Co-operating in the Conflict Zone.

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Abstract.

When NATO nations responded to complex emergencies in the early 1990s, they found themselves operating in conflict zones with many unfamiliar actors. The international military contingents were no longer the principle organisers of the "battle field". The presence of large, vulnerable populations called for the involvement of a host of civil agencies to provide immediate humanitarian relief as well as the long term requirements for development, nation building and security sector reform.

Two different approaches towards co-operation co-existed. Among the military there was a universal recognition of the need for co-ordination. But the civilian organisations represented a much wider array, or disarray, of disciplines, conflicting charters and in some cases, unbridled rivalry. They were suspicious of attempts to organise them into a co-operative structure because for many, successful competition had been the basis of their survival and success.

At the beginning of the 1990s, co-ordinating the elements of the international response in the conflict zone was therefore seen as unachievable by the military element and undesirable by the civil organisations. However as the number of interventions increased, a model for conducting themselves in a co-operative manner began to emerge. In many cases the military and civilian actors in each intervention were the same. At a local level co-operative structures began to grow between them, in the civil sector these were orchestrated by lead organisations and among the military, by the framework provider or lead nation. Despite the same actors participating in each emergency, the co-operative linkages between them relied on the personalities at the interfaces between them, rather than the institutionalisation of their relationships . The structures they created were ephemeral and had to be recreated for each new contingency. By the end of the decade Kosovo represented a template for these operations; if not a model for success at every level, it was at least a methodology on which to build a co-operative structure that might survive from one operation to another.

The attack on the 11 September jeopardises this aspiration. Although the deployment to Afghanistan has a familiar ad hoc and incremental character , the nature of the coalition and the operation itself are essentially different to the Kosovo model and may stand at the threshold of a new genre of operations . Despite many reasons for the military and the civilian agencies to be more co-ordinated , no strongly based structures have emerged so far . Until the elements of the international response are confronted more immediately and closer to home by the consequences of a dramatic failure , the ad hoc approach may continue.

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Introduction.

The problems of organising the efforts of different actors involved in the same crisis began with early warfare. As long ago as 218 BC Hannibal's disparate force of ninety thousand infantry, cavalry , slingers and targeteers with its supporting ships and elephants was drawn from a host of different tribes and countries[1]. To co-ordinate their efforts Hannibal used the same techniques of inducement and leadership that are also the instruments of a modern military commander leading an international coalition. By the time Clausewitz began to consider the nature of violence, military formations had become more formally structured and co-ordination between their different arms (infantry, cavalry and artillery) also became easier to arrange. During the 1914 –18 European War, allied forces created formal co-operative structures between corps and armies in the field. Modernisation caused military forces to spread out over the battlefield, each unit occupying a larger and larger space. Within the military the process of co-operating between units of the same army and between armies of different nations continued to improve. During the Cold War the integration and joint command of large coalition forces reached new levels of effectiveness in the Warsaw Pact and NATO, spurred on by the advances in communications technology.

However, while co-ordination of military forces became more and more comprehensive, beyond the horizon of the military profession, the world was changing at an increasing pace. By the 1980s, the Clauswitzian model of wars

between states, was being overtaken by the incidence of "new wars"[2] within states. New wars were usually less intensive than conventional war-fighting, but in other ways more complicated and less defined in time and space. In the new wars of the 1990s, there tended to be no frontlines. Combatants were not from vertically organised state armies but more often civilians, in some cases children, carrying arms, operating in loosely formed militias and factions. The violence was pervasive, it also gripped the civil population causing massive displacement and migration and civilian casualties. The military were no longer the lone organisers of the battle field. The area of conflict had expanded, becoming less defined and the mass of the civil population continued to subsist there, often with the assistance of a host of other international organisations.

In the "new wars" of the post Cold War era, the professional armed forces associated with NATO and the now dismantled Warsaw Pact were being used more to stabilise a violent area than to destroy enemy forces in a conventional manner. An increasing number of military contingents of different nationalities were now involved in the international responses to the emergencies of the 1990s. In the Balkans the majority of contingents which made up the ad hoc coalitions in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia were drawn from NATO countries. The dominating NATO military culture provided a strong co-operative structure to which the non-NATO contingents could adapt themselves. So within the military element of the response, co-operation and even co-

[1] Gavin de Beer. *Hannibal the Struggle for Power in the Mediterranean.* Thames and Hudson. London . 1969. Page 119 – 150.
[2] "New Wars" as defined by Kaldor M. "New and Old Wars, Organised Violence in a Global Era" Polity Press,1999.

ordination between unlikely allies such as the Russian and the US contingents in Bosnia [3], was achieved without much difficulty or friction.

However the problems of organising the disparate elements of the international response now manifested themselves at a wider level. Whereas the commanders of multi-national forces from Hannibal through to Dwight Esienhower controlled a defined group of military actors on the battlefield, the presence of large numbers of vulnerable civilians in the conflict zone now attracted a commensurate array of civilian agencies to deal with their immediate and longer term needs. As the frequency of the emergencies seemed to increase and attract the attention of the media, the civil element of the international response also grew, they were now an essential and established part of the response. In the humanitarian crises of the 1990s, the civil agencies were the veterans of complex emergencies and it was the international military contingents of NATO and the Warsaw Pact that were the new comers.

To succeed in these circumstances, the individual elements needed to co-operate, however on what institutional framework could this be organised? Each element brought with it a different institutional or professional approach. The military were now only one element in an array of different capabilities that included the UN agencies , the UN civil administrators, international organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), donor governments, regional

[3] Jacob W. Kipp and Tarn Warren "The Russian Separate Airborne Brigade-Peacekeeping in Bosnia and Herzegovina" Chapter 2 of Ed J Mackinlay and P Cross. *The Paradox of Russian Peacekeeping.* United Nations University. Tokyo. Publication forthcoming 2002.

organisations, non-governments organisations and the media (these actors are defined in the next section). There were many reasons why this gathering of participants in the "new wars" of the early 1990s either could not or did not wish to , submit themselves to the direction of a higher co-operative structure that could have organised their efforts with a greater degree of cohesion . During the 1990s , the UN Agencies and the military coalitions have gradually developed a better understanding of each other's operational role and institutional sensitivities , but this accord did not result in a compelling framework for co-operation. In each contingency linkages were set up between the separate elements of the international response and with the host country where the crisis had arisen. But these were fragile structures, created and energised by the personal relationships of the key officials in a particular operational area. They could not be translated to another contingency, so that each operation had an idiosyncratic network of co-ordinating committees and inter-agency relationships. Although in the Balkans , many of the factors and actors were common to most of the serial emergencies in that sub-region, the co-operative structure or modus vivendi that developed between the elements of the international response was ephemeral and a new set of relationships arose with each new emergency. But the 2001 deployment to Afghanistan crossed the threshold of yet another chapter of co-operative developments. The multinational build-up of naval forces in the Arabian sea and beyond, the co-ordinating role of the US CENTCOM, the spaghetti tangle of military command channels culminating in Afghanistan all opened a new dimension of co-operating challenges. The military command structures for coalition operations was becoming increasingly complex even before the inclusion of the problematic civil agencies. The individual elements of the international response seemed unable to

achieve a cohesive structure that could survive the pace of events. Every new deployment was ad hoc , the actors might be the same but the operational linkages between them were altered to reflect different political pressures and the individual style of new generations of key officials and commanders.

This paper sets out to explain the nature of the operational and information linkages that develop between the actors in a complex emergency. Its scope of analysis includes the concerned foreign nations, authorising bodies, media , local parties within the conflict zone as well as the civil and military elements which have responded to most of the complex emergencies of the 1990s. This investigation goes beyond the limited discussion of co-operation in the Balkans which is the familiar terrain of the NATO staff. The paper argues that although there is a recurring nucleus of actors in each emergency, the co-operative structures and linkages between them alter with every new contingency. The logical response to this situation is not to prescribe more lists of principles and co-ordinating measures. Instead the paper seeks to understand and emphasise the institutional differences and sensitivities of each professional culture. Its purpose is not to recommend the imposition of new co-operative codes but to clarify an existing and extremely complicated relationship, with a view to explaining why in these circumstances co-operation and co-ordination may not be feasible. The paper also asks whether a coherent approach is merely desirable or an essential factor for success. In situations where it is essential, it is possible to expect that a working level of co-ordination may emerge between the elements of the response.

The paper is organised in four sections. The first explains some definitions and introduces the actors that habitually participate in most complex emergencies. It also shows how their presence in the operational area and beyond may be represented in the form of a model. The second explains why the concept of "co-ordination" provokes such different reactions from each sector of the response. The Third section on intervention operations shows how the purpose and the political inhibitions of the international response have altered during the 1990s up to the present deployment in Afghanistan. At this point the paper assesses the need for co-ordination in view of the intent of the international response; is it essential or merely desirable? Finally the paper explains some of the co-operative devices that have emerged so far in a decade of international operations and also points out where they may be applied.

