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**«The Ethnic-Cultural-Geopolitical Approach to
Formation of the New Limited Russia's Security
System Within a Post-Soviet Space»**

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INTRODUCTION

After the Second World War probably for the first time since the epoch of medieval Crusades the West began to act on the international arena as an integral entity under American leadership.

During the Cold War Western consolidation seemed to be arisen from the necessity to contain Soviet expansion. But after collapse of the Soviet Union Western integration, including the NATO alliance, proved to be vital, stable, voluntary with evident tendency for further enlargement.

In my opinion the West will continue to proceed strategically on the world arena as an entity in the future, one may foresee. The Western nations after many centuries of endless wars with each other became in their ethnic-cultural evolution so matured that abandoned use of force among them. Western integrity in international life is the first principal characteristic of the new coming post-Cold War world order.

The second one may be defined as ethnic-cultural. Under moral influence of the West and after the long historical period of despotism and terrors of communism, the Orthodox Slavic nations among others began to develop their fragile democracies. This process introduced into international life such objective factor as ethnic and cultural sometimes subconscious sympathies of large parts of those nations towards each other. All this may be true in respect of Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Serbs, Bulgarians and others.

Similar phenomenon of ethnic-cultural closeness and gravitation towards the Westerners one may see among majorities of Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Slovenes, Croats, Baltic nations and others. Such a gravitation of those nations is a most powerful stimulus of their states to obtain, for example, the NATO's membership.

In other words the role of ethnic and cultural factors in the post-communist democratizing world is becoming much more significant as compared with previous historical periods. In the past the influence of those factors, though sometimes visible, at large degree was suppressed by absolutist, autocratic or totalitarian state power.

All this means, at present the traditional European “balance of power” theory for explanation of international conduct of states looks obsolete. It has to be supplemented with an approach, which takes into consideration the influence of ethnic-cultural or civilizational identity of any nation upon foreign policy of its national government. But before demonstrating this here on the example of relationships between Russia and Newly Independent States it is necessary to remind main ideas of the balance of power paradigm.

The balance of power theory is based on the recognition and acceptance of the limits of state power. In it accumulation, threat, and if need be use of armed force were considered as necessary instruments of foreign policy.

According to the balance of power world view every strong state aspires to hegemony over other states if its real resources allow to obtain this goal. Thus statecraft consisted in the identification of national interests, the realistic assessment and permanent accumulation of available resources. If the resources are sufficient, a state may realistically pursue the policy of dominance or subordination of other less powerful states.

But if they are not, politicians must strive to enhance the power of their own state by creating explicit or implicit alliances with other weak states. Such a coalition of several states is able to balance hegemonic aspirations of a strong state and to deter its possible use of force. Just this picture of permanent balance of power’s play in international life suits the famous Lord Palmerston’s words. Once he said, that there are no permanent friends or permanent enemies, there are only permanent state interests. In this study I define the balance of power paradigm, like other Western and Russian scholars, as geopolitical approach. At the same time it is known, H.Mackinder and other European inventors of the “geopolitics” term used it in another understanding.

The theory was developed on the basis of real international practice of the European states during the XVII-XIX centuries. During that historical period none of the European big powers, including the Napoleonic France or the Russian Empire, was capable to establish lasting hegemony. Thus as a

rule they had to pursue power politics in international relations. Richelieu, Metternich, Bismark and perhaps few Russian emperors, beginning with Peter the Great, were most skilful statesmen in practicing European realpolitik.

However it must be outlined, during those times rulers of European states owed no allegiance before their peoples. In largely selfsufficient agrarian economies of their countries transnational interests were minimal. The foreign policy sphere was in the hands of small elites, who were often interrelated and shared common values. They shared those values more with each other, than they did with the peoples, they ruled. Thus rulers were almost absolut in their power to conduct foreign policy.

That's why they were able to change easily geopolitical orientation of their own states, to leave a certain alliance of states and to join another one. In short the balance of power foreign policy simply ignored ethnic-cultural nature of states.

Though towards the present time such a situation has changed very much, among some contemporary Western politicians and experts the tradition to perceive the world through the power politics' views is remaining strong. For instance, in the United States the foreign policy's establishment of the Republican party unlike Democrats treats to the balance of power paradigma as to something like international party's ideology. A still leading Republican expert, former Secretary of State H.Kissinger is the most ardent American supporter of this concept. In his numerous and voluminous books he presents power politics as the only right way for conducting successful American foreign policy. The balance of power's picture of the world is also shared by the present national security adviser of the President Bush – Condoleezza Rice. At the same time she believes the main essence of human history is clash of different civilizations.

To my mind the best confirmation of growing role of ethnic, cultural and religious national loyalties in contemporary international life was the NATO air strikes' campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999. At the beginning of it in several Orthodox countries (Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, at lesser degree Romania and others) spontaneous massive public protests took place as manifestation of

solidarity with the Orthodox Southern Slavs – the Serbs. Even Orthodox Greece, a NATO member, happened to be in a mess of such protests. Public opinion in majority of the Orthodox countries also was in favor of the Serbs.

All these public pressures from below upon Orthodox national governments limited their freedom for geopolitical manoeuvring in the situation of international crisis. For instance, the Greek government had to abandon participation in the NATO military operation for preserving stability inside the country despite official support of it.

This spontaneous consolidation of the Orthodox nations in the situation of international crisis in my opinion proved best of all an existence of multicultural or multicivilizational world and of the phenomenon, which a well known Harvard professor S.Huntington and others defined as the Slavic-Orthodox or Orthodox Russian civilization.

At the same time it is to be outlined, in many Orthodox states, including Russia, large parts of political elites and intellectual circles tend to believe in universalism of the Western civilization and want to make their countries members of the West. Huntington introduced for such states with non-Western history, culture, traditions and mainly pro-Western elites a new good term – «torn countries».

Hence the Huntington multicivilizational paradigm proved to be useful methodological instrument for better understanding of the modern democratizing post-Cold War world.

The main ideas of his «clash of civilizations» paradigm are as follows. He is right, contending, that in the post-Cold War world the most significant distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political or economic. They are cultural or civilizational. Culture became both a divisive and a unifying force in international relations.

He perhaps in his «Foreign Affairs»' article (1993) somewhat exaggerated meaning of cultural and religious differences of civilizations as a main cause for permanent conflicts between the peoples, belonging to different of them. But in his bold and provocative book «The Clash of Civilizations and the

Remaking of World Order» (1996) he reasonably became more cautious in this respect.

The monograph contains many new interesting ideas, scientific notions, terms and forecasts. In my opinion the Huntington's whole picture of the multicivilizational world, where different civilizations like earlier the European nation states try to keep balance of power in respect of the most powerful West, is rather an ideal one. Undoubtedly the world is moving to this direction, but there will be many obstacles and crises until this picture becomes reality.

In this introduction it is impossible to cover all Huntington's numerous innovations and ideas. I mention a few of them. Civilization is really the highest cultural grouping of the peoples and the broadest level of their cultural identity. Modernization does not mean automatic Westernization of any non-Western country. Since the Westernization's attempt, undertaken by Peter the Great, almost three centuries have passed. But up to date Russia is still remaining backward and an alien state to the West. Huntington is right, believing the very notion that there could be a «universal civilization» is a Western idea.

The peoples of different civilizations have different systems of basic human values. In my opinion one of the major causes of the Soviet Union's collapse was its multicultural nature and inability of such giant multicivilizational conglomerate to exist under democratic rule.

As Huntington thinks, civilization identity step by step is really growing, for example, inside the Orthodox world. In 1999 Yugoslavia, which is geographically situated far from Russia, initiated the idea of joining the Slavic Orthodox Russian-Belorussian Union. In the spring of 2001 in Orthodox non-Slavic Moldova communists, or better to say, pro-Russian political forces came to power after democratic elections. One of their victorious election campaign's slogans again was joining the Russian-Belorussian Union.

According to Huntington a world of clashing civilizations is inevitably a world of double standards. At present, for example, mass media of Russia, on

one side, and American and European media, on the other, often present contrary estimations of the same international or domestic Russian events.

Huntington presents an interesting and adequate classification of modern civilizations: Western, Orthodox Russian, Islamic, Chinese (Sinic), Japanese, Indian (Hindu), Latin American and possibly African. He is right, that in the post-communist world public and statesmen of any state are less likely to see threats emerging from peoples of other states, whom they can trust because of shared religion, values, language and culture. And they are much more likely to perceive the states, belonging to different cultures, as threatening to them. Also his view, that at present most conflicting zones are intercivilizational fault lines or border-lines between different civilizations, is confirming by real life.

To understand better structure of modern civilizations he introduced new useful notions. The «core state» is a central or main state or one of the main states of any civilization. Such a state is source of order within its civilization. The «cleft country» is the one, population of which is divided in respect of culture and thus it has potential for disunion, like modern Ukraine, and etc.

Huntington is not an inventor of multicivilizational intellectual tradition. At certain degree his concept derives from views of German philosopher O.Spengler, English historian A.Toynbee and other Western scholars.

In Russia a talented study with multicivilizational world's view "Russia and Europe" was written by "latest slavophil" N. Danilevskiy and published even in 1871. Danilevskiy was a scholar with encyclopedian knowledge. In his works he explained first of all that "Europe" is not geographic notion, but cultural-historical one. He compared the European "cultural-historical type" (his synonym of the term "civilization") with the Slavic one and discovered many interesting differences. His dream to create the all-Slavic federation under Russian hegemony and to develop unique Slavic civilization, including all the Slavonic peoples (among them Catholic and Protestant Poles, Czechs, Croats, Slovenes and etc.), today looks Utopian and fantastic.

Towards the end of the XX-th century religious and cultural differences among the Slavs proved to be much more important and separating than their ethnic kin.

Despite Utopian dreams and his anti-German emotions (as a real Russian he had the presentiment of nearing imminent military fight between Germans and Slavs), some of his scientific finds are still remaining their actuality. For example, double standards' treatment of European public towards wars of the European nations and the Russians. Negative European perception of the Russian conquest of the Caucasus in the XIX-th century today is continuing in respect of the war in Chechnya and etc.

Huntington, Dunilevskiy other researchers of multicivilizational intellectual school mostly concentrated on cultural and religious distinctions of different civilizations. They understand that every civilization has a certain period of its existence. Huntington in his book presents a very interesting picture of the civilizational evolution through certain historical phases, developed by C.Quigley.

But those scholars somehow failed to introduce into their analysis an ethnic embodiment of any civilization as a subject, acting in history and slowly changing in its evolution through many centuries.

In my opinion this "white point" may be successfully filled in by the concept of ethnic passionate evolution of a talented Soviet and Russian ethnograph L.Gumilev. He suggested the notion "super-ethnos" as an ethnic synonym of the term "civilization". Any super-ethnos may consist of several more or less equal peoples (ethnoses), like the Western one, which included before the rise of the USA the French, the Spanish, the English, the Germans and etc. Or super-ethnos may have one biggest dominating people and several small ones, for example, the Russian super-ethnos or the Chinese one. Religious, cultural at lesser degree ethnic kin and common or similar environment (geographic landscape) unite different peoples in one super-ethnos. According to Gumilev ethnoses usually have subconscious sympathies with certain ethnoses and negative attitudes to other ones. Usually the peoples

are sympathizing with those ones, who are belonging to the same super-ethnos.

His most interesting scientific finds are clarifying periods of ethnic evolution and even producing the diagram of how level of energy of any super-ethnos is changing through many centuries. He has defined middle age of existence of any super-ethnos (civilization) in 1200-1500 years. During that period a super-ethnos is developing like human organism. It is passing through periods of growth (roughly 300 years); ethnic super-activity usually in the form of external expansion (next 300 years); bloody internal conflicts, when level of ethnic energy decreases in several times from the peak down to "normalcy"; inertia, when science, art, economy and etc. are flourishing; and final slow obscuring and memorizing.

In my opinion the Gumilev's picture of ethnic evolution suits well history of at least the Ancient Romans with the final collapse of the Western Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire, the modern West, Russia and the Russians.

In this study the Gumilev's concept is used mostly in the 1-st chapter for the analysis of the ethnic political evolution of the Russian people as a core nation of the Orthodox Russian civilization and Russia.

Also in the study I used the ideas and works of the best Russian historian of the XIX-th century V.Klyuchevskiy, mainly his concept of the nature of the Russian state as the state "votchina"— full personal domain or patrimony of its rulers. The R.Pipes' "Russia under the Old Regime" book (1974) is still remaining one of the best Western analytic study of the Russian traditional political culture. In it the author further successfully developed and deepened the state-"votchina" Klyuchevskiy's concept. This study also was used.

