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THE FINAL REPORT OF PROJECT

**"A DISTINCTIVE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY ORGANISATION AND
UKRAINE AS A NEW TYPE OF RELATIONS IN
THE EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY ARCHITECTURE"**

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PREFACE

The North-Atlantic Alliance appeared to be the most efficient and capable union of democratic, developed countries of Euro-Atlantic region. NATO has proved its ability to guarantee to its members their security, to adapt for new conditions. By this time this organization plays a pivotal role as to development of military and political cooperation in the sphere of security in Europe. Maintaining the potential for meeting the commitment in the field of the collective defence, NATO enlarges its political functions.

But, despite of successful settling both current as well as strategic problems, the future of NATO doesn't seem to be without problems. These problems arise due to the further NATO's transformation and new threats to security of Europe.

Arising of new versatile threats to security in the period after the "Cold war" largely was connected with establishing of "security vacuum" in Central Europe and Europe peripheral, and also with disintegration tendencies on the past-communistic space of this continent. The vacuum of security arose also in the result of contours washout, borders of liability for security on the European continent from the part of leading countries of Europe or international organisations. Displays of these new threats to security are the domestic conflicts, narcobusiness, uncontrollable population migration, refugees, terrorism, and proliferation of a weapon of mass destruction and missile technologies.

The European Union appeared not to be able to solve any of the listed above problems, which Europe had faced after the end of the "Cold war". The Balkan crisis was bright evident of this inability. OSCE was not ready to resist to new challenges to security, and had not for these purpose sufficient resources.

Hence, there was and still is no organization in Europe, except the NATO capable to conduct tasks, delivered by new epoch. But thus there is a question as to what role NATO is going to play in new geopolitical measurement and how to decide these new problems. The success of the realization of these targets in many respects will depend on that type of relations, which the Alliance will built with other European countries, including Ukraine.

Though except for complete membership NATO has no other forms of participation in this organization, the Alliance develops several types of relations with other countries. These are relations with the members-candidates, Russia, countries of the Mediterranean. All these relations have qualitative differences. What are the peculiarities of Ukrainian-Russian relations in comparison with other types of relations?

The peculiarities of these relations are defined not only with interests of NATO to Ukraine, but also with the interests of Ukraine to NATO. Understanding of that outside the frameworks of Euro-Atlantic structure national security and sovereignty of Ukraine can not be secured, and also comprehension of burn problems, which are anticipated in Ukraine on a way of European integration fairly promoted the government of the country to search the "special" relations with NATO.

Thus, the main research tasks of this work are the answers to the questions about that what policy does Ukraine conduct within the framework of the special partnership with NATO and what prospects of this policy is possible hereafter? In this research there is investigated the evolution of Ukrainian interests to NATO, the possibilities and obstacles of Ukraine on a path leading to NATO are analyzed, the role and prospects of the special partnership between Ukraine and NATO in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture is considered.

SECTION 1

UKRAINE IN A NEW STRATEGY OF THE ALLIANCE

§ 1. NATO in a new geopolitical measurement.

The end of the "Cold war" marked cardinal changing of all geopolitical landscape of Europe. As well as any war, the "Cold war" was the struggle of two rivals. One part of it was represented with the countries of the communist block led by USSR, another part was represented with countries of West and USA joint in the Euro-Atlantic system of collective security and defence (NATO). Europe appeared to be the main scene of the "Cold war".

NATO itself was the winner in this struggle, having proved its efficiency and viability. The opposition with the countries of the communist block was the main component of existence and development of the Alliance in the "Cold war" period. The opposition to the Soviet threat was that cementing force, which strengthened transatlantic link between Western Europe and USA. This common purpose had fastened the allies even then, when their economic and political interests had not coincided. Just that very transatlantic link allowed NATO countries to mobilize necessary military and economic resources and to manage to be the winners in global struggle in the "Cold war".

The basis of global opposition during the period of the "Cold war" was the ideological contravention. It was, first of all, clash of opposite values, ideas and

civilizations. Hence, the core and applicability of the Euro-Atlantic security system are the follows:

- ensuring unity and security of Northern America and Western Europe, jointing of collective efforts in realization of the common interests of the Alliance countries-members;
- collective protection of territory of the Alliance countries and their sovereignty from external aggression;
- protection of the world order in Europe created on values of democracy, human rights and supremacy of law.

Proceed from that global opposition in times of the "Cold war" had brightly expressed ideological character, then it is obviously that the last of triune purpose defined main core of North Atlantic Alliance. Moreover if the second goal - the collective defence can be considered as external function of the Alliance, then first and third are their internal functions. Hence, the viability of the Alliance was defined, first of all, by its abilities to solve these internal functions.

The one of prime problems of the Alliance since its creation, since 1949 was creation of democratic regime in Germany and implantation of democratic values to the German society. The resolving of this problem let avoid relapses of Nazi revenge in Germany forever. Due to transatlantic link the economy of Western Europe, destroyed by the Second World War, was restored.

It is obviously that the main merit of Euro-Atlantic system of collective security was transformation of Western Europe in prospering, safe and stable region with highly developed democratic institutes. During 50 years NATO promoted reinforcing of democratic values and democratic regimes in the countries - members of the Alliance. NATO promoted also strengthening of stability in the intergovernmental relations between the Alliance countries, due to support of definite balance of interests between them.

The realization of Nato's internal function allowed providing the USA presence in Europe and realization of the American interests in the European continent. Due to NATO USA ensure the historical spiritual link with Europe. For more than 70 % of the Americans Europe still remains to be the first historical Native land. Europe holds the second place in export-import transactions of USA. Europe takes about 20 % of the American import and about 30 % of export of USA [1]. USA remains to be the basic investor of Europe. The transatlantic investments still much more exceed Pacific and Asian. Thus, for the period of the "Cold war", NATO successfully carried out its applicability and functions, assigned to it.

The victory of the Euro-Atlantic system of collective security in global opposition has brought NATO the enormous geopolitical, military, political and ideological dividends. To major geopolitical NATO advantages acquired as a result of the "Cold war" end should be attributed:

- integrating of Germany;
- liquidation of the Warsaw Pact;
- the USSR dissolving;
- geopolitical collapse of Russia;
- appear of independent Ukraine, that deprive Russia its imperial possibilities.

The victory in the "Cold war" let NATO gain huge military-strategic advantages. These advantages are, first of all, that the end of global opposition and arms races had been put, that considerably reinforced military security of the Alliance countries - members. The result of the Cold war end was deep reduction of conventional armaments in Europe on account of what the Alliance had received the 3-multiple superiority in comparison with Russia [2].

USSR and then Russia withdrew the troops from Eastern part of Germany, Central Europe and Baltic Republics. As a result of this Russian geopolitical retreat from Europe the double bumper zone was formed between Russia and NATO. The first bumper zone was created with the countries of Central Europe, and second – with Baltic countries, Ukraine and Moldova. Thus, the line of a possible military opposition was removed from the countries of NATO far on the East to borders of Russian Federation.

At last, result of the "Cold war" end was the conclusion of the base agreements in the field of the control over conventional armaments and transparency in military sphere. Thus, the international-legal mechanism of maintaining of military-strategic stability and military security in Europe was created. All these military advantages, gained by NATO, in its total, meant disappearance of global military threat from East for NATO.

Simultaneously this main victory of the Alliance had cast it in the first serious crisis, because with disappearance of military threat the external defensive function of NATO was settled. In 1991-1992 not only outside the Alliance, but also among its members more and more often votes about self-dissolution of this organization, became to be heard, because it exhausted its historical mission [3].

The end of the "Cold war" had marked the victory of democratic values and complete collapse of the communist ideology on the entire European continent. Downfall of totalitarian and authoritarian communist regimes in all the countries of Europe, including Russia, means self-evident political and ideological victory of NATO. And it, perhaps, was the main result of the "Cold war" and main victory of NATO. In contrast to all other aspects it was the common victory of all European countries. The general democratic values became the main base for creation of united Europe. In this ground NATO also carried out the ideological mission, not only having maintained democratic values in Western Europe, but also having spread them on all European continent.

The fading of threats to democratic values in Europe caused weakening internal functions of NATO. This political and ideological victory turned to be the second internal crisis of NATO. This internal crisis of NATO consist in weakening transatlantic link between Northern America and Europe. The direct reasons of this crisis were generated by the listed above victories of NATO in the "Cold war". The victory in the "Cold war" brought about, on the one hand, reorientation of USA from external to internal problems, and on the other hand, forming by Europe own geopolitical orientations.

The end of the "Cold war" allowed Western countries as well as USA to pay more attention to the internal economic problems. According to statement of the former Trade minister of USA Jeffrey F. Garten "Days, when we sacrificed the economic interests for the sake of establishing political blocks and the national security remained in the past" [4].

The priorities of economic interests brought about in its turn reorientation of foreign economic relations of USA from Europe to Asia. Asia becomes the most dynamically developing economic region all over the world. According to some assuming data by 2002 GNP of this region will constitute 8079 billions dollars USA, whereas in Europe -7503 billions dollars USA [5].

The volume of trade of USA with countries of Asia more than on 130 billions dollars exceeds volume of trade with EU. The share of the American export in Asia constitutes about 33 %, import 45 % that exceeds the appropriate parameters as to Europe.

The victory in the "Cold war" was not the only reason of reorientation of USA to internal problems. The change of generations, change of a demographic situation, at which the share of the American citizens of the European origin is constantly reducing – this all pushes USA to weakening traditional orientation on Europe [6].

The fading of the Soviet military threat and easing of attention of USA to Europe in its turn pushed leading countries of Western Europe to recognising of theirs own self-supporting geopolitical role on continent. For the first time their national, economic and political interests became to prevail above collective interests and allied obligations. The intensive economic growth of countries of the European Union objectively demanded new commodity markets and using the capitals. Such uncovered market for Western Europe with the downfall of communist regimes became Central and East Europe. The opening of Central and East Europe, without any doubt, promoted reorientation of EU to the East and weakening of transatlantic link. Between countries of EU there was competitiveness for economic and political assimilation of countries of the Central and East Europe, that in its turn brought about the need in expansion of the European Union.

The important factor of strengthening of independence of Europe became integrating of Germany. The economic power of Germany was complemented by its

territorial gains that turned this state into the chief European leader capable itself to influence on processes that took place on the European continent.

The strengthening of power and geopolitical influence of Germany also had an effect on Euro-Atlantic structure of collective security. If to proceed from the formula of the First General Secretary of NATO Lord Hastings Ismay, that " NATO was created to force out Russia, to drop Germany and to save presence of America" in Europe [7], then now strengthening of Germany and weakening of the USA influence has changed a balance of interests that provided before stability of the Alliance. Germany began to be capable to constitute opposition to USA and to influence on changing of a balance of interests in the Alliance. Therefore the president of USA George Bush in 1989 had to recognise, that Germany and USA "the partners in leadership " [8].

So Germany had the opportunity to choose by itself the new geopolitical allies in dependence on coincidence or discrepancy of its interests and interests of USA and other countries of NATO. One of such allies can be Russia, which strives to return its former power in Europe with the help of German support. In case of American - German clashes arise Russia will be ready to support Germany to constitute opposition to USA interests in Europe.

Other field of integrating of efforts of Germany and Russia can become Central and East Europe. And though the majority of the western experts affirm, that Germany does not seek for any special relations with Russia [9], hypothetically the possibility of repetition of the geopolitical script of the division of the Central and East Europe by these by two regional leaders in future cant be exude.

Thus, new geostrategic purposes arose before the European community and USA with the end of the "Cold war".

1. Preserving of internal stability and durability of transatlantic link that ensures security of Europe and Northern America.
2. Economic and political assimilation of postcommunistic space in Central and East Europe.
3. Adequate reaction on new challenges and threats to the European security that outgoes from past-communistic space of Europe and other regions, bordering with Europe.

Arising of new versatile threats to security in the period after the "Cold war" largely was connected with establishing of "security vacuum" in Central Europe and Europe peripheral, and also with disintegration tendencies on the past-communistic space of this continent. The vacuum of security arose also in the result of contours washout, borders of liability for security on the European continent from the part of leading countries of Europe or international organisations. Displays of these new threats to security are the domestic conflicts, narcobusiness, uncontrollable

population migration, refugees, terrorism, proliferation of a weapon of mass destruction and missile technologies.

The European Union appeared not to be able to solve any of the listed above problems, which Europe had faced after the end of the "Cold war". The Balkan crisis was bright evident of this inability. OSCE was not ready to resist to new challenges to security, and had not for these purpose sufficient resources.

Hence, there was and still is no organization in Europe, except the NATO capable to conduct tasks, delivered by new epoch. Today the Alliance became to be claimed by the time. Necessaries as never before the internal functions of the Alliance become to be urgent. The new geopolitical measurement demanded the new approaches to the realization of internal functions of the Alliance. Rather frequently many experts connect the need in the existence of NATO with extremely external function - protection against military threat. To their mind - in conditions of absence of military threat "the NATO should either extend, or die" [10]. Such sight on understanding of the role of NATO in modern Europe is rather simplified.

The enlargement is one of the ways or approaches of realization of internal function of NATO. The enlargement does not resolve all those grandiose tasks, which define applicability of NATO as structure of Euro-Atlantic security in the 21-century. NATO will carry out its new historical mission in Europe, if it can resolve the following complex of tasks:

- to consolidate transatlantic unity of Europe and Northern America;
- to keep Germany in collective interests of Euro-Atlantic security and defence, and also to prevent threat of hegemonic strivings in Europe;
- to exclude the possibility of a geopolitical revenge of Russia in Europe.
- to provide economic and political assimilation Central and East Europe, and also to reinforce stability and security in this region;
- to prevent threats and challenges to security outgoing from peripheral of Europe, the Near East and Northern Africa.

