

**RUSSIA'S ELITE ATTITUDES TO THE NATO
ENLARGEMENT: SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS**

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Abstract

In this paper presents analysis of Russian elite attitude to the NATO enlargement implemented on the base of a wide range of specific sociological data generated throughout the period of the last five years. It was revealed that there is no complete consensus on this realm, members of the elite occupy various positions. To analyze these variations author created typology of the elite concerning attitudes to NATO expansion and described it to understand difference in views on Russian foreign affairs, future of Russia, and etc., of those who have various positions on NATO enlargement. One of the key factors of elite's position - public opinion on NATO expansion, also was analyzed. Finally, were examined three scenarios of the possible Russia's response on NATO enlargement.

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1. Purpose of this Paper, Methodology and Data

In the focus of this paper is the analysis of Russian elite attitudes to the NATO expansion to the East. This process was started up in 90s after the end of the Cold War, and met the opposition at the side of Russia.

After destroying the Warsaw Pact the political vacuum, as well as military-strategic one, has emerged. States of Central and Eastern Europe (CEES), some newly established countries of former USSR found themselves in the position of lack of the national security. They were enforced to develop anew their military systems and political networks. These countries, first of all CEES and Baltic States, chose coming into NATO.

Two key factors determined this decision. Firstly, they wanted to include to Western (Europe and USA) community, that prescript to entering to appropriate institutions, such as Council of Europe, Schengen Agreement, etc. NATO is one of the most important among these institutions. To be full range Europeans mean for them to become the members of NATO. Secondly, they feared relapses of empire's policy at the side of Russia. They hoped that NATO potentially could provide them protection in case of conflict with Russia.

In the end of the 80s and first part of 90s there was significant uncertainty in the Russian foreign affairs - it was a period when Russia lost or refused from traditional Soviet allies but had no idea on new background for the strategy at the international stage. Throughout this period nobody exactly could assert who are friends and who are enemies for Russia; who are partners and who are opponents.

Nobody could proclaim certain values for foreign affairs. Hence, there was no ground for elaboration purposes of the international policy.

This situation in foreign affairs was because of decaying of domestic traditional Soviet institutions. New values - democracy and market economy - were proclaimed as the base of domestic and foreign policies in 90s. Transition has started since the beginning of 90s and new social forces has started to emerge. 90s were a period of instability and vagueness in position of various groups of ruling class. Many among leaders changed their opinions. For example, S.Glaziev, in the beginning of 90s, when he was the member of Gaidar team, was the first who suggested that Russia have to joint to NATO. Then he became the member of Communist Party of Russia, which is strongly opposite to NATO in general and its enlargement in particular. And it was unclear what specific goals and methods for strategy to USA, Germany, UK, Belarus, Ukraine, Estonia, Poland, and etc., are related with these new values.

Throughout the 90s there was an illusion that the democratic system and market economy similar to that in the West will form in Russia. When Putin emerged as the president-elect after rising second Chechen war, this illusion was disappeared. Obviously, the new Russia's system isn't the same that that it was during the USSR. It is semi-democratic and semi-market system, so called Mafia economy (Anderson, 1995), or criminal capitalism (Klebnikov, 2000), or Kremlin capitalism (Blasi, Kroumova, Kruse, 1997), or clan's capitalism (Kosals, 1995), or etc. This is a mixture of arbitrariness in the realm of human rights at the side of authorities and criminals, in the one hand, and uncontrolled freedom in the economy, in the other hand.

Putin's mission is to institutionalize this system and to enforce it, deleting the most inefficient elements (as extra-high level of taxes or the lack of private property on land) and eliminating from the political stage those persons who provoked the

acute public irritation (as B.Berezovsky or V.Gusinsky). He wants to provide small changes to save the roots of the system. And one of his key tasks is to create the attractive image of this system inside Russia and abroad. Attractive image inside Russia requires the development of policy of nationalism, taking into account the necessity of compensation failures and humiliations of the last decade. Otherwise it is impossible to maintain the stability of new system.

Due to these circumstances Putin and his team declare the new national goals in the realm of foreign affairs. Of course, these goals are rather uncertain. This is because of Russian public has no exact idea about national interests so far. As per survey carried out by Foundation “Public Opinion” (April 19, 2001) 57% of the population polled answered nothing about national interests of Russia¹. Meantime, some general ideas in this realm elite, as well as population can declare. Among these ideas is negative position on NATO and its enlargement. Due to these circumstances Russian elite painfully respond to NATO enlargement, while, Gorbachev and Eltsin almost missed it.

To study elite attitudes to NATO expansion in the context of position of Russian society we used sociological methods of analysis. The key among them was expert poll and public opinion surveys. The last ones carried out at the base of national representative samples. SPSSPC was implemented to process data of expert poll.

There were the four sources of data.

1. Expert polls of the elite attitudes in the realm of foreign affairs. Data of two polls were used. The Russian Independent Institute of Social and National Problems in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Moscow Branch) carried out

the first at the April of 2001. The data included answers of 210 specialists in the foreign affairs. Among them were Deputies of State Duma related with foreign affairs; Members of Council of Federation engaged in this field; officials from Ministries governing these affairs; researchers from Academy of Sciences and Universities focusing in the international business and policy; analysts from the non-profit foundations and centers as well as columnists writing up topics on foreign affairs in the leading newspapers and journals. The tasks of this poll were to reveal opinion on goals of policy at the international stage; security, including NATO enlargement; role of Russia in the world; Russia's allies and enemies; future of Russian policy in the international stage; and etc.

The second poll was implemented by Russian Center for Public Opinion and Market Research "ROMIR" at September of 2000 and included 500 representatives of Russian elite in 10 cities. The key questions were on goals of state policy at the international stage, zones of national interests of Russia abroad, attitudes to coming Central and East European countries to NATO as well as inclusion into NATO Baltic and CIS states.

2. Public opinion surveys. We used public opinion data generated by three Russian centers: 1) VCIOM - Russian Center for Public Opinion Research - surveys of population at 1996 - 2001 carried out on the base of representative sample (2300-2500 people polled). The questions focused on attitudes to NATO and its enlargement; external threats for Russia, allies and enemies; 2) FOM - Foundation "Public Opinion" generated data on the field of question at 1997-2001 using representative sample (1500 respondents). The key topics were as follows: estimation of NATO and its expansion (is it any jeopardy for Russia), possible alliances for

¹ See: National Interests of Russia, 2001

Russia, etc.); 3) “ROMIR” - Russian Center for Public Opinion and Market Research - data collected during 1998-2001 (1500-2000 respondents, representative samples). The polls focused on population’s attitudes to NATO and its expansion, allies and enemies of Russia, and etc.

3. Data collected from general press. There were materials and documents where positions of various groups and officials in the realm of foreign affairs, including attitudes to NATO enlargement. The data were collected from the following leading Russian newspapers: Nezavisimaya gazeta, Kommersant, Izvestia, Moskovskie Novosti, Argumenty i Fakty, Zavtra. These issues reflect political spectrum of current Russia, from “left” to “right”, from democrats to nationalists. Opinions of Putin, Ivanov, Iliuhin, Hakamada, Zhirinovskiy and others were collected.