Thus the ethnic-cultural-geopolitical approach to analysis of the modern post-communist world may be formulated as follows. *Firstly, unlike previous historical era, when a most reliable temporary international partner was a state with current geopolitical common interest to keep existing balance of power and to contain any state-aspirant for hegemony, at present religious, cultural and ethnic affinity are becoming most important criterions of reliability in international life.*

Classical geopolitical state interests in comparison with mutual sympathies and gravitation of the peoples of different states, but of common religion and culture, are short-lived and unstable. The more the post-communist world is democratizing the stronger influence of cultural or civilizational identity of any nation upon its government. And as time goes on and civilizational consciousness grows freedom for geopolitical manoeuvring of the governments even of the torn countries is decreasing.

Thus to create any reliable lasting and effective international alliance or organization, one should involve in them firstly countries with common religion, culture and if possible ethnic kin and loyal governments, secondly the analogous torn countries, and only thirdly the countries of other cultures but with common geopolitical interests. Unlike previous historical era in the post-communist multicivilizational world potential permanent states-friends are appearing and most important permanent interests of the core countries are to make and to keep them as real ones.

Secondly to conduct proper foreign policy one should take into account the age of the civilization, to which this or that country belongs. It is very important especially in the situations, when use of force becomes possible. Among other equal conditions the younger civilizational age of any nation the sooner it may use force and bear human losses.

The main task of this project is to use this approach for clarifying the most reliable partners or allies of Russia and the modern Russians among the New Independent States. For this first of all it is necessary to analyse the ethnic-political evolution of the Russians and to estimate their present state in it. Mostly it is done at the 1-st chapter.

The 2-nd one is devoted mainly to clarifying the most reliable states-partners with the use of quantitative methods. One of the most important characteristics of the NIS in the analysis is treatment of their governments and national majorities towards their countries' Russians. Also national majorities of the CIS countries are estimated from the view of their closeness to the Russians in respect of their religious and cultural belonging, ethnic kin, geographic and climatic regions of living and etc.

The 3-rd chapter is devoted firstly to consideration in general of the official Putin's security policy towards the CIS and the certain pragmatic changes in this sphere, that have already happened after Yeltsin. Secondly, the contours of the new shrunk security system of Russia on the basis of modern state of the Russians in their ethnic-political evolution are presented. Also ethnic-cultural and geopolitical interests of Russia in respect of the CIS countries are formulated. Thirdly, big attention is paid to the failure to stop narco-traffic from Afganistan by Russian military presence in Tajikistan.

In conclusion among other things certain judgements are proposed. They are directed to easing possible collisions with Russia in the hypothetical case of creation of the limited security system and Western security penetration to the post-Soviet space.

Chapter 1

The Ethnic-Political Evolution of the Russian people and Territorial Formation of the Russian Empire

The Soviet Union, as it is known, at large degree inherited the giant territory of the Russian Empire in general besides Poland and Finland – its two most westernized parts.

This giant empire from the Baltic Sea up to Pacific Ocean had been created during XVI-XIX centuries after the rise of the Moscovite centralized state. Towards the end of the XIX-th century Russia as a result of many offensive wars and peaceful peasant colonization managed to become the biggest state in the world in respect of her territory. But despite its giant sizes and numerous multinational population, the Russian Empire remained backward and poor state as compared with the European industrial states or the United States.

Nevertheless the last Russian emperor Nikolas the Second at the beginning of the XX-th century seriously dreamed of new big territorial increases. According to the memories of his former military minister A.Kuropatkin, he wanted “for glory and favour of Russia” to join to his empire: Manchuria (Northern China), Korea, Tibet, Iran and the straits Bosphorus and Dardanelles. In this imperial logic a most surprising thing was following. Russian czar wanted to conquer peoples and states, who and which were absolutely alien for the Russian people in respect of ethnicity, culture, religion, climate, geography, natural conditions and etc.

Moreover, at present such imperial dreams look fantastic. Naturally the following questions one may ask. Why did Russia during four centuries, ignoring big human losses and permanent domestic poverty, with great persistence widen its territory? What imperial logic had her rulers in the process of endless territorial enlargement?

For finding answers for these questions and better understanding of contemporary national interests of Russia in respect of the Newly Independent States (NIS) it is necessary to consider first of all the ethnic-

political evolution of the Russian people essentially on the basis of the Gumilev's concept.

1.1. Some peculiarities of the Ancient Rus

The Eastern Slavs slowly inhabited drainage-basins of many large rivers of the big East-European plain. Those rivers slowly run in meridional, north-south direction and through them it is possible with use of easy portages to navigate from the Baltic Sea to the Black or Caspian seas. Ancient Russian statehood appeared just along the waterway, which connected the Baltic Sea and Scandinavia with the Black Sea and Byzantium.

Towards the end of the first millennium A.D. the East-European plain was a giant territory with many wild deciduous and coniferous forests, poor soil, severe continental climate, short summer and long frosty winter. Probably because of such hard climate, inhabitants of the Byzantine Empire, which had several cities-colonies along the Northern Black Sea coast, did not colonize this near agricultural region and did not bring high Roman culture there.

Thus unlike medieval Western Europe with its warm climate, good natural conditions for agriculture and heritage of high Roman culture, the Kievan Rus of the IX-XII centuries of the Christian era was an archaic primitive state of the Eastern Slavs.

Also unlike Europe from the beginning of the Ancient Rus the natural environment, where early Russians lived, was a big plain without any mountains, with many slow rivers, wild forests or a mixed forest-steppe geographic zone near Kiev and with hard continental climate.

In the Kievan Rus with its giant plain wild territories, not numerous population and severe climate land was not a symbol of wealth like in Europe. First Russian princes considered cattle, especially herds of horses, and slaves as real wealth. They saw their most reliable subjects not in free men, like in Western Europe (vassals), but in slaves, who worked in their domains, partly consisted of their troops and ruling staff. Even Orthodox church after its adoption by the Rus was not able to limit spread of slavery. Church managed only to soften most brutal forms of slavery.

But it would be a mistake to think that the Ancient Rus was merely a dark slavish society. Strong primitive democratic tendencies and freedoms severely limited autocratic-slavish political culture of princes. After a disintegration of the Kievan Rus in the XII-th century the Russian land converted into several almost independent self-ruling principalities. Every of such semi-states was headed by self-ruling gathering of inhabitants of a central big city, which was called "veche". Contemporary Russian St.-Petersburg's historian I.Froyanov even calls such cities – "republics".

Ancient Russian understanding of personal freedom meant the right and possibility to move periodically from one place of service to another, from one prince to another.

Ensuring national security already at those historical times meant to guard a vital center (city) of state by giant territories of the East-European plain from permanent invasions of predatory nomadic Asian tribes from the steppe or from real and potential aggressors. In this sense the Kiev's region, that was geographically situated on the border between the forest and the steppe, was very vulnerable.

Mostly because of such security reasons massive migration of the Slavic population from the Kiev's region to the North-Eastern Rus took place in the XII-th century. There on the territory between Volga and Oka rivers numerous Slavs met with more primitive Finnish tribes, assimilated them and in a such way a nucleus of the contemporary Russian people appeared.

Surprisingly this medieval Russian national security logic was dominating during many centuries until Gorbachev and collapse of the Yalta post-World War II system.

1.2. The first stages of the ethnic-political evolution of the Russians

The XIII-XV-th centuries were a period of formation and strengthening the new, young, active Russian ethnic entity. Because of the Mongol-Tatar yoke and permanent struggle with Lithuania, Tatar and Lithuanian ethnic components also were added in upper circles of the Russians. At the same time during those three centuries the Russians managed to become a strong

state-forming nation but with a very specific method of their ethnic energy's realization.

This formative period also corresponds to the Gumilev's concept. According to it, from the moment of a mutable appearance of the new ethnos' nucleus until this ethnos achieves a peak of his super-activity, roughly three centuries have to pass.

The origins' moment of the modern Western super-ethnic entity one may see in the times of creation of the Charle the Great Christian empire somewhere towards the end of the VIII-th century. Accordingly the West obtained the peak of its ethnic super-activity by the end of the XI-th century. Really, it was the time of the First Crusade to recover the Holy Land from the Saracens.

According to Gumilev during this historical period the activity of an ethnic entity is higher in several times as compared with the periods of "normalcy". It happens because new ethnos gives birth to the mass of super-active individuals, who are ready to change the world, to fight and to die even for abstract ideas or ideals. Gumilev called such persons - "passionate" ones. Such periods of super-activity often are entering in history as times of romantic heroism.

In European history really heroic crusaders pursued an abstract idea "to liberate the Holy Land" and majority of them, if not to say vast majority, really perished.

The Russian young ethnos achieved his peak of super-activity by the end of the XV-th century under the rule of the first Russian czar Ivan III. At that time the Russians (Moscovites) easily conquered Novgorod the Great, a reach mercenary republic, which had close trade relations with German Baltic ports. Also in 1480 the Moscovite state officially got rid of the Mongol-Tatar yoke.

In ethnic-political sense the origins of the Russians differed from formation of the Western peoples. European kings had no authority over private property of their subjects. Moreover, they understood well, the wealthier their subordinates were the stronger their state was. Hence they gave personal economic and if need be political freedom for their subordinates for the sake

of increasing incomes, which were received from their subjects. European history was moving in the direction of step by step abolition of serfdom.

Contrary to this, the Moscow's Great princes and czars widened primitive political attitudes of their Kiev's predecessors. Gradually they suppressed all ancient Russian freedoms, including first of all self-governing public gatherings of cities' inhabitants. With the help of the Tatars their ancient autocratic-slavish political culture began to dominate.

Step by step the Moscow's rulers began to treat to their state, its territory and population as to their full private property or their own domain or in Russian definition – their personal "votchina" (patrimony). This very important historical discovery was made in my opinion by the best Russian historian V.Klyuchevskiy in the end of the XIX-th century. His state–votchina concept was the main in his very analytic course of lectures of Russian history. This concept helps to understand and to explain many things in Russian domestic and foreign policy during many centuries.

R. Pipes perhaps for better understanding of Western readers defines the Moscovite votchina-type's state as "patrimonial" one. And he is very right in his judgements that in such a state ruler at the same time is owner of his state and authority over people and over material objects is combined without any separation.

From such an attitude towards a state it is easy to come to the following conclusion. If in own domains (patrimonies) of the Russian princes most reliable servants were slaves ("kholopy"), in all the votchina state all its population, despite social ranks, also must be kholopy in respect of state power without any civil rights. Only patrimonial state was the most stable strong and reliable one in the eyes of the Russian czars. This logic explains why Moscow's rulers slowly suppressed all ancient Russian freedoms and converted all their subordinates into the state kholopy. Limited slavery slowly was spreaded upon much of peasants and converted into serfdom.

On the other hand, such logic simply excludes economic dimensions of state power and operates merely quantitative ones. *In short, the more population a state has in its possession, the stronger it is. And because of a*

slavish position of state subjects, the easiest way to increase their number is not to take care of them, but to conduct offensive wars for enlargement state territory and population.

Also this logic ignores ethnic, cultural, climatic, geographic belonging of conquering peoples and territories. The main goal - to increase their number.

If now to recollect essence of the ancient Russian understanding of national security, it is easy to come to the following conclusion. *For the sake of strengthening the Russian state and its national security it was necessary to enlarge its territory and population as much as possible by conducting numerous offensive wars. Agrarian backward character of Russia guaranteed for her rulers high birth rate of essentially peasant population. In its turn, it allowed them to conduct such wars, ignoring heavy human losses.*

This my conclusion helps to answer questions, that have been put at the beginning of this chapter. The last Russian emperor had so fantastic plans for territorial enlargement of his empire, because like his predecessors he simply wanted to strengthen it and its national security.

In this study I define this logic of foreign policy as the Russian Imperial logic. One may say, that it is the same as the logic of European Empires. In my opinion there is a principal difference – slavish position of population of Russia in respect of state power (equality in slavery) and as a consequence its poverty.

In other words, such a position means that any private or collective business activity, directed to increasing somebody's wealth, will be perceived as a direct challenge to state power, that must be suppressed. Russian autocratic rulers from first czars up to Communist general secretaries as a rule did not understand one simple truth. Despite all efforts and attempts to modernize the country, their treatment to own population as to state slaves simply doomed Russia to be backward and poor.

On the other hand, majority of the early Russians somehow step by step accepted such treatment, refused to be self-sufficient individuals like Westerners and to bear personal responsibility for own destiny. They idolized

very much of their czars and considered them as their "fathers, who are taking care of us". In reality those "fathers" at best ignored their subjects.

In official documents even high ranking Russians defined themselves as the "czar's kholopy (slaves)". In autocratic-slavish political culture to call themselves by such humiliating definitions and to demonstrate permanent selfhumiliating and servile behavior before the rulers became the best way of proving loyalty before them.

The medieval Moscovite rulers suddenly for them received in their possession the young Russian people with good national features: patriotism, courage, persistence, hardiness, tolerance and readiness to bear heavy losses. In short, the young nation happened to be an ideal ethnic material for armed forces, ideal soldiers.