Resolving of these problems presupposes not only saving and strengthening of the world order of security and stability in Western Europe, but also distribution of these values on all European continent, including its peripheral. The resolving of these problems inevitably will demand from the Alliance the follows:

- internal transformation that corresponds new geopolitical realities and purposes;
- expansions of the "basic zone" of the Alliance that includes territory of the members-states (adoption of the new members);
- defining of the "zones of liability" and "zones of interests" of the Alliance outside of the "basic zone" and creation of the mechanism of the relations that provides stability and security in these zones.

§ 2. Interests and priorities of NATO policy concerning Ukraine.

The analysis of NATO interests concerning Ukraine requires several preliminary methodological improvements. First of all, these interests are not constant, that established once and for all. They have the dynamic nature. Proceeding from this it is necessary, first of all, to investigate the evolution of these interests. Secondly, as the interests are realized need, it is necessary also to take into account those internal and external factors, under which effect the comprehension of these needs occurs. Thirdly, the interests of NATO are represented as totality of the agreed by the consensus national interests of the leading member-states of the Alliance. This implies immutable demand to point out from all the totality of interests, national interests of such leading members of the Alliance as USA, Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy and to take into account their effect on forming NATO policy as a whole.

If now to analyze NATO interests to Ukraine taking into account these three methodological remarks, then it is necessary to notice, that from the very beginning NATO considered Ukraine, as a part of the heir, which was left to it from former Soviet military potential. The availability of this high-power first of all nuclear-missile potential in the absence of the advanced democratic institutes of political authority caused serious concern in countries of NATO. Certainly nuclear weapon located on Ukrainian territory in that time, did not constitute direct military threat for countries of NATO, however there was a threat of its uncontrollable ravelling out or unauthorised use. The NATO countries largely were afraid of its unauthorised use, as the questions of the control over it were the matter in dispute between Ukraine and Russia.

After the dissolving of the USSR Ukraine really began to possess the third on its power in the world after USA and Russia nuclear-missile grouping. On its arms there were 130 intercontinental ballistic missiles SS- 19 with 6 nuclear warheads and 46 missiles SS- 24 with ten warheads. There was the air component of strategic forces consisting of 21 bombers TU-95 MS 16 and 19 bombers TU-160 with the ammunition load up to 500 cruise missiles with nuclear warheads in Ukraine. The availability of such nuclear-missile component made consider Ukraine as territory that can submit a potential nuclear threat. The nuclear component of Ukraine was point of concern, first of all of USA and other nuclear member-states of NATO.

The countries of nuclear club did not want to see Ukraine as one more nuclear mandatory power. And in this respect the interests of Russia, USA and West countries coincided. Russia wanted to be the only successor of nuclear-missile potential of former USSR and to maintain complete monopoly of possession by this weapon. USA wanted to avoid a precedent of proliferation of nuclear weapons and

deployed unprecedented pressure on Ukraine in order to deprive it of its nuclear weapons. Though in USA that time there were the votes against expediency of nuclear disarming in Ukraine [11]. The basic argument was that with the help of nuclear weapon Ukraine could better defend its sovereignty from the possible invasions on it from Russia. Provided that Ukraine will conduct prowestern policy, it becomes the natural geopolitical ally of West and USA. However these arguments were not taken into consideration, because during this period USA and other members of NATO held the policy of "Russiacentrism".

In Ukraine itself there were both supporters, and opponents of the nuclear status of Ukraine. In opinion of the supporters of preserving nuclear status, it would be unreasonable to get rid of such weapon, for which engineering other countries spend tens billions of dollars. Such point of view, that nuclear weapon should be returned to Russia without any conditions, also was shared by minority. In particular in the Ukrainian Parliament there were them an overwhelming minority.

Eventually, the position had affirmed that Ukraine would conduct nuclear disarming, but only on certain conditions. Originally among such conditions by some national democrats were laid down the follow demand: "nuclear disarming" in exchange for adopting Ukraine in the members of NATO [12]. However that time in 1992-1994 nobody in Ukraine considered this demand seriously.

Among political elite of Ukraine the consensus was reached concerning the following conditions: nuclear disarming in exchange for the joint control over uncomletion of nuclear warheads removed from Ukraine; financial compensation and guarantees of national security. The financial and technical assistance was stipulated in Declaration of the presidents of USA, Ukraine and Russia of January 14, 1994. It stipulated financial compensation for nuclear weapon as supplies of nuclear fuel to the Ukrainian nuclear electric power plants. The financial assistance at a rate of 175 million doll.US was rendered to Ukraine also within the framework of the Program Nana-Lugara.

The trilateral declaration consolidated also political guarantees of security and territorial integrity of Ukraine from the part of USA and Russia. Later on the OSCE summit of November in 1994 other two nuclear member-states of NATO joined these guarantees of security: France and Great Britain. Thus, for the first time three leading countries of NATO committed themselves to grant to Ukraine the guarantees of its national security and territorial integrity, as non-nuclear state. Providing of the stated above conditions persuaded Ukraine to ratify the Treaty about strategic arms reduction (START - 1) in February 1994 and Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in November 1994.

Executing by Ukraine of the terms of the agreement START - 1 and supporting of its unrestricted prolonging NPT, and also the efforts as to non-proliferation of

nuclear weapons are included into the most priority interests of NATO concerning Ukraine today also.

Other major interest of NATO concerning security is the control over non-proliferation of missile technologies of Ukraine. It is known, Ukraine has the most advanced in the world missile technologies. The transfer of these technologies to rival countries of NATO and USA, can constitute definite military threat to security of the Alliance. Therefore NATO is rather interested in observance by Ukraine of the regime of the control over missile technologies. Its intention to meet these requirements Ukraine acknowledged in May 1994, having signed "the Memorandum of mutual understanding between government of the United States of America and government of Ukraine concerning transferring of missile equipment and technologies". In May of 1998 Ukraine became the full and equal member of RCNMT (Regime of the control over non-proliferation of the missile technologies). The membership in the regime of the control over non-proliferation of missile technologies is recognizing of its legitimate activity in the space-rocket area.

To major interests of NATO in Ukraine in the field of military security it is necessary to attribute executing of the Treaty terms about Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). Alongside with nuclear potential Ukraine inherited from USSR the most powerful military grouping with conventional armaments. Its military potential yielded only to Russia and American military contingent in Europe. It included more than 6 thousand tanks, 8 thousand battle armoured machines, more than 3800 piece of ordnance, 1494 battle aircrafts and 229 battle helicopters. Possessing such military power, Ukraine is capable to render self-supporting effect on changes of a military balance in Europe at regional as well as subregional levels.

The executing by Ukraine of this Agreement promoted removal misbalance of forces in Europe that was established in the period of the "Cold War". According to the CFE of Treaty Ukraine cut 1974 battle tanks, 1545 battle armoured machines, 550 battle aircrafts, having finished quantity of its arms to the arranged level. The process of reduction of conventional armaments is under the control of both national and foreign military inspections. In total for the period of reduction 166 inspections were conducted. However the most significant problem as to adaptation of the Agreement to new conditions, which touched upon both interests of NATO, and interests of Ukraine was a "flank" problem. Taking into account requirements to the "flank" zone, Ukraine had to concentrate all its arms in the western Pricarpathian district, where there were more than 50 % of all tanks and 54 % of battle armoured machines. Such concentration of forces on the western borders did not promote strengthening of security of countries of Central Europe - potential members of NATO. Realization of mutual interests of Ukraine and NATO as to resolving the "flank" problem was signing in Istanbul in November 1999 the Agreement about adaptation of the Agreement about conventional armed forces in Europe according to which the sizes

of the flank zone for Ukraine are reduced up to the Odessa area. In this zone Ukraine can deploy no more than 400 tanks, 400 battle armoured machines and 350 guns and in addition deploy about 153 tanks, 241 battle armoured machines and 140 guns. The new adapted Agreement establishes more stable regime in the field of military security and excludes not controlled escalating of land arms for conducting large-scale offensive operations.

To priority interests of security of NATO in military sphere it is necessary to attitude the fulfilling by Ukraine of measures of military trust and transparencies in the military field. In this respect ratification by Ukraine of the Agreement "the Opened sky " in March, 2000 meets strategic interests of the Alliance, that is fixed in the New strategic concept of NATO [13].

Thus, both security of the Alliance, as well as international security in the whole directly depend on realization of the listed above interests of NATO in the military field. Due to available military component, as well as due to the extremely important geostrategic situation, Ukraine more than other countries is capable to influence on condition of security in the Central and East Europe. Proceeding from these reasons of NATO officially assigned to Ukraine **a key role in ensuring stability and security in Europe** [14].

To other non-military threats, which can be originated from the territory of Ukraine and can cause enormous aftermath for all Europe, the problems of ecological security should be referred. The aftermath of the crush on the Chernobil NES became the main problem for all Europe. And though largely the European Union deals with the problem of closing Chernobil NES, the interests of economic security also constitutes the number of priority interests of NATO security connected with Ukraine. Evidence to this is existence of the numerous programs and measures of NATO as to joint reaction on crisis situations, accidents of technical character and consequence of natural calamities.

To priority interests of NATO concerning Ukraine in the sphere of security the overcoming of internal political instability in country connected with the Crimean separatism arising should be referred. Exactly this occurrence provoked arising both internal conflict in the country and intergovernmental conflict between two the greatest states on former Soviet space. Arising of such conflict could have catastrophic effects on security of all the European continent. However Kiev had demonstrated uncommon ability to settle the internal conflicts by the peace political means, that met principles of policy of NATO. Moreover, by 1997 Ukraine managed by signing the intergovernmental agreement to settle all territorial problems that it inherited from former USSR.

Thus, Ukraine during the first five years of its existence managed basically to remove those challenges and threats, which could be originated from its territory for

security of the Alliance and all European continent. It met both the interests of NATO, and interests of Ukraine.

However the main interests of the Alliance, linked to Ukraine, connect not with military sphere taking into account all its importance and primacy, but with **political** aspects. Their core is the strengthening of democratic values and all that what is called promotion of the Western European civilization. These interests are more global, more long-term and most important.

As a matter of fact these interests consist of filling vacuum that formed as a result of communist ideology collapse in the countries of former Social camp in Europe. The realization of these interests, finally, should introduce the newly appeared on this postcommunitistic space democracies in the Atlantic community.

The process of realization of the basic political interests of the Alliance depends on two major factors of the internal order. First of all, it depends on vitality of the rests of the communistic regime, on the deepness of its penetration into society; secondly, on the degree of development of democracy process in these countries.

The vitality of communist ideology depends in its turn on that in what time this ideology dominated in the society and on that what role it played in the society. Proceeding from these criteria, all postcommunitistic space of Europe can be divided into three zones. The countries of the Central Europe, that belonged earlier to the Socialist camp, such as Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania refer to the first zone. The special feature of countries of this zone can be considered that the communist ideology here was used only as the mean of supporting authoritarian political power, but not as the goal. Due to that this ideology had been existing for rather small historical period - about 40 years, it had not managed to penetrate deeply into society. Therefore with the end of the Soviet military occupation the powerful national elite easily refused from this ideology, having preferred democratic means for political power fighting in their countries.

The second group of countries is countries of so-called postsoviet space of Europe, except Baltic countries. The peculiarity of political regime of these countries is that the communist ideology played here the role of not only the mean of consolidation of the authoritarian regime, but also was values system of the society. Therefore with the collapse of the authoritarian communist regimes that happened after USSR dissolving, the communist ideology appeared to be claimed by the majority of populations of these countries. The communists in these countries again appeared to have power or to constitute the majority in parliaments. The former Secretaries of republican organizations became to be the Presidents of the newly independent states or heads in local authorities. Anti-NATO rhetoric still remains to be popular among the majority of the population of these countries, especially among aged generation. The Communist party still remains to be the most influential among other political parties. The democratic institutes execute a role of scenery of political

power of the former communist nomenclature and oligarchic groups. There is no civil society in these countries, and at the same time the large possibilities for revival of authoritarian regimes are saved. The communist ideology dominated in such countries more than 70 years.

The intermediate position between two of these groups of countries belongs to Baltic countries, partly to Ukraine and Moldova. The communist regime was imposed to Baltic countries with the beginning of the Soviet occupation. The same thing was made concerning the Western Ukraine. The western regions of Ukraine can be referred to the first zone, whereas the eastern ones can be refer to the second zone.

In this sense the political interests of NATO concerning Ukraine, no less than other countries of the first and second group deal with supporting process of democratization, introduction of democratic values into society, strengthening of national identity as the member of western community, prevention of relapses of chauvinism as well as ultranationalism and authoritarianism.

The countries of the third group are the countries that make the core of authoritarian communist system. They are former Yugoslavia and Russian Federation.

It was supposed, that the realization of these political interests of the Alliance could be realized according to the German - Japanese pattern [15]. According to this model the countries of the first and second group should have refused from their ambitious foreign policy and centred on internal democratic and economic transformations. The West and USA render the technical and economic assistance in these transformations. As to the countries of Central Europe this pattern appeared to be rather eligible and the realization of political interests of NATO practically was guaranteed, than as to Ukraine there were internal problems connected with transformation of its social and political system.

Concerning Russia the application of the German - Japanese pattern had the least success and in essence finished with the failure. Russia appeared not to be able to refuse from its imperious geopolitical ambitions. Therefore the end of the Cold war turned for it to be the full geopolitical catastrophe. It had lost its allies in Central Europe and essentially was rejected on a rim of East Europe.

As the geopolitical construction Russia was built as empire. Even in the Soviet period Russia identified itself with all Soviet Union, constituting the core of this totalitarian state. Allied republics were external streak around this core, through which the expansion of the core to the external world was realized. This totalitarian system was retained due to external enemy opposition, which was represented by the world capitalist system led by USA and NATO. With the end of the Cold war and cease of NATO opposition the image "of an external enemy" as well as the possibilities of the further external expansion, were lost, that sharpened the internal contravention. You see without external threat the subjects of Federation less and less

are drawn towards centre and more and more are inclined to follow an example of the young independent states of former republics. Therefore, after the dissolving of USSR the process of disintegration of Russian Federation, built on the same basis as USSR, had begun.

