, the identification of looted assets and illegal war gains. Without intelligence cooperation it would be almost impossible to trace the movement of funds, art works and other looted treasures in a post-conflict phase. In order to combat the theft of art and national heritage treasures, the European Commission, in cooperation with INTERPOL's Art Division and many West and East European police forces, created a special 'Art Loss Register'. The Art Loss Register lists thousands of art works reported as stolen in Eastern Europe. Auction houses, dealers and private individuals can trace through the Register the official ownership of a specific piece of art on offer and thus prevent it being sold within the EU. As a further measure against the movement and sale of such stolen art works, the EU Directive of 1993 requires art works identified as stolen to be returned to their original owners, provided they were classified as 'National Treasures', with a limitation for claims being 30 years³⁴. The work of the Register, together with investigations carried out for the International War Crimes Tribunal, could enable the return of looted assets to their owners and for the benefit of the public.

NATO's supervision of the disarming of the Albanian UCK organisation in the autumn of 2001 demonstrated the value of local intelligence not only for war but also

for missions designed to enhance peace. Local partner intelligence services could assist in monitoring cease-fire agreements and verification of treaties. It also has a role to play in NATO post-conflict humanitarian and reconstruction efforts, similar to those carried out in the former Yugoslavia and in Kosovo.

The above sections examine intelligence requirements that could be addressed by cooperation with intelligence services in the Mediterranean. The following chapter examines practical ways by which NATO-Mediterranean intelligence cooperation could be enhanced.

5 Policy Options for Enhancing NATO-Med intelligence Cooperation

The previous chapter examined policy limitations and operational characteristics affecting Euro-Med intelligence cooperation. This chapter aims to build upon this analysis and present a series of concrete policy options for enhancing and expanding effective Euro-Med intelligence cooperation. These policy options were defined through discussions with numerous experts, former intelligence officials and civil servants in the field of security. Many of the suggestions were followed up by input from other sources, pointing out advantages of deficiencies of each approach. These policy options are not aimed at presenting a ‘turn-key’ approach to enhancing cooperation but rather to stimulate discussion and creative policy initiatives. The policy options discussed in the following sections present a crystallisation of a much larger number of individual initiatives proposed by different persons, each aimed at solving particular problems of enhancing specific issues in the Euro-Med intelligence cooperation.

While some of the options discussed could be implemented individually, on the whole they present a way forward towards an intelligence cooperation framework resilient enough to function on a long-term basis through common interests. Although the recent massive terror attacks against the United States amply demonstrate the wide variety of national interests at play in Middle East security policy-making, an intelligence cooperation framework does not depend wholly on a common threat. Rather it is aimed at creating long-term cooperation in key areas of intelligence, which can be capitalised upon during times of crisis or conflict. As such, it should be considered a long-term policy asset rather than an arrangement for immediate results. The development of mutual institutional confidence and trust, personal relationships between key officials, regular meetings and standardised communications would make a significant contribution to the security interests of Europe. The following sections present policy options for enhancing such a framework by establishing different initiatives that would help develop the institutional basis for future cooperation.

5.1 Intelligence Liaison Officers

Past experience in multinational intelligence cooperation illustrates the value of permanent liaison officers stationed at other countries. Assigning NATO officers as military representatives to Mediterranean countries could be a step perceived by many as an attempt to create NATO policy away from that of the individual member states. The issue of stationing such intelligence liaison officers inside NATO member-state embassies could also create political problems. However, the problematic nature of permanent in-place representation could be overcome by assigning NATO intelligence liaison officers to individual Mediterranean countries that would not be

based at their assigned country but at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. These officers could often visit their country of assignment, creating and enhancing personal contact with the relevant officials and authorities, while avoiding the problematic need to be based permanently at a foreign capital.

5.2 Participation in PfP Initiatives

NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) aims to enhance the relations between NATO and the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Beyond its political functions, the PfP brings together military officials and personnel from the participating countries to participate in a wide range of NATO training courses and study programmes. The participation of East European officers side by side with those of the NATO member countries not only enables the acquirement of skills and training but also greatly contributes to goodwill, understanding and personal relationships. The PfP courses are funded by NATO's regular budget and cover a wide range of topics and military skills, ranging from strategy to logistics, maintenance and troops welfare. Many experts point out that participation in PfP courses and programmes is highly sought after in Eastern European armed forces, and the participants in the courses often gain advantage in their promotion over others with little or no knowledge of NATO.

5.3 Mediterranean Intelligence College

Intelligence as a profession requires a lengthy period of training and education. Training and professional education in the field of intelligence are usually carried out by dedicated institutions belonging to the intelligence services on the national level.