Rulers converted de-jure free men (nobles) into military servicemen, who were obliged without any protests or consent to go to war, if rulers ordered it. For their service czars began to give them land with villages for provisional use. National interest to defend enlarging territory from continuing Tatar invasions from the steppe also stimulated it. Hence from the beginning the Moscovite Russia was like a big military camp.

Where did czars direct the Russian ethnic super-energy to? *According to the Russian Imperial logic and autocratic-slavish political culture this direction was to be only one. This super-activity was channeled not for internal improvement, but for merely permanent territorial expansion by war and by peaceful colonization.*

But before confirming this conclusion by real numbers, it is to be told a few words about the Russian Cossacks, because of their great role in widening of Russian borders.

1.3. About the Russian Cossacks

In Russian and Soviet historical science Cossacks usually were presented as organized groups of armed robbers, who lived in the steppe, were free from state control and essentially were formed from the escaped Russian peasants and criminals. But this view did not explain, why the Cossacks were so skilful cavalrymen and good warriors as compared with peasants.

In my opinion, A.Gordeev, being a descendant of the White Cossack's emigrants, gave a more reliable view on the Cossacks' origins. His works recently were published in Russia.

The Tatars after forcing their yoke upon the Russian land in the middle of the XIII-th century besides money tribute began to take 1/10 of the Russian population to the steppe, where they created their Golden Horde nomadic state. It continued near a century. According to Gordeev, in the steppe part of those Russians under Tatar command was trained as cavalymen and border-guards. The Tatars did not try to assimilate the Russians, kept their language, Orthodox religion and even their spiritual subordination to the Moscovite metropolitan. Russian small military villiges – "khutora" appeared in the steppe, where Russians besides military service bred cattle and horses, fished and hunted. Like nomadic peoples they were prohibited from farming, because it distracted them from their main activity – military cavalry service. The steppe Russians adopted from nomads certain habits, clothes, partly language, sometimes wives. So in a such way, that seems to be true, a new specific Russian subethnos – the Cossacks arose.

The appearance of the Cossacks among other things meant that the Russian ethnos on the whole widened his natural geographic space of living (or according to Gumilev "the containing landscape"). Since the XV-th century in addition to traditional forest and mixed forest-steppe plains it began to include also the steppe geographic area with long hot arid summer and frosty winter. Later Cossacks became the leading force in the process of joining to Russia different steppe regions of Eurasia.

The Tatars created several border-lines of Russians. One was established along the Dnieper river. The Dnieper Russian Cossacks already in the XIV-th century were absorbed by the widening warlike Lithuanian Principality. Later their territories became a part of the joint Polish-Lithuanian state. Though at present those Cossacks are called "Ukrainian" in historical works, in reality Poles called them and they called themselves "Russians" during XIV-XVII centuries. On the European maps of those times their territory also was marked as the "Russian land". Later in the middle of the XVII-th century they

rebelled against hegemony of the Catholic Polish-Lithuanian state to save their Russian land and Orthodox religion.

Another border-line was created along the Don river. Since the beginning the Don's Cossacks gravitated to Moscow. After dissolution of the Golden Horde a lot of them moved to the territory of the Moscow's state. But there, according to Gordeev, being at the military service of Moscow's rulers, they were very impressed by slavish obedience of the Russian people to central power and its despotism. Since those times the main care of the Russian Cossacks became - how to save themselves from despotism of central Russian power and to escape converting into de-facto state slaves like other population.

In my opinion this Gordeev's observation is very right. Undoubtedly the Cossacks were a most active, courageous, freedom loving part of the Russian people. They kept primitive democracy and self-ruling. Their leaders – "atamany" were elected and bore responsibility before common Cossacks.

Many Cossacks as well as a mass of the most adventurous enterprising peasants to keep their freedom had to escape from despotism of central power to far frontier regions: the steppe, the Russian North, Siberia and etc. Giant Russian territories, weak communications, absence of good roads really gave them chances to minimize the czars' control. By so doing those passionate men widened peacefully the territory of the Russian state.

Again there is a principal difference between Russians and Europeans in general stimulus of colonization of new territories. Partly because of land shortages in Europe many adventurous Europeans moved to far America first of all to receive free lands of the wild continent with warm climate in full private property. In Western civilization land-owner's (or other property-owner) status and hard work are fundamental values and guaranties of freedom, independence and respectable social position of any man in human society.

1.4. Historical realization of the ethnic super-energy of the Russians

During the XVI-XIX centuries, while the Russians were on the peak of their ethnic energy, conducting offensive wars for territorial enlargement became a

usual way of conducting foreign policy.

To prove it in this study I made special calculations. I used the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, the reference book of contemporary Russian researcher V. Pokhlebkina, covering all Russian wars during 1000 years, other sources as data base. Making my calculations, I tried to take into account not official periods of wars until the time of reaching peace, but rather periods of merely active military fight. Finally the following picture appeared.

During the XVI-th century the Moscovite state spent in general 55 years for conducting offensive wars and only 8 years for defensive ones. Often offensive military operations were conducting simultaneously in different geographic directions.

The main offensive war was the Livonian one for the sake of reaching territorial access to Eastern coasts of the Baltic Sea and development of direct sea trade with Western Europe. For this it was necessary to conquer the German Livonian state, inheritor of the Teutonic-Livonian Order of German knights-crusaders. Russia spent 25 years in this war and was defeated.

At the same time Russia successfully conquered the Tatar khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan, the remains of the collapsed Golden Horde. After that massive migration of Russian peasant population to the steppe began to be far from the Moscow's despotism.

At the beginning of the XVII-th century so called «Dark time» happened in Russia. The old ruling Rurik's dynasty broke off. In the situation without any brutal «legitimate» czar (their master or their owner) the Russians became confused, internal disorders began.

The Poles and others decided to use Russian weakness, invaded and attempted to force a new Catholic dynasty upon the Russians. Russia had to spend 14 years to defeat this aggression and finally to elect by "all land" a new young czar. In a such way the new Romanov's dynasty began to rule.

Despite tragic and devastating "Dark time" during the XVII-th century Russia was taking part in offensive wars for 34 years. The most long and bloody offensive wars were with Poland and Turkey after Ukraine (the Army

of Ukrainian Cossacks with their territory – roughly territory of the modern Central Ukraine) voluntarily joined to Russia in 1654.

Towards the middle of that century the Russian Cossacks and land-conquerors ("zemleprokhodtsy") already reached coasts of the Pacific Ocean. They needed only roughly 70 years, since the time of crossing the Ural by the first small Ermak's army of Cossacks, to reach the Amur and Chukotka and to join to Russia giant territories of Siberia and Far East.

In my opinion Russians managed so fast to penetrate those giant geographic regions mostly with cold climate, because firstly they met traditional for them the plain forest, forest-steppe landscape with many slow rivers and without high mountains. Like their Eastern-Slavonic ancestors the Russians erected their first towns there along shores of long Siberian rivers. Secondly, they did not meet any strong resistance because of absence of any nation in such very severe and cold natural conditions.

During the XVIII-th century Russia perhaps achieved the highest level of its military expansion and ethnic super-energy of the Russians. At the beginning of that century a brutal shallow attempt to westernize the country was undertaken by Peter the Great. According to the Russian Imperial logic all his modernization mostly was realized in build-up of the strong Russian navy and the numerous regular modern army. Before his reforms military expenses neared a half of state budget, by the end of his reign they increased up to 75% of it, while the size of state budget more than tripled.

Russia spent 44 years in offensive wars during the XVIII-th century and only 5 years in defensive ones. After the victorious Northern 21 years' war with Sweden Peter the Great returned Eastern coasts of the Baltic Sea and opened «window» to Western Europe.

As a result of four Russian-Turkish wars Russia reached the Black Sea, joined the Crimea and territory of the Near Northern Black Sea's regions, which were called Novo-Rossia (the modern Southern Ukraine). Also Russia together with Austria and Prussia took part in three divisions of Poland and as a consequence joined Belorussia and the Right bank's Ukraine.

The XIX-th century on one hand was a continuation of the peak of conquering super-energy of the Russian Army. On the other hand, during the second half of that century evident signs of entering the Russian people into the fracture's stage in his ethnic evolution with sharp domestic civil conflicts appeared.

During the XIX-th century Russia was participating in offensive wars for 58 years and in defensive ones only for 3 years. Again there were four wars with Turkey, including the lost humiliating Crimean war of 1853-1855. That war demonstrated all backwardness of the Russian navy and weapons in comparison with the sameness of industrial European countries. A direct result of that lost war became the abolition of serfdom in Russia in 1861.

The main results of the Russian-Turkish war of 1887-1888 were very positive. Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Romania received state independence. In history of the Czarist Russia before World War I it was the only war, when Russian public really influenced ruling circles to unlish fight "for liberation of our Orthodox brethren from Turkish Muslim yoke". But later "Bulgarian brethren" participated in two World Wars on the side of Germany against Russia.

During that century Russia conquered two geographic regions, that were very alien in all aspects for the Russians: the Caucasus and Central Asia. 47 years were necessary for the conquest of the Caucasus. The Caucasus' war was brutal, long and bloody. Paradox of it was that Russia had no national or strategic interests in the Caucasus at all. If, for example, the Crimean Tatar khanate periodically invaded Russia until its annexation, the Caucasus was not such a military threat. Russian ruling circles often stated there were not any practical needs to join the Caucasus. General A.Ermolov, who began the Caucasus' war in 1817, outlined alien regional climate (hot, damp, subtropical) for the Russian soldiers. It promoted spreading many diseases among them and their high death-rate. He also wrote that fear was the only mean to get submission of warlike mountaineers, among whom most aggressive were Chechens. Later the former officers, who took part in that war, emphasized heroism, courage, fighting malice and even humor after

hard battles of Russian soldiers. Usually mountaineers had much more losses than the Russians.

In other words, if to recollect that the Russian Army in ethnic sense mainly was Russian, all these meant the Russians really was on the peak of their expansive super-energy.

A weak justification for the Caucasus' war was voluntary joining to Russia of several small Georgian Orthodox principalities (different parts of the modern Georgia) at the beginning of the XIX-th century. They did not want to be under Iranian or Turkish Muslim hegemony. Russia at first introduced her troops to Georgian Tras-Caucasus' region and later decided to link it with main Russian territory by conquest of all the Caucasus, including mostly Muslim North-Caucasus' half-barbarian and very hostile peoples. Finally such a linkage took half a century of brutal bloody war.

The conquest of the Central Asia during 1860-1880-ths was much more easy. Regional Turks happened to be not so militant as the Caucasus' peoples were. They did not represent any threat for Russia. And again Russia had no national or strategic interests in joining that region. It situated very far from Russian natural territories and occupied alien for the Russians geographic zone with very hot summer almost without raining in the sandy deserts, with a few rivers and permanent water shortages, the cultivated and region's most populous Ferghana Valley and many high rocky and snow mountains.

In respect of culture and religion Central Asia was even more far from the Russians as compared with the Caucasus, where several small Orthodox peoples were living. The conquered khanates of Kokand and Khiva and the Emirate of Buckhara with their ancient Eastern cities Samarkand, Buckhara, Tashkent and others were an integrated cultural region, the Northern center or border of the medieval settled Muslim civilization.

A main reason of the Central Asia's conquest was not national interest. The imperial government simply wanted after humiliating defeat in the Crimea to demonstrate before Europe and first of all before the British Empire that the Russian Army was still strong. According to the Russian Imperial logic to prove this it was necessary to widen further state's territory. And even in such

a situation the government hesitated, but regional Russian troops and their officers began the conquest on their own, without official confirmation from St.-Petersburg. So strong was ethnic super-activity of the Russians.

Thus the conquest of the Caucasus and Central Asia was a display of inertia of the governmental Russian Imperial logic, of conquerable super-energy of the Russian Army, of high birth-rate of agrarian population and nothing more. And I absolutely agree with V. Klyuchevskiy, who more than a century ago wrote, that by joining those regions Russia had gone out of her natural borders.

If to summarize ethnic super-activity of the Russians during the XVI-XIX centuries with numbers, the following picture appears. During that historical period Russia was participating in offensive wars for the sake of territorial enlargement for 191 years and in defensive ones only for 30 years. In general she was taking part in active military hostilities for 221 years from 400. These numbers need not any comments.

Since the times of Peter the Great (the first quarter of the XVIII-th century) Russia was becoming a "torn country", according to the Huntington's definition. The ruling Romanov's dynasty, nobility and later majority of intelligentsia were westernizing, on one side. They consisted just a small minority of all population. But vast majority of mostly agrarian population was remaining in its traditional culture and life, on the other side.