In contrast to other nations of former USSR to major values of the Russians should be included not only values of communist ideology, but also maniacal great-power chauvinism. With vanishing of communist ideology the great-power became to dominate in values of the Russians. So it isn't by chance that exactly the Russians constituted in USSR the dominant state nation, which felt being responsible for the Soviet Union fortune. Not by chance, that the USSR dissolving was considered as the national tragedy, due to which they lost 25 % of territory and almost 40 % GNP. Such understanding of a new geopolitical situation generated Weimar syndrome, which sooner or later was to lead to shrinking democratic reforms and recovering of imperial essence of the Russian state. Just the great-power idea, on the Russian political experts' opinion, is capable to unite the Russian people and to mobilize it in order to alive the great Russian state on all the Euroasian space of former USSR.

Unitary, centralisation, authoritarianism are to become the basical structure of such a state. The role of the constructor of such state should belong to the Russian ethnos that lives in Russia as well as countries "of near foreign countries" [16].

Little war in Chechnia brings about favourable conditions for renewal authoritarian regime in Russia, concentration of all the power at Centre, conservation in the top echelons of authority of the representatives of force structures, strengthening of the chauvinistic moods aimed at carrying out of great-power interests. After the representative of the force structures V.Putin reaching the presidential post in Russia the establishment of such an authoritarian state had become obvious.

Such internal transformations as to recovering over the super state have rather definite foreign-policy aspect. It means revival of "the enemy image" in the person of NATO and return of the geopolitical influence in Europe. For this reason Moscow outcries against Nato's expansion and considers the relations with the Alliance as "the cold peace" [17]. Under the pressure of gradual loss of its geopolitical positions in Caucasus and in Central Asia Russia had turned to the revenge policy as to Europe that was aimed at reestablishment of the Russian prevalence in East Europe at a regional level.

However today the major geopolitical interests of Russia direct not to Europe (in spite of all its significance), but to "near foreign countries". They imply the reintegration of all the postsoviet space into the Russian statehood. Without the first step - reintegration - Russia can not do the second step - renewal of its influence in Central Europe. Russia is not capable even partially to reestablish former influence in Europe neither in geopolitical aspect, nor in economical, nor in military strategic one

without annexation of Ukraine, Belorussia and probably the Baltic countries (either as a union or as the whole state). Therefore the most important demand of Russia to NATO will be the recognition of Ukraine and the Baltic countries as zones of the Russian vital interests. Such recognition would mean factual dividing of influence spheres in Europe.

Not having an economic resources for realization its geopolitical interests, Russia is eager to reach political-military hegemony over its former territory - countries of CIS. Till now three levels of restoration of such hegemony were definite. The first one is military presence of Russia on the territory of countries of CIS and common protection of borders of former USSR. The second one is Tashkent pact about collective security. The third one –bilateral military unions. In the long term perspective the creation of the uniform military organization must be planed within the framework of the unified state.

Today Russia has started to realize the third level - creation of the military alliance that implies the strictly differentiated choice of the most devoted strategic allies. The embodiment of such approach brought about he conclusion of the military alliance between Russia and Byelorussia. The Charter of this military alliance was drawn up in accordance with international-law. Due to conclusion of the military alliance with Byelorussia Russia considerably improves its geostrategic situation, but it does not solve the problem of reestablishment of its geopolitical prevalence in East Europe.

The geopolitical resource shortage can be compensated for Ukrainian annexation to this union or for search and realization of common with Germany geopolitical interests, and also for an usage European Union and NATO contradictions.

All these intentions of Russia are equally dangerous to NATO. The success of their realization largely depends on attitude of Ukraine.

Without Ukraine the geostrategic capacity of Russia looks vulnerable as to countries of Central Europe and NATO. Together with Belorussia Ukraine had the most advanced infrastructure in the European part of USSR. So it is not by chance that after the Warsaw Pact cancellation there was placed the first strategic defence echelon of the Soviet Union on the territory of these republics. But the only Belorussia can not provide to Russia rigid military-strategic position from Baltic up to Black Sea. Russia is not capable to create such military infrastructure on its territory yet.

Hence, Ukraine is gaining the extremely important significance for NATO from the both points of view, the first one - the defence of its new members, and the second - maintaining the Euro-Atlantic partnership. Ukrainian joining the Russian military block would not only essentially complicate organization of the forward defence of an Alliance, but also would make rather problematic its further

enlargement on East. If Ukraine joined the military alliance proposed by Russia and provided a system of front basing for Russian troops, NATO would have to deploy much of its peacetime front basing forces in the territories of new members. This would mean that NATO would have to spend ten times more to provide security for its new Central European allies (up to \$US 110 billion instead of \$US 10-14 billion)[18].

The forfeit of the democratic achievements and slipping down to authoritarianism inevitably would have drawn Ukraine nearer to the Belorussian - Russian Union and would bring about appearance of the antiNATO's tendencies in its foreign policy. Therefore NATO is rather interested in maintaining independent and democratic Ukraine, considering "the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, its territorial integrity and democratic development, economic prosperity and non-nuclear status" as the key factors of stability and security in Europe [19].

If the basic priorities for the Alliance are the political ones, then thus what role economic interests play? Despite that they are not priore for NATO as defence organization, largely exactly the economic interests of the Alliance's leading countries define its policy. Not studying definite economic interests, NATO is invoked to provide political stability and by that to secure the investments of leading countries of the Alliance in countries of the Central and East Europe and development by them this new capital markets, goods, natural and labour resources.

In spite of that such mission of NATO is not its direct function, it strengthens transatlantic unity, because it promotes realization of economic interests of leading countries of the Alliance. The adoption this or that country to the members of NATO largely depends on presence at this country of the capitals of leading countries of the Alliance. The adoption to the members of NATO of the Czech Republic and Poland largely was promoted by the high specific gravity of the American and German capitals. Now interests of Romania in the Alliance are lobbied by France, and of Slovenia – by Italy [20]. So that was not by chance that the first applicants for the introduction in NATO in 1995 had the largest volume of the investments among other countries the Central and East Europe [21].

Thus, it is quite objective that one of the basic criteria of adoption to the Alliance is free market and advanced system of market regulation in the country which applies for being the member of NATO. The Czech Republic became the real applicant for the introduction in NATO, only after there were privatized more than 80 % of the Czech economy [22].

If one looks now at the basic economic parameters, which define economic interests of NATO countries to Ukraine, they do not look consolatory, especially on a background of increasing expansion of the Russian capitals in Ukraine. Thus the structure of export-import transactions of Ukraine for 9 months of 2000 was the follow. The highest volume of export supplies belonged to Russian Federation. It was

23,3 % from the whole volume of Ukrainian export, whereas in such countries of NATO as USA there were only 5,8 %, in Germany - 5,2 %, in Italy - 4%, in Poland - 3,1 %, in Great Britain - 0,9 %, in France - 0,7 %, in Turkey - 6,1 % [23].

However in general the total amount of export of Ukraine in countries of NATO in 2000 reached 30 %, that exceeded its export supplies in Russia. At the same time in the Ukrainian import the share of Russia was 42,7 %, whereas the share of USA is only 2,5 %, Germany - 7,6 %, Poland - 2,1 % [24]. In 1999 Ukraine was gained the foreign investments for the sum of 281 billions dollars US. The greatest investors of Ukraine among countries of NATO were USA - 511 millions dollars, Germany - 229 millions dollars, Great Britain - 201 millions dollars, Netherlands - 270 millions dollars. [25]. For the first half-year of 2000 the volume of investments in Ukraine had increased up to 3,59 millions dollars US [26]. The key positions among the foreign investors belonged to USA - 18 % from the total amount of the investments, Netherlands - 9 %, Great Britain - 8 %, Russia - 8 %, Germany - 6 %, Italy - 4 % [27]. In general direct investments from the NATO countries constituted about 50 % of all the investments incoming in Ukraine.

Thus, despite poor investment climate in Ukraine the NATO countries are ready to grant it the significant investments. There is also the tendency that gives a hope, that the investments of countries of NATO, as a rule, are directed to highly technological fields of Ukraine and to development of small and average business, whereas the Russian investments act (arrive) basically in raw and recycling branches of economy.

However greatest economic lagging Ukraine demonstrates during privatization. For 1998 in a state ownership there was 53,6 % of the fix goods of the industrial enterprises, 44,1 % in collective and only 2,2 % in a private property [28].

The above-stated interests define policy of NATO, basic approaches and ways of their realization.

With the termination of cold war in a conceptual kind these new approaches were worded in the strategic concept accepted at meeting in Rome in November, 1991. As before Alliance remained extremely defensive organization. An overall objective of an alliance still was containment and protection against aggression against any of the state - member of organization.

The indivisibility of security was understood in the greater degree as security of the members of an alliance founded on the collective defence of their own territory [29]. Problem of NATO included also " conservation of a strategic balance " in Europe [30]. Except for the collective defence by new elements of security policy an Alliance of steel dialogue and the partnership, through which was supposed to form safe for the countries - members a foreign-policy and geopolitical encirclement.

However from the moment of adoption in 1991 in the Strategic Concept of an Alliance much was changed on the European continent. In July, 1997 by the chiefs of

countries of NATO the decision on creation of the new strategic concept was accepted which would take into account the occurred changes and new problems of an Alliance more full. In the New Strategic Concept of NATO accepted in April, 1999 on Washington meeting, new wider approach to understanding system of collective security is fixed. The European collective security now should be formed within the framework of such structures as NATO and European Union. The NATO shares liability for a security not only owns members of an Alliance, but also countries - associates. Thus, NATO more significant is assigned, than before role in ensuring collective security having now not only military, but also political, economic and ecological measurement.

The expansion of functions of safety has demanded displacement of accents(stresses) with clean(only) military on the political remedies of realization of policy of an Alliance. The political interests become priority for NATO. The enlargement of functions of security of Alliance has resulted also in enlargement of geographical borders of Euro-Atlantic security. The expansion of security functions will force NATO to transfer from " the defences of the members of an Alliance " to " to protection of its interests ". The displacement of accents (stresses) on protection of interests in turn provides actions of NATO outside territory of countries - members of the Washington treaty. By virtue of these reasons will happen structuring itself Euro-Atlantic's space and formation in it of three basic zones, in which NATO will bear a miscellaneous degree of liability for safety and defence of this space.

Each of these zones is possible conditionally is to designated as "the basic zone", "a zone of liability" and "a zone of interests". Hence, and the policy of NATO with that or other state will be plotted depending on what zone it will appear in.

"The Zone of interests" of an Alliance includes those regions of Europe and bordering to it frontier regions, whence can emanate threats of Euro-Atlantic security, such as: the internal interethnic conflicts, clandestine migration, terrorism, distribution of a weapon of mass destruction, relapses hegemony and militarism. This zone includes countries, which have large problems with democracy, violation of rights of the person, country with authoritarian political modes. Priority for an Alliance by interests in this zone the interests of military safety are. This zone by virtue of the internal instability is most restless and most difficult for realization of interests of an Alliance. It is possible to call it as forward margin of actions of NATO. However in this zone of NATO to the greatest degree can demonstrate the efficiency or, on the contrary, hopelessness. The leading countries of Europe and USA require this zone in protection of the economic interests with the help of NATO, as any other pan-European organization to defend their interests in this zone is not capable.

The basic instrument of realization of interests of NATO in this zone is the dialogue. It is invoked to adjust the consensus on the sharpest security problems.

Proceeding from this characteristic, to "to a zone of interests" the NATO is possible to refer, first of all, such countries of Mediterranean as Israel, Egypt, Tunis, Mauritania, Morocco, and Jordan. On past-soviet space to this zone of interests it is necessary to refer countries of the Caucasian region, Moldova, Byelorussia and Russia, and also Republic of Yugoslavia.

Main area of activity of NATO in this zone is the dialogue with Russia. As to Ukraine, it can be considered NATO as transitional country for advance of interests of an Alliance on past-soviet space, first of all, on the Caucasian region and as hostage of dialogue with Russia. In a context of this dialogue of NATO will return always priority to the Russian interests, and to neglect Ukrainian, staking them depending on interests of Russia. In dialogue of NATO - Russia the Ukrainian interests can be a subject of tender. They can be neglected in a favour of achievement of the consensus on important both for Russia, and for an Alliance to problems. In this dialogue of NATO stresses, that the relations with Russia are more important, than relation with Ukraine[31]. Such "russiancenterism" of policy of NATO promotes transformation of Ukraine in is strategic no man's ground, than constantly calls enticement in Russia to repair the complete control above this country.

"A Zone responsibility of NATO". This zone includes countries, which NATO has given the definite security guaranties or has the definite obligations in sphere of their national security. The countries refer to such countries which have filed the application for the introduction in NATO. To this zone of liability of NATO it is possible to refer and Ukraine, as nuclear countries the members of NATO have given to Ukraine such warranties as non-nuclear state to the mandatory power. The alliance has taken also definite obligations concerning Ukraine, having signed with it in 1997 a Charter about the special partnership.

Leading particular of policy of NATO in this zone is the partnership. Within the framework of the program " Partnership for peace " countries the associates can simultaneously participate as in measures on preparing for the introduction in NATO, and in measures directed on the decision of general problems Euro-Atlantic security. The basic gear of realization of interests and obligations of NATO is the gear of advisories.

"The Basic zone" includes territory of the countries - members of NATO. Concerning this territory of NATO will realize not only security function, but also function of the collective defence according to an item 5 of the Washington Treaty. Main and priority for policy of an Alliance in this zone the political interests and interests of the defence are. By the basic principle of ensuring of these interests the principle of containment and defence acts.

