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ETHNIC CONFLICT AND THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION:
EVALUATING NATO'S USE OF COERCIVE DIPLOMACY IN MANAGING PROTRACTED INTRASTATE CRISES IN BOSNIA AND KOSOVO

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ETHNIC CONFLICT AND THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION:

EVALUATING NATO'S USE OF COERCIVE DIPLOMACY IN MANAGING PROTRACTED INTRASTATE CRISES IN BOSNIA AND KOSOVO

CHAPTER 1

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES, LITERATURE REVIEW AND FRAMEWORK

The level of ethnic violence in the Balkans (Bosnia, Slovenia, Croatia, Kosovo), Africa (Rwanda, Zaire, Somalia, Sierra Leon), the Middle East and Asia appears to be rising at a time when traditional Cold War impediments to third-party intervention and mediation are falling. It remains unclear, however, whether the post-Cold War environment is improving the capacity of third-parties to manage ethnic conflict, or whether it simply exacerbates ethnic division and violence. The outlook is not promising, to say the least. Evidence from the most recent case of protracted ethnic violence in the former Yugoslavia (especially Bosnia and Kosovo) appears to confirm suspicions that international organisations like NATO and the United Nations are not easily mobilised to handle these newly developing threats. The academic and policy communities, unfortunately, are not well equipped to provide persuasive answers to pressing questions about the onset, escalation and resolution of ethnic conflicts. There still is no definitive evidence on when and under what conditions third-parties should intervene in a coercive way to prevent ethnic tensions from escalating out of control, or how to manage crises when they do? Nor do we understand the conditions under which deterrent and compellent threats issued by single states or coalition (like NATO) will succeed or fail in this setting, or how credibility, resolve and capability of third parties can be enhanced?

With this in mind, the challenge of this project was to advance basic research on questions about early warning, preventive diplomacy and the management of ethnic violence, with specific emphasis on recent cases involving NATO. Unfortunately, scholarship on ethnic conflict continues to theorise in terms of primordialism, ethnonationalism and ethnic mobilisation. A review of the literature on ethnic conflict would no doubt produce an assortment of competing explanations for this kind of violence -- *primordial drives* (Geertz 1973; Isaacs 1975; Smith 1981, 1986; Stack 1981, 1986, 1994; Valdez 1994), the *fear* of being marginalised and driven to extinction (Azar and Haddad 1986; Horowitz 1985), *elite mobilization* (Barth 1969; Bell 1975; Rothschild 1981; Nagel and Olzak 1982; Olzak 1983; Neilson 1985; Zald and McCarthy 1987), *relative deprivation* and *subordination* of ethnic groups in pluralist societies (Furnivall 1948; Gellner 1964; M.Smith 1965; Gurr 1970, 1991; Hechter 1975; Despres 1976; Horowitz 1985), or structural factors like *modernisation* (Melson and Wolpe 1970; Connor 1972; See O'Sullivan 1986; Metcalf 1994), *geographic proximity* of ethnic enclaves (Horowitz 1985; Mason 1994), *territorial apportionment* (James 1994), the failure of *political institutions* to accommodate ethnic groups (Marshall 1994), and

so on. While these psychological, social, historical, and structural factors account for the motivations behind demands for political, social or territorial separation based on a distinct national identity, and while they may help to explain why each side is prepared to fight (that is, root cause explanations), they are not sufficient to explain the escalation or duration of ethnic violence in most cases. Only situational factors tied to diplomatic and strategic decisions by political and military officials on all sides of these dispute can explain the protracted nature of the fighting – i.e., the escalation, intensity and duration of the war, or the *conflict profile*. The proposed program of research will explore the protracted nature of ethnic violence through this prism.

Therefore, there are two interrelated objectives: (1) to explore the nature of ethnic conflict escalation, de-escalation and resolution in the FormerYugoslavia, and to compare these cases with others characterised by this type of rivalry in other regions. The purpose here is to compile and synthesise data and evidence on coercive diplomatic successes and failures in these disputes using a new *protracted crisis* framework (described below), and (2) to produce policy relevant work on peacemaking and peacebuilding as related to preventive diplomacy and third-party mediation. Each of these two objectives is explained in more detail below.

1.1 New "Protracted Crisis" Framework of Analysis

The most prominent method of producing evidence to evaluate the utility of coercive diplomacy (particularly in the forms of deterrence and compellence, but not limited to them) recommends identifying foreign policy crises in which these strategies were used, coding these cases as instances of success or failure, isolating conditions that were present during successes (or absent during failures) and, based on differences across cases, drawing conclusions about why and how different coercive strategies work. Unfortunately, there is very little agreement in the literature on the relevant cases to examine, or, if agreement on a particular case is reached, how it should be coded. This is a key area of difficulty confronting those who apply the dominant *success-failure* framework. As revealed by ongoing disputes in the literature, these "empirical" problems are seldom resolved with reference to the historical record.

In sum, an approach that codes crises as single encounters is not likely to produce definitive evidence regarding the utility of coercive diplomacy, simply because there are too many opportunities, throughout a typical crisis, to provide different interpretations of events and outcomes. While debates over the accuracy of historical accounts are constructive, lingering divisions slow the progress towards (a) developing testing strategies that lie outside the existing *success/failure* framework, (b) finding alternate sources of empirical evidence, or (c) identifying a wider range of propositions about effective strategies. The proposed project will attempt to accomplish all of these interrelated tasks by generating a more authoritative body of evidence on the subject, and by testing key propositions about successful diplomacy and mediation.

The key weakness with the dominant *success-failure* framework is that researchers are forced to code crises as though they encompass a single, dominant exchange (i.e., as individual data points). Decisions have to be

made about who the *challenger* and *defender* are in each case, but since most military-security crises involve a series of interactions or exchanges, with each side (and their respective clients) acquiring and playing the role of defender and challenger at various stages, disagreements about who initiated the "crisis" are common. Researchers must also establish whether the threats *succeeded* or *failed*, but most crises exhibit properties of both types of outcomes over time, given the number of interactions that take place during a typical international dispute. Carefully separating threat / counter-threat sequences in order to accurately identify challengers, defenders and outcomes is difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish with any degree of empirical precision, especially when one has to code the entire crisis as a single case, as the dominant approach recommends.

Events during the Cuban Missile crisis serve to illustrate the problems with coding entire crises as single data points. The 1962 crisis can be regarded as a general deterrence failure (the crisis should not have occurred in the context of a general, mutual nuclear deterrent threat), an immediate deterrence failure, an immediate deterrence success, and an immediate compellence success. As Lebow and Stein (1987: 28-29) point out, “President Kennedy defined the proscribed action -- no offensive weapons were to be deployed on the island -- and communicated his commitment to the Russians through different channels on several occasions. Kruschev challenged Kennedy’s commitment and put missiles in Cuba.... The Onset of crisis between the two superpowers over Cuba is more properly characterised as a deterrence failure.” The authors go on to point out that the outcome “must be judged a success for coercive diplomacy (compellence),” because the Soviets were forced to dismantle the missiles and return them to the Soviet Union. Of course, deterrence also succeeded, midway through the crisis, when Russia decided against running the blockade and escalating military hostilities. The point is that all of this evidence, and more, should be examined if the case is to be used to evaluate deterrence.

This report on ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia, for example, identifies 18 separate deterrence and compellence encounters between NATO/UN forces and the Bosnian Serb military between 1993-1995, and then additional exchanges in Kosovo between 1998-1999. Clearly, evidence from all of these exchanges should be examined if the cases are to be used for a fair and reliable evaluation of third-party intervention and coercive diplomacy.

A *protracted crisis* framework avoids many of the pitfalls and coding controversies surrounding the dominant method of analysis and testing. The approach begins by rejecting the prevailing assumption that every international crisis encompasses a single, dominant encounter. Instead, each case is viewed as a series of separate and distinct exchanges or episodes, thus expanding the pool of evidence appropriate for evaluating the conditions for third-party success. This new approach is expected to provide a fairer assessment of theory for two reasons: (1) it goes beyond existing data bases on coercive diplomacy by focusing more precisely on the timing and exact sequence of individual threats, counter-threats and outcomes in each exchange, for each crisis, and (2) there is a specific theoretical focus and rationale tied to data gathering.

Among other contributions, dissecting each crisis to reveal different encounters will help to establish whether the presence (or absence) of *communication*, *commitment*, *capability* and *resolve* varies during the same case, and, more importantly, whether this has an impact on outcomes. The approach partially addresses the problem by rejecting the prevailing assumption that a crisis encompasses a single, dominant encounter.[1] Since we are no longer faced with having to fit all of this information into a single data point, far more information is made available upon which to judge the strengths and weaknesses of deterrence.

1.2 Policy Relevance: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Third-Party Intervention

Policy relevant research and advice can take on three distinct qualities (George, 1991). It can be diagnostic, whereby emphasis is on describing how and why things work as they do. It can also take the form of a conditional generalisation -- that is, in situation X, if one does Y, one should expect Z. Finally, policy-relevant theory can be prescriptive, offering explicit recommendations to policy makers faced with certain kinds of problems. Evidence from this research illustrates the relevance and potential contributions of the proposed project along all three dimensions of policy relevance. Recommendations derived from the research are expected to highlight strategies appropriate for managing ethnic violence and, in so doing, create a more suitable environment for negotiation. The project was designed to assist NATO policy makers when evaluating the constraints imposed on the 'foreign' and 'security' policies of third parties. This, in turn, will help to identify feasible courses of action to prevent escalation of future disputes involving ethnic rivals. Given NATO's long standing commitment to developing innovative strategies aimed at increasing international stability and promoting the resolution of conflict through peacekeeping and peacebuilding, efforts towards greater understanding of ethnic conflict are becoming imperative for NATO policy communities.

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESES

Data and information was compiled from several sources: (1) briefings from officials in policy and planning divisions at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium; (2) official briefings from Canadian and American military personnel in respective Areas of Responsibility; (3) official documents produced by strategy and defense divisions within NATO and the United Nations; (4) unclassified reports from the UN, NATO, US State Department, Department of National Defense, and Department of External Affairs and International Trade, Canada; (5) Keesing's Contemporary Archives; (6) The New York Times, New York Times Index and London Times; and (7) public and 'secured' access web sites with information relevant to ethnic conflicts in the study (NEXUS).

The data compiled for this project is different from existing case lists in two important respects. First, case summaries focussed more precisely on information about the timing and exact sequence of individual threats, counter-threats and outcomes in each exchange, for each crisis. This is expected to provide a more nuanced record

of crisis interaction than BCOW or ICB. Second, only information relevant to the study of coercive diplomacy, deterrence and compellence theory was highlighted. In other words, there is a very specific theoretical and methodological rationale tied to the collection of evidence -- namely, to produce data on the presence/absence of key prerequisites for successful conflict management, and to establish whether outcomes in *protracted crises* are consistent with expectations and predictions derived from the relevant literature.

With respect to coding procedures, the most relevant question was whether encounters within protracted crises constitute specific instances of attempted coercion. To qualify as a relevant exchange, a challenger must be considering (or already undertaking) an action that is viewed by a defender as undesirable and, in response, the deterring side must attempt to dissuade the challenger from committing the undesired action through the threat of sanctions. All major statements, threats (implicit or explicit), and actions (e.g., sanctions, mobilisation of force, demonstration of force, dispatch of diplomats, etc.) initiated by defenders to alter (deter or compel) the behaviour of a challenger will be recorded. Special attention was given to the "time" between threat and response (minutes, hours or days), since this is important when making judgements about the success of coercive threats.

Once a specific encounter was deemed relevant, a judgement was made about the presence/absence of key prerequisites. Emphasis was placed on decision-makers' evaluation of these prerequisites, and their assessment of subjective costs and benefits associated with the threats and counter-threats in each exchange. Whenever possible, estimates of these costs and probabilities was evaluated by other scholars, area experts and historians as a way of improving the quality of the data and findings.

2.1: Testing Deterrence and Compellence Theory

With respect to core hypotheses, Rational deterrence and compellence theory,[2] as described in much of the literature, stipulates that a retaliatory threat will succeed in preventing a challenge if leaders of the deterring state:

> ***A*** ***Clearly define and communicate to challengers the behaviour deemed to be unacceptable***;
>
> ***B*** ***Establish and convey to challengers a commitment to punish violations***;
>
> ***C*** ***Possess the capability to defend the commitment -- by punishing adversaries who challenge it, or by denying the challenger the specific objectives sought through its aggression***; and
>
> ***D*** ***Demonstrate to challengers the resolve to carry out the retaliatory actions if the challenger fails to comply.***

Communication is coded as present if leaders in the defending state respond to a challenger's probes with some form of coercive diplomatic bargaining move or threatening, retaliatory statement. The action must indicate to a challenger that the issue is receiving the attention of high-ranking military and political officials in the defending

state. *Commitment* was coded as present if the defender and client had formal military ties, were members of a military alliance, or had an important economic or political relationship (Huth and Russett 1984, 1988). Such ties have historically served as strong indications that the defender is willing to mount a costly retaliation. Commitments was also assessed in terms of whether the threatened punishment was severe enough to be more costly to the challenger than the sacrifice incurred through non-capitulation.[3] The presence of *Capabilities* depended on whether the immediate or short-term balance of forces favoured the defender and client at a ratio above 1:1. Finally, *resolve* is demonstrated through costly signals – that is, any action, statement or condition that increases the political, economic or military costs of the challenge, while lowering the costs of responding to a challenger's probes. Relevant actions include the mobilisation and/or deployment of military forces; statements include public announcements, clear and unambiguous threats of impending retaliation, or explicit ultimatums and deadlines; and conditions include domestic and international support for retaliation, positive press coverage, etc.[4] When coding for the presence of resolve reference was made to the following types of indicators: previous interactions between defender and challenger; whether the defender responded to a similar challenge in the past or experienced a success in its most recent case of extended deterrence; or whether the defender responded with military force when deterrence failed in its most recent interaction.