The Romanovs saw a most reliable way of their europenization in their germanizing. As a rule they married German princesses and in ethnic sense quickly became Germans. Under them the state's bureaucracy also became predominantly German. The Germans began to rule the giant multinational empire, which was based on the Russians. The German Romanov's origins did not deprive them of deep complex of psychological inferiority before Europe. They also began to prove their European belonging by many offensive wars in coalitions with different European states in the spirit of balance of powers. Those wars often ignored real national interests of Russia, but lead to heavy losses.

Between the germanized dynasty and westernized elite of Russia, on one side, and many millions of the common Russians and other peoples, on the other, a sharp cultural and ethnic gap and deep mutual mistrust arose. Later during the Civil war many Russian officers were shocked to get to know how the mass of their former soldiers hated them. Some of them began to realize that such a hatred was a result of many centuries of slavish status of the Russian peasants.

Moreover, during imperial period the Russians step by step was converting into discriminated ethnic majority of the empire. At the beginning of the XX-th century the number of its multinational population exceeded 150 millions, the Russians consisted less than half of it. Near 20 millions of non-Russian peoples were excused from military service, because their men were not reliable soldiers. The regions with mostly Russian population paid the biggest taxes. The Poles and the Finns had their constitutions, the Russians could only dream of it and etc.

Again unlike the European Empires, the Russians as the only state-forming nation became in many respects less privileged in comparison with many empire's national minorities. It was a direct consequence of the patrimonial nature of the Russian Empire.

According to Gumilev, after historical period of as a rule external ethnic super-activity comes the stage of "fracture" in ethnic evolution with its deep internal civil conflicts and wars. In history of the West such a period began since the Reformation with its sharp conflicts and bloody fight between Catholics and Protestants somewhere in the XVI-th century.

During that period a super-active or passionate mass of individuals of any ethnos or super-ethnos is becoming split and different parts of that mass fight and kill each other under any pretext. As a result of perishing super-active ethnic mass in revolutions and civil wars, the level of energy of the whole ethnos drops in several times from the peak down to the level of "normalcy".

Russia and the Russians entered into such a period in 1905, when the first revolution began. But before it evident signs of nearing the fracture's period appeared during the second half of the XIX-th century. There were among

them: creation of the revolutionary parties, which used terrorism, assassination of the emperor Alexander II, many acts of terror against state's officials, creation of the Social-Democratic party, headed by Lenin, and etc., on one side. And conducting many oppressive and police measures against revolutionaries by the imperial government, on the other.

At the beginning of the XX-th century the situation worsened. During 1901-1911 years near 17 thousands of men were killed by revolutionaries and terrorists, including a single more or less successful westernizer of Russian peasantry in history – Prime minister P.Stolypin.

In 1917 the Bolsheviks-internationalists, headed by Lenin, skilfully used cultural and social split of the Russians, hatred of common people towards upper circles among other things for seizing power.

1.5. About the Soviet period

During revolutions and brutal bloody Civil war the Bolsheviks exterminated much of the Russian westernized elite (the Romanov's dynasty, state officials, officers, academical scholars, nobles, merchants, Orthodox clergy and etc.). They attempted to replace it as a new ruling class of the Soviet Russia. But mostly they failed.

Stalin managed to use the Cheka, the revolutionary mashine of massive terror, against the Bolsheviks themselves. During purges of the 30-ths years he executed vast majority of the Bolsheviks' elite and established personal dictatorship. After all stormy revolutionary years instead of the westernized Germans a typical Eastern Georgian despot began to rule the empire.

The common Russians, who in their majority supported the Bolshevik's revolution with its attractive slogans "to liberate labour and all suppressed", found themselves in more worse situation as compared with many national minorities and the old czarist regime. Unlike many non-Russian peoples the Russians within the USSR had not their national republic, Academy of sciences, radio, TV and even ... communist party. The multinational Russian Soviet Federation was converted into economic "milking cow" for national Soviet republics. Stalin's GULAG restored the system of official state slavery with much more cruelty in comparison with the czarist serfdom.

The World War II demonstrated well how the bloody communist Stalin's regime was unpopular among the Soviet people, including the Russians. To save it from destruction by the Nazi Germany the communist despot had to appeal to traditional Russian patriotism. He "rehabilitated" in history the famous czarist Russian generals – Suvorov, Kutuzov, Nakhimov and others, established orders, named after them, as high ranking awards for the military. He almost restored uniform of the czarist officers with its "golden" shoulder-straps to rise prestige of the Soviet officers. He even had to restore the Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox church, which was abolished by Peter the Great. Since 1943 the Red Army began to defeat Germans.

But it would be a great mistake to see in the Soviet past only dark sides. Undoubtedly the Stalin's regime gave an opportunity for tens of millions of common people, including Russians, to get high and higher institute's education. Under Stalin's leadership industrialization was conducted for ... ten years. Communists liberated creative energy and labour enthusiasm of the youth of mostly agrarian population. During industrialization's years many sons of Russian peasants quickly proved to be talented engineers, factories' managers, designers.

Also under communist leadership the Soviet Union quickly became industrial-agrarian society. Urbanization, fast development of new big industrial cities was a main feature of the Soviet life. Since the 50-ths urban Soviet population exceeded agrarian one. And again the Russians took leading positions in the process of urbanization. As a result the birth rate of the Russians decreased very much. Before the Second World War an average Russian peasant woman gave birth usually for ten children, from whom roughly a half grew up to adult age.

Among other things it gave the opportunity for the Stalin's regime to treat to the Soviet soldiers without any mercy and to ignore giant human losses during the World War II.

After that war survived children of such a woman, while living in cities, as a rule had two or at best three children in their families.

Evident leading role of the Russians in industrialization and during the World War II forced the supranational all-Union Communist ruling circles to recognize officially that the Russian people was "elder brother" of all other "socialist" nations.

But despite such symbolic recognitions the Russians was remaining discriminated national majority within the USSR without their even symbolic statehood, Academy of sciences, communist party and etc. Common citizens of the Russian Soviet Federation knew very well, that inhabitants of many national Soviet republics had much higher living standards than they had.

In my opinion Gorbachev simply did not realize such unequal status of the Russians within the USSR. When he allowed limited democracy for the Soviets, the first Russian Federation's big parliament in 1990 immediately voted for separation from other republics and transformation of the Soviet Union into something like confederal alliance.

"Parent state" left its "colonies". It was the main cause of the final disintegration of the Soviet Union. And again there was sharp contrast with the model of collapse of the European Empires, where colonies usually after bloody long fight separated from a metropolis' state.

Chapter 2

Russia, the Russians and the New Independent States

The Soviet Union like earlier the Russian Empire was the giant multicultural, multireligious, multiethnic, multiclimate conglomerate also with different geographic landscapes. In the North-West of it the Baltic republics and peoples represented typical culture and values of the Western civilization. In the South the Central Asian republics objectively were belonging to the Northern area of the settled Muslim civilization. In the West, Belarus and Ukraine mainly represented Western regions, if not to say Western borderline, of the Slavic-Orthodox world.

Like czarist Russia the Soviet power managed to keep together all this giant diversity of cultures, peoples and geographic regions by force, by violent methods of state rule. During the Soviet period this diversity at certain degree was suppressed. The Communist regime even proclaimed that the Soviet people became a "new historical community", in which ethnic and cultural differences were not important. The all-Union Communist supranational leadership wanted to assimilate all cultures and peoples with the help of, as they believed, special Soviet culture. In reality it was rather the Russian industrial culture.

As I attempted to prove at the 1-st chapter, all those diversity and giantism were the results of a very specific period in history. During that four centuries' period the Russians, as a most numerous and single state-forming nation, were being on the peak of their ethnic activity. And the ruling circles of Russia mainly was guided by the Russian Imperial logic in their foreign policy.

After dissolution of the Soviet Union all its cultural, religious and ethnic diversity immediately began to revive. And the Russians quietly without any resistance accepted its death unlike the collapse of the Russian Empire seven decades ago.

Thus to understand contemporary national interests of Russia, including its security interests, in respect of the "near abroad" countries, it is necessary

first of all to clarify the modern state of the Russian people in his ethnic-political evolution.

2.1. The modern state of the Russians in their ethnic-political evolution

At first glance the Russians towards the end of the XX-th century have passed through much of the bloody fracture's phase in their ethnic-political history. Though according to Gumilev the most active period of this phase usually is lasting roughly 150 years, the World War II with its giant losses as an important external factor brought serious shortenings of it for the Russians.

In the first half of the XX-th century revolutionary terrorism, three revolutions, two World Wars, long and bloody Civil war, starvation and the Bolsheviks Stalin's terror took away lives of tens of millions of Russians as well as millions of other peoples. It is well known, during the revolutionary, civil war and war times the mass of most active, patriotic, honest or passionate individuals is perishing first of all.

Like in the evolution of other ethnoses, as a result of such giant losses among super-active human mass the level of ethnic energy of the Russians and all super-ethnos of Russia dropped down in several (roughly four) times. During four centuries of territorial expansion and mainly in storms and turmoils of the XX-th century the Russians have spent at large degree their surplus ethnic energy. In other words the many centuries' period of military imperialism in Russian history has passed once and forever. Also it means at present restoration of any superpower like the Soviet Union by force is objectively impossible.

There are many practical confirmations of this conclusion's validity in the current life of Russia and the NIS. During the conquest of the Caucasus in the XIX-th century Russian soldiers and Cossacks fought with enthusiasm, courage and ... jokes after the battles. Russian officers held offensive initiative in their hands. At present the war in Chechnya looks like defensive one, when Russia is defending against active Chechen terrorists. Russian soldiers and officers are taking part in the war with big reluctance. Different Russian

militia's units in Chechnya are replaced frequently, in two or three months. The local Cossack's population is not able for any resistance at all. They are leaving their towns and villages, which under Soviet power happened to be within the Chechen republic and where their ancestors were living for centuries.

Russia on the whole remained indifferent to the Yeltsin's coup d'état of 1993. Despite evident split of the Moscovite political elite at that point in time, that event did not produce any civil conflicts across the country, not to speak of civil war. Also widely spread discontent with the Yeltsin's regime did not instigate any acts of terror against state officials, like it has been at large scale a century ago.

Moreover, since the dissolution of the Soviet Union the number of the population of the Russian Federation is decreasing annually by near one million. The Yeltsin's regime pretended there was not such a problem at all. Putin began to speak openly and officially recognized annual population's losses in 700 thousands.

According to official state statistics in 2000 the number of population decreased by 750 thousands of persons and at the beginning of 2001 consisted only 144,8 millions. If this tendency prevails in the nearest future, towards 2016 only 134,4 millions will remain at the country. Today the death rate in Russia is two times higher than the birth one. If to recollect that the Russians now consist 82-85% of all the population of Russia, it becomes clear all Russia's demographic numbers mostly are their ones.

Central TV networks often reports, that in province commissariats have to call up for military service the young men, who are not healthy and exhausted because of malnutrition. They are not able to be soldiers, and during first several months of their "military service" the Army has simply to feed them properly for recovering.

Thus, towards the beginning of the XXI-st century the Russians have already spent much of their surplus ethnic energy and even during peaceful time turned out to be in the situation of deep demographic crisis. Now the time comes for recovery after the turbulent XX-th century.

In other words at present general objective national interest of Russia - to stop decrease of her population and to stimulate its high birth rate. Democratization, market economy, economic growth are only the means for realization of it. In international life it means among other things minimizing as much as possible all foreign security obligations first of all in respect of the NIS. The main goals of such minimizing to exclude if possible losses among Russian soldiers and to economize financial expenses for foreign policy's needs.

Such minimizing also means clarifying most reliable state partners and allies in different regions of the post-Soviet territory, where Russia in cooperation with them will be able to keep minimal necessary influence and if need be presence.

2.2. The attitudes of the NIS towards Russia and the Russians

To clarify closest and reliable partners of Russia among post-Soviet states I conceived eight different characteristics. They consist of three groups and may be estimated by numbers. The first group includes geographic, ethnic-cultural and historical characteristics. The second one is characterizing merely the attitudes towards Russia and the Russians. The third group unites modern geopolitical and security orientations of the NIS.

Every characteristic has its quantitative index. The more close or near any characteristic to proper ones of Russia and the Russians the higher its quantitative expression and vice versa. Negative discriminating treatment, for example, towards the Russians of the government of any country is estimated with the zero mark - 0. Positive and equal treatment is estimated with the highest grade - 6. Thus, if to summarize all eight quantitative grades, the country with the biggest sum will be a most reliable partner and culturally close to Russia and the Russians and vice versa. Now the characteristics are presented in details.

I. Geographic, ethnic-cultural and historical characteristics.

1.1. Level of the geographic and natural-climatic closeness of any country and its nation towards traditional conditions of the life of the Russians within the East-European plaine.

The Caucasus and Central Asia, as it has been already said, have alien for the Russians living conditions. That's why countries of those regions are to be evaluated with the zero grade -0.

Kazakstan with its mostly steppe's landscape, which is traditional environment for the Russian Cossacks, may be estimated with the mark – 2.