Ukraine is not included into this zone Euro-Atlantic security, and while that has the rather distant prospects to appear in it hereafter. However concerning this zone in policy of NATO to Ukraine the role is challenged essential. The territory of Ukraine

agrees of this role certain "security zone" can to be considered by an Alliance as or "bumper zone" separating territory of the countries - members of NATO from unstable and explosion-dangerous regions [32]. The ensuring of such security external encirclement simplifies the decision of problems and obligations of NATO to the members. The ensuring in particular by Ukraine of such external security environment allows NATO to harden Euro-Atlantic security by expansion of the basic zone. Such way of annexation of new countries to NATO allows to decide problems of its expansion, not using thus of significant military resources and to not provoke Russia to redundant confrontation. It is accepted to call such way of enlargement of NATO as "reinforcing of political stability" [33]. At such way of enlargement the military-strategic interests are not defining. The basic demands, which presents NATO to the associates, including to Ukraine wear, first of all, political and economic character.

They consist: in the democratic control above the Armed Forces and accomplishment of deep military reform; demonstrating of devotion to the cause of a strengthening of stability and well-being through observance of principles of economic freedom, social justice and liability for guards of an environment.

The realization of these demands depends not only on interest of NATO, but also from the appropriate policy of Ukraine concerning an Alliance. Proceeding from this, the prospects of Ukraine in Euro-Atlantic security system are largely defined by own possibilities of this country.

SECTION II.

POLICY OF UKRAINE CONCERNING NATO.

§ 1. The evolution of interests of Ukraine concerning NATO.

During the first years of establishing its independence Ukraine did not show the special interest to NATO. Mostly such attitude could be explained by that Ukraine proclaimed its direction aimed at keeping non-block and neutral status in the Declaration of independence and state sovereignty adopted in 1990[34]. Though, undoubtedly, that such intention concerned rather Russia, than NATO. Declaring of its non-block status helped Ukraine to solve main for it in those times problem - to avoid engagement in military alliance with Russia and participation in the Tashkent Treaty about collective security of CIS [35].

Other reason of Ukrainian indifference concerning NATO, as some experts suppose, was skepticism of Ukrainian politicians concerning the prospects of membership in the Alliance and steadfastness of the guarantees for Ukraine [36].

Rather interests of NATO to Ukraine, than vice versa stipulated the first contacts between Ukraine and NATO. These interests were connected with the problem of nuclear disarming of Ukraine, control over conventional armaments, and also new policy of the Alliance concerning the East Europe countries, based on the principles of cooperation, partnership and dialogue.

According to the context of this policy of the Alliance in January 1992 the representative of Ukraine for the first time took part at the meeting of working group of the Council of the Northatlantic cooperation. On the 22-23 of February 1992 the first visit of the General secretary of NATO M. Werner to Kiev took place. On the 8 of June 1992 headquarter of NATO was visited by the President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk. Since then there began to develop close contacts between Ukraine and NATO.

Proceeding from interests of the Alliance the basic subject of Ukrainian – NATO's relations during this period was problems of nuclear disarming, reduction of conventional armaments and number of armed forces, conversion of the military-industrial complex of Ukraine [37].

However the real interest of Ukraine to NATO was defined not by these problems. It increased in process of comprehension by Ukraine the threats to its own national security. The threats coming from of Russia and problem of unsettled state borders, inherited to Ukraine from USSR were key.

Settling these national security problems Ukraine could not rely on support from the NATO's part. NATO, as well as USA concerning countries of CIS and the East Europe conducted the policy of "russiacerism". Holding such policy the interests of NATO were on the part of Russia, especially concerning nuclear disarming of Ukraine. So it is not by chance, that the first recognized interest of Ukraine to NATO arose during nuclear disarming. It dealt with granting, by Russia, as well as countries of NATO additional guarantees of security to Ukraine, as to the non-nuclear state.

The second qualitatively new period of the relations of Ukraine and NATO began since 1994. It was stipulated by several circumstances: by the beginning of process of expansion of NATO to East; by incoming to presidential power Leonid Kuchma in Ukraine; by exacerbation of contradictions in the Ukrainian-Russian relations; by increase of revenge moods in Russia and revival of gegemonial tendencies in the Russian policy.

After that when the members of the Alliance acknowledged their readiness and openness for adoption into this organization new countries at the Brussels summit in January, 1994, the tendency of tension increasing in the relationship between NATO and Russia began to reveal clearly. Though actually the original reason of this

tendency was revenge forces incoming to the state authority in Russia. It happened after parliamentary election in December of 1993. Increasing of intensity between NATO and Russia created new threats for Ukraine.

The previous foreign policy concept, as well as The Ukrainian sovereignty Declaration defined integration into Europe as the basic strategic purpose. The strategy of realization of this purpose meant common direction of Ukraine together with Russia in Europe. Therefore Ukraine highlighted the necessity of a complex system of the all-European security aimed at avoiding possible creation some new blocks and dividing lines [38].

Proceeding from such understanding Ukraine spoke in support of NATO's transformation from organization of the collective defense in organization of collective security, which would include Ukraine and Russia together with other European countries. In many respects such understanding coincided with a position of Russia on this problem, and also took into account Russiacentrism of NATO.

NATO expansion and Russian opposition against this process created threats of arising new dividing lines and transformations of territory of Ukraine into "bumper zone". Moreover, coming back to military confrontation between Russia and NATO could return territory of Ukraine into the possible theater of operations. The threat of such prospect firstly caused the skeptical attitude to NATO expansion of the President of Ukraine L. Kuchma, which was expressed by him during his visit to USA in November of 1994 [39]. The First Minister Deputy of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine of that time B. Tarasuk spoke on this question more definitely. He stated the later "expansion" happens, the better for Ukraine [40].

Though the main problem was not about that NATO would or wouldn't expand, but about that in what way this organization would expand. The concept of enlargement by reinforcing political stability helped to avoid the above-stated fears.

The main conditions of such enlargement were priority of NATO political interests over military-strategic ones, reaching compromise with Russia, introduction the broad program of cooperation in the field of security titled "Partnership for peace", correspondence of the new candidates to political requirements of the Alliance. NATO's requirements to the candidate for the introduction into this organization consist in reaching complete democratic control over their armed forces; absence of the territorial claims to the neighbors and solution of these problems by the extremely peace political means; resolution of all the interethnic contravention inside country [41].

All these conditions appeared rather positive for security of Ukraine. Due to such conditions and requirements Ukraine could realize security interests of its borders and settle territorial disputes with Romania and Poland. Outcome of solution of these problems was conclusion the Declaration between Poland and Ukraine as to conciliation and Friendship Treaty with Romania.

What had reaching of the compromise between NATO and Russia given for Ukraine? Due to this compromise it worked to avoid arising new dividing lines in Europe. But the most important thin was that due to NATO's support Ukraine succeeded in concluding the Treaty as to friendship, cooperation and partnership between Ukraine and Russian Federation. By this Treaty at international-law level Russia recognizes territorial integrity, independence and inviolability of borders of Ukraine [42].

Besides Ukraine itself also played rather pivotal role in reaching the compromise between NATO and Russia. Its position concerning enlargement of NATO took into account not only interests of the Alliance, but also interests of Russia. It meant the following:

- NATO enlargement should be evolutionary;
- none of state has a right to veto on membership of other states in the Alliance;
- NATO should to be transformed into broader organization of the Euro-Atlantic security;
- the function of the collective defense of NATO should be substituted with the function of collective security;
- there should not be placed nuclear weapons on territory of the new members of NATO;
- the interests of Ukraine and Russia should be taken into account in the process of NATO enlargement[43].

With such position Ukraine factually secured non-conflict's enlargement of NATO to the East, which will cost the Alliance the minimum financial and military resources. Due to such position of Ukraine NATO does not need to deploy contingents of armed forces on forward boundaries on the territory of new members. Exactly this circumstance for the first time made NATO to recognize that Ukraine played "the key role in establishing stability and security in Europe" [44].

However the first enlargement wave of NATO had two essential negative consequences for Ukraine. First of them consists that Ukraine appeared to be in the role of "bumper zone", and its foreign policy began to balance between interests of NATO and Russia to the detriment of own interests. The second circumstance is a derivant from the first one. The role of "bumper zone" provokes Russia to fill this "no man's" land with its influence in order to compensate lost Central Europe. Thus, the policy of Russia concerning Ukraine became harder and more expansional. Such policy of Russian force pressure threatens to existence of Ukraine as the independent states.

The threats of internal character are not less serious. The President Leonid Kuchma having proclaimed direction forward conducting market reforms and democratic transformation in country faced serious problems of its realization [45].

Slipping down of the country to condition of economic chaos weakened support from the West and strengthened pressure from Russia on Ukraine aimed at the reintegration it in Russian Federation and CIS [46]. Under conditions of budget deficit appeared to be impossible to maintain up to due level defence complex and Armed Forces. There was a sharp necessity to reform military sector. All these internal and external circumstances gradually have formed in the Ukrainian establishment understanding that the withdrawal from the European choice or slowing down the process of integration into Europe makes existence of Ukraine as independent democratic state to be doubtful.

Taking into account these circumstances and also vital importance of internal economic transformations in country, the President Leonid Kuchma, in his inaugural speech at re-election him for the second presidential term in November of 1999, defined the introduction of Ukraine into the European Union as the basic target of the foreign policy.

But the last two years of this policy have shown, that the integration in Europe through the introduction in the EU is a task incomparably more complicated, than reaching this task by the introduction into NATO. While the conference of EU in Paris in September 2000 Ukraine was actually refused of being membership even in the long-term prospect [47]. Thus **the question concerning change of strategic priorities of integration of Ukraine in Europe arises. *It means that, continuing to develop cooperation with the EU, Ukraine should consider as the prime strategic task entry the system of Euro-Atlantic security.***

Such choice is dictated by a number of strategic advantages of Euro-Atlantic security in comparison with the EU for Ukraine. First of all, the demands that the EU requires from the candidates are incomparably more difficult, than demands for membership in NATO. These demands imply high enough level of economic development of the member-states, a high degree of compatibility of their political and economic systems with the EU system [48].

Secondly, if the enlargement of NATO does not mean establishing of any dividing lines, than the EU quite the reverse actively constructs new curtain, by establishing rigid customs and visa barriers, cutting off Ukraine from "Great Europe" [49]. In this respect in contrast of NATO the targets of the EU and Russia as to Ukrainian isolation from Europe involuntarily coincide.

Thirdly, if the Euro-Atlantic security system is aimed at strengthening stability of all the Europe, than the EU aims its policy at a security providing of only its own members.

Fourthly, in Europe lately there becomes more obvious the tendency to play the role of self-supporting geopolitical force in Europe, that can bring about weakening the transatlantic link with Northern America and intimacy with Russia. On condition of maintaining authoritarianism in Russia and hegemonic tendencies in Russian

policy, the geopolitical union of EU with Russia is dangerous for Ukraine by the large difficulties. At the best Ukraine appears to be overboard of European integration, in the worst the EU recognizes Ukraine to be a sphere of extremely Russian impact.

Fifthly, on condition of maintaining transatlantic partnership between Northern America and Europe between NATO and the EU, the Eastern European outskirts have an addition possibility of the introduction in this European political structure with the help of the Alliance. Examples of such introduction into the EU at "black entrance" through NATO are Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic.

Sixthly, the realization of the policy in the field of defence and security by the EU will result that the European Union will turn into one more political-military organization that little differs from NATO. In that case advantages of Ukraine adoption to the EU as not military, just political or economic organization are lost. This argument is especially important in the context of the Ukrainian-Russian relations.

Seventhly, the Euro-Atlantic security is founded on USA leadership that allows Ukraine to consider the American presence at Europe as the powerful factor of support of independence and sovereignty of Ukraine.

Former communist countries of the Central Europe realized these advantages of Euro-Atlantic security. These countries entering NATO aimed at three main tasks: to come back in Europe, to become the members of all the western structures, and finally to avoid geopolitical impact of Russia [50]. ***For Ukraine these purposes today are even more actual, than for countries of Central Europe.*** Comprehension of urgency of these tasks, and also advantages of NATO in neutralization of threats to national security of Ukraine form a system of long-term strategic interests of Ukraine concerning the Alliance.

1. Receiving for Ukraine the strong guaranties of its national security, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

2. Leaving sphere of geopolitical prevalence of Russia and reaching the equal as it intergovernmental relations.

3. Integration into Europe, into western political and economic structures.

4. Reinforcing international security and stability in the region of the Central - East Europe.

5. Reinforcing internal bases of national security of Ukraine with the help of NATO. Usage of NATO experience and support in increasing efficiency of defence sector of Ukraine.

The realization of these strategic interests depends first of all on those possibilities, which Ukraine has and hardness of those problems, which it faces coming to the system of the Euro-Atlantic security.

§ 2 The possibilities and obstacles to Ukraine on its path to NATO.

With the USSR dissolving, Ukraine inherited not only large part of nuclear and conventional armaments, but also the most highly developed structure of the Soviet economy. According to the western experts' opinions Ukraine had the best of all the postsoviet republics conditions for economic development and integration to Europe. Even now after ten years economic crisis the potential economic possibilities of Ukraine exceed the countries of Central Europe, such as Poland, Hungary and Slovakia.

Ukraine has rich raw, natural and labor resources. For this resources proceeding there are large productive capacities. The industrial production in Ukraine has developed enough diversified character. Ukraine has maintained also highly technological fields of production such as an airbuilding, missileengineering, shipbuilding, and mechanical engineering. Such economic potential of Ukraine can be considered as the potentially perspective, attractive and rather capacious market for the western capitals and investments, and as a commodity market of highly technological production of West. But preservation of old administrative economic system and worsening of national economy condition factually brought to nothing these advantages and constituted substantial threat to its national security [51].

In such system the basic subject of the market economic relations is not the businessman or private entrepreneur, but a high-ranking government official. In countries, where there is an absolute prevalence of state ownership, its assignment can not be conducted by sale and purchase, as nobody has necessary financial resources. Process of assignment in such situation is possible only due to usage of state authority. The acquiring of state ownership and its possession is possible to achieve by state authority ownership. Such process of assignment of state ownership by government officials accepted to call as "nomenclature privatization", and economic relations at such character of assignment – as "nomenclature capitalism".