I. Defining the Conflict Zone

Complex Emergencies. In the context of the post Cold War period, when violence arises in a failing state, it touches every aspect of human life and grows from small incidents [4] which seem to have no fixed beginning and cannot be ended by an order to "stop firing" from a commander in chief; the state has lost control. In the 1990s violence was not defined in space, there were no formal frontlines where intensive destruction could be expected or rear areas where civilians could survive in safety. The geography of genocide corresponded to the complexity of ethnic and economic interests which motivated and drove its passions [5]. The armed fighters in many cases knew the people they set out to kill but it was impossible for the

[4] For example in Georgia the tension between Tblisi and the Abkhazians began to show itself in small incidents as early as 1978. Several people died in rioting in Sukhumi in July 1989 before the outbreak of extremes of violence in the post Soviet period in the 1990s. For a chronology of the dispute see study by Ed Jonathan Cohen. " A Question of Sovereignty – The Georgia /Abkhazia Peace Process". Accord. Issue 7. 1999. Page 86

[5] William Shawcross. "Deliver us from Evil". Bloomsbury , 2000. Chapter 5 "Genocide in Our Time"

intervening military to tell who were the combatants. In the affected areas many families possessed weapons and combatants wore no uniform, except that a particular gang or faction might distinguish themselves with a colour or article of clothing. States which were collapsing from within and had failed to provide their populations with the basic protection and needs that defined the responsibilities of statehood, nevertheless keep up a plausible outward appearance. They were still members of the UN General Assembly, with missions in New York, but in reality their writ did not extend very far beyond the margins of their capital cities. The violence, which confronted the peace forces of the 1990s, was dominated above all by local strong men and warlords. The combinations of failing states, societies in transition, globalised markets, a proliferation of communications, improved transport technology and unprotected national resources had propagated a new generation of local leaders, who were in many cases negatively disposed towards the peace forces and the process they stood for.

A number of conditions distinguished a modern conflict area from its Cold War antecedents. Although none of these were especially novel, their manifestation together in the same time and space suggested what the international response now describe as, a complex emergency. These conditions included all or some of the following:

- Humanitarian suffering on an enormous scale
- Numerous armed factions
- Collapse of the civil infrastructure
- Absence of governance and a legal system

- Absence of individual security
- Possibility of ethnic cleansing and genocide
- Large numbers of displaced civilians and refugees
- Unchallenged criminal activities in the host nation[6]

The civil elements of the international response were the first to coin the phrase "complex emergencies".[7] This definition is now widely used by both the military and civil agencies. It also has much the same meaning for the UN, NATO and the sub-regional organisations. Essentially international organisations agree that a complex emergency is distinct from interstate violence and usually comprises a humanitarian emergency complicated by the opposed interests of several armed factions and further exacerbated by human accidents and natural hazards such as drought, earth quake, crop failure, economic collapse and dangerous epidemics. The symptoms are so complicated and severe that efforts to contain or stabilise the situation will exceed the capabilities of a single responding agency, even the entire UN system. To address such a diversity of misfortunes, the response and will have to involve several different functional areas . A complex emergency is therefore never a narrowly humanitarian or a military problem, its containment requires more than the individual capability of a single element of the response.

[6] MoD UK *Peace Support Operations* . JWP 3-50. HMSO. London 1996. Chapter 2.
[7] The term was accepted into wider use after the 1994 IASC conference working paper. See Alex Schmid. "Thesaurus and glossary for Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Terms." FEWER. UK 1998. And Ramsbotham and Woodhouse op cit page 46.

Not all academics are happy with this definition[8]. The idea that these disturbances are crises and emergencies is derived from the rationalisation of the situation by rich nations, which in the main provide the response. A crisis or emergency in their thinking implies a short term commitment to a contingency that arises swiftly and which can be just as swiftly resolved. However this rationalisation is at odds with the view that the violent crisis is in reality only the visible part of a much bigger social transition, punctuated by several emergencies, in which thousands will die but nevertheless which are only a part of a much larger canvas of long term, violent metamorphosis.

The Conflict Zone. The area known as the conflict zone is imprecisely delineated and therefore hard to define or even describe in accurate terms. It may comprise a territory that lies astride several international borders within a particular sub-region. Elements of the threatened population may even be living as a diaspora in a distant state in another region. There are no front lines. At a local or tactical level a rash of incidents in one particular district may define a critical area and there may be several such areas within the conflict zone. A critical area may be the site of a massacre, the temporary refuge of a vulnerable population or the interface between violently opposed factions. The higher , operational or theatre level, will enclose the flash points and critical areas that arise from the crisis and most of the active elements of the response. In some cases the operational area may correspond to the territory of the host state. However some elements of the response will have administrative bases beyond the borders of the host state. Above the operational or theatre level , in the case of a complex emergency, the strategic level has a political and a military dimension. For the

[8] M Kaldor. New and Old Wars, Organised violence in a Global Era. Polity Press. UK 1999. Page 113.

military, the strategic level is significant as a geographic area in which off shore assets can be positioned and command linkages can be set up which connect the assets at the theatre level to their respective commands. In this context the strategic area is not usually a contested zone where large intercontinental forces manoeuvre against each other. When operating against a widely dispersed insurgent organisation such as the al Qaeda, with cells in many different countries, the strategic area may become more significant to the military as a source of potential security threats and a task for closer surveillance. The strategic level also has a strong political significance as the sub-region that defines the front line states and the nations which will contribute to the response. The strategic area may define which state becomes the military framework provider and which regional or sub-regional security organisation becomes the mandating authority.

This description is further complicated by the presence of the humanitarian agencies and the UN civil elements, which will have different definitions of a crisis area and the levels of activity within it. Large humanitarian agencies are "stove pipe" organisations in that they are self sufficient with a single link for logistics, funding and control running from the field to their directorates, mostly in OECD countries. The degree of self sufficiency implied in a stove pipe organisation tends to cut across the artificial boundaries imposed for the purposes of military control. However in this study the "conflict zone" corresponds largely to the land area taken up by the operational area or theatre, as well as the local level. It contains all the active elements of the response as well as the local military leaders, local community leaders and the surviving elements of the host state government. The media representing every

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And R Kent in J Mackinlay and R Kent. " International responses to complexes emergencies: why a

interest, will also be present in the conflict zone. The civil and military actors and their positions in each level of the conflict are shown at Chart A.

The Actors in a Complex Emergency

In the 1990s , a characteristic of civil wars and complex emergencies has been the proliferation of actors at every level , who can influence the outcome of an international intervention. The purpose below is to identify these and later indicate their level of operational interest in the form of a model.

The authorising body. Although the civil agencies are likely to be operating in the crisis zone prior to the deployment of the international military force, the peace settlement and the role of the leading actors is usually initiated, authorised and determined by a mandate that is issued by an authorising body. In the case of the United Nations the objectives of a mission and its authority to act are approved by a Security Council resolution[9]. In normal circumstances a mandate will set out the role of the international force, the appointment of its military commander and the senior official responsible for the overall mission (the Special Representative of the Secretary General or High Representative). The mandate also authorises the financial and logistic arrangements for the international force. [10] The mandate may also specify the arrangements for interim government and the related development objectives, while the peace process takes effect or during a transfer of power. The authorising body thus provides the higher command for the forces in the field. During the Cold War peacekeeping operations, the relationship of the UN Security Council via the UN

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new approach is needed". NATO Review . May-June 1997.

[9] UN Charter. UN Department of Public Information (Reprinted) October 1997 . See Chapter V for the powers and procedures of the UN Security Council.

Secretariat to the deployed international contingents was a simple, vertical chain of command. After the Cold War, the relationship between the deployed force and its authorising body, was complicated by the UN's inability to meet its own military requirements. The use of coalition forces, raised beyond the aegis of the UN, introduced a second chain of command between the coalition contingents , their military commander and the sources of those contingents, which underpinned the day to day directing influence of the authorising body. Therefore in a NATO led coalition, the troops in the field may be authorised by a UN Security Council mandate, but their operations are directed from a regional NATO HQ or by SACEUR. The UN Charter provides for regional and sub-regional security organisations to act as authorising bodies. During the 1990s the CIS, OSCE and ECOWAS have acted as regional authorising bodies . Some argue that in 1998 NATO set a precedent by acting on its own as an authorising body to initiate the Kosovo bombing campaign when the UN Security Council was locked in disagreement. [11]

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[10] O Ramsbotham and T Woodhouse. *Encyclopedia of International Peacekeeping Operations*. ABC-CLIO Oxford 1999. Page 151.

[11] "On the basis of the tenets of human rights recognized by the tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo after World War II and more recently in the charters of the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda; the provisions of the U.N. Charter obligating its members to promote and encourage respect for human rights ; the formulation and adoption by the U.N. General Assembly of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 ; and the widespread adoption of numerous treaties and conventions concerning human rights such as the Geneva Conventions, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Genocide Convention, the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, and the Torture Convention, it is contended by some that states are no longer free under international law to mistreat their own nationals but are obligated to respect their fundamental human rights"

D Ackerman. Kosovo: Internatioanl Reactions to NATO Air Strikes" . CRS Report to Congress . Code RL 30152. 28 April 99. Page 9.

Ed K Donfreid. "Kosovo: International reactions to NATO Air Strkes" CRS Report to Congress . Code RL 30114. 21 April 99. Page 15.

Involved foreign nations. An international intervention relies above all on the support of individual foreign nations that are concerned with the outcome of the crisis. Foreign nation support can come in the form of a contact group, or in the case of Bosnia as the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), which offers political pressure and diplomatic assistance, troops contributors and fund donors. A contact group is therefore "a coalition of states that are using their collective, diplomatic and sometimes economic power to foster or negotiate peace among belligerents in a conflict".[12] The expression was used in the context of the Namibian peace settlement to describe the group of Western States comprising US, UK, Canada , France and West Germany , which in 1976 was established to mediate a peaceful settlement . This functional collective has also been described as a group of "concerned states" in other contexts.