If these four prerequisites (A-D) are satisfied, the expected net costs of the threatened sanction (to the challenger) should be greater than the expected net gains from non-compliance, because the punishment (if carried out) would prevent the challenger from achieving intended military, political or economic goals. Of course, these are not the only prerequisites discussed in the literature, but they do represent the ones most often cited by critics when describing and testing deterrence. As such, they serve as an excellent starting point for re-evaluating their conclusions. While some critics do not make explicit reference to the identical set of four conditions, the variables they do examine are often different representations of the same four.[5] My intention is not to present and evaluate claims about what a good model of deterrence should include (e.g., domestic political conditions within the challenging state, the challenger's assessment of the costs associated with the status quo versus a challenge, and other variables that remain outside the domain of standard "defender" oriented models). I will address the more general question of whether this defender oriented model is sufficient to tap into the complexity of the deterrence problem later in the report. The main objective here is to evaluate efforts by critics to test the standard, four condition, defender oriented model. Re-evaluating this particular version of the theory will help to make an important point about the complex nature of testing, even a very basic deterrence model, from a “necessary and sufficient conditions” perspective.

Breaking a crisis down into component parts (*protracted crisis framework*) allows for the possibility that the four conditions can change during the same crisis. Capabilities, for example, often vary over a relatively short period of time as more states join a defending (or challenging) alliance. Shifts in the level of domestic support for retaliation within a defending state could also improve the capacity of leaders to mobilise forces, thus enhancing the

credibility of a deterrent threat – as occurred in the United States following the February 1994 market bombing in Sarajevo. Resolve also varies in crises depending on circumstances; mission creep, for example, often creates additional incentives to become more fully involved in a crisis, notwithstanding the possibility that the economic and military ties between defender and client are minimal to non-existent. US and European resolve to protect NATO's reputation in Bosnia, for example, increased as the number of failures mounted. Finally, the capacity to communicate retaliatory threats to the Bosnian Serb military also changed repeatedly throughout the crisis as NATO and UN officials repeatedly eliminated, and then reinstated, the dual key approach to crisis management (described below).

It is also conceivable that the relative importance of each condition varies across exchanges within the same crisis. For example, throughout most of the first year of fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina NATO's capability (condition C) to deny the Bosnian Serb military the objectives they sought was never really doubted, until the eighth exchange (see Table ?? below). It was during this exchange that the Bosnian Serb leadership began to question the ability of UN and NATO officials to co-ordinate operations for air support, a key component of NATO's retaliatory capability. Several U.S. warplanes, preparing to retaliate against a Serbian attack on French peacekeepers during the first week of April 1994, were unable to respond in time because of communication problems in the chain of command (a product of the dual key system for UN/NATO operations in the region). The original request for air strikes was made by the French Commander whose troops were being attacked. His request went to the Commander of peacekeeping forces in Bosnia, then to the Commander of UN forces in Yugoslavia, and finally (two hours later) to Yasushi Akashi, the special representative of Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali -- who happened to be the only person with the power to authorise the strikes. The UN official then tried, for approximately one hour, to contact Bosnian Serb military leaders to inform them of the impending strikes should they continue attacking the French troops, and only then requested that NATO planes respond. The three hour delay allowed Bosnian Serb forces (and weaponry) to escape without having to face any air strikes. From that point onwards, NATO officials were faced with having to satisfy the capability prerequisite in order to mount a credible deterrent threat, whereas previously it was only NATO resolve that posed the most difficult problem for peacemaking efforts.[6]

2.2 The Conventional Wisdom

With this in mind, conventional wisdom stipulates that if these four prerequisites are present and the challenge still occurs, that would constitute a case of failure -- both in terms of theory and strategy. But until this point, only a fraction of "relevant" evidence has been compiled to establish whether communication, commitment, capability, and resolve are all *necessary* conditions for deterrence success. Very little time, for example, has been spent on whether the absence of any one of the four prerequisites is sufficient, but not necessary, for failure, as the theory predicts. Several other deterrence hypotheses derived from the logic of necessity and sufficiency have never even been

systematically tested. It remains unclear, for example, whether the presence of all four conditions is jointly necessary for success; whether the absence of any one condition is independently sufficient for failure; whether the absence of all four is jointly sufficient for failure; and so on.

Viewed from the perspective of possible interactions and their corresponding outcomes, there are 32 hypothetical scenarios or response sets (RS) that provide information about when and under what conditions deterrence works (described in Table 1). The "Y" and "N" represent, respectively, the presence and absence of key

(Table 1 here)[7]

prerequisites for success.[8] The relevance of information from each scenario, however, depends on the specific hypothesis being tested. Some response sets are appropriate for establishing necessary conditions for success/failure, while others are helpful with respect to sufficiency. One relatively straightforward way to interpret the logic of necessity and sufficiency is to view the requirements in terms of a simple two by two matrix (Braumoeller and Goertz, 1997). If after examining cases in which the independent variable is present one finds evidence corresponding to cell *d* but no cases matching cell *b*, that would support a claim of sufficiency. A claim of necessity, on the other hand, can be supported in one of two ways: 1) if after examining cases in which the dependent variable was present one finds evidence corresponding to cell *d* but no cases matching cell *c*; or 2) if after examining cases in which the independent variable was absent one finds evidence corresponding to cell *a* but no cases matching cell *c*.

Table 2
(derived from Braumoeller and Goertz 1997:9-10)

			SUFFICIENCY	
			Independent variable	
			absent	**present**
		absent	**a**	**b**
NECESSITY	***Dependent variable***			
		present	**c**	**d**

With respect to the *four* prerequisite version of deterrence described earlier, and based on the logic stipulated by Most and Starr (1989) and Braumoeller and Goertz (1997), ten *necessary* and *sufficient* condition hypotheses can be identified, outlined in Tables 3 and 4. The first five hypotheses deal with requirements for deterrence *success* (S1

(Table 3 and 4 here)

through S5), the other five apply to deterrence *failure* (F1 through F5). The corresponding evidence to support and/or disconfirm each hypothesis is noted in the third column of each table.

Two points should be noted before moving on to testing. First, any necessary condition hypothesis can be transformed into a sufficient condition equivalent, and vice versa (e.g., S2=F1 and F4=S4). However, the evidence

needed to support each version of the same hypothesis is not identical, as is evident from the list of relevant response sets in the third column of Tables 3 and 4. Two examples will suffice to make the point:

> Example 1 -- if the set (ABCD) is jointly necessary for success (Hyp. S2), then the absence of any one condition is independently sufficient for failure (Hyp. F1), by definition. However, while response set # 1 (YYYY Y) is entirely appropriate for establishing whether the set (ABCD) is jointly necessary for success, it is not relevant (i.e., cannot and should not be used) to establish whether the absence of any one condition is independently sufficient for failure, because none of the conditions is absent.
>
> Example 2 -- if the set (~A~B~C~D) is jointly necessary for failure (Hyp. F4), then the presence of any one condition is independently sufficient for success (Hyp. S4), by definition. Again, while response set # 16 (NNNN N) is important for establishing whether the set (~A~B~C~D) is jointly necessary for failure, it is not appropriate for establishing whether the presence of any one condition is independently sufficient for success, simply because none of the conditions is present.

Table 2 can be used here to illustrate why the evidentiary requirements for counterpart hypotheses are not identical -- there are two ways to support claims of necessity (the independent variable may or may not be present), but only one way to support claims of sufficiency (the independent variable must be present). By implication, close to half of the response sets appropriate for evaluating hypotheses about "necessity" are irrelevant to their "sufficient" condition counterparts, which explains why different empirical results can be produced when testing what appear to be logically identical hypotheses. This point is discussed in more detail later in the paper.

Second, some hypotheses represent claims about necessity and sufficiency that are justified by logical arguments drawn from deterrence theory (e.g., hypotheses S1, S2, S3, F1, F3), while others represent claims that aren't generally found in the literature (S4, F2 and F4). The most straightforward approach to evaluating the theory, then, would be to focus solely on "relevant" hypothesis and to exclude all others. On the other hand, if deterrence is sound, we should not only expect to find empirical support for "relevant" hypotheses, but also very weak or no support for "non-relevant" hypotheses. For instance, the claim that each of the four conditions is independently sufficient for success (hypothesis S4) is not an argument made by deterrence theorists, for obvious reasons. If it receives strong empirical support, however, that would be inconsistent with expectations derived from deterrence and would represent a potential defect in the theory. Testing both sets of hypotheses, therefore, is a useful way to establish stronger overall confirmation or disconfirmation of the theory.

Of course, absolute confirmation or disconfirmation of any one of the ten hypotheses is unlikely, but it is possible to measure the overall strength of deterrence by calculating the proportion of correct versus incorrect predictions. The objective here is to establish whether the proportion of evidence supporting the effective use of coercive diplomacy, deterrence and compellence outweighs the proportion of disconfirmations based on information obtained from NATO's interventions into Bosnia and Kosovo.

With this in mind, the most straightforward way to test these ten hypotheses is to calculate the proportion of all cases falling into the "supporting evidence" category (from Tables 3 and 4). The problem with this approach is that it overlooks several distinct features of individual hypotheses; specifically, each of the 32 response sets offers

more or less (i.e., stronger or weaker) support depending on the predictions implicit in the hypothesis being tested. In order to establish a value for each response set, therefore, I assigned weights (ranging from 1-4) to each of the 32 scenarios, for all 10 hypothesis, based on the amount of "over-determination" (roughly analogous to multi-collinearity) implicit in the information obtained from that case. A detailed explanation of the logic underlying the weights assigned to every response set is beyond the scope of this paper (it would require close to 320 separate explanations), so only a few key examples will be discussed here. Although the argument and tables are a bit complex, they do help to make a valuable point about the nature of the deterrence puzzle -- testing the theory is not as straightforward as critics imply.

With respect to testing hypothesis S4 (each prerequisite is *independently sufficient* for success), and using condition A (communication) to illustrate the argument, it stands to reason that information from cases corresponding to RS22 (YYNN Y) offers comparatively less "confirming" information than, say, RS28 (YNNN Y), because the latter produced a success when condition A was the only prerequisite present – the strongest indication of *independent sufficiency*, so RS28 receives a weight of four. RS22 represents a success in the presence of conditions A and B, so, compared to RS28, it receives a weight of three. Of course, RS22 (YYNN Y) provides stronger support for hypothesis S4 than, say, RS18 (YYYN Y), because it isn't clear from the latter whether it was the presence of one, two or all three conditions together that produced the success. Based on the amount of over-determination implicit in response sets RS28, RS22, RS18 and RS1, therefore, they receive corresponding weights of 4, 3, 2, 1, respectively, given the logic implicit in hypothesis S4. In sum, while all four of these response sets provide some information about the relationship between condition A and success, and while they are all consistent with expectation regarding the *independent sufficiency* of A, some of the evidence, when compared with other relevant response sets, is more powerful. Weights ranging in value from one to four were assigned accordingly.

Joint necessity (Hyp. S2) implies that success is always preceded by the set (ABCD), but the set (ABCD) may not always lead to success. Support for a claim of joint necessity requires evidence that deterrence failure is always preceded by the absence of at least one condition (for example, RS2 to RS16), without disconfirming evidence that success is preceded by the absence of at least one condition (RS18 to RS32). Response sets 2 to 5 receive a weight of four, because a failure with three conditions present implies that at least four are required for success, which would be the strongest confirmation of joint necessity. By comparison, RS12 to RS15 each receive weights of two, because it is not entirely clear from these cases whether two, three or all four conditions are required to produce a success. RS16 receives a confirming weight of one, because it provides even less information than RS12-RS15 about joint necessity.

Compared with other response sets, RS17 offers no disconfirming information about the joint necessity of ABCD -- there is no way to determine from this information whether adding a fifth element to the set (e.g., ABCDE) would produce a success, which implies that ABCD may still be necessary, but not sufficient, for success. With

respect to disconfirming joint necessity, RS18 receives a low weight of one, because it implies that deterrence can succeed with at least three conditions. On the other hand, RS30 is more potent as a disconfirmation of joint necessity given that success is preceded by only one condition. By comparison, RS32 implies that none of the four conditions was needed to produce a success and, therefore, represents the strongest evidence against joint necessity in comparison with other scenarios.

Table 5 outlines the weights for each response set across ten hypotheses.[9] Two hypotheses (S4 and F1) can be tested in *aggregate* form, by combining information from tests of all four prerequisites (S4a and F1a), or *individually*, by focussing on each prerequisite in isolation (S4b and F1b). As illustrated in the Table, the weights assigned to relevant response sets vary depending on which of the two approaches is used. Of course, these weights are not meant to be definitive; I expect the values assigned here will be subjected to debate and discussion. The important point, however, is that weights should be assigned, and the effort here represents the most straightforward approach. The implications of using a more complex system

(Table 5 here)

of weights will be discussed in the conclusion. The following formula is used to calculate the proportion of weighted confirmations across all response sets for each hypothesis. Again, my objective is not to establish absolute confirmation or disconfirmation of the ten hypotheses, or to produce closure on the issue of necessity and/or sufficiency. The percentages generated from the equation simply measure the overall strength of deterrence by calculating the proportion of correct versus incorrect predictions

$$1) \qquad \frac{\sum n(ws)}{\sum n(ws) + \sum n(wd)}$$

where:
n = number of cases
ws = weight assigned to supporting evidence;
wd = weight assigned to disconfirming evidence

derived from each of the core hypotheses. The key question is whether the proportion of confirming evidence from these data outweighs the proportion of disconfirming evidence.