4. Data collected by Internet. Many Internet sites were screened to collect data on attitudes of Russian officials to NATO enlargement. 243 documents were found. The key web sites were as follows: www.polit.ru, www.presscenter.ru, www.gazeta.ru, www.nns.ru, www.apn.ru, www.lenta.ru, www.ntv.ru, www.eurasia.org, www.strana.ru, www.eurasia.org, www.kavkaz.org, www.smi.ru, www.rian.ru, www.deadline.ru, www.opec.ru. Except texts of presentation of many Russian politicians, a lot of documents were collected, from shorthand record of Duma sessions to statements of Russian Orthodox Church.

The logic of our analysis was as follows. The initial step was study of new purposes of international policy and elite’s vision of threats in foreign affairs. Then we focused at the elite’s attitudes to NATO enlargement by means of creation and analysis of typology. The next step was examine factors of elite’s position - public opinion to NATO and its expansion. And finally, there was analysis of possible future, what changes in Russia will develop as a response to the NATO enlargement.

2. Purposes of Russia's International Policy and the Key Threats

After the decade of radical reforms, when was the period of uncertainty in directions of foreign affairs, the key purposes of international policy are revealing itself at the moment.

Russian elite (data collected by Russian Independent Institute of Social and National Problems in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Moscow Branch, at the April of 2001) ranks the purposes of international policy as follows:

Table 1. What purposes in international stage are important for Russia: elite's opinion (percentage and rank)*

Purposes	Percent	Rank
1	2	3
Strategic partnership with leading Asia states (China and India)	67	1
Strategic partnership with Europe	65	2
Protection of Russian population in CIS countries	57	3
Strategic partnership with USA	49	4
Creation new mechanisms for prevention military, economic and ecological threats for world community	47	5
Reluctance for globalization and attempts of some countries to control any other states	44	6
Partnership with NATO	43	7
Reluctance for NATO enlargement	36	8
Russia's inclusion into "united Europe"	36	9
Creation prerequisites for reunification Russian Diaspora within Russia	24	10

* Source: M.Gorshkov, A.Andreev, L.Byzov, V.Petukhov, N.Sedova, F.Sheregi, 2001, pp. 18-19. Since every respondent answered whether important (or not important) every purpose, the sum in the second column isn't equal 100 percent.

It was surprise that Asian direction was estimated as most important in the current Russian foreign policy, because in 90s this direction was almost lost and ignored by Eltsin administration. Now it is another story - near 40% of the total

Russian arms export is for China, including such modern weapons as “TOR M1”, “BUK M1”, “S-300PMU1” and others (Levin, 2001). Special protocol for military trade between Russia and India recently was elaborated until 2010. The minimal total size of contracts within this protocol is \$US 10 bln. Sides intend to develop many joint projects including military fighter of fifth generation (Sokut, 2001). These facts, as well as a lot of others, show that it is Renaissance of Russia-China-India strategic relations.

Goals related to NATO are significantly less important for Russian elite than purposes concerning Asia. The rank of these goals is between 7th and 8th. Really, Russia’s partnership with NATO is in long-drawn crisis at the moment. In one hand, war in Yugoslavia delayed this partnership. In other hand, it didn’t finish and step by step developed almost up to the pre-war level. Although, many officials declared that Russia against the NATO enlargement², they have no certain idea how to develop Russia’s relations with NATO. Therefore, at the Russian side this is a “crisis of uncertainty” when Russia promptly and spontaneously reacts to some uncomfortable events within line of NATO enlargement and its activity (as it was throughout the acute phase of Yugoslavian conflict). This is long crisis of low intensity and, therefore, with low priority for Russian authorities. Its priority risen significantly when any extra-ordinary event emerges in Russia-NATO relations.

We can estimate potential importance of Russia-NATO relations under analysis of elite’s opinion on threats to national security.

² For example, President Putin, presenting at the workshop (January 26, 2001) in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, noted that the NATO enlargement is the wrong line and Russia against it. After Balkan war, he mentioned, NATO-Russia relations were lagged behind, but interaction gradually restores (Brief Report..., 2001). Or Ministry of Foreign Affairs official A.Yakovenko, commenting Slovak’s Parliament decision to join NATO, asserted that Slovak Republic, using its right to choose allies, has to take into account interests of other countries - Russia, which is against NATO enlargement so far (Yakovenko, 2001). And as mentioned in Concept for the International Policy of Russian Federation “Russia still has negative opinion on NATO enlargement” (Concept for the International Policy..., 2000).

Table 2. Threats to Russia's national security: elite's opinion (percentage and rank)*

Threats	Percent	Rank
1	2	3
International terrorism, expansion of Muslim fundamentalism and its penetration into Russian territory	61	1
Russia's low competitiveness in the realm of economy	59	2
Russia's backlog from the West in science and technology	55	3
NATO enlargement to the East and inclusion states of former USSR (Baltic states, Ukraine, Georgia, and etc.)	53	4
Control under the world at the side of USA and its closest allies	51	5
Pressure to Russia from the international economic and financial institutions to eliminate it as competitor in international market	51	6
Jeopardy of the disintegration of Russia	26	7
"Information wars", pressure to Russia at the realm of information and psychology	19	8
China expansion in demography	17	9
Weakening of UN and disintegration of world system of common security	17	10
Large-scale technological emergencies	16	11
Uncontrolled spreading of nuclear weapons	12	12
Global threats (AIDS, warming of climate, and etc.)	10	13
Border claims to Russia from neighbors	7	14
There are no real threats for Russian national security	3	15

* Source: M.Gorshkov, A.Andreev, L.Byzov, V.Petukhov, N.Sedova, F.Sheregi, 2001, pp. 20-21. Since every respondent could specify more than one threat, the sum in the second column isn't equal 100 percent.

NATO enlargement has very high rank in the list of threats for Russia's national security. It is among the five most important dangers together with international terrorism and Russia's backlog from the West in fields of economy, science and technology. Russia's elite estimates NATO enlargement as much more serious threat than such obvious pathologies as uncontrolled spreading of nuclear weapons (the percentage in four times higher) or large-scale technological collapses (in three times higher). Paradoxically, but this means, that NATO enlargement is considering by elite as event which potentially more dangerous for national security than Chernobyl nuclear emergency.

There are two kinds of threat fixed by members of Russian elite. The first kind is the expectation of direct military intervention from NATO into Russia; and the second one is waiting for indirect damage for national security.