Troop contributor nations may provide individual observers, a complete contingent or contribute with other states towards a composite contingent. [13] Troop contributors have an ill defined but palpable influence on the operations of an international force. In some cases they act as military facilitators, without taking part as a contingent in the conflict zone, by providing the strategic lift required for the initial deployment or some other out of theatre aspect of military support such as communications or the provision of intelligence assessments. Troop contributing nations can exercise considerable influence over their own national contingent (as opposed to a composite contingent or individual observers) through separate national communications links

[12] T Weiss and C Collins. *Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention. World Politics and the Dilemmas of Help* Boulder , Westview. page 218, cited in A Schmid *Thesaurus and Glossary of Early and Conflict Prevention Terms.* Forum on Early Warning and Early Response. London 1998.
[13] For example Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia have developed a Baltic response battalion BALTBAT, that comprises elements from all three states and trains together in preparation for deployment to peace support operations possibly as part of a Nordic brigade.

which operate directly from a national defence HQ to the troops in the field. This national link will operate in addition to the international force command structures. A nation may use its influence to override the orders of a force commander, not usually in a confrontational manner but by imposing the limitations of spurious "equipment failures" and "manpower shortages" which achieve the same result.

Donor nations are by far the greatest source of funds for peace operations. The funds can reach the conflict zone through their defence budgets and through donor agencies such as the UK's Department for International Development and in the case of the EU, whose funds are disbursed through ECHO. By 1996, 90% of all official aid came from the members of OECD. Through this means, donor nations provide immediate relief, food aid, aid for refugees as well longer term development funds; they are in this respect an essential element of a successful intervention in a complex emergency[14].

In the context of NATO , the contact group, the troop contributors and the donors usually comprise the same group of actors – the NATO members. Their cohesion is ensured to a certain extent by NATO structures and their decisions are jointly promulgated through NATO channels. However when a nucleus of NATO nations deploys beyond its area of interest, cohesion is eroded by the presence of non-NATO actors and institutions . In Afghanistan, the troop contributors , donors and contact groups cannot be shown as a composite block, speaking with one voice under the aegis of a single authority.

Lead or Framework Nations During the Cold War peacekeeping deployments, the United Nations was largely responsible for the provision of an operational framework that could be used to unify , deploy and command its individual contingents. [15]After the Cold War, when international forces became much larger and were provided by organisations beyond the aegis of the UN, the military framework was also separately constituted and provided a leading nation such as the US, or by regional organisations such as NATO; this principle works for most regions. For example in West Africa, Nigeria acts as the lead nation for ECOMOG forces; in a Southern African contingency, South Africa could provide some of the support required of a lead nation, India might be regarded as a potential South Asian framework nation. Russia was the framework provider for the CIS deployments to Abkhazia and South Ossetia , Tajikistan and Moldova. Beyond the regional context, UK has acted as framework provider in 1980 for the Commonwealth Monitoring Force during the Zimbabwe /Rhodesia transfer of power and more recently during the nation building process in Sierra Leone. In East Timor, Australia acted as the lead nation for the initial deployment. [16]Within the Western European area of interest, the US through NATO has so far provided the enabling support in the form of strategic air lift and intelligence assessment, which is essential to the deployment phase of an international intervention. Within the NATO membership there is a more complex system of framework nations whereby US, UK, France, Italy and Germany may act jointly to provide framework support for the established formations that comprise the

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[14] Cleo Small. "Government Donors" in *A Guide to Peace Operations.* Ed J Mackinlay. Watson Institute for International Studies. Providence . 1996

[15] Although some very important elements of this support were provided by individual nations, for example the strategic transport by the US and the logistic framework in some cases by the UK or France (Mackinlay J . *The Peacekeepers.* Unwin Hyman London. 1989. See comments on logistics Chapters 3 and 6.) these assets were organised by the UN Secretariat and acted in accordance with their instructions.

garrisons in Bosnia and Kosovo. A lead or framework nation can therefore in most cases be defined as the source of military support, which is vital to the success of a multinational force. This support may include strategic transport, intelligence assessments, the provision of air power in all its forms and logistics.

The international military forces. Peace forces have been internationally composed since the UN's prototype peacekeepers at the Arab-Israel interface, but by the 1990s most of them were also multifunctional, the international military forces constituting only one element at theatre level . Within the military element there might be internationally organised land, naval and air forces, which were usually the most visible part of a response group. Compared to the civil elements of the response, they were unique because the UN, or other authorising body, had mandated them to use violence if necessary to implement the will of the international community. [17]

Larger operational areas, the complexity of the mission and the multiplicity of involved agencies raised the importance of having sophisticated communications. The UN's past reluctance to accept the use of information and intelligence collection was, by the mid 1990s,overtaken by the realities and imperatives of a more dangerous conflict zone. In comparison to the traditional forces of the Cold War period, the 1990s peace forces also had the capability for manoeuvre. In military terms this meant the ability to move and operate in adverse geographical conditions, if necessary under hostile fire. This also meant they could alter the tactical situation in their favour by threatening or bringing force to bear at a crucial moment. They were not any longer

[16] A Ryan. "The Strong Lead-Nation Model in an ad hoc coalition of the willing : Operations Stabilise in East Timor" . International Peacekeeping Vol 9 No 1 Spring 2002.

merely garrisons, they had the capability of using movement, mobility, protection and the application of force. In the operational area this gave them the ability to overcome local opposition and maintain freedom of movement. It was even possible that these capabilities could be used to persuade or force belligerents to co-operate with a peace process. The new peace forces generally included infantry , armour, fire support , engineers, special forces and logistic units.

Many of the tasks of the military forces remained the same as before, however in some cases there were new problem solving capabilities implied. Each national contingent might be asked to take on one or more of the following tasks:

- Observation, monitoring and supervision of truces and cease-fires.
- Conflict prevention
- Interposition or preventative deployment,
- Demobilisation operations.
- Humanitarian relief and its protection.
- Establishment and supervision of protected areas.
- Mine awareness and demining operations.
- Guarantee and denial of movement [18]

Although the civil elements of the international response tend to regard the military presence as monolithic, in reality there may be more than one regional or international

[17] R. Gregorian. "Introduction to Armed Forces in Peace Support Operations" in Ed J. Mackinlay, op cit page 139.
[18] For a complete list of the UK tasks which more or less follow this list see. MoD UK. *Peace Support Operations* . JWP 3-50. HMSO. London 1996 pages 6-1 to 6-14.

force operating in the same crisis area. However in the array of actors in the conflict zone, the military was probably the most homogenous professional culture in the response. Among the armed services, there was a similarity of professional outlook, training, equipment and organisational structure. In some regional and sub-regional groups such as NATO, the CIS and the Commonwealth countries, there was an even greater uniformity that extended to staff training , procedures and standardisation agreements. Although NATO staff may complain at the disparity of member states armed forces, the civil agencies are more disparate that the military.

The Civil Agencies The major civil components of an international response include : Principal UN agencies (UNHCR,UNICEF, WHO, FAO/WFP, UNDP); UN civil elements (Human Rights, Civil Administration, Electoral Staff and Development Staff) ;UN or International Civil Police, the international organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross/ Crescent (ICRC) and the Non Government Organisations (NGOs),

"UN Agencies" refers to all elements of the United Nations System which are not part of the UN Secretariat. Depending on their mandate and organisation, they might also be referred to as "Agencies", "Programmes", "Organisations", or "Funds" with the exception of the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, which is part of the United Nations Secretariat. Prior to the increased demand after the end of the Cold War for emergency relief, the Agencies' normal role was purely developmental and concerned with the well-being of specific categories of populations. By the 1990s many UN Agencies had taken on emergency roles. UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, FAO, and WHO were the main actors in emergency response, recovery and aid, but

other agencies such as WMO, UNESCO, ILO, UNEP could also become involved in their areas of specific expertise.

In the 1990s UN Agencies were present in most developing countries, each was individually accredited to the Host Government and in the operational area loosely grouped into a UN Country Team. This was intended to encourage co-ordinated use of resources and expertise between the Agencies themselves and between the Agencies and the Host Government. In addition to their development tasks, the UN Agencies had roles in emergencies, some of them created in response to the circumstances arising immediately after the Cold War.

After the end of the Cold War, the UN system categorised rising number of emergencies as: mono-sectoral emergencies, natural disasters, technological disasters/accidents, and complex emergencies. The last category involved armed conflict, refugees and or internally displaced persons (IDPs), and humanitarian advocacy. The humanitarian work of the UN agencies fell within nine main areas:

-early warning of potential emergency,
-assessment of severity ,
- mobilization of resources,
-co-ordination of response,
-information collation and reporting,
- ensuring access to affected populations,
-delivery of supplies and services,
-education and advocacy,
-and transition to reconstruction and rehabilitation.

The Agencies had a degree of commonality in their relationship to the UN charter, accountability to member governments, institutional commitments to improving human well-being and organisational cultures. However in emergency and disaster,

co-ordinated planning and best use of resources could not be taken for granted. Co-operation was complicated by the differences between organisations and a dependency on , or even a competition for, the same sources of funding. Nevertheless they shared information derived from emergency-related surveys and over many contingencies held similar policies.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) provides protection and material assistance to refugees, and in certain cases to internally displaced persons. The UNHCR HQ is in Geneva and has a staff of close to five thousand persons with offices in some ninety countries. Its responsibilities includes international protection for refugees, and providing them with food, shelter, medical aid, education and other social services. UNHCR's material assistance is largely channelled through implementing partners such as the government of the asylum country and non-governmental organisations. While there was no UN organisation specifically charged with responsibility for internally displaced persons, over the years, UNHCR established a limited mandate to undertake humanitarian assistance and protection for IDPs This required the consent of all concerned parties, the support of the international community and unhindered access to the affected population .