The nomenclature capitalism gives the possibility to power elite to gain the huge profits, not caring very much about production growth and labor efficiency. Such nomenclature capitalism leads to inevitable complete collapse of the society, because it is unproductive by its nature. Its basic features are corruption, enlarging of the ratio of "shadow" economy, crisis of payments and lowering of enterprises' profitability.

Corruption is the main source of the incomes of power elite under conditions of nomenclature capitalism. Inconsistency and incompleteness of market economic reforms, and on the one hand by maintaining of an administrative system of economic management generate corruption in Ukraine, on the other hand. Formally economic freedom exists, but there are no guarantees of its protection of legislation and government. In such situation a businessman completely depends on the bureaucrat. The bureaucrat appropriates to himself the rights of the state. Not finding

protection of his interests at the bureaucrat as governmental representative, a businessman buys governmental services in the private way, and tax payment are considered by him as double taxation from which he, naturally, strives to avoid. The tax avoidance is stimulated also by extremely high level of taxation in Ukraine.

According to a present tax system in Ukraine in total from 60 % to 80% of income are excluded, and the businessmen have no legal protection against tax inspection. As a result there establishes the steady habit of tax avoidance and taking away of business activity into "shadow" in the country. Thus, the ruling groupings, first of all, are not interested in being effective system of work of the law-enforcement agencies. Therefore the legislation bodies themselves mostly accept the laws that protect not needs of the society, but interests of this or those influential groups that have a possibility to lobby or "push" the necessary to them solutions. According to such system people ignore the laws, considering them for themselves illegal, that strengthens economic activity taking into «shadow». In such a way **"shadowing" of economic, political and social life of country takes place.**

The amount of shadow economy in Ukraine, by some expert estimates, today has reached 60 % of GDP. The main reason of growth of shadow economy also is the maintaining of a command control system of economy with the uncompleted liberalization. You see under such circumstances there is a prevailing share of public sector in economy, which requires the grants from the budget. Due to distribution of the budgetary grants the bureaucrats gain the possibility through a system of the shadow firms to "scroll" governmental money. In 1999 more than half of all money in national currency were in the cash form and rotated outside of the budget. It in its turn generated crisis of payments, that made *activity of the enterprises more and more wasteful and, simultaneously, less profitable*. Such tendency, in its turn, led to increasing of a number of unprofitable enterprises. If in 1995 every fifth Ukrainian enterprise was unprofitable, in 1996 every third was unprofitable, and in 1998 - every second. In 1999 54 % of the enterprises of Ukraine were unprofitable.

In the context of European integration the problem here is that Ukraine can not be integrated in a world economic system with "nomenclature capitalism". Capitalist West for the powerful nomenclature is not some other as the way of money washing up, where they can to transfer their shadow superprofits into rigid dollar currency. Thus gradually the countries of nomenclature capitalism turn into autarchy called Commonwealth of Independent States.

Unacceptance of West and European values by the powerful nomenclature occurs not only at a level of comprehension of economic interest, but also at a political level.

Appropriation of political power by clan-oligarchic groups. That is an extremely dangerous to Ukraine process. So called "political holdings", which represent interests of the group of "shadow" business in power structures, took in this

process the place of the political parties as the communicational linkages between power and society. 34,9% of interrogated suppose that the real political power belongs to "shadowers", 22,9 % believe that power is completely disposed by the corrupt state bureaucracy [52]. The interests of these clan-oligarchic groups are connected, first of all, with dividing of the state financial and material resources, budget funds, licensing - with all of that, what is required for the normal functioning of shadow economy. In such a way the "shadow" economy in Ukraine generated "shadow" policy.

The clan-oligarchic groups in Ukraine are strictly enough structured, first of all, according to branch indication ("energetics", "oil-gas", "steelmaking", "military-industrial"). The functioning of these branches in Ukraine depends first of all on cooperation with Russia. Proceeding from this, both economic and political interests of these groups are connected with Russia, but not with West. Such situation reduces economic possibilities of integration of Ukraine in Europe, but quite reverse, increase need of such integration. Because only western capital is capable to establish the developed market economic relations in Ukraine.

The President L. Kuchma at the presidential elections of 1994 had come to power by sympathizing to prorussian moods in Ukraine. His foreign policy grounds on balancing between interests of West and Russia. Therefore his attitude to NATO is rather inconsistent. In one case he speaks in support of maintaining of the neutrality, in other case in support of intimacy with Russia, in third one –that the neutrality can not be eternal and Ukraine "will go not into NATO, and to NATO" [53].

Being re-elected for the second presidential term, during his inaugural speech in 1999 L. Kuchma stated, that the basic target of his foreign policy would be the introduction of Ukraine in EU. Though, having faced significant difficulties, L. Kuchma seems to intend to return to double pole policy. The core of this policy comes to the necessity of simultaneous deepening of cooperation both with Russia, and with West. But under such conditions, when Russia is backing to revival of confrontation with West, such double pole policy of Ukraine hardly can be productive. Many experts consider such policy as "the game with zero result", because the enlarging of cooperation of Ukraine with NATO undermines stability of the relations with Russia and visa versa [54].

Government. Till 1999 the government of Ukraine largely dealt with service of clan-oligarchic groups. The reassuring in the European orientation and adherence to reforms was necessary only for receiving the assistance and credits from West that the government used for absorbing budget deficit.

In 1999 the Prime Minister Victor Uschenko formed the first government of the reformers, which began resolutely to conduct market economic transformations in country. The success of these reforms had already become appreciable in one year. The task of V. Uschenko's government was not only accomplishment of economic

transformations, but also to create real conditions for economic integration of Ukraine in Europe.

Parliament. The situation in the Verhovna Rada is defined by ambiguity of the relation of political fractions to NATO. If the right and centrist forces speak in support of the Ukrainian introduction into NATO, then the left and prorussian ones are the opponents of this process. So, the Party for Slavic Unity outcries against expansion of NATO on East and supports the idea of military union of Ukraine with Byelorussia and Russia, and also creation the whole panslavic state. The Ukrainian Regional Revival Party outcries against entry of Ukraine in NATO, because, according to their opinion, this military block after the dissolving of the Warsaw Pact had lost its existence sense. The Green Party and Socialist Party of Ukraine maintain the non-block status of Ukraine and consider NATO as just the defence union. The Progressive Socialists consider that Ukraine can enter NATO only together with Russia.

The largest fraction of the communists in the Ukrainian Parliament is the most ardent opponents of the idea of rapprochement of Ukraine and NATO. At the parliamentary elections (of 1998) the communists received about 30 % of deputy places. By Gosduma's example of the Russian Federation in the Verhovna Rada of Ukraine 170 deputies from the left parties established the bloc "Anti-NATO". The culmination of Anti-NATO campaign was the attempts in the Verhovna Rada of Ukraine and in Crimea to frustrate the international training "Sea-Breath". It needs that to discredit Ukraine that signed the Charter about the special partnership with NATO and to present it for the members of the Alliance as unreliable partner.

To counterbalance to the left forces such political movements and parties as Narodniy Ruh of Ukraine, National-Democratic Party of Ukraine, Republican Party of Ukraine support the idea of the introduction of Ukraine into NATO. Thesis parties support also the official direction of Ukraine forward deepening of the integration process with the North-Atlantic Alliance.

In 2000 after establishing in the Parliament the unleft majority, the Verhovna Rada of Ukraine began to conduct more constructive solutions concerning Ukraine and NATO. So in the beginning of March, 2000 it ratified the Treaty "Opened sky" and the Agreement SOFA.

Political elite of Ukraine. The political elite in general has positive attitude to NATO and accounts that in the perspective Ukraine will become the member of the Alliance. So according to sociological polling conducted in 1996 52 % maintained the European choice of Ukraine and 49 % speak in support of joining in NATO [55]. The polling conducted in 2000 among elite and the experts of Ukraine had shown that 58 % of the respondents maintains the idea of joining of Ukraine in NATO irrespectively of other countries. 7 % - for military union of Ukraine with Russia, 26,8 % from them would support neutral and non-block status of Ukraine [56].

The militaries. Among the militaries the idea of the introduction of Ukraine in NATO is supported by no more than 27 % of the servicemen. Among the young officers there are more supporters of cooperation of Ukraine with NATO, than among the officers of older generation [58].

The population. In general the majority of the population of Ukraine have positive attitude to NATO. According to sociological polling 53,8% do not considers the Alliance as the aggressive block. 16,5 % of them consider that the Alliance is peacekeeping organization, and 21,5 % consider it defence union [58].

The sociological polling conducted in 2000 shown the ambiguous attitude of the Ukrainian population to the process of NATO's enlargement. 28,3 % of the respondents foster this process. 21 % from them consider that it will promote reinforcing of democratic regimes in Europe. 7,3 % consider that it promotes to strengthen independence of Ukraine from Russia.

At the same time about 46 % have negative attitude to the process of NATO enlargement. 7 % of the respondents consider that the Alliance stands military threat to Ukraine, 19,5 % are inclined to consider that thus Ukraine can be involved in opposition between NATO and Russia. 19,6 % are assured that the process of expansion will increase dependence of Ukraine from West [59]. 36 % of the respondents in Ukraine according to the polling of 1998 supported Russia in its counteraction to the process of NATO enlargement [60].

Thus, the public opinion of the Ukrainians to some extent reflects both positive and negative consequences of the NATO enlargement for Ukraine.

Concerning joining Ukraine to NATO, it must be admitted that there is no consensus as to this issue among the population. In 1995 the idea of the Ukrainian joining NATO was maintained by 27 % of the respondents [61], in 1996 – by 36 % [62], in 1997 – by 38 % [63], in 2000 – by about 34 % [64]. In 1995 there was against 27% of the respondents, in 1996 - 19 %, in 1997 - 21 %. In 2000 there were 34 % [65].

Sharp increasing in 2000 of a number of those who did not want Ukraine to become the member of NATO was provoked by war operations of the Alliance against Yugoslavia in 1999. 55 % of the respondents of Ukraine are convinced that the Alliance had no right to interfere into domestic affairs of sovereign Yugoslavia [66].

It must be admitted that the full consensus concerning joining the Alliance was not even in the countries-candidates for the membership. Thus hardly more than 50 % among the interrogated population spoke in a support of Poland joining NATO [67]. In Spain before the joining NATO there were about 57 % of the interrogated for this solution [68].

However for Ukraine the peculiarity of this situation was that the dividing into the supporters and opponents of the Ukrainian joining NATO took place under the

regional characteristic. So the major danger for Ukraine is that its western and eastern regions have different geopolitical orientation. It testifies of existing geopolitical rupture in Ukraine.

The regional political contradiction is stipulated, first of all, by different historical conditions of development of western and eastern regions of Ukraine, different ethnic structure of the population, and thus, also by a little different mentality, different conditions of economic development and structure of economy.

In eastern part of Ukraine there were located the most important centers of heavy industry, the production of which was oriented, largely, on needs of the Soviet Union, and now of Russia. Therefore population of these regions most of all suffers from inconsistency of economic reforms and financial and economic crisis. Due to these reasons, it is the basic social base of the left political forces.

As far as the ethnic structure concerns, eastern region of Ukraine is the region of the most compact living of the Russian. They are 45 % of the population of Lugansk region, 44 % - of Zaporozhye one, 33 % - of Kharkov region, 32 % - of Zaporozhye one, and 67 % - of Crimea region [69]. To the contrary of the Baltic countries, there are no reasons to speak about breaching their ethnic rights in Ukraine. They are well enough incorporated in the Ukrainian society, and Ukrainian government reliably protects their ethnic rights.

Though undoubtedly, their sympathies first of all concern Russia and to much smaller extent NATO. So, if among the ethnic Ukrainians the idea of the joining of Ukraine into NATO is maintained by about 40 % of the respondents taking into account that 19 % were against, among the ethnic Russian in Ukraine this idea was maintained by about 30 % [70].

Undoubtedly, that it imposes definite mental peculiarities on a set of political and geopolitical orientation of the population of all the Eastern region of Ukraine and its national self-identification. So, according to the data of sociological researches, 84 % of the inhabitants of Donetsk region identify themselves not with the Ukrainians or citizens of Ukraine, but with the Soviet people.

Therefore 41,7 % of the population of eastern areas of Ukraine, according to sociological researches positively attitude to maintaining the Soviet political system [71]. 44,2 % among the supporters of socialism in these eastern areas support restoration of the uniform with Russia state, 25,7 % - for creation of the union of Ukraine and Russia, and only 26,9 % - for saving state independence of Ukraine [72].

Absolutely different situation is in the central and western regions of Ukraine. The population of these regions in mentality meaning is a support of the Ukrainian statehood. 91 % of the population of western region of Ukraine identify themselves, first of all, as the Ukrainians and support for market economy and creation of the Ukrainian society on the basis of the western political pattern. The inhabitants of these regions of Ukraine are the most consecutive supporters of independence of

Ukraine and European integration. In particular, 50 % of the population of western region are for the joining of Ukraine into NATO and 23 % of the central regions of Ukraine. Whereas in eastern part of Ukraine the number of the supporters of such solution does not exceed 8 % [73].

The analysis of the listed-above data of sociological polls points out two essential enough tendencies in public consciousness of the population of Ukraine. First of all, the supporters of Ukrainian joining NATO are that part of the population, which maintains its state sovereignty and independence, and also shares democratic values and advocates democratic transformations in the country. Views of the opponents of the joining of Ukraine into NATO, as a rule, are presented to the past and connected with renewal of the Soviet Union or Ukrainian annexation to Russia. The opponents of the Ukrainian joining NATO are the opponents, in most part, of independence of Ukraine and of democratic transformations in the country.