By establishing or helping to found a Mediterranean Intelligence College, NATO could encourage joint intelligence training which could not only imparts operational skills and methods but also establish organizational culture and working norms. This so-called 'service culture' influences the way intelligence professionals perceive the role of their service in society, their attitude towards political control, and the way they perceive regional and global security issues.

NATO has long since recognized the importance of joint training and officer education. By bringing together young intelligence practitioners of different nationalities and services but with similar jobs or responsibilities, not only is future cooperation enhanced but also a common 'culture of cooperation' develops. Such training and education create networks of personal relationships that often go way beyond the professional level. Often junior officers from different nations who attend NATO educational or training programs remain in contact for many years the to as they advanced through their careers. These interpersonal relationships play an important role in maintaining goodwill not only on the political level but also among security officials directly concerned with intelligence cooperation.

5.4 Standardisation of Communications

Effective communications are a key to successful cooperation. Intelligence cooperation frameworks require the communication infrastructure that would enable regular, efficient and secure communications between the cooperating partners. The standardisation of communications between NATO and potential Mediterranean intelligence partners is a requirement for long-term effective relations. While ad-hoc intelligence problems could be solved by existing communication methods, dedicated

systems, similar to those already in use by NATO, could immensely improve the swift transfer of information, in a format that would fit existing NATO modes of operation.

In developing NATO-Med intelligence cooperation frameworks, two approaches could be taken towards the issue of communications. The first would be to incorporate these frameworks into standard NATO communication networks. The second would be to develop dedicated communication networks for the purpose of external intelligence cooperation.

The first approach would be easy and relatively cheap, but carries a potential security risk in exposing NATO secure communications channels to external bodies outside the alliance. The second approach, that of dedicated communication channels, would entail adapting existing standards to external communication channels. NATO already possesses systems that could be adopted for such purposes. The development of NATO's Joint Operation Information and Intelligence System (JOIIS) is seen as a milestone in the progress of intelligence information systems. JOIIS, used by SFOR in Bosnia, processes information in a standard way, making it available for a multitude of tasks and decision-making processes. NATO's Command Control and Consultation Center (NC3A) in Denhagen has a successful history of developing computer systems tailor-made for NATO's strategic and tactical requirement. These developments include, for example, the DARE (Data Access/Retrieval for Entities) computer system for the use of SFOR site inspectors³⁵. Similar development could be applicable for NATO external intelligence cooperation, presenting the information in a format instantly usable by NATO.

5.5 Information Security

Most of the intelligence material going through NATO channels is highly confidential. Indeed much of it, while made available to officials of the various member states, is marked as not for distribution outside the Alliance (“NONFOR”). Intelligence information is provided by member state intelligence services on the understanding that it will not be provided to countries outside the Alliance, possibly risking sources and methods. Much of the concern of member state intelligence services is that security at the services of non-members is lower or not as efficient as that of NATO, making a possible leak of secret information more likely or possible. Herman notes that “all (intelligence) organizations have the usual institutional conviction that no-one else’s work is as reliable as their own”.³⁶

The issue of information security is a crucial one in intelligence cooperation. Secrets would only be provided if the provider were convinced they would remain secret. Every exchange of secrets could threaten the security of intelligence sources, and intelligence chiefs are reluctant to trust new cooperation partners until their reliability has been proven over a period of time. This is especially valid for exchanges with countries of unstable regimes, where change of government could lead to intelligence secrets being made public.³⁷

The issue of information security and integrity could be addressed on a level that would enable countries participating in the PfP or Mediterranean Dialogue access to some forms of NATO material, upon the understanding that it would not be provided to any third party. The development of intelligence cooperation frameworks would depend on developing effective systems of information classification acceptable on

both cooperating sides. It also requires NATO authorities to accept, or at least endorse, the personnel vetting practices and security clearances of potential cooperation partner intelligence services. NATO could, of course, outline basic guidelines for information security, personnel vetting and security clearances. But it would be up to the cooperation partner services to implement those guidelines and to NATO to have confidence in such an implementation. Such confidence is built over an extended period of time but is not impossible to achieve.

5.6 Information on NATO

A paramount barrier towards effective and open cooperation with NATO is the inherent suspicion which exists within official security and intelligence circles in many Mediterranean Arab countries, especially some of the smaller ones, towards NATO and its political agenda in the region. This suspicion is based on the belief that NATO policy is a clear manifestation of Christian European values and follows some hidden agenda against Muslim states. Such beliefs were popular during the first half of the 1990s but declined significantly following the Kosovo campaign, where NATO forces set out to defend the Albanian Muslim population. However, even though NATO seemed to follow a 'pro-Muslim' line in Kosovo, the military campaign against Serbia was perceived by many in the Arab world as foreign intervention demonstrating the military weakness of small countries against the modern military might of a united Europe.