Firstly, the direct threat. For example, scenario of military maneuvers “West-99”, carried out by Russian Army in 1999, intended that NATO implements the same operation towards Russia and Belarus that it was towards Yugoslavia (A.Golts, 2001). G.Churkin (Agrarian group of Deputies, State Duma), talking in Duma about Yugoslavian war, scared that “Yesterday NATO didn’t like S.Hussein, today it doesn’t like Miloshevich. Who is next?” (Shorthand Record..., April 16, 1999). M.Deliagin (former economic adviser in President Administration, the Director of Institute for Problems of Globalization at the moment) argued, that Russia doesn’t allow to transform itself into large Yugoslavia, while such attempts are realizing via Chechnya, Belarus, Ukraine (Deliagin, 2001). As per A. Arbatov (who is a member of “Yabloko” estimated by communists and patriots as pro-Western political force) and P.Romashkin “Second task due to NATO military intervention into Yugoslavia at Spring of 1999 is protection Russia and its allies from hold up similar to “Balkan” war. This could provoke regional or inter-regional conflict of highest intensity with using most advanced arms. This could be the short-term conflict which will be stopped promptly or will be developed into nuclear war” (Arbatov, Romashkin, 2001). And, at least, V. Zhirinovsy declared in Duma’s speech: “If we don’t solve the problem of NATO enlargement properly, then it is possible the end of Russia in general” (Shorthand Record..., May 19, 2000).

The second kind of threats is weakening of Russia’s position because of NATO enlargement. M. Mikhailov (former Minister of Ethnic Affairs of Russian Federation), presenting in Duma, asserted that Russian state “can come to grief in

terms of economic and political indicators, and this can damage national sovereignty of Russian Federation” (Shorthand Record..., May 19, 2000). A. Golts mentioned that “Except Baltic States other post-Soviet countries have tiny odds to become members of NATO. But then they can use efficiently Russia’s fears on NATO enlargement. Threat to come to NATO forces Russia back when it in regular time starts to require payments for gas” (Golts, 2000).

Thus, Russia’s elite representatives estimate NATO enlargement as the real and serious threat for national security. Therefore, we decided to examine elite’s attitudes to this enlargement in details.

3. Elite’s Attitudes to the NATO Enlargement: Are Any Variations of the Opinion?

It is generally accepted that there is consensus within Russia’s elite on NATO enlargement - it is against this expansion. For example, as it was published in semi-official Internet site Strana.ru: “Relations with NATO discuss in Russian society during many years. And it is possible to say that consensus in this realm has already emerged, while its frames are wide enough. There are no principal objections to necessity of NATO enlargement prevention. There are only discords in methods of this prevention: one group suggests stopping any relations with NATO, another one - to provide open dialogue” (Gornostaev, 2001).

There are some sociological data confirming this opinion. As per answers got by Russian Center for Public Opinion and Market Research “ROMIR” at September of 2000 and included 500 representatives of Russian elite in 10 cities, 72%

respondents negatively estimate the possibility of coming states of Central and Eastern Europe into NATO. 21% estimate this positively and negatively simultaneously and only 4% gave positive answers (3% don't know - Attitudes to NATO..., 2000). As per inclusion of Baltic States into NATO, 77% are the negative answers; 18% - positive and negative simultaneously; 4% - positive answers (1% - don't know). And opinions about inclusion of CIS countries were as follows: 82% - negative; 14% - positive and negative simultaneously; 3% - positive answers (1% - don't know).

Thus, in spite of that majority among the respondents polled are against NATO enlargement, there is no unambiguous picture of opinion. Therefore, to examine this problem in more details we analyzed the data of expert poll carried out by Russian Independent Institute of Social and National Problems in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Moscow Branch) at the April of 2001 (210 respondents were surveyed).

To reveal any variations in respondent's opinion we developed the typology of attitudes to NATO enlargement. Three questions were used:

- What Forms of European Security are Most Acceptable for Russia?
- How Russia Ought to React to the Second Stage of NATO Enlargement?
- Is it Important for Russia to Prevent NATO Enlargement?

The answers for these questions were as follows.

What Forms of European Security are Most Acceptable for Russia (%):

- Russia's inclusion into NATO	12
- Other forms (OSCE, etc.)	88
<hr/>	
Total	100

How Russia Ought to React to the Second Stage of NATO Enlargement (%):

- Tough reluctance to NATO enlargement	36
- To seek compromises with NATO	51
- To do nothing/ don't know	13
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Total	100

Is it Important for Russia to Prevent NATO Enlargement (%):

- Important	36
- Not important/ don't know	64
Total	100

We studied inter-relations between answers on these three questions (see appendix). The analysis of these inter-relations allowed creating the following typology.

1. Pro-NATO oriented persons	9%
2. Neutral persons	42%
3. Anti-NATO oriented persons	49%
Total	100%

Let us describe the polar types, pro- and anti-NATO oriented persons in more details, because the intermediate type includes pragmatics who share relatively moderate position in compare with others.

Pro-NATO oriented persons. The percentage is less than 1/10 of the total.

This type includes people who answered that Russia has to be included into NATO; it is not important to prevent NATO enlargement; and it is necessary to seek compromise with NATO concerning its enlargement (see table 3).

Table 3. Variations in opinion on forms of European security most acceptable for Russia; necessary reaction of Russia to NATO enlargement; and importance for Russia to prevent NATO enlargement (percentage)

Types	Percentage of every type	Those, who consider, that...		
		it is important to prevent NATO enlargement	Russia has to come into NATO	it is necessary to seek compromise with NATO
1. Pro-NATO oriented persons	9	0	100	87
2. Neutral persons	42	9	3	50
3. Anti-NATO oriented persons	49	67	0	41
In average	-	36	12	51

Being the same age as in average, they differ, first of all, in their political engagement - among them 30% are democrats, supporters of Yabloko and Union of Right Forces, while in average this percentage only 8% (almost in 4 times lower). Among them there are no allies of “Unity” (pro-Putin official faction in Duma), Communist party and Liberal-democrat party (Zhirinovsky), meantime the percentage in group’s average are 14% for these three political forces. The rest of respondent in type 1 have no certain political attitudes, that less than in average.

Estimation of the threats for Russia in international stage is also specific for the type 1. First of all, the respondents from this type scare significantly less jeopardy of world control from the USA and its allies - 30% against 51% in general. But then they see another threats for Russia - low competitiveness in the international markets (85% against 59%); large-scale technical emergencies (30% against 16%); illegal dissemination of nuclear weapons (20% against 12%).

They have the following view on Russia’s purposes in foreign affairs: 70% think that it is important to establish strategic partnership with USA³ (46% in average); and 50% - that comprehensive inclusion in “United Europe” is significant for Russia (36% in average). On the contrary, less than in average they oriented to creation partnership with leading Asia countries: ½ against 67% in average. Less than others they oriented towards prevention trend of globalization (20% against 44% in average).

They have their own vision of the goals of West’s policy towards Russia: only 30% think that the West strives to weakening geo-politic position of Russia

³ In Russia many people don’t distinct USA and NATO at all, supposing that this alliance fully control by USA without any independent position of European states. For example, V.Iluikhin, when it was attempt of impeachment for B.Eltsin’s impeachment in 1999, starting his speech with the following phrase: “Dear Deputies! I start to motivate charge to Boris Eltsin for impeachment. He signed Belovezh agreement and carried out his ongoing activities in the interests of NATO members, first of

independently of the domestic changes in it; and 45% don't share this statement (25% don't know). There is the opposite balance of views in average: 57% against 21% those who don't agree with the idea of the West "conspiracy" against Russia (22% don't know). In addition, pro-NATO respondents have their own vision of the key direction Russia-EU cooperation. They less oriented to "rise political level of contacts between Russia and EU" - only 20% against 39% in general. But they prefer "integration and commercialization of the R&D potential of the sides" - 50% against 19% in average, as well as they want to "develop military-industrial cooperation" - 40% against 30% and "develop cultural contacts and people diplomacy" - 40% against 26%.