Secondly, the division of the population of Ukraine into the supporters and opponents of its joining NATO has the pronounced regional context. The most of western regions of Ukraine maintains membership of Ukraine in NATO, the most of eastern regions do not.

Such tendencies are quite accountable. The Ukrainian society is in condition of transformation, therefore, as well as other former-communistic and former-soviet countries, it bears weight of the past. It contains not only tenacity of communist Anti-NATO stereotypes in the higher generations' mind, but also the ethnic structure of the population, and religious factor.

The religious factor. Ukraine is the polyconfessional country. Among the believer in Ukraine are the Catholics, the Orthodox. The staunch defender of the European integration and Ukrainian joining NATO is the Catholic Church.

The negative impact of the religious factor in Ukraine lies, first of all, in existing of the conflict inside the Orthodoxy between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kiev Patriarchy and Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchy. 20 % of orthodox organizations belong to Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kiev Patriarchy. 70 % of all the orthodox organizations of Ukraine are included in Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchy [74]. The Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchy, in essence, is a conductor of interests of Russia in Ukraine. The subject matter of the conflict of these Churches is the struggle for influence zones in different regions of Ukraine.

Listed-above internal factors of negative character nevertheless are not irresistible. They testify only that the country is in condition of transformation. One of directions of this transformation is the process of integration of Ukraine into Europe and Euro-Atlantic security structure, for which in the Ukrainian society already there are definite prerequisites.

External problems. The basic external problem of Ukrainian integration into Euro-Atlantic security structure is, on the one hand, the policy of Russian centrism form the part of NATO concerning Ukraine, on the other hand, the policy of Russian domination over Ukraine.

In the geopolitical strategy Russia considers Ukraine to be a sphere of its exclusive vital interests. Proceeding from this, it aspires not to admit both the influences of other geopolitical centers on Ukraine, as well as the movement of this country in Europe, its integration into European and Euro-Atlantic security structure.

B. Elzin in his time unambiguously stated at the summit of the leaders of the states of CIS in March of 1997: "we are not interested in someone's domination on the territory of former Soviet Union, especially in a military-political field. We are not interested, that any of states played a role of buffer countries" [75].

The policy of Russian domination over Ukraine, in the end, is directed on the reintegration of Ukraine to a lap of the Russian statehood. For the most part of the populations of Russia consider that Ukraine should not exist as the state, independent of Russia [76].

The government of Russian Federation actively enough realizes the policy of domination of Russia over Ukraine. It has several elements.

Military predominance. The political-military predominance of Russia is achieved, first of all, with military presence of forces of the Black Sea Fleet on the territory of Ukraine. This Russian groupings of 20 thousands is invoked to provide political-military control of Russia over Ukraine, retain it from participation in some unions and blocks with other states and simultaneously "to encourage" intents of Ukraine together with Russia as countries of CIS "to unite to defence union on the ground of commonness of interests and political-military purposes"[77]. These are considered the purposes and interests connected with opposition policy of NATO.

Russian economic expansion. Such expansion is dictated, first of all, by peculiarities of Russian extensive model of market economy establishing. At such model the forming of the national capital takes place in traditional raw export industries and defence industry to the prejudice of intensive development and modernization of civil industries and agriculture.

Such tendency of the economic situation development in Russia brings about fast narrowing of the domestic market and orientation to export of the Russian raw material and aiming at the former neighboring external markets and first of all at the rather closed markets of Ukraine. This noncompetitive outside Commonwealth production sale is realized due to artificial monopoly, resisting of the economic development of Ukraine with its orientation on the large volumes of raw material consuming.

The activity of Russian capital in Ukraine is aimed at reaching complete economic control over its strategic works in the non-ferrous metals industry, oil

proceeding industry, and military-industrial complex. In the field of mechanical engineering the Russian capital drops in Ukraine the out-of-date technologies making capacities for new technologies in its own country.

Predominance in information space of Ukraine. In information sphere Russia aspires to maintain complete monopoly of the information product in Ukraine. At that revival of the Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian language it considers as a threat to national interests of Russia in Ukraine. Ukrainian culture is regarded in Russia just as cultural Russian provincialism. The reason for the Russian information expansion is that fact, that about 40 % of the population of Ukraine are Russian-language. And despite that there are 90 % of books, newspapers and magazines in Ukraine published in Russian, and of 12 television channels 9 of them are Russian, the government of Russian Federation constantly raise the question concerning oppression of the rights of the Russian-spoken population in Ukraine. Such policy of Russia as to information sphere is invoked to form at the population of Ukraine definite ideological stereotypes concerning NATO, Ukraine and Russia to the best for the Russian leaders advantage.

The not less important direction of Russian predominance policy is engaging Ukraine to the Byelorussian-Russian Union on the basis of so-called "brotherhoods of the Slavic peoples".

The significant external problem of integration of Ukraine in Europe is its strategic depending on the Russian energy supply. 78 % of Ukrainian import of gas and 40 % of petroleum fall to the share of Russia [78].

However it must be admitted, that such strategic depending is mutual. Ukraine possesses by 100 % monopoly to transportation of the Russian gas in Europe and also it is one of the basic transport corridors that connect Russia to Europe.

But the military-strategic significance of Ukraine for Russia is of incomparably greater importance. In case of Ukrainian joining NATO, Russia would appear to be not only in the condition of geopolitical, but also military-strategic collapse. Such situation forever would deprive Russia of illusions of its revival as superpower. So that in response to policy of Russian prevalence Ukraine could use geopolitical, geoeconomic and military-strategic vulnerability of Russia.

SECTION III.

THE SPECIAL PARTNERSHIP IN THE STRUCTURE OF EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY.

§1. Features of Ukraine - NATO partnership.

Understanding of that outside the frameworks of Euro-Atlantic structure national security and sovereignty of Ukraine can not be secured, and also comprehension of burn problems, which are anticipated in Ukraine on a way of European integration fairly promoted the government of the country to search the "special" relations with NATO. In this context, Ukrainian government considered the non-block status of Ukraine as the temporary condition, which is necessary only for preparing to the joining NATO. The ideologist of Ukrainian strategy concerning NATO former Secretary of National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine V. Gorbulin stated that during creation of new structure of security in Europe "it should not excluded changes of the status of Ukraine" as non-block of the state, but it is necessary to wait [79].

The problem was also that NATO, on the one hand, did not demonstrate being interested in membership of Ukraine too, on the other, it did not know what alternative form of co-operation could have been offered to this country. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine B. Tarasuk told concerning this: "If to press for membership now, then it will bring about only depreciation of our situation in Europe: the doors are not opened, so what for to us to lose self-respect and to appeal for memberships? If we are sure that the doors will be opened, then it is worth of thinking about the joining. But this process requires some time, and we [still] should find proper form of co-operation between Ukraine and NATO" [80].

Hence, the unwillingness of NATO, and also uncertainty of Ukraine of that its application for membership will be satisfied, led the parties to understanding the "special" form of relation between them. By official formalizing of these special relations of Ukraine with NATO the signing by two parties on the 9-th of July 1997 in Madrid "Charter for a Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and North Atlantic Treaty Organization" became. Concerning NATO's willingness to help Ukraine "to draw its own special way to new Europe" the General Secretary of NATO George Robinson stated during his visit to Kiev in January of 2000 [81].

Though except for complete membership NATO has no other forms of participation in this organization, the Alliance develops several types of relations with other countries. These are relations with the members-candidates, Russia, countries of the Mediterranean. All these relations have qualitative differences. What are the peculiarities of Ukrainian-Russian relations in comparison with other types of relations? The criteria for pointing out these features can serve character and

principles of the relations, measurement of a degree of readiness and possibility of joining the Alliance, scope of obligations and degree of liability of NATO.

The Mediterranean dialogue of the Alliance.

The dialogue of NATO with the countries of Mediterranean arose simultaneously with the Program of Partnership for Peace (PFP). It takes its beginning from the Declaration acceptance at the Brussels summit in January 1994. The PFP as well as the Mediterranean dialogue are the important addition of the process of NATO enlargement. The Middle East peace process was the main term for beginning the Mediterranean dialogue. The same term for development of the relations of partnership was the dissolving of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union, and also establishing of the new independent states on the past-soviet space.

Both the dialogues with the countries of Mediterranean, as well as the partnership with countries of East Europe are established on a contract basis. Both regions are of great importance for the Alliance. In 38-th article of the Strategic Concept of the Alliance there was directly stated "The Mediterranean is an area of special interest to the Alliance"[82]. This interest is, first of all, concerned the sphere of military security. Mediterranean in comparison with East Europe is rather burning region. It is characterized with high troops concentration, zones of conflicts, existence of dangerous fireplaces of tension, existence in some countries the fundamentalism authoritarian regimes.

Some of Mediterranean countries, such as Algeria, Syria kept from participation in the dialogue according to political-military reasons. NATO considers Libyan Gamaharia as the hostile state that fosters terrorism in the region [83].

Thus, Mediterranean is considered as the region, where NATO has potential military opponents and can resolve military problems. Proceeding from this one of the components of NATO's policy in Mediterranean is holding military manoeuvres like "Bright star - 99" [84].

The military actions are maintained with broad diplomatic contacts, including more active exchange of views and information concerning the regional security. It is the core of the Mediterranean dialogue. Its main goal is security and Mediterranean stability promotion, achieving better understanding of NATO with the countries of Mediterranean [85].

Ukraine-NATO relations unlike the Mediterranean dialogue are built on deeper mutual interests. The interests of military security of the Alliance concerning Ukraine like the Mediterranean ones had been already realized in the period till 1997. Except for military security interests Ukraine-NATO relations are founded first of all on the common political interests that are connected with stability and common democratic values strengthening.

The Mediterranean dialogue is the form of mutual relations between two systems of regional security: Euro-Atlantic and Mediterranean. It is aimed at

reinforcing the Mediterranean regional security. The special partnership Ukraine-NATO is the internal component of the Euro-Atlantic security. In the Strategic Concept of the Alliance there is stated, that Ukraine "occupies a special place in the Euro-Atlantic security environment" [86].

The special partnership Ukraine-NATO implies availability of the mutual obligations of the parties in the security sphere whereas the participants of the Mediterranean dialogue are free from such liabilities. In contrast to Mediterranean Ukraine is included not only into the zone of interests, but also into the zone of liability of the Alliance.

In view of that, these two types of the relations have different organizational structures. If the Mediterranean dialogue is realized with the help of the Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG), then the Body of the Special Partnership is the NATO- Ukraine Commission (NUC). Its status and level is much higher than MCG's. The special partnership between Ukraine and NATO is reinforced with "strategic partnership" between Ukraine and USA. Mainly France is interested in the Mediterranean dialogue, especially in its North-African direction [87].

Relations NATO - RUSSIA.

These relations are one of the basic bearing member of new structure of Euro-Atlantic security. Therefore this structure establishing initially implies "active Russian participation in it" [88]. In the Strategic Concept of the Alliance there is stressed, that "Russia plays a unique role in Euro-Atlantic security" [89]. The core of this role is the follow: at first, to provide conflict-free NATO enlargement; secondly, to reconcile to Ukrainian independence; thirdly, to be the powerful factor of stability in Europe.

Russia is included into the zone of interests of NATO. The military interest of NATO concerning Russia is to avoid arising the new conflict, to save the peace in Europe and essentially to shrink an arsenal of nuclear and conventional armaments. The political interests of NATO concerning Russia were connected with its internal democratic transformation [90]. By means of democratic transformation the West intended to deprive Russia of its imperial ambitions and to engage it to solution of the Euro-Atlantic security problems. Democratic Russia is to provide stability on all the former soviet space.

Thus NATO relations with the new countries of former soviet space should be built with taking into account the interests of Russia. Such policy of the West was gained the title of "Russiacentrism" policy. However as the time has proved, such policy appeared to be fallacious. The democratic reforms in Russia had no success.

Instead of the democratic regime there was gradually restored authoritarian one in Russia. Instead of the policy aimed at strengthening stability on the past-soviet space Russia came back to the policy of geopolitical revenge. This reality made NATO refuse its political projects concerning Russia. Only the political-military

questions of cooperation between Russia and NATO remain to be topical. The new Strategic Concept of NATO pays more attention to military interests of the Alliance concerning Russia.

NATO develops with Russia "broad dialogue on such matters as disarmament and arms control, including the adaptation of the CFE Treaty; peacekeeping and nuclear weapons issues" [91]. The urgent goal for NATO now is to except the possibility of arising threats for Euro-Atlantic security from the part of Russia. There is underlined in the Strategic Concept concerning this that "NATO and Russia have committed themselves to developing their relations on the basis of the common interests, reciprocity and transparency to achieve a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area" [92]. Such type of relation was consolidated in the "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and Russian Federation" signed on the 27-th of May 1997 in Paris.

Though the Founding Act NATO-RUSSIA and the Charter for a Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and NATO is accepted to consider as it were in one burst, nevertheless they are two principally different documents.

They fix different levels of relations. In the Founding Act the parties refused to consider each other as the military adversary. However it does not exclude the possibility of military or geopolitical rivalry (competitiveness) between them. The Founding Act establishes existence of the relations at a level amid rivalry and partnership. The partnership is supposed to be developed for solution common problems of security. At same time arising of the regional rivalry between them is not excluded.

The Charter for a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine consolidates the relations at a level between partner and allied. The political interests of the parties are the main ones for Ukraine-NATO relations. The relations Russia - NATO are founded, first of all, on mutual military and political-military interests.

The special relations between Ukraine and NATO first of all are aimed at internal transformations of the parties. Because of that the parties undertake the definite mutual obligations. The Founding Act does not imply such liabilities. The mechanism of realization of these relations doesn't infringe on internal affairs of Russia or NATO [93]. It also can not be used in order to do damage to the interests of other countries.

If the main target of the relations Russia-NATO is the long-term peacekeeping in Europe, then the main target of the special relations between Ukraine and NATO is integration of Ukraine in Europe and the Euro-Atlantic security structure. Therefore in the Charter there is fixed that Ukraine is a part of the Central-East Europe, i.e. the zone of liability of NATO, but not of Russia.