CHAPTER 3

CASE STUDIES: BOSNIA (1993-1995) AND KOSOVO (1998-1999)

A summary of the evidence from18 exchanges between 1993-1995 appears in Table 6. Exchanges with split coding decisions (for example, ***2a/b***, ***3a/b***, ***13a/b*** and ***14a/b***) represent cases in which two different coercive threats were initiated during the same interaction. The 30-50 page limit for ***NATO Fellowship Final Reports*** precludea a more detailed treatment here, so three representative examples will be included below:

(Table 6 here)

3.1 Bosnia, 1995: Exchange 12

Serbian use of heavy artillery in the assault against Sarajevo escalated on 22 May when it was reported that, contrary to the Geneva Conventions, phosphorous shells were being used. A total of six people were killed and 30 injured.[10] Lt.-Gen. Rupert Smith issued a formal ultimatum to both the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian government forces two days later, demanding that all heavy weapons within the 20-km exclusion zone be removed or surrendered to the UN. Smith warned of impending NATO-led air strikes if the arrangements were not met by noon on 25 May.[11] On the day of the deadline, NATO aircraft, predominately US led, struck an ammunition dump near Pale, destroying two weapons bunkers in the process.[12]The attack was described by Lt.-Col. Coward, the UN spokesman in Sarajevo, as "a significant military infrastructure target.[13] A second round of air strikes by NATO aircraft at Pale on 26 May destroyed six weapons bunkers.[14]

Although the effort was lauded by British and American officials, both the French and Russian Foreign Ministries condemned the action maintaining that it produced "thoughtless risks" and was "misconceived."[15] Newly-elect French President Jacques Chirac re-issued warnings that the French would withdraw its troops if the United Nations continued to take inadequate steps to protect its peacekeepers. The rift in UN consensus regarding both the ultimatum and the consequent air strikes undermined not only their credibility, but the capability of the NATO to continue to wage an effective front. Motivated by their ability to defy UN demands, the Serbs retaliated by shelling five UN 'safe havens' and conducting a massive bombardment of the Tuzla in northern Bosnia-Hercegovina on the evening of 26 May. In one of the worst atrocities of the war, 48 people were killed and more than 150 were injured.[16]

3.2 Bosnia, 1995: Exchanges 13a/b

On 11 July, Bosnian Serb forces captured the town of Srebrenica, a Muslim enclave and one of six UN-designated 'safe areas". The assault commenced five days earlier when upwards of 1,500 Bosnian Serb troops arrived in the city.[17]Although two air strikes were carried out by Dutch and US

military aircraft under the auspices of NATO, a third sortie was abandoned after the Bosnian Serbs threatened to kill some of the Dutch soldiers they were holding as hostage.[18] Srebrenica fell to the Bosnian Serbs shortly thereafter. The resulting refugees were ushered to Tuzla, close to where the remainder of the 400-strong Dutch force was based (at Potocari).[19] The ambivalence of the Dutch towards the refugees was striking. "Many of the Muslims in the town (of Tuzla) surrendered to the Dutch, seeking the UN's protection, only to be handed over to the advancing Serbs."[20] On 24 July, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the UN representative for human rights in the former Yugoslavia, resigned his post citing what he called the international community's "hypocrisy" and the lack of resolve to deter insurgent forces from committing the atrocities in Srebrenica and Zepa.[21] The strongest reaction to the fall of Srebrenica came from French President Jacques Chirac who chastised the UN for its military and political impotence in Bosnia and drawing parallels to the appeasement of Hitler in the 1930s.[22]With Srebrenica under Bosnian Serb control and Zepa already surrounded, the Bosnian Serbs moved to Bihac and Gorazde. Fighting continued and the war escalated.

There were two retaliatory threats issued in this exchange: a relatively weak NATO offensive (which failed), and a subsequent Bosnian Serb retaliatory threat to kill hostages (which succeeded). Although two air strikes were carried out by Dutch and US military aircraft under the auspices of NATO, a third sortie was abandoned after the Bosnian Serbs threatened to kill Dutch soldiers. Although NATO had the capability to continue with the offensive, its resolve in pursuing the mission was compromised when the hostages were taken. With a breakdown in resolve, the success of UN's (compellence) strategy was unlikely. From the Bosnian Serb perspective, however, the threat to kill hostages satisfied all four prerequisites for deterrence and succeeded in preventing further NATO air strikes.

3.3 Bosnia, 1995: Exchange 14a/b

On 9 August, the United States unveiled a *new* peace initiative. Roughly based on the Contact Group's 1994 proposal (which saw the collaboration of French, German, Russian, British, and American efforts), the present plan outlined a territorial division which would preserve the ratio of 49 percent of Bosnian territory for the Bosnian Serbs and 51 percent for a Muslim-Croat federation.[23] While the Bosnian Serbs would be able to retain control of the recently conquered towns of Srebrenica (11 July) and Zepa (25 July), the Muslims would be compensated with land around Sarajevo. The plan, introduced by Richard Holbrooke, US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, was gaining favor among the warring factions. On 18 August, the prospects for peace in the Balkans were stronger than at any time in the past four years of the conflict.[24] But

hopes of an immediate peaceful resolution to the war were shattered on the morning of 28 August, when Bosnian Serbs launched a single mortar shell which landed near the Markale market place in central Sarajevo. The ensuing explosion killed 37 people and wounded approximately 80 others.[25]A similar shelling of the same market occurred in February 1994, killing 68 and provoking international outrage against the Bosnian Serbs.[26]

Haris Silajdzic, the Prime Minister of Bosnia, set the stage for a US-led response when he threatened to suspend his government's participation in the peace process until NATO clarified and re-asserted its role in protecting Sarajevo as a UN-designated 'safe area'. Bosnian President Izetbegovic demanded the UN establish a NATO led Rapid Reaction Force to respond to the "crime".[27]On August 30, two days after the bombing, NATO launched a series of devastating air attacks on Bosnian Serb targets throughout Bosnia. Referred to as 'Operation Deliberate Force', the offensive amounted to the largest military operation undertaken by NATO since its formation in 1949.[28] Over a 12-hour period, aircraft from five NATO countries--France, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK and the USA--flew nearly 300 sorties.[29]Ninety radar, communication, missile and artillery sites were hit across 23 target areas.[30]In co-ordination with NATO, the UN Rapid Reaction Force, comprising Dutch, French and British units, fired hundreds of artillery rounds on Bosnian Serb mortar emplacements and ammunition dumps around Sarajevo.[31]The strikes were part of an initiative to eliminate the Serbian capacity to shell Sarajevo, and to force them to the bargaining table.

Commentators were quick to draw parallels with 'Operation Desert Storm' which heralded the US-led allied forces in January 1991 for their decisive, united, and overwhelming campaign against Iraqi forces in Kuwait. The US State Department followed the punitive action with a statement proclaiming that the Bosnian Serbs "ought to have concluded that there is no military victory in sight for them."[32]French President, Jacques Chirac, echoed American sentiment the following day when he suggested that the bombing continue until 'free access' to Sarajevo was guaranteed, and not just secured. In a statement issued on 30 August, Silajdzic described the NATO operations as "a very important step toward peace because it restored the credibility (emphasis added) of the international community."[33]Two days later, the Vatican gave support, in principle, to NATO bombing on Bosnian Serb targets in an effort to pre-empt further attacks on civilians.[34] In what was widely regarded as a significant shift, it was announced that the Bosnian Serbs would henceforth conduct peace negotiations as part of a team, which was headed by Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic.[35] On 1 September, NATO announced a pause in 'Operation Deliberate Force' in preparation for the new round of peace talks.

Although Mladic was prepared to accept two of the three key NATO's demands -- to stop shelling UN 'safe areas' and to open routes into Sarajevo -- he was not prepared (at that point) to pull

heavy weapons from the outskirts of Sarajevo.[36]NATO resumed air strikes four days later, and the Rapid Reaction Force carried out artillery attacks against Serb artillery and mortar positions in response to the shelling of central Sarajevo that same day.

On 10 September, the US warship Normandy fired 13 Tomahawk cruise missiles at Bosnian Serb targets. This was the first use of so-called ‘smart weapons' in the offensive and received widespread media coverage.[37] Public interest and support for the newest NATO assault served to strengthen allied resolve. By 13 September, NATO had carried out approximately 3,400 missions, including 850 bombing runs.[38]On 14 September, nearly two weeks after its initial implementation, ‘Operation Deliberate Force' was suspended for 3 days following Bosnian Serb commitments to withdraw their heavy weapons from the 20-km exclusion zone around Sarajevo. The declaration was made by Karadzic and Mladic following negotiations in Belgrade, the Serbian capital. Russia, which had strongly condemned the resumption of NATO air attacks on 5 September, also announced its support for the latest deal. The sentiment was echoed by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev who said that the resolution offered “a quite realistic chance to overcome the stalemate over Sarajevo."[39]

The first UN relief flight landed in Sarajevo on 15 September, and the following day Serb forces began removing their heavy weapons (which Mladic had explicitly refused to do two weeks earlier).[40]By 21 September, the Serbs removed some 250 heavy weapons from the “exclusion zone,” and UN monitors were given unimpeded access to the area.[41]The fighting had stopped, and the peace process was well underway.

This particular exchange can be viewed in two stages. Stage one (Exchange 14a) is unique in that it appears to mark a failure of both compellence theory and strategy. Although all the requisite criteria were met, it took some time for allied forces to achieve all three objectives. Notwithstanding a series of devastating air attacks on Bosnian Serb targets (largest military operation undertaken by NATO since its formation in 1949), Mladic refused to pull back. The Bosnian Serbs were neither compelled to comply with, nor deterred from committing further infringements against, UN demands. The apparent anomaly, however, can be explained with reference to theory. Given several previous failures during four years of fighting, the US and European (NATO) did not have a reputation for maintaining resolve over the long run. Mladic, which at this point had very little to lose, assumed it was a matter of time before the air attacks would end, especially given Russian threats of intervention if the strikes continued. In addition, a short term deterrence failure is required to demonstrate resolve; how else would Mladic know that the alliance was committed to following through on their threats?

Stage two (Exchange 14b) occurred when NATO resumed air strikes on 5 September, backed by artillery attacks from the Rapid Reaction Force and the launching of 13 Tomahawk cruise missiles. The NATO assault received near universal acclamation and on 14 September, the Bosnian Serbs

capitulated to UN demands by withdrawing their heavy weapons from the 20-km exclusion zone around Sarajevo. This time, with all the prerequisites for deterrence and compellence met, the allied forces succeeded in ending nearly four years of bitter war.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS AND FINDINGS

With respect to hypothesis S2 and its counterpart F1a, 100% of relevant weighted cases support the mutually reinforcing claims that all four prerequisites are necessary for deterrence success, and the absence of any one is sufficient for deterrence failure (please see Tables 7-11 and

(Tables 7-12 here)

summary Table 12). Also consistent with expectations is the very weak support (21%) for hypotheses S4a (the presence of any one condition is *independently sufficient* for success) and F4 (the set ~A~B~C~D is *jointly necessary* for failure). The tests for independent necessity and sufficiency (S4B, S5, F2 and F1b) are almost entirely consistent with the theory. Among the more interesting findings is that *resolve* consistently performed well relative to other factors, implying that the presence or absence of different prerequisites (or combinations of prerequisites) does not have a uniform impact on the probability of success.

A somewhat more refined version of hypothesis S1 was tested in Table 11. Does the presence of more (or fewer) conditions affects the probability of success (or failure). Based on logic implicit in the "more is better" (MIB) proposition, corresponding weights were assigned to each scenario. Cases conforming to RS1 (YYYY Y), in which all four conditions are present when deterrence succeeded, counted as stronger confirmation of Hyp. MIB than any other scenario, with the exception of RS16 (NNNN N) -- it too received a weight of four given expectations. Other combinations were assigned weights in comparison to this baseline. For example, if the “more is better” hypothesis is correct, RS2 (YYYN N) is expected to occur less frequently than, say, RS29 (NNNY N), because the former represent cases of failure when almost all of the conditions are present, while the latter represents a failure when only one condition was present, a more likely scenario if MIB is sound. By extension, RS2 and RS29 receive confirming weights of one and three, respectively. One interesting feature of the MIB hypothesis is that response sets can be assigned supporting and disconfirming weights, since each provides some information about confirmations and disconfirmations. The results, outlined

in the last column of Table 12, show that 64% of the exchanges support the “more is better” claim.

The final set of results focussed on hypotheses S4b, S5, F1b and F2. Among other things, these findings helped to determine whether and under what conditions some prerequisites are more crucial than others when predicting outcomes. A key assumption in much of the literature is that the four prerequisites are equally important in determining success and failure, although this has never been systematically tested. But the evidence suggest that some conditions appear to be far less important than others for success, and may even be connected to failure. The least important condition for success appears to be *communication* (19%) while the most crucial is *resolve* (88%). The results also indirectly support Zagare’s (1987) claims about the crucial role of capabilities, and Fearon's (1994) observation that only resolute challengers are likely to challenge – commitments, to the extent that they exist at all,

are less likely to be connected to deterrence successes, because they are known to challengers (and included in the challenger's risk assessment and utility estimates) when leaders decide to challenge in the first place. Costly signals (i.e., explicit moves by the defender to communicating retaliatory threats), on the other hand, are more likely to be connected to deterrence success because they provide a stronger and more reliable indication of the defender's interests and intentions at a particular point in time.

With respect to overall support for deterrence, definitive interpretations are difficult because critics and proponents are likely to put a different spin on the meaning and significance of the percentages in the table. Proponents may not be particularly surprised by high percentages but anything at or above 50% "should be enough to force some critics to reconsider their position or, at least, hold off on rejecting the theory." This is especially true for crucial hypotheses, like S2.

Much lower values were generated for hypotheses for which deterrence predicts no support -- e.g., S4a, S4b and F4. The claim that each of the four conditions is independently sufficient for success (hypothesis S4a), for example, or that all four must be absent to produce a failure (hypothesis F4) are not arguments made by deterrence theorists, for obvious reasons. High values for these hypotheses would not be consistent with standard predictions from the theory. Viewed in terms of what we should expect if rational deterrence is valid, almost all of the values are "theoretically" consistent.

4.1 Explaining Coercive Diplomatic Successes and Failures

While ratios of confirmations to disconfirmations are informative, these percentages are not sufficient, in and of themselves, to tap into another layer of complexity -- namely, the interaction effects among the four prerequisites and their relative potencies in different contexts. Capability, for instance, affects both resolve and communication -- the capacity to demonstrate resolve is usually enhanced when leaders of the defending state have access to (and control over) a large, easily mobilised military force. Effective and timely communication often depends on the quality of political, diplomatic and bureaucratic capabilities. Communication and commitment are also related -- defenders are more likely to mount a serious diplomatic effort to define the unacceptable behaviour and communicate intentions to challengers when the balance of interests, which tend to drive commitments, favours the defender. Resolve may be less important during situations in which the defender's capabilities are so overwhelming, and the costs of retaliation so low, that the deterrent threat remains credible even if resolve is questioned. Conversely, the balance of interests may favour the defender, but what if capabilities are so low the defender is unable to mount a threat of sufficient clarity and severity? Finally, as Schaub (1996: fn 40) points out, "the degree of credibility that must be impaired to a threat if it is to be successful is negatively related to the costs that are threatened" -- the lower the costs of retaliation to the defender, the more resolute the defender is likely to be perceived, and the more credible the defender's threat. There are other examples but these are sufficient to make an

important point about the need to systematically identify interaction effects.

Challenges almost always occur when at least one key component of a credible retaliatory threat is missing. The results from this research and other work published by the author also illustrate the interactive effects of the four variables. The absence of certain prerequisites is more or less likely to provoke a challenge depending on the status of other variables in the model. The absence of resolve is more likely to provoke a challenge when defenders clearly communicate a threat of retaliation and have a strong commitment to the issue or protégé in question. That combination is particularly susceptible to failure for two reasons: 1) because the probability of a successful challenge increases when defenders are not resolute, and 2) because challengers are likely to gain more by successfully challenging in these situations than they would if the defender made no public pronouncements or was never fully committed to the issue or protégé in the first place – the victory, in other words, would not be as sweet.