UNICEF has its headquarters in New York, and by 1994 was represented in some 117 countries. In situations of social upheaval and natural disaster, its provides emergency assistance for child survival and development. Its assistance activities could include: programmes for children in especially difficult circumstances such as for the unaccompanied, displaced and returning refugee children; war affected children; the demobilisation of child soldiers; child feeding (in collaboration with WFP); water supplies, sanitation and direct health interventions (in collaboration with WHO). It also arranges related management and logistical support, maintaining a stockpile of emergency supplies.

The World Health Organization HQ is in Geneva where it maintains a Division of Emergency and Humanitarian Action (DEHA). Within the United Nations System, DEHA co-ordinated the international response to emergencies and natural disasters in the health fields, in close partnership with the other member agencies of the United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee. WHO co-ordinated efforts to raise health levels world wide and had an early warning system for the outbreak of epidemics.

The task of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) is to provide advice on reducing vulnerability and helping in the rehabilitation of agriculture, livestock and fisheries, with emphasis on local food production. FAO assesses food production, exports and imports, and forecasts any requirements of exceptional food assistance. World Food Programme (WFP) was the food aid organisation of the UN system. It provides food aid primarily to low-income countries and to the victims of disasters. In addition it advises on emergency food aid, the planning and managing of food aid interventions and any necessary logistics support .

The United Nations Development Programme, administers and co-ordinates most of the technical assistance provided through the UN System. UNDP Headquarters is in New York. The Programme is represented in virtually all developing countries . Its objective is to assist them to accelerate their economic and social development . With respect to emergencies, UNDP plays a role in prevention, relief and rehabilitation. In post-emergency phases, UNDP would normally fund activities related to: rebuilding of a national political system, organisation of elections, human rights, good governance, restoration of agriculture and food production, reestablishment of financial operations, opening of local markets, rehabilitation of social services including education and public health, the reconstruction of infrastructure including housing, energy, transport, water supply and the reintegration of returnees .

The term"NGO" refers to a wide range of mainly non-profit making organisations, motivated by humanitarian values, which are independent of governments, UN and commercial sectors. NGOs range in size from field kitchens, to multi-national health or food distribution agencies with HQs in London, Paris or New York and an annual budget of many millions of dollars. The NGO sector falls between the government sector and the commercial sector and is characterised by its great diversity comprising a mass of different sized organisations with various management structures and missions. Nevertheless within the sector as a whole NGOs could be characterised into the following groups: international, multinational, religious and local. By the mid 1990s there were over 4000 NGOs in OECD countries alone, referred to as international NGOs (INGOs) or "northern" NGOs (NNGOs) because they worked internationally, often in more than one country and because of their origins in the industrial societies of the northern hemisphere. Being multi-national is increasingly important to INGOs if they are to influence the institutions of the international community and raise funds from them in a concerted fashion. Religious NGOs also had a similar international and supranational structure. Smaller INGOs might work out of a single northern headquarters and only have projects in one or two countries. In the case of local NGOs, there is an estimated 20, 000 other NGOs beyond the OECD countries which could act as the operational partners of INGOs or international development donors and UN agencies.

UN Civil Elements. The UN civil element refers to the group of administrators and field departments of the UN Secretariat and directorates, which deploy as part of an internal response. In addition to the UN Agencies, there are a number of UN civil organisations for

facilitating elections, resuscitating collapsed government structures, investigating human rights and assisting the restoration of a more normal, stable society. Two elements in this category have grown considerably in size and importance since the early 1990s, Human Rights and the International Police contingents.

The UN civil element may include a contingent of International Civilian Police, mandated by the authorising body, and deployed as part of the international response. Where a peace force deploys to an area in which national and local government structures have broken down there is a need for law and order enforcing capability in addition to the use of military force. This is usually provided by the civilian police (CIVPOL) element. In most cases their role is to liaise between the military component and the local police or between the local police of different factions within the host state. CIVPOL are also required to monitor human rights and provide training for local police forces. In many cases CIVPOL is dependent on the local units of the international military forces for its logistic support and protection.

In addition to the UN Agencies and the NGOs, which are the two largest groups of civilian actors with the international military peace forces, there was an array of independent organisations which are nevertheless vital to the peace process. These include international organisations like the ICRC and IOM which are not INGOs, nor part of the UN system.

The host state[19]is not strictly speaking part of the international response however, within the conflict zone its government, armed forces and population are key actors in the long term success of the peace process . The host government's effectiveness is crucial particularly in

[19] Ed J Mackinlay. *A Guide to Peace Support Operations.* Op cit. pages 17 and 18.

the restoration of state economy, political systems and, in the case of a prolonged conflict, the rehabilitation of fighters and military forces. Host country governments exercise an important influence on the freedom of the individual elements of the response group to enter and operate in the conflict zone. When a host government is hostile to a party in the dispute, a close relationship with the host government may compromise a response element's impartiality. A country with no effective government is likely to have limited overseas diplomatic representation and security of borders. In some cases these will be provided by an interim government, which is convened and empowered under the guidance of the authorising body. International military forces may play an important role in the stability and continuity of the host government. The failure of a government may be linked to the break up or defeat of the armed forces. After a successful peace settlement it may be necessary to disarm large numbers of irregular fighters and government troops whose numbers have grown as a consequence of prolonged hostilities and who will now jeopardize the peace process if they continue to prey on the local population. An important task for the response group will be to rehabilitate them and reconstitute a much smaller number into a new defense force; this action should regroup some power back into the hands of the elected government . In most cases the response group will be working close to the population. In a host state divided by intercommunal conflict, the civil population may have been victims of every kind of misfortune including dislocation, starvation and the physical dangers of existing in a war zone. Very often this trauma will bring on profound changes that challenge long established hierarchies and alter ethnic distribution, power structures and clan values. Providing for their survival needs and long term reconciliation and rehabilitation is demanding and complicated.

II. Different Approaches to the Co-ordination of Effort

The previous section shows that there is certain to be many actors with different organisational and professional characteristics operating in the same conflict zone. It follows that within each element of the response there are also different approaches between actors on how the crisis should be addressed. These differences arise from the dissimilar intent and professional ethos of each element. This section explains some of these differences, in particular towards the concept of co-operation and co-ordination and why these apparently sensible measures may cause division , particularly between the military and the civil elements of the response. Co-ordination in the conflict area is a matter of consensus building . If, for example, success is dependent on the delivery of a large volume of relief goods and roads and ports are limited , then a consensus becomes crucial. The humanitarian relief network lacks a conventional command and control system and the diversity of actors and the mechanisms which link them together defines the character of the operation.

The military view of co-operation. Although the international military force may comprise as many as twenty different national contingents, it is a more homogenous group than the civil element. As previously suggested this homogeneity is derived from professional similarities of education, the common social conventions of military forces, a uniformity of appearance and their standing within the state, society and the law. Although there will be differences between each national version of these characteristics there will also be a recognisable affinity.

However on the principles of co-operation and co-ordination , the military are likely to have an even greater similarity of approach. As early as 218 BC, Hannibal recognised that the co-ordination of the different arms and services within a fighting force was a crucial factor of its survival and success. A disparate force whose arms commanders were in constant rivalry was

destined to fail. For the military defeat in combat is an absolute condition which cannot be compared to commercial failure or bankruptcy. For these reasons the military profession has given much thought to the achievement of co-ordination between arms within the same forces and between forces of different nations. The ethics of military success and battlefield survival dictate that the military instinctively regard co-operation and co-ordination as a positive, if not essential, condition[20]. This instinctive view is reinforced by elaborate conventions on the delegation of command, which allow elements of one unit to be subordinated to another, possibly even to a unit of a different nation. Subordination may be for the purposes of supporting each other in a battle, for movement or as part of a long term garrison that is far away from the parent unit. In most nations , the status of the commander and his control over the different elements of his force are underwritten by military law. The conventions provide a widely recognised structure for co-ordinating the different components of a military force, moreover they are conventions that can be transferred and applied to every operational situation and between most countries. As a result, most military officers have a universal acceptance of being subordinated to a larger force structure and will have some idea of the broad conventions whereby this can be achieved.

Civil agencies view of co-ordination. The civil agencies by instinct and application are antithetical to this military approach. The civil organisations, which operate in the conflict zone, represent a much wider span of disciplines. Many are technical and logistic, providing the physical needs of a vulnerable society such as power, water, shelter, food aid and health care, but there are also legal, religious, political, administrative and investigative

[20] For some time co-operation has been a principle of war. " Military operations are joint enterprises involving co-operation between all arms and services within the Army , between the three fighting Services, between the Army and the police……Under certain circumstances , and for specific tasks , one Service must be prepared to place itself under the operational control of another." UK Army. Army Field Manual . Vol. 1 . "The Fundamentals. Part 1. The Application of Force." D/DT/13/34/25. 1985. . Principles. Chapter 3

organisations present. This melee of skills and disciplines is provided by a host of individual organisations. Rather than any instinct for co-operation , between them there is a compulsion for competition. In their natural state as part of society they survive and flourish by successfully outstripping their rivals. From the largest UN agency to the small single-issue NGO, each individually strives to be self-contained. This results in a proliferation of stove-pipe organisations operating in the same zone, every one with its own directorate and source of funds. Each will have its own charter and many, particularly the NGOs, do not require to be mandated by an authorising body in the way the military force does, to participate in the conflict zone. Because they have , until recently , been largely self-funded , they tend to emphasise their independence of action. Although there are co-ordination structures within the civil sectors to achieve some prioritisation and the best use of resources, many agencies view these organising efforts with a fundamental antipathy for the reasons explained. In direct contrast to the military, the co-ordination of their efforts threatens the competitive independence which they regard as a key to their long term survival as a distinct organisation. The NGO's appeal to its funders is often based on its free-spirited approach in which they claim to be alone in having sufficient determination and resourcefulness to reach a particular threatened community which no other agencies can reach. A co-ordinating structure diminishes this resourceful and free spirited approach. More important, in almost every case their stove-pipe, self funded stand-alone existence has ensured that if necessary they can resist efforts to co-ordinate them.