Belorussia, Ukraine and Moldavia, which mainly are situated like Russia within the East-European plain are to be estimated with the highest present characteristic's grade – 4.

1.2. Level of religious, cultural and ethnic closeness towards the Russians.

All peoples and ethnoses of the former Soviet Union may be classified in the following manner. The closest in respect of religion and culture and kin in respect of ethnicity are the Orthodox Eastern Slavs – majority of Ukrainians vast majority of Belorussians. In the Russian Empire they officially were considered as two small branches of the big Russian people. They are to be evaluated with the highest mark – 6.

The Moldavians are an Orthodox non-Slavic European people. Russophobia has been spreaded among them at the beginning of the 90-ths years. Recently they democratically elected a pro-Russian communist government. It seems their Orthodox civilizational identity is beginning to influence their political sphere. They may be estimated by the grade – 4.

The Orthodox peoples of the Caucasus – Armenians and Georgians may be evaluated by the mark – 3.

The Muslim peoples of the Caucasus and the Central Asia in their religious and cultural identity are the alien ethnoses for the Russians. It means the Azeries, the Turkmen, the Uzbeks, the Tadjiks, the Kyrgyzs are to be estimated with the zero grade –0. Perhaps the Kazakhs may be estimated by the grade – 2, because they have been being for a long historical period groups of nomadic tribes without any statehood and majority of them has not been belonging to the settled Muslim civilization.

1.3. The way, by which a certain country or its national majority joined Russia.

If any country or majority of the main ethnos voluntarily joined Russia, they may be estimated with the highest present characteristic's mark – 4. For example, Ukraine deserves it, because in 1654 the Army of the Ukrainian Cossacks with their territory voluntarily joined Russia as the only independent Orthodox country at that time. The same is true in respect of Georgia, Belarus, Kazakhstan.

If there was weak, short resistance for the Russian conquest, like, for example, within the Central Asia, the mark is to be – 2.

II. The Attitudes towards Russia and the Russians

1.1. The attitude of the general ethnos (national majority) of any state to Russia and the Russians within that state.

The positive attitude is when national majority treats the Russian minority, who is living at the same country, equally, without Russophobia and attempts to discriminate the Russians in every day life. Such a positive treatment is to be evaluated with the highest mark – 6. At present among all the former Soviet Socialist nations only the Belorussians and probably the Armenians deserve it.

If the largest part of the general ethnos tends to treat the Russians without discrimination, but the smaller one is not, such a case may be estimated by the mark – 4. In my opinion these are the cases of Ukraine, Moldavia and perhaps Kazakhstan.

If the largest part of national majority is discriminating the Russian minority, this situation may be evaluated by the mark – 2. These seem to be the cases of Georgia and Azerbaijan.

In all the Central Asia's states primitive Russophobia is flourishing among common people. The Russians, who have money and possibilities, are fleeing that region. The Central Asia's countries are to be estimated with the zero mark.

2.2. The attitude of the national ruling circles of any country towards the Russians of their state.

It seems only the governments of Orthodox Belarus and Armenia do not de-facto pursue the policy of discrimination of the Russians within their

countries. In this respect both countries may be estimated by the highest mark – 4.

Contrary to them Ukrainian political elite, despite its mainly Orthodox and Slavic origins and an ethnic kin, is conducting policy of evident discrimination of the Russians, partly by excluding them from key political positions. Its treatment is to be evaluated with the zero grade.

The same or worse situation one may see across all the Central Asian countries.

III. The modern geopolitical and security factors and orientations.

3.1. The level of geographic encircling by historically and culturally unfriendly or hostile states.

Undoubtedly at present Orthodox Armenia has the highest level, because it is at large degree surrounded by hostile Muslim Azerbaijan and Turkey. They are conducting policy of economic blockade of Armenia due to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict because of Nagorno-Karabakh. Its mark is to be highest in this respect – 4.

The same estimation may suits the situation of Tajikistan, which has long (1350 km) and unstable border with turbulent Afghanistan. The endless bloody Civil war in Afghanistan, the Taliban radical Islamite movement present a real serious military threat first of all for Tajikistan and at lesser degree for other Central Asia's countries.

The middle level of such an encircling is estimated by the mark – 2. The situation with the absence of unfriendly borders deserves the zero grade.

3.2. Dominating geopolitical orientation of the governments.

The highest mark of this characteristic is 6. It suits Belarus, Armenia and Tadjikistan, which governments are conducting permanently more or less pro-Russian foreign policy.

The countries, which often are balancing between Russia, on one side, and the West and Turkey, on the other, are estimated with the middle mark – 3. In my opinion they are Ukraine, Moldavia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan. Others are predominantly pro-Western and pro-Turkish.

3.3. Level of cooperation in the sphere of national security with Russia.

Until now the highest level of security cooperation with Russia is remaining participation in the Collective Security Treaty of the Commonwealth of Independent States (the CST), which was signed in 1992 in Tashkent. In the spring of 1999 Georgia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan left membership of that treaty. Now the member-states are: Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. All these countries are estimated with the highest mark – 6.

The mark for the situation of balancing between Russia and NATO alliance in security sphere with Russian dominance is 4. The same one with Western dominance is 2. The last mark to my mind suits best of all Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and perhaps Uzbekistan. Officially and de-facto neutral Turkmenistan may be estimated with the zero mark.

If to summarize quantitative estimations of every mentioned characteristic in respect of a certain CIS's country, one may receive its resulting numeral grade, demonstrating its ethnic-cultural-geopolitical reliability and closeness towards Russia and the Russians. Despite simplicity of such a method in my opinion it gives valid numbers for quantitative comparisons of closeness of different states towards Russia. In general the following picture appears.

The European CIS' countries: **Belarus** receives the highest cumulative mark – 38. It seems the Belorussians do not want to become a nation and to live within their independent state. During all their history they have not national statehood (a short attempt to create anything of that under German occupation in 1918 is to be ignored).

At present Belarus and Russia are officially forming a unioned state, the treaty for creation of which has been signed in December 1999 by Yeltsin on the Russian side before his pre-term resignation. On paper the union is to have federal-confederal structure, in reality even creation of confederal community is very slow.

Ukraine, according to my calculations, may get the cumulative mark – 21.

To my mind that country simultaneously is the cleft and torn one, if to use the Huntington's definitions. Its religious and cultural split on the Orthodox Russian-Ukrainian East and South, on one side, and predominantly the Greek-Catholic Ukrainian West, on the other, may be illustrated by the following numbers. According to the Ukrainian public polls in May 1997 28% of all respondents were for pro-Western geopolitical orientation and leaving the CIS, 46% supported integration of the CIS into a single state (pro-Russian attitude), 13% were indefinite.

At the same time the Ukrainian political elite is remaining mostly pro-Western, despite its periodic geopolitical manoeuvres. Such an orientation has deep historical roots. In the XVII-th c. mainly pro-Russian mass of Orthodox Ukrainian peasantry has forced their pro-Polish Cossacks' ruling circles to remain within Russia. Also Ukrainian nationalistic ideology considers the Ukrainians as real Slavs, real Russians and real Europeans, unlike the Moscovite Russians – an Asian people with high share of Finnish and Tartar blood.

The current elite's hatred towards the Russian language is surprising. It wants by compulsory methods officially to prohibit its use, despite evident violation of international law and norms. This and many other similar measures stimulate moods for disunion.

Moldova at present deserves the higher mark than Ukraine – 23. Its rating grown after communists had come to power in February 2001 by receiving half of voters. During the 90-ths Moldova reminded at certain degree torn and cleft country. In 1994 83,7% of respondents were for independent statehood, from them 36% were for pro-Western orientation, 47,8% for a sovereign state within the CIS (pro-Russian).

The ruling circles at the same time pursued mostly pro-Western political orientation during all decade. Among other things they were fulfilling recommendations of the IMF and other Western structures to reform economy. Economic situation and living standards drastically worsened. The communists as a result gradually were strengthening their positions in the parliament and finally took power.

In my opinion the instance of Moldova shows well that Western economic prescriptions hardly may be valid for the countries of the Orthodox world. But the main problem is that Russia as a core country has not developed yet any own civilizational model of effective economic self-development, unlike the Western one.

Two most popular pre-election communists' slogans were joining the Orthodox Russian-Belorussian union and giving the state status to the Russian language like the Moldavian one. Because analogous ideas have been the main causes of creation of the seceded Russified Trans-Dniester Republic, immediatly prospects for solving the conflict began to improve. If the present Moldavian leadership really pursues pro-Russian geopolitical orientation, as it has already stated, the Trans-Dniester's conflict may be resolved fast.

The Caucasian post-Soviet countries: Armenia undoubtedly deserves the second after Belarus highest cumulative grade – 31. The Armenians are surely a nation with very long ancient history and origins of the times of the Roman Empire. Armenia is not a torn country, because much of the political elite as well as Armenian public support pro-Russian geopolitical orientation. In 1996 according to public polls 50% of respondents supported military-political alliance with Russia as the best way of sustaining national security for Armenia. Near 12% supported the NATO membership for that goal. 6% were for neutral status.

Georgia may be estimated only with the general grade – 15. The Georgians are still not a nation and modern Georgian (former Soviet) borders are not natural. At least four ethnic regions of Georgia (Abkhazia, Southern Ossetia, Adjara, Javakhetia) attempt or want to be separated from that mini-empire, as they think. Inside Georgia there are several subethnoses: "Mengrely", "Kakhetintsy", "Imeretintsy", "Svanety", "Guriytsy" and others. They have their ethnic territories and in the past many of them had national statehood (principalities).

Anti-Russian moods there had already appeared in the czarist past. During Soviet period especially after the Stalin's death and exposure of his bloody crimes and terror those moods deepened and widened. At present Georgian

political elite is mostly anti-Russian and is conducting pro-Western, pro-Turkish foreign policy. Many Georgian politicians blame Russia for her unwillingness, as they believe, to force seceded Abkhazia to be an integral part of the Georgian state. In their opinion, for the sake of it Georgia under Shevardnadze had joined the CIS, the CST and allowed Russian military bases to be, but Russia did not justified their hopes.

Azerbaijan is estimated with one of the lowest mark – 10. Since the collapse of the USSR its leadership has been conducting pro-Turkish and pro-Western foreign policy mostly under the rule of the former member of the Soviet Communist Politburo G.Aliev and obtained fast withdrawal of all Russian troops. All this was happening despite its formal membership in the CIS and temporarily the CST. In my opinion such a geopolitical orientation is natural for this Muslim state. It objectively in respect of religion, culture, ethnic kin and geography is much more close towards Turkey than Russia.

On the other hand the Azerbaijanian instance proves well the failure of the “Soviet internationalism” or Russian industrial culture to assimilate that Muslim-Turk country during Soviet period. The same is true in respect of the Central Asian states.

All the Central Asian states after the USSR’s collapse established traditional for the Muslim East authoritarian ethnocratic political regimes. Though under pressure and criticism of the West presidents of those countries had to add something like democratic facades. Across all those states “Islamic awakening” is taking place. At the same time their leaders are afraid of radical Islamic movements very much and undertake tough police measures against them.

The Soviet power widely used and stimulated Russian “elder brethren” to migrate to Central Asia for fast industrialization of that medieval backward region. There the Russians were working as industrial top managers, workers, scholars, teachers, physicians and etc, while majority of local population was farming.

Usually almost every local top official, belonging to national majority of his republic, had his Russian first deputy, who in reality was doing much of the

managing job. In such a way fast industrialization and big progress in many spheres were achieved.

In the post-communist time massive migration of the Russians backward to Russia began. Return to traditional Eastern political despotism and culture accompanied by numerous acts of violence against Russians, evident violation of their human rights, widely spread Russophobia and discrimination.

As a result wide deindustrialization and demodernization are taking place now in Central Asia, even despite Western investments to gas and oil industries. Some regional politicians understand all this, but they are unable to stop it, because it is beyond their power to remake traditional culture of their Muslim-Turk peoples.

Near two millions of Russians lived in Uzbekistan, historical leader of the region, at the end of the 80-ths. They consisted roughly 10% of all republican population. During 1987-1997 near 900 thousands of Russians left that country, which towards the end of 1997 numbered 23,8 millions of population. Now the Russians numbers near a million.

In Turkmenia with its 5 millions' population the share of Russians decreased to 5-8% and creation of national cultural organizations, including Russian, is prohibited.

In Tajikistan at the end of Soviet period near half a million of Russians were living. Then brutal civil war in addition to all other factors accelerated Russian emigration. Already towards the middle 1993 near 300 thousands of Russians had left the country. At present according to different estimations from 30 to 50 thousands still are living.

Kazakhstan has the highest regional share of the Russians in its 15 millions' population. However that share decreased from 37,8% in 1989 down to 30% in 1999 according to official state data. During 1992-1999 in general 1731 thousands of Russians left that country. At present the Russians number near 4,5 millions.