For realization of these two types of relations the different bodies are stipulated also. By such body of the Russia-NATO relations the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint

Council (PJC) is. Concerning Ukraine-NATO the similar body is the NATO- Ukraine Commission. Though both bodies are presented at the equal level (their chairman is the General Secretary, members are ambassadors, ministers), they play different roles. The Permanent Joint Council (PJC) is created for consultations conducting and reaching the consensus between Russia and NATO concerning problems of military and political-military character. Because of this the primal problem of PJC lays in dialogue enlarging between the supreme military government of NATO and Russia at a level of the chiefs headquarters.

The work of the NATO- Ukraine Commission has political character. It deals with estimation of the Ukraine-NATO relations and further development of the integration process.

NATO and candidates-countries.

The main goal of this type of relations is the preparing of the parties for adoption of the mutual allied obligations. Due to such relations the party behave as the future allies. The basic form of these relations is the cooperation in the collective defense and security sphere.

The terms of reaching such type of relations are: the application for membership in the Alliance from the candidate-state, internal consensus in the society concerning membership, absence of external problems or possibility of their solution by the peace means, existence of a stable democratic regime in the country. Besides the candidates-countries should meet the criteria and principles of membership in NATO. The basic tasks of the candidates-countries concerning such relations with the Alliance are reaching by them the capacity and readiness to carry out the allied bonds and by that to contribute to reinforcing the collective defence and security.

The joining the Alliance permits the candidates-countries to realize such vital for them political interests as: to gain the most reliable guarantees of the national security, to finish the process of complete integration in Europe, to reinforce existence and development of democracy inside and once and for all to get out of Russian hand [94].

In essence such relations represent transition of the candidates-countries from the zone of responsibility with the lower security guarantees to the basic zone of the Alliance with the greatest security guarantees.

An indispensable condition of NATO enlarging is its ability and availability to conduct its allied bonds concerning the new members. The executing of these liabilities is supposed not to be too burdensome for the Alliance.

The basic motive for meeting the application of the candidate must be the availability of significant economic interest to this country from the part of the leading members of the Alliance. At the same time the process of expansion should not weaken or damage other bearing members of the Euro-Atlantic security. Namely:

it should reinforce the connection with European Union, not exacerbate the conflict with Russia, and avoid detriment to national security of Ukraine.

NATO and the Baltic countries. The Alliance relation with the Baltic countries is specific display of described above type of relations of NATO – the candidate-country. Its specificity is defined by readiness of the Baltic countries to the joining the Alliance and unavailability of the NATO to grant these countries membership in its organization. The obstacle for this purpose is an inevitable escalation of tension with Russia and uncertainty in ability of NATO forces to provide the if necessary efficient defense of territory of these states. "The geographical location, the small territories, small population of the Baltic states and closeness of the Russian military power exacerbate problems, which inevitably would arise with granting to three countries of reliable guarantees of security" [95].

If to compare Ukraine-NATO relations with the relations of NATO-candidates-countries, then there can be found the very large discrepancies. Ukraine has intents to be integrated in Euro-Atlantic security structure, but it has not applied officially for the entering the members of NATO. Ukraine inwardly is not ready to be the member of the Alliance. In the society there is no internal consensus concerning NATO. The democratic regime in the country is not resided with stability. Ukraine still does not meet the most of criteria required by NATO. It has neither economic, nor financial capacities to carry out its contribution to the collective defense and security of the Alliance. For this purpose Ukraine should increase its defense budget approximately in 5-6 times.

Rather complicated external problems should include incompleteness of international-legal establishing of state border with Russia and existence of the Russian military presence on the territory of Ukraine. Both Ukraine as well as NATO is not ready for such type of relations. The economic interests of the leading members of the Alliance concerning Ukraine are expressed rather poorly.

The EU does not consider Ukraine as the European country and is not going to consider it as the potential member of its organization even in a long-term future. NATO is not ready to undertake the bonds according to the 5-th item of the Washington Treaty concerning Ukraine. The executing of the allied commitment to Ukraine would constitute for the Alliance hard military-strategic and political-military problem, caused first of all by the escalation of tension with Russia. Economically it would demand from the Alliance to incur much more costs, than for the defense of all three new members of NATO taken together.

It is obvious that the special partnership is just invoked to resolve all these internal and external problems of the relations both from the part of NATO, as well as from the part of Ukraine. **The final result of the special partnership should be reaching of a level of the relations as NATO-candidates-countries.** The peculiarity of such partnership is gradual transfer of its subjects from the associates in the allies.

The mechanism of such transfer is pledged in the Charter for a Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and NATO. The peculiar properties of this mechanism is defined by the several key moments.

1. One of the major principles of the special partnership is binding the provision that Ukraine can not be considered as a sphere of influence of any other state.

2. The goal of development of the special relations is the development of democratic institutes, realization of radical economic reforms and integration of Ukraine in all the European and the Euro-Atlantic structures.

3. Right of Ukraine on the conclusion of the allied agreement in process of evolution of the special relations.

4. The maintaining of independent stable and democratic Ukraine is the key factor of stability ensuring in Central-East Europe, of which part it is, and also on the continent in general.

5. Ukraine confirms its determination to conduct military reform, to reinforce democratic control over Armed Forces, to achieve their operative compatibility with Armed Forces of NATO.

6. Carrying out of the liabilities, undertaken by the parties, is reached: by consultation conducting and realization of the joint programs on broad circle of problems concerning development of Euro-Atlantic security and security of Ukraine. The joint programs include also such problems as the prevention of the conflicts and peacekeeping; defence projection; resolving of economic problems and environmental protection; researches in the field of usage of air and space, defence conversion; an arms production; military training and military cooperation with the neighbour countries [96].

§ 2. The role and prospects of the Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and NATO in the Euro-Atlantic security structure.

The further forming of the Euro-Atlantic security structure hereafter is likely to be realized by reinforcing its bearing members, such as:

- deepening of cooperative connections between NATO and EU in the field of security;
- further enlargement of NATO to the East;
- involving of Russia in the process of strengthening of stability and peacekeeping in Europe;
- economical and political developing of the former soviet space by USA and the western countries.

Besides it is necessary to take into account those challenges and risks, which can constitute definite threat to all this Euro-Atlantic security structure.

To a number of such possible risks should be referred:

1. Weakening of the presence and influence of USA in Europe;
2. Transformation of the EU into self-dependent geopolitical power in Europe;
3. Restoration in Russia of the authoritarian regime with returning to the policy of geopolitical revenge.
4. Geoeconomic and geopolitical fragmentation of the former soviet space.

Almost all these risks are connected with the future development of Russia. The policy of Russiacentrism led up West and USA a blind alley, having presented them with three practically insoluble problems.

At first, whether is it possible hereinafter to maintain economic reforms, overlooking breaching humanitarian law and genocide as to the ethnic minorities? [98]. The result of such a policy of the double standards is that Russia in the nearest and intermediate term prospect will remain internally unstable and externally aggressive country. Secondly, how to intensify Trans-European cooperation at maintaining potential aggressiveness of Russia? [98] And, thirdly, how is it possible under such circumstances to continue to support economic and political reconstruction of former communist countries of Europe? The way out of this geopolitical impasse, to which were led by it West and USA, is seen in the refusal from the policy "Russiacentrism" and turning to creation of stable external environment round the European part of the territory of Russia.

The key role in forming such zone of stability in the East Europe can be played by Ukraine. It has all the reasons to be considered as an advanced post of stability in the Eastern-European and Black Sea subregions.

With a view to strengthen stability an advanced outpost-country should conduct active policy aimed at settling conflicts, reinforcing security of a sub-region, to assist politically unstable countries as to neutralization of internal and external threats. The geopolitical location of Ukraine gives it a possibility to render stabilizing effect on Moldova, Belorussia, Russia, Caucasian and Black Sea regions, all European part of past-soviet space.

Exactly this region becomes the basic zone of rivalry between NATO and Russia under the further development of the basic elements of the Euro-Atlantic security. Having conceded to the West in Central Europe, Russia is to inevitable concentrating its efforts on maintaining the whole control over this part of past-soviet space.

The Russian statehood is supposed sooner or later spread to this space. That is why appearing of any other force center or economically strong and politically influential state is considered as direct threat to national security of Russian Federation. Therefore governmental bodies of Russia, first of all the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, "have to work at hindering of any attempts of creation multicentria or biacentria on the former soviet space" [99].

As Russia headily loses political handlebars of influence on countries of former soviet space than, it is obvious, that it is resorting more and more to "decisive involving into the process of statebuilding in former republics of the USSR in order to by using economic, military, ethnodemographic and other handlebars of impact prevent consolidation of state authority around the forces that have the Anti-Russian and anti-integration tendency. Only active actions (to the extent of destabilization of internal political situation in the regions) are capable to prevent the process of a sluggish leaving of these states from Russia" [100]. Undoubtedly, the basic efforts of reintegration policy of Russia will be directed on Ukraine.

So, under maintaining the specified tendency, the policy of Russia is directed on unconcealed interfering to internal affairs of the European countries of CIS, that can bring to destabilization of all the region of East Europe. It is clear, that the security of Western and Central Europe can not be stable and reliable near to unstable East Europe.

Thus, the role of Ukraine as advanced post of stability in East Europe would be, **at first**, accomplishment of restricting and stabilizing impact on Russia and its European policy, **secondly**, ability of Ukraine to undertake the definite obligations and liabilities concerning strengthening of security and stability of the European countries of CIS. In a practical respect it means that Ukraine should be capable itself to resolve the problems with Russia, and also be capable to neutralize destabilizing demonstration of Russian expansion policy concerning the European countries of CIS.

But in order to be able to play such role Ukraine should be politically stable and strong state. Hence, the role of West and USA in security strengthening of Ukraine will consist not so much in engaging it to western systems of collective security, but in assistance to political stability as well as strengthening of economic and defence capacity of our state. . And it, most likely, is in strategic interests of West and USA. A real way of realization of such assistance is reaching by Ukraine the level of strategic partnership with USA, and also including it into the Euro-Atlantic collective security co-ordinates.

The second direction of Ukrainian security providing and strengthening its stabilizing role in the region could be direct connection it to the basic zone of NATO, with the help of creation strategic axis - Brussels - Warsaw - Kiev on the northern direction and axis - Brussels – Ankara - Kiev on the southern direction. Both commonality of history, as well as commonality of geopolitical interests connect Ukraine with Poland. It gives the reasons to establishing partner and allied relations in their strategic measurement.

The role, which is played by Poland concerning Ukraine, can be defined by the formula "in Europe with the help of Poland". Poland can be largely a good example for Ukraine of entry of a country with socialist and Russian-imperial past in the European community, market economy and democratic society. As far as Poland is concerned Ukraine plays a role of an advanced post of stability and security on its eastern borders. The basic directions of cooperation of Ukraine and Poland in the military-political sphere should be common consultative bodies, which would coordinate military and foreign policy in the field of security, creation of joint military subdivisions and units, deepening of military-industrial cooperation, enlarging of the program of the joint maneuvers, educational programs, exchange of experience of military construction and mutual assistance in this sphere.

The development of close co-operation with Turkey is considered prospective. Ukraine has with these country common views as to many important issues. Undoubtedly, the significant point for Ukraine is the geopolitical location of Turkey as to connection with the international community. In the long term Turkey can become the most consequent supporter of Ukrainian interests in NATO.

Being the last part of the European security chain Brussels - Warsaw - Kiev, - Ankara, Ukraine could become the basic point for creation the arc of stability in East Europe, which would spread from the Baltic countries to Ukraine through Poland further it should run on the line of Kiev - Kishinev and Kiev - Tbilisi - Azerbaijan. Such strategic chain would give a possibility to stabilize all the South-Eastern region of former soviet space. Thus, due to stable external surrounding stimulation of internal transformations in Russia would be possible.

Stable and democratic Ukraine can play pivotal role concerning also other elements of the Euro-Atlantic security. What role can Ukraine play in reinforcing cooperative connections between EU and NATO?

The development of this elements of Euro-Atlantic security, as the Strategic Concept of NATO states, is supposed to realize within the framework of NATO, the European security system and defence. Such pattern of cooperation is supposed to "it will enable all European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance as an expression of our shared responsibilities; it will reinforce the transatlantic partnership; and it will assist the European Allies to act by themselves as required through the readiness of the Alliance with using its resources" [101].

However there is definite risk that, having reached the critical level of its independence in the field of defence and security, EU would want to get rid of excessive guardianship of USA, having secured by this with support from Russia. Russia will certainly take advantage of squeezing out USA from Europe [102].

Other risk of developing of such situation can be creation of bipolar West – Europe – Russia structure and establishing by countries of Western European -

Russian condominium over Central - Eastern Europe [103]. The realization of such script would bring about the crisis of transatlantic partnership that would have catastrophic consequences for Ukraine. Under such transformation of Europe into the "Euro-Russian" geopolitical space "Byelorussian variant" spreading on Ukraine and its independence and sovereignty losing should be expected. It can be assumed that, having appeared to be self-supporting geopolitical power in Europe, the EU could concede with revival of Russian hegemony on former soviet space in exchange for cheap Russian raw material and energy supply.

To avoid such a risk is possible by reinforcing of USA interests in such countries of East Europe as Ukraine and Poland. The conclusion of triple "strategic partnership" between USA, Ukraine and Poland would prevent a possibility of creation of Russian-West-European geopolitical structure and would strengthen the system of Euro-Atlantic security.

Intensification of cooperation between NATO and the EU is avail for Ukraine as well. Ukraine claimed its intent to become the member of the EU. However the doors of the EU are closed for Ukraine. NATO, on the contrary, opens the doors for the new members joining. Thus, Ukraine has additional possibility of becoming the member of the European Union due to NATO's "door" even contrary to the wish of influential European countries.