III. Intervention Operations before and after 11 September

Cambodia to Kosovo - Containment Operations. Throughout the turbulence of the 1990s, the elements of the response refined their conceptual approach towards

intervention and the co-operative arrangements, which emerged during each contingency. The initial interventions, which took to the field directly after the Cold War,[21] were in many ways similar in their ad hoc approach to the traditional UN peacekeeping forces that deployed during the Cold War. But by the time Kosovo had been stabilised, a recognisable model or structure had emerged from the serial interventions since the first of the major international peace forces in the 1990s . This process linked the principle actors in the conflict zone into an informal mesh of horizontal relationships. The sequence of events which followed the deployment of the international intervention forces could be identified as having two or three phases that occurred between the start of the military campaign and the operation reaching a slower pace of activity that indicated the start of a garrison phase. Each phase was distinguished by particular events or conditions, although not all were manifested in each of the 1990s contingencies.[22] The first or intervention phase was usually initiated by the steering group or contact group of nations putting pressure on warring parties in the conflict zone using sanctions and or the threats of violent action. If these failed the international military forces would achieve military superiority in the conflict area which might involve a bombing campaign using conventional forces including war ships and combat aircraft. The consequent change in the tactical situation , in favour of those supporting the peace process might result in the apparent capitulation of the local resistance to intervention. The local warring parties might make an outward show of accepting the concept of a peace process at a signing ceremony[23].

[21] Referring to United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia 1989-1990 and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 1992-1993.

[22] The model suggested here does not correspond precisely to any particular operation but is a distillation of experiences to show how the nature of intervention changed quite swiftly in the space of 8 years from Cambodia to Kosovo.

[23] An early and particularly notorious post Cold War example of such an event was the signing of the August 1989 Paris Agreement by the warring parties in the Cambodian conflict almost immediately after which the Khmer Rouge reneged on the agreement.

International military forces would then move into the conflict area to establish security, restore law and order, assist humanitarian survival and restore basic civil amenities. In the second phase the conflict zone would be stabilized. During this period there might not be an effective number of humanitarian agencies present in the conflict zone or even a viable level of development funding. In this case the international military force might have to provide for the basic shelter and amenities required by the civil community using short-term funds supplied directly by individual governments to their respective national contingents[24]. To achieve stabilisation the international military forces would have to suppress overt armed resistance to the peace process. Very often the local armed resistance would reorganise in a covert structure as a result. Towards the end of the stabilisation phase, after a successful consolidated appeal by humanitarian agencies, funds might begin to reach the conflict area. As the humanitarian presence increased, the international military would scale back their presence from humanitarian sphere of responsibility. A less threatening security environment allowed the international military forces to reduce their campaign – capable element . In the third phase the international military forces would reduce their commitments and would be restricted to garrisoning the conflict zone. UN and regional organisations established themselves to organise and supervise trustee governance, law and order, development, economic recovery. The military commander would relinquish his degree of control over non-military activities. A High Representative (usually of the authorising body) would be appointed . The number of civil agencies would increase as they arrived to carry out

[24] In an unpublished study by the Centre for Defence Studies (for MODUK in 2000), it was found that government funds were used to finance the initial restoring efforts of their incoming military contingents on their arrival in Bosnia and Kosovo (US, UK and Netherlands for example)

peace-building and nation building programmes. Meanwhile the remaining international military units focused on, what amounted to, counter insurgency tasks.

Afghanistan – An International Counter-Insurgency Operation The 11th September attack reduced the illusive protection of distance between the richer contributor states, which habitually responded to complex emergencies in collapsing states and the hostile forces in the conflict zone. The validity of the emerging operational model represented by Kosovo was greatly diminished by the demonstrated capability of an insurgent force based outside the US (in this case) , to mount a devastating attack on its most protected cities. Contingent contributors and donor states were now directly threatened, together with their financial centres, their facility to travel, culture and institutions. Containment was no longer a valid response to a situation where a potential enemy could reach out and strike at the heart of the involved foreign nations. This increased their resolve to contribute armed forces in a more committed and interventionist way towards a collective solution.

In Afghanistan the initial sequence of the intervention followed the familiar routines of political pressures, followed by the bombing campaign and a tactical build-up, which led to military efforts to dominate the area. However in the first few months after the arrival of the military forces, several characteristics distinguished what has happened in Afghanistan from the 1990s or Kosovo model of containment. Two differently constituted military forces, with separate tactical missions, co-existed in the same space. The International Security Assistance Force maintaining security in the Kabul urban areas (see annex A) had a command relationship to its authorising body , the UN Security Council, but a more functional day to day operational

relationship with its framework providing nation. This was initially provided by the British and later by the Turkish armed forces. ISAF is in many respects a recognisable post war international security structure derived from the Balkans experience. It is however a diminutive neighbour to the US led Combined Joint Task Force, known as CJTF 180, based at Bagram, which is the military manifestation of the coalition to prosecute the "war on terrorism" .

Several factors distinguish CJTF 180 from its recent , post Cold war predecessors. To succeed CJTF 180 cannot allow itself to become a long term containment operation in the style of a Balkans garrison, under pinned by a loosely orchestrated federation of actors in the conflict zone. The political expectations for this intervention are much greater; a result oriented public and an unequivocally vocal US administration require a visible success. This dictates a short and decisive militarily campaign. However the history of interventions into Afghanistan and the nature of the long term opposition that may be arise there, challenges the US led coalition and in particular its concept of operations. The urgency and the pre-eminence of the military element of this intervention ensures the CJTF 180 coalition and operations are unlike any other since the end of the Cold War. There is less transparency than before, the military mission statements are classified, although anodyne versions are released to the public; the linkages between actors are also secret matters. In reality there several overlapping coalitions: military , political, economic and for the support of international law enforcement. Each functional area represents a web of unilateral relationships and at the centre of each the US, which is also the lead nation and framework provider. Each of the 78[25] partner or member nations supports the campaign with varying degrees of

[25] Now 79 nations with the arrival of the Japanese at CENTCOM.

complicity, hedged about with individual national caveats. The influence of the US as framework providing nation is pervasive and overwhelming, only the US could have achieved a response so powerful, but also so complicated. Although the NATO framework may have provided some aspects for the planning start point of the European nations, the military structure and modus operandi are supremely American. For the larger military nations which can develop a self supporting coalition package, the relationship with the American framework is workable. But for the smaller nations which require to be more reliant on a US modus operandi, the integrated relationship has in some cases proved to be unworkable. The immediacy of the response directly after the attacks on New York and Washington[26] dictated an incremental plan which has adapted itself to the changing political and military requirements . However for individual coalition members, the ad hoc nature of the force development and its operations has led them into open-ended commitments which politically may not be easy to sustain in the long term.

Different models for co-operation emerge.

The containment model and the counter insurgency model each have a different underlying reason to achieve a co-operative structure. Although in both cases the actor-categories (referring to the military contingents , civil agencies etc.) are essentially the same, the tensions and linkages between them are different. In each model it is possible to argue , if somewhat speculatively at this early stage without a fully researched proposition , that in the Afghanistan conflict zone a different operational concept is collectively at work in which the actors have different reasons to co-operate with each other. At this stage it is not possible to describe each linkage

[26] Military planning for the coalition presence began at CENTCOM on the afternoon of 11 September

exhaustively as in many cases they continue to evolve. However the collective intent and therefore concept of each type of intervention may be different.

In the case of a containment operation citing the examples of post Dayton Bosnia, Kosovo , Macedonia , East Timor and (post May 2001) Sierra Leone, several factors have influenced the degree of co-operation between actors. The timing and the effect of the military intervention were designed to change the tactical situation in the host state. In every case, armed opposition to the peace process was significantly reduced. In the Balkans this was achieved by bombing campaigns and the consequent withdrawal of the hostile forces, in East Timor by the removal of the Indonesian military presence, in Sierra Leone by the arrival of a small but effective British forces, which altered the tactical balance in favour of the GOSL. Once the armed opposition was reduced , the balance of forces favoured the successful implementation of the peace process. Because the security situation after the stabilisation phase was seen as benign, the international forces domination of the intervention effort soon gave away to more pressing humanitarian concerns relating to the survival and long term sustainment of the vulnerable elements of the population. The handover from the military to the civil also relaxed the need for conditionality or the need to relate the emphasis of humanitarian tasks to the achievement of security goals in the host state. Although in the post Cold War containment operations, the major fund providers for the humanitarian agencies and the military contingent providers were the same countries, they did not have the determination to achieve the kind of orchestrated response that would be required to achieve conditionality. Nevertheless, if closer co-operation had been seen as an essential requirement for the overall success of the

2001 and the first contingent liaison cell arrived shortly after.

mission , the contact group could have imposed , by contract and command , a more effective system across the response. [27]However, except in some interesting local examples , development resources were proffered unconditionally and the fund providers did not link their development efforts to the military campaign to achieve stabilisation.