As a result, they have the idea of Russia's integration as its perspective within Europe that fixed in table 4, where presenting answers on question "What position Russia will occupy in Europe in a nearest 10-15 years?".

Table 4. Variations in vision of Russia's place in Europe in a 10-15 years: opinions of respondents from different types (percentage).

Types	Russia's position in Europe in future of 10-15 years				Total
	Restoration of status of great power being outside Europe	It'll not be integrated and will turn into peripheral state	Integration in Europe being one of its leaders	Integration in Europe being one of the common states	
1. Pro-NATO oriented persons	5	25	35	35	100
2. Neutral persons	16	25	14	45	100
3. Anti-NATO oriented persons	32	22	15	31	100
In average	23	23	17	37	100

Only tiny amount of respondents in type 1 expects that Russia will restore its position of great power, almost in 5 times less than in general. They foresee that

all, in interests of USA" (Shorthand Record..., May 13, 1999). Therefore, to support NATO in Russia

country will integrate in Europe as one of the leader or common state. It is interesting, that leading opinion among pragmatics from type 2 is that Russia will integrate in Europe as one of the common state, while pro-NATO respondents expect that it'll integrate as leader or common state with equal probability (35%). They believe in Russia's leadership in Europe much more than others - the percentage is 2 times higher than in average.

Also it is significant variation in vision of the tools for improving position of Russia at the international stage. Only 5% among respondents from type 1 think that consolidation of society around President Putin, while in average this figure is 30%. On the contrary, large percentage of representatives in type 1 asserted that Russia can improve its status by means of political and economic integration with the West - 47%, against 30% in general. But then only 32% of pro-NATO respondents suppose to manipulate raw material resources to improve Russia's position in the world (52% in average); 74% that such a tool has to be science and educational potential of Russia (40% in average). Nobody in the first type asserts that it is necessary to restore old Soviet diplomatic "capital" (that is to say, to recover friendship with the old allies - Iraq, Cuba, Northern Korea, etc.) as an instrument for improvement Russia's position against 13% in average. The similar picture is in the realm of domestic political tools of improvement Russia's position: among pro-NATO persons no those who orient to dictatorship (3% - in average) and only 25% suppose that authoritarian power could improve position of Russia (47% - in general). The most of them sure that democracy is the key instrument for overcoming crisis in the country.

We described this type with many figures, but it is very hard to present the activity of the persons of this type in operation, because there is the sophisticated

thing to find open statements in media and political debates loyal to NATO in Russia at the moment. Here we present only a few indirect declarations concerning that it is necessary to change the preconceived attitude to this organization. For example, I.Hakamada argued at presentation, that it is impossible for Russia to have normal development without optimization relations with Japan and change permanent negative attitude to NATO. She mentioned that it is necessary to stop scare USA, which fear not strong but weak Russia (Hakamada, 2001). U.Davydov (Academician of the Academy of Military Sciences), answering to the question “Is the charge to NATO in aggressive planes motivate?” mentioned: “NATO is the alliance based at the certain values, and I think, that we hesitate all the time not by chance: we obviously understand that probably we must join it. If it is aggressive alliance we don’t agree to take part in it” (U.Davydov, 2001).

Since the idea of NATO enlargement is unpopular in Russia, the voices of those who have another opinion sound moderately at the moment, as contrasted with the polar type - **anti-NATO** oriented persons, who suppose that it is important to prevent NATO enlargement in tough manner (49% among people polled).

The large percentage - 22% - among them support communist-patriotic forces (Communist Party of Russia, “Unity”, Liberal-democratic Party), while supporters of democratic groups in minority (5% against 30% in the first type).

They charged by the threat of world control from the USA and its allies - 62% against 51% in general and 30% at the side of persons in type 1. Less than ½ of them worry about Russia’s low competitiveness in the international markets (85% within type 1 and 59% in general) and increasing gap between Russia and West in the realm of technology (65% - type 1 and 55% in average). As per view of the persons in type 3, the most important threat for Russia now is NATO enlargement - 70% mentioned it

among the most serious danger, while only 35% in type 1 and 53% in general. In compare with this, only 15% in type 3 specified China expansion as the important threat and 10% - uncontrolled dissemination of the nuclear weapons.

Estimating NATO enlargement as the key threat for Russia now, they specify the following goals for Russia's international policy. First of all - establishing strategic partnership with leading Asia states (China and India) - 78% against 50% within type 1 and 67% in general. Another important purpose among their priorities is protection of ethnical Russian population in CIS countries - 72% against 45% for type 1 and 57% in average. And at least, the third important goal is the direct prevention of NATO enlargement - 67%, while zero for type 1 and 36% in general.

The greater part of anti-NATO oriented persons (71%) sure that the West strives to weaken Russia against 30% for type 1 and 57% in average. In Russia-EU relations they first of all interest (if we compare with type 1) in overcoming discrimination in trade (62% against 45% for type 1 and 55% in average). They have less interest in "integration and commercialization of the R&D potential of the sides" - 13% against 50% for type 1 and 19% in average, and they do not want to "develop military-industrial cooperation" - 25% against 40% in type 1 and 30% in general. As well they do not want to "develop cultural contacts and people diplomacy" - 20% against 40% for type 1 and 26% in general.

They believe that the key tool for improving Russia's status at the international stage is manipulation of raw material resources - 63% (32% for type 1 and 52% in average). They don't believe that it is possible to reach this goal by means of integration with the West (22% against 47% for type 1 and 30% in general) and using the scientific and educational potential of Russia (37% against 74% for type 1 and 40% in average). On the contrary, they believe that it is possible to improve

Russia's position in the world via arms trade - 44% against 26% in type 1 and 33% in general. 1/3 among them also supposes that consolidation around President Putin could be the factor of improvement Russia's position (5% for type 1 and 30% in average).

Since they are going to use so specific tools for improving Russia's status in the world, then they have contradictory expectation on future of the country. As per question of the Russia's perspective within Europe in a nearest 10-15 years, they "split". Little bit less than 1/3 among them think that Russia will restore status of great power and politically being outside Europe; and almost the same percentage suppose that Russia will integrate into Europe as one of the common states (see table 4).