Thus my cumulative estimations of the Central Asian countries are low.
Kazakhstan– 21. **Kyrgyzstan** – 13. **Tajikistan** – 18. **Uzbekistan** – 9.
Turkmenistan – 5.

x x
 x

In my opinion this quantitative analysis really confirms how large diversity of cultures, ethnoses and geographic regions was concentrated within the former Russian Empire and the USSR. The Belorussians, for example, almost in eight times are more close to the Russians than the Turkmen (38:5). Needless to say, that in democratizing post-communist world attempts to keep more or less equal relations with all these so different peoples and countries are senseless.

Moreover, so different countries have different natural gravitations to the core states of their civilizations. It means among other things the validity of firther existence of the CIS has to be thoroughly estimated. Until now it exists mostly on paper.

Perhaps the most important conclusion of the quantitative analysis is the following. In every geographic direction of former Russian territorial expansion, concerning the present CIS – European, Caucasian, Central Asian, it has clarified a most reliable state-partner for Russia and the Russians. It is Belarus within the European area (38). It is Armenia within the Caucasus (31). And it is Kazakhstan in the Central Asia (21).

In my opinion these finds allow to formulate main ideas of the new limited security system of Russia within post-Soviet territory. It will be done at the next chapter.

Chapter 3

The Contours of the New Limited Security System of Russia and her Geopolitical Interests in respect of the NIS

At the present time the general objective interest of Russia is to moderate her ambitions in respect of the New Independent States and to abandon the attempts to control or to dominate all post-Soviet territory, like it has been earlier. In other words the Russia's policy towards the NIS is to be corresponded to the "normal" level of ethnic energy of the modern Russians, which now roughly in four (according to the Gumilev's diagram) times lower in comparison with imperial historical period.

Also it means modern rulers of Russia are to give up the traditional Russian Imperial logic, because mostly it was a result of a certain long super-active period in ethnic-political history of the Russians. Towards now it has already passed once and forever and the Russians have spent their surplus of ethnic energy. In domestic policy, with the attempts to develop market competitive economy they more or less succeeded. Political leaders of Russia now realize well the power of their state depends mostly on the strength of its economy. Though they are still very far from development and use of the Russian civilizational model of self-improving market economy. In foreign policy the imperial inertia is still taking place.

As I attempted to display at the 1-st chapter Russian conquest of the Caucasus and Central Asia mainly was a mistake. Those regions in every aspect are alien for the Russians.

On the other hand Russia can not ignore those peoples or countries of the former USSR, who or which on the basis of free choice gravitate to her. Of course, to economize her human and other resources Russia has to choose among them at first most reliable partners.

Hence, the main security Russia's strategy in respect of the CIS is minimizing her presence, including the military one, in every strategic direction by keeping close relations only with the most reliable partners. Belarus, Armenia and Kazakhstan are to be basic countries, pillars of the structure of a new limited security system of Russia within post-Soviet space.

Russia in military aspects has already left Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. It is not accidental. All those countries belong to the settled Muslim civilization. Despite common Soviet past their political elites and much of their peoples do not trust Russia. The proposed concept of the limited security system means among other things the Russian troops are also to leave Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and probably Georgia.

Unfortunately even under Putin the ruling circles of Russia lack very much good national and civilizational consciousness. Their policy towards the NIS seems to be a mixture of imperial inertia, Soviet internationalism and patrimonial indifference to the destiny of Russians.

3.1. The official concept of Russian national security and the modern state of the collective security system

Unlike B.Yeltsin new President of Russia V.Putin made the important step forward in the Russian strategy towards the CIS. Yeltsin as a typical former Communist Party boss attempted to make belief that Russia still was able to dominate all the post-Soviet space and as usually for Communists-internationalists at the expense of Russian national interests. Often leaders of post-Soviet countries blackmailed him on the eve of a new coming Commonwealth's summit that they would not had visited it. To secure their participation he made new economic and other concessions.

Putin abandoned this practice and decided to strengthen first of all the more coherent nucleus of the CIS, which spontaneously has appeared during last decade. It includes member-states of the Collective Security Treaty (Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and of the Custom Union (the same countries without Armenia), which in the fall 2000 was transformed into the Euro-Asian Economic Community. *But somehow the Putin's administration failed to define certain national interests of Russia in respect of every of those states.*

Official concept of national security of Russia, that has been adopted in October 1999, looks rather collection of good intentions and compromise of interests of proper federal ministries. The authors of the document are far from civilizational or ethnic-cultural world view. Though it recognizes that

Russia stands for multipolar post-communist world. Also at the document big attention is paid for necessity to struggle with "international terrorism".

The other interesting feature of the document outlining domestic threats in comparison with foreign ones as more significant for national security of Russia. Among them are big decrease of the GNP, social polarization of the society, very low birth rate and etc.

In respect of the NIS it is said the appearance near the Russian borders of the foreign military bases or troops is a factor of external threat likewise the rise and escalation of conflicts.

Moreover, the authors of the document consider Russia as multinational democratic federal state. If to recollect that the ethnic Russians consist now 82-85% of all population, it hardly may be true. Even more, like Soviet ideologists they conceived from the view of elementary logic very doubtful notion - the multinational or multiethnic people of Russia like the Utopian Soviet people had been. A nation may be multiethnic, but a people is always mononational or monoethnic. In general the Russians at the document still are looking as discriminated vast national majority in the spirit of patrimonial state.

Also the Putin's administration proved to be not interested in linkage of cooperation in the collective security sphere of the CIS countries with treatment of their governments towards their Russians.

That's why Western perception of Putin as "nationalist" in my opinion is wrong. Also all his leading economists (G.Gref, A.Illarionov and others) are very liberal like Gaidar or Chubais. He is a typical Russian Westernizer, but unlike Yeltsin, who often was ready to make concessions to please the West, he is a tough guy.

During last decade many documents, that deals with possible formation of the CIS collective security system, have been adopted. But their practical realization is remaining mostly on paper until now. Among those not classified documents there are following most important ones.

The Collective Security Treaty (CST), that was signed in May 1992. The Article № 4 is most significant. According to it an aggression against any

member-state of the Treaty is considered as the aggression against all member-states. In such a case all other states-participants are supplying all necessary assistance, including military one, to the state – victim of aggression, according with the Art. № 51 of the UN Charter. In April 1999 only Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan decided to continue its acting and membership in it. Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Georgia refused.

For better realization of the Treaty the Council of Collective Security (CCS) was established. It includes heads, foreign ministers and defense ministers of member-states and General Secretary of the CCS. In February 1995 the CCS at its session adopted the Concept of collective security and the General guidelines of deepening military cooperation of the member-states. The Plan (schedule) of realization of the Concept and the General guidelines for 1995-1997 also was adopted.

In my opinion the most important measures of all those steps were intentions to create regional coalition's groupings of armed forces, joint anti-aircrafts' system and to develop mechanism of making and realization of decisions for collective use of force. Practical realization of these and much of other measures in time failed.

In April 1999 the Plan of general measures of the second stage of formation of the collective security system for 1998-2000 was adopted. The main goal of it was creation of coalition's (regional) groupings of armed forces "as the base of regional structures of security". The real progress was achieved in creation of the joint anti-aircrafts' system. The formation of regional groupings and development of mechanism of decision-making for collective use of force again failed.

In my opinion the main causes of it were traditional fears of the leaders of the post-Soviet states to limit their sovereignty and to become again subordinates of Moscow.

With the Putin's coming to power the Russian policy towards the NIS became much more active, including the CST. In May 2000 he initiated adoption of the Memorandum on the adaptation of the CST to the modern

geopolitical situation. In it again the sides promised to begin practical realization of measures for formation of regional systems of collective security in 2000.

Perhaps the most important clause was that, according to which the sides was beginning necessary work for formation of the collective peacekeeping forces of fast deployment for resolving conflicts within their territories. It took a year to prepare proper protocols for signing.

One year later, in May 2001, during the next session of the CCS the Protocols for formation of the fast deployment's forces in the Central-Asian region were signed by the leaders of Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzia. Those Protocols for their realization need not ratifications by the national parliaments. The forces may be used if any of the sides needs and asks the help in the struggle with extremists. According to non-confirmed information those troops may number roughly 1,5 thousand soldiers. The coordinating head-quarters of the forces will be located in Bishkek – the capital of Kyrgyzstan and it will include two representatives from every member-state. The decision to use those forces will be made by the heads of the member-states without any confirmation of national parliaments.

At the session problems of formation of regional coalition's groupings of armed forces, as it had been outlined in the Memo 2000, were not discussed. It seems Russia found way out on the basis of twolateral relations. Decisions to create regional groupings were made with Belarus and recently Armenia out of the CST's frame.

The case with Armenia is an interesting example, of how the Putin's administration takes lessons of the civilizational world view under pressure of the real international life. In January of 2001 the Russian president with big delegation made official visit to Azerbaijan in accordance with the Aliev's invitation. Perhaps the Russian side hoped to make breakthrough in improvement of relations between two countries and promotion of Russian oil Caspian interests on the part of Baku. During visit Putin even stated that Azerbaijan was «friendly state» for Russia.

From the point of view of the ethnic-cultural-geopolitical approach this visit to the Muslim state, a close ally of Turkey was a mistake. Additional mistake was to define the country, which has had since 1994 the collective defense treaty with Turkey (directed mostly against Russia), as «friendly».

Two months later Azerbaijanian high officials, including president Aliiev, resumed their statements about necessity to locate within their state Turkish or NATO military bases «to restore regional balance of power». Baku again began to demonstrate that Russian military presence in Armenia was a military threat for Muslim Azerbaijan. That is very understandable from the point of view of civilizational approach.

Those statements seemed to be irritated Moscow. Breakthrough proved to be failed. In my opinion first of all for «punishment» of Azerbaijan the project to create joint Russian-Armenian regional military grouping was quickly proposed by Moscow and accepted by Armenia. It seems sometimes political emotions rather than well realized national interests direct the Russia's policy towards the NIS.

Thus for escaping such mistakes in the future Russia needs formulation of her ethnic-cultural-geopolitical interests in respect of the CIS countries on the basis of civilizational approach.

3.2. Formulating ethnic-cultural-geopolitical interests of Russia in respect of the NIS and their geopolitical security orientations

At present the Russian high ranking military as well as much of politicians more or less share the opinion, that for sustaining national security in respect of the «near abroad» there are three main strategic directions. They are the European, the Caucasian, the Central Asian ones.

As analysis of the previous chapter shows there is one most reliable state-partner for Russia in every of those directions. And those countries are to become main pillars of the structure of the new limited security system of Russia. Spontaneously this process is already going on especially in respect of Belarus and Armenia.

The European strategic direction. After the end of the Cold War nobody in sober mind in Russia thinks, that the NATO alliance may organize a

massive military invasion to the Russian territory. After all Russia is still remaining the big nuclear and military power. The current mistrusts and misunderstandings between Russia and the West partly are heritage of the Cold War. But mostly they are modern continuation of the intercivilizational many centuries' mutual misperception of the Catholic and Protestant Europe, on one side, and the Slavic Orthodox world, on the other. Danilevskiy wrote about it 130 years ago. And it will take long historical period even in the case of more or less democratic Russia to dispel those mistrusts.

Undoubtedly Russia as the core Orthodox country is interested to keep all Orthodox European countries of the CIS within the area of the Orthodox civilization, surely with different levels of closeness or integration with her. These are her religious cultural ethnic national interests in respect of Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. Geopolitical interests are different in respect of every country.

Numbers about armed forces of the CIS, which are presented below, have been taken mostly from «Nezavisimaya gazeta» - the best newspaper of Russia, covering the Commonwealth's affairs.

Belarus at present has very important geopolitical meaning. Russia is still remaining backward and poor country as compared with Western ones. She still needs European technologies, goods and capitals, like it has been being for many centuries.

In the situation, when political elites of Orthodox Ukraine and Moldova during last decade were mostly pro-Western, Belarus objectively became the only ground «window» to Europe for Russia. In my opinion this Russian geopolitical interest is more important than military cooperation with Belarus, especially if to recollect long and bloody wars of Ivan IV and Peter the Great to reach this goal. Though undoubtedly the decision of two countries to create a Union state (December 1999) and military cooperation within that frame increases Russian national security in the European direction.

Belarus geopolitical security orientation is only pro-Russian. Since 1997 Russia and Belarus after de-jure creation their Union began joint guarding Belorussian borders with Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia under Russian

leadership. Also close coordination of foreign policy and armed forces' building began.

In 1997 according to public polls 59% of Russian respondents supported creation of a single state with Belarus (versus – 16%), the same share in Belarus was 46% (versus – 20%). In 1998 already 75% of Russian respondents supported it.