Even within NATO, different approaches to civil-military co-operation emerged. British commanders in Bosnia and in Kosovo instinctively turned to their counter-insurgency experience and regarded the efforts of civilian agencies in their area as central to the overall strategy for success. At every level , co-operation and co-ordination with civil efforts were organised from within the J-3 or G-3 operations staff and therefore close to the commander. In the US and French sectors the civilian effort was regarded as an addition to, rather than as an integral part of, the military effort. In the US formation the planning of civil projects was left to specially trained officers, who although very highly qualified, were usually positioned outside the J-3 operations command chain. In most contingents the use of civil military co-ordination centres improved the relationship between the military and local civil agencies. However the degree to which this fusion of effort could alter the speed and success of the peace process was decided at a much higher level where the directors of he independent agencies met with their funding ministries. As a rule the local executives of the civil agencies and their tactical counterparts in the military developed closer working relationships than their directors in their separate offices in Geneva, Rome

[27] In the Balkans, leading nations usually seek to reduce their military presence. However their infrastructure support capabilities , which include communications , off road cargo delivery and information collation and dissemination are important aspects of development achievement and their withdrawal is locally resisted by the civil agencies. The same leading NATO nations also underwrite much of the development programme and could if they organised it, sub contract these capabilities to their client civil agencies, but so fare they have failed to do this.

and New York. In both the UN and the UK staff, unpublished papers[28] written for internal purposes testify to the usefulness of the system of civil military co-operation centres (CIMIC) in Bosnia , Kosovo and East Timor. However CIMIC is essentially a liaison and co-operative system, whereas in post-Dayton Bosnia, the British staff structure indicated that in addition to the efforts of the CIMICs, integrated planning took place at every level between the operations staff and the senior civil agency representatives. The CIMIC system is one co-operative system nevertheless which has become institutionalised and has managed to be transferred from one operation to another . In Afghanistan the US forces in CJTF 180 have organised an elaborate civil-military liaison staff known informally as "chicklets" or Coalition Civil-Military Logistic Operations.

In contrast the military situation in Afghanistan is not yet stabilised and the security of the relief and development efforts is threatened from time to time. Despite the dramatic regime change in the capital, insurgent forces with their principal leaders remain at large in the field and have so far eluded capture. They therefore implicitly threaten the international intervention especially where it is poorly protected and the rising number of proxy and direct attacks bear witness to this. Unless the delivery of essential life-sustaining supplies to the displaced element of the population is carefully controlled, there is also a danger that humanitarian relief also becomes the logistic support for the insurgent forces , as it has in the sub Saharan African conflict zones. At the strategic and operational levels , there is a greater imperative for a co-ordinated approach. The elements of the al-Qaeda network, which masterminded the

[28] These cannot be cited however they originate mainly from SHAPE concerning the organisation and success of the CIMIC system in FY and from OCCHA concerning the use of CIMIC in East Timor.

assault on 11 September, still pose a threat and have on several occasions, albeit on a reduced scale, demonstrated their ability to attack Western interests.

Despite the military imperative to do more than contain the situation, the civil agencies deployed in the ad hoc manner of previous contingencies. The build-up followed a familiar ad hoc and incremental pattern. The elements of the humanitarian response have loosely organised themselves into several co-operative groups . Some of these are operational such as the Joint Logistic Centres and there is also a series of overlapping committees and groups comprising every category of donor for Afghan reconstruction, peace implementation and security sector reform. Among the civil agencies, co-operation has certainly been enhanced by the Joint Logistics Centres but beyond these co-operating structures, which essentially organise the civil element of the response, the co-ordination of civilian efforts in a significant way either with the military operation or even among themselves is fragile.

The civil element is also extremely complicated . In addition to the humanitarian and reconstruction programmes , there is a multifaceted effort to rebuild the Afghan Security Forces and impose a basic level of internal security. Each part of this diffused plan is supervised by a nation of the G8. The group is loosely co-ordinated to achieve Security Sector Reform, but it has a horizontal structure and is without an overall director. The SRSG Ambassador Brahimi is ostensibly the overarching co-ordinator of the humanitarian effort at an operational level. However as most programmes are funded nationally or independently of the UN system, his authority is tenuous and very much dependent on the good will of the actors rather than his real ability to control their activities. Nevertheless in Afghanistan, more than ever before,

there has been an opportunity for contingent contributors and donor governments to exercise more control over the humanitarian agencies. On this occasion the independence that arises from the ability of each agency to raise its own funds from public subscription has been greatly diminished. Much of the funding has been from government sources and there could be a greater degree of control (that is, *contributor governments'* control - for they are in many cases the same countries) exercised as a result.

There was also a major political and military effort led by the US to address the wider global dimension of al-Qaeda's organisation beyond the Afghan crisis zone. Counter terrorist programmes operate in several different regions. The surveillance of illegal traffic in weapons, drugs and human beings has intensified. Military assistance missions have been despatched to several states that were potential refuges for al-Qaeda including Sudan, Yemen, Philippines and Indonesia. Around the world the movement of shipping and private aircraft has been monitored more closely and satellite -imagery re-monopolised for a while by the US.[29] Electronic communications have been screened and intercepted and where possible, transfers of money tracked and audited. Migration was more carefully watched and the unregulated or unlawful movement of individuals , communities and populations across borders became a higher priority for intelligence units. The organisation and deployment of these efforts have given the US, as the framework providing nation, an unusually powerful and intrusive influence over the management of intervention into Afghanistan. However within the US capitol a more effective co-ordinating structure is needed to link these surveillance and enforcement measures to a wider counter strategy.

[29] Bhupendra Jasani. "Orbiting Spies- Opportunities and Challenges" . Space Policy 18 (2002) 9-13

Although 11th September had energised the speed and military intensity of the US/Western response to this particular contingency, no distinguishable pattern has yet emerged that could become a model for future operations. The international dimension of the Western response has had an incremental, ad hoc character, a reactive array of isolated activities, but not a coherent political offensive. There are nevertheless several powerful reasons for making every effort to defeat al-Qaeda; in addition to the obvious threat to security there also high political and public expectations whose disappointment are likely to be seriously damaging to the Bush administration as well as to US wider standing among its allies .

Conclusions

The purpose of this paper has been to describe the actors in a modern complex emergency and the degrees to which they work together in the conflict zone. The running surfaces between the individual units of the response exist throughout the conflict area. At the tactical and local level, good co-operation between and within the civil-military elements may improve the situation locally, but the overall success of a co-operative structure and the ability to transfer the experience to another theatre is decided at a much higher level. The critical mass of the international response is provided by foreign nations, representing many different regions far from the conflict zone. When operational failures are less visible and less immediate, they are also less keenly felt by the populations of these nations. Although public indifference to the outcome of international interventions is related to the distance and visibility of the crisis , this relationship has been altered by the emergence of globally organised insurgent forces which can strike at the heart of the foreign nations involved in the

response through terrorist attacks. In the context of the above, this paper concludes that:

- Among professional military officers the co-ordination of effort and assets is regarded as a principle of success and long standing conventions have emerged for this purpose. However in complex emergencies the presence of many different actors in the same operation area has diminished the validity of a purely military approach and also outstripped efforts to achieve civil–military structures for planning and conduct of operations beyond the local level.
- The co-operative structures for an operation rely on personal relationships and can seldom be transferred to another theatre.
- Civil agencies and many of the government departments, which underwrite them in the involved foreign nations, are ambivalent towards achieving more effective structures for closer co-operation in the conflict zone. In particular donor governments may participate in discussions about co-operation but they seldom impose it through the conditional use of their donations and assets.
- The case against the need for achieving more effective co-operative structures for organising future operations emphasises that:
    - It reduces the ability of stand alone NGOs to reach out to threatened communities that have been abandoned by the international system.
    - It impedes the ability of a civil programme to develop individually, at their own speed and in their own direction.
    - Close association with the international military stigmatises the humanitarian element of the response in the eyes of the factions which oppose the peace process. In the short history of recently failed operations the international

military forces have not always been able to protect the stigmatised elements of the civil agencies.

- There is no genuinely authoritative international body which will organise or direct an overall co-ordinating structure. Individual donor nations are not co-ordinated within themselves. The US has not successfully co-ordinated the different elements of the Operation Enduring Freedom.

- The case for greater co-ordination emphasises that:
  - There are now too many moving parts in a modern conflict zone; without effective co-ordination they are wasteful of resources and lack concentration of effort and commitment.
  - The achievement of an international structure for co-ordination becomes more possible after Afghanistan because the stand alone, stove pipe, agencies are more dependant on government funding than ever before and the imperative to overcome the problem, as opposed to containing it, is much greater post 11th September 01.
  - Without a long term improvement of individual security in the conflict zone, efforts to achieve Security Sector Reform, good governance, capability enhancement etc. are likely to become a wasted effort when the situation returns to violence. A co-ordinated effort to restore authority to a legitimate government is more likely to succeed than an incremental policy of ad hoc efforts.
  - Without co-ordination, the assets for development and humanitarian relief become the logistics of the armed factions which oppose the peace process.
- A well reported failure in Afghanistan may change donor government's relaxed approach to co-ordinating their restorative efforts with the overall campaign

objectives. But it is not easy to foresee the emergence of a framework providing nations or international organisation with the both the power and the inclination to create and lead a more co-ordinated structure for effective intervention.