Their voices sound aloud in Russian political stage at the moment. For example: "There are no reasons for Russia's support NATO enlargement to the East. Moreover, new doctrine of this alliance, operating in conflict with Yugoslavia, enforces Russia to elaborate tough position without any compromises in prevention NATO diffusion around the planet" (from the division "Peaceful State" of Program for political movement "Otechestvo", headed by Luzhkov and Primakov). As per presentation in State Duma of A.Mikhailov: "I'd like to talk that the perspective of the second wave of NATO enlargement we meet now draw those, who wanted to finally destroy our economy and national sovereignty, near achieving this goal" (Shorthand Record..., May 19, 2000). Deputy of State Duma N. Ryzhkov (former Prime minister in Gorbachev period): "If we don't issue this decision (inclusion Yugoslavia into Union Russia and Belarus - L.K.), and do not establish this new Union, we'll have very sad future. And not only our future, but perspective for another country too. First or last they'll singly destroy or occupy us" (Shorthand Record..., April 16, 1999).

M.Leontiev, commentator at ORT TV (first channel), mockingly mentioned in his program “Odnako” (However): “However, there is the problem preventing NATO expansion in post-Soviet space. Military contingents from civilized wealthy states are extremely sissy. And view of our simple field toilet can destroy big divisions. Thus, absence of the necessary comfort may be the most effective obstacle of NATO enlargement” (Leontiev, 2001).

In these and many other statements we can find, that, of course, one or another attitude to NATO is only the part of the attitude to the West in general. And those who want that Russia in 21 century will integrate into the West have pro-NATO position. On the contrary, those who suppose that Russia has to follow its own distinctive line, have obvious anti-NATO position (see table 5).

Table 5. Variations in vision of best Russia’s strategy in 21 century: opinions of respondents from different types (percentage).

Best Russia’s strategy in 21 century is	Types			Total
	1. Pro-NATO oriented persons	2. Neutral persons	3. Anti-NATO oriented persons	
Specific “Russian way” alternative to the Western line	4	32	64	100
Integration with the leading Western countries and refusal of “syndrome of distinctiveness”	18	49	33	100
In average	9	42	49	100

Except view on Russia’s future, there are many other factors of the attitude in question. One of the most important is public opinion on NATO enlargement.

4. Attitude of Population to NATO Enlargement as a Factor of the Elite's Position

One of the new features of Putin Presidency (in compare with Eltsin's period) is a sensitive enough attention to public opinion, to that fact, in what manner the population perceives his policy - both domestic, and foreign. Continuous Putin's trips in the peripheral regions and his meetings with representatives of different layers of the population testify this, first. This fact is testified also by his statements in TV, where considerable place occupies problems of social policy, such as, for example, pension reform. Therefore, considering the attitude of Russian elite to NATO, it is necessary to take into account that this attitude dependent of the public opinion.

Moreover, he develops his policy taking into account population reaction and behavior. It is known, that in the very mechanism of Putin's advent to power just the orientation of his "advent-to-power designers" ("Eltsin's clan") toward actions, which are adequate to expectations of the population, played not the least role. The Chechen factor was one of the "painful points" of mass consciousness: the population was indignant concerning failures of all the operations of the Russian army in Chechnya. The most sensitive string of "Russian soul" was touched - conviction in invincibility of Russian weapon. The population perceived the failure of Yeltsin's policy in Chechnya very painfully. Therefore, "Eltsin's clan" promoted Putin as that man, who is capable to reach victory in the "strange war", to defend honor of the Russian weapon. This example shows, that Putin and his team originally are not deaf to public opinion, and, on the contrary, are sensitive to it.

To the full, it concerns also problem “Russia and NATO”. This is one of those questions in international policy, which Soviet/Russian elite traditionally decided concerning public opinion. However, it is clear, that this opinion arises completely not spontaneously, and is formed by authorities. Nevertheless, creating the necessary public opinion, the authorities motive its further political steps by this opinion.

Taking this into account, let’s examine perception of NATO by Russian population.

Table 6. Estimation of NATO by the population of Russia in 1997 and 2000: the aggressive force or defense alliance? (percentage)*

NATO is	Date of the poll:	
	1997	2000
Aggressive force	38	56
Defense alliance	24	17
Don’t know	38	27
Total	100	100

* Source: Surveys of the Foundation “Public Opinion” in 1997 and 2000; representative sample, 1500 respondents (“We and NATO”, 2000).

According to data of 1997 poll, large percentage, 38%, were those who didn’t declare certain opinion, while the same proportion answered that NATO is aggressive force; and little bit less than ¼ estimated it as the defense alliance. In short, there was relatively little gap between weights of various positions. Further this changed: throughout the period of 1997-2000 it was significant decrease of those who have uncertain position and significant increase percentage of people estimated NATO as aggressive force (in 1.5 times); and only 1/6 perceived it as defense alliance. The key event during this period that turned public opinion, was conflict in Yugoslavia.

The leading views were that NATO is the principal perpetrator in the Balkan war and its activities threaten to national security of Russia (table 7). These views have been changed during period from April to June of 1999, and after the acute

phase of the conflict still approximately stable. But in spite of these changes the principal priorities in people's opinion were just the same.

Table 7. Estimation of the guilty in the military conflict in Balkans and opinion on influence of NATO activity to Russia's national security in April and June of 1999 (percentage)*

Who is guilty in Balkan's conflict	Date of the polls	
	April 1999	June 1999
NATO	63	49
Yugoslavia	7	11
Both sides	13	17
Don't know	17	23
Total	100	100
NATO activities in Yugoslavia		
Threatening Russia's security	70	64
Do not threatening Russia's security	19	24
Don't know	11	12
Total	100	100

* Source: Surveys of the Foundation "Public Opinion" in April and June of 1999; representative sample, 1500 respondents (Balkan's Crises..., 1999)

We do not want to examine the reasons for these views⁴, because it is out of the task for this paper, but fears of Russian public concerning NATO and its activity in Yugoslavia - now it is a reality which Russian elite has to take into account in any case.

However, these fears do not fully reverse the common sense of Russian public. This conclusion is due to analysis of people's position on problem whether it is necessary to cooperate with NATO. The answers on question asked at July of 1999:

⁴ Some experts mentioned that this was because of powerful propaganda drive, hiding information of the Miloshević guilty, and etc. - see: Yugoslavian Crisis..., 1999

“Battle NATO-Yugoslavia already has been stopped. How do you think, is it ought for Russia to enforce cooperation with NATO or it isn’t necessary?” were as follows⁵:

- Necessary	45%
- Not necessary	32%
- Don’t know	23%
Total	100%

More percentage of publics wanted to develop cooperation between Russia and NATO. This means that Russians even so strive to contacts with NATO not to force confrontation.

The “level of misgiving” directly depends on the trust: if people entrust to any organization of political/defense force, they do not scare it. Therefore, we attracted the data whether public trust NATO and what it is the rate of this confidence. To analysis correctly, it is necessary to compare trust to NATO with the confidence to another international organizations (see table 8).