In a slightly different setting, however, the presence of resolve actually provokes challenges, especially when a defender is less than fully committed to the issue or protégé . Military mobilisation is more likely to be perceived by the challenger as a bluff when the issue is unimportant to the defender or when political, military and economic ties between defender and protégé are insignificant. These types of failures occur even when a defender's capabilities, on balance, outweigh those of the challenger. In this context, challengers may gain more by provoking a strong, resolute defender who isn't entirely committed to the cause. It is important to note that although high levels of capabilities and/or resolve can actually provoke a challenge (as critics claims), the mechanisms through which these failures occur are entirely consistent with expectations implicit in standard, rationalist models of deterrence. The evidence also show how a lack of capabilities can lead to failure. In both cases challenges occur when defenders are committed and resolute but relatively weak -- a victory by the challenger is not only more probable in these cases, given superior capabilities, but also likely to represent a more significant and exploitable accomplishment.

It is equally informative to identify models that do not emerge from the data, especially those we might expect to find based on claims in the literature. Contrary to claims made by critics coercive strategies do not appear to provoke the very behaviour they are designed to prevent, particularly when the strategy is practised correctly. Communication in the absence of resolve is a common path through which failures occur – communicating a retaliatory threat is more likely to provoke a challenge when defenders are not particularly resolute, because challengers are given an opportunity in these cases to exploit the defender's bluff. The lack of resolve is independently sufficient for failure in 100% of relevant cases. The presence of resolve was found to be independently necessary for success in 100% of the relevant cases.[42] This is likely to be even more pronounced when the defender has ties to the protégé -- the gains to the challenger from successfully exploiting an important ally (i.e., one to whom the defender is committed) are much greater, by definition.

Exploring interrelationships among the four conditions proved to be an important area of inquiry. The evidence appears to suggest that capabilities are directly related to both resolve and communication -- the capacity to

demonstrate resolve is usually enhanced when leaders of the defending state have access to (and control over) a large, easily mobilised military force. Effective and timely communication, in turn, often depends on the quality of political, diplomatic and bureaucratic capabilities. Communication and commitment are also related -- defenders are more likely to mount a serious diplomatic effort to clearly define the unacceptable behaviour and communicate intentions to challengers when the balance of interests, which tend to drive commitments, favours the defender. Resolve appears to be less important in situations where the defender's capabilities are so overwhelming, and the costs of retaliation so low, that the deterrent threat remains credible even if resolve is questioned. These are important issues to consider when making judgements about the strength of the theory, because if the evidence shows that relative potency varies, that should be an important consideration when conducting subsequent tests of deterrence. If capabilities are found to be more crucial to success than any other component, then the presence/absence of this prerequisite should be assigned greater relevance when assessing the predictive validity of the theory.

4.2 Contribution to Deterrence Research

Sceptics will question the extent to which these techniques are capable of producing accurate models of coercive diplomacy, or correctly tracking complex interactions among causal variables. While the approach is useful for eliminating unnecessary and insufficient causes, it cannot confirm the necessity and/or sufficiency of key variables. The problem of judging whether factors are truly necessary or sufficient can partially be addressed by comparing results with those derived from other approaches – e.g., statistical methods (Russett 1963; Fink 1965; Huth and Russett 1984, 1988; Huth 1990; Fearon 1994), in-depth case studies (George and Smoke 1974; Jervis, Lebow and Stein 1985; Lebow and Stein 1990; Mercer 1996), formal modeling (Powell 1990; Cioffi-Revilla 1998), game theory (Zagare 1987, 1994, 1996; Brams and Kilgour 1985, 1987a, 1987b; Coiffi-Revilla and Starr 1995), necessity-sufficiency (Dion 1997; Harvey 1998; this study), etc. Given the number and diversity of deterrence projects, a systematic compilation of the findings could identify key points of consensus. These techniques provide an excellent point of departure (and a common framework) for assessing the logical and empirical claims found in the literature.

Evaluating data through the prism of necessity and sufficiency makes three important contributions to the literature on deterrence. First, these techniques combine inductive and deductive methodologies in a unified program of research, thus avoiding a central point of contention in the literature (see George and Smoke 1989; Lebow and Stein 1989; Huth and Russett 1989; Achen and Snidal 1989; Jervis 1989).

Second, these alternative testing strategies improve on static conceptions of deterrence by disentangling the relevance of prerequisites as they interact in different contexts. Instead of assuming that resolve and capabilities, for example, are always positive forces, the logic applied here suggests different ways in which their presence or

absence matters -- more, in other words, is not necessarily better. These interaction effects are not easy to identify using traditional statistical techniques because they tend to "bias investigators toward viewing different causes as competitors in the struggle to explain variation. In the Boolean approach, by contrast, arguments about causal conjunctures are favoured over arguments about single causes" (Ragin 1987: 120). The important relationship between context and causation remains relatively unexplored in the literature on coercive diplomacy, with a few notable exceptions -- e.g., Liebermann 1994; Fearon 1994; Mercer 1996; Schaub 1996; Goertz 1994; Braumoeller 1999).

Third, re-evaluating the standard, four condition 'defender' oriented model helps to make an important point about the complex nature of testing even the most basic version of the theory. Obviously these are not the only prerequisites described in the literature, but they are the ones most often cited by critics when describing, testing and ultimately rejecting rational deterrence. As such, they represent an important starting point for evaluating the most widely accepted critique in the literature. If nothing else, the arguments presented here should confirm that we have a long way to go before rejection is prudent. In fact, the complexity of the deterrence puzzle is even more pronounced when one considers the next stage – namely, exploring the impact of (and interrelationships among) other causal factors that might be included in a more complete deterrence model (e.g., domestic political conditions in the challenging state; the challenger's assessment of the costs associated with the status quo versus a challenge; bargaining strategies and reputations; and any other variable outside the domain of standard 'defender' oriented models). The two approaches developed here can help to narrow the list of possible candidates and provide a basis for assessing their impact on the distribution of confirmations and disconfirmations.

Whether or not deterrence entails much more than these four prerequisites is an empirical question that requires proof. If true, we should not expect to find a great deal of empirical support for necessary and sufficient condition hypotheses that ignore the more precise utility estimates of defenders and challengers. On the other hand, if we do find strong support for the standard defender oriented model, as is the case with this study, the findings can be explained in one of two ways: 1) the other variables not accounted for in the standard model may not be as crucial to deterrence success as some have argued; or 2) the other variables are crucial, but their most important features are already accommodated within existing measurements of the four core prerequisites. Even if they are not, it may be possible to produce more refined operational definitions of condition C (capabilities), condition D (resolve), or both that can account for the challenger's comparison of expected utilities for the status quo versus attacking. Instead of measuring capabilities in terms of the short/medium term balance of force ratios (>1:1), for example, it may be possible to produce a more precise measure that includes, in addition to force ratios, the capacity to inflict direct personal harm on the military and political leadership of the challenging elite. Similarly, resolve could be measured in terms of the willingness of the defender to "go the distance" -- that is, to retaliate in a way that makes the status quo more acceptable to the challenger, because the costs associated with the retaliatory strike are

enormous (something Clinton accomplished in the Gulf crisis circa 1998). If these two conditions (C' and D') were met, the challenger would almost always assign a higher expected utility to the status quo and a lower expected utility to attacking. These more nuanced measurements of the four prerequisites maintain the parsimony of the traditional, defender oriented model, but accommodate the need to account for the challenger's assessment of the status quo.

With respect to the status and future of deterrence theory and testing, there is an important, although often ignored feature of the deterrence puzzle that needs to be explored in more detail: defenders may occasionally prefer to fail, much like police who threaten to impose relatively low fines as a way of intentionally failing to deter motorists from speeding or illegally parking to generate funds by issuing tickets (Quester 1996). A more relevant illustration of a defender's preference for failures can be found in Harvey's (1995) study of the Syrian invasion of Lebanon in 1976. Had Israel established clearer (more precise) guidelines and communicated to Syria the military repercussions of each violation, the deterrent threat would likely have been more effective, but Israel would have been forced to respond (in theory) to any move by Syria outside the strict confines of the *red line* conditions, a very risky threat. In fact, Syria would have lost the window of opportunity to respond to the Lebanese crisis in a way that was perfectly consistent with Israel's security objectives at the time. In other words, the outcome of a successful deterrent threat was less appealing to Israeli strategists, primarily because Israel stood to gain from a limited Syrian invasion into Lebanon: they could (1) ensure military support for the Maronites, who were on the verge of defeat, without getting involved in a confrontation; (2) avoid jeopardising their relations with the United States; and (3) allow the Syrian intervention to affect Arab unity by promoting a battle between Syrian forces and the PLO.

Judgements about deterrence success or failure, therefore, should try to distinguish a defender's "intrinsic" and "strategic" interests (Jervis 1979). Although Syria was deterred from intervening in a way that was contrary to the "intrinsic" interests of Israel (e.g., survival, territorial integrity, etc.), Syria still invaded in a way that challenged many of Israel's "strategic" interests as stipulated in the red lines. If success is measured, at least in part, in terms of whether the strategic objectives of the deterrer were satisfied, then Syria's invasion should be considered a partial deterrence failure; Israel's efforts to convey its commitments and resolve were intentionally restricted in order to provide Syria with a window of opportunity to move into Lebanon. On the other hand, if the outcome is assessed in terms of Israel's intrinsic interests, the case would be classified as a deterrence success, both in terms of theory and strategy, because the most important of the five conditions (i.e., the geographical line 10 km south of the Beirut-Damascus highway) was never crossed. Depending on which of the red line conditions one highlights, and the specific time frame one selects, the final coding of this case would change.

CHAPTER 5

POLICY RELEVANCE:

THE REAL LESSONS FROM BOSNIA and KOSOVO

Preferences for solutions to ethnic conflict will always depend on the particular explanation(s) for the violence we find most convincing.[43] If one emphasises root causes (for example, ethno-nationalism, primordialism, relative deprivation, etc.) then the list of solutions would include, among other things, partition, power sharing, constitutional entrenchment of ethnic or minority rights, proportional division of key offices, mutual vetoes, and so on. Without an end to ethnic violence, however, debates about root causes and corresponding policy solutions are largely irrelevant, simply because they provide no guidelines when fighting breaks out, when territory is lost through war, or when the death toll from ethnic violence reaches numbers in the tens of thousands thus threatening to create yet another generation of division, fear and hatred.

With respect to policy recommendations tied to third-party (outside) intervention, therefore, recommendations derived from this research project will focus on exploring the application of credible coercive threats and diplomatic strategies that are best suited to stopping the violence -- a more immediate priority for people living and dying in regions of the world plagued by this kind of rivalry.[44] I am not suggesting that NATO must take on the responsibility of intervening in every ethnic war to stop the killing -- this is unlikely to happen. But in future cases in which NATO officials perceive a security threat from an escalating conflict, alliance members have an obligation to mount the most effective and credible diplomatic and military strategy to stop the violence.

With this in mind, there are at least three important policy implications that follow from the arguments and evidence developed in this report. First, conventional wisdom regarding ethnic conflict does not provide a convincing explanation for the last decade of violence in the Balkans. The tone and tempo of ethnic war in the region between 1990-1999 had very little to do with underlying primordial, religious or ethnic hatreds. Individuals and groups in the region may have been persuaded by ethnic elites to hate and fear members of another group, but the probability of war, violence, ethnic cleansing and genocide depended almost exclusively on the opportunities and constraints that presented themselves to the warring factions at particular points in time. The evidence from Bosnia and Kosovo suggests that the protracted nature of fighting was a direct consequence of strategic decisions by political and military officials on all sides of the dispute.[45] Ethnicity, religion, the socialisation of violence and history may account for mutual fears and hatreds, but war is waged with specific objectives in mind -- acquisition of territory, access to key waterways, control over transportation and trade routes, etc. Decisions by Mladic and Karadzic to escalate the fighting between 1993-1995 depended on the prospects of winning and losing particular battles. When US and European leaders mounted a prolonged and stable threat of retaliation (through NATO), backed by ultimatums, deadlines and a clear commitment to punish, credibility was high and coercive diplomacy worked. Weak threats, on the other hand, promoted violence.[46] A serious problem facing the coalition in Bosnia was

the barrier imposed on UN and NATO forces by narrow interpretations of international law which severely limited the rules of engagement and, by extension, the capacity of intervening forces to mount sufficiently credible threats to control hostilities.

This is not to suggest that nationalist sentiments should be ignored by policy-makers when attempting to manage these kinds of crises. Elites have an incredible capacity, in these situations, to mobilize a large group of people to perform atrocities in the name of security and survival. Presidents Milosevic and Tudjman were able to obtain almost complete control over the media during this period and used it to persuade hundreds of thousands of citizens that their security depended on a successful and harsh military retaliation against "other" ethnic groups -- a crucial component of the mobilisation efforts on both sides. Nationalist sentiments are particularly susceptible to mobilisation because they provide leaders with political ammunition that might otherwise not be available. Obviously, Western officials should be mindful of the way these forces play out in regions of the world characterised by ethnic conflict. But the existence of nationalist sentiments should never be cited by policy-makers as sufficient evidence to confirm the position that any and all efforts to control violence will fail. It was wrong for policy makers to assume that nothing could be done between 1990-1995 to prevent "primordial" animosities from generating a prolonged ethnic war in the Balkans, and equally wrong to make the same argument in 1999 with respect to air strikes against Milosevic in Kosovo and Serbia.

Proponents of the primordial thesis face several logical and empirical problems when they apply this conventional wisdom to the collapse of the former Yugoslavia. First, it is almost impossible for people in the region to trace the ethnic line of most inhabitants. There are virtually no physical differences among people of different ethnic origins, primarily because intermarriage in the region was so extensive. During the war, soldiers in mixed communities were unable to identify who was or was not of the "right" ethnic heritage. Until the collapse of their country, most people "did not even know which of their friends were Serb and which were Muslim", and there were "frequent accounts of old friends sending each other personal messages and gifts and even helping each other escape across the battle lines". Language, the other obvious source of information when distinguishing "enemies" offers little assistance in this regard. Recounting his experience with translators during the Dayton negotiations in November 1995, Holbrooke made the following observation:

> The translators' booth in the two large conference rooms came to symbolize for me the stupidity of the war. Our system had six language channels on the headsets. The first three were for English, French, and Russian. Channel 4 was for translation into Bosnian, 5 into Croatian, and 6 in Serbian. This puzzled us, since the same language, with minor differences, was spoken throughout the region. The answer came when one looked at the translation booths a few feet from our table. Each participant from the Balkans could choose his or her channel of preference–but one interpreter translated for Channels 4, 5 and 6.