In 2000 the Belorussian army numbered near 81 thousands, 1,5 thousands of tanks and had mobilization's resources up to half million potential soldiers. Also in 2000 Putin and Lukashenko made decision to create Russian-Belorussian regional grouping of armed forces with number 300 thousands in war periods. Until now realization of the decision seems to be mainly on paper.

Moldova. The Russian main geopolitical interest in respect of this country is to keep it as a small Western counterbalance to intentions of the much of the Ukrainian political elite to be out of the Slavic-Orthodox civilizational area. From this point of view the decision of the OSCE Istanbul's summit (1999) to withdraw Russian troops from the Trans-Dniester region was an unjustified concession of the Yeltsin's regime.

During last decade geopolitical security orientation of Moldova was mostly pro-Western. The Moldavian Army is very small and numbers only 6 thousands with mobilization's reserves in 30 thousands. Moldova actively participated in the NATO "Partnership for Peace" program. In 1995-1997 near a hundred of the Moldavian military received education and training in the NATO countries, 145 – in Romania, which wants a NATO membership very much. In 1998-1999 only 17 officers took training within the NATO states, while 148 – in Romania. In 2000 the numbers were 20 and 73 properly.

The communists' coming to power is opening prospects for revision of this security orientation to the pro-Russian direction.

Ukraine. Undoubtedly this torn and cleft Orthodox Slavic country is the most complicated case for Russia across all post-Soviet space. In theory Russian geopolitical interest in respect of Ukraine consists in development

such close relations with the country, which Russia has with Belarus. But torn and cleft nature of Ukraine is the biggest obstacle for realization of it.

If, for example, Ukrainian leadership somehow decides to reunite with Russia or to create close alliance with her, as majority of all 50 millions' population wish, immediately the Greek-Catholic Western Ukraine with its 7 millions' population will begin separating.

On the other hand, if predominantly pro-Western Ukrainian ruling circles somehow decide to join NATO and to break relations with Russia, as Western Ukrainians want, the Orthodox East and South of Ukraine, where together with Ukrainians 11 millions of ethnic Russian are living, may also begin secession. Surely in such a hypothetical case Russia hardly would remain indifferent.

Thus the Ukrainians are not an integral nation and serious potential for disunion is existing. One should not underestimate it. Stability within Ukraine mostly is a result of traditional for the Russians passiveness, low ability for self-organization, great tolerance, indifference on the part of the political elite of Russia and etc. A decade of state independence did not stimulate national consolidation, mostly because of policy of compulsory ukrainization of official Kiev. In my opinion in the long run federalization of Ukraine is the only effective mean to decrease this potential.

At the same time public polls demonstrate, that pro-Russian moods are dominating within Ukraine. In March 2001 the all-Ukrainian public polls showed the following picture. 55% of respondents wish Russia and Ukraine are to be independent states with special friendly relations. 36% support their reunion into a single state. In other words 91% of respondents stand for at least special close relations with Russia. Only 8% think relations with Russia are to be the same as with all other countries.

In respect of foreign orientations the situation is as follows. 57% of Ukrainians want to develop relations first of all with Russia. 29% want to develop relations first of all with European countries. And only 2,5% - with the USA.

In October 1999 the picture was following. 57,4% of respondents regreted the USSR's disintegration. 51,1% believed Ukraine should join the Russian-Belorussian Union. 26,5% wanted Ukraine to get the NATO membership. 19% wanted creation of an independent from Russia and NATO alternative military-political bloc.

It seems the best external mean to keep such a cleft country together is to pursue neutral and non-bloc foreign policy, as it has been stipulated in official documents at the beginning of Ukrainian independence.

Despite this and dominating pro-Russian public moods Ukrainian ruling circles conducted pro-Western security policy during last decade. Ukraine actively participated in the "Partnership for Peace" program. The best embodiment of the pro-Western security orientation became the Ukrainian-NATO Charter (1997), which established "special partnership" between the sides, though did not give the NATO security guaranties for Ukraine.

In my opinion present cleft Ukraine is not a reliable partner in the sphere of security for Russia as well as for the NATO alliance. In April 1999 Ukrainian parliament was on the verge of breaking relations with NATO as a sign of solidarity with the Serbs. Probably the best way of development relations with this country in every sphere for Russia and for the West to cooperate most of all with those regions, which gravitate to each of them.

The Caucasian strategic direction. At present there is not any serious military threat for Russia in the Caucasus. The threat of Chechen terrorism considerably decreased, after much of passionate and radical Chechens have been killed in hostilities with the Russian Army.

Hence, the main geopolitical interest of Russia in this region to keep minimal necessary presence here partly to counterbalance Turkish mostly economic and cultural penetration to the region. Close security cooperation and minimal military presence in Orthodox Armenia and also keeping Georgia as merely transit territory, connecting Russia and Armenia, are quite enough for it.

Armenia now is the only reliable security ally of Russia in the Caucasus, not merely because of Orthodox closeness and big geopolitical intererests in

military cooperation with Russia. Traumatic memory of massive genocide of Armenians inside the Ottoman Empire in 1915 consists an undeniable part of the modern Armenian national consciousness. At present politically active Armenian communities across all the world are struggling for official recognition by foreign governments of that genocide.

Turkey on its part is actively resisting and rejecting it. In my opinion at least some decades will be necessary to solve Armenian-Turkish problems and to normalize their relations. This factor is an additional strong stimulus for Russia to see a most reliable partner in Armenia.

Armenian geopolitical security orientation is firmly pro-Russian. Armenian army numbered roughly 53 thousands and a hundred of tanks in 2000 and was the best one in the Caucasus. Armenians in the 1993-1994 Nagorno-Karabakh's war demonstrated strong national will and defeated Azeris, who had triple military superiority over them. Russia and Armenia together are guarding the Armenian-Turkish border. Also there is a Russian military base within Armenia, which numbers 2,8 thousands of troops. Roughly ten Russian modern fighters MIG-29, which are based in Armenia, helps to control sky over that country. With creation of Russian-Armenian coalition regional grouping of troops Armenia will become a real pillar of common security in the Caucasus.

Georgia. Despite Orthodox nature of this country Russia geopolitically needs it only as transit ground territory to reach Armenia. Dominating anti-Russian moods of Georgian political elite stimulate its pro-Western geopolitical security orientation and intentions to get the NATO membership in the future.

On the other hand much of the Russians also have negative attitudes towards the Georgians. During Soviet period they discredited themselves very much in the eyes of the Russians. Georgians - Stalin and Beria (an executed bloody KGB chief) exterminated many millions of Russians to build the Soviet empire. Finally another Georgian - Shevardnadze, while was being the Soviet foreign minister, ignored all those giant victims, promoted dissolution of the USSR and international division of the Russian people among the NIS.

Those negative attitudes towards Georgians are now a part of the forming post-communist national consciousness of the Russians. Probably it will take half a century to heal of this trauma of the modern Russian mentality. Hence the appearing Russian public may support final elimination of the four military Russian bases in Georgia and withdrawal of the 10 thousands' military contingent of Russia from that country as it is stipulated by the decisions of the OCSE (1999).

At the same time it will be natural for the Russians to demand a small compensation for all Stalin's crimes and Shevardnadze's harm in the form of voluntary reunion with Russia of Abkhazia and Orthodox Southern Ossetia. Finally, if Georgia does not want to be within the «Russian empire», why its former Soviet parts, which gravitate to Russia, must remain within the «Georgian mini-empire»?

At present Georgia insists on three years' period of withdrawal of all Russian troops and bases. The Putin's administration suggests to prolong this period up to 14 years, referring to financial difficulties.

Azerbaijan. Russia has not any serious geopolitical interest in respect of that country, not speaking about ethnic-cultural ones. In my opinion to sustain Caspian oil interests of Russia the limited military presence in Armenia is enough. Now it is clear that Azerbaijan and Turkey have exaggerated very much real Caspian oil resources. If during Soviet period there was merely average oil deposit near Baku, why after the collapse of the USSR a new Kuwait is to appear suddenly there?

Azerbaijan is pursuing pro-Turkish, pro-Western security orientation. Towards the middle of 1999 more than 5 thousands Azeris' officers were trained in Pakistan, Turkey, the USA and other NATO countries.

Like Georgians Azeris also want to get the NATO membership or at least to deploy NATO or Turkish military bases within Azerbaijanian territory. Some Azerbaijanian radicals even call for creation of united state with Turkey to keep seceded Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh.

The Central Asian strategic direction. At present Russia is not interested in some Central Asian states as a certain "buffer zone" between her

and China. China is deeply involved in fast modernization, wants to become big economic power, needs Russian and Central Asian oil and gas. Also China needs Russia geopolitically to support balance of power with the USA. Hence, Communist China is not a military threat for Russia now. Since Gorbachev relations with China have normalized.

The real military threat for the Central Asia is a militant Taliban radical Islamite movement, which periodically controls up to 90% of all the territory of Afghanistan and continues long bloody civil war in that country. The Taliban's armed forces at best number 50 thousands of mainly irregular troops, with whom the 18-20 thousands' forces of the mainly Uzbek and Tajik Northern Alliance inside Afghanistan are fighting. Also at present up to 2,5 thousands of Pakistan's military may be within the Taliban's forces.

The Taliban forces are armed mostly with obsolete Soviet weaponry – tanks T-55, T-62, artillery systems of caliber up to 152 mm, rocket systems of volley fire of caliber up to 220 mm, armoured vehicles and even jet fighters.

Surely the Taliban is not any military threat for Russia with her one million's army, 15,5 thousands of modern tanks, 880 fighters, 717 bombers, 1000 helicopters and etc. At the same time the Taliban is a real military threat for the CIS Central Asian countries, probably besides Uzbekistan. The armed forces of all other countries are weak, poorly financed, trained, supplied and hardly will be able to contain the Taliban in hypothetical case of establishment of its control across all Afghanistan and further invasion to the South of the CIS.

But the Taliban presents non-military threats for Russia: export of terrorism and narco-traffic. Drugs' trade is the main financial source of these radical and brutal Islamites. In 1998 they grew 2800 tons of opium, in 1999 – 4600 tons, in 2000 – 7000 tons. According to UN estimations it consists 70-75% of all world production of opium. From this raw material they are producing heroin for delivery and selling in the CIS, Russia, Western Europe and even the USA. Also there are several military camps in Afghanistan for training bands of terrorists by Taliban's instructors.

Officially the Russian 201-st infantry division and Russian border guards in Tajikistan, which number on the whole roughly 27 thousands (more than in any other CIS' country), are called to neutralize those non-military threats. TV networks of Russia often broadcast brave reports from the Tajik-Afghan border about heroic activity of the Russian border guards. TV journalists try to make belief that good shield exists against narco-traffic from Afghanistan.

But if to look at the Central Asia's map, immediately big doubts arise. Besides Tajikistan Afghanistan has common ground short border with Uzbekistan and long border with Turkmenistan. Neutral Turkmenistan in its turn has almost friendly relations with the Taliban's regime and attempts to be a mediator between conflicting sides of Afghanistan.

Since 1993 a thousands of Russian border guards' officers had kept closed border between Turkmenia and Afghanistan, according to special twolateral treaty. But Turkmenia suddenly in 1999 decided to go out of the treaty and by the end of that year Russian border guards left that country. At present the Turkmen-Afghan border is transparent for the Taliban's penetration, according to Russian newspapers.

If to take into account, that Turkmenia has transparent, not equipped borders with Kazakhstan, and the last in its turn has the almost transparent borders with Russia, it is easy to understand the following thing. While Russia attempts to keep closed border for narco-traffic and terrorists from Afghanistan in Tajikistan, there is another legal indirect almost transparent way for those flows through Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan to Russia and further to Europe.

Thus even brief geopolitical look at Central Asia gives rise to big doubts of validity of the Russian military presence at least in Tajikistan.

Flow of drugs through the Kazakh-Russian border is increasing fast. 90 kg of narcotics were intercepted in 1998, but in 1999 the number already reached 919 kg (growth in ten times), including 200 kg of heroin. 1999 was the year, when Russian border guards were leaving Turkmenistan.

Also, the Soviet power established very arbitrary borders between Central Asian republics. Thus at present there are up to 70 disputable zones of potential interstate and interethnic conflicts in the region. And if somehow the

Taliban's military threat weakens, immediately "clarifying real borders" will begin and Russian troops may be automatically involved.

Moreover, some Central Asian leaders have already proved not to be reliable partners of Moscow in the sphere of collective security as real cunning Eastern rulers. In November 1998 the Uzbek batallion without any preliminary notification left its part of the Tajik-Afganian border in violation of agreements on creation of collective peacekeeping forces of 1993. In February 1999 Kyrgyzia made the same. At present the last "collective" Kazakh batallion seems to help a little bit Russian troops to guard that border.

Tajikistan. Russia has not any serious geopolitical interest in respect of this country for containment of the non-military Taliban's threats, as I've just demonstrated. Russian military presence there seems to be spontaneous.