Table 8. The rate of public trusts to some international organizations in 2000 (percentage)*

International organizations	Rate of trust				Total
	Trust completely	Trust in certain rate	Do not trust	Don’t know	
The European Union	2	38	27	33	100
UN	2	42	31	25	100
NATO	0	21	59	20	100

* Source: Public opinion survey carried out by ROMIR in April of 2000; representative sample, 1500 respondents (Insofar Russians Trust..., 2000)

This poll has showed two problems. First, the population is rather badly informed in this realm: from 1/5 to 1/3 of respondents has no idea about their attitudes to these organizations. Second, the level of trust to NATO in comparison with trust to

⁵ Source: Russia and NATO..., 1999

other international organizations is the lowest: the percentage of not trusting NATO is 1,5 – 2 times exceeds this parameter for EU and UN. This picture correlate with forgoing public estimation of NATO as aggressive alliance that doesn't deserve the confidence.

Hence, we can expect that public, do not trusting NATO as an aggressive organization, fears its expansion to the East. To confirm or to approve this statement we have two groups of data on enlargement. The first one is about potential threat for Russia because NATO enlargement to the East in general. The second is on attitude to including former East and Central European socialist countries - Poland, Hungary, and Check republic.

Firstly, answers on question “What do you think, whether NATO enlargement to the East in general threatening Russia?” are as follows⁶:

- Threatening	66%
- Does not threatening	14%
<u>- Don't know</u>	<u>20%</u>
Total	100%

Obviously, 2/3 among Russian public supposes that NATO expansion is jeopardy for Russia. Of course, almost nobody can explain the reasons and mechanism for this threat. Moreover, nobody seriously discuss why and how this jeopardy could transform into real military conflict. As a rule, there is the following logic, showed by V. Shurygin in his article “They Will Bomb Us in the Same Manner...”: “Sincerely talking, Russia has to establish monument to Serbia. And not only because of its courage and stability in battle with NATO legions, but first of all, because self-sacrificing Serbia in fact saves Russia. It obviously, in details, shows

⁶ Source: Russia and NATO..., 1999

HOW NATO prepares to fight in 21st Century. Moreover, we have to refuse on illusions WHO is the enemy for NATO in the beginning of the third millenium. It's enough to see the vector of NATO's pace, which comply with well-known "Drung nach Osten": Poland, Hungary, Check Republic. Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia are in the line. NATO crawls up to Russia's borders. Serbia - it is only rehearsal before Russia..." (Shurygin, 1999).

For those among forgoing two thirds not necessary any real proofs to believe that there is the real jeopardy of hold up to Russia at the side of NATO. This is the ideological prejudice generated both Soviet legacy and complex of national inferiority provoked by post-Soviet Russia's failures in the realm of politics and economy.

Secondly, there are the data on attitude to East and Central European countries inclusion due to answers on the following question: "The former socialist countries Hungary, Check Republic and Poland became the members of the NATO. What do you think, whether this membership in NATO increased or not increased the threat of war for Russia?"

- Threat increased	64%
- Threat didn't increased	17%
- Don't know	19%
<hr/> Total	100

In general we have almost the same distribution of answers that it was for forgoing question: almost 2/3 among people polled suppose that it is military jeopardy for Russia because of inclusion East and Central European countries into NATO.

Thus, NATO has the "image of enemy" for public in Russia. To analyze this phenomenon we must take into account that the Russian state has huge historical experience in manipulating people's mind, educating the population in hostile attitude to those or other states, social groups and some personalities "at the discretion" of

authorities. This mechanism was fulfilled Stalin on an example of so called “trotskists”, “bukharinists” and others numerous “public enemies”, the struggle with which fills all history of USSR. It seems Putin uses this mechanism too. He uses it to challenge indignation of the people of the country with those or other actions of those or other forces inside the country or in other countries, and to motive necessary reaction of the state. In these cases, the authority informs the population about those or other anti-Russian actions of foreign politicians or organizations, about those or others “non-patriotic” actions of any Russian citizens (for example, scientists, collaborating with Western colleagues). This allows the state to arrange on suppression: to start cases, to conduct ideological drives aimed to challenge answer-back reactions of the people.

In a current situation this mechanism operates almost in the similar manner as half-century ago: “the common folk” receive a signal, understand this signal and adequately react to it. For example, if they start cases against the scientists for their contacts to West – the cooperation with the West is a display of animosities to Russia. The authority is directing the population who exactly is its enemy, and the population forms appropriate settings.

Thus, the animosities to the West, on the one hand, are derivative from a situation inside Russia (economic difficulties, poverty of the population), and on the other hand - product of governing the society by the state.

The efficiency of this governance, that is success of authority in education of the society in the spirit of animosities to the West, will depend on the following: whether the economy will be increasing, or, on the contrary, there will be an economic stagnation; whether the elements of democracy will be kept, or, on the

⁷ Source: Former Socialist Countries Inclusion into NATO, 1999

contrary, they definitively “will be eliminated”; whether the corruption will decrease or it will remain at a present level; whether the criminality will be or will not be reduced; in what way the Chechen question will be solved, and etc.

Since the political elite is not homogeneous, its influence on public opinion concerning the West is not identical for different layers of the elite.

Concerning the force of influence, today the first rank occupies the President (him trusts 36 % of the population of the country at the end of June of 2001); second rank – communists (13 % - Zuiganov). To politicians of democratic orientation (Yavlinsky, Nemtsov) trust between 3 to 6% of the population (Ratings of Trust/Distrust..., 2001). Accordingly, their influence on public opinion is actually unimportant. Since communist opposition today is weak, and in the basic questions they maintain authority, it is possible to say, that exactly the authority defines (and will define further) state of political consciousness of the most population.

Explaining public attitude to NATO enlargement to the East, especially incorporation states of former USSR into alliance, we must take into account people's opinion on disintegration of the USSR. It is a deep and not passing regret concerning its disintegration: 79 % of the polled people answered “I regret” on the question “Do you personally regret or do not about disintegration of the USSR?” as per data generated by Foundation “Public Opinion” in March, 2001 (Restoration of the USSR..., 2001). In this paper it isn't necessary to study the factors of this opinion, it is important to declare that the public feeling of damage because of the USSR disintegration is the reality for Russian society. And NATO enlargement fixes this reality making it inconvertible. Inclusion states of former USSR into NATO transforms idea of Soviet Union restoration in complete utopia.

Of course, though Mr. Putin answered “Why not?” on the question about possibility of Russia’s coming into NATO, after all in this case Russia wouldn’t lose the contacts with its traditional allies and, simultaneously, didn’t find real new supporters. Everybody in Russia and many abroad understand that this event isn’t a problem of current real policy but question of the intellectual speculations. For example, estimating this possibility in the interview (the question was “Is it real for Russia to come to NATO?”) A.Golts argued: “Some years ago NATO formulated criterion for those who want to come to NATO. It is true, that Russia doesn’t meet many of them, that is to say, transparency of all military activity, as well as clear civil control under military in general” (“Is it real for Russia to come to NATO?”, 2001). And as per S.Karaganov statement when he answered to the same question: “It would be possible, if the new generation of politicians, who oriented to strategic but not tactic decisions, come to power in Russia and in NATO. However, President of Russia told several times, that our key claim to NATO is that they don’t want to include us”. And Russian population understands that it is not real for Russia to come into NATO in near future as well. Only Communists pretended that they perceive Putin’s answer seriously as the motive for safe criticism. G.Ziuganov mentioned that “This statement witnesses on Mr. Putin’s line of mind and it rises the deep trouble. And his further prompt disclaimer enforces the perception of instability and impermissible light-mindedness in statement producing by leader of Government in the realm of global importance... Putin, talking about his acceptance to be included in NATO, in fact, rejects the arguments against joining to this hostile to Russia alliance at the side of another competitors, such as Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Georgia, and etc. Where then will occur the border of NATO? And what will be the development of our cooperation with the countries of the East, many of those roughly criticize NATO,

because they truly believe this alliance is the direct threat for their interests, international order and independence of the countries and peoples?” (Antokhin, 2000). He and his supporters understand that this was only political rhetoric and there were no initiations of any action in Duma or in other establishments.