Second, the history of conflict in the region points to obvious inconsistencies with the primordial argument. Ethnic differences, to the extent they existed at all, were constants in a region in which the level of violence varied significantly–Serbs, Croats and Bosnians lived and worked together for centuries without fighting. If ethnic

differences are present during times of peace and war, the source of the violence must be tied to something other than ethnicity–perhaps, for example, changes in leadership, political circumstance or economic conditions. These "environmental" changes are more consistent with standard social scientific accounts of the fighting and provide a better explanatory fit without the same logical and empirical inconsistencies. One such thesis is offered by Warren Zimmermann, US Ambassador to Yugoslavia just prior to the collapse. Zimmermann states that:

> The Yugoslav catastrophe was not mainly the result of ancient ethnic or religious hostilities, nor of the collapse of communism at the end of the cold war, nor even of the failures of the Western countries.... Yugoslavia's death and the violence that followed resulted from the conscious actions of nationalist leaders who co-opted, intimidated, circumvented, or eliminated all opposition to their demagogic designs. Yugoslavia was destroyed from the top down.

Third, ethnic and racial divisions are not unique to Yugoslavia, nor do they make tragedies like Bosnia and Kosovo inevitable. Similar levels of ethnic and religious division exist in many regions of the world without resulting in ethnic cleansing or civil war. As Woodward observes in her excellent study of Yugoslavia's war of dissolution:

> Ethnic differences, even substantial differences, do not set a society inexorably on a path toward war. Few states are free of the potential for animosity along ethnic, religious, racial, or communal lines. All countries have histories, even unresolved quarrels and un-expunged traumas, but they do not inevitably become the cause of war. In societies like the United States, ethnic differences are valued for enhancing the quality of life through variety and creative tension, even if ethnic conflicts also arise.

Fourth, contrary to conventional wisdom, religious and linguistic division did not create the war; the collapse of the former Yugoslavia produced and amplified the divisions and hatreds we see today. While research on evolutionary theory, phenotype matching and kinship affiliations is extremely useful for understanding the root causes of patriotism, nationalism (both ethnic and non-ethnic), xenophobia and even racism, it cannot explain ethnic war–a subset of human social interaction involving a high level of inter-group violence and hostility. As Zimmermann points out, "nothing in their genes makes Serbs irrational or inhuman or 'Balkan,'" and not all Serbs are like Milosevic.

Sceptics might question whether it is possible to draw definitive conclusions about the utility of evolutionary accounts of ethnic violence from a single case, but there are at least two exceptions to this methodological rule of thumb that apply to this study. First, my primary objective is to point to empirical and logical problems with primordial explanations of the violent collapse of the former Yugoslavia, but to the extent that this case is representative of a particular class of conflict (those characterised by ethnic and religious rivalries) it can and should be used as a "crucial case" to evaluate the overall utility of primordial and evolutionary explanations more generally. The wars in the Balkans (throughout 1990-1999 in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and now Kosovo), for example, share many characteristics with each other and with many regions of the world plagued by virtually hundreds of ethnic conflicts. Among other similarities, all of these conflicts have:

a large, territorially concentrated minority groups;
b a history of ethnic division that compounds existing political and economic problems and, in turn, leads to intensified competition among groups for scarce resources;

c governments with little or no institutional capacity effectively and fairly to manage conflict among diverse ethnic groups, except through coercion and intimidation;
d an absence of civic cultures conducive to the pursuit of peaceful policies for the reduction and management of ethnic conflict and divisions;
e highly divided political loyalties;
f political elites who have a vested interest in advancing particular agendas for maintaining or augmenting their own power base;
g a tendency on the part of political elites in ethnically divided societies to use history and myth-making as a way of establishing symbols around which ethnic groups coalesce (for example, Kosovo as the soul of Serbia), which in turn makes inter-ethnic violence appear just, honourable and legitimate;
h a tendency towards contagion and diffusion of ethnic conflicts through processes of vertical (within) and horizontal (across) state boundaries; and so on.

Constraints in space preclude a more detailed treatment of other parallels, but the list is sufficient to establish the point that the Balkans represents a "crucial case" and, arguably, a crucial test of evolutionary and primordial explanations of ethnic violence. Second, if the Balkan case fails to provide sufficient evidence to support the primordial thesis, what case could? Some might argue the Rwanda case would perhaps provide a fairer test of primordial theories of ethnic violence (especially given a 13-week death toll of over 500,000). But a four year, 900-page report on Rwanda by the Paris-based International Federation of Human Rights Leagues and the US-based Human Rights Watch disputes the notion that primordialism explains the catastrophe. According to the report, the genocide, which began on 6 April 1994, was not "an explosion of rage ... motivated by old tribal hatreds". The death toll stemmed from "a deliberate choice by a modern political elite to incite fear and hatred to keep itself in power". Rather than being "possessed by demons", Rwandan Hutus "chose to do evil" by slaughtering Tutsis and moderate Hutus. The Report states that "many (Hutus) expressed pleasure in inflicting horrible suffering on their victims (while) hundreds of thousands of others hesitatingly joined in the genocide".

The second, somewhat related policy implication that follows from the evidence in this report is that officials who ultimately reject primordial explanations are more inclined to favour interventionist strategies. Clinton's speeches prior to the Kosovo air strikes in 1999 offer the clearest example of this. On the question of ethnic conflict in the Balkans and the utility of issuing the air strike threat, Clinton made the following statements on 23 March 1999, a few days prior to the attack on Serbia:

> I actually started reading up on the history of that area. And I found out that in fact they had been fighting on and off for hundreds of years, but there was more off than on. And it was an insult to them to say that somehow they were intrinsically made to murder one another. That was the excuse used by countries and leaders for too long....I know what happened in Bosnia. The United States and our allies, along with courageous people in Bosnia and in Croatia who refused to be subdued and fought back, found the unity and the will to stand up against the aggression and we helped to end the war....And now we've withdrawn 70 percent of our troops and there are still difficulties, but we preserved the peace and the slaughter hasn't come back.
>
> So, what have we learned from Bosnia? We learned that if you don't stand up to brutality and the killing of innocent people, you invite the people who do it to do more of it. We learned that firmness can save lives and stop armies. Now we have a chance to take the lessons we learned in Bosnia and put them to work in Kosovo before it's too late.... I think if the American people don't know anything else about me, they know

> that I don't like to use military force, and I do everything I can to avoid it. But if we have to do it, then that's part of the job, and I will do it.[47]

The Kosovo air strikes were a product of the lessons learned about President Milosevic, which in turn were derived from ten years of war in Bosnia, lessons which clearly demonstrated the fundamental error in Eagleberger's assertion that until Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats decide to stop killing each other "*there is nothing the outside world can do about it.*"[48] He, of course, was wrong.

Perhaps the most straightforward and important series of 'policy relevant' lessons derived from the Kosovo intervention have to do with the military options available to NATO at the time. With respect to the "ground war" option, which was often cited by critics as the preferred military option, the most obvious problem was that Milosevic 'preferred' it -- he needed a few hundred (if not, a few thousand) victories in the form of NATO casualties to sustain support for his fourth unsuccessful war in ten years. What better way to reinvigorate domestic support and military morale than by demonstrating to your domestic and military constituencies that you are not losing. If NATO's strategy ultimately worked by demoralizing Serbian political leaders, citizens and its military, then sending in NATO ground troops would have produced the exact opposite effect, by definition.

In addition to gaining control of heavily fortified Serb centers in Presitna, Dakovica, Srbica and Decani NATO would have had to control villages held by the KLA. But proponents of the ground war option have never fully explained how NATO could successfully deal with the KLA, battle 40,000 well-armed and hunkered-down Serb troops, safeguard innocent Kosovars trying to escape the fighting, and prevent ethnic cleansing all while trying to limit collateral damage and NATO casualties. No compelling answers have been provided by critics for how long it would have taken a ground offensive to control all of Kosovo in preparation for invading Serbia and facing another hundred thousand Serb troops. Nor is it clear how this approach would have achieved NATO's five objectives (especially the prevention of ethnic cleansing) in the same (or shorter) period of time with the same (or fewer) casualties. Even if we exclude all terrain related impediments to this kind of operation, a ground war would have taken significantly longer than 78 days (even to mobilize) and would clearly have produced far more casualties. Consider how long it was taking 40,000 Serb troops to fight a few thousand poorly equipped and poorly trained KLA soldiers.

Some critics argue it would at least have been more 'moral' for NATO to send in ground troops, but these "experts" never fully explain why it is more moral to lose more lives in a protracted war. Political leader should never be prepared to accept civilian or military casualties simply for the sake of proving they are prepared to accept casualties. This is particularly true if the best available military option (that is, the one most likely to achieve the stated objectives in the shortest period of time) also happens to be the one with the lowest risk of civilian and military casualties.

With respect to 'negotiation' alternatives, critics repeatedly overlook the fact that Milosevic rejected every

request to place any foreign (UN, NATO or Russian) troops inside Kosovo. There is no empirical evidence whatsoever to indicate that either Russia or China was prepared to endorse even a weak UN force without President Milosevic's consent, and critics provide no evidence that Milosevic was prepared to concede on that point. Meanwhile NATO was forced to deal with mounting evidence of ethnic cleansing and hundreds of thousands of refugees streaming into Albania and Macedonia, all prior to one bomb falling.

Most critics also fail (or refuse) to grasp the causal chain of events surrounding Kosovo's humanitarian catastrophe. Kosovar refugees flooding into Albania and Macedonia throughout the crisis left because of ethnic cleansing; none of the 850,000 refugees blamed their humanitarian disaster on NATO. The only request the refugees repeatedly made was for NATO to continue the campaign. Second, the decision by Milosevic to increase the pace of ethnic cleaning was arguably the most significant political and tactical error of the conflict, because it provided NATO with everything the alliance needed to succeed: 1) overwhelming and consistent public support for the bombing effort, 2) a moral justification for the campaign against Milosevic, and 3) evidence to support NATO's claims of proportionality, even when innocent Serb civilians died or foreign embassies were bombed.

Unfortunately, NATO's successful intervention into Kosovo in 1999, however justifiable on political, humanitarian or strategic-military grounds, was very costly. Consequently, when managing ethnic conflicts in the future the foreign policies of major powers will continue to be guided (and justified) by expectations derived from the primordial thesis, not because it is correct, but because it offers a practical and convincing rationale for avoiding involvement in potentially costly interventions. Military and political officials in the United States, Europe and Canada (not to mention several academics) continue to depend on these explanations to establish explicit limits on intervention options, and to justify a collective reluctance to get involved in wars that appear to be motivated by ethnic rivalry.[93] What is particularly disturbing about this fact is that crises characterised by ethnic division are becoming the major source of instability and violence. The widespread acceptance in academic and policy communities that primordial explanations are sufficient to account for this violence is something about which we should all be concerned.

5.1 Lessons Learned about Lessons Learned: NATO, Kosovo and Beyond

Perhaps the best way to predict NATO's role and strategy in future conflicts characterised by intrastate ethnic rivalry is by focussing on the lessons we have all learned from the last ten years of war in the Balkans, and especially the most recent case of Kosovo. As is usually the case, future behaviour ultimately depends on the most credible interpretation of the crucial lessons leartned from previous "similar" cases. Indeed, this has certainly been the pattern in the Balkans so far:

* lessons learned about the need for robust Rules of Engagement (ROEs) in UNPROFOR established more precise guidelines for IFOR and SFOR;
* lessons from SFOR mobilization served as the basis for KFOR;

* lessons about the use and misuse of coercive diplomacy in Bosnia between 1992-1995 were used to guide the application of retaliatory threats prior to Kosovo, circa 1998/1999;
* lessons gained from the Vance-Owen and Dayton negotiations served as a basis for Ramboulette; etc.

By the same logic, if a key lesson from Kosovo is that air strikes are not sufficient to win a war, or that ground troops should ***never***, under any circumstances, be taken off the list of military options, then, all else being equal, we can predict that NATO officials will never again depend exclusively on air strikes alone or explicitly exclude ground troops. Charles Darwin's *Theory of Evolution* is perhaps the single best explanation for why this prediction is likely to be proven correct -- evolutionary processes of fitness, selection and adaptability have always accounted for why certain policies, beliefs, strategies and lessons get selected, and why other options get discarded. Successful approaches are selected (preferred) because they are more fit for the survival of the person, groups, institutions, governments and alliances, like NATO. Failed policies, conversely, tend to get discarded precisely because they are less fit for the survival of these same individuals, groups and alliances. It is essential for individual and/or organisational survival, in other words, to learn the right lessons from history.

The major problem with the Kosovo experience, however, is that we have yet to identify the core lessons to learn. In fact, notwithstanding the publication of anywhere between 60-80 major reports on Kosovo, listing hundreds (if not thousands) of lessons learned, derived from informed contributions from hundreds if not thousands of so-called "experts", we have managed to compile a collection of mutually exclusive lessons. In effect, there is no learning curve in this case -- most of these "lessons" are put forward by individuals or groups for the purpose of re-confirming positions most of them held before the conflict. Every critic of NATO's approach prior to (and during the air strikes) remains a critic today, while every proponent of NATO's strategy continues to be supportive. If the gap between critics and proponents remains virtually identical before, during and after the conflict, then, by implication, we have no learning curve. In sum, the lessons learned from Kosovo are rarely compiled and disseminated for the purposes of improving our collective wisdom about NATO intervention or ethnic conflict, or to clarify what went right and/or wrong in Kosovo, or to establish how we might best avoid similar errors in the future. Creating a more effective policy framework for the next conflict is not (and never has been) the primary objective of a typical "lessons learned" report. The reason, of course, is that the really important lessons derived from key facts from the Kosovo experience are simply unknowable. For every lesson one can identify, from any of the major reports, there is a mutually exclusive counterpart lessons (from some other report) that is perhaps just as compelling and equally defensible using the same historical record and body of evidence. By implication, we simply do not have (nor will we ever have) a very solid foundation upon which to make balanced judgements about what happened in Kosovo or informed predictions about NATO's future role in the Balkans, since lessons from Kosovo can be used to justify (a) doing nothing, or (b) intervening with air strikes alone. Two illustrations of "mirror image" lessons are described below to illustrate the point.

LESSON 1 (version A) ➔ Political Interference by NATO leaders *Prolonged* the War in Kosovo.

EXPLANATION ➔ NATO officials misunderstood and miscalculated the ***negative*** effects of allowing politics to enter the decision-making process. This occurred in three important respects: 1) by excluding ground troops from the outset; 2) by taking a risk averse approach to the air strikes (for example, limiting the number of sorties in bad weather and using a three-stage approach to the strikes, which focussed first and foremost on immobilising Serb air defences); and 3) by giving NATO leaders a veto in selecting targets. The war was prolonged because Milosevic believed the damage would be limited to air strikes alone. There were no serious efforts made to mobilise ground troops, so Milosevic was able to question the commitment, resolve and, ultimately, credibility of NATO threats and overall strategy. The core lesson from this is that you never allow politics to enter into these sorts of decisions, and should never include and/or exclude any military option, like mobilising ground troops. If you do, you never make this decision explicit by giving your enemy a clear indication of what you do or do not intend to do.

LESSON 1 (version B) ➔Political Interference by NATO Officials *Shortened* the War in Kosovo.

EXPLANATION ➔ Milosevic misunderstood and miscalculated the ***positive*** effects NATO's decision to allow politics into the decision-making process. Excluding the option of mobilising ground troops from the outset and taking a risk averse approach to the air strikes (see above) helped to undermine Milosevic's political and military objectives. We know, for example, that Milosevic believed democratic states could not withstand casualties (Serb or Western). He fully expected high casualty levels would increase domestic pressure in US and European capitals and create the domestic and alliance divisions that would force NATO to capitulate (and he may have been correct in this regard). Since casualties would increase with either a ground war or a more risk acceptant approach to the air strikes, it was in Milosevic's interest for NATO to pursue such strategies. Since NATO made it explicit that politics would continue to play a role, time was not on Milosevic's side. There were no victories (or any prospects for victories) which he could offer his constituency to balance the costs he continued to suffer as a result of NATO bombing. Without any evidence of even small successes to appease his domestic constituency, or any counterbalancing victories to offer his military to sustain morale, time was not on his side.

We have two mutually exclusive accounts of how "politics" affected NATO's (and Milosevic's) choices. Depending on which of these assessments one accepts, one arrives at a different explanation for why Milosevic capitulated in the end. It is virtually impossible to accept both as valid, although both are equally defensible with reference to the historical record. Again, the truly important lessons are unknowable, because they require getting into the mind of Milosevic and his advisers. However, it is possible to interpret intentions and infer preferences based on patterns of behaviour throughout the conflict. Although not perfect, this approach provides a slightly more complete and perhaps more accurate account of the alternatives confronting Milosevic at the time. Indeed, when this is done, the evidence appears to support the second version of Lesson 1 more strongly than the first.

With respect to NATO's ground war option, Milosevic, like most NATO officials, understood that a ground invasion through Albania (the only option for NATO)would be exceedingly messy, producing far more civilian and military casualties than an air war alone. It certainly wouldn't have helped free Kosovar Albanians (or

helped return the 300,000 - 350,000 refugees already in Albania) and would certainly have created a worse humanitarian catastrophe -- consider the implications of hundreds of thousands of Kosovars in the middle of a conventional war between NATO ground units and close to 40,000-60,000 well-armed Serb troops. This kind of catastrophe was far more likely to increase domestic opposition to NATOs efforts than the refugee problem Milosevic was responsible for.

It is clear from Milosevic's behaviour that he placed a great deal of importance on emphasising little victories. Consider what he focussed on: the capture of Macedonian peacekeepers; the downed US Stealth bomber; the civilian casualties produced by errant NATO bombs; the destroyed Serb TV station and civilian casualties this produced; the Chinese embassy bombing. If one tracks the ebbs and flows in diplomatic movement throughout the crisis, there was an obvious pattern: the momentum tied to modest NATO and Russian diplomatic successes dropped significantly after each one of these episodes; each one of these episodes increased opposition to NATO bombing, represented a small victory for Milosevic and gave him renewed hope that the pressure would be sufficient, this time, to crack the alliance. Unfortunately for Milosevic he was limited to these relatively minor victories which, even together, could not create the momentum he needed to sustain his efforts or increase opposition to NATO bombing. The humanitarian catastrophe caused by his decision to pick up the pace of ethnic cleansing further undermined his efforts and created the conditions for ultimate failure.

Contrary to convention wisdom about the Kosovo case, therefore, military and civilian casualties were not bad because they risked increasing the degree of domestic pressure, especially within western democracies, to get out of a conflict prematurely; in the case of Kosovo, casualties were bad because they tended to convince the losing side to stay the course in hopes that domestic pressure will force the wining side to leave sooner or later. With this in mind, it is just as mistaken to mobilise ground troops in every single conflict as it is to exclude their use in every single conflict. But one or the other option may be useful under different sets of circumstances. Indeed, making a clear and unambiguous statement to your opponent that you will not deploy ground troops can, in some circumstances, represent a useful coercive diplomatic threat, as it did in Kosovo, because it denies the opponent the benefits of victories derived from casualties of any kind. This is especially true if the opponent prefers high levels of casualties to serve specific political and military objectives.

Another example of mutually exclusive lessons also helps to make the point about mirror image interpretations of the key lessons from Kosovo.

LESSON 2 (version A) ➔ **NATO air strikes *caused* ethnic cleansing and the humanitarian catastrophe**. If one tracks the pace of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, NATO's decision to start the air campaign was perhaps the single biggest political and military blunder of the entire conflict.

LESSON 2 (version B) ➔ **NATO air strikes *did not cause* ethnic cleansing and the humanitarian catastrophe.** In fact, they were designed and implemented to convince Milosevic that it wasn't

> in his interest to continue the ethnic cleansing. Not only did Serb officials fail to get the message until the 78th day of the campaign, but the decision to pick up the pace of the catastrophe was the single biggest political and military blunder of the entire conflict.

Indeed, even if Milosevic threatened to increase the pace of ethnic cleansing in anticipation of the air strikes, and even assuming he made this coercive threat clear to Holbrooke at their last meeting, NATO officials still should not have acquiesced -- their decision to begin the air strikes was based on the assumption that Milosevic was rational. This was (and always is) the correct approach and strategy, even in situations where there is some probability the opponent will act irrationally. If fact, it is actually more appropriate to assume rationality in situations where an opponent's irrational behaviour (while less likely) will create a chain of events that ultimately undermines his interests, as in this case -- ethnic cleansing gave NATO officials the justification (and domestic support) they needed to continue with the air strikes until Milosevic capitulated.

These examples illustrates another interesting feature of various efforts to identify the "lessons learned" from Kosovo: few of these reports have assessed preferences from the point of view of Milosevic and then used this information to revisit and re-asses the lessons NATO leaders should learn from the experience. For example,

(a) what if Milosevic actually wanted a ground war, for reasons outlined above? Afterall, losing Kosovo to a NATO ground offensive would amount to the same outcome -- Serb troops out, NATO troops in;

(b) what if Milosevic wanted NATO to take a more risk acceptant approach to air strikes (e.g., maintain a high level of sorties even in adverse weather conditions or without completely immobilising Serbian air defences)?;

(c) what if Milosevic wanted NATO officials to remain outside the military decision-making process, especially in regards to targeting, so that NATO military leaders could take the risks they were entirely prepared to take and suffer the casualties they were prepared to suffer?

If these were indeed preferences held by Milosevic, what exactly does that suggest about the preferences NATO leaders should have had? Moreover, if these preferences were held by Milosevic, what lessons should be learned from the strategy NATO ultimately selected? In both cases NATO leaders did the right thing.

Similarly, we almost never assess lessons learned from the perspective of the adversary, and then use this information as a basis for revisiting the lessons NATO officials should learn from the same experience. For example, what if the lessons learned by Milosevic (and Russia) include the following:

(a) democracies can fight and sustain an operation against an authoritarian regime which does not have the same domestic constraints or experience the political pressures.
(b) democratic states can inflict a great deal of damage on other states without having to commit ground troops;
(c) democracies can control the media and political spin as effectively as authoritarian regimes;
(d) NATO countries can act together and remain united notwithstanding hundreds of impediments, political pressures and distinct agendas;
(e) creating a humanitarian catastrophe is not the best way to get people on your side.

The point is that lessons NATO officials learn must be based on a more comprehensive and complex assessment of preferences and lessons learned by opponents. This is the only way to acquire a full and perhaps more balanced

assessment of policy implications for the next crisis.

Another problem with the entire “lessons learned” program is the tendency to assume that, because a war occurred we must have important lessons to learn about what went wrong. In the case of Kosovo, for example, since diplomatic efforts failed to avoid violence, NATO diplomatic officials must have erred. But lessons should always be assessed in terms of the complex nature of the conflict itself, not in terms of some ideal world in which co-operation is the norm and in which conflict and war is anomalous or assumed to be obsolete. The diplomatic requirements and associated impediments to success (political agendas and divisions; Russiana nd Chinese support for Milosevic; the lack of the UN mandate to intervene; a humanitarian catastrophe; the Chinese embassy bombing; the history of ethnic turmoil in the region; etc. This is the environment through which we must assess success and failure and the real lessons. With all of this in mind, critics are having a very hard time sustaining the view that NATO did not succeed.

I close with a warning:

The only thing worse than being forced to learn the "right" lessons from a failure is being forced to learn the "wrong" lessons from a success. the former partially protects us from making the same mistake again, but the latter virtually guarantees we will make even worse mistakes in the future.

As academics and policy officials we simply cannot afford to make these mistakes.

ENDNOTES

[1] A similar argument and approach was developed by Leng and Singer (1988) in relation to the study of interstate war using Behavioral Correlates of War (BCOW) data.

[2] Although there is a great deal of overlap between conventional and nuclear deterrence theory, I focus exclusively on the requirements for success at the conventional level. For excellent treatments of the prerequisites for crisis stability at the nuclear level, see James (1991, 1993), Brams (1985), Brams and Kilgour (1987a, 1987b) and Harvey (1997c).

[3] A final point of clarification should be made about the coding of *commitments* (condition B). Deterrence theory stipulates that challengers assess the costs and benefits of inaction versus action depending, in part, on a critical judgement of the defender's commitment to its allies (in the form of military and economic ties). But measuring commitments in terms of military and economic ties between defender and protégé is not very helpful in the context of a protracted crisis, since there is little variation in such ties during the course of the same dispute. An alternative method of measuring commitments, which taps into a somewhat related prerequisite for deterrence success, is to establish whether the threatened punishment is severe enough to deny the challenger the objectives sought. After all, even clear and credible threats from resolute defenders will fail if the challenger believes that the challenge is worth costs incurred by triggering the threatened response. The crucial question when identifying commitments in protracted crises, then, is whether the retaliatory threat is likely to be more costly to the challenger than the sacrifice incurred through capitulation.

[4] Audience costs affect the credibility of a retaliatory threat and are usually produced by a) the act of signalling (e.g., "burning bridges", Spence 1973), and b) the act of backing down (Fearon 1989, 1992, 1994). If a defender is expected to suffer enormous costs from backing down, the threat is likely to be more credible to the defender.

[5] George and Smoke's (1974) excellent study of deterrence assesses the impact of several other factors from the perspectives of defender and challenger by focusing on their respective cost calculations. Included among variables tied to success are the initiator's belief that the *risks* of the challenge are calculable and controllable, and the challenger's comparison of the *costs* of a challenge versus the status quo. More often than not, however, these additional variables can be operationalised as different representations of the four core prerequisites specified here (a point discussed in more detail in the conclusion). Moreover, to the extent that there are other factors, they are usually considered "minor" in comparison (George and Smoke 1974: 530-532).

[6] Efforts to identify the presence of *resolve* are especially susceptible to coding problems, unless explored through the prism of protracted crises. Conventional wisdom stipulates that once a challenge takes place and the defender follows through with the retaliatory threat, the case is coded as a failure and the search for evidence ends. But deterrence successes are often achieved as a result of short term failures, because failures provide the best opportunity for leaders in the defending state to demonstrate resolve, not to mention capability and credibility, all essential requirements for successful deterrence (Lieberman 1995). Evaluating deterrence in the context of protracted crises, therefore, can help to explain otherwise puzzling phenomenon and to provide a new way to test core hypotheses about deterrence prerequisites.

[7] A similar approach was used by Lebow (1981) to assess the link between deterrence theory and 13 cases of deterrence failure. His data is re-evaluted in this paper from the perspective of necessity and sufficiency.

[8] Some might argue that RS16 and RS32 should not be included among possible scenarios since they don't appear to represent relevant deterrence activity. However, both the Huth and Russett (1988) and Harvey (1997a, 1997b) datasets, described later in the paper, include cases that correspond to these types of

exchanges.

[9] Hypotheses S3 and F5 are excluded from the Table, and subsequent analysis, because they represent combinations of other hypotheses.

[10] Ibid., 40564

[11] NYT, 25 May 1995, A, 14:3

[12] NYT, 26 May 1995, A, 1:1

[13] Keesing's, May 1995 (40564)

[14] Ibid

[15] Ibid

[16] Ibid

[17] Keesing's, August 1995 (40688)

[18] Ibid

[19] Ibid

[20] Ibid

[21] Ibid

[22] Ibid

[23] Ibid., 40690

[24] NYT, 18 August, 1995, A, 4:3

[25] Keesing's, August 1995 (40690)

[26] NYT, 29 August 1995, A, 1:1

[27] Keesing's, August 1995 (40690)

[28] Ibid., 40691

[29] Ibid

[30] Ibid

[31] NYT, 31 August 1995, A, 1:3

[32] Keesing's, August 1995 (40691)

[33] Ibid

[34] NYT, 1 September 1995, A, 10:1

[35] Keesing's, August 1995 (40691)

[36] Keesing's, September 1995 (40734)

[37] Ibid., 40735

[38] Ibid

[39] Ibid

[40] Ibid

[41] Ibid

[42] Relevant percentages for Harvey and Lebow are taken from Harvey (1998).

[43] Harvey, "Deterrence and Ethnic Conflict," 207.

[44] Ibid

[45] Zimmermann, *Origins of a Catastrophe;* Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*; Harvey, "Deterrence and Ethnic Conflict"; Harvey, "Rigor Mortis or Rigor, More Tests"; Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will*.

[46] Harvey, "Deterrence and Ethnic Conflict," 208.

[47] William J. Clinton. For a copy of this speech see http://cnn.com/transcripts/9903/23/se.05.html.

[48] Eagleberger, quoted in Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 23, emphasis added.

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TABLES

Table 1

Deterrence and/or Compellence Prerequisites

Response Set #	A	B	C	D	Outcome
1	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
2	Y	Y	Y	N	N
3	Y	Y	N	Y	N
4	Y	N	Y	Y	N
5	N	Y	Y	Y	N
6	Y	Y	N	N	N
7	Y	N	N	Y	N
8	N	N	Y	Y	N
9	N	Y	N	Y	N
10	Y	N	Y	N	N
11	N	Y	Y	N	N
12	Y	N	N	N	N
13	N	N	N	Y	N
14	N	N	Y	N	N
15	N	Y	N	N	N
16	N	N	N	N	N
17	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
18	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
19	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
20	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
21	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
22	Y	Y	N	N	Y
23	Y	N	N	Y	Y
24	N	N	Y	Y	Y
25	N	Y	N	Y	Y
26	Y	N	Y	N	Y
27	N	Y	Y	N	Y
28	Y	N	N	N	Y
29	N	N	N	Y	Y
30	N	N	Y	N	Y
31	N	Y	N	N	Y
32	N	N	N	N	Y

Table 3
(adapted from Most and Starr 1989: 62)

Prerequisites for Deterrence and/or Compellence Success

Hypotheses	*Interpretation*	*Supporting Evidence*
S1. if A and B and C and D, then success **without** 17	jointly sufficient	1
S2. only if A and B and C and D, then success 18-32	jointly necessary	1-16 **without**
S3. if and only if A and B and C and D, then success **without** 17-32	jointly necessary and sufficient	1-16
S4. if A or B or C or D, then success 1,18,19,20,22,23,26,28 **without**	independently sufficient (test for each prerequisite)	**A** 2,3,4,6,7,10,12,17 **B** 1,18,19,21,22,25,27,31 **without** 2,3,5,6,9,11,15,17 **C** 1,18,20,21,24,26,27,30 **without** 2,4,5,8,10,11,14,17 **D** 1,19,20,21,23,24,25,29 **without** 3,4,5,7,8,9,13,17
S5. only if A or B or C or D, then success **A** 1,5,8,9,11,13,14,15,16,	independently necessary (test for each prerequisite)	18,19,20,22,23,26,28 **without** 21,24,25,27,29,30,31,32 **B** 1,4,7,8,10,12,13,14,16, 18,19,21,22,25,27,31 **without** 20,23,24,26,28,29,30,32 **C** 1,3,6,7,9,12,13,15,16, 18,20,21,24,26,27,30 **without** 19,22,23,25,28,29,31,32 **D** 1,2,6,10,11,12,14,15,16, 19,20,21,23,24,25,29 **without** 18,22,26,27,28,30,31,32

Table 4
(adapted from Most and Starr 1989: 62)

Prerequisites for Deterrence and/or Compellence Failure

Hypotheses	*Interpretation*	*Supporting Evidence*
F1. if ~A or ~B or ~C or ~D, then failure	independently sufficient	
~A	(test for each prerequisite)	
5,8,9,11,13,14,15,16		
		without 21,24,25,27,29,30,31,32
		~**B** 4,7,8,10,12,13,14,16
		without 20,23,24,26,28,29,30,32
		~**C** 3,6,7,9,12,13,15,16
		without 19,22,23,25,28,29,31,32
		~**D** 2,6,10,11,12,14,15,16
		without 18,22,26,27,28,30,31,32
F2. only if ~A or ~B or ~C or ~D, then failure	independently necessary	
~A	(test for each prerequsite)	
1,5,8,9,11,13,14,15,16,		
		18,19,20,22,23,26,28
		without 2,3,4,6,7,10,12,17
		~**B** 1,4,7,8,10,12,13,14,16,
18,19,21,22,25,27,31		
without		
		2,3,5,6,9,11,15,17
		~**C** 1,3,6,7,9,12,13,15,16,
18,20,21,24,26,27,30		
		without 2,4,5,8,10,11,14,17
		~**D** 1,2,6,10,11,12,14,15,16,
19,20,21,23,24,25,29		
		without 3,4,5,7,8,9,13,17
F3. if ~A and ~B and ~C and ~D, then failure **without** 32	jointly sufficient	16
F4. only if ~A and ~B and ~C and ~D, then failure and 18-31	jointly necessary	1,16
		without 2-15 and 17
F5. if and only if ~A and ~B and ~C and ~D, then failure and 18-31	jointly necessary and sufficient	1,16
		without 2-15, 17, 32

Table 5

Hypotheses and Evidentiary Weights for Relevant Response Sets
(ws=supporting weights; wd=disconfirming weights)

	S1	S2	S4a		S4b				S5				F1a	F1b				F2				F3	F4		MIB	
					A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D		A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D					
Response Set#	ws	ws	ws	wd	ws wd	ws wd	ws wd	ws wd	ws wd	ws wd	ws wd	ws wd	ws	ws wd	ws wd	ws wd	ws wd	ws wd	ws wd	ws wd	ws wd	ws	ws	wd	ws	wd
1	4	4	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	-	1	0	4	0
2	-	4	-	3	2	2	2	-	-	-	-	4	4	-	-	-	4	2	2	2	4	-	-	3	1	3
3	-	4	-	3	2	2	-	2	-	-	4	-	4	-	-	4	-	2	2	4	2	-	-	3	1	3
4	-	4	-	3	2	-	2	2	-	4	-	-	4	-	4	-	-	2	4	2	2	-	-	3	1	3
5	-	4	-	3	-	2	2	2	4	-	-	-	4	4	-	-	-	4	2	2	2	-	-	3	1	3
6	-	3	-	2	3	3	-	-	-	-	3	3	3	-	-	3	3	3	3	3	3	-	-	2	2	2
7	-	3	-	2	3	-	-	3	-	3	3	-	3	-	3	3	-	3	3	3	3	-	-	2	2	2
8	-	3	-	2	-	-	3	3	3	3	-	-	3	3	3	-	-	3	3	3	3	-	-	2	2	2
9	-	3	-	2	-	3	-	3	3	-	3	-	3	3	-	3	-	3	3	3	3	-	-	2	2	2
10	-	3	-	2	3	-	3	-	-	3	-	3	3	-	3	-	3	3	3	3	3	-	-	2	2	2
11	-	3	-	2	-	3	3	-	3	-	-	3	3	3	-	-	3	3	3	3	3	-	-	2	2	2
12	-	2	-	1	4	-	-	-	-	2	2	2	2	-	2	2	2	4	2	2	2	-	-	1	3	1
13	-	2	-	1	-	-	-	4	2	2	2	-	2	2	2	2	-	2	2	2	4	-	-	1	3	1
14	-	2	-	1	-	-	4	-	2	2	-	2	2	2	2	-	2	2	2	4	2	-	-	1	3	1
15	-	2	-	1	-	4	-	-	2	-	2	2	2	2	-	2	2	2	4	2	2	-	-	1	3	1
16	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	4	4	0	4	0
	wd	wd	ws	wd	ws wd	ws wd	ws wd	ws wd	ws wd	ws wd	ws wd	ws wd	wd	ws wd	ws wd	ws wd	ws wd	ws wd	ws wd	ws wd	ws wd	wd	ws	wd	ws	wd
17	4	-	0	4	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	-	0	4	0	4
18	-	1	2	-	2	2	2	-	2	2	2	4	1	-	-	-	4	2	2	2	-	-	2	-	3	1
19	-	1	2	-	2	2	-	2	2	2	4	2	1	-	-	4	-	2	2	-	2	-	2	-	3	1
20	-	1	2	-	2	-	2	2	2	4	2	2	1	-	4	-	-	2	-	2	2	-	2	-	3	1
21	-	1	2	-	-	2	2	2	4	2	2	2	1	4	-	-	-	-	2	2	2	-	2	-	3	1
22	-	2	3	-	3	3	-	-	3	3	3	3	2	-	-	3	3	3	2	-	-	-	3	-	2	2
23	-	2	3	-	3	-	-	3	3	3	3	3	2	-	3	3	-	3	-	-	3	-	3	-	2	2
24	-	2	3	-	-	-	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	3	-	-	-	-	3	3	-	3	-	2	2
25	-	2	3	-	-	3	-	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	-	3	-	-	3	-	3	-	3	-	2	2
26	-	2	3	-	3	-	3	-	3	3	3	3	2	-	3	-	3	3	-	3	-	-	3	-	2	2
27	-	2	3	-	-	3	3	-	3	3	3	3	2	3	-	-	3	-	3	3	-	-	3	-	2	2
28	-	3	4	-	4	-	-	-	4	2	2	2	3	-	2	2	2	4	-	-	-	-	4	-	1	3
29	-	3	4	-	-	-	-	4	2	2	2	4	3	2	2	2	-	-	-	-	4	-	4	-	1	3
30	-	3	4	-	-	-	4	-	2	2	4	2	3	2	2	-	2	-	-	4	-	-	4	-	1	3
31	-	3	4	-	-	4	-	-	2	4	2	2	3	2	-	2	2	-	4	-	-	-	4	-	1	3
32	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	4	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	0	4

Table 6

Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1993-1995

Prerequisites	*1*	*2a/b*	*3a/b*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*	*9*	*10*	*11*	*12*	*13a/b*	*14(a)*	*14(b)*
undesired action defined and threat communicated	**Y**	**Y/Y**	**Y/Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y/Y**	**Y**	**Y**
threat potentially costly to challenger	**Y**	**Y/N**	**Y/N**	**Y**	**Y**	**N**	**Y**	**N**	**Y**	**N**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y/Y**	**Y**	**Y**
capability to deny gains from challenge	**Y**	**Y/N**	**Y/Y**	**N** (light option)	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**N**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y/Y**	**Y**	**Y**
resolve (consensus) demonstrated	**Y**	**Y/N**	**Y/N**	**N**	**Y**	**N**	**Y**	**N**	**N**	**N**	**N**	**N**	**N/Y**	**Y**	**Y**
Success?	**Y**	**Y/N**	**Y/N**	**N**	**Y**	**N**	**Y**	**N**	**N**	**N**	**N**	**N**	**N/Y**	**N**	**Y**

Table 7

Coercive Diplomacy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1993-1995

THE SET (ABCD) IS JOINTLY NECESSARY FOR SUCCESS (S2)
OR
THE ABSENCE OF ANY ONE CONDITION IS INDEPEDENTLY SUFFICIENT FOR FAILURE (F1a)

	Response Set#	A	B	C	D	outcome	ws	n	n(ws)
*	1	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	7	28
	2	Y	Y	Y	N	N	4	4	16
	3	Y	Y	N	Y	N	4	0	0
	4	Y	N	Y	Y	N	4	0	0
	5	N	Y	Y	Y	N	4	0	0
	6	Y	Y	N	N	N	3	1	3
	7	Y	N	N	Y	N	3	0	0
	8	N	N	Y	Y	N	3	0	0
	9	N	Y	N	Y	N	3	0	0
	10	Y	N	Y	N	N	3	3	9
	11	N	Y	Y	N	N	3	0	0
	12	Y	N	N	N	N	2	2	4
	13	N	N	N	Y	N	2	0	0
	14	N	N	Y	N	N	2	0	0
	15	N	Y	N	N	N	2	0	0
**	16	N	N	N	N	N	1	0	0

	Response Set#	A	B	C	D	outcome	wd	n	n(wd)
*	17	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	-	1	-
	18	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	1	0	0
	19	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	1	0	0
	20	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	1	0	0
	21	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	1	0	0
	22	Y	Y	N	N	Y	2	0	0
	23	Y	N	N	Y	Y	2	0	0
	24	N	N	Y	Y	Y	2	0	0
	25	N	Y	N	Y	Y	2	0	0
	26	Y	N	Y	N	Y	2	0	0
	27	N	Y	Y	N	Y	2	0	0
	28	Y	N	N	N	Y	3	0	0
	29	N	N	N	Y	Y	3	0	0
	30	N	N	Y	N	Y	3	0	0
	31	N	Y	N	N	Y	3	0	0
**	32	N	N	N	N	Y	4	0	0

$$\frac{\sum n(ws)}{\sum n(ws) + \sum n(wd)} = \begin{array}{ll} \mathbf{100\%} & \mathbf{(Hyp.\ S2)} \\ \mathbf{100\%} & \mathbf{(Hyp.\ F1a)} \\ \mathbf{0/0} & \mathbf{(Hyp.\ F3)} \end{array}$$

* Response sets 1 and 17 are not relevant to testing hypothesis F1a
** Response sets 16 and 32 receive supporting and disconfirming weights of 4, respectively, for hypothesis F3.

Table 8

Coercive Diplomacy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1993-1995

THE SET (~A~B~C~D) IS JOINTLY NECESSARY FOR FAILURE (F4)
OR
THE PRESENCE OF ANY ONE CONDITION IS INDEPEDENTLY SUFFICIENT FOR SUCCESS (S4a)

	Response Set#	A	B	C	D	outcome	ws	wd	n	n(ws)	n(wd)
	1	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	1	0	7	7	0
	2	Y	Y	Y	N	N	-	3	4	-	12
	3	Y	Y	N	Y	N	-	3	0	-	0
	4	Y	N	Y	Y	N	-	3	0	-	0
	5	N	Y	Y	Y	N	-	3	0	-	0
	6	Y	Y	N	N	N	-	2	1	-	2
	7	Y	N	N	Y	N	-	2	0	-	0
	8	N	N	Y	Y	N	-	2	0	-	0
	9	N	Y	N	Y	N	-	2	0	-	0
	10	Y	N	Y	N	N	-	2	3	-	6
	11	N	Y	Y	N	N	-	2	0	-	0
	12	Y	N	N	N	N	-	1	2	-	2
	13	N	N	N	Y	N	-	1	0	-	0
	14	N	N	Y	N	N	-	1	0	-	0
	15	N	Y	N	N	N	-	1	0	-	0
*	16	N	N	N	N	N	4	0	0	0	0

	Response Set#	A	B	C	D	outcome	ws	wd	n	n(ws)	n(wd)
	17	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	0	4	1	0	4
	18	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	2	-	0	0	-
	19	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	2	-	0	0	-
	20	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	2	-	0	0	-
	21	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	2	-	0	0	-
	22	Y	Y	N	N	Y	3	-	0	0	-
	23	Y	N	N	Y	Y	3	-	0	0	-
	24	N	N	Y	Y	Y	3	-	0	0	-
	25	N	Y	N	Y	Y	3	-	0	0	-
	26	Y	N	Y	N	Y	3	-	0	0	-
	27	N	Y	Y	N	Y	3	-	0	0	-
	28	Y	N	N	N	Y	4	-	0	0	-
	29	N	N	N	Y	Y	4	-	0	0	-
	30	N	N	Y	N	Y	4	-	0	0	-
	31	N	Y	N	N	Y	4	-	0	0	-
*	32	N	N	N	N	Y	-	-	0	-	-

$$\frac{\sum n(ws)}{\sum n(ws) + \sum n(wd)} = \begin{matrix} \textbf{21 \% (Hyp. F4)} \\ \\ \textbf{21 \% (Hyp. S4a)} \end{matrix}$$

* Response sets 16 and 32 are not relevant to testing hypothesis S4a.

Table 9

Coercive Diplomacy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1993-1995

PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS: MORE IS BETTER (MIB)

Response Set#	A	B	C	D	outcome	ws	wd	n	n(ws)	n(wd)
1	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	0	7	28	0
2	Y	Y	Y	N	N	1	3	4	4	12
3	Y	Y	N	Y	N	1	3	0	0	0
4	Y	N	Y	Y	N	1	3	0	0	0
5	N	Y	Y	Y	N	1	3	0	0	0
6	Y	Y	N	N	N	2	2	1	2	2
7	Y	N	N	Y	N	2	2	0	0	0
8	N	N	Y	Y	N	2	2	0	0	0
9	N	Y	N	Y	N	2	2	0	0	0
10	Y	N	Y	N	N	2	2	3	6	6
11	N	Y	Y	N	N	2	2	0	0	0
12	Y	N	N	N	N	3	1	2	6	2
13	N	N	N	Y	N	3	1	0	0	0
14	N	N	Y	N	N	3	1	0	0	0
15	N	Y	N	N	N	3	1	0	0	0
16	N	N	N	N	N	4	0	0	0	0

Response Set#	A	B	C	D	outcome	wd	ws	n	n(wd)	n(ws)
17	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	4	0	1	4	0
18	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	1	3	0	0	0
19	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	1	3	0	0	0
20	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	1	3	0	0	0
21	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	1	3	0	0	0
22	Y	Y	N	N	Y	2	2	0	0	0
23	Y	N	N	Y	Y	2	2	0	0	0
24	N	N	Y	Y	Y	2	2	0	0	0
25	N	Y	N	Y	Y	2	2	0	0	0
26	Y	N	Y	N	Y	2	2	0	0	0
27	N	Y	Y	N	Y	2	2	0	0	0
28	Y	N	N	N	Y	3	1	0	0	0
29	N	N	N	Y	Y	3	1	0	0	0
30	N	N	Y	N	Y	3	1	0	0	0
31	N	Y	N	N	Y	3	1	0	0	0
32	N	N	N	N	Y	4	0	0	0	0

$$\frac{\sum n(ws)}{\sum n(ws) + \sum n(wd)} = \mathbf{64\%}$$

Table 10

Coercive Diplomacy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1993-1995

INDEPENDENT NECESSITY OF X FOR SUCCESS (S5)
and
INDEPENDENT SUFFICIENCY OF X FOR SUCCESS (S4b)

Supporting Response Sets and Weights (for each prerequisite)

A	n	wsA	B	n	wsB	C	n	wsC	D	n	wsD	n(wsA)	n(wsB)	n(wsC)	n(wsD)
1	7	1	*1*	7	1	*1*	7	1	*1*	7	1	*7*	*7*	*7*	*7*
5	0	4	**4**	0	4	**3**	0	4	**2**	4	4	**0**	**0**	**0**	**16**
8	0	3	**7**	0	3	**6**	1	3	**6**	1	3	**0**	**0**	**3**	**3**
9	0	3	**8**	0	3	**7**	0	3	**10**	3	3	**0**	**0**	**0**	**9**
11	0	3	**10**	3	3	**9**	0	3	**11**	0	3	**0**	**9**	**0**	**0**
13	0	2	**12**	2	2	**12**	2	2	**12**	2	2	**0**	**4**	**4**	**4**
14	0	2	**13**	0	2	**13**	0	2	**14**	0	2	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
15	0	2	**14**	0	2	**15**	0	2	**15**	0	2	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
16	0	1	**16**	0	1	**16**	0	1	**16**	0	1	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
18	0	2	*18*	0	2	*18*	0	2	*19*	0	2	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*
19	0	2	*19*	0	2	*20*	0	2	*20*	0	2	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*
20	0	2	*21*	0	2	*21*	0	2	*21*	0	2	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*
22	0	3	*22*	0	3	*24*	0	3	*23*	0	3	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*
23	0	3	*25*	0	3	*26*	0	3	*24*	0	3	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*
26	0	3	*27*	0	3	*27*	0	3	*25*	0	3	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*
28	0	4	*31*	0	4	*30*	0	4	*29*	0	4	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*

Bold = evidence supporting necessity of X for success
*Italics = evidence supporting necessity **or** sufficiency of X for success*

Sum of relevant weighted cases for **necessity** ∑n(wsA) = 7 ∑n(wsB) = 20 ∑n(wsC)= 14 ∑n(wsD) = 39
Sum of relevant weighted cases for **sufficiency** ∑n(wsA) = 7 ∑n(wsB) = 7 ∑n(wsC)= 7 ∑n(wsD) = 7

Disconfirming Response Sets and Weights (for each prerequisite)

A	n	wdA	B	n	wdB	C	n	wdC	D	n	wdD	n(wdA)	n(wdB)	n(wdC)	n(wdD)
2	4	2	*2*	4	2	*2*	4	2	*3*	0	2	*8*	*8*	*8*	*0*
3	0	2	*3*	0	2	*4*	0	2	*4*	0	2	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*
4	0	2	*5*	0	2	*5*	0	2	*5*	0	2	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*
6	1	3	*6*	1	3	*8*	0	3	*7*	0	3	*3*	*3*	*0*	*0*
7	0	3	*9*	0	3	*10*	3	3	*8*	0	3	*0*	*0*	*9*	*0*
10	3	3	*11*	0	3	*11*	0	3	*9*	0	3	*9*	*0*	*0*	*0*
12	2	4	*15*	0	4	*14*	0	4	*13*	0	4	*8*	*0*	*0*	*0*
17	1	1	*17*	1	1	*17*	1	1	*17*	1	1	*1*	*1*	*1*	*1*
21	0	4	**20**	0	4	**19**	0	4	**18**	0	4	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
24	0	3	**23**	0	3	**22**	0	3	**22**	0	3	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
25	0	3	**24**	0	3	**23**	0	3	**26**	0	3	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
27	0	3	**26**	0	3	**25**	0	3	**27**	0	3	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
29	0	2	**28**	0	2	**28**	0	2	**28**	0	2	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
30	0	2	**29**	0	2	**29**	0	2	**30**	0	2	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
31	0	2	**30**	0	2	**31**	0	2	**31**	0	2	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
32	0	1	**32**	0	1	**32**	0	1	**32**	0	1	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**

Bold = evidence against necessity of X for success
Italics = evidence against sufficiency of X for success

Sum of relevant weighted cases against **necessity** ∑n(wdA) = 0 ∑n(wdB) = 0 ∑n(wdC)= 0 ∑n(wdD) = 0
Sum of relevant weighted cases against **sufficiency** ∑n(wdA) = 29 ∑n(wdB) = 12 ∑n(wdC)= 18 ∑n(wdD) = 1

$$\frac{\sum n(ws_x)}{\sum n(ws_x) + \sum n(wd_x)}$$

necessity of **X** for **success** ====> **A = 100%** **B = 100%** **C = 100%** **D = 100%**
sufficiency of **X** for **success** ====> **A = 19%** **B = 37%** **C = 28%** **D = 88%**

Table 11

Coercive Diplomacy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1993-1995

INDEPENDENT NECESSITY OF ~X FOR FAILURE (F2)
and
INDEPENDENT SUFFICIENCY OF ~X FOR FAILURE (F1b)

Supporting Response Sets and Weights (for each prerequisite)

~A	n	ws~A	~B	n	ws~B	~C	n	ws~C	~D	n	ws~D	n(ws~A)	n(ws~B)	n(ws~C)	n(ws~D)
1	7	1	**1**	7	1	**1**	7	1	**1**	7	1	**7**	**7**	**7**	**7**
5	0	4	*4*	0	4	*3*	0	4	*2*	4	4	*0*	*0*	*0*	*16*
8	0	3	*7*	0	3	*6*	1	3	*6*	1	3	*0*	*0*	*3*	*3*
9	0	3	*8*	0	3	*7*	0	3	*10*	3	3	*0*	*0*	*0*	*9*
11	0	3	*10*	3	3	*9*	0	3	*11*	0	3	*0*	*9*	*0*	*0*
13	0	2	*12*	2	2	*12*	2	2	*12*	2	2	*0*	*4*	*4*	*4*
14	0	2	*13*	0	2	*13*	0	2	*14*	0	2	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*
15	0	2	*14*	0	2	*15*	0	2	*15*	0	2	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*
16	0	1	*16*	0	1	*16*	0	1	*16*	0	1	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*
18	0	2	**18**	0	2	**18**	0	2	**19**	0	2	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
19	0	2	**19**	0	2	**20**	0	2	**20**	0	2	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
20	0	2	**21**	0	2	**21**	0	2	**21**	0	2	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
22	0	3	**22**	0	3	**24**	0	3	**23**	0	3	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
23	0	3	**25**	0	3	**26**	0	3	**24**	0	3	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
26	0	3	**27**	0	3	**27**	0	3	**25**	0	3	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
28	0	4	**31**	0	4	**30**	0	4	**29**	0	4	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**

Bold **= evidence supporting necessity of ~X for failure**
Italics *= evidence supporting necessity or sufficiency of ~X for failure*

Sum of relevant weighted cases for **necessity** ∑n(ws~A) = 7 ∑n(ws~B) = 20 ∑n(ws~C) = 14 ∑n(ws~D) = 39
Sum of relevant weighted cases for **sufficiency** ∑n(ws~A) = 0 ∑n(ws~B) = 13 ∑n(ws~C) = 7 ∑n(ws~D) = 32

Disconfirming Response Sets and Weights (for each prerequisite)

~A	n	wd~A	~B	n	wd~B	~C	n	wd~C	~D	n	wd~D	n(wd~A)	n(wd~B)	n(wd~C)	n(wd~D)
2	4	2	**2**	4	2	**2**	4	2	**3**	0	2	**8**	**8**	**8**	**0**
3	0	2	**3**	0	2	**4**	0	2	**4**	0	2	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
4	0	2	**5**	0	2	**5**	0	2	**5**	0	2	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
6	1	3	**6**	1	3	**8**	0	3	**7**	0	3	**3**	**3**	**0**	**0**
7	0	3	**9**	0	3	**10**	3	3	**8**	0	3	**0**	**0**	**9**	**0**
10	3	3	**11**	0	3	**11**	0	3	**9**	0	3	**9**	**0**	**0**	**0**
12	2	4	**15**	0	4	**14**	0	4	**13**	0	4	**8**	**0**	**0**	**0**
17	1	1	**17**	1	1	**17**	1	1	**17**	1	1	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**
21	0	4	*20*	0	4	*19*	0	4	*18*	0	4	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*
24	0	3	*23*	0	3	*22*	0	3	*22*	0	3	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*
25	0	3	*24*	0	3	*23*	0	3	*26*	0	3	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*
27	0	3	*26*	0	3	*25*	0	3	*27*	0	3	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*
29	0	2	*28*	0	2	*28*	0	2	*28*	0	2	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*
30	0	2	*29*	0	2	*29*	0	2	*30*	0	2	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*
31	0	2	*30*	0	2	*31*	0	2	*31*	0	2	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*
32	0	1	*32*	0	1	*32*	0	1	*32*	0	1	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*

Bold **= evidence against necessity of ~X for failure**.
Italics *= evidence against sufficiency of ~X for failure.*

Sum of relevant weighted cases against **necessity** ∑n(wd~A) = 29 ∑n(wd~B) = 12 ∑n(wd~C) = 18 ∑n(wd~D) = 1
Sum of relevant weighted cases against **sufficiency** ∑n(wd~A) = 0 ∑n(wd~B) = 0 ∑n(wd~C) = 0 ∑n(wd~D) = 0

$$\frac{\sum n(ws_{\sim x})}{\sum n(ws_{\sim x}) + \sum n(wd_{\sim x})}$$

necessity of **~X** for **failure** ====> **~A = 19%** **~B = 63%** **~C = 44%** **~D = 98%**
sufficiency of **~X** for **failure** ====> **~A = n/a** **~B = 100%** **~C = 100%** **~D = 100%**

Table 12

Deterrence / Compellence in Bosnia, 1993 - 1995

Results for 10 Hypotheses

S1	*S2*	*S3*	*S4a*	*S4b*	*S5*	*F1a*	*F1b*	*F2*	*F3*	*F4*	*F5*	*MIB*
				A B C D	A B C D		A B C D	A B C D				
88	100	94	21	19 37 28 88	100 100 100 100	100	-- 100 100 100	19 63 44 98	--	21	--	64

S6	*S7*	*F6*	*F7*
A B C D	A B C D	A B C D	A B C D
60 69 64 94	-- 100 100 100	-- 82 72 99	19 50 36 93

Hypotheses Related to Success

S1. if A and B and C and D, then success — jointly sufficient
S2. only if A and B and C and D, then success — jointly necessary
S3. if and only if A and B and C and D, then success — jointly necessary and sufficient
S4. if A or B or C or D, then success — independently sufficient
S5. only if A or B or C or D, then success — independently necessary

Hypotheses Related to Failure

F1. if ~A or ~B or ~C or ~D, then failure — independently sufficient
F2. only if ~A or ~B or ~C or ~D, then failure — independently necessary
F3. if ~A and ~B and ~C and ~D, then failure — jointly sufficient
F4. only if ~A and ~B and ~C and ~D, then failure — jointly necessary
F5. if and only if ~A and ~B and ~C and ~D, then failure — jointly necessary and sufficient

Additional Hypotheses Derived from Combinations:

S6. X is independently necessary and sufficient for success.
S7. X is independently necessary for success and its absence is independent sufficient for failure -- ***overall importance***
F6. ~X is independently necessary and sufficient for failure.
F7. ~X is independently necessary for failure and its presence is independently sufficient for success -- ***overall importance***