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Colonel K Larsen	- International Military Staff
Stephen Orosz	- Acting Director, Civil Emergency Planning

SHAPE

Lt Colonel J Rollings	- CIMIC

UN HQ Geneva

Guillaume de Montravel	- Chef Groupement des Resources Militaires de Protection Civile and Logistique Service des operations d'urgence Bureau de la Coordination des Affaires Humanitaires
Ingrid Nordstrom-Ho	- Humanitarian Affairs Officer Military and Civil Defence UnitDisaster Response Branch United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Annex A

MILITARY TECHNICAL AGREEMENT

Between the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan ('Interim Administration') .

Preamble

Referring to the 'Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions', signed in Bonn on 5 December 2001, ('Bonn Agreement'), The Interim Administration welcomes the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386.

The ISAF welcomes the Interim Administration's commitment in the Bonn Agreement to co-operate with the international community in the fight against terrorism, drugs and organised crime and to respect international law and maintain peaceful and friendly relations with neighbouring countries and the rest of the international community.

Article I: General Obligations

1. The Interim Administration understands and agrees that the Bonn Agreement requires a major contribution on its part and will make strenuous efforts to co-operate with the ISAF and with the international organisations and agencies which are assisting it.

2. Interim Administration understands and agrees the Mission of the ISAF is to assist it in the maintenance of the security in the area of responsibility as defined below at Article I paragraph 4(g).

3. The Interim Administration agrees to provide the ISAF with any information relevant to the security and safety of the ISAF mission, its personnel, equipment and locations.

4. For the purposes of this Military Technical Agreement, the following expressions shall have the meaning described below:

a. 'The Parties ' are the Interim Administration and the ISAF.

b. 'ISAF' includes all military personnel together with their aircraft, vehicles, armoured vehicles, stores, equipment, communications, ammunition, weapons and provisions as well as the civilian components of such forces, air and surface movement resources and their support services.

c. The 'Interim Administration' is the organisation as detailed in the Bonn Agreement.

d. 'Military Units' includes all Afghan factions, armed representatives or personnel with a military capability, to include all mujahidin, armed forces, and armed groups, other than the 'Police Force' defined at paragraph 4e. The definition of 'Military Units' in this context does not include the ISAF, Coalition Forces or other recognised national military forces.

e. The Interim Administration 'Police Force' means individuals who have been formally appointed as Police by the Interim Administration, are recognisable, and carry official identification. The Police Force includes the national security police, the criminal police, the uniform police, the traffic police and the border police.

f. 'Host Nation Support' (HNS) is the civil and military assistance rendered by the Interim Administration to the ISAF within Afghanistan.

g. Area of Responsibility (AOR) is the area marked out on the map attached at Annex B.

h. 'Coalition Forces' are those national military elements of the US-led international coalition prosecuting the 'War on Terrorism' within Afghanistan. The ISAF is not part of the 'Coalition Forces'.

i. An 'Offensive Action' is any use of armed military force.

j. Designated Barracks to be agreed between the parties and to be detailed at Annex C.

5. It is understood and agreed that once the ISAF is established, its membership may change.

Article II: Status Of The International Security Assistance Force

1. The arrangements regarding the Status of the ISAF are at Annex A.

Article III: Provision of Security and Law and Order

1. The Interim Administration recognises that the provision of security and law and order is their responsibility. This will include maintenance and support of a recognised Police Force operating in accordance with internationally recognised standards and Afghanistan law and with respect for internationally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms, and by taking other measures as appropriate.

2. The Interim Administration will ensure that all Afghan Military Units come under its command and control in accordance with the Bonn Agreement. The Interim Administration agrees it will return all Military Units based in Kabul into designated barracks detailed at Annex C as soon as possible. Such units will not leave those Barracks without the prior approval

of the Interim Administration and notification to the ISAF Commander by the Chairman of the Interim Administration.

3. The Interim Administration will refrain from all Offensive Actions within the AOR.

4. A Joint Co-ordinating Body (JCB) will meet on a regular basis. The JCB will comprise of designated Interim Administration officials and senior ISAF representatives. The purpose of the JCB will be to discuss current and forthcoming issues and to resolve any disputes that may arise.

Article IV: Deployment of the ISAF

1. UNSCR 1386 authorises the establishment for six months of an international force to assist the Interim Administration in the maintenance of security in the AOR. The Interim Administration understands and agrees that the ISAF is the international force authorised by UNSCR 1386 and may be composed of ground, air and maritime units from the international community.

2. The Interim Administration understands and agrees that the ISAF Commander will have the authority, without interference or permission, to do all that the Commander judges necessary and proper, including the use of military force, to protect the ISAF and its Mission.

3. The Interim Administration understands and agrees the ISAF will have complete and unimpeded freedom of movement throughout the territory and airspace of Afghanistan. The ISAF will agree with the Interim Administration its use of any areas or facilities needed to carry out its responsibilities as required for its support, training and operations, with such advance notice as may be practicable.

4. In consultation with the Interim Administration, the ISAF Commander is authorised to promulgate appropriate rules for the control and regulation of surface military traffic throughout the AOR.

5. The ISAF will have the right to utilise such means and services as required to ensure its full ability to communicate and will have the right to the unrestricted use of all of the electromagnetic spectrum, free of charge, for this purpose. In implementing this right, the ISAF will make every reasonable effort to co-ordinate with and take into account the needs and requirements of the Interim Administration.

Article V: Illustrative Tasks of the ISAF

1. The ISAF will undertake a range of tasks in Kabul and surrounding areas in support of its Mission. ISAF will make every reasonable effort to co-ordinate with and take into account the needs and requirements of the Interim Administration. Possible tasks, which may be undertaken jointly with Interim Administration Forces, will include protective patrolling.

2. By mutual agreement between the ISAF Commander and the Interim Administration the ISAF may:

a. Assist the Interim Administration in developing future security structures.

b. Assist the Interim Administration in reconstruction.

c. Identify and arrange training and assistance tasks for future Afghan security forces.

3. The ISAF will liaise with such political, social and religious leaders as necessary to ensure that religious, ethnic and cultural sensitivities in Afghanistan are appropriately respected by the ISAF.

Article VI: Identification

1. ISAF personnel will wear uniforms and may carry arms if authorised by their orders. Police Force personnel, when on duty, will be visibly identified by uniform or other distinctive markings and may carry arms if authorised by the Interim Administration.

Article VII: Final Authority to Interpret

1. The ISAF Commander is the final authority regarding interpretation of this Military Technical Agreement.

Article VIII: Summary

1. The purposes of the obligations and responsibilities set out in this Arrangement are as follows:

   a. To provide the necessary support and technical arrangements for the ISAF to conduct its Mission.

   b. To outline the responsibilities of the Interim Administration in relation to the ISAF.

Article IX: Final Provisions

1. Certified copies of this Military Technical Agreement will be supplied in Dari and Pashto language versions. For the purposes of interpretation the English language version of this Military Technical Agreement is authoritative.

Article X: Entry Into Force

1. This agreement will enter into force upon signature by the Participants.

Signed by the Minister Of Interior, QANOUNI	**Signed By General McColl, COMISAF**
On behalf of the Interim Administration of Afghanistan Dated	**On behalf of the International Security Assistance Force Dated**
Witnessed by BG DE Kratzer for Lt Gen PT Mikolashek Coalition Forces Land Component Commander	
Dated	

Annexes:

A. Arrangements Regarding The Status Of The International Security Assistance Force.

B. Map of Area of Responsibility.

C. Designated Barracks.

ANNEX A

ARRANGEMENTS REGARDING THE STATUS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE

SECTION 1: JURISDICTION

1. The provisions of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 13 February 1946 concerning experts on mission will apply *mutatis mutandis* to the ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel.

2. All ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel, enjoying privileges and immunities under this Arrangement will respect the laws of Afghanistan, insofar as it is compatible with the UNSCR (1386) and will refrain from activities not compatible with the nature of the Mission.

3. The ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel, will under all circumstances and at all times be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective national elements in respect of any criminal or disciplinary offences which may be committed by them on the territory of Afghanistan. The Interim Administration will assist the ISAF contributing nations in the exercise of their respective jurisdictions.

4. The ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel, will be immune from personal arrest or detention. ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel, mistakenly arrested or detained will be immediately handed over to ISAF authorities. The Interim Administration agree that ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel, may not be surrendered to, or otherwise transferred to the custody of, an international tribunal or any other entity or

State without the express consent of the contributing nation. ISAF Forces will respect the laws and culture of Afghanistan.

SECTION 2 ENTRY INTO AND DEPARTURE FROM AFGHANISTAN

5. The Interim Administration understands and agrees that the ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel, may enter and depart Afghanistan with military identification and with collective movement and travel orders.

6. The Interim Administration understands and agrees that the ISAF will have the unimpeded right to enter Afghan airspace without seeking prior diplomatic clearance.

SECTION 3 INDEMNIFICATION, CLAIMS AND LIABILITIES

7. ISAF will be exempt from providing inventories or other routine customs documentation on personnel, vehicles, vessels, aircraft, equipment, supplies, and provisions entering and exiting or transiting Afghanistan territory in support of the International Security Force. The Interim Administration will facilitate with all appropriate means all movements of personnel, vehicles, aircraft or supplies, airports or roads used. Vehicles, vessels and aircraft used in support of the mission will not be subject to licensing or registration requirements, nor commercial insurance. ISAF will use airports, roads without payment of duties, dues, tolls or charges. However, ISAF will not claim exemption from reasonable charges for services requested and received, but operations/movements and access will not be allowed to be impeded pending payment for such services.

8. ISAF will be exempt from taxation by the Interim Administration on the salaries and emoluments and on any income received from outside the Interim Administration.

9. ISAF and their tangible movable property imported into or acquired in Afghanistan will be exempt from all identifiable taxes by the Interim Administration.