The direction of not less importance of intensification cooperative connections between NATO and the EU is synchronization of the process of expansion of these organizations to the East. The further NATO enlarging to the East is the second important element of new architecture of Euro-Atlantic security.

The 2-nd enlargement wave of NATO is supposed to take place in the period of 2002 till 2005. As the most perspective candidates in the members of the Alliance Slovenia, Romania and possibly Slovakia are considered. These countries joining the Alliance will means in essence enlargement of the basic zone of NATO's liability in Europe. And thus Slovakia and Slovenia joining is in essence filling of "holes" formed inside this zone. But the main problems can arise not inside this zone, but at its periphery, on front line of expansion. These problems are connected, first of all, with the reaction of Russia, with the security expenses of countries not included into the basic zone, with the financial and political expenses of the Alliance itself.

In order to avoid these problems during the second enlargement wave a number of terms should be abided by. At first, to avoid direct impacts with Russia. Secondly, to follow the provisions of the Founding Act of Russia – NATO. Thirdly, the expansion should not be too onerous for the Alliance from the military, financial and political points of view. In principle joining of Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia meets the terms, because they directly don't bound with Russia. Though in such a case key factor, on which largely the further enlargement will depend, becomes to be Ukraine. It will border upon two biggest applicants for membership in the Alliance

Romania and Slovakia. The future enlargement of the Alliance will depend on its behavior in many respects.

If to proceed from that the tendencies, which exist today, maintain in the nearest decade, then it is possible to foresee precisely enough three the most typical scripts of development of a situation around Ukraine. Besides the script, that Russia has lost its imperial geopolitical ambitions, is excluded, because the democratic reforms in Russia have failed. This country is not going to integrate in Europe, but it desires to be self-sufficient geopolitical force with own spheres of dominance on the continent. Proceeding from this, the process of resistance against and regional confrontation of Russia and NATO will continue. Russia practically has already opposed NATO its military union with Byelorussia.

Under such conditions there are three most probable scenarios of development of a situation around Ukraine: the "worst", "not best", "the best of possible". The realization of this or that scenario definitely will depend on Ukraine.

The "worst" script. It deals with the Ukrainian annexation to the Byelorussia-Russian Union and turning of its territory into military bridgehead of Russian Federation. Such script is the worst both for Ukraine and for NATO. First of all, it casts doubt on all the further process of Alliance's enlarging. In such a case all the favorable conditions which ensures security of such expansion disappear. The expenses for ensuring the defence and security of the new members of the Alliance will increase tenfold. The outcome of realization of such script will be inevitable deepening of confrontation between NATO and Russia. Due to Ukrainian annexation Russia will just reinforce its neoimperial geopolitical ambitions.

Hence, there will be a factor of potential Russian threat for the countries of Central Europe, or, at least, there will be a substantial possibility of restoration of Russian dominant influence in this region. The enlarging of Russian military presence in Ukraine and Byelorussia will compel NATO partial deployment of its forces of forward basing on the territory of the new members. So political confrontation between Russia and NATO will develop into political-military one.

For Ukraine the realization of this script will mean: final loss of its European prospect, loss of independence and state sovereignty, return to the authoritarian and totalitarian past. The probability of realization of such script will depend mainly on development of the internal situation in Ukraine. It will become to be inevitable with dominating of the authoritarian tendencies in the system of political authority, further deepening of economic dependence on Russia, renewal of new more penetrating economic crisis in the country and lasting marginalization of the population.

The "not best" script. It deals with transformation of Ukraine into a "bumper zone". This script is already partially realized. Ukraine has actually appeared to be clamped between NATO and Byelorussia-Russian military union. The 2-nd enlargement wave of the Alliance will just heighten features and contours of this

"bumper zone". This script can be acceptable for the Alliance from the military point of view, as it does not require additional deployment of forces on the territory of the new members and does not imply the large expenses for ensuring of their defense and security. However this script can not satisfy NATO from the political point of view. At first, it lays up the process of the further enlargement of the Alliance; secondly, promotes strengthening authoritarianism and political instability in Ukraine.

The matter is Ukraine as a "bumper" can promote reinforcing of Euro-Atlantic security, only then, when it is internally politically stable country. The role of a bumper deprives it of external conditions for ensuring such stability. The situation of indeterminacy of a "bumper zone" will provoke Russia to return to itself this early belonged to it territory. Under the condition of its military presence at this bumper zone Russia inevitably tries to establish in this country its political and economic domination. If it happens, then the script of "bumper zone" will be intermediate on a way of Ukrainian involving in Byelorussia-Russian Union.

"The best of possible". This script deals with variant of NATO enlarging by strategic reacting way. According to this variant "the solution as to necessity and terms of the block enlarging should be grounded extremely on strategic criteria and trend of developments in Russia" [104]. Ukraine as none else country of the Central-East Europe falls under these criteria. Authoritarianism in Russia is already obvious, and its expansion policy is directed against Ukraine. If the Alliance motivated the enlargement by intents to ensure security and to reinforce sprouts of young democracies in the countries of East Europe, then most of all Ukraine needs realization of these intents, because it has the greatest deficiency both security as well as democracies.

Such way of Ukrainian joining NATO would meet the interests of both parties. This way of NATO enlarging has a number of advantages. At first, thus the Alliance could rely on military element, which would justify its existence as a military organization. Previously the enlarging took place mainly with using political functions. Thus, the Alliance could express its traditional strong side.

Secondly, the realization of such way of expansion concerning Ukraine finally and forever would resolve a military-strategic dilemma in Europe. Joining of Ukraine NATO would not only exclude a possibility of the Russian military expansion, but also would deprive Russia of ability to plot any efficient defence on its western strategic direction. Such military-strategic advantage of NATO would have not smaller significance for security of Europe, than the Warsaw Pact dissolving. It would forever deprive Russia of its geopolitical ambitions and would let it develop really partner relation between all European players, including USA also.

For Ukraine the advantages of such way are that it let at once resolve its main strategic problem - be integrated in Europe, having avoided at the same time a long-term and difficult way.

However the way of strategic reacting would have also a number of the serious disadvantages. The realization of such way will demand forward presence of NATO's forces in Ukraine that unambiguously will increase the expenses of the Alliance for defence ensuring and will provoke Russia. In order to avoid these negative consequences, even having become the member of NATO, Ukraine will have to direct its attention to dominant self-defense basing on the national Armed Forces and national defence industry. NATO can undertake only some functions concerning ensuring the defence of Ukraine.

Thus, the second enlargement wave of NATO inevitably will require reinforcing and strengthening Ukraine as a factor of stability of the Central - East Europe. Safe enlarging of "the basic zone" is impossible without reinforcing "the zones of responsibility" of NATO, the core place of which is belonged to Ukraine. The tasks, which Ukraine faces as to ensuring the 2-nd enlargement wave of NATO, are the follows: at first, not to allow a new turn of confrontation between Russia and NATO; secondly, not to exacerbate its relations with Russia; thirdly, to strengthen own national security.

The outcome of realization of these tasks in the period of the 2-nd enlargement wave of NATO should be:

- liquidation of Russian military presence on the territory of Ukraine;
- successful finishing of the economic and military reforms;
- turning the relations between NATO and Ukraine from partnership into a level "NATO-candidate-country".

Ukrainian joining the Alliance in the system of relations NATO-candidate-country, on opinion of some experts, will depend on several conditions: at first, on a degree of strategic and political importance of Ukraine for the Alliance; secondly, on that how Ukraine will be able to diversify its economic links with Russia; thirdly, on the extend of support of the new members of the Alliance and USA [105].

All these three terms come to understanding of that to what extend Ukraine is significant for West and USA as an advanced post of stability in the Central Europe.

This significance increases many times with the beginning of economic and political developing by West and USA of former soviet space. Ukraine can be there as the basic bridgehead for such developing.

CONCLUSIONS

The fundamental changing of all the geopolitical landscape of modern Europe should be connected, first of all, with the realisation of "Cold War" outcomes and new role of NATO on the European continent. NATO itself was the winner in this struggle, having proved its efficiency and viability.

The victory in the "Cold war" let NATO gain huge military-strategic advantages. These advantages are, first of all, that the end of global opposition and arms races had been put, that considerably reinforced military security of the Alliance countries – members. A result of the "Cold war" end was the conclusion of the base agreements in the field of the control over conventional armaments and transparency in military sphere. Thus, the international-legal mechanism of maintaining of military-strategic stability and military security in Europe was created. All these military advantages, gained by NATO, in its total, meant disappearance of global military threat from East for Alliance. Simultaneously this main victory of the Alliance had cast it in the first serious crisis, because with disappearance of military threat the external defensive function of NATO was settled.

The new geopolitical measurement demanded the new approaches to the realization of internal functions of the Alliance. However the enlargement does not resolve all those grandiose tasks, which define new applicability of NATO as a structure of Euro-Atlantic security in the 21-century. The new historical NATO's mission in Europe implies not only saving and strengthening of the world order of security and stability in Western Europe, but also distribution of values of stability, security and democracy on all European continent, including its peripheral.

Ukraine can play the key role in realization of these grandiose tasks of the all-European security, which NATO faces in Europe. The vision of such role of Ukraine as to joint with NATO settling the tasks of both national and all-European security is embodied in philosophy of "the distinctive partnership". The distinctive partnership with NATO in the context of all-European security is directed, first of all, on Ukraine reinforcing as an advanced post of stability in the Eastern-European and Black Sea subregions.

The geopolitical location of Ukraine gives it a possibility to render stabilizing effect on Moldova, Beylorussia, Russia, Caucasian and Black Sea regions, all European part of past-soviet space.

Exactly these regions become the basic zones of rivalry between NATO and Russia under the further development of the basic elements of the Euro-Atlantic security. Having conceded to the West in Central Europe, Russia is to inevitable concentrating its efforts on maintaining the whole control over this part of past-soviet

space. It is clear, that the security of Western and Central Europe can not be stable and reliable near to unstable East Europe.

Thus, the role of Ukraine as advanced post of stability in East Europe would be, **at first**, accomplishment of restricting and stabilizing impact on Russia and its European policy, **secondly**, ability of Ukraine to undertake the definite obligations and liabilities concerning strengthening of security and stability of the European countries of CIS. In a practical respect it means that Ukraine should be capable itself to resolve the problems with Russia, and also be capable to neutralize destabilizing demonstration of Russian expansion policy concerning the European countries of CIS.

But in order to be able to play such role Ukraine should be politically stable and strong state. Hence, the role of West and USA in security strengthening of Ukraine will consist not so much in engaging it to western systems of collective security, but in assistance to political stability as well as strengthening of economic and defence capacity of this state. And it, most likely, is in strategic interests of West and USA. A real way of realization of such assistance is reaching by Ukraine the level of strategic partnership with USA, and also including it into the Euro-Atlantic collective security co-ordinates.

The second direction of Ukrainian security providing and strengthening its stabilizing role in the region could be direct connection it to the basic zone of NATO, with the help of creation strategic axis - Brussels - Warsaw - Kiev on the northern direction and axis - Brussels – Ankara - Kiev on the southern direction. Thus, due to stable external surrounding stimulation of internal transformations in Russia would be possible.

The distinctive partnership of Ukraine with NATO is invoked to provide also strengthening of other elements of the Euro-Atlantic security. It concerns first of all the second wave of NATO enlarging, which inevitably will require strengthening of Ukraine. The tasks, which Ukraine faces as to ensuring the 2-nd enlargement wave of NATO, are the follows: at first, not to allow a new turn of confrontation between Russia and NATO; secondly, not to exacerbate its relations with Russia; thirdly, to strengthen own national security.

In philosophy of "the distinctive partnership" of Ukraine and NATO there is laid the answer to the main question – as to the introduction of this country into Euro-Atlantic structure of security.

Ukraine has not applied officially for the entering the members of NATO. Ukraine inwardly is not ready to be the member of the Alliance. In the society there is no internal consensus concerning NATO. The democratic regime in the country is not resided with stability. Ukraine still does not meet the most of criteria required by NATO. It has neither economic, nor financial capacities to carry out its contribution

to the collective defense and security of the Alliance. For this purpose Ukraine should increase its defense budget approximately in 5-6 times.

Rather complicated external problems should include incompleteness of international-legal establishing of state border with Russia and existence of the Russian military presence on the territory of Ukraine. Both Ukraine as well as NATO is not ready for such type of relations. It is obvious that the special partnership is just invoked to resolve all these internal and external problems of the relations both from the part of NATO, as well as from the part of Ukraine. So in this plan the variant of NATO enlarging by strategic reacting way would be the most acceptable.

Ukraine as none else country of the Central-East Europe falls under these criteria. Authoritarianism in Russia is already obvious, and its expansion policy is directed against Ukraine. If the Alliance motivated the enlargement by intents to ensure security and to reinforce sprouts of young democracies in the countries of East Europe, then most of all Ukraine needs realization of these intents, because it has the greatest deficiency both security as well as democracies.

Such way of Ukrainian joining NATO would meet the interests of both parties. The realization of such way of expansion concerning Ukraine finally and forever would resolve a military-strategic dilemma in Europe. Joining of Ukraine NATO would not only exclude a possibility of the Russian military expansion, but also would deprive Russia of ability to plot any efficient defence on its western strategic direction. Such military-strategic advantage of NATO would have not smaller significance for security of Europe, than the Warsaw Pact dissolving.

So the result of aim and target realization of the distinctive partnership of NATO for Ukraine should be:

- liquidation of Russian military presence on the territory of Ukraine;
- successful finishing of the economic and military reforms;
- turning the relations between NATO and Ukraine from partnership into a level "NATO-candidate-country".

The success of realization of these tasks will depend, first of all, on Ukraine and also on that to what extend Ukraine is significant for West and USA as an advanced post of stability in the Central Europe.

This significance increases many times with the beginning of economic and political developing by West and USA of former soviet space. Ukraine can be there as the basic bridgehead for such developing.

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