However, it seems the reaction of Russian elite to further specific steps in the path of NATO enlargement, will not be only the rhetoric.

5. Russia’s Response: Possible Scenarios

There is no officially declared plan for prevention NATO enlargement to the East. The indirect witness is the fact that State Duma recently (end of May) in its resolution has required from President Putin to elaborate specific plan for prevention NATO expansion. Duma wanted that Putin obliges Government to expand activity concerning prevention NATO enlargement to the East. Duma banned its mission in Parliament Assembly of NATO to stop participation in sessions carried out within the territory of states-competitors to inclusion into NATO. The most anxiety Duma expressed regarding Baltic States further coming to alliance (Requirement for Vladimir Putin..., 2001).

In spite of the absence officially declared plan for prevention NATO enlargement there are many proposals how to do it, circulating within the public, experts and politicians. For example, Foundation “Public Opinion” carried out public opinion poll with question on such proposals in July 1999. People answered on question: “If you suppose that NATO enlargement to the East led to the jeopardy for Russia, what it is necessary to do to prevent this threat?” in the following manner *:

- Russia should not admit expansion of NATO to the East by political and diplomatic actions	25%
- Russia should be ready to repel the threat of NATO by a military force	22%
- Russia should create a defensive union with the states, operating outside NATO	16%
- There is no threat for Russia from NATO	11%
- Russia should come to NATO	5%
- Don't know	21%
<hr/> Total	100%

Source: Proposals for Prevention..., 1999;

As it is obvious, the population of the country is rather strongly varied regarding to the question, how is necessary to react to expansion of NATO to the East. In the answers, both supporters of force reaction and of political actions, both supporters of individual and collective actions are presented; alongside with the supporters of defensive actions - the supporters of entering NATO have become known. Such a variety of opinions mean, that the Russian State can not conduct policy on behalf of the whole society when the lack of social consensus. It can be guided not by any stable national principles (which while is not present), but only by those or other current reasons, by circumstances of the current moment.

As we presented foregoing there is the large variation of opinion on NATO expansion among the Russian elite too. However, some "points of consensus" there are. For example, the most of actors agree that the turning point will be reached when countries of former USSR come into NATO. A. Avdeev, the First Deputy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, presenting at the Session of Duma at May 19, 2000, declared this as follows: "It is still operates the principle stated by Primakov Eugene Maksimonich in course of talks on Primary Act, that NATO expansion across the "red line", that is to say inclusion former republics of Soviet Union into alliance, will

destroy the background of Primary Act and led to the radical changes in our relations with the alliance” (Shorthand Record..., May 19, 2000).

We analyzed many specific proposals on prevention NATO enlargement generated by the members of Russian elite. Really, there are the significant variations in this ensemble, including as moderate actions in the realm of diplomacy, as well as radical ones. It is possible to divide them into three scenarios of activity differing of the rate of radicalism.

The first scenario will include is the mild action (“mild” scenario); **the second one** will include the tough response (“tough” scenario); and **the third scenario** will include the military response (“military scenario”). Any of these scenarios may to carry out in case of the specific steps of inclusion Baltic States into NATO.

Let us describe these scenarios in details.

Mild scenario.

The supposed actions within this scenario are likely similar that already done against NATO, but operating more intensively.

This scenario would include four groups of activity.

First, the ideological drive in media - TV, press, radio, and Internet. The key direction of this drive would be the development of “image of enemy”, that NATO has plan to occupy Russia, to built the “sanitary cordon” around the country, and etc. Simultaneously, the syndrome of “precipitated fortress” would be emerging in the public opinion, because “the enemy near our borders”. The second line would be the plot of the “salvation of ethnical Russians in Baltic States”. Now this is relatively outlying idea of Russian public opinion and among foreign policy priorities. As a result, it is expected the significant changes in public opinion. We can expect that

problem of NATO enlargement and its consequences for Russia during several months would be the key task for top media corporations (ORT, RTR, and NTV). Obviously, not only communist and nationalist commentators would take part in this drive, but some current democrats too. And if now 49% among the elite and near 2/3 of the population are against NATO enlargement at the moment, after this drive near 2/3 of elite and 80-90% among the population become anti-NATO persons.

Second, the activity of some social and political forces - parties, movements and groups. Probably, the most of the known parties and groups would issue the appropriate anti-NATO resolutions. Moreover, political forces of every line, including some democratic ones would issue such resolutions. Probably, not only political parties and groups will issue appropriate resolutions, but such organizations as Russian Orthodox Church, which is now formulating its attitude (Russian Orthodox Church Has to Elaborate..., 2001). Taking into account traditional relations between authorities and church in Russia and its current state, we can forecast that this attitude will be rather negative towards NATO expansion. As per extremist groups (for example, Limonov's national-bolsheviks, Anpilpov's "Trudovaya Rossia (Labor Russia)", some young communist/komsomol groupings), they will show much more activity than formal resolutions. They'll manage the picket lines and mass-meetings near embassies of state NATO-member (first of all - USA) and of Baltic States. Moreover, we can expect some terrorist actions as it was against USA embassy while bombing of Yugoslavia (by the way, the person who tried to shoot to USA embassy was sculptor Alexander Suslikov, the creator of statue "Our response to NATO" expressed man with grenade launcher - see: Sculpture "Our Response to NATO"..., 2001).

Third, we can intend the activity of the State Duma - one or several sessions and some resolutions. Many extremist presentations with radical requirements and treatments would be the production. Two groups of resolutions we can expect: 1) requirements to executive authorities “to do something” and 2) to some other countries and international organizations such as “Union Russia-Belarus” or to develop anti-NATO activity. The efficiency of Duma’s operation in this realm will be, probably, low. Sure, this activity becomes the cause of media’s drive but not. Maximum it is possible to issue resolution for Russia to stop program on partnership with NATO and shut NATO’s information bureau (the similar requirement was already formulated by G.Zuiganov who asked Putin do not restore contacts with NATO and do not permit establishment of information bureau, because this isn’t the bureau for data collection, but department for “intelligence service and propaganda” - Zuiganov..., 2000).