Suspicion towards NATO and its political and religious agendas often rise due to lack of clear understanding as to NATO's structure, mandate and decision-making mechanisms. Peacetime intelligence cooperation between NATO and Mediterranean

countries should therefore aim to overcome these suspicions, in order to create solid ground for open cooperation. Visits by NATO officials to the headquarters of Mediterranean intelligence services and visits of Mediterranean officials at NATO Headquarters and SHAPE could go a long way towards disseminating information on NATO and eradicating prejudices. Effort should also be expanded at providing information on NATO structure and missions to intelligence and political officials, especially at the smaller Mediterranean countries. The provision of such information, coupled with visits to NATO facilities, could go a long way towards allaying the suspicions expressed in official circles towards NATO.

5.7 Training and Education

Another area where cooperation could be developed during peacetime is the field of training and officer education. Under NATO's Mediterranean Partnership, military officers from Mediterranean countries are invited to participate in a range of NATO training courses. This participation could be expanded to intelligence officials, who could be invited to attend existing NATO courses, conducted at various NATO education facilities, including Oberammergau, Rome etc.

The importance of participation in multinational training courses and study programs goes beyond the acquisition of personal skills and information. NATO experience amply demonstrates that the participation of officers from many different nations in joint training courses or study programs create personal relationships between officials, relations which often later turn into expanded goodwill and cooperation. Relations on a personal level are highly important in the intelligence field, where the success of active cooperation is often dependant on mutual trust and reliability.

Beyond participation in existing NATO training and study courses, Mediterranean intelligence officials could be incorporated into special intelligence liaison courses. Those could also include intelligence officials from the Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries in Eastern Europe, thus creating an even wider base for interpersonal interaction and future relations.

6 Conclusions

Despite the euphoria that accompanied the 1993 Oslo Accords and the end of the civil war in former Yugoslavia, the Mediterranean region remains an area characterised by political instability and conflicts. It is also the arena of NATO's first-ever conflict region military operations. NATO forces are stationed at various areas in the Balkans in an attempt to stabilise peace and regional security. The Mediterranean is a potential theatre of operations for NATO and the alliance's intelligence posture in the regional should be strengthened.

Intelligence cooperation is one way of expanding intelligence capabilities in this difficult region. By enhancing such cooperation, NATO would not only be gaining strategic assets and increasing its intelligence collection capabilities but would also make a significant contribution towards regional stability and security. Through the commitment of political will and resources, this intelligence cooperation could assist NATO in bridging its intelligence information gap over the Mediterranean.

This study examined the development of intelligence cooperation frameworks, which served the security interests of the countries involved. In a world where security is measured by knowledge and not only by numbers of tanks or aircraft, not only

everyday security needs but also comprehensive security benefits from closer ties between intelligence services. These services provide information for decision-makers and are therefore in a position to influence policy, directly or indirectly.

Closer contacts between NATO and the intelligence services of individual Mediterranean states could also lead to better intelligence relations within the Mediterranean region itself. This element could be crucial for effective action against terrorism. While it is too early to assess the impact of the recent wave of radical Islamic terrorism on NATO, the alliance did declare it an 'Article 5' attack, the first-ever in NATO's history. NATO intelligence must adapt its range of sources and partners to provide the required information against this new and deadly threat.

External intelligence cooperation could serve peace as much as war. New forms of information are required to support NATO's expanding range of peacekeeping efforts. Recent events in Macedonia demonstrated the need for extensive preparedness if such efforts are to bolster long-term political changes. As intelligence services are moving from being weapons of war towards also serving peace, the role of intelligence cooperation will expand as NATO plans forward to facing new potential challenges in the Mediterranean region.

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Notes:

¹ Herman M., *Intelligence Power in War and Peace*, Cambridge, 1996, p. 204.

Herman has had a distinguished career at GCHQ and later coordinated the activities of the UK Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).

² The countries which independently operate intelligence satellites include the USA, Britain, France, Russia, China, India and Israel.

³ Becher K., 1996, p. 46.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Politi A. (ed.), *Towards a European Intelligence Policy*, Paris, 1998, p. 3-18.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 19-28.

⁷ Ibid, pp. 29-45.