10. The ISAF and its personnel will not be liable for any damages to civilian or government property caused by any activity in pursuit of the ISAF Mission. Claims for other damage or injury to Interim Administration personnel or property, or to private personnel or property will be submitted through Interim Administration to the ISAF.

SECTION 4 FORCE SUPPORT

11. The ISAF will be allowed to import and export free of duty or other restriction, equipment, provisions and supplies necessary for the mission, provided such goods are for official use of ISAF or for sale via commissioners or canteens provided for ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel. Goods sold will be solely for the use of ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel, and not transferable to other participants.

12. The ISAF will be allowed to operate its own internal mail and Telecommunications services, including broadcast services, free of charge..

13. The Interim Administration will provide free of cost, such facilities as the ISAF may need for the execution of the Mission. The Interim Administration will assist the ISAF in obtaining at the lowest rate, the necessary utilities such as electricity, water and other resources necessary for the Mission.

14. Nominated representatives of ISAF will be allowed to contract direct with suppliers for services and supplies in Afghanistan without payment of tax or duties. Such services and supplies will not be subject to sales or other taxes. ISAF Forces may hire local personnel who will remain subject to local laws and regulation. However, local personnel hired by ISAF will:

a. Be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity.

b. Be immune from National Service and/or national military service obligations.

c. Be exempt from taxation on the salaries and emoluments paid to them by the ISAF.

15. The Interim Administration will accept as valid, without tax or fee, drivers licences and permits issued to ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel, by their respective national authorities.

SECTION 5 MEDICAL AND DENTAL

16. The Interim Administration will permit the importation and carriage of controlled drugs as required by ISAF and as officially issued to individual personnel.

17. The Interim Administration will ensure that ISAF Forces and MEDEVAC aircraft, including helicopters, will be given the highest priority to transit to, within and from the relevant operation area and given unrestricted access to the airspace of Afghanistan to fulfil any emergency mission.

SECTION 6 APPLICATION

18. The protections hereby set out shall apply to the ISAF and all its personnel, and to forces in support of the ISAF and all their personnel. This will not derogate from additional protections, rights and exemptions other forces operating in connection with the ISAF may negotiate separately with the Interim Administration or the follow-on Government.

AO: KABUL AND ITS SURROUNDING AREAS



ANNEX C
TO THE MILITARY TECHNICAL AGREEMENT
DATED 4 JAN 02

LOCATION OF MILITARY BASES WITHIN KABUL AOR

SER	NAME & TYPE OF UNIT	LOCATION	COMMENT
1.	055 LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION	KHYER KHANA	
2.	315 TRANSPORT BRIGADE	KHYER KHANA	
3.	10 ENGINEER DIVISION	KHANJA BOGHRA	
4.	255 TANK BRIGADE	KHANJA BOGHRA	LOCATION ONE
5.	219 TRANSPORT REGIMENT	KHANJA BOGHRA	
6.	NATIONAL GUARD UNIT	KHANJA BOGHRA	
7.	POLICE SUPPLY BASE	KHANJA BOGHRA	
8.	2ND GUARD REGIMENT	KHANJA RAWASH FIELD	KABUL AIRPORT
9.	AIRPORT PROTECTION BATTALION	KHANJA RAWASH FIELD	KABUL AIRPORT
10.	AVIATION UNIVERSITY	KHANJA RAWASH FIELD	KABUL AIRPORT
11.	22ND CITY PROTECTION REGIMENT	SHARI NAO	
12.	717 ENZIBAT SUPERVISION DIVISION	QALA-I-MARANJAN	
13.	52ND COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION	1ST MICROROYAN	
14.	AIR DEFENCE UNIT	1ST MICROROYAN	
15.	AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT	TATA-I-MARANJAN	
16.	NATIONAL GUARD	BALA HISSAR	
17.	AIR DEFENCE UNIT	BE BE MAHRO HILL	
18.	5TH TRANSPORTATION REGIMENT	SEYA SANG	
19.	PROTECTION & COMMUNICATION BATTALION	TELEVISION HILL	

20.	POLICE PROTECTION DIVISION	MICROROYAN	
21.	101 SECURITY PROTECTION	GARNESION	
22.	1ST GUARD REGIMENT	PALACE (ARGE)	
23.	OPERATORY POLICE DIVISION	DEHMAZANG	
24.	5TH INTELLIGENCE SERVICE MAIN OFFICE	DARUL AMAN	
25.	235 UNIT	DARUL AMAN	
26.	21 PROTECTION DIVISION	DARUL AMAN	
27.	206 DETECTIVE UNIT	PULLY MAHMOOD KHAN	
28.	205 DETECTIVE UNIT	DARUL AMAN	
29.	3RD GUARD REGIMENT	TAJBEK HILL	
30.	313 ESCOT UNIT	TAJBEK HILL	
31.	61 ZARBATE (SERIES) DIVISION	MAHTAB QALA	
32.	88 TOOY (T) REGIMENT	DARUL AMAN	
33.	MILITARY SCHOOL (HARBE SHOWANZY)	MATAB QALA	
34.	MUSIC BATTALION	MATAB QALA	
35.	MILITARY UNIVERSITY (HARBE POHANTOON)	PULLY CHAR KHI	
36.	TECHNICAL ACADEMY	PULLY CHAR KHI	
37.	57 TRAINING DIVSION	HOOD KHEL	
38.	CENTRAL ARMY REPAIR CENTRE	HOOD KHEL	
39.	TECHNICAL SCHOOL (SHOWANZI-I-TEKHN)	HOOD KHEL	
40.	SENIOR OFFICERS COURSE (KORSE-I-ALEE-I-AFSARAN)	PULLY MAHMOD KHAN	
41.	SECURITY DIRECTORATE OF KABUL CITY	AIRPORT BLOCKS	
42.	1ST INTELLIGENCE OFFICE	AIRPORT BLOCKS	
43.	2ND INTELLIGENCE OFFICE	AIRPORT BLOCKS	
44.	3RD INTELLIGENCE OFFICE	AIRPORT BLOCKS	

45.	4TH INTELLIGENCE OFFICE	AIRPORT BLOCKS	
46.	5TH INTELLIGENCE OFFICE	AIRPORT BLOCKS	
47.	6TH INTELLIGENCE OFFICE	AIRPORT BLOCKS	
48.	7TH INTELLIGENCE OFFICE	AIRPORT BLOCKS	
49.	8TH INTELLIGENCE OFFICE	KARTA-1-NAO	
50.	9TH INTELLIGENCE OFFICE	KARTA-1-NAO	
51.	10TH INTELLIGENCE OFFICE	KHYER KHANA	
52.	11TH INTELLIGENCE OFFICE	KHYER KHANA	
53.	12TH INTELLIGENCE OFFICE	ARZAN QEMAT	
54.	MILITARY FIREFIGHTING SECTION	ASMAEE STREET	
55.	MILITARY WORKSHOP	ASMAEE STREET	
56.	MILITARY MUSEUM	DARUL AMAN	
57.	ACADEMY FOR MEDICAL SCIENCE	BB BE MAHRO	
58.	MILITARY HEALTH CENTRE	SHANI NAO	
59.	LOGISTICS INSTALLATION	SHANI NAO	
60.	2ND MILITARY HOSPITAL	PULLY MAHMOOD KHAN	
61.	MILITARY SLAUGHTER HOUSE	PULLY MAHMOOD KHAN	
62.	MILITARY VEHICLE PARK	MICROROYAN	
63.		SHASH DARAK	
64.	GARNISON HEADQUARTERS	SHASH DARAK	
65.	4TH TANK PARKING DEPOT	PULLY CHARKHY	
66.	10TH TANK PARKING DEPOT	PULLY CHARKHY	
67.	RESERVIST TRAINING INSTITUTION	PULLY CHARKHY	
68.	PRODUCTION DEPOT	PULLY CHARKHY	
69.	MILITARY HOUSING	PULLY CHARKHY	

	COMPLEX		
70.	10TH ENGINEERING COMPANY	PULLY CHARKHY	
71.	MILITARY CLOTHING STORAGE DEPOT	PULLY CHARKHY	
72.	STORAGE DEPOT	PULLY CHARKHY	
73.	255 TANK BRIGADE	PULLY CHARKHY	LOCATION TWO
74.	4 AND 15 MILITARY HOUSING COMPLEX	PULLY CHARKHY	
75.	5TH TRANSPORT COMPANY	KHANJA BOGHRA	
76.	704 COMPANY	KHANJA BOGHRA	
77.	220 AVIATION COMPANY	NORTH OF AIRPORT	
78.	TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE INSTALLATION	KHYER KHANA	
79.	MILITARY STORAGE DEPOT	KHYER KHANA	
80.	FOOD STORAGE DEPOT	KHYER KHANA	
81.	16TH TANK BATTALION	OIL TANKS	
82.	1ST INFANTRY BATTALION	KARGHA	
83.	MINISTRY OF DEFENSE BUILDING	DARUL AMAN	
84.	DARUL AMAN PALACE BUILDING	DARUL AMAN	
85.	UNIT 195 T BUILDING	DARUL AMAN	
86.	CENTRAL MILITARY ADMINISTRATION BUILDING	DARUL AMAN	
87.	MILITARY SLAUGHTER HOUSE	PULLY MICROROYAN	
88.	MILITARY HOUSING COMPLEX	QAMBER CROSS ROAD	
89.	MILITARY HOUSING COMPLEX	QAMBER CROSS ROAD	
90.	MILITARY TECHNICAL WORKSHOP	SHARE POOR	