Four, development military and economic cooperation between Russia and other states of former USSR, as well as cooperation (first of all - military cooperation) between Russia and leading Asian states. Maybe the main line here is the promotion “Shanghai 6” - newly established military-strategic alliance of Russia and Asian states as well as development of three-sided relations between Russia, China and India. As we mentioned forgoing, military cooperation between Russia and Asian states now is on the high level and includes many forms (such as training of officer-commandos for armies of CIS and China - In City of Riazan Graduated..., 2001). And we can expect that this cooperation will be expanded further.

Meanwhile, the key feature of the mild scenario is ignoring or insignificant participation of the executive authorities in its implementation.

Tough scenario.

Another story is the tough scenario, which would be developed under the leadership of executive authorities. Probably, it'll include the following actions.

First, elaboration the plan for prevention of NATO enlargement and officially (or semi-officially) declared it by executive authorities (for example, by Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Ministry of Defense). This will raise the problem of stopping NATO expansion at the level of task for the whole Government, both federal and local branches.

Second, implementation of partial censorship in TV and press in behalf of filtration the facts, included alternative, non-official point of view on the realm of the NATO enlargement and the activity of NATO in general.

Third, military integration between Russia, China and India, in particular, carries out joint military maneuvers and other joint military activities. Possibly, this would include some new agreements between Russia and two other sides in military-strategic realm. As a result we can expect in the future creation special united military forces ("Eurasian military forces" or the like) containing contingents from these three (maybe more, than three) sides, as an alternative NATO armed forces⁸.

Four, return nuclear weapons to Belarus. It is possible to do it promptly because necessary infrastructure and troops were saved. Such ideas already have been stated in Duma. For example, Deputy N.M.Bezborodov, presenting proposals of the Deputy group "Narodovlatie", suggested to manage consultations with leaders of Belarus to locate there such weapons (Shorthand Record..., March 27, 1999). It is true, that Belarus military officials refused similar ideas, but the fact of such discussions enforce to seriously regard statements in this realm (for example, Ural

⁸ By the way, in the report "Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts", prepared by National Intelligence Council in collaboration with US Government specialists and many experts outside the government at the end of 2000, was forecasted that China, India, and Russia form a geo-strategic alliance in an attempt to counterbalance US and Western influence.

Latypov, Minister of Foreign affairs, visiting Berlin in March of 2000, said, that because the lack of nuclear weapon status of Belarus fixed in the Constitution, there will no such arms in Belarus in future - It Will No Nuclear Weapons..., 2000).

Five, Real exit or official threat of denunciation by Russia some international agreements, first of all those which regulate the regime for dissemination of arms of mass destruction. Such proposals also sounded in State Duma (Deputy A.V.Mitrofanov: "Real methods for prevention second wave of NATO enlargement are clear statements addressed to the Wets, for example, whether we ready to exit of regulation for rocket's non-dissemination. This may threaten them!" - Shorthand Record of Plenary Session..., May 19, 2000).

Carry out tough scenario would bring another results that implementation of mild scenario. In spite of tough scenario, obviously, also cannot stop NATO enlargement and, on the contrary, urgently will force Baltic States to compete to come into alliance, it'll create dramatically another relations Russia-West than it is now.

And at least, **military scenario**.

Potentially, it is possible to expect the following steps within this scenario.

First, implementation two ideological drives: 1) anti-NATO drive ("enemy near our borders") and 2) drive "nostalgia of USSR", including necessity to save ethnical Russian in Baltic States who are in jeopardy because of NATO enlargement. As a result - declaration policy "recovering USSR by every methods".

Second, destabilizing the situation in Baltic States using groupings of radical nationalists in Russia and some movements operating in these states. Presenting some territorial claims for Baltic States and announcement some economic sanctions.

Third, military occupation. In spite this sounds as complete fantasy, some statements related with it, were declared. For example, Governor of near border

Pskov's oblast, Mr. E.Mikhailov stated in interview for Estonian newspaper "Eesti Paevaleht" that Pskov's commandos could occupy Estonia during forty eight hours, motivating this that NATO already operates via Latvia and Estonia (Pskov's Governor..., 2000).

The mild scenario has some odds for carrying out. The tough one has very small odds and the last one, military scenario is almost fantasy. It is possible that really will be conducted some mixture of first and second scenarios, relating with the specific changes of domestic position of Russia as well as its international status. As per the third scenario, it may be implement when the combination of many unfavorable factors: acute domestic economic recession; tough debt's pressure at the side of the West; significant fall of prices on raw materials at the international markets; closing West banking and financial system to the flight of Russian capitals; and approaching President elections in Russia.

Conclusion

Analyzing possible behavior of Russian elite, it is necessary to take into account that it occupies the contradictory position. In the one hand, it declared the adherence to values of democracy and market economy and tried to follow them in practice. In the other hand, during the attempt of transformation elite accumulated the vast and painful experience showing that utilization new values led to many failures in Russia. However, Russian elite so far does not want to refuse from elements of democracy and market economy that exist in Russia at the moment. NATO enlargement is one of the most dramatic tests for the strength of these elements in last several years. It seems that finally Russia can overcome it successfully.

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Appendix

Typology of Respondents Differing by Their Attitudes to NATO enlargement: Steps of Creation

Step 1: Analysis of the relation between indicators “Importance of prevention NATO enlargement” and “What forms of European security are more suitable for Russia”.

Importance of prevention NATO enlargement	What forms of European security are more suitable for Russia		Total
	Inclusion Russia into NATO	Other forms	
	1	2	
1. Important	4	96	100
2. Not important	17	83	100
In average	12	88	100

We made the preliminary classification:

1 - pro-NATO persons - 2,1 - those who answered that it is not important to prevent NATO enlargement and desire to join Russia to NATO (**11%**).

2 - neutral persons - 1,1 + 2,2 - those who answered that it is important to prevent NATO enlargement and desire to join Russia to NATO or those who answered that it is not important to prevent NATO enlargement and not desire to join Russia to NATO. They have contradictory position, have no certain idea to prevent NATO or do not (**54%**).

3 - anti-NATO persons - those who answered that it is important to prevent NATO enlargement and do not desire to join Russia to NATO (**39%**).

Step 2: Analysis of the relation between the preliminary classification and opinion how Russia has to react on the second stage of NATO enlargement.

Preliminary classification	How Russia has to react on the second stage of NATO enlargement			Total
	To resist	To find compromise	To do nothing	
	1	2	3	
1. Pro-NATO	13	87	0	100
2. Neutral	31	50	19	100
3. Anti-NATO	51	41	8	
In average	36	51	13	100

We created the final typology:

1 - pro-NATO persons - 1,2 - those who want to find compromise on NATO enlargement; those who indicated as pro-NATO in preliminary classification, but answered that Russia has to resist NATO expansion, were excluded from class “pro-NATO persons” (9%).

2 - neutral persons - 1,1 + 2,2 + 2,3 + 3,3 - those who occupied uncertain and contradictory positions or being neutral or anti-NATO persons in preliminary classification answered that Russia has to do nothing (42%).

3 - anti-NATO persons - those who answered that Russia has to resist to NATO enlargement being neutral or anti-NATO persons in preliminary classification (49%).