Population of Tadjikistan is not a nation at all. Rather it is a community of Muslim regional Tajik subethnoses (or klans), who are permanently struggling for power and control of state wealth. Civil war was unleashed because the president Rakhmonov's subethnos – «Kulyabtsi» had taken too much power from the view of others (80% of all influential state posts). Yeltsin liked Rakhmonov, because of his firm pro-Russian policy unlike other the CIS' leaders. Hence the 201-st Russian division helped Rakhmonov to seize power. Later Moscow forced him to share partly power with the leaders of competing subethnoses, while remaining the president (30% of all important political posts). And in such a way civil war has been stopped. Now Tajikistan is divided among several leaders on their zones of influence and receiving profits. This fragile political balance and limited Rakhmonov power are still supported by the presence of the 201-st division.

Despite this Tajik ruling circles (especially former opposition) and lower state officials are almost surely widely involved in narco-traffic and drugs' trade, including Russia. Local Tajik officials permanently press Russian border guards to pass them all seized drugs, after that narcotics disappear. Often Afganian and Tajik narco couriers consist a single team, which organize imperceptible for border installations drugs' supply in certain places. Russian soldiers often are shot to their backs from Tajik territory. Recently even

Tajik ambassador in Kazakhstan was arrested, because his car was full of narcotics. Threats to kill Russian border guards' officers are usual phenomenon.

As a result of this situation Russian border guards are simply unable to intercept all flow of drugs. According to information of "Nezavisimaya gazeta", that seems to be true, they intercept only 1/10 of all the flow. It means the Tajik-Afghan border is also mostly transparent for the Taliban's narco-traffic.

In other words, while Russia supports stability and balance of ruling circles inside Tajikistan, the large part of its political elite is involved in making evident harm for Russia by supply of narcotics to her and promoting further reduction of her population. If to recollect official discrimination of local Russians inside Tajikistan, religious cultural geographic climatic alienation of the country for the Russians, the whole picture is becoming sad. It seems imperial and patrimonial inertia of Russia is so strong, that allows to conduct so paradoxical foreign policy.

At least to keep common sense Russia must withdraw all her troops from Tajikistan.

Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan now are fortifying their borders with Tajikistan.

Kyrgyzstan. Russia also has not any serious geopolitical interest in respect of this country. It has not common border with Afghanistan. In 1999 Russian border guards left the Kyrgyz-Chinese border, though according to special agreements now Russia establish modern radiolocations along borders with China and Tajikistan.

Tajikistan also became a shelter for armed terrorists' detachments of the Islamite movement of Uzbekistan (the IMU), which have close contacts and support of the Taliban and number roughly 2 thousands. The IMU bands periodically invade Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan with the purpose to break through to the Ferghana Valley and to create there a radical Muslim state. In the valley traditionally radical Islamite organizations find wide support.

That is why Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are strengthening their borders with Tajikistan.

Kyrgyzstan has small army, which numbers more than 9 thousands of service men and 210 tanks. In 1999 urgently national border guarding troops were created with 2800 soldiers. For Kyrgyzstan's armed forces now even to contain the IMU's small troops is a big problem.

Uzbekistan now is the only Central Asian state, which officially is not afraid of the military Taliban's threat. At the same time in 1999-2000 it signed new agreements with Russia for additional supply of heavy weaponry, which are realizing slowly. That's on one side.

On the other side, Uzbekistan since the fall of 2000 drastically has changed its previous irreconcilable attitude towards the Taliban. Now it attempts to become like Turkmenistan a mediator between conflicting sides of Afghanistan.

Uzbekistan traditionally tends to dominate the Central Asian region and in this light considers Russia as competitor. That is the most significant geopolitical cause of permanent frictions with Russia.

Kazakhstan. Russia has big ethnic and geopolitical interests in respect of this country. Ethnic interests are the results of big share of Russians inside all population (30%) and necessity to defend their human rights.

Geopolitical interests of Russia follow from necessity to close ways for narco-traffic, export of terrorism and radical Islamism from the South, first of all from Afghanistan.

Because of wide flows of illegal migrants and drugs through almost transparent Kazakh-Russian border in Russia periodically the question of its transformation into real interstate one is risen. Lack of enough money is main obstacle for realization of such projects.

But even brief look at the map shows that the ground Kazakhstan's border with other Central Asian CIS states at least in 1,5 times shorter in its length than the very long Kazakh-Russian border. That means hypothetically for Russia to close this border for realization of mentioned geopolitical interests would be much more cheaper than to equip the long Kazakh-Russian one. Moreover, to defend those interests of Russia would be much more easier dealing with only one Kazakh government, than now Moscow has to deal with

three governments of the countries, which have common borders with Afganistan and have not the same ones with Russia.

Surely, as I've demonstrated at the previous chapter, Kazakhstan is almost in two times less reliable partner for Russia than Belarus (21:38), mostly because of alien for the Russian ethnic and cultural belonging. Also Kazakh elite is still afraid of possible Moscow authoritarian rule. Hence it hardly accepts voluntarily the proposed plan. Thus Russia has to create strong geopolitical stimulus.

Now Kazakhstan geopolitically is less vulnerable, because there is a "buffer zone", consisting from other Central Asian countries, between it and Afganistan. But, if Russia withdraws from Tajikistan, Kazakh vulnerability immediately will increase. And the Kazakh 66 thousands' army, where only 18 thousands of service men are more or less ready to fight, will not be sufficient to deter the Taliban. Thus Russia may create fast such a strong geopolitical stimulus.

Surely practical realization of the proposed shrunk security system of Russia will create some zones of "security vacuum" within post-Soviet territory, which for example the West may fill in. But this hypothetical filling will have to be cautious to escape serious collisions with Russia.

Conclusion

Before Soviet period, as I've attempted to prove in this study, the main principle of Russian foreign policy was merely a quantitative one – the more, the better. The more population, peoples and territories Russia had in her possession, the stronger she was. This logic of endless territorial enlargement, while the heartland remained poor and backward, had been guiding Russian foreign policy during four centuries (XVI-XIX) since the rise of the Moscovite state. It ignored ethnic, cultural, geographic belonging of the conquered peoples, territories and states.

At the same time it was a direct consequence of the patrimonial nature of Russia and long historical period of ethnic super-activity of the Russian people as the only state-forming nation of the Russian multiethnic state.

During those four centuries and especially the turbulent XX-th one the Russians have spent much of the surplus of their ethnic energy and now objectively are unable to support control by force of all the post-Soviet territory or the former giant multiethnic, multicultural empire. Also they do not want to do it - to be again exploited national majority of any empire.

After the collapse of world communism and the Soviet Union much of the world began to democratize. Immediately earlier suppressed mutual gravitations of peoples and states, belonging to the same religion and culture, began to influence international life. As a result ethnic-cultural-geopolitical approach became useful methodological instrument for understanding of modern international relations.

Taking into account all this, it is easy to conclude. Now the less religious, cultural and ethnic diversity Russia has in creation of any international alliances or organizations, the more reliable and effective they are. Moreover, ethnic energy of the modern Russians in comparison with imperial times decreased roughly in four times, now the birth rate in Russia is lower than the death one in two times. Hence Russia must pursue very careful and economical foreign policy, including "near abroad". This policy should be directed first of all to taking care and regeneration of the Russian people, who consists now 82-85% of all Russia's population.

In this study as one of the directions for realization of such an economical policy I proposed the concept of the new limited security Russia's system within post-Soviet space. It means Russia is able to sustain her national security at the minimal necessary level by close integration and cooperation, including military sphere, with only one most reliable partner (or ally) in every strategic directions. Quantitative analysis, that has been conducted in this study, shows, those allies or partners are: Orthodox Slavic Belarus in the European strategic direction, Orthodox Armenia in the Caucasus' one and Turks' Kazakhstan with high share of Russians in the Central Asian direction. Those countries are to become main structural pillars of the new shrunk security system of Russia within former Soviet territory.

As to security dealing with other post-Soviet states Russia is to withdraw from some of them or to seek balance of interests with other centers of power, mostly with the West, to which leaders of those countries gravitate.

Practical realization of the concept of shrunk security means among other things withdrawal of Russian troops from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia (probably besides Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia) and strengthening, closing, joint guarding the Kazakh border with other Central Asian countries.

Also it opens prospects for coordination of Russian and Western policies towards the CIS, if the West decides to fill in certain zones of "security vacuum" within post-Soviet territory to support stability there among other things.

In my opinion the Putin's administration is not ready to put into life this concept of shrunk security. To fulfill this there is to be another political leadership in Russia, which has civilizational world view, recognizes Russia as a core state of the Slavic-Orthodox civilization and takes care of the Russians after all shocks of the XX-th century.

As I've already said, Putin is a typical Russian tough Westernizer. He seems to believe, that modernization of contemporary Russia means her Westernization, ignoring Peter the Great failed in this sense experience and the Romanov dynasty's sad past. At the same time he considerably limited the disproportionally big power of the soft Yeltsin's "young reformers".

His foreign policy unites contradictory aspects: Westernization's illusions, inertia of Soviet internationalism and even of global ambitions, inertia of patrimonial and imperial past.

Partly the Russians themselves are responsible for the lack of any serious national pro-Russian consciousness of the Russia's political elite. Five centuries of Moscovite, imperial and Soviet despotism promoted development of such national features as: social passivity, indifference, low level of ethnic solidarity, low ability for self-organization and etc. Their national awakening is happening very slow. According to Bismark, the Russians slowly harness their horses, but then they are moving fast. Now the Russians are slowly harnessing in respect of creation among other things of their civilizational modern paradigm or ideology and then self-organization.

At the same time, because the Russians consist vast majority of all voters, they vote for the leader, who looks most pro-Russian during election campaign in comparison with all other contenders. That was the main cause of the Putin's landslide. Thus from one presidential campaign to another the level of the government's Russification, if it's possible to say, is slowly growing.

Hence, to my mind, if Putin's presidency lasts without any serious domestic or "near abroad" shocks, at best the next president of Russia will be ready to accept the proposed concept of limited security.

Finally I'd like to suggest several judgements for hypothetical case of Western penetration into post-Soviet territory for filling certain "security vacuum" zones.

Firstly, I share the Huntington's point of view, that the West is to recognize Russia as the core state of the Slavic Orthodox civilization and hence her legal rights to have close relations with Orthodox countries.

I dare to say that Orthodox countries will never be reliable members of the NATO alliance, because it is a military structure of the West, of another civilization. Behaviour of Greece, Ukraine, Bulgaria and others during the NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia in 1999, communists' coming to power in Moldova in 2001 are good confirmations of this judgement.

The West should abandon illusions that pro-Western politicians of Orthodox countries may somehow change the non-Western culture and values of their peoples. The sooner it will be done, the better.

It is a big illusion, that mainly pro-Western Ukrainian political elite is able somehow peacefully bring the whole mostly Orthodox Slavic Ukraine to the West, including NATO. The best coordinated policy of the West and Russia towards this deeply cleft and torn country to deal with those parts of it, which have properly pro-Western and pro-Russian gravitations, and to insist on its federalization. Neither the West is able to assimilate the Orthodox East, South of Ukraine and the Crimea, nor Russia is capable to change cultural belonging of Western Ukraine. Hence search of balance of interests is necessary.

In respect of Orthodox Georgia the best balance of interests between Russia and the West may be its neutral, non-allied status. Shevardnadze began often to speak of it in the last time.

Secondly. From the point of view of minimizing potential losses Central Asia is much more suitable region than the Caucasus. The history of the Russian conquest of both regions in the XIX-th century proved it well. The Central Asian peoples are not so good soldiers as the Caucasus' mountaineers. The numbers of the present time also confirm it. According to official data, during the Second Chechen war (1999-2001) up to May 2001 near 2700 of Russian soldiers were killed, while during seven years of guarding the Tajik-Afghan border since 1993 the losses consisted only near 60 of service men.

The regional balance of interests from the view of the shrunk security system may be as follows. The West on its part stimulates acceptance by the Kazakh leaders of the joint Kazakh-Russian guarding of the Kazakhstan's border with other Central Asian countries. At the same time Russia agrees with deployment of Western troops in the region, for example in Uzbekistan.

Thirdly. At present widely spread negative prejudices against NATO and Americans within Russia are still existing. Hence, the best way to minimize possible collisions with Russian political elite is to conduct hypothetical

security penetration step by step, not under the alliance's umbrella and with the absence of Americans.

Objectively Western Europeans are much more interested in stopping narco-traffic from Afganistan than Americans. Recently in April 2001 a delegation of the heads of military missions in embassies of the Western European countries in Moscow visited Tajikistan and Russian border guards there. It seems the Putin's administration begins to realize that time is coming to share security burden with Europeans.

Taking into account all this, the most suitable way of filling «security vacuum» may be to make it under umbrella of the Western European Union, the European pillar of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.