⁸ Shpiro S., *Intelligence Media and Terrorism: Imperial Germany and the Middle East*, *The Journal of Intelligence History*, Summer 2001, pp. 21-35.

⁹ For the development of intelligence as a policy tool see, for example, Shulsky A., *Silent Warfare*, Washington, 1993.

¹⁰ For WWII intelligence cooperation see, for example, Handel M., *Intelligence and Strategy in the Second World War*, London, 1994.

¹¹ The best available source on UKUSA is Richelson J., *The Ties That Bind*, Boston, 1990.

¹² For the political arguments over funding and access rights within UKUSA see, for example, Leigh D., *The Wilson Plot*, London, 1988, pp. 232-233.

¹³ Benyon J., *Policing the European Union*, *International Affairs*, Vol. 70/3, July 1994. Pp. 497-516.

¹⁴ This would not include, however, bilateral agreements that would be outside the European framework.

¹⁵ US intelligence listening post in Buenos Aires was used for monitoring Argentinean communications during the war, the information being provided to the British. See Richelson J., *The US Intelligence Community*, Boulder, 1995.

¹⁶ Information on TRIDENT is available from several publications as well as from an official secret CIA report that was captured by students who stormed the US Embassy building in Teheran in 1979. Although shredded by CIA operatives, the report was painstakingly put together by the Iranians and published in several languages, within 13 volumes of CIA documents. The report, which deals with the Israeli intelligence

services, gives details on TRIDENT and KILOWATT. See *Central Intelligence Agency, Israel Foreign Intelligence and Security Services (Report)*, March 1979, published in full text and edited by Melman Y., Tel-Aviv, 1982, pp. 56-57.

¹⁷ The connection to Ethiopia came about due to CIA operation “KK Mountain” which was aimed at stabilising the regime in Ethiopia against Muslim or communist insurrections. See Cockburn A. & Cockburn L., *Dangerous Liaison*, New York, 1991, pp. 98-101.

¹⁸ Malman & Raviv, 1989.

¹⁹ The hijacking of the Air France flight to Entebbe was carried out by Palestinian and German terrorists. German, Spanish and Irish terror groups were supplied and trained by several Arab states, mainly Libya.

²⁰ For further details see the CIA report mentioned above regarding TRIDENT.

²¹ Some sources suggest that beyond sharing information, some KILOWATT member services also allowed intelligence officers of other KILOWATT members to interrogate imprisoned terrorists, who would normally not be available for interrogation by the agents of another country. See also Shpiro S., *European-Mediterranean Intelligence Co-operation: A Hidden Element In Regional Security*, Athens, 1995, pp. 6-7.

²² The first report on MEGATTONE appeared in the French newspaper *Le Point*, 3 August 1987.

²³ Woodward R., *Establishing Europol*, *European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research*, Vol 1-4, 1993, pp. 7-33.

²⁴ *Ibid*, pp.10-11.

²⁵ *Trevi Programme of Action to the Reinforcement of Police Co-operation and of the Endeavours to Combat Terrorism or other forms of Organised Crime*, June 1990, quoted *ibid*, p. 33.

²⁶ Some DLO’s participated actively even in micro-level operations, right down to taking part in raids and arrests. Interview by the author with former senior German police official.

²⁷ For examples see: Security Service Act 1989 (UK), Secret Intelligence Service Act 1994 and 1996 (UK) BND Gesetz 1992 (Ger.).

²⁸ Informal connections to some intelligence services were apparently also carried out via the Intelligence Section of the WEU.

²⁹ Information on the Brenner Club was obtained at an interview with a senior German intelligence official.

³⁰ For the role of Israeli intelligence in post-Oslo relations with the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation see Karmel H., *Intelligence for Peace*, London, 1999.

³¹ For an extensive account on the development and workings of the UKUSA agreement see Jeffrey Richelson, *The Ties That Bind*, Boston, 1990.

³² Author's interview with former senior Israeli intelligence official.

³³ Through regular consultation with the head of the opposition or similar unwritten, but nevertheless respected, parliamentary customs.

³⁴ Which has been extended to 75 years for art works stolen from churches or museums. B. Freemantle, pg. 217.

³⁵ For DARE and its application within JOIS see *SFOR Informer* No. 75 (also available online as '*SFOR Informer Online*').

³⁶ Herman, 1996, p. 207.

³⁷ Examples where political changes brought about the revelation of intelligence secrets could be seen in the 1979 revolution in Iran, where secret CIA documents were seized at the US Embassy in Teheran and later published by the Republican Guards, also in the 1998 German Unification, which resulted in the public opening of almost the entire archives of East Germany's intelligence services.