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WESTERN (NATO /PfP) ASSISTANCE TO BUILD DEMOCRATIC CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE. THE CASE OF BULGARIA, ROMANIA AND SLOVENIA

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ABSTRACT

This study assess the impact of Western (NATO / PfP) assistance for building democratic civil-military relations in South Eastern European countries. It approaches civil-military relations in a broader societal sense and it starts from the assumption that civil-military relations are essential for strengthening democracy in South Eastern Europe and for integrating Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia into NATO. The study is organized in three

main parts. The first part is an introduction that defines assistance and assess the current status of civil-military relations in (South) Eastern Europe. It points out the NATO's relevance of mutual security assistance principles over the years and will make the assistance delivered to candidate countries efficient. It outlines the assistance designed for Eastern European countries – assistance for reform and integration – as a new form of assistance. It also reassess civil-military relations in the area by pointing out the relationship between the characteristics of transitional societies and the process of reform in the defense and security sectors. It stresses that real-help works where there is self-help and points to the great role the associative and deliberative forms of society play in a democracy. In this sense it uses the democratization experience in other parts of the world (Southern Europe, Latin America) and proposes a reconceptualization of civil-military relations in the former Eastern block. It considers that the main issue of civil-military relations in (South) Eastern Europe has not been military praetorianism, but effective civilians leadership for building democratic civil-military relations and a modern military. The second part describes the political and military dimensions of cooperation and assistance as the bedrock of the new East-West relationship. It points out that at the end of the Cold War in an environment of uncertainty and hope NATO was one of the few institutions to take the lead in shaping a new course of the East-West relationship. It also reveals the significance of Partnership for Peace that initiated a complex process of cooperation and assistance of an unprecedented scale in Europe. Then it nominates various Western assistance programs, institutions and funds for building democratic civil-military relations in SEE countries and their specific contribution. Part three of the Study steps on the pathways of civil-military relations in South Eastern Europe in the last decade. It points out that all countries in the area developed a legal framework for democratic control, secured the civilian leadership on defense and the parliamentarian oversight, and developed public education on security and defense. The Study considers them as being the forms of democratic civil-military relations and indicates that more substance has to be put into these forms. It also briefly reveals some side effects of reforming civil-military relations that are due to limited responsibility of the civilians, to the conservative attitudes of the military and to some unproperly conceived assistance programs. It stresses the need to enlarge the concept and practice of democratic control to all agencies in the filed of defense and security such as the intelligence services. In trying to answer to the question of "what still needs to be done?" the Study points out the need for increased deliberations within the political body, for extended accountability of the executive and for an enlarged civil education on security and defense. Taking into account the invitation in Prague for Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia, the Study considers developing civil (political and administrative) infrastructure being as much relevant for democratic civil-military relations as the military one. It suggests adapting and focusing assistance on more productive leverages of civil-military relations such as developing the deliberative and the associative forms at the "middle" level of society (the so-called deliberative associations). The Study considers the continuation of Western (NATO/PfP) assistance as being essential for fulfilling NATO's membership criteria for Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia before 2004. It also recommends to balance assistance to the civilian side as to improve parliamentarian oversight, to strengthen effectiveness of the executive defense management and to develop civilian education on strategic and security issues.

I.

INTRODUCTION:

DEFINING ASSISTANCE AND THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN (SOUTH) EASTERN EUROPE

I.1. DEFINING NATO'S MUTUAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE. PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES FOR EASTERN EUROPEAN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES

> "Neither political science, nor economics – nor even military science or diplomacy – has produced a coherent theory that provides standards, criteria, models, or even clear guidance for practitioners or administrators, whether for particular issues or the entire concept of providing or accepting military assistance."
>
> William H. Mott IV, *Military Assistance. An Operational Perspective*, Greenwood Press, 1999

1. NATO as a mutual security assistance organization. The West European Lesson - the doctrine was correct. 2. Redefining security assistance after the Cold War. Aid-for-development, aid-for-reform and aid-for-integration. 3. Operationalizing security assistance. 4. Eastern Europe 1990-2002 : Characteristics of transitional societies. 5. To whom should be assistance delivered? The role of the recipient society. Self-Help and Real-Help

The East-West relationships have significantly changed in the last ten years. Soon after the end of the Cold War and the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the former enemies initiated a new relationship called "a strategic shift from confrontation to cooperation". At that time, in spite of realizing the importance of this historic change, no part was fully aware of its dimension. Few people in the West envisaged the magnitude of the transformation in the former Eastern Block. Even fewer people in the East thought how much the Western strategist would get involved in the Eastern European transformation process.

In early 1990s, the Western countries initiated one of the largest assistance processes after WW II. In spite of the "no new Marshall Plan" for the Eastern Europe approach, which Brussels and Washington rushed to prompt on, a significant amount of assistance had been eventually delivered. In the security field, the US experience of assisting the Western European allies after WW II was instrumental in developing NATO's assistance for the East European countries at the end of the Cold War. Looking at the Alliance's history, one could consider NATO as being built on the principles of collective defense and mutual security assistance. Collective defense had never been employed before September 2001 while mutual security assistance had been permanent.

In this Study, the engine that started moving things ahead was the process of institutionalizing the new East-West relationship by signing the Partnership for Peace in 1994. NATO's Partnership for Peace initiated a process of security and defense cooperation in Europe to an unprecedented scale, with military and security assistance playing a significant role. A good part of this assistance was directed to the civil-military relations in the broader sense of the term. One should notice a new form of assistance that emerged after the end of the Cold War and which remained somehow undefined in public papers, yet which was specifically designed to deal with the change of the East European security institutions and defense establishments: the assistance for reform and integration.

The first part of this introductory Section tries to define the Western (NATO/PfP) assistance to (South) Eastern European countries, by invoking the US assistance experience with the Western European allies and by assessing the current assistance concept for Eastern Europe. The second part deals with the characteristics of the transitional societies in Eastern Europe and their relevance for building democratic civil-military relations. The assumption here is that domestic society is essential for assistance both as a recipient and as a custodian of broader political, economic and societal conditions for building democratic civil-military relations.

1. NATO as a mutual security assistance organization. The West European Lesson - the doctrine was correct.

A short review of mutual assistance employed within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization intends to show the validity of the mutual security assistance principle over the years and its actuality after the Cold War and September 11th as well.

It is commonly accepted that NATO inception in 1949 and its subsequent consecutive enlargements before the end of the Cold War (1952 - Greece and Turkey, 1955 - Germany and 1982 – Spain) largely depended on the concept and practice of mutual security cooperation and assistance. After the ravages of WW II, the Western European countries had too little resources to build a collective defense as the 1948 Treaty of Brussels tried to. In the context of a more aggressive Soviet Union, recovering of Western European war-torn countries was a strategic imperative for the United States. In order to make that possible, a mutual political, economic and security relationship was developed on both sides of the Atlantic. This nexus of strategic imperatives and economic and political assistance requirements lead to the 1949 signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. Article 10 of the Treaty of Washington reflects a long term commitment of mutual assistance beyond the security realm. It created what has been called since the late 1950s a "security community".

An assessment released after 1990 shows what the real dimension of the American assistance was for the Western European allies. For the Government of the Netherlands in critical years of a new military buildup, for instance in 1953, as Ine Megens points out (1994) "… the grant aid from the United States relieved the Netherlands of a burden of defense which would have been too heavy for it to bear at the time. (…)American military support was of paramount importance to the Dutch armed forces."[1] To various degrees, all European allies were recipients of US security and military assistance. (See *Annex 1*, showing the US aid to Western Europe over the years.) From this point of view, NATO was the proper framework to keep America engaged in Europe and to build a real security community within the Euro-Atlantic realm.

As W. Mott IV points out more recently (1999):

> "The Europe Lesson [of security assistance] as learned and taught by Congress was simply that this doctrine was correct… [it] emphasized priority of economic aid and the wisdom of shifting military and political burdens to recipients as soon as possible; the brilliant achievements of the Marshall Plan had set a precedent of rapid success in balanced use of military assistance and of economic aid."[2]

Therefore, looking back to NATO's history one could say collective defense (Art. 5) and mutual security assistance (Art. 10) were the main principles that brought NATO into existence and made it survive the Cold War. Even in the absence of a new Marshall Plan, the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 created the conditions these very principles to be further enlarged Eastwards. One could notice mutual security assistance is not just the principle that created the Alliance and made it survive the Cold War, but also the one that should keep it alive. However, to what kind of security and military assistance has Eastern Europe qualified for? How should one define this assistance and how to assess its impact over the years?

2. Redefining security assistance after the Cold War. Aid-for-development, aid-for-reform and aid-for-integration

In 1970, the Harvard professor S.P. Huntington wrote that the "continued quest for a rationale for foreign aid is one of its distinguishing characteristics as an area of public policy".[3] Huntington was interested mainly to query the benefit donors derive from aid, but his remark could be reversed to the reasons why some countries need assistance in order to develop well or at least to have a good take off. Here the literature on the subject does not offer a comprehensive explanation. Aid-for-development failure in the Third World countries in the 1970s and 1980s generated a crisis of the development aid in early 1990s.[4]

Hence, the basic question "Who qualifies for assistance?" could receive only a political answer, as Huntington himself pointed out more than 30 years ago. More recently, Janine Wedel (1998) deviously confirms that political reason is what made the aid for Eastern Europe to benefit from a new concept, i.e. aid-for-reform.[5] It was not meant to replace the aid-for-development concept but rather to make the difference. What are then the circumstances in which the aid-for-reform is being employed in Eastern Europe? Are civil-military relations so important to justify assistance?

The premises to answer to these questions go back to early 1990s. First, the rationale to deliver assistance to former communist countries rested on the difficult transition to market economy and democracy. Aid-for-reform was mainly about encouraging reform and democracy. Quite soon it was realized that the transformation of the former communist world eliminated old threats and generated new kinds of security risks instead: political instability, economic strife, ethnic conflict, civil war. This is why, by mid 1990s, a good part of Western aid shifted to security. More precisely, to address the new security risks. One could notice that to a certain extent Partnership for Peace was invented to specifically

address Eastern European security issues and to create the proper conditions to integrate new members into NATO. PfP is in itself a form of assistance, as it embodies the spirit of the Article 10 – mutual security assistance – and represents the policies and practices specific to aid-for-integration.

From the donors' point of view, Section II.1 of the Study describes the political steps NATO has taken in order to develop a new relationship with the East European countries. Explaining the political evolution of the post-Cold War East-West relationships and of the enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic security community helps to understanding the rationale of assistance. In this process, NATO has played a pivotal role indeed.

From the point of view of the recipient countries, in order to properly analyze the process of building democratic civilian control over the military and the role of the foreign assistance all along this process, one should also briefly approach the characteristics of the transitional societies in East Europe. What kind of society is currently evolving in Eastern Europe is significant for the new type of civil-military relations. Therefore, the recipient society is essential to the assistance policies. Assistance is to be designed for a specific societal environment and for specific civil-military relations.

3. Operationalizing security assistance.

In the early 1990s it was therefore a difficult task to define assistance for Eastern Europe. P. Burnell (1997) mentions the "definitional impasse" of aid after the Cold War: "Some people call it foreign aid, others prefer international assistance, and still others development cooperation, even partnership."[6] The puzzle is even more obvious in the case of military assistance. Therefore, the concept and practice of assistance had to be redefined and adapted to East European conditions.

In order to overcome the definitional impasse, Clarke et al. (1997) adopted an operational definition of security assistance as it consists of (1) military assistance – grants and some low-interest loans to friendly countries for military equipment and training: and (2) economic assistance for special political-strategic purposes under the Economic Support Fund (ESF).[7]

This paper considers assistance in general, security and military assistance, in particular, as being rather different from other forms of aid of the past. It considers it a specific form of assistance designed to support military reform and security sector transformation of the Eastern European countries as to become compatible with democracy and with Euro-Atlantic partnership and integration. Security and military assistance to Eastern Europe refers mainly to the cooperation for transferring knowledge and procedures and less for arms transfers. In political terms, after the Cold War assistance trough cooperation became a form of partnership

Taking into account these definitional features, one could make the difference and point to a new concept of security and military assistance. First, the new post Cold War concept of security assistance relates to aid-for-reform, i.e. assistance to support the transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy and market economy. Here civil-military relations are to be addressed primarily. Second, it refers to aid-for-integration aimed at consolidating

security and military reforms and integrate Eastern European countries into the new Euro-Atlantic security structure. As about its forms, the new assistance is mainly about transferring skills and knowledge, providing education on democratic civil-military relations, transferring procedures of military planning and budgeting, of professionalization of the armed forces, of democratic political oversight and of public education.

4. Eastern Europe 1990-2002 : Characteristics of transitional societies.

The logic of the post-Cold War transformation in Eastern Europe resembles to the early days of building capitalism in the 19th Century. World Bank report of November 2001, *Transition. The first Ten Years. Analysis and Lessons for Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*, presents the ups and downs of transforming East Europe. (See *Annex 2* for a classification of political systems in Eastern Europe according to the achievements in 1990-1999.)

After more than a decade of transition there are competitive democracies and concentrated political regimes alongside with war-torn societies and non-competitive political regimes. There are also clear differences between countries and regions. Institutional weakness and corruption spread in some countries, while others consolidated reforms and democracy. The countries of Central Europe are now safe for democracy. The Baltic States and South Eastern Europe countries are on a good path too, while in the CIS countries transition has not yet delivered what it had been expected to.

How could one explain the large diversity of performances in Eastern Europe after 1989? Theoretically, the process of transformation still points out to the same direction, i.e. modern capitalism. Practically, many new democracies seem to have stopped down the road. For those that expected democracy and market economy to be built in "less than 500 days" - and this was the case for many Western advisers in the early 1990s - there might be some disappointment. It is not exaggerated to say that a good part of the former socialist countries are facing a new crisis that could be considered a crisis of transition or rather of post-transition.

One the one hand, consolidated reforms and emerging democracy have certainly generated a democratic pattern of civil-military relations. On the other hand, the prospects of failure to establish a working democracy and a free market economy might change the relationships between civilians and military.

There are two prevailing standpoints that organize the field of post-socialist transformation knowledge to be used for a better understanding of civil-military relations. The first one is known as the *path-dependency approach* while the second one is called the *neo-classic sociology*.[8]

The path-dependency approach (D. Stark and L. Bruszt, 1998) considers that a new society takes shape by designing completely new democratic institutions (democracy-by-design – destroy the old state-socialist institutions and replace them with the new ones, the institutions that work in advanced democracies). Parliaments, for instance, which are essential for the democratic oversight of the military, are such examples of discontinuity. And indeed, Parliaments in most of the East European countries are almost new institutions. Parliamentary systems in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia are completely new-designed institutions after 1990. For new born democracies, such as Slovenia,

Slovakia, Croatia and the Baltic States, the military are completely new institutions that were created almost from the scratch. On the other hand, for countries like Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, the military are institutions with certain continuity after 1989. Larry Watts (2001) considers that before 1996, for instance, the "Romanian civil-military authorities had to pursue reform with 'old eyes'".[9] That is to say institutional continuity clashed with the reform prerequisites.

First designs for reforming the large military in Romania and Bulgaria were made sometime after 1992 and 1996, respectively, as the new civilian political leadership became aware of its responsibilities, but a certain form of "continuity" delayed implementation. After the Madrid Summit in 1997, with the first wave of enlargement becoming real, South Eastern European countries started implementing reforms more coherently.

For discontinuity to occur and new institutions to be formed, Stark and Bruszt envisage a more important role for the civil society during the process. They start from the assumption that both the state and the market are rather weak and improperly equipped for the task of making the social fabric work. There is the risk institutions to be captured by vested interests groups and the state itself to be captured (as shown in *Annex 2*). Then the transformation process will be distorted from normal and healthy evolution towards the well-functioning democratic institutions to the weak state and path-dependency syndromes.

In order to prevent state capture and spreading corruption for the countries with larger institutional continuity, the solution is to strengthen the role and functions of the so-called "deliberative associations" networks which are specific to the civil society (parliament support groups, private, business oriented, professional and non-governmental organizations, think-tanks, free press). Large and virtually socially non-limited networks of "deliberative associations" could prevent the state to be used by private groups (clans), could make parliaments responsible to the public and governments accountable to the citizens, could improve political participation, transparency of public policies and strengthen civil-society and NGOs. This approach considers the development of the societal infrastructure (of private and public organizations) in a network that helps society work on the horizontal and prevent it to be manipulated from above. If making democratic institutions work fails, then "*transition is not from plan to market, but from plan to clan*" (Stark, 1999). This theory of post-communist continuity appeared when studying the emerging democracies in Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary and when comparing them with those in countries such as Russia and Ukraine.

For the civil-military relations in countries with a larger "state capture" phenomenon, there might be clear civilian control over the military, but which is not necessarily also a democratic one. On the contrary, in countries with expanded and active public life (i.e. *deliberative* and *associative* social networks, free press, independent think-tanks) there are good chances for a democratic civilian control. As mentioned in some other parts of this Study, it is mainly a weakness of the civilian society and of the political leadership that should be eventually addressed. Accordingly, supporting the deliberative and associative

proclivities of the civilian society is a proper way to fight corruption and to strengthen democracy in general and democratic control over the military in particular.

An alternative theory on East European transformation is the theory of the new forms of capitalism. Eyal et al. (1998) consider that the market and democratic institutions in Eastern Europe are built in two rather different ways. The first one is *capitalism without capitalists* and is specific to Central European countries where the proper market institutions are created by the former socialist technocrats and dissident intellectuals before a well-formed class of capitalists has taken shape. The leading role during transition is played by the civilian intelligentsia and the main focus is on building the institutions of democracy and market economy. *Capitalists without capitalism* is built in East Europe, in Russia namely, and it consists in lacking of proper market and democratic institutions while new oligarchic capitalists (clans) interfere with politics. The leading role is played by the former Soviet-type bureaucracy.

As Eyal et al. suggest, these are of course the ideal-types of the East European transitional society: there is room for differences among countries. It does not mean that there are no clans (or cliques) in Central Europe, it is only that they do not dominate the state. On the other hand, it does not mean that the market institutions are totally absent in Eastern Europe, it is just that they are not able to hold the actions of the vested interests groups.

From the interest of this Study, the similarity between the two viewpoints relates to the greater role civil society (new parliaments, business and professional corporate networks, neighborhood and citizenship associations, civil rights activists, intellectual groups, think-tanks, free press and so on) plays in reforming and building the state institutions. The difference consists in the meaning attached to these institutions. Stark & Bruszt put their emphasis on the non-governmental-type associations as the watchdogs of the well functioning of the governmental institutions, while Eyal et al. stress the importance of the civil-society vision and of its leadership during the transition period. From this viewpoint, there is little similarity with the process of building democracy in the West and the role civil society and NGOs have in the advanced democracies. During transition, the role of the civilian political leadership is essential: it is about vision, determination and democratic political action.

Therefore, in Eastern Europe the state is too weak while the market is not strong enough to regulate de functions of a nascent democracy. The countries with a strong network of deliberative associations and powerful intellectual leadership are more advanced on the way to democracy and integration with the Western community. On the contrary, in the countries where civil society is weak and underrepresented, vested interest groups take over state institution. Of course, there are situations in between these two. Foreign

assistance also tends to increase its contribution and to generate better results in countries with larger "civil society networks" and with improved government accountability, less corruption and state capture. The more so when security assistance is about. Domestic democratic infrastructure for receiving assistance is very important for successful programs.

Table 1 : *A comparison of two ideal-types evolutions of the Eastern European society*

	The new ruling elite	Dominant political ideology	Capitalist Institutions	Property	Civil society	Foreign investments	Foreign assistance
CENTRAL EUROPE	Technocrats and former dissident *intelligentsia*	Managerialism and civism	Capitalism from top down	Diffuse (corporate)	Active and expanded	Large & diversified	Large & well used
EASTERN EUROPE	Former *Nomencklatura*	Nationalism and statism	Capitalism from bottom up (State capture)	Concentrated (oligarchs)	Reduced and fragmented	Small & concentrated	Small & misused

5. The recipient society - delivering assistance to whom? Self-Help *and* Real-Help

One of the conclusions of this Section is that the domestic society of the recipient country is essential for developing assistance programs in general, military programs in particular. East-West relationships after 1989 have developed better for countries with a stronger tradition of civil society, responsible parliaments and accountable governments. It should also be noticed that foreign assistance functions better in countries with proper infrastructure, larger social participation, free press and active NGOs. For want of transparency and of active and expanded civil society and NGO networks, assistance might go to support already dominant cliques (clans).

After ten years of reforms in Eastern Europe, one could therefore assume that Western assistance programs for Eastern Europe have operated twofold. On the one side, they have made a real contribution to the development of market-oriented and democratic institutions, better in countries where internal conditions were created. On the other side, they have helped some groups (or clans) to the detriment of others hence impeding on the democratic process. Janine Wedel's example of Russia seems to be true. In the countries where "clans" still fight the battle for capitalism, it could be the case that assistance offered a better position to those that benefited from it.

Therefore, *real-help* as consistent foreign assistance contributes where *self-help* is consolidated enough. *Real-help* would not work where there is little *self-help*. For civil-

military relations, real-help means supporting the development of a genuine civil society, a responsible political leadership that is aware of their role in a democracy and an assistance infrastructure that makes the best use of the assistance programs.

Notes:

1. Ine, Megens, *American Aid to NATO Allies in 1950s. The Dutch Case*, Amsterdam, 1994, p. 158-9. For a comparison, with the Marshall Plan, the West European countries benefited some $ 13.2 billion, or 5-10 percent of the US federal budget, that meant an annual average of more than $ 13 per person in economic aid ($21) including military aid. Since then, US foreign aid has never exceeded one tenth of the Marshall Plan. US and Western European countries aid for Central and Eastern European countries after 1990, Russia included, is far bellow one tenth of the Marshall Plan. See more in *Annex 1* of this paper.
2. William H. Mott IV, *Military Assistance. An Operational Perspective*, Greenwood, 1999, p. 310-2.
3. Huntington S.P., "Foreign aid for what and for whom", in *Foreign Policy*, 1970, 1:161-89.
4. For the first time international assistance was officially defined some 40 years ago. It was in the 1960s, with the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) when aid was formally defined as "official development assistance" (oda). P. Burnell (1999) points out that "The DAC defines oda as resources transferred on concessional financial terms with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main declared objective." This is a very large definition that includes humanitarian assistance and emergency relief. Most of the Third World countries benefited of oda in the 1970s and 1980s. See for details Burnell, Peter, *Foreign Aid in a Changing World*, Open Univ. Press, Buckingham, 1997, p. 1- 4.
5. Wedel, Janine, *Collision and Collusion : The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe*, St. Martin's Press, updated edition, 2001.
6. Burnell, *Op. Cit*. p.4.
7. Clarke, Duncan L., Daniel B. Oconnor & Jason D. Ellis, *Send guns and money. Security assistance and US foreign policy*, Praeger, 1997.
8. The two major works in the field are: David Stark & Laszlo Bruszt, *Postsocialist Pathways. Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, and Gil Eyal, Ivan Szelenyi, Eleanor Townsley, *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists, The New Ruling Elite in Eastern Europe*, Verso, London, 1999. For Stark & Bruszt, "The transition is not from plan to market, but from plan to clan." For Eyal et. al., Central Europe is a model of working capitalism in the absence of a proper capitalist class while Eastern Europe (Russia mainly) is a model of fighting capitalist clans in the absence of capitalist institutions.
9. Larry Watts, "Introduction: The Convergence of Reform and Integration", in L. Watts (ed.), *Romanian Military Reform and NATO Integration*, The Center for Romanian Studies, Iasi, 2001, p.16.
10. The amount of Western aid to Eastern Europe varies by source. Janine Wedel approximated it around $ 80 billions. The general amount is impressive, but more significant is to see it as engaged per countries and per capita. Here differences are quite clear: Poland benefited the largest aid (around $ 40 billions) which is half of the rest of the whole Eastern Europe. It follows Russia, but per capita the difference between Poland and Russia is quite large. For other countries, in 1993 for instance, the direct foreign investment in Hungary was around $

300 per capita. In the same year in Romania were invested $ 3 per capita. See Wedel, Janine, *Collision and Collusion : The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe*, St. Martin's Press, updated edition, 2001.

I.2. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN (SOUTH) EASTERN EUROPE. A REASSESMENT

> The Communist regimes in Eastern Europe maintained a firm control over their militaries. In this sense, the political transition in Eastern Europe did not entail the "return of the military to the barracks". The military was already in the barracks, and it respected the principle of civilian control as a fundamental tenet of civil-military relations.
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> Thomas Szayna, Stephan Larabee, RAND, 1995

1. Previous Experience in South Europe and Latin America: the "wise guys" and the role of security services. Lessons learned. 2. Post-Cold War civil-military relations – a reassessment. 3. Before 1989: subjective control and limited professionalisation. The pampered soldier. 4. The Civil-Military Gap. The Alienated Military Institution. 5. After 1989: The Transitional Military – Tentative Professionalization. 6. The post-modern military and civil-military relations in South Eastern European countries.

The literature on transitional societies has largely expanded in the last ten years due to the enormous theoretical and practical tasks required by "the biggest social transformation in history", as the transformation of the former communist countries was termed. As seen in the previous Section, the question "transition to what" points to the type of society that results out of the ashes of socialism and which determines the types of civil-military relations. A short review of previous writings on political transition in other regions (South Europe, Latin America) are also useful for interpreting civil-military relations in the new East European democracies. Then explaining what type of society has come out in Eastern Europe and what civil-military relations are expected to be developed is the main task of this Section.

1. Previous Experience in South Europe and Latin America: the "wise guys" and the role of security services. Lessons learned

T. Edmunds, A. Cottey and A. Forster (2001) also pointed out the relevance of the new case study of civil-military relationship in Central and Eastern Europe after the Southern European and Latin American transitions to democracy.[1] However, a reassessment of the civil-military relations would provide important insights by the similarities and differences that exists between the cases.

Most of the works on transition to democracy in South Europe (Greece, Portugal, Spain) and Latin America (Brazil, Argentine, Chile) point out to the critical relevance of civil-military relations in managing democratic reforms. The main Latin American lesson is that no young democracy would survive in the absence of democratic civil-military relations

and of democratic civilian control. If civilians fail in their job to control the military, democracy is being jeopardized.

Alfred Stepan (1988) rightly pointed out that

> "Since a monopoly of the use of force is required for a modern democracy, failure to develop capacities to control the military represents an abdication of democratic power."[2]

The case of non-communist authoritarian regimes transition to democracy is relevant for Eastern Europe by its similarities and differences as well. As *Table 2* suggests, there is a strong similarity as to the role of the internal security services which are the core of the coercive state apparatus. (For Eastern Europe, a large literature already makes the case and no extra explanations are necessary here.[3]) The second similarity relates to the sequence of transition. As Stepan pointed out, "liberalization began within the state apparatus owing to the contradictions generated by the increasing autonomy of the security apparatus".[4] That means liberalization and democratization were initiated from within the state coercive apparatus, most probably by those "wise guys" aware of the urgent reforms the system needed. For that reason, formally and informally, the political influence of security services continues to be quite high during transition because of the simple fact they were among its initiators. This influence tends to be strengthened in the national security sectors but also to be expanded to the emerging sectors of business, intellectual, press and other would-be relevant sectors. Establishing democratic civilian control at this stage is critical, by legally limiting the role and missions of the security services.

A third similarity relates to the contradictions between democratization and legacies in the form of continuous prerogatives of the security services and the definition of military and security services missions that are inconsistent with democratization. And fourthly, there is a clear lack of civilian expertise for both regimes on defense and security matters. That means there is a technical dependence of the civilian leadership on security and defense matters, at least at the beginning of transition. The lesson is that the uniformed people will almost always tend to preserve their influence. For that to happen, less prepared and less educated civilians in security matters are preferred and mastered as dependent political masters.

As about the differences that make East Europe a particular case, one should first think of the supremacy of civilian leadership over all state institutions, the military included. In most Latin American dictatorships, the military had a dominant role instead. On the contrary, in Eastern Europe the military did not have a dominant role in politics and internal repression.[5] Repression was a function of the security services. The second difference is related to the orientation of the military mission. Specific for East European military is the definition of its mission chiefly for external threats. A third difference is about the main task of post-authoritarian regimes, i.e. establishing a democratic civilian control over the military which implies depolitization (returning to barracks) in Latin

America and "civilization" (opening the barracks to the values and aspirations of the civilian society, inducing a new professional ethos, change of the recruiting patterns, of officership's characteristics, etc).

Table 2. *A comparison of civilian and military roles in authoritarian regimes before 1989*

	Political leadership	Core of coercive state apparatus	Military mission definition	Transition type	Main task of civil-military relations
South European and Latin American	Praetorian (Military Dictator and/or Military *Junta*)	Security Services & Military	Internal	Liberalization (Regime concession-*Aperture*)	Extrication (*depoliticisation*)
East European	Civilian (Civilian Secretary General and *Politbureau*)	Security Services	External	Tentative democratization (Regime collapse)	"Civilization" (Social reintegration of the military)

Even briefly mentioned, the similarities and differences with the South European and Latin American cases simply highlight the particularities of the East European civil-military relations before 1989, i.e. the supremacy of the civilian political elite and the use of security services for internal repression, and not of the military. Liberalization was due to internal contradictions within the coercive political and security state apparatus. Democratization is difficult without redrafting the role and missions of the security services and of the military, a job that otherwise the civilians lack the proper expertise to do. Last but not least, for Eastern Europe the main task of military reform is the "civilization" of the military, i.e. to make it a mirror not of the state, as in the past, but of the whole society, as in a democracy. Again, civilians are to play the main role in establishing a democratic civilian control over the military and security services.

As G. O'Donnell and P. C. Schmitter pointed out (1986):

> [The] "reference to civilians reminds us of a crucial point: demilitarization is not a problem referring only to the military. The political tradition of the [Latin American] countries examined … has been plagued (and continues to be plagued) by civilian politicians who refuse to accept the uncertainties of the democratic process and recurrently appeal to the armed forces for 'solutions', disguising their personal or group interests behind resounding invocations of the national interest; in no case has the military intervened without important and active civilian support."[6]

One could see that the South European and Latin American cases point out once more the important responsibility civilians have in democratic control. The more true for Eastern Europe where secret police played a repressive role during the communist time.

2. A reassessment of Post-Cold War civil-military relations.

The previous experience of democratization in South Europe and Latin America was to a certain extent neglected in reforming civil-military relations in Eastern Europe. Currently, the first common supposition on civil-military relations in communist states is that they were quite satisfactorily explained by Huntington's theory on the subjective civilian control. This theory assumes that politics and military were inseparable in communist countries (i.e. the military was a "mirror" of the communist politics), that the party functions could not be pursued without military support (i.e. communism would not last without being backed up by the military) and for that support the military enjoyed a special status in society (the "brave men" that protect the country, the party and its supreme leader). Accordingly, the main task of post-communist military reform would have to be establishing an objective civilian control alongside with depoliticising and professionalising the military.

A second supposition is that Eastern European countries have the opportunity to adapt to one of "the best" or "most advanced" and well professionalized armed forces models after the Cold War. It is the so-called "post-modern" model (Moskos et al, 2000) which comprises the all-volunteer forces, smaller armed formations, flexible, fully interoperable, highly mobile and state-of-the-art equipped.

While not attempting to challenge such strong suppositions, this paper only tries to reassess those aspects that are relevant for the post-communist development of the civil-military relations in Eastern Europe. This is due to the fact that most of the military reform policies initiated in the 1990s were built on such prerequisites as reestablishing objective "civilian control" and professionalisation of the military according to the "best available" model. Western assistance also went in line with such perceptions. Was this a good assessment? To answer such a question, one should first reassess the basics of civil-military relations theory as a good starting point and then tailor it for Eastern Europe.

3. Before 1989: subjective control and limited professionalisation. The pampered soldier

Before 1989, the political regime in Eastern Europe was based on the total subordination of state institutions to the communist party. It was the so called authoritarian party-state system. Consequently, civilian control over the military was a civilian party (political) function rather than a state (government's) prerogative. Despite variations over time due to the internal dynamics of communist politics, there was a clear civilian control over the military institution. This seemed to be the very condition of establishing communist rule in most of the East European countries rather than its condition of subsistence. No regime would have survived without a total subordination of the military, but some of them would have lasted in the absence of a strong military. (For a comparative political control of the military, See *Table 3*) In spite of strong appearances, the effectiveness of the East European military was rather low (except in the Soviet Union) and the civil-military relations were under civilian supremacy while ideology and security services exerted an extended control over the larger society. The military was twofold controlled: from outside by the Soviet military (the Warsaw Treaty, except Romania after 1968) and from within by the political and repressive apparatus.

This aspect of East European civil-military relations was pointed out in Timothy Colton's (1979) study of patterns of Soviet military involvement in politics.[7] Colton's conceptual scheme considers that military participation in politics in any society can be analyzed along two distinct dimensions: the scope of issues involved (i.e. internal, institutional, intermediate, and societal) and the political means employed to achieve

the goals (i.e. official positions, expert advice, political bargaining and force.)[8] Colton's results show that political participation of military people was restricted to military and security matters for internal, institutional and intermediate (both civilian and military) issues. As about the means, these were limited to official prerogatives (otherwise strictly restricted by the Constitution) and expert advice (not always taken into account by the communist leaders). Political bargaining was used only occasionally while force was never attempted. From this point of view, civilian control was never contested. One could even think of a an uncontested "civilian supremacy".

In comparison with, for instance, the People's Liberation Army of China, East European military personnel were less involved in party politics (military people were not nominated governors, mayors or chairmen in the revolutionary committees of the communist party). Before 1989, East European military was separated from high politics and enjoyed a relatively professional autonomy. Few military people were members of the political bureaus and, when nominated to such bodies, they did not merely represent the armed forces, but their status as party *nomencklatura*, even if they continued to wear uniforms and to deal with military affairs. Few East European officers were assigned to administrative jobs in the party or in the government apparatus, as these are characteristics of the subjective civilian control. This means that Huntington's difference between *objective* and *subjective* civilian control over the military is partially true in the case of East European militaries before 1989.

To quote Huntington:

> "Subjective civilian control achieves its ends by civilianizing the military, making them the mirror of the state. Objective civilian control achieves its ends by militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state."[9]

Accordingly, some of the complicated features of the East European military could not be solely explained by the theory of subjective civilian control and that there are professional features that also fit the theory of objective control. For such considerations, we may call the communist-type civil-military relationship as *limited professionalism*. If this is the case, then how could one accommodate the two theoretical viewpoints to get a better picture of the East European military before 1989? On the one hand, there is a clear political indoctrination and a strong party apparatus in the military, as features of close subjective control. On the other hand, there are certain aspects of professional autonomy and therefore separation from politics that made East European military effective in different periods of time. Political indoctrination was meant to keep the military away from politics and the real society, while relative autonomy of profession was meant to keep the military effectiveness as good as possible.

One could call this mixture, specific to most authoritarian regimes, the *pampered soldier*. Before 1989, the fearless child of socialism, the East European soldier, trained his muscles to fight when and how the father-party would decide. His mind belonged to the civilian political leadership. The mission was not a result of a national-based and realist assessment but rather a foreign driven (Soviet) and ideological one.

4. The Civil-Military Gap. The Alienated Military Institution

To get a complete picture of civil-military relations before and after 1989, it is necessary to extend the analysis beyond the political relationship between the civilian government and the military establishment. That is to see the military as part of the larger society, i.e. as a bureaucratic professional organization. Then the societal and political profile of the East European soldier could be better traced if taking into account the compatibility of the military and the broader societal values, the patterns of recruitment and retention of

personnel, professional ethos, officership, education and training, norms of political influence, prestige and public relations. This is a theoretical model created by the sociologist Moriss Janowitz in his work *The Professional Soldier*.[10] As early as the 1960's, Janowitz envisioned that a professional profile of the modern soldier might be traced only by studying the main characteristics (political, societal, cultural, organizational) of the military organization. The profession is a reflection of its organization.

Janowitz argued that changes in technology, society and military missions are meant to inevitably increase the political influence of the military and that, over time, there is the risk that, if not continuously adapted to and integrated with the civilian society, the military could develop alienated characteristics that would rise a gap between it and society. Janowitz argued that by professionalization, the military acquires political skills and that only a better integration of the military organization within society creates conditions for self-restraint and therefore prevents the uniformed people to attempt politics. Therefore, by studying the military organization and its degree of integration with society one could get a better picture of the communist militaries. More recent studies, such as the one published by Marybeth Ulrich (1999), also point to the productivity of such an approach.[11]

As *Table 3* shows, Eastern Europe military effectiveness was a result of harsh internal conditions to the military organization (conscript system, authoritarian leadership, patronage networks, low public accountability, little access of civilians to military affairs, limited or no media access). Being extensive rather intensive, bureaucratic (red tape) rather than corporate (*esprit de corps*), more hierarchical and less managerial, over time such a system consumed increased resources to preserve its effectiveness. The gap between its practices and values and those of the civil society was even larger than in the other communist state-bureaucracies. Sociologists call such a process of deterioration *organizational sclerosis*.[12] Over time, organizations that fail to adapt and integrate into society become sclerotic and alienated. Such organizations develop features that no longer reflect their main mission and affiliation to the broader society. Moreover, both communist political ideology and indoctrination contributed to an increased cultural and political gap between the civil society and the military, isolated the military and, ultimate, increased its sclerosis and alienation.

Table 3 - *A Comparison of Democratic, Soviet and Transitional Models of Political Control*

Elements of Civilian Control	***Democratic Features***	***Soviet Features***	**Transitional Features**
Constitutional and Legal Provisions	Mechanisms for civilian control sufficient and clearly codified.	Communist party vested with supreme authority.	Formally approved and relatively clear provisions, partially functioning mechanisms.
Executive Oversight and Control	Clear chain of command from military leaders to the executive. Civilian national security staff. Effective civilian management within the MOD. Transparent and responsive MOD and military. Expert advice of military leaders on imput to national security decisions. Mutual confidence between civilian and military leaders. Corruption not tolerated. Executive actively educates public on national security policies and priorities.	Clear chain of command from military leaders to party leaders. General Secretary is Communist Party leader and directs party apparatus that carries out party policies. Military exerted influences over military policy and issues of professionalism but accepted the Party as the sovereign authority. Opaque Military relatively free of corruption in Soviet era. Political manipulation of security and military issues.	Ambivalence Lack of qualified civilian staff. Military still overrepresented. Ineffective civilian management within MOD. Ambivalence Ambivalence Corruption spreads as transition begins. Executive not fully aware of its responsibilities yet
Legislative Oversight and control	Sufficient expertise to oversee budgetary and other oversight issues. Broad control over policy issues and ability to conduct hearings. Transparent MOD and military that allow unrestricted access to information to legislatures.	Legislature is no counterweight to the party leadership. No real oversight role. Loyal ratifiers of party policies.	Lack of expertise and of civilian staff. Limited oversight role. Military resistant to parliamentarian oversight

	Military responsive to legislative inquires. Legislators motivated to ensure accountability of the military institution.		Partial and superficial. Lack of real political motivation.
Relationship between Military Institution and Society	No serious tensions between military and society. Respect for the military as the guardians of societal freedoms. Limits on the military's access to influence and to public participation. Well developed Public Relations and positive relationship with NGO's.	Party was source of military's prestige and status. Party controlled all levels of socialization and instilled militarism and respect for the military through official ideology. The degree of prestige varied across the Soviet block. Lack of public relations and of free press.	Social reintegration of the military. Increase of respect for the military as compared with other state institutions. Political limits on the military's access to public participation. Public Relations deficient, tensions with the NGOs and the Press

Source: Adapted version from Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, *Democratizing Communist Militaries*, Univ. of Michigan Press, p. 12.

Communism swelled the military's muscles, but dropped its brain, created a large military with little capacities to adapt to rapidly changing environments, nationally and internationally.

Therefore, in 1989 the militaries in Eastern Europe were not the guardians of the communist political regime only, but its victims too. This ambivalent position of the military was certainly reflected in different public actions such as the ousting of Todor Jivkov in November 1989 in Bulgaria, of Nicolae Ceausescu in December 1989 in Romania or in supporting Boris Eltin in August 1991 in Moscow. In such cases "the rules of engagement" of the military were made on an ad-hoc basis, by instantly adhering to and adopting the social values and public attitudes of the moment. Actually, the first measures of reform were self-reform, as no civilian authority codified in 1989-1990 the new civil-military relationship. It was also a first step to fill the civil-military gap and therefore of social and political reintegration of the military with the East European renascent society and democracy. Did foreign assistance encourage such a natural trend? Did the civilians understand how to deal with it?

5. After 1989: The Transitional Military – Tentative Professionalization

Most of the general characteristics of the East European transitional society are reflected in particular features at the level of civil-military relations. For instance, the "first generation" reforms, i.e. establishing democratic civilian control, were accomplished in parallel with the establishment of a political democracy. After 1996, a "second generation" of reforms of the military (called professionalization) was initiated alongside with a second or third political change of executives in most of the East European countries. These elements indicate reform of the civil-military relations is closely connected with the process of democratization and transformation of Eastern Europe. There is no separate pattern of transforming civil-military relations aside the larger society. Transitional society means a transitional military too.

Therefore, one could complete that civil-military relations in the region are currently shaped by the characteristic of the political, economic and cultural orientations of the transitional society. Its political instabilities, ups and downs, economic transformation, structural and cultural changes and other transitional features – all are influencing the military establishment. One could say that the type of the new social and political organization of the East European countries will determine the type of civil-military relations. As pointed out in the previous section, there are currently at last two pathways East European societies advance on. There are competitive democracies in Central Europe and concentrated political regimes (*capitalism without capitalists*) and non-competitive democracies in the former Soviet republics (*capitalists without capitalism*).

With little variation, in the early 1990s, most of the former socialist countries adopted reform policies to establish objective democratic control and to professionalize the military. Western advise contributed significantly to such a reform orientation. I call this reform policies *tentative professionalization* as they are meant to redefine the civil-military relations and the role and place of the military within a democratic society. They are *tentative* because there are different pathways toward this goal and not all countries are expected to reach the end. It is about *professionalization* because they aim at creating a modern professional military. The destination is the same for most competitors, but reaching it is not sure for all of them. There are certain positive developments due to reforms and assistance as there are plagues of the military that are not due to the communist past only, but which were generated by the post-communist evolution too.

Table 4 shows the characteristics of the transitional military as compared to the democratic and the former Soviet models of professional military. At both levels – democratic civilian control and integration within the larger society – the transitional model exhibits improved situations as well as new deficiencies. (These

features are explored in Section III.3 of the Study) On the political side, in most cases there is a limited political interaction with oversight institutions and ineffective civilian management within MOD. (These features are explored in Section III.3 of this Study) On the societal side, internal operations reflect organizational deficiencies during transition (organizational instability, corruption, patronage). Hence, tentative professionalization implies a good chance of success in transforming the post-communist military, but also the risk of limited reform or even failure. On the one side, the case of Albania is quite relevant for the link between transition failure and less successful military reform. On the other side, the case of Poland is a good example of transition success and sustained military reform, even if it may look still far from being perfect or even completed.

6. The post-modern military and civil-military relations in South Eastern European countries

There are not only the Eastern European armed forces to undergo important changes. In the last ten years, the patterns of armed forces and society relationships have changed significantly on both sides of the old Cold War divide. The armed forces transformation in the countries of the Euro-Atlantic area have been shaped by two correlated imperatives (Callaghan, Dandeker and Kuhlman, 1999).

Table 4 - *A Comparison of Democratic, Soviet and Transitional Models of Military Professionalism*

Elements of Military Professionalism	**Democratic Features**	**Soviet Features**	**Transitional Features**
Recruitment and Retention	Cross-societal, variety of sources Entry based on merit. Prestige of commissioning sources high. Democratic values reflected in treatment of personnel.	Conscript system led to universal service. Entry into the officer corps related to merit and factors others than merit (social origin). Bureaucratic treatment of personnel.	Conscript system alongside with some professionalisation. Entry based on merit.
Promotion and Advancement	*Merit-based promotion system.** Affirmative action based advancement may be used to fulfill democratic norms of inclusion. Performance and seniority balanced. Officers promoted who support democratic values.	Political influence interferes with merit-based system. Patronage network compromise bureaucratic norms of promotion. Seniority predominate. Officers promoted who support party ideology.	Political influence interferes with merit-based system. Seniority predominate.
Officership and Leadership	Styles of officership and leadership reflect democratic principles and respect for individual human rights. Professional ethos. Preference for non-authoritarian style of leadership. Respect for private life of subordinates.	Individual rights sacrificed beyond the constrains necessary for military competence. Preference for authoritarianism style of leadership. Professional ethos imbibed with political ideology. Abuse of soldiers common.	Professionalization in due course. Changing leadership style. Professional ethos to be crystallized. Respect for private life of subordinates.
Education and Training	Principles of democracy and the role of military professionals in the state taught throughout the military system. Loyalty to democratic institutions taught. Qualified civilian and military instructors with some participation of civilian students at some levels. Professional ethics emphasized along with military competence.*	Extensive and in-depth education and training network. Professional knowledge stressed. Marxist-Leninist ideological training emphasized, loyalty to the party taught. Limited appreciation of civilian expertise aquired in training. Professional military competence appreciated.	Principles of democracy taught throughout the military system. Loyalty to democratic institutions formally taught. Lack of qualified military and civilian instructors.

Norms of Political Influence	Military fully accepts role in the political order.* No involvement of military in political feuds. Recognition that some limited degree of political interaction with oversight institutions is necessary. Direct participation in politics is not accepted. Attempts to influence the political process are nonpartisan.	Accepted junior partner role to Soviet sovereign Communist Party. Limited political influence in some areas of military affairs. Favored role in society and centralized economy reduced need to lobby for resources. Competed for resources within "the rules of the game".	Military accepts de jure its role in political order. Limited political influence. Limited political interaction with oversight institutions. Compete for resources within the new "rule of the game".
Prestige and Public Relations	High public accountability. Full disclosure of information. Responsiveness to outside inquiries. Media has full access. Military actively manages relationship with the public.	Low public accountability. Controlled release of all information to outside inquiries. Limited media access. Militarist socialization methods continually connected military to society.	Moderate public accountability. Limited disclosure of information. Limited media access. Unsatisfactory relationship with the public.
Compatibility of Military and Societal Values	Accepts legitimacy of democratic institutions. Conceptualization of democracy is similar to society's. Adapts internal operations to reflect democratic societal values.	Military and social values highly compatible. Military used as primary instrument of political socialization. Internal operations reflected corrupted Soviet bureaucratic values (mediocrity, patronage).	Military values to adapt to societal values. Internal operations reflect social deficiencies during transition (instability, corruption, patronage).

- Indicates characteristics that could be appropriate for military professionals in either system.

Source: Adapted version from Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, *Democratizing Communist Militaries*, Univ. of Michigan Press, p. 12.

The first imperative, stemming from the changes of the external strategic context (the end of Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new East-West relationship, the Partnership for Peace, September 11th) created the conditions for a major redefinition of security and military missions. Military organization should adapt to a new security environment that is based less on external threats and more on internal risks in areas of political instability and war-torn societies. Among other things, the events in the Balkans demonstrated the non-military dimensions of security need to be addressed and the military would have to shift its main mission from national (and alliance) territorial defense to multinational force projection (i.e. out of area missions). Support for international peace and projecting stability are today's missions Western militaries are gradually adapting. The Eastern European military had never thought about it before 1989.

The second imperative, stemming from the dynamics of the internal transformation, created conditions for an extensive reform of the military establishment. In Western and Eastern countries as well, internal transformation equates the so-called dilemma of civil-military gap, i.e. the increasing differentiation in terms of political and cultural identities between the civilians and the military. As pointed earlier, for the Eastern European countries the civil-military gap exhibits in a different manner, it is linked with the process of post-communist transformation and requires chiefly a civilianization of the military, i.e. a societal reintegration in terms of values, education, culture, internal procedures and political orientation. For both West and East European countries, "The main challenge for the armed forces is that changes … are not occurring sequentially, but simultaneously."[13] Therefore, both civilians and military have to adapt and properly manage this challenge at the same time.

Theoretically, the changes of armed forces missions and format are specific to the so-called trend of "post-modern military" (Moskos et al, 2000). Although not calling it as such, Christopher Donnelly considers that this trend created pressures for smaller, more professional and eventually more expensive armed forces (Donnelly, 2000). It is a trend specific to the Western advanced capitalist societies, as also Tim Edmunds points out:

> "the way in which defense reform has been promoted in CE&E has been strongly influenced by the 'post-modern' changes perceived to be occurring in the West."[14]

However, Moskos himself doubts that post-modern military model fits all countries and all armed forces. For the current transformation in the security and defense field, post-modern is just a label to name a process of larger transformations of the defense establishments after the Cold War. For countries such as Greece and Turkey, the well-known sociologist in Chicago considers the model is that of "late-modern" which means rather a classic posture of the armed forces for national (territorial) defense, with increased capacities for rapid reaction and participation within allied power projection multinational forces. For the

late-modern model, Moskos does not envisage, for instance, an all-volunteer force, but professional forces with mixed formats, i.e. both conscript and volunteer. Even desired, scarce social and economic resources limit the all-volunteer model. For late-modern armed forces the main challenge is the social and cultural embededness of the military whithin the larger society. It means democratic civil-military relations and traditional social functions additional to defense. Therefore, even if economic conditions would support an all-volunteer force, there are countries that fit better the late-modern model. For Western and Eastern strategists alike, professionalization is not a matter of resources only, but of adaptation to the traditions and patterns of the civil-military relations of a specific country.

Presumably, the military reform and the civil-military relations in Eastern European countries are closer to the pattern of "territorial defense" and therefore fit the late-modern paradigm.[15] The East European military has to adapt in its specific way to the current trends of the military affairs. Moreover, internal conditions, national military traditions and current economic resources limit the extent to which the East European military might use different models to build its new armed forces. In a broad Tocquevilleian sense, no military is better or worse than the society it belongs to. Hence, it is worth mentioning here the need to adapt the existing model to domestic conditions, to the extent that, as Tim Edmunds rightly points out,[16] a farfetched model would rather consume resources and eventually generate unexpected results. From this point of view, in the early and mid 1990s, the pressure for integration into NATO and the assistance to accomplish it tended to deliver unrealistic models of reform that were eventually amended by domestic resources and abilities to reform. Therefore, I named the process of East European transformation of the military *tentative professionalization,* as it certainly points to a different pattern than before 1989, which is certainly a professional one, but not necessarily post-modern for all countries. Seemingly, it would not generate democratic patterns for all former communist countries. Moreover, integration into NATO and the NATO/PfP assistance are to offer a better framework for this adaptation, although not also the solution itself. The solution is to be found on the domestic scene.

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One could conclude that the assumption that subjective civilian control characterized the Soviet-type civil-military relations needs a reassessment. Reform policies and Western assistance that were shaped according to such an assumption also need to be reassessed. Limited professionalization before 1989 meant a strong civilian political control, even civilian abuse of the military, but certain effectiveness of the military. Tentative professionalization is specific for the transitional period and expands beyond the level of political process of controlling the military. After 1989, the civilian leadership over the military was not contested. There was also no tentative praetorianism. As Szayna and Larabee pointed out (1995), "The Communist regimes in Eastern Europe maintained a firm control over their militaries. In this sense, the political transition in Eastern Europe did not entail the 'return of the military to the barracks'. The military was already in the barracks, and it respected the principle of civilian control as a fundamental tenet of civil-military relations."[17]

Therefore, one could think that the main issue of the civil-military relations in Eastern Europe has not been military praetorianism, but effective civilian leadership for building democratic civil-military relations and a modern military. To conclude this Section, with the civilians the issue has been limited competence, arbitrary decisions, corruption and lack of responsibility and accountability. With the military the main issue has been conservatism and the need for modernization alongside with the so-called civilian-military gap, i.e. the degree of integration between the larger society and the military organization. Tentative professionalization does not refer only to an all-volunteer force, but to changing procedures within the military, new officership, changing professional ethos and modernizing education as well. The proper model for the East European military is the "late-modern" one, that combines elements of "territorial defense" and participation in international force projection. To accomplish these goals, the civilian leadership and its responsibility for building a new military establishment in East Europe is critical. However, are the civilians prepared for such an important job?

Notes:

1. T. Edmunds, A. Cottey, A. Forster, *The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe*, *TCMR 1.7b* papers, June 2001.
2. Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics, Brazil and the Southern Cone*, Princeton University Press, 1988, p. XV.
3. For a comparative analysis of authoritarian regimes, see for instance Amos Perlmutter, *Modern authoritarianism : a comparative institutional analysis*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1981.
4. A. Stepan, op. cit., p. 13.
5. Using the military for internal repression was defined by the Soviet leadership within the Warsaw Treaty in the aftermath of Budapest (1956) and Prague (1968) uprisings as being necessary "to protect socialism unity and brotherhood relations among all communist countries." However, 1968 intervention in Prague was for the Soviet military a response to a "foreign threat" even if it occurred within the socialist block. In 1981, Poland was to repeat 1968 Czech experience if the military was not to intervene. Notwithstanding, most analysts agree that the Polish military was not directly involved in politics, even if under the martial law General Jaruzelski took over the communist government, the military remained in the barracks.
6. Guillermo O'Donnel, Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, The John Hopkins University Press, 1986, p. 31.
7. Timothy Colton, Commissars, *Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics*, Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1979.
8. For details, see Yang Zhong, "The Transformation of the Soviet Military and the August Coup", in Peter Karsten (ed.), *The Military and Society. A Collection of Essays*, Garland Publishing Inc., 1998, p. 131-54.
9. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1957, p. 83.
10. Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Military. A Social and Political Portrait*, Westview Press, 1960.
11. Marybeth Ulrich, *Democratizing Communist Militaries*, Univ. of Michigan Press, 1999.
12. The concept of social sclerosis was proposed by Mancur Olson and presented in such well-known works as *The rise and decline of nations : economic growth, stagflation, and social*

rigidities, New Haven : Yale University Press, 1982. It refers mainly to those societies whose political system and institutional basis are not development supportive.

13. J. Callaghan, C. Dandeker, J. Kuhlmann, "Armed Forces and Society in Europe – The Challenge of Change", in Kuhlmann, Juergen & Callaghan, Jean M. (eds), *Military and Society in Eastern and Western Europe - A Comparative Analysis*, Hamburg: LIT Verlag, 1999, p. 4.
14. Tim Edmunds, "Promoting Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe: The Inevitability of 'Post-Modern" Reform?", paper presented at the Biannual Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, October 19-21, 2001.
15. A. Foster, A. Cottey and T. Edmunds make a typology of professional armed forces by which are identified four distinct 'ideal-types': power projection, territorial defense, post-neutral and neutral. See for details, A. Foster, A. Cottey and T. Edmunds, "Professionalisation of Armed Forces in CEE. A Background Paper", *TCMR paper 1.5*, September 2002.
16. T. Edmunds, ibid. 8.
17. Szayna, S. Thomas, F. Stephen Larabee, *East European Military Reform after the Cold War. Implications for the United States*, Santa Monica, RAND, 1995, p. 5

II.

WHAT HAS THE WEST (NATO / PFP) DONE ? POLITICAL AND MILITARY DIMENSIONS, ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AND FUNDS

II.1. THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF THE POST-COLD WAR EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR DEMOCRATIC CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

"NATO's responses to developments in the East… have been extraordinary and insufficient. … extraordinary in that so many new initiatives have been taken in such a short period of time. …

> insufficient in that events have moved at such a fast pace that NATO's responses have not kept up with expectations in the region."
>
> Jeffrey Simon,
> *NATO Enlargement. Opinions and Options,* 1995

1. We are no longer adversaries – the London Declaration of July 1990. 2. To intensify military contacts – Copenhagen Declaration of June 1991. 3. The Moscow coup of August 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet Union. 4. Former enemies to cooperate - NATO's new Strategic Concept and the NACC. 5. New challenges for NATO - Enlargement and out-of-area operations. 6. The Partnership for Peace (1994) – Too small a step in the right direction? 7. The Study on NATO Enlargement (1995) – to confirm what everybody already knew. 8. The EAPC (1997) – to redefine political cooperation. 9. "Today, we invite the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland …" The Summits in Madrid (1997) and Washington (1999). 10. The NATO-Russia Founding Act (1997) and the NATO-Russia Council (2002) to work as "equal partners". 11. The Open Door Policy: The door remains open, but it is on a moving train. 12. The NAC and EAPC Summits in Reykjavik, May 2002 – The increasing role of assistance for the new members.

The military-to-military East-West contacts before 1989 were sporadic. Officially, the two parts were still formal enemies until 1991. Unofficially, in the early 1990 both parts were ready for significant change.

On the civil-military side, with the abolition of the Soviet Union in 1991, there were at least three main Western concerns related to the East European military. First, there was the fear of losing control over the Soviet nuclear machinery with the collapse of communism. Second, it was the civil-military relations that could be jeopardized with the demise of the communist leadership. And third, there were the large East European Cold War-type military establishments that needed to be reformed and socially integrated before creating social and political problems.

One could say except a few politicians and intellectuals, public opinion and institutions were not yet prepared to adapt to the fast changing East-West relationships after 1989. Due to a long time indoctrination, in most East European countries the public was still suspicious on NATO.

Moreover, in spite of significant good will, the lack of a clear Western policy towards the East European countries was quite obvious in the early 1990s. In Eastern Europe, alongside enthusiasm there was no practical guide of how to deal with the huge post-socialist transformation. In countries such as Bulgaria and Romania, the new civilian political leadership believed the military might be conducted by press communiqués. If both civilians and military considered they knew *what to do*, few of them knew *how to do* it. Civilians were satisfied the military were in the barracks, while the military were happy the civilians would no longer enter the barracks.

In that environment of hope and uncertainty, NATO was one of the few organizations to take the lead in shaping a new course. Civilians and military engaged on the way of transforming post-Cold War Europe. However, no future partnership and military cooperation would have been developed without a new political framework. The political steps of building a new East-West relationship have created the bedrock of this relationship. What were these steps and what was their relevance for building democratic civil-military relations? One could mention at least a dozen of them that have contributed over the last decade in advancing East-West cooperation and integration.

1. We are no longer adversaries – the London Declaration of July 1990

At the NATO's London Summit in July 1990, the then Secretary General Manfred Wörner said that :

> "The Cold War belongs to history. Our Alliance is moving from confrontation to cooperation. We are building a new Europe, a Europe drawn together by the unfettered aspiration for freedom, democracy and prosperity."[1]

Up to 1994, Manfred Wörner made his imprint on NATO's relationships with the Eastern European countries. To reflect the extraordinary change of that time, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) issued the London Declaration which stated that "NATO must become an institution where Europeans, Canadians and Americans work together not only for the common defense, but to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe."[2]

The NAC authorized NATO Secretary General to visit Moscow and some other former communist countries. Considered impossible just few years before, visits of NATO high-officials in Eastern Europe became natural after1991 and routine after 1994. Furthermore, heads of states and governments in Eastern Europe were invited to visit Alliance HQ in Brussels and "… to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO." East European countries diplomatic liaison with NATO was considered that it "… will make it possible for us to share with them our thinking and deliberations in this historic period of change." The London Declaration clearly stated the new East-West rapprochement. It also paved the way for the next steps. Similar statements came from most of the former East European countries. The political opening was quite clear.

Jeff Simon is right (see motto) in that in the early 1990s, in its political posture NATO performed well but fell short in meeting the practical expectations of the Central and Eastern European countries.[3]

2. To intensify military contacts – the Copenhagen Declaration of June 1991

The NAC Summit in Copenhagen enlarged on the idea of military contacts at various levels as practical steps to develop cooperation. Visits to SHAPE and subordinate military HQ were soon initiated. Alongside military contacts, the Copenhagen Declaration promoted regular meetings of civilian experts on defense issues and, for the first time, opened to the Eastern partners the so-called "Third Dimension" of NATO, i.e. the scientific and environmental programs. It is also worth mentioning that the Copenhagen NAC Summit encouraged the development of bilateral and regional relationships between the East European countries.

As stated in the Declaration: "We support also the wide range of bilateral and regional contacts, treaties and programmes which are developing between our countries and those of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as positive developments in relations between those countries."[4] A process of redefining bilateral relationships in Central and Eastern Europe was much encouraged by some other European organizations such as the Council of Europe, and the CSCE. The CFE Treaty for reducing the conventional armaments in Europe – an important dimension of the CSCE – played quite a significant role in early 1990s for developing security cooperation.. Bilateral and regional agreements were under negotiation and signed between Central and Eastern European countries in due course.[5]

3. The Moscow coup of August 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet Union

The attempt in Moscow in August 1991 proved the fragility of post Cold War evolutions in Eastern Europe. Much of responsibility was associated with the large Soviet military establishment. However, as pointed out in Section I.2 of this paper, Moscow coup was mainly an initiative of the civilian Soviet bureaucracy.[6] As about the uniformed people, one could say their role was eventually positive. The coup created room for the new Russian key-figure Boris Eltin to take over the events and for that to happen he got support from the military. It is known that Marshal Yevgeni Shaposhnikov played an important role as chief of the Air Force.[7]

The Moscow coup failed and hastened the fall of the Soviet Union. Former Soviet republics became independent states. In the aftermath of the coup, the events in Moscow got an important international political and military significance. It generated a supplementary stimulus to define a policy towards Eastern Europe. It also clearly advanced the idea of security cooperation and of military assistance.

After the coup in Moscow, the Eastern European militaries were strongly discouraged to interfere with politics during the transformation period. Moreover, even initiatives that were not military in their intent, but had been promoted by the military, were smashed. As a result, the political influence of the military have greatly diminished after August 1991. One could say that, to a certain extent, the coup in Moscow discouraged a more active and positive role to be played by the military during the transformation period. It worried NATO and the international community and made Western officials think more seriously about the East European military establishments. However, in 1993 the Russian military intervenes again in politics by cleaning up parliament building from the opponents to president Boris Eltin.

4. Former enemies to cooperate - NATO's new Strategic Concept and the NACC

Further steps to develop cooperation were made at the November 7-8, 1991 Rome North Atlantic Council summit. It was then decided to be created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC, later to become the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, EAPC) and issued the new NATO strategic concept. The decisions made in Rome established the political partnership to include all former enemies. Essential elements of the post-Cold War security agenda were to be discussed by all parties. In its second part, the new NATO strategic concept stated that "the opportunities for achieving Alliance objectives through political means are greater than ever before." Furthermore, there were outlined the main ways of achieving these objectives to be the "three mutually reinforcing elements of Allied security policy - dialogue, co-operation, and the maintenance of a collective defense capability."[8]

On December 20, 1991 an enlarged form of political cooperation between East and West was inaugurated: the North Atlantic Cooperation Council to include NATO member countries and initially nine East European countries. Other East European states (former Soviet republics) were to come as well. On February 26, 1992 NACC was extended to include the former Soviet republics. Except at that time Georgia, NACC broadened its political partnership to 35 countries. The new strategic concept offered NATO a new rationale, but in 1992 out-of-area problems already put serious strains to this new concept. The situation in former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia required a reassessment of the NATO new strategic concept short after its issuing in Rome. Dialogue and political cooperation were no longer enough.

5. New challenges for NATO - enlargement and out-of-area operations

By 1992 it became quite clear that Central European countries were not satisfied by their relationship with NATO. The Alliance was expected to enlarge. NACC gave the Visegrad countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland) the same status as, for instance, the Central Asian countries (such as Uzbekistan). Among the Central European countries, Poland pressured for as soon as possible NATO membership. If in 1990 the Alliance enlargement seemed just illusory, with the pressure for membership of the Central European countries, enlarging NATO came on the agenda.

The 1991 tentative coup in Moscow made people both in the East and the West realize that the post-Cold War evolutions were still fragile. However, before any discussion on enlargement to take shape, the crisis in Yugoslavia needed to be addressed. In Oslo (June 1992) the NAC foreign ministers made a decision that would then change completely the Alliance missions – there was launched the concept of the out-of-area operations. With the Oslo declaration, crisis management became a job relevant to NATO. The final communiqué stated that has "prepared to support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping activities … including by making available Alliance resources and expertise."[9]

As S. Nelson Drew (1993) observed, "While the word 'peacekeeping' did not appear in either the new Strategic Concept or the Rome Declaration, it was difficult to envision a means by which NATO or the NACC could make good on their commitment to stability and peace throughout the trans-Atlantic community without consideration of an Alliance role in peacekeeping activities."[10] The first out-of-area operation came as early as April 1993 when NATO imposed a no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The NAC/NACC summit in Athens in June 1993 went further ahead in peace-keeping. Practical measures were taken for planning, training and logistics with an Ad-Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping to include civilian and military representatives from all NACC countries. Soon it became evident that developing military cooperation and committing ground troops for peace-keeping was more than necessary.

6. The Partnership for Peace (1994) – Too small a step in the right direction?

The Partnership for Peace inception is closely linked with the new strategic concept and the new missions of NATO, i.e. projecting security and stability in an enlarged Europe. The Mini-Statement at the openings of the January 1994 Brussels Summit affirmed that "In addition to these classical political and military tasks two new post cold war missions have been put on our Alliance's agenda. One is crisis management and peacekeeping. The other is the projection of stability to the East through close cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia."[11]

Therefore, with the PfP, NATO's core functions of common defense endured (Article 5), but the new functions of collective security became apparent (Article 10). On the one hand, a collective security function of the Alliance could barely be envisaged in 1991 with the new strategic concept. "Flexible Response" was replaced by a clear defense posture. Then in 1992-1993 it became clear that the transformation process in Eastern Europe would generate tensions and conflicts affecting the whole of Europe. Disintegration of Yugoslavia was a first and clear example of the new security risks. Therefore, NATO's post Cold War concept of security changed. It was the intra-state conflicts at regional level that needed to be addressed rather than the inter-states ones at the continental level.

Western strategists realized that the transformation of Eastern Europe was going to last longer than expected and be more painful than envisaged. On the other hand, Central European countries were pushing for differentiation and for setting an accession data as their achievements with reforms clearly put them ahead of many other post-communist countries. As the Polish foreign minister A. Olechowski stated in January 1994, PfP was a "too small step in the right direction". On the contrary, as the Government in Bucharest

stated, for Romania PfP was a proper toll to further cooperation between NATO and East European countries. The only country to oppose PfP was Russia, but later on Moscow apparently changed its mind. One by one, the new NATO partners came to Brussels to sign the PfP agreement. Some of them with the conviction PfP was just a delay of their accession into the Alliance, some others satisfied they had any relationship with Brussels at all, while others being still cautious with the new NATO appearance. Largely defined, PfP activities included defense planning and budgeting, military exercises and civil emergency operations. From the interest of this paper, defense planning and budgeting and military exercises are clearly assistance-related activities.

7. The Study on NATO Enlargement (1995) – to confirm what everybody already knew

In less than one year after the launching PfP, the evolution was quite remarkable: by the end of 1994, 23 countries had signed the PfP document, most of the signing countries sent already liaison officers to the Partnership Coordination Cell in SHAPE, and PfP exercises were organized in due time. One could say that the Partnership for Peace has somehow in between: it did not disappoint very much the candidates for the first wave of membership (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary), encouraged the countries of the next wave (Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Slovakia), and did not push too much the former Soviet republics that otherwise wanted to develop a cooperative relationship with NATO. With PfP every country was satisfied in its expectations, having in mind the degree to which each partner was involved in the new cooperative relationship.

In 1995, as the PfP initiative proved successful, the issue of NATO enlargement was managed more systematically. One of the important documents of 1995 is "The Study on NATO Enlargement". The study formally stated PfP functions as being:

- help partners to further develop democratic control of their armed forces and transparency in defense planning and budgeting processes;
- enhance the network of military and defense-related cooperation;
- develop the cooperative features of PfP, by increasing capability/readiness to contribute to peacekeeping, humanitarian, search and rescue and other activities to be agreed;
- strengthen the confidence-building and transparent character of defense-related and military cooperation;
- complement the development of interoperable forces by adequate mechanisms to duly involve partners in planning and carrying out joint peacekeeping operations.[12]

For many analysts the Study only confirmed what was already known – the guidelines for integration into NATO most likely refer to active participation in NACC and PfP, well functioning of the democratic political institutions, free market economy and promotion of

human rights, effective democratic control over the military and improving military capability and interoperability with NATO.

8. The EAPC (1997) – to redefine political cooperation

Just before the decision on extension to be made at the July 1997 Madrid Summit, NACC met in its final session in Sintra, Portugal in May 1997. The foreign ministers decided to create the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council as "marking a qualitative step forward in raising to a new level the dynamic and multi-faceted political and military cooperation successfully built up under the NACC and the Partnership for Peace (PfP)."[13] As an expression of the expanded political cooperation, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council was created in 1997 to replace the NACC.

To a larger extent, EAPC reflects the evolution of both NATO and PfP in the 1990s. First, it is the trans-Atlantic dimension of NATO, that is the US participation in the building of a new Europe. While encouraging the development of a European defense and security identity (ESDI), EAPC points out the significance of the US strategic presence in Europe as well. PfP extended NATO and US "stabilizing presence" beyond the NATO borders to the troubled areas of the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Today EAPC is the largest forum for cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic area, i.e. from Vancouver to Vladivostok. At present, there are 46 members: 19 NATO member countries and 27 partner countries. All EAPC members are members of the Partnership for Peace programme. EAPC enlarged the political cooperation to regular meetings for consultations "to build transparency and confidence through practical cooperation activities."

9. "Today, we invite the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland …" The Summits in Madrid (1997) and Washington (1999)

It took 7 years to make the decision to enlarge NATO to Eastern Europe, and another 2 years to formally implement it. Despite the fact only three new members (Poland, Czech Republic, Poland) were admitted, the decision to expand NATO made at the July 1997 Madrid Summit was a clear confirmation of the policy inaugurated at the beginning of the 1990s. From a purely military point of view it is hard to state if the candidate countries were better prepared in 1997 than, for instance, in 1992.

Interoperability, a key concept of the PfP military dimension, came up later on as a criteria for membership. Interoperability did not play a significant role in the decision of the first wave of NATO enlargement. That is why, from a political point of view, such a decision reflected the progress in what Jeff Simon called "guidelines for expansion": active participation in PfP, democracy and free market economy, respect for human rights. These

are mainly non-military criteria. One could notice that, to a certain extent, the military recommendations made in the Enlargement Study were not actually followed.

The Study stated, inter alia, that NATO's military effectiveness should be sustained as the Alliance enlarges. Therefore, one could suspect political reasoning behind the decision to expand NATO in the first wave. A complete assessment of the military effectiveness of the new members came up after accession. As for accession decision making, political reasons seemed to prevail.

10. The NATO - Russia Founding Act (1997) and NATO-Russia Council (2002) to "work as equal partners"

A very important document - the *NATO-Russia Founding Act* – reflects the significance of the political dimension of Alliance's enlargement. While not giving Russia the right to veto any of the Alliance's decisions, the Founding Act recognizes Russia's role in the European security in that no European security issue would be addressed and no NATO decision be made without prior consultation of both sides. The *Charter* signed on the same year 1997 with Ukraine expressed the need to develop if not a special then a particular NATO-Ukraine relationship alongside PfP framework. The decision made in Madrid was formally endorsed at the Alliance's 50th Anniversary Summit in Washington in April 1999. In spite of the Kosovo crisis and Alliance's intervention in Yugoslavia, the Washington Summit marked "NATO's first step in the 21st Century", as it was termed.

In spite of good intentions, Kosovo crisis made the Founding Act get little substance. The next step in bringing Russia closer to Euro-Atlantic integration process was made on May 14, in Reykjavik, Iceland, with the decision to create a NATO-Russia Council to "work as equal partners" on issues pertaining to security and cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic area. As a political decision of the North Atlantic Council, it is still premature to asses its impact on the European security over time. A closer relationship with Russia will certainly facilitate cooperation on such issues as improving security in the whole post-Cold War area and fighting terrorism internationally. However, an "equal" status for Russia might encourage Moscow to look after its traditional interests in such areas as Central Europe, South eastern Europe and the Baltics. It might also make Ukraine feel uncomfortable in strengthening its relationship with NATO.

11. The Open Door Policy : The door remains open, but it is on a moving train

Alongside with receiving three new Alliance members, the 1999 NATO Summit in Washington issued a new strategic concept. With the new strategic concept NATO became "an Alliance in transformation". Officially, NATO's new Strategic Concept is responsive

for the changes in the Euro-Atlantic security environment. It is focused on the following key elements:

-- *Collective Defense*: The Strategic Concept underscores the enduring core mission of NATO as the collective defense of its members under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

-- *Military Capabilities*: The Concept reaffirms the Allies' determination to strengthen Alliance defense capabilities by ensuring forces that are more mobile, sustainable, survivable and able to engage effectively on the full spectrum of NATO missions.

-- *New Missions*: The Concept calls for improvements in NATO's capability to undertake new missions to respond to a broad spectrum of possible threats to Alliance common interests, including: regional conflicts, such as in Kosovo and Bosnia; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; and transnational threats like terrorism.

-- *New Members*: The Concept underscores NATO's continued openness to new members and Allies' commitment to enlargement as part of a broader effort to enhance peace and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic community.

-- *Strengthened Partnerships*: The Concept reinforces Alliance's efforts to build wide-ranging partnerships with the aim of increasing transparency and mutual confidence in security matters and enhancing the capacity of allies and partners to act together.

-- *European Capabilities*: The Concept highlights development of a European Security and Defense Identity within NATO as an essential element of NATO's ongoing adaptation, enabling European allies to make a more effective contribution to Euro-Atlantic security.[14]

As seen in the above, the new (1999) strategic concept confirmed the "open door policy" promoted soon after the Summit in Madrid. Of course, developments after the Madrid and Washington summits highlighted the growing importance of enlargement. The open door policy created the conditions for a second *when* and *how*.

12. The NAC and EAPC Summits in Reykjavik, May 2002 – The increasing role of assistance for the new members

September 11, 2001 certainly changed the way the US and its European allies would see security in the 21st Century. It also brought a new US policy towards NATO and European allies. President Bush confirmed the US commitment for a strong US-European alliance and his determination for a "robust enlargement" too, from the Baltic to the Black Sea. In the aftermath of the attacks on USA, it was for the first time in 52 years the Alliance activated Article 5: an attack against one it is an attack on all. Alongside with members' sustenance, the candidate countries expressed their readiness to support the fight against terrorism. Romania is among the few candidate countries that sent troops to Afghanistan to fight terrorists. The other South Eastern European candidate countries expressed their willingness to act as *de facto* members of the Alliance. The public in all South Eastern European countries are largely supportive these actions.[15]

In Reykjavik, NATO foreign ministers recognized that "Since 11 September, the important contribution made by NATO's Partnerships to Euro-Atlantic security has been confirmed and reinforced."[16] It confirmed the long term commitment of partner countries to the Euro-Atlantic security community indeed.

Being the last meeting at the level of foreign ministers before Prague, the May 14, 2002 Summit in Reykjavik was very significant for the process of enlargement. As stated by foreign ministers, "During accession talks and on the basis of an invitee's Annual National Programme, the NATO Expert Team, on the basis of political guidance to be elaborated, will discuss with individual invitees specific issues and reforms upon which further progress will be expected before and after accession in order to enhance their contribution to the Alliance."[17] One could say this is to recognize the importance of strengthening cooperation and of deepening assistance for the new members before and after formal accession into NATO. Alliance membership will only offer a better position for delivering assistance to the new members.

The political dimension of the post-Cold War new relationship is the bedrock for the security cooperation and military assistance to East European countries.

Notes:

1. Manfred Wörner, *Opening Statement to the NATO Summit Meeting*, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1990/s900705a_e.htm
2. London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, July 5-6, 1990, at http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900706a.htm
3. Jeffrey Simon (Ed), *NATO Enlargement.. Opinions and Options*, National Defense University, Mc Nair, Washington DC, 1995, p. 47.
4. Statement issued by the North Atlantic Council Meeting in Ministerial Session in Copenhagen, 6-7 June 1991, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c910607d.htm
5. An example in case is the so-called "Visegrad Initiative" designed to develop political and economic cooperation of the Central European countries. Other regional initiatives, such as the Central European Initiative (CEI), were extended to former communist countries.
6. There are lots of controversies over the Moscow coup in 1991. However, most of sources point to the KGB Chairman Kryuchkov as the key figure and initiator of the coup. See for instance Gordon Logan, at http://www.infowarrior.org/strategy/moscowcoup.html
7. Marshal Yevgeni Shaposhnikov even threatened to bomb the Parliament building where communist hard-liners gathered.
8. NATO's Cold War strategy adopted in 1967 was called "Flexible Response". The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, adopted at the Rome Summit in November 7-8, 1991 could be read at http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htm#III
9. Oslo *Final Communiqué*, June 1992, at http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c920604a.htm

10. S. Nelson Drew, *NATO from Berlin to Bosnia*, McNair Paper no.3, INNS, National Defense University, Washington DC.
11. Opening Statement, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council / North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940111b.htm
12. *The Study of NATO Enlargement*, 1995, at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9504.htm
13. Chairman's Summary of the Meetings of the NACC and the EAPC in Sintra, Portugal - 29 May 1997, at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-067e.htm
14. *The Washington Summits*, April 23-25, 1999, at http://www.fas.org/man/nato/natodocs/99042450.htm
15. Such posters as "US don't be afraid, Slovenia backs you" on the streets of Ljubljana expressed the large public support for USA in the days following the attacks in New York and at the Pentagon.
16. Excerpts from the NATO *Final Communiqué* of the Rejkyavik Summit, May 14, 2002, at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-059e.htm
17. Ibiden 16.

II.2. NATO'S *ACQUIS*. THE MILITARY DIMENSION AND PfP MILITARY COOPERATION

1. Adapting NATO and Transforming Partners: CJTF. 2. Achieving Interoperability – PARP (Self-selection). 3. Membership Action Plan – NATO's acquis.

The Partnership for Peace political background created the proper conditions for a large range of military activities between NATO and the partner countries. Three main types of such activities are worth mentioning in this Section - CJTF, PARP and MAP – as they are specifically NATO designed programs to assist and integrate the East European partner countries. These programs, in spite of not being specifically designed to such goals, have had a great significance for developing democratic civil-military relations in the partner countries. It strengthened cooperation between civilians and military both in the Alliance's framework and within security and defense establishments of the partner countries. PfP is about democratic civil-military relations, nationally and inter-nationally.

CJTF is an outcome of the Alliance first post-Cold War strategic concept. It refers to the new military missions as a main tool to integrate different national armed forces and services, of the members and non-members countries, and make them interoperable. PARP and MAP reflect the evolution of the Partnership for Peace and the deepening relationship between the Alliance and those candidate countries seeking for membership or closer cooperation. Even being specifically designed as military cooperation programs, PfP activities have eventually contributed as assistance programs and have created an Alliance *acquis communtaires* : a set o common standards, procedures, attitudes and language.

As Jeffrey Simon pointed out (2000),

> "When NATO adopted PfP at the Brussels Summit in January 1994, many aspiring NATO members were disappointed and criticized PFP as a 'policy for postponement.' Few had any notion of how important the program would become."[1]

Simon is much right having in mind the military dimensions of PfP as a main tool of transforming the Alliance and the partner countries. PfP performed multiple functions. From a technical point of view it first showed the gap between the NATO and East European armed forces and the differences among the PfP countries as well. In 1994, if no country was ready to join NATO and the differences among candidates were so significant, in 1997, with the first countries ready to join, some of the differences became blurred.

1. Adapting NATO and Transforming Partners: CJTF

Before the PfP agreement was signed in 1994, military contacts were limited mainly to bilateral cooperation on various activities related to peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations. On the basis of the post-Cold War NATO strategic concept, it was launched the military CJTF operational concept in 1993 to create "multinational (combined) and multi-service (joint) task force, task-organized and formed for the full range of the Alliance's military missions requiring multinational and multi-service command and control by a CJTF Headquarters."[2]

CJTF intended to use military cooperation as a tool to enhance political relationships on both sides of the former Iron Curtain. However, it was soon realized that a larger umbrella was needed as to comprise also political cooperation. Partnership for Peace included from the very beginning institutionalized political cooperation.

As a NATO military operational concept, CJTF was specifically designed to include, for the first time, elements from non-NATO troop contributing nations. Different NATO and partner countries exercises have proved CJTF being functional. Peace-keeping missions, such as the one in Bosnia-Herzegovina (SFOR) in which NATO member and partner countries have been involved since 1995 are proofs the CJTF works properly. Moreover, CJTF made peacekeeping in Bosnia easier to be organized and managed during all these years.

NATO/PfP exercises, such as "Allied Effort" in November 1997, in which a number of Partner countries participated as observers, and "Strong Resolve" in March 1998 and in March 2002, in which Partner countries participated and were integrated throughout the structure of the CJTF, are such practical examples.

In 1999, the Alliance started an orderly implementation of CJTF Headquarters. This process, which includes the acquisition of necessary headquarters support and command, control and communications equipment is scheduled for completion in late 2004. The implementation process is taking fully into account lessons learned from NATO-led operations in former Yugoslavia.

Therefore, CJTF reflects the changing nature of the military missions to address the new security environment in Europe: smaller, easy to deploy, multinational formations of NATO and partner countries. While CJTF is a main mechanism for adapting the Alliance to a new military role, for the partner countries CJTF is an effective transformation tool that enables their armed forces to become interoperable with the NATO forces. CJTF has contributed to a better preparation for accession and has made candidates become accustomed with NATO procedures.

2. Achieving Interoperability – PARP (Self-selection)

As mentioned in Section I.1., it is difficult to point the separation line between cooperation and assistance within PfP. CJTF made NATO and East European countries aware of the political dimension. Military assistance was indeed a key factor for the candidate countries to get admission into the Alliance. However, as admission is a political decision in which military preparedness is an important, but not the decisive factor, one should think on other criteria such as democratic control of the armed forces, market economy and respect for the human rights. Therefore, PfP has also created the conditions that partners that do not yet qualify for membership to be engaged in a closer process of cooperation to address the critical conditions for admission.

Alongside refined political criteria, PfP advanced to closer military cooperation. The Planning and Review Process envisaged such a process as early as December 1994 when the first PARP cycle was launched with 15 candidate countries willing to become full NATO members.

As stated in NATO's official documents, PARP was "designed to provide a basis for identifying and evaluating forces and capabilities which might be made available for multinational training, exercises and operations in conjunction with Alliance forces."[3] In October 1996 a second PARP cycle followed. If in the first cycle the main activities related to peacekeeping, rescue and humanitarian missions, in the second cycle activities expanded to encompass the full range of NATO missions.

PARP also initiated what one would consider to be one of the most important military aspects of PfP: the *interoperability objectives*. Simply defined, interoperability objectives are aimed at making partner armed forces become progressively interoperable with the NATO forces. The PARP goals and the interoperability objectives are discussed with each partner as partners themselves decide which goals and objectives are to be implemented. Later on (1997) the interoperability objectives were renamed *partnership goals*.

In June 1998, NATO Defense Ministerial with PARP partners adopted the so-called "Expanding and Adapting the PFP Planning and Review Process" aimed at making PARP come close to the Alliance Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ). With the PARP reassessment in 1999 it was developed the *Operational Capabilities Concept*. In June 1999

Political Military Steering Committee on Partnership for Peace recommended an Enhanced and More Operational Partnership. Hence, the partnership goals are to be implemented with the PARP third cycle since 2002. For the partner countries, it is considered that PARP represents a practical tool for learning Alliance's procedures and rules of defense planning in both its dimensions - political and military.

3. Membership Action Plan – NATO's acquis

The NATO April 1999 Summit in Washington confirmed the open door policy in that for the candidate countries not yet invited to join it was offered a closer relationship instead – the Membership Action Plan. Politically, MAP was intended to recognize the progress achieved by the candidate countries and to demonstrate the open door policy (Article 10) is valid. The bulk of the MAP countries are the South East-European ones (Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania and Slovenia). MAP was also extended to the Baltics, despite clear differences of PfP (military) performances between the two groups. NATO's official documents stated that "the MAP gives substance to NATO's commitment to keep its door open. However, participation in the MAP does not guarantee future membership, nor does the Plan consist simply of a checklist for aspiring countries to fulfill."[4]

While variously mentioned since PfP inception in 1994, non-political and non-military issues are officially named in the MAP documents for the first time in 1999 as defined criteria for membership. This document stated that "Aspirant countries are expected to achieve certain goals in the political and economic fields. These include settling any international, ethnic or external territorial disputes by peaceful means; demonstrating a commitment to the rule of law and human rights; establishing democratic control of their armed forces; and promoting stability and well-being through economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility."

One could notice the rising membership criteria as admission is postponed and PfP advances in time. For the NATO officials this is a normal evolution that the Membership Action Plan was build on the "experience gained during the intensified dialogue process and the integration into the Alliance of the three newest members."[5] This is to say the experience gained with the three new admitted members (the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary) was thought to be much useful to devise the candidate countries. However, one could also notice that in 1999 it was only in theory.

Actually, integration of the three new members proved to be more difficult than expected. But this did not diminish the MAP significance as an advanced tool for preparing the candidate countries. Moreover, self-organized in the so-called "Vilnius Initiative", the nine Membership Action Plan (MAP) foreign ministers launched a political initiative on May 18-19, 2000 in Vilnius, Lithuania, to remind the member states of NATO "to fulfill the

promise of the Washington Summit to build a Europe whole and free...[and] at the next NATO Summit in 2002 to invite our democracies to join NATO."[6] This political initiative was followed by similar MAP meetings, such as the meeting of defense ministers in Sofia in October 2000 and of the head of governments in Bucharest in March and Riga in July 2002.

MAP has proved to be the most advanced tool for better preparing the candidate countries. MAP was so designed that objectives essential for NATO membership to be achieved before issuing the invitation and in advance of ratifying the Washington Treaty. Some other objectives might be achieved afterwards. The primary mechanisms by which MAP is accomplished are the Annual National Plans (ANP), comprising five chapters – political, economic, defense, military, resource, security of information, and legislation – and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, which assesses the performance of the candidate countries.

Larry Watts (2002) points out that "The first MAP cycle did provide the requisite experience for NATO to learn what needed to be included in the ANP, how the PARP, Individual Partnership Plans (IPP), and MAP processes needed to be coordinated, and for both sides to understand how the process would work."[7] MAP is usually considered a *road map* as it uses the previous experience of various programs for pointing out the steps to be made for better preparing the candidate countries. MAP is an integrated mechanism for integration.

For Romania, Watts considers that "In terms of pace and effectiveness, the MAP process created a 'sea change' in Romanian military reform and integration".[8] This observation is valid for Bulgaria and Slovenia as well. MAP not only visualized the destination for the candidate countries, but it also marked the pathway. From the interest of this study it is difficult to delineate cooperation and assistance within various NATO/PfP programs, MAP included.

Notes:

1. Jeffrey Simon, "The Next Round of NATO Enlargement", in *Strategic Forum*, no. 176, National Defense University, INSS, Washington DC, 2000.
2. The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Concept, at http://www.afnorth.nato.int/ae01/cjtfconcept.html
3. Quoted from "The Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP)", in *NATO Handbook*, Chapter 3: The Opening Up of the Alliance, 1997 Edition.
4. See *NATO's Membership Action Plan*, at http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/nato-map.htm
5. Ibidem.
6. J. Simon, op. cit.

7. Larry Watts, "Introduction: The Convergence of Reform and Integration", in L. Watts (eds), *Romanian Military Reform and NATO Integration*, Iasi, 2002, p. 19.
8. Ibidem, p. 20.

III.3 WESTERN (NATO / PFP) ASSISTANCE FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. PROGRAMS, INSTITUTIONS AND FUNDS

1. Military-to-Military / US Joint Contact Program. 2. International Military Education and Training Program (IMET / Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia). Other NATO countries educational programs. 3. Marshall Center. 4. NATO Defense College in Rome. 5. NATO School (SHAPE) in Oberammergau. 6. The Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCRM) in Monterey, USA. 7. The Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces – DCAF. 8. The TCMR Project (The Transformation of Civil-Military Relations in Comparative Context) – United Kingdom

In the framework of evolutionary political and military dimensions – which are the bedrocks of the new East-West relationship – specific programs for assisting the process of democratization of the East European militaries and of building democratic civil-military relations are the practical tools to pursue such goals. There is a large variety of programs and institutions that NATO and the member countries have developed to address the issues of civil-military relations in Eastern Europe.

Most of these programs are focused on military contacts (MIL-TO-MIL / JCP), education of military and civilian personnel (IMET), NATO/PfP conferences, round tables, seminars, visits, etc. as well as information, research and assistance centers (such as DCAF in Geneva). These institutions function in the member countries (such as the Marshall Center in Garmish-P, NATO Defense College in Rome and NATO School in Oberammergau) as well in the partner countries (such as the Regional Center for CIV-MIL Relations in Brasov, Romania, NATO Information Center in Sofia, Bulgaria).

As with the focus of such programs, one should notice that during the "first generation" reforms, assisting democratic civil-military relations mattered most. With the advent of the PfP and of the "second generation" reforms, assistance programs for downsizing and professionalisation of the East European military become predominant. It is not easy to delineate between the two kind of programs as one could not clearly determine which programs are designed for what purposes. Hence, in the early 1990s much attention was attached to the issue of democratization. By mid-1990s the focus shifted on professionalisation, downsizing and converting redundant military personnel.

As PfP became a self-differentiation mechanism among partner countries, many assistance programs have developed as bilateral ones as they were initiated and funded by member countries toward individual partners. In principle, each partner country assesses its needs and makes proposals for cooperation on the subject. NATO/PfP framework makes possible for various programs and institutions to intercede for each other. Usually, NATO and NATO member countries offer their assistance according to certain criteria.

As for funding, there is a variety of funding schemes mainly through defense departments (ministries) of the NATO member countries. Allocating money was done according to the scope and duration of specific programs and to their goals as well. If, for instance, IMET benefited of an well-established and long planned funding, other programs such as MIL-TO-MIL received funding rather on a random basis. Programs and institutions that work usually receive funds and develop their activities over time. An assessment of the main assistance programs and institutions would show their large significance for developing civil-military relations in (South) Eastern Europe.

1. Military-to-Military / US Joint Contact Program

MIL-TO-MIL initiative was the first cooperation and assistance program for East European countries to be launched as early as 1991. US gained a good experience in the field in the aftermath of WW II in the efforts to build a new German military and demilitarize and democratize Japan. At the end of the Cold War, the program was designed to manage similar goals in Eastern Europe: provide military liaison teams of qualified US specialists to assist transition to democracy by encouraging former communist militaries to head toward "positive, constructive elements of democratic societies that are apolitical, respect human rights, and adhere to the rule of law."[1]

The initiative was outlined by the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell and sent to the then SACEUR General John Shalikashvili to create a program similar to a military peace corps for the transitional East European militaries. The US teams were to provide the right contacts and expertise for Eastern European needs. The first US team was sent to Hungary in July 1992 as a trial. By next year ten other Mil-to-Mil US teams were sent to Central and Eastern Europe. A large exchange visits program has developed since 1993. In the first year, the program was funded with $ 6 million. In 1994 it received $ 10 million and in 1995 $ 16.3 million.[2] After 1996 the program was funded by the Commander in Chief (CINC) European budget with some $ 15 millions.

With the progress of other assistance programs, Mil-to-Mil diminished its importance but remained to be called the first institutionalized military cooperation and assistance program for Eastern Europe. Its mission statement is still at the core of the post-Cold War East-West military cooperation, i.e.

> "[T]o assist the governments of Central and East European countries, the republics of the former Soviet Union in developing civilian controlled military forces which foster peace and stability in a democratic society".[3]

Mil-to-Mil just opened the gates for cooperation on both sides of the former divide. It stimulated not only the military cooperation, but also the political one. In early 1990s, Mil-to-Mil challenged the still reticent East-West diplomacy. Reactions from State Department, the institution in charge with foreign policy, promted the DoD as not to take initiative in the field.[4] However, JCTP did take the initiative. It is the first born "child" of the new East-West military relationship. It opened the way for more substantial and for an enlarged cooperation. With JCTP was also born the concept of integration. In 1993, for instance the US-Czech Republic Mil-To-Mil program included 16 activities and respectively 46 in the following year. US-Romania Mil-To-Mil program included more than 52 bilateral activities in 1994.

2. International Military Education and Training Program (IMET). Other NATO countries educational programs

US began to train and educate foreign servicemen as early as 1947. Other NATO countries had previously a good experience in the field, even before WW II (such as the UK and France). Since 1950, the International Military Education Program as a distinct US assistance program for overseas countries has provided training for over than 500,000 international military students. Worth mentioning, all West European countries that signed the Washington Treaty in 1949 or became NATO members later on, benefited IMET during the Cold War and after as well. That means the US post-war assistance to Western Europe was well extended to also include education (See for details regarding IMET programs for Western Europe in *Annex I*)..

After 1990, alongside US, most of the NATO countries also developed Imet-type educational programs for Central and East European countries. Among these NATO member relatively extended funds and seats in different military academies are offered by the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Greece and Italy. These seats are offered on a yearly basis in Western European and US defense universities, military colleges, armed forces academies and institutes. More than 200 such military academies offer each year seats for most of the partner countries. Each partner country benefits each year of some 20-30 long term (at least one year) scholarships, some 80-100 medium term courses (up to six months) and over 250 short term courses (up to 5 weeks) whithin the NATO countries defense academies network.

As for IMET, much of its high regard abroad had already been received prior to 1990, but it consolidated afterwards. With the extension of IMET to the East Europeans, it virtually

became an world-wide assistance program on foreign military education. Since its very inception it has had two broad missions: first, to provide professional military education and military training for allied or friendly armed forces and second, to expose foreign military personnel to democratic values, respect for human rights and belief in the rule of law. IMET means professional military education in the context of a democratic society. As Clarke et al. (1997) suggest, the program "is not designed to change behavior, but it may have affected the attitudes of some participants".[5]

In the early 1990s IMET offered more than 2,000 courses a year in as many as 150 US military schools in the US and abroad. An IMET review concluded that the program has well defined functions such as: assist foreign countries in developing effective management of their defense establishments, provide an alternative to the Soviet-type military training, promote military cooperation and promote a better understanding of the United States, of its people, political system and culture. With the end of the Cold War, IMET changed, too. New courses and new countries were included. With the fiscal year 1991, IMET was expanded to include training and education for military and civilian officials in East European countries. It also expanded to include practically all former communist countries and Soviet republics that declared their independence.

However, despite IMET expanded geographically to cover former communist countries, its financing declined substantially for a number of years. In 1992, IMET received 44.6 millions. By 1994 it received only half of that, (19.0 millions). With the 1996 budget, IMET increased its resources to almost 40.0 millions to reach some $ 70 millions in 2001. (See *Figure 5*) Although Eastern Europe countries in particular are not among the "privileged" recipients, however, IMET provides an important opportunity for educating East European military and civilians in security and defense related matters.

Figure 5 – US IMET Program/Deliveries (includes MASF and Emergency Drawdowns)



Source*: US Defense and Security Cooperation Agency*.

As for South Eastern European countries, *Table 6* presents the IMET details for Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia. As data show, South Eastern European countries are well represented in the IMET programs. In 2001, for instance, 127 civilians and military from Bulgaria, 284 from Romania and 78 from Slovenia benefited from IMET educational programs.

Table 6 - *US IMET Funding and Students for Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia (1999-2001)*

	1999		2000		2001	
Bulgaria	Budget $ 0.974	Students 118	1.0	125	1.1	127
Romania	1.11	281	1.1	278	1.4	284
Slovenia	0.65	75	0.65	75	0.7	78

Source*: US Defense and Security Cooperation Agency*. (For 2001 data is estimated as the budget close October 2002.)

Similar to IMET, other important NATO countries offer their educational programs for partner countries in Eastern Europe. Civilians and Military of the partner countries take part on an annual basis to education at *King's College in London*, *Sandhurts Military Academy* in UK, *Dutch National Defense College* in Breda, the Netherlands, *Bundeswehr Militarische Academy* in Hamburg, Germany, *National Defense College in Rome*, Italy and *L'Ecole Militaire Superieure* and *Saint-Cyr* military academy in France. Short courses (three to six months) in armed services academies are offered by almost all NATO member countries on a permanent basis.

3. George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies

Established in the Summer of 1994 as a US-German lead institution, the European Center George C. Marshal Center for Security Studies was designed to play a long-term role in assisting Eastern European militaries to develop democratic practices. To a large extent, Marshall Center has the characteristics of each of the other assistance programs, such as the long-term courses or short-term conferences, but it has built its own distinctivity by specifically addressing the East European issues incumbed by the transformation of their military. The Marshall Center is a Western program unequivocally created to deal with the East European military.

Marshall Center mission statement reflects the general philosophy at the end of the Cold War that "the current environment provides a unique opportunity to fashion a world for the 21st century truly different from the centuries of conflict that characterized the nation-state system since its inception. The Marshall Center exists to help educate those leaders from the Atlantic to Eurasia who will forge a brighter future for all our nations."

Therefore, Marshall Center's commitment is :

> "[T]o create a more stable security environment by advancing democratic defense institutions and relationships; promoting active, peaceful engagement; and enhancing enduring partnerships among the nations of North America, Europe, and Eurasia."[6]

This general mission is accomplished by the Center's five branches aimed to assist East European military: the College of International and Security Studies, the Conference Center, the Research Center, the Foreign Language Training Center and the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes.

The first group of 50 officers and 25 civilians from Western and Eastern countries graduated Marshall Center in December 1994. Students are usually security studies and defense specialists, from General/Flag officer and Ambassador/Parliamentarian level to Captain/Major and Third and Second Secretary level. The courses offered by the Marshall Center reflect the post-Cold War evolution of the East European and Russian affairs. While in 1994 the Marshall Center curriculum was designed to mainly address the US-Soviet military post Cold War issues, in late 1990s courses adapted to more practical issues such as globalization, cooperative security, foundations of emerging democracies, human rights and so on. Due to teaching in three different languages (English, German, Russian) accessibility to Marshall Center is actually open to any East European student who meets the selecting criteria. (There were allegations that at its inception the Marshall Center was subservient to addressing the new US-Russian relations. However, time has demonstrated that such allegations were only partially right. With the first change of curricula in 1997, the Russian studies diminished).

The heart of the Marshall Center is the College of International and Security Studies (CISS) with its three main courses: "Senior Executive" – a two weeks (twice a year) course with a general theme derived from current issues of Euro-Atlantic security aimed at high military and civilian officials, "Leaders of the 21st Century" – a nine weeks course that focuses on a younger audience for a basic education on security and defense matters, and an "Executive Program" – a 15 weeks main course for colonels and for their civilian counterparts. The College is responsible for developing a group of graduates expected to use the knowledge and expertise achieved during the course for a democratic defense and security management in their own countries.

At the Marshall Center efforts to keep in tune with the College and the evolution of main courses for graduates are currently undertaken. If at the beginning of the College, the military dimension was predominant, after 1997 education on civilian aspects of security and defense has much improved. Civilian professors from various US and European universities complemented the military ones. This was in line with the growing number of civilian students to attend the courses. Also a limited number of professors from Central and East European countries are teaching at the College. Guest speakers from all the NATO and Partnership countries are also invited to address current international and security issues. Much of the College accomplishment is based not only on the number of graduates, but on the high positions Marshall Center graduates get in their countries. Among Marshall Center graduates there are defense ministers and deputies, chiefs of general staff, chiefs of armed forces services, high echelon commanders, ambassadors. Marshall Center graduation usually gives a better standpoint for professional appointments in home countries.

The Conference Center organizes at least 20 conferences a year to be held in Garmish-P. or in various other places in Europe. Most of the conferences are to complement the College courses for participants that are involved in the security and defense sectors. The Conference Center could be imagined as a "mobile college" due to its high mobility and flexibility in organizing conferences for various attendants, from high level officials to junior officers.

The MC Research Center is meant to tackle on those issues that challenge the security environment in the Euro-Atlantic area. Two such research projects received great appreciation in the academic community: "Military and Society in 21st Century Europe" and "Warriors in Peacekeeping: Points of Tension in Complex Cultural Encounters"; both projects are now books published by the Marshall Center.*

In various degrees, all the South Eastern European countries benefited from the educational and training programs at the Marshall Center. It is worth mentioning that some South Eastern European countries were invited to send students even before their governments to have signed the PfP agreement (Bosnia-Herzegovina sent students as yearly as 1996). Other non-partner countries from South Eastern Europe were involved in different programs (conferences, seminars) before a formal agreement to be signed by their governments (for instance Serbia).

Table 7 – *Marshall Center students and funding for Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia*

* I should mention here the great work done by the Marshall Center Research Branch over the years and the dedication of Jurgen Külman and Mathias Schönburn, assisted by Jeannie Callaghan, to developing research on civil-military relations, in general and on sociology of the military, in particular.

	1999		2000		2001*	
Bulgaria	14	$ 211,904	81	$ 1,226,016	79	$ 1,036,210
Romania	23	$ 348,128	74	$ 1,120,064	78	$ 1,024,680
Slovenia	10	$ 151,360	17	$ 257,312	18	$ 263,453

Source*: US Defense and Security Cooperation Agency*. (For 2001 figures are estimated as the budget close October 2002.)

The PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes. Also located at the Marshall Center, but as an independent organization, the PfP consortium is "dedicated to strengthening defense and military education and research through enhanced institutional and national cooperation".[7] There are currently 263 defense academies, institutes, NGOs, think-tanks, universities and research centers affiliated to the Consortium. It was formed in 1998 as a US-German initiative and has grown up to become an umbrella for generic cooperation on academic and education "in the spirit of PfP". By the number of participants, Consortium's conferences are rather PfP conventions, but the opportunity given to so many participants to meet and discuss at least once a year is much useful.

4. NATO Defense College in Rome

For over 50 years NATO Defense College in Rome (NDC) has trained and educated high military officers to work in NATO HQ and other major military commands. Advanced courses on strategy and defense are taught to a multinational audience. Following the Alliance transformation at the end of the Cold war, NDC has opened for East European flag officers too. Partner countries are offered seats for the NDC senior courses. The main academic course to deal with the new security environment in the Euro-Atlantic area and with the evolution of the Partnership for Peace is the "Integrated PfP/OSCE/MD Course (IPOC)". Additional NDC Fellowship programs and NDC Conferences are available for East European participants.

The NDC mission statement outlines the atmosphere of "human interoperability" as a factor for enhancing operational effectiveness. For East Europeans that work in the NATO HQ and subordinate commands PfP cells graduating the NDC is a proper way to better adapt to the Alliance's procedures. All South Eastern European countries benefited at least one NDC graduate a year. Also, Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia each benefited of 3 NDC Fellowships (one of the most prestigious NATO/PfP research fellowships).

5. NATO School (SHAPE) in Oberammergau

Established as early as 1953, the NATO School in Oberammergau (Germany) was the key training and educational center for the North Atlantic Alliance during the Cold War. After the Alliance Summit in Rome in 1991, NATO School expanded its curriculum to address the non-Article 5 procedures and operations too. Students from NATO member states, partners and from Mediterranean Dialogue countries are currently attending courses at the NATO School. The first course for East Europeans, called "European Security Cooperation", was initiated in 1991. In 2001, 20 courses out of 54 were offered to the East European partners. One of these courses specifically addresses the "Civil-Military

Cooperation". Guest speakers from Eastern European countries are also invited at the NATO School on a permanent basis.

6. The Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCRM) in Monterey, USA

The mission statement of the CCMR at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California specifically points to the assistance of other nations in civil-military relations: "strengthening democratic civil-military relations and assisting other nations make integrated defense decisions".[8] The main way of CCMR work is courses offered in-residence and overseas on specific issues of civil-military relations. The METS is a 5-day course in specific topics of interest to the recipient country. The Executive Program is designed as a two-week course for senior officers and their civilian counterparts. The Graduate course offers an M.A. degree in civil-military relations and international relations. The CCMR also organizes on a permanent basis workshops on civil-military relations and has developed a Internet network-based learning. CCMR also developed what one could call "the operational Civ-Mil", i.e. civil-military relations in multinational missions, mainly on peace-keeping. Quite significantly, the Center in Monterey is one of the few to tackle on the civilian control over the intelligence and security services in Eastern Europe. Publications available on line are also offered by the CCMR.

7. The Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces – DCAF

Part of the Swiss participation within the PfP, the government in Geneva established in October 27, 2000 the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. Even if the Center is organized as a Swiss foundation, it actually includes representatives from 24 other PfP countries. Broadly, the Center is designed to promote democratic control over the armed forces in the NATO/PfP countries. Its specific activities include periodic analysis and evaluations, developing standards and procedures for the assessment of democratization and reform of the defense and security sector, and cooperation with other partners on a case-by-case basis.

On a permanent basis, in Switzerland or in other NATO/PfP countries, are organized round tables, conferences and seminars. A wide Internet documentation source on civil-military relations has been developed in a short time. Other publications are available on request. Worth mentioning, DCAF in Geneva created a think-tank to deal with current issues of civil-military relations, a regional partners network in Central and Eastern Europe to focus on specific civil-military issues (two working groups are already active, one on parliamentary oversight, the other one on security sector reform) and an in-house information resources unit. Alongside PfP network, DCAF also initiated cooperation on civil-military issues with the OSCE and with the UE Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe.

8. The TCMR Project (The Transformation of Civil-Military Relations in Comparative Context) – United Kingdom

Even with less staff and resources and within a three-year limited undertaking, the TCRM Project has managed to comprehensively approach the evolution of civil-military relation in Eastern Europe, to properly analyze and to promptly offer policy recommendations to governments both in the East and the West. Formally, the TCMR intended to identify patterns in the development of civil-military relations in Central and Eastern Europe, to explore the factors that shape these patterns and to asses the impact of western policies on civil-military relations. Formally, the British team managed to create a network of experts from most of the CEE countries to periodically meet, discuss and exchange knowledge on civil-military relations. Informally, TCMR also contributed to create a community of students on civil-military relations that will survive the formal end of the research program.*

TCMR focused on three important fields: democratic control, professionalisation and the military and society. An additional interest goes with the so-called defense diplomacy which is intended for practitioners and policy makers. As a successful program on civil-military relations, the TCMR model might be extended to other areas, such as defense industry or reconversion of redundant military personnel. It implies small but very specialized research groups, that focus on certain important issues and deliver highly professional reports.

Notes:

1. Tim Edmunds, "Professionalization of the Military", in *Tool Category C: Military Measures*, at http://www.caii-dc.com/ghai/toolbox6.htm
2. See for details on Mil-to-Mil program, M.P. Ulrich, *Democratizing Communist Militaries. The Cases of the Czech Republic and Russian Armed Forces*, Ann Harbor, Univ. of Michigan Press, 1999, p. 53-5.
3. JCTP mission statement as presented in 1995, apud. M.P. Ulrich, *op. cit*. p. 55.
4. M. P. Ulrich points out the State Department idiosyncrasy on DoD self-appointed foreign policy posture. See for details M.P. Ulrich, *op. cit*., p. 56-7.
5. Clarke, Duncan L., Daniel B. Oconnor & Jason D. Ellis, *Send guns and money. Security assistance and US foreign policy*, Praeger, 1997, p. 21.
6. Excerpts from the Marshall Center Mission Statement, Marshall Center web site at http://www.marshallcenter.org/committment.htm
7. For details on PfP Consortium, see http://www.pfpconsortium.org
8. See for details, Center for Civil-Military Relations in Monterery, California at http://www.ccmr.org/public/home.cfm

* I consider TCMR one of the most comprehensive and advanced programs on civil-military relations in Eastern Europe

III.

WHAT SOUTH EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAVE DONE? DEMOCRACY, REFORM AND INTEGRATION

III.1. DEVELOPING CIV-MIL AFTER 1989: DEMOCRACY, REFORM AND INTEGRATION. THE *FORMS* OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

1. The post-communist agenda for transforming civil-military relations in South Eastern European countries. 2. Establishing a legal framework for democratic control. 3. Civilian leadership of defense. 4. Parliamentarian oversight. 5. Downsizing the military. 6. Filling the civil-military gap: professionalization of officer corps. 7. Changing the strategic culture

Even limited by domestic circumstances and by post-Cold War evolutions, for Eastern European countries the magnitude of post-Cold War reform of the military has no comparison yet. As mentioned in Section I.2, international and internal factors have contributed in different ways to shaping the new civil-military relations. For South Eastern European countries, regional political instability and war-torn societies added supplementary difficulties to an already complicated domestic agenda of reform and integration.

1. The post-communist agenda for transforming civil-military relations in South Eastern Europe

In practical terms, what is the post-Cold War East European agenda of military reform in general and of civil-military relations in particular? As Anton Bebler pointed out in the early 1990s, the East European civil-military agenda and "… [its] main components could be summarized as follows:

a) increased transparency of defense policies and often a greater supervisory role by parliaments and public opinion;
b) civilianization of defense ministries;
c) radical personnel changes in the upper echelons of the armed forces;
d) national emancipation, new security and defense doctrines;
e) partial redeployment and an altered profile for the armed forces;
f) a greater stress on a participatory managerial style within military establishments, humanizing some aspects of the way they function but combining this with stronger "institutionalism";
g) relative political neutralization of the armed forces, discontinuation of the military's internal security role, disbanding separate military formations for internal security, and in some states abolishing separate military courts;

h) ideological pluralism; abolition of the widespread and obtrusive discrimination against known religious believers (in all states except Poland where the regime in the armed forces had been rather liberal on this score); and decriminalization of conscientious objection."[1]

Bebler's list should be seen mainly as a general agenda of transforming civil-military relations in Eastern Europe. In the early 1990s it was enthusiastically embraced by most East European governments. However, the reality went in some cases beyond this incipient list or, in some other cases, it fell short of it. Specific domestic conditions have shaped this new course in various ways and such an agenda was to remain orientative and normative. Hence its declarative and purely normative character. In practice there are common features of the civil-military relations in (South) Eastern Europe as there are certain differences. No matter the destination is the same, i.e. democratic civil-military relations in a working democracy, the pathways are different for different countries.

To sum up, the main tasks of civil-military relations in (South) Eastern Europe have been establishing a legal framework for democratic control and civilian leadership on defense and parliamentarian oversight, downsizing the armed forces, societal reintegrating the military and professionalizating the officers' corps, changing the strategic culture and raising the civil society and public awareness on defense and security issues.

2. Establishing the legal framework for democratic control

Democratization was the first step on the pathway to transforming civil-military relations in South Eastern European countries. This first step equated with establishing a legal framework for democratic civilian control. Worth mentioning, from the very beginning the inspiration for drafting new constitutional and legal procedures was to be taken from Western constitutional and legal democratic practices and some prewar indigenous traditions as well. Particularly, the European constitutional models (mostly French) played a significant role in inspiring the Eastern European lawmakers. European bodies, such as the Council of Europe, offered support and encouragement.[2]

Actions for establishing a democratic framework for civil-military relations were made as early as 1990. New drafts of post-communist constitutions were adopted in 1991-1992. In **Romania**, the *Constitutia* adopted by referendum in December 1991 grants the President with the authority as the supreme commander of the armed forces. The separation of state powers gives the Parliament the right to oversee the executive, while the executive is responsible with the national defense policy. In **Bulgaria**, the Grand National Assembly of July 1991 adopted the new *КОНСТИТУЦИЯ* which entered into power next year. The Bulgarian post-communist Constitution gives the civilian authorities the rights to control the military and establishes the role of the President, the Government and the Parliament in

defense and security matters. In **Slovenia**, the *Ustava* was adopted in December 1991 after the declaration of independence. Being less explicit on national defense or on the role of the President and the Government, the Constitution of Slovenia is more precise on the leading role of the Parliament in defense and security matters.

In early 1990s, when Soviet legacy was still present, the new constitutional drafts created large public debates and adverse reactions on such sensitive issues as joining military alliances, allowing foreign troops on national territory and, mostly, participating in peace-keeping operations. In such an environment, public participation and the setting up of democratic constitutional rules constituted an expression of the incipient East European democracy. It indicated quite clearly the engagement on the way to democracy and market economy and expressed the political will to join the Euro-Atlantic security community.

However, as mentioned in Section I.1., the continuity of the military post-communist establishments impeded on democratization in certain countries (Bulgaria, Romania) while discontinuity offered a better start for others (Slovenia). As Larry Watts points out (2002), "plans initiated in early 1990 for the first structural reform of the Romanian Armed Forces completed and presented on January 1, 1991 proved premature and had to be scrapped less than a week later."[3]

With the ups and downs, in full compliance with the new constitutional provisions, basic defense acts are to be adopted in the following years in all the South Eastern European countries. In Romania, the 1994 *Lege a Apararii Nationale* / Law on National Defense codifies the armed forces relationship with the President, the Parliament and the Government. In Bulgaria, an improved *ЗАКОН ЗА ИЗМЕНЕНИЕ* / Law on Defense and Armed Forces was adopted in 1998. In Slovenia, the *Zakon o obrambi* / Defense Act of 1994 also states the separation of powers between the President, the Parliament and the Government. Successive revisits of the defense laws were meant to improve norms and procedures on national defense. For instance, in 1995, with the Dayton Accord, South Eastern European countries had to modify national legislation as to permit participation in peace-keeping operations. Improving legislation on national security have solved confusions on the role of the President, the MOD and the General Staff in the South Eastern European countries.

In all three countries there have been established *National Security Councils* to conduct current national security affairs. As in advanced democracies, the National Security Council is a working body of the President and it is the only body the Chief of the General Staff participate in his capacity as chairman of Chief of Staffs and adviser to the President. In all three countries, the President nominates the Chief of the General Staff at the defense minister proposal. The defense committees of the parliament also hold hearings with the

nominated Chief of the General Staff. The Chief of the General Staff is no longer a member of the Government.

Practically, the whole constitutional and defense legal system was changed in all South Eastern European countries in less than 7-8 years after 1989. Eventually, the new constitutional and legal provisions created a sound foundation for democratic management of civil-military relations, established a clear role and function of the military and increased the civilians' awareness on defense matters.

3. Civilian leadership of defense

South European countries incipient democracy of early 1990s created the basis for the new civilian political leadership to take over on national defense. It took a number of years the Soviet tradition of appointing military people as defense ministers to be abolished as reflecting neither the domestic tradition nor the advance of democracy. It started with the nomination of a civilian Minister of defense and exclusion of the Chief of the General Staff as a member of the Government. However, the practice of nominating uniformed people as defense ministers did not challenge the civilian "supremacy" over the military, neither before 1989 nor in the first years after. Appointing a civilian minister and separating the General Staff from the Defense Ministry was part of a larger process of "civilianizing" the defense ministries. Accordingly, defense policy, planning and budgeting were to formally become a civilian responsibility. Prior to 1989, there were no civilians appointed in the defense high hierarchy. Rather, civilian political appointees were granted with military ranks after a short education in military affairs.

Larry Watts (2002) thinks that "the initial misidentification by NATO and Western analysts of measures that indicated reform progress, such as the early appointment of civilians in defense management positions, regardless of their expertise or ethical standing"[4] generated certain side-effects. As mentioned in Section III.2, the slogan, "Civilians, no matter which ones!" generated over time one of the current issues of civil-military relations in Eastern Europe : limited political responsibility of the civilian leadership, i.e. it is enough to be a "civilian" to rule a defense structure; the civilians should be responsible and competent.

Bulgaria nominated a civilian defense minister as early as 1991. It was followed by Slovenia in 1992 and Romania in 1994. Political quarrels put at test the new civilian leadership. Improved legislation on civilian responsibilities diffused conflicts on leadership, as the dispute in 1993-1994 between the President and the Defense Minister in Slovenia. (Similar experience was recorded in 1992 in Poland, between the President Lech Walesa and defense minister Onyszkiewicz.[5]) In Bulgaria, in 1997 the defense minister Georgi Ananiev (with the support of the prime-minister Kostov) decided to dismiss general

Tsvestan Totomirov as Chief of the General Staff and to nominate general Mikho Mikhov instead.[6] Such decisions proved the civilians will to control the military. Moreover, it proved the civilian control function, as the Chief of the General Staff is nominated and replaced by the President at the Defense Minister proposal.

Executive civilian authority functioned in the case of Romania as well. In 1999, for his alleged political standpoints on national security matters, the then Chief of the General Staff General, General Mircea Chelaru, was replaced by President Emil Constantinescu at the proposal of the then defense minister Victor Babiuc. In cases of abuses, corruption or disciplinary wrong-doings, the civilian authority does have the capacity to intervene and replace officers. In Slovenia, the "arms affair" in 1993 (arms transfer to Bosnia under the cover of humanitarian assistance) was solved within the new democratic constitutional framework.. In Romania in 2002, defense minister Ioan Mircea Pascu abused its position when delivering a press communiqué. The democratic mechanisms, even if not fully exercised, functioned and solved what would otherwise become a crisis of civil-military relations.

The principles of democratic control, the leadership of civilian democratically elected officials and the conscious obeying of the military are today's "rules of the game" in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia. However, to improve civilian leadership and responsibility, further measures are necessary. Main issues are still education of and sufficient supply with civilian experts, alongside with extended responsibility and accountability of the elected and appointed officials.

4. Parliamentarian oversight

Among the procedures of civilian control, the parliamentarian oversight, while the current culture might not consider it important yet, is actually the most significant one for democracy. It is instrumental in developing a democratic pattern of civil-military relations and it is inducive to democratic behavior for both the civilians and the military. The Parliament is where the practice of democratic civil-military relations exhibits all its features. And indeed, as compared with the period before, when parliaments simply ratified decisions already made by the party leadership, oversight of security affairs has become a practice since early 1990s in the South Eastern European countries.

With the end of the Cold War, for Central and South Eastern European countries the Parliament embodies the sovereignty of the country and has the right to declare war and state of emergency, to ratify bilateral treaties, to join alliances and declare others null. The Parliaments in the South Eastern European countries adopt the *National Defense Strategy*, various Government's *White Papers* on defense and the *Military Doctrine* of the armed forces. The Parliament of Bulgaria voted the latest national security strategy in 1998 and a revised military doctrine in February 2002. Romania approved the national security strategy and military doctrine in 1999. Annual defense budget and case-by-case participation in peace-keeping missions need voting too. If appropriate, other important documents are debated and approved by the Parliament in plenary session. Such documents as *Membership Action Plan Annual Documents* are debated by the defense committees. In April 2002, for instance, the Romanian Parliament adopted a national plan for integration into NATO that was proposed by the Government. Similar initiatives were adopted by the Parliaments in Sofia and Ljubljana. In

May 2002, the Parliament of Romania supported Romanian armed forces participation in Afganisthan, the first war-like mission after WW II.

The day-to-day parliamentarian practice proves to be equally relevant for the issue of democratic control over the military. That is because parliamentarian oversight is not about exceptions only – i.e. situations when Parliament has to make its decisions in extraordinary situations, but also about ordinary situations that prove democracy works every day. Here, the main role is held by the defense and foreign affairs committees of the Parliament.

In Bulgaria, a **defense committee** of the National Assembly was created in 1990, while Slovenia has had such a body since its independence in 1991. In Romania, the Parliament's committees on defense, both on the House of Deputies and the Senate, formally oversight defense policy since July 1990. The defense committees have worked on all important domestic and international decisions to be made in matters of national security and defense. Passing legislation, assessing military budgeting, discussing issues relevant to the Parliaments, are current democratic practices in South Eastern European countries. Changing political composition of the Parliaments and of its committees in the successive elections of 1992, 1996 and 2000 strengthened the procedures developed in so far.

Currently, *Bulgaria* has a Foreign Affairs, Defense and Security Committee with 28 MPs (14 from the Bulgarian Socialist Party, 6 from PU and Union of Democratic Forces, CB - 6, MRF - 2) and an Internal Security and Public Order Committee with 24 MPs (BSP -12; PU and UDF - 5; CB - 5; MRF – 2). *Romania* has defense and foreign and integration committees for both the Senate and the House of Deputies. Proportional political representation means that, for instance, out of 25 committee members in the lower house, 13 are from Social-Democrats with Razvan Ionescu as Chairman, 5 are from nationalists, 3 from democrats, 2 from liberals and 2 from ethnic minorities parties. Chairmanship was mainly with the Social Democrats of the President Ion Iliescu and Prime-Minister Adrian Nastase, including 1996-2000 when the party was in opposition.[6] The *Slovenian* National Assembly has a Committee on Defense (chairman Rudolf Petan, Social Democrat) and another one on Foreign Policy (chairman Jelko Kacin, Liberal Democrat) that both have responsibilities in the civil-military field. The committees have the right to ask for hearing the Government members, the chiefs of the intelligence services or the Chief of the General Staff. The MPs could also interpelate any member of the Government and are entitled to receive answers.

5. Downsizing the military

The Eastern European "people's armies" were large Cold-War militaries that had to be downsized. Decision to downsize the military had to be made by the civilian leadership soon after 1990. *Table 8* shows the comparative trends in defense establishments and budgets in South Eastern European countries. (Greece is presented here for purely

comparative reasons, in spite of its particular defense policy within NATO). The new civilian leadership had to make painful decisions. In Bulgaria and Romania, downsizing the military has meant getting off some 60% of the 1990 level as to make both countries ready for NATO membership. Here again the civilian leadership tested its authority in making harsh decisions. To a certain extent, civilian limited expertise and a conservative posture of the military have delayed measures to downsize that actually had to be made at the right time.

With the US assistance, the South Eastern European countries made a defense reform assessment (the *Kievenaar Study*, 1998) based on two important assumptions: the internal resources and the perspectives for NATO membership. In 1999, Bulgaria had a defense establishment of 112,000, still too large for its new defense needs.[7] Using the Kievenaar study recommendations, Romania drafted a "National Defense Framework Action Plan" (FAP) for 2000-2005. In 1999, Romania had 180,000 (almost half of the 1990 level) while Slovenia was on its way of building a military force having just 9,000, which is roughly half of the proposed (not yet official) military strength. Worth mentioning, the Slovenian military was built by transforming the former TDF (territorial defense forces) after achieving independence.

The 2004 forecasts show that Bulgaria and Romania would manage to downsize their militaries, in spite of political strains and extensive social costs. Bulgaria is expected to hold a defense establishment of some 45,000 while Romania will reduce to 140,000 or less. It is a downsizing of roughly 65% in less than ten years. Slovenia, even if there is no official document yet, is expected to build a defense establishment of up to 15,000 military and civilians. All three countries are expected to develop a *Rapid Reaction Force*, NATO interoperable, as the core of their new defense establishments.

Romania has already a rapid reaction force core which is made mainly by units that participated in peace-keeping operations (Bosnia, Kosovo and Afganisthan). Bulgaria also has a good record on training rapid reaction units while Slovenia still needs to work on it.

Table 8: *Comparative Trends in Defense Establishments and Budgets South Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Greece)*

	Population	Strength of Defense Establishments			Defense budget as Percentage of GDP			Conscription Term (Months)
	1999	1991	1999	2004	1996	1998	2000	
Bulgaria								
Total	8,194,722	117,000	112,000	45,000	2.6%	2.1%	2.5%	12

Military			82,000	40,000				
Civilian			30,000	5,000				
	1999	1990	1999	2003		2000	2007	
Romania								
Total	22,334,312	320,000	180,000	140,000	NA	1.8%	2.1%	12
Military		275,000	150,000	87-112,000				
Civilian		5,000	30,000	28,00				
			1999			1999		
Slovenia	2001							
Total	1.992.969	NA	8,200-9,400	NA	NA	1.55%		7
	2001	1994	2000			1994	2000	
Greece								
Total	10,623,835	159,300	165,600			5.7%	5.0%	12-16

Source: Data combined by the author from Jeffrey Simon, "Transforming the Armed Forces of Central and Eastern Europe", in *Strategic Forum*, # 172/June 2000, INSS, NDU, Washington DC and from *The Military Balance 1995/96* and *The Military Balance 2002/2001*, published by the Institute of Strategic Studies, London.

6. Filling the civil-military gap: professionalization of the officer corps

In a 1995 RAND study on East European military, T. Szayna & S. Larabee pointed out that the militaries in former socialist countries

> "[H]ave an unintegrated and somehow autonomous status that does not correspond to the usual position in a democratic society. These militaries have a core of a highly professional officer corps and limited direct civilian oversight over them."[8]

While being accurate in general, the above mentioned officers corps professionalism reflects mainly its technical dimension, in particular, i.e. officers' supposed skills as soldiers. But, beside effectiveness, another important feature of the modern professional soldier is his *esprit de corps* and professional responsibility and democratic attitudes.

After 1990, the reform also meant the change of officers corps skills as citizens of democratic countries. Hence, professionalizing the officers corps is part of the armed forces reform and it should be seen as a process of creating attitudes and behavior that reflect the values of a liberal and democratic society as well as the professional and organizational values of responsibility, *esprit de corps* and sacrifice (in a Huntingtonian sense). It also involves additional features such as the right treatment of the subordinates, achieving "civilian" skills in negotiations, competencies in foreign languages, public relations, human rights, international law and others. This is the so-called process of "civilizianing" of the military, of filling the civil-military gap, i.e. of integrating the

military professional corps within the society (in a Janowitzian sense).[9] Therefore, in most of the South Eastern European countries, the members of the armed forces are to be considered civil servants and subject to national civil service regulations and associated personnel policies. These policies establish personnel hiring levels, wages, retirement conditions, and pensions. Specific programs are also in due course. In Romania, for instance, a draft of the military professional career was developed in 1999. The retirement age for generals was set at 56 and at 50 for colonels.

As an important way of promoting professionalization of the officers corps, South Eastern European countries also initiated the reform of the military education as early as 1990. Bulgaria and Romania reorganized their military academies as *Armed Services Academies* (army, navy and air force academies). The *High Military Academy* educate on the joint operative level while the *National Defense College* provides education for both military and civilians in matters of national security policy. Annually, in each South Eastern European country some 30-40 military and civilians graduate the national defense colleges. Curricula are similar to those of NATO member states national defense universities. In Slovenia, the military education is part of the civil University of Ljubljana as a Department of Security Studies.

Implementing specific NATO/PfP education is also a current objective. In Brasov (Romania), in partnership with the US Monterey Naval Academy was created the *Regional Defense Management Center* to educate officers from all Central and Eastern European countries. In Slovenia, to assist improving military education, the US IMET program extended each year, from roughly 20 students in 1996 to 200 in 2002 (projected). In 1998, with the assistance of the British MoD, a *Foreign Language Center* within the High Military Academy of Romania was created to teach English to civilian and officers alike. Opportunity to study in the NATO member countries was much extended to all South Eastern European countries.

Bulgaria had in 1999 the following number of graduates abroad: USA – 50; France – 16; Germany – 10; the UK – 9; Austria – 5; Greece – 6; the Netherlands – 24; Hungary – 3; Romania – 4; Turkey – 9; Canada – 14; "George Marshal" Center - 8; NATO Defense College in Rome – 3 (total 161 graduates). With such a high number of NATO/PfP graduates per year, South Eastern European countries are expected to train roughly 15-20% of their officers abroad in the next five years.

7. Changing the strategic culture

The above mentioned RAND study of 1995 pointed out that, in 1994, “the absence of a qualified cadre of civilian defense specialists presents a fundamental obstacle to full civilian control. Until this deficiency is rectified, civil-military relations will be conflictual

and civilian control will remain largely superficial."[10] Significant improvements have occurred since the 1995 RAND's report.

First, by mid 1990s the political leadership came to the conclusion that reforming education on national security would not be sufficient if it comprised only the military. Second, it was also understood that educating civilians within the military education system at home or abroad would not supplement the need for an increased public awareness on the importance for democracy of the national security issues. Third, it was realized that the reform on education would be partial if not extended to civilian education. Hence, main universities in South Eastern Europe initiated studies in sociology of the military, civil-military relations, security studies and defense economics. A democratic culture on security and strategic issues had to replace the Soviet-styled culture on national security.

In Romania, the Bucharest University opened in 1998 an *Euro-Atlantic Center* for teaching and research on European security with the Faculty of History, while civil-military relations are taught at the Faculty of Sociology. In Slovenia, it was established a *Defense Studies Department* within the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Ljubljana. In Bulgaria, the University "St. Kliment Ohridski" in Sofia also opened M.A. studies in security and geopolitics. Other similar initiatives have followed in different other universities throughout South Eastern Europe. They attract not only civilians, but also uniformed people that are looking for a civil university degree. Worth mentioning, such departments and centers are parts of larger NATO/PfP academic networks (such as the PfP Consortium) and are at least once a year financed by NATO HQ or a NATO member country for different projects/programs.

Independent assessment on civil-military relations and on security has developed in all of the South Eastern European countries. It consists mainly of independent NGOs and think-tanks to deal with security issues. All the South European countries are represented in such international NATO/NGO networks such as the Atlantic Treaty Association. The Atlantic Club of Bulgaria was one of the most active NGOs in the area. In 2001, Solomon Passy, the president of the Club, became foreign minister of Bulgaria. In Romania, the president of the Manfred Worner Euro-Atlantic Association, Sorin Encutescu, became Secretary of State for Parliamentary Affairs within MOD. In Slovenia, Anton Bebler, a well-known sociologist of the military with the University of Ljubjana, is the president of the Slovenian Atlantic Association. Other NGOs in South Eastern European countries are very active in the field of Euro-Atlantic integration. South Eastern European NGOs networks are also active within the EU Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe.

The press has also become more aware of the importance of security and civil-military issues. Most newspapers, TV and radio stations are dealing on a permanent basis with such issues. An increased number of journalists are educated within the military and/or the

civilian system. Such institutions as the Marshall Center offer on a permanent basis seats for South Eastern European journalists. Conferences, round tables and seminars on the role of the free press in a democracy are organized at the national and regional level on a regular basis.

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One could come to the conclusion that the South Eastern European countries have accomplished a large agenda of transformation of their armed forces and of civil-military relations aimed at making their militaries become compatible with the NATO ones. In all the South Eastern European countries it was established a legal framework for civilian control, the civilian leadership is in charge with defense policy and a formal parliamentarian oversight is in function. There is still work to be done with downsizing, so by 2004 the defense establishments in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia should reach the projected strength. Comprehensive measures for the professionalization of the officer corps are in due course.

These measures aim at professionalizing and "civilianizing" the military as to include changes in education, recruiting, and developing a new "honor, duty, country" professional ethos. The trend is to consider the officer corps as part of the national civil service. Equally relevant for civil-military relations in South Eastern European countries is the civil society increasing awareness on the importance of the national security matters. The press is being responsive and education on national security matters is initiated in civilian universities. Grass-root NGOs have extended their specific activities within the civil society. Therefore, basic formal prerequisites for a democratic civilian control have already been established in the South Eastern European countries.

Notes:

1. Anton Bebler, *The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe*, NATO Review, no. 4, Aug. 1994, web edition, p. 28-32.
2. In drafting the Constitution there was a large public debate in most Central and Eastern European countries. In Romania, before the new Constitution to be adopted, it circulated the Belgian, the French and Italian constitutions translated into Romanian. An ad-hoc group to study foreign constitutional practices and to write a new constitution was formed in 1990-1991.
3. Larry Watts, "Introduction: The Convergence of Reform and Integration", in L. Watts (ed.) *Romanian Military Reform and NATO Integration*, The Center for Romanian Studies, Iasi, 2002, p. 15.
4. Ibidem, p. 16.
5. For more details, see J. Simon, NATO Enlargement. Opinions and Options, INSS, NDU, Washington DC, 1995, p. 60.
6. For more details, also see Jeffrey Simon, "Bulgaria and NATO : 7 Lost Years", in *Strategic Forum, # 142*, May 1998, INSS, Washington DC.
7. One of the implicit practices in Romania is chairmanship of the defense committee to be given to the opposition. While in opposition in 1996-2000, the Social Democrats asked for

chairmanship and received it. Even so, the then chairman of the committee, Ioan Mircea Paşcu, complained that "national consensus on defense policy cannot be achieved in the absence of a substantive dialogue between Government and Opposition, which, in Romania, is almost absent at present", (i.e. date of publication November 2000, see details in A. Cottey, T. Edmunds, A. Foster, "The Civil-Military Relations and Defense Planning: Challenges for Central and Eastern Europe in the New Era", *TCMR 1.3* paper, November 9, 2000, p.7). With the November 2000 elections, the social-democrats won and I.M. Pascu became the Defense Minister, but his party no longer agreed to give up the defense committee and its chairmanship. Of course, one could ask himself if, from a democratic point of view, the dialogue between the Government and Opposition has improved at all after the last elections. The current opposition is too much quiet.

8. See for details the comprehensive study of Jeffrey Simon, "Transforming the Armed Forces of Central and Eastern Europe", in *Strategic Forum*, # 172/June 2000, INSS, NDU, Washington DC.
9. T. Szayna & S. Larabee, *East European Military Reform After the Cold War. Implications for the United States*, National Defense Research Institute, RAND, Santa Monica, 1995, p. 34.
10. A similar process evolved in the German *Bundeswehr* since 1955 with the concept of *Innere Führung* (internal leadership).
11. Ibid 11, p. 34-5.

III.2. SOME SIDE EFFECTS OF REFORMING CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE

> " … the debate on democracy and civil-military relations in Central and Eastern Europe … has been distorted, narowed and sometimes confused by a conceptual focus on 'democratic control' of armed forces which assumes that the primary problems are the threat of praetorian military intervention in domestic politics and the resultant need to enforce civilian executive control of the military."
>
> *T. Edmunds, A. Foster, A. Cottey*, 2001[1]

1. The first generation reforms. From the pampered military to the pampered civilians. 2. The "facade discourse" and the "wood language". 3. Assistance for second generation reforms. Preventing wasting human resources.

1. The first generation reforms. From the pampered military to the pampered civilians.

As pointed out in Section III.1, "first generation" reforms are chiefly those conceived to establish a democratic civilian control over the military. As early as 1990s there was a relatively widespread belief that, in order to secure the East European fragile democracies, the first to be secure should be the civilian control over the large post-communist military establishment. In the Western parlance, it was mainly about to design assistance programs for the new East European governments to help them establish an objective civilian control over the military. This assumption was partially correct. The civilian supremacy was in fact challenged neither before nor after 1989 (See Section I.2.). In 1992, less preoccupied with the civilians, but with the large post-Cold War Soviet military, the new Clinton administration, for instance, intended to create mechanisms that would help sustain the civil-military program past its first year when influencing "dangers to democracy and reform, in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere".[2] Other NATO member countries developed cooperation and assistance programs for Eastern Europe in similar conditions and terms. The new democracy of Eastern Europe was seen as endangered by any other factor, except its civilian masters and the reforms they started in early 1990s.

To nominate, Mil-To-Mil / Joint Contact Team Program as a specific assistance program for the first generation reforms comprised mainly exchange visits, bilateral and multilateral meetings, round tables and conferences, mainly with the military personnel. To a certain extent, JCTP bilateral programs precluded NATO/PfP multilateral programs on Civ-Mil relations. Grounds for military assistance specific for the second generation reforms were also created during this period, most of them related to military and civilian education programs (IMET), military and civilian training programs, diplomatic and military roles of military attachés, military confidence-building measures and the like. However, for South Eastern European countries more consistent assistance was offered just after the PfP was signed in 1994.

For the US, Marybeth Ulrich (1999) considers that the multitude of East-West exchange visits, conferences, round tables and tours "was indicative of both an inability to operationalize democratization goals and the appropriate equating of nonlethality with democratization."[3] In the enthusiasm of the early 1990s and in the absence of a clear policy goal, leaders such as General Colin Powell considered that "All contacts are good" and that in the long run lots of interactions would pay off.[4] One could say that no side had a clear image on each other's objectives. Lots of contacts would mean few interactions in the absence of long-term operationalized goals.

The vague military assistance assumption of the "first generation" reforms could be seen in the mission statement of one of the leading Western assistance institutions as the Marshall Center in Garmish-Partenkirchen, Germany. Its mission statement of 1994 announced that

"The need for an institution such as the Marshall Center was identified in the wake of the failed August 1991 coup attempt in Russia. (...) The intention was to positively influence the development of security structures appropriate for democratic states."[5] This kind of statements (and others that followed) considered the military somehow “responsible” for such political struggles as the one in August 1991 in Moscow.

This is why in that period of time the focus of assistance on the democratic civil-military relations intended to secure the civilians political ascendancy over the uniformed men, but the programs targeted mainly the military. This assumption has proved to be partially right. The military had always had a low profile in the communist decision-making process. In certain situations, the military was not only used, but even abused by the communist party civilian political leadership. The situation was obvious in communist countries with less stronger armed forces and weaker participation in the Soviet-led Warsaw Treaty.[6]

With the new political leadership of 1990, the uniformed people were still overrepresented in the security and defense establishments, but main decisions continued to be made by the civilians. There are few signs that this path has changed in Eastern Europe in early 1990s. There were also little chances that such incidents as the Moscow coup in 1991 could change the pattern of the civil-military relationships in the former communist countries. It is hard to believe that in 1990 the military would have the political ability and managerial capacity to challenge the otherwise enthusiastically supported new civilian political leadership in most of the former communist countries. On the contrary, after 1991, as pointed out in Section I.1 in spite of a clear need of post-communist depolitization, civilian tentatives to atract the military in new political orientations were made in most of the East European countries. In the East European countries where democratization is still incomplete, politization of the military is a current issue. Daniel Nelson (2002) thinks that “postcommunist military and defense institutions more often will be targets of, and susceptible to, political manipulation and influence”.[7]

>From the point of view of this Study, in the early 1990s one could identify a misperception of the civil-military relations in Eastern Europe in connection to the relationship between the (new) civilian leadership and the (old) military. In my opinion, one of the main causes is the Cold War fixation on the Soviet military. In 1990 many Westerners still perceived the huge Soviet-type military as a danger for the fragile new civilian political leadership in Eastern Europe. The military was seen as a danger to democracy more by its dimension and less by its social and political changing roles.

To a certain extent, the foreign advisers and analysts were not able to exactly match Western expertise to Eastern needs meanwhile the Easterners were not able to properly define what they needed from the Western experts, as they had not experienced democratic civil-military relations for about 50 years. This is why in the early 1990s assistance was somehow poorly defined as “all contacts are good.” If few knew what to do, fewer knew how to do it. By focusing almost exclusively on the military people, civilian deficiencies such as lack of expertise and responsibility, superficiality and corruption escaped attention. Such aspects had to be taken into account only in the late 1990s when the issue of corruption became obvious. This is why assistance institutions such as the Marshall Center, that were built with the task of educating civilians and military alike

on the importance of strict subordination of the military to civilian leadership, realiyed the nedd to also stress the great responsibilities civilians have in defense. It became only later quite clear that for most civilians in Eastern Europe, being “chief” was somehow more important than being responsible. For the military “obeying” to civilians chiefs meant getting authonomy of their command which would sometimes encourage paternalism and corruption.

In Romania, in 1993 the first civilian appointed as deputy MOD minister considered civil-military relations as being a metter of “shared responsibility”. Later on, it proved to be a label to cover his isolation within MOD and his limited responsibility. The civilians tended to pass over the important responsibility they had alone by “sharing” it with the military people.[8] Larry Watts (2001) thinks “consensus-building” and “shared responsibility” have been positively influencing civil-military relations in Romania. While not diminishing the value of Watt’s view, on a long run one could ask himself if not diffused civilians’ responsibility and eventually increased military’s politization as well. In Slovenia, L. Jelušič and M. Malešič (2001) drew similar conclusion to this point of view when they state that “The military side is in fact out of control, because the civilian side is lacking the knowledge of how to control it.”[9] “Sharing responsibility” sometimes meant the civilians’ demise of their specific duties. In Bulgaria, as Daniel Nelson points out (2002), conflicts among top civilian officials impede upon the civilian leadership on defense.[10]

What are the consequences of such a limited civilian policy objective as “shared responsibility” instead of “full responsibility”? In my view, the agenda of the early 1990s of thwarting the military and warding the civilians created a kind of "facade discourse" by which imitation was the prevailing way of doing things. For some people, nominating a civilian defense minister was necessary in order to be like "in the West", not because of domestic democratic and civilian leadership needs. The lack of proper creative solutions for the new defense and security policy for their countries made civilians consider the western model as “the only one” and “the best”. This was a bad imitation and therefore an artificial process. The “copy and paste” mentality dominated the early 1990s. Such an approach continued with the nomination of other civilians that were good on the rhetoric of democratic civilian control but with poor expertise and leadership in defense and military affairs and therefore with limited responsibility. To a certain degree, one could say that from a situation of pampered military in late 1980s, the East Europeans moved to a situation of pampered civilians in early 1990s.

2. The “facade discourse” and the “wooden” language

Civilians’ go-between behavior and the military people conservatism postponed a clear and realistic assessment of the security sector reform needs. It therefore shuffled and delayed necessary reforms of the military. Almost everyone wanted its military to be “like in the West”, but no civilian authority was yet able to make a draft on it. Bulgaria and Romania are examples in case. In these countries, there were successive attempts to draft basic documents on national security. Because of such hesitations, up to 1996 in Romania and 1997 in Bulgaria deep military reforms missed some of the basic documents. Hence, neither the legislative, nor the executive were able to draft a policy paper sooner. Inconsistency adjourned attemps to draw a comprehensive legislation on defense before the late 1990s.

In spite of Westrerners good will, one could assume this period of time consumed lot of assistance in the

forms of conferences, round tables, visits and so on. “All contacts are good” was resource consuming for both parties. Many Easterners spent much of their time out of office by participating in so many conferences abroad. Civilians that just had started working in the military spent more time abroad than in their defense ministries at home. This contributed to the perception of civilians as “strangers” in their MODs. Even if it seems exaggerated, some people considered this form of incipient cooperation a kind of Euro-Atlantic “tourism” indeed: it could enrich someone’s personal knowledge, but would not make institutions work.

Moreover, as the Westerners stressed the importance of civilians in defense, at home democratic control was sometimes undermined by nominating purely civilian political appointees (“chiefs”) with no knowledge on defense matters and poor political responsibility. Aby mid 1990s, as a side-effect, the superficial discourse on civil-military relations discouraged civilians to take full responsibility on defense and security issues while the military people adopted a self-defense and conservative posture (“keep quiet”) that also discouraged them to be more active in the reform process.

Therefore, Western assistance for democratic civilian control of the military did create incentives for solving important points on the military reform agenda (i.e. a new model of political control over the military, an increased number of civilian defense experts, military awareness of the importance of international cooperation, etc). However, in parallel, due to old perceptions of the Soviet military and to a political agenda of post-Soviet civil-military relations too focused on securing civilian control, some side effects occurred. Such side effects were not due to the Soviet time legacy, but to difficult and inconsistent transition to democracy.

The side effects prevented the military to be more active and professionaly responsible and thwarted the civilians to be aware of the important leadership task they had and of their political responsiblility. Such an approach encouraged the uniformed people be complacent with mediocrity and take action only in crisis situations. A good part of the discourse was still ideological, resembling a pattern from the communist past called "the wooden language" – promise everything and do (almost) nothing.

Therefore, one could conclude that in the early 1990, suppressing the military was a real issue of democratic civil-military relations in Eastern Europe, but enforcing the new civilian leadership and its political responsibility were as much as necessary.

3. Assistance for second generation reforms – preventing waste of human resources

For legitimate political reasons, the (South) Eastern European military was sometimes garnished as to get closer to the NATO membership criteria. This happened in most of the Eastern Europe countries, the more in the valid candidate countries to NATO membership. Such a point of view, if not encouraged, was sometimes tacitly accepted by NATO and other Western experts on Eastern Europe, especially those that had worked as advisors for East European military affairs or were involved in different assistance programs (bilateral or multilateral – NATO/PfP).

The admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO exposed their militaries to the Alliance standards. And it became clear that the Central and Eastern European militaries not only lag behind Western militaries, but, in some aspects, even lag behind their own society in terms of organizational modernization, management, institutional effectiveness, mentalities, professional ethos and others. Chris Donnelly considered (1997) that "… no post-communist country has yet achieved a totally satisfactory degree of democratic control and good civil-military relations. In all cases, as societies transform, their armies lag behind."[11]

The Summit in Madrid was a great event but also it was a "cool shower" for the governments and the military of all the candidate countries, admitted or not yet admitted. The NATO Summit in Madrid made Central and Eastern European countries understand that enlargement is real and Alliance membership is a demanding position. It also made NATO bureaucracy understand the necessity to extend assistance to both admitted and would-be-admitted countries and to stress that, for instance, the PfP interoperability objectives were to be accomplished for the countries that do aspire to membership.

On this ground, for the candidate countries the second-generation reforms started approximately in 1998 as Easterners and Westerners alike become more aware not only of the progress made, but also of the work still ahead. In 1999, the new NATO members submitted to the Alliance's common standards and procedures. In 1997, to the "would-be-members" was submitted the so-called PfP/MAP process (see Section II.2) that required expanded cooperation and Western assistance. In practical terms, for the new members and mainly for the would-be-members the second generation reforms meant downsizing and professionalising the military. Here, Western (NATO/PfP) guidance was again necessary.

Therefore, assistance was oriented for downsizing the former large communist militaries. In the early, 1990's the rhetorics of the first generation reforms made many military people angry with the lack of real reform down the road. By mid 1990s', successive reform drafts generated some incoherence and instability in the military. Promoting reforms from top-down also limited initiative at middle and ground levels. The amount of redundant personnel was considered somewhere between 30-45 percent of the 1997 military in most of the East European countries.

Under such conditions, coupled with the decrease of real wages in the entire state sector, many uniformed people started a second professional activity in their local civilian environment (teaching, small business, self-employment, weekend or afternoon jobs). An open growing labor market offered these military people a second professional opportunity. NATO offered professional reconversion programs, funds and experts. Those with less bureaucratic orientation, greater flexibility and the most skilled have managed to adapt to the changing social environment (mostly captains and majors as well as NCO technicians). Former experts on radars or artillery are now successful in running small business.

In terms of institutional capacity for change, much of the energy and initiative was associated with the middle-level and technical personnel. However, the second generation reforms encouraged a good part of these people leave the military at the first opportunity. Programs of downsizing military personnel offered only to some of them the opportunity

to leave. Their number is thousands of officers and NCOs per year. In Romania the annual release from the military ranges from 4,000 to 7,000. In Bulgaria the average is 3,500 officers to leave the military per year.

Romania, Manpower Evolution 1997-2001

	Dec 1997	**Dec 1998**	**Dec 1999**	**Dec 2000**	**June 2001**
Officers	35,057	30,576	28,795	27,106	23,982
NCO's	34,256	26,430	25,411	23,857	24,024
Contracted	17,861	16,614	17,640	17,269	16,466
Conscripts	76,345	75,075	60,381	37,368	33,154
Peacetime Active Force	**163,523**	**148,695**	**132,227**	**105,600**	**97,536**

Even though the potential for real change was placed within this groups, a good part was actually encouraged to leave the military. Some of them were even paid to leave. So, in the absence of clear criteria about who to leave, the trend was that the officers holding the largest institutional and innovational reform capacity were encouraged to leave while to those less adaptable to change and therefore more conservative and just "imitational the chance" was offered to stay. The result is that, to a certain extent, the military organization dismissed some of its most valuable people.

Being characteristic for most East European countries, this situation could be encountered in the case of South Eastern European countries in some particular aspects. While Romania and Bulgaria share a similar situation, Slovenia has a different one. However, all these countries have experienced similar developments in terms of civil-military relations and Western military assistance. With the first generation reforms (1992-1996), Romania and Bulgaria adopted the "imitation-type" with a large military that received little reform, while Slovenia also adopted a kind of imitation but not having a real military yet. With the second generation reforms, Romania and Bulgaria have started downsizing their military in a rather unproductive way to buil effective military compatible with those of NATO, while Slovenia is building a military but in a non-supportive social environment characterized by the lack of interest for the military profession. A decreasing interest for a military career is specific to all South Eastern European countries and adapted personnel policies would have to be promoted sooner than later.

To sum up, the trend to build democratic civil-military relations is counterbalanced by some side-effects that are generated less by the communist past but by current transition difficulties, mainly by insufficent civilian responsibility, incresead corruption, conservative attidudes of the military and some improperly delivered Western assistance programs.

Notes:

1. T. Edmunds, A. Foster, A. Cottey, *The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe*, TCMR1.7.b, 2001, p.1.
2. One of the "dangers to democracy" was indeed considered the large post-Soviet military. For details of Clinton's Administration policy towards East Europe, see Les Aspin, *The Bottom-Up Review: Forces for a New Era*, Washington, DC: GPO, 1 September 1993, also mentioned in M. Ulrich's book, *Democratizing Communist Militaries*, p. 55.
3. Ibidem, p. 57.
4. Ibidem 2.
5. Excerpts from the Mission Statement of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmish-Partenkirchen, Germany at *www.marshallcenter.org* and of the Geneva Center for Democratic Control at *www.dcaf.ch*. These mission statements reflect the Western vision on Eastern post-communist civil-military relations and the evolution of military assistance.

   First generation military assistance - Marshall Center in Garmish P., Germany, Mission Statement, 1994

   The need for an institution such as the Marshall Center was identified in the wake of the failed August 1991 coup attempt in Russia. The U.S. European Command's Plans and Policy Directorate began to develop proposals to expand defense and security contacts with the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia. The intention was to positively influence the development of security structures appropriate for democratic states.

   Second generation military assistance – Geneva Center for Democratic Control over the Armed Forces, Mission Statement, 1998

   In spite of the progress made in the past decade, the transformation and management of democratic civil-military relations remain a major challenge to many States. This is particularly true for the countries in transition … . Armed and paramilitary forces as well as police, border guards and other security-related structures remain important players in many countries. More often than not, they act like "a State within the State", putting heavy strains on scarce resources, impeding democratization processes and increasing the likelihood of internal or international conflicts. It is therefore widely accepted that the democratic and civilian control of such force structures is a crucial instrument of preventing conflicts, promoting peace and democracy as well as ensuring sustainable socio-economic development.

Both these statements see the military as a potential danger to democracy. In 1994, as reflected in Marshall Center's Statement, the East European military need to be addressed as to influence the development of security structures appropriate for democracy. In 1997, DCAF mission statement still points to the military posture as "a State within the State". Both programs / institutions advocate the civilian leadership and clear subordination of the military. What remains to be asked is "what if civilians are a danger to democracy too?" Therefore, one could suppose such statements need to be reassessed.

6. In Albania, for instance, the communist party used the military in different economic activities as a cheap and disciplined labor force.

7. Daniel Nelson, "Armies, Security, and Democracy in Southeastern Europe", in *Armed Forces and Society*, Spring 2002, Vol. 28., no.3, p. 428.
8. For the idea of "shared responsibility", see Larry Watts, "Democratic Control of the Military in Romania: An Assesment as of October 2001", in Graeme P. Herd (ed), Civil-Military Relations in Post-Cold War Europe, December 2001, Conflict Studies Research Center, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, UK, p. 24.
9. L. Jelušič and M. Malešič, "Legal Aspects and Controversies of Democratic Control over the Armed Forces. Slovenia in Transition", paper presented at the DCAF Seminar *Legal Framing of Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the Security Sector: Norms and Realities*, Geneva, May 4-5, 2001.
10. Daniel Nelson, "Armies, Security, and Democracy in Southeastern Europe", in *Armed Forces and Society*, Spring 2002, Vol. 28., no.3, p. 449.
11. Chris Donnely, "Defence Transformation in the New Democracies: A Framework for Tackling the Problem", in *NATO Review*, no. 1/1997.
12. The first top-level civilian to be nominated in the Romanian military was Ioan Mircea Pascu as early as 1993. However, being moved from Presidency to the MOD, State Secretary Pascu was perceived as rather looking for a "more quiet" office rather than willing to become involved and taking responsibilities within the MOD. As State Secretary (1993-1996), his actions confirmed limited involvement and leadership and, as Defense Minister after 2000, even some non-democratic attitudes.
13. For Bulgaria, Jeffrey Simon considers the years 1990-1997 as being "seven lost years", see for details, *Strategic Forum*, 142, May 1998, "Bulgaria and NATO : 7 Lost Years".

III.3. WHAT STILL NEEDS TO BE DONE? THE *SUBSTANCE* OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS. ADAPTING ASSISTANCE TO THE REAL NEEDS

"… [T]he magnitude of the difficulties faced by armed forces in transition, and the problems of Central and Eastern European countries in establishing effective management of defence and security policies, is only just being recognized."

Chris Donnelly, NATO Review, *no. 6, November 1996*

1. Main areas of civil-military relations that require further assistance 2. Responsible democratic Parliamentarian oversight.3. Effective management of the security sector.
4. Adapt assistance to the needs.

1. *Main areas of civil-military relations that require further assistance*

Taking into account both the accomplishments and the deficiencies as well the side effects in the last decade, this study identifies three main areas of civil-military relations in South Eastern European countries that will further require watchfulness and assistance, from both domestic and Western (NATO) governments:

- Democratic parliamentarian oversight;
- Effective Government's management.
- Public education on security.

Accordingly, domestic measures and Western (NATO/PfP) assistance would have to step on these paths as to refine the process of building democratic civil-military relations in South Eastern Europe. The assumption here is that if the Western expertise would have to match SE European needs then the needs should be properly defined.

Andrew A. Michta (2001) refined the areas and built a six-point checklist intending to demonstrate "the extent to which MAP states have accomplished the transformation towards <<democratic-style civil-military relations>>".[1]

The checklist comprises:

- Legislative oversight of defense organization;
- The practical oversight / monitoring mechanism;
- Capability of the defense organization;
- Budget and procurement practices;
- Civilian expertise and professionalism;
- The attitudes of the officers corps.

The Hudson sponsored research of 2001 (that Andrew Michta mentions) points out the great achievements indeed, but concludes that no country in South Eastern Europe has fully achieved democratic-style civil-military relations yet. Other students of civil military relations confirm certain deficiencies on the MAP countries checklist. In 1996 Chris Donnely warned that "… there is no Central and East European country that has the effective army it needs and no government that can evaluate what kind of defense it

requires, nor what size, nor evaluate the proposals of its generals."[2] Of course things have improved ever since. But to what extent? More recently, M. Ulrich (2002) considers that "deficiencies in the depth of the transformation of the national security systems go virtually unnoticed"[3]. D. Nelson also points out (2002) that "The democratic transformation of post-communist militaries, defense ministries, and related organs is far from finished".[4]

Therefore, this study points out there are still important steps to be accomplished and they relate to a working democracy, effective management and civilian education. From this standpoint, the normative approach on civil-military relations of the early 1990's was replaced by a functional approach by late 1990's. The main assumption of this Section is that, if there had been created the *forms* of democratic civil-military relations, the trend now is to put *substance* into them.[5] The lesson learned is that institutional relationships and arrangements alone, as imitated from the "Western model" (see Section III.2), cannot impose good civil-military relations. Hence, the question *of what still needs to be done* receives answers specific from one country to another from the South Eastern Europe as a country group. Certain functional deficiencies would have to be addressed once first South Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia) are invited for NATO membership.

2. Responsible Democratic Parliamentarian oversight

In all three South Eastern European countries parliamentarian oversight formally functions, but currently restricts to main legislation on defense with a small margin of debate. The insufficient debate in the Defense Committees reflects the insufficient knowledge, preoccupation and education on defense and security within the larger society. In mature democracies, national security policy deliberations involve participation of civilian and military professionals, think-tanks, NGOs and are properly covered by the media. Political decisions are to be made after transparent and democratic public deliberations with the Parliament as the politically institutionalized deliberating body. Certainly, this model does not always fit the South Eastern European case. To strengthen the parliamentarian oversight it is necessary to:

- increase deliberations within the political body and the larger society;
- enlarge knowledge on defense issues;
- limit the practice of political appointees.

Increase deliberations

In Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia the parliament's defense committees are indeed deliberating on national defense and security issues, but usually restrict to the political body with less deliberation within the larger society. On the one side, the political balance between different political parties and factions transfers at the level of defense committees. In Bulgaria, a fragile balance of the political parties in the Parliament reflects a superficial debate in the defense and foreign affairs committees. In Romania, after the 2000 elections, the ruling Social-Democratic Party passes legislation through defense committees using its ruling majority. In Slovenia, the Liberal Democratic Party managed to form a more stable coalition after the 2000 elections, but a quality increase of the defense committee activities is still to be seen. In the three countries, decisions to participate in peacekeeping missions (such as the "Enduring Freedom" operation in Afganisthan in the case

of Romania) were sometimes made with insufficient deliberations both in the parliament and with the public at large. Such situations were motivated by the "higher" intention of joining NATO, but insufficient deliberations created the impression of superficiality. On the other side, the opposition sometimes uses deliberations within the defense committees for purely political gains while independent think-tanks are not invited, either by the ruling party, or by the opposition to provide supplementary expertise. As a consequence, in spite of already exiting independent experts and educated journalists on defense issues, deliberations within the defense committees are not properly sustained and covered by the media. When initiative belongs to the civil society, current bureaucratic routine makes the parliamentarians and staffers to irregularly participate in public debates (seminars and/or conferences). Hence, substantiating deliberation within the political body as well expanding it to the society at large is a necessary step toward democratic civil-military relations in South Eastern European countries.

Enlarge knowledge on defense issues

Beside insufficient deliberations, the day-to-day activities in the defense committees also bring to light some deficiencies. Neil Grayston, UK defense advisor to the MOD in Slovenia, points out (2001) that "In theory, … parliament has very close oversight of defense expenditure. In practice, the level of parliamentary scrutiny is constrained by the limited knowledge of defense issues among parliamentarians."[6] Such a situation seems to be common to all South Eastern European countries. First, the defense committee staffers that are supposed to supply professional knowledge on security and defense to the parliamentarians have themselves a limited competence. Second, the practice of using the expertise of independent institutes and scholars is not yet fully employed by the defense establishments in all South Eastern European countries. In Bulgaria, despite one of the strongest pool of independent expertise, as Plamen Pantev points out, there are few opportunities to be used either by the legislative or the executive.[7] In Romania, current legislation limits the ability of the Government to pay independent NGOs to work on public issues, defense and security included. In Slovenia, a good expertise was created within the Defense Studies Department of the Ljubljana University, but its capacities are not properly used yet. Third, there is a good experience of using foreign experts / think-tanks, but no matter how valuable this might be, it is always limited and on a long term should in turn encourage developing domestic expertise. In practice, in spite of being called for "assistance", currently foreign advisors ought to take over responsibilities of the domestic establishments.

Limit the practice of political appointees

Also of significance for the current situation of civil-military relations is the limited capacity of the defense committees and of the MOD civilian bureaucracies to oversee and draft specific defense budgetary lines below the overall budget amount. A bounded coordination with the MODs and other security agencies contributes to this situation. A "security community" to comprise civilians and military from all defense and security institutions is still a desideratum for all South Eastern European countries. In certain situations, staffers' nominations to the defense committees and to the MOD and other security agencies are rather political appointments that are not based on expertise, so the positions are not considered to be of prestige.[8]

To a certain degree, political appointees plaque civil-military relations in South Eastern European countries. The practice of "It's who you know, not what you know" sometimes tends to become prevalent especially soon after elections.[9] On the one hand, the lack of

educated civilians on defense and security matters encourages the practice of political appointees. On the other hand, political patronage within the ruling party or political coalition in office usually gives way to arbitrary civilian nominations within the MOD and to other national security agencies. In Romania, the situation was widespread between 1996-2000 with the Democratic Convention coalition. In Bulgaria, similar practice was associated with the Socialist Party before the 2000 elections. If it gets out of control, the practice of political appointees might itself undermine democratic civil-military relations. As pointed out in Section III.2 as well, this time it might be the civilians, not the military, to jeopardize democratic civil-military relations. Frequent changes of middle-level civilian officials specific to successive political waves certainly impedes upon civil-military relations as it affects the stability and continuity of people and policies. From this point of view, a clearer delimitation between political and public service positions within the defense and security agencies is necessary.

3. Effective management of the security sector

The issue of good governance and effective management is currently the most pressing one in the South Eastern European defense and security establishments. In spite of democratic-like exercise for more than a decade after the end of the Cold War and in spite of the experience achieved in more than 8 years within the NATO/PfP framework, there is still a deficient management of the defense and security sector in the South Eastern European countries. On the political realm, evolutions in these countries have successively replaced politicians, public servants and military officials and the new comers do not always expose increased competence on defense and security issues. Developing mature mechanisms and routine people for effective defense and security management seems to require longer time than expected. On the societal realm, as pointed out in Section I.1, the characteristics of the transitional society reveal the need for responsible parliaments and accountable governments. That is to say developing *responsibility* and improving *accountability* of parliaments and governments is a process still in the making. Democratic and effective management of the security and defense policy could not be isolated from the other legislative and executive functions. On the security sector, one could mention three main deficiencies that currently impede upon defense and security policy: ineffective coordination of policies and institutions, inadequate management within ministries and agencies and incoherent implementation of policies.

Effective coordination of defense and security policy

If from a formal point of view the national security structure is already formed and currently functioning, what is on the scheme is not always properly operating. First, all South Eastern European countries have established National Security Councils, but such bodies are still understaffed. In each country the council is headed by the President, but presidents do not have the executive tools at their disposal to implement decisions. Implementation is with the Government, i.e. the Prime Ministers. In Romania and Slovenia,

unclear constitutional provisions on the role and responsibilities of the President and the Prime-Minister on security and defense have generated tensions and hence inadequate institutional coordination over time. In Bulgaria, parallelisms between the President and the Prime Minister created shortcomings, such as the one in June, 1997 when Prime Minister Georgi Ananiev relieved the Chief of Staff General Tsvetan Totomirov, only to become adviser to the next president Peter Stoyanov later. It proved political cohabitation (the prime minister and the president represent different political parties) made things harsher. Due to poor coordination, sometimes the government's executives take actions that are not endorsed by the Parliament or make decisions / give statements to which they are not constitutionally entitled. To prevent such discrepancies, the national security councils are to became able to coordinate policies and institutions in the security sector on a permanent basis.

Second, the limited coordination of policies between security and defense agencies gives way each agency to have its own agenda of reform and of NATO/PfP integration and hence difficulties in integrating these agendas at the national level. Coordination of defense and security policies is a *civilian responsibility* that all South Eastern European countries should work on as to become responsible NATO members. Because of legal ambiguities on the role and functions of the President and the Prime Minister and of ad-hoc current practices on defense, further measures would have to solve them foremost. Romania and Slovenia are examples in case. As with the defense ministers, in Slovenia the frequent change of ministers (four in four years) has induced a sense of instability, as changing ministers means changing down the road (state secretaries, other high officials). In Romania, the political game of minister Victor Babiuc in early 2000 generated strains within the ruling coalition and his resign threatening conducted to a political crisis. Again in Romania, the initiative of Minister Pascu in June 2002 to pass legislation that was intended to limit the freedom of the press generated a political crisis that inflamed the civil-military relations. Such "minor accidents" are actually showing improper functioning of civil-military relations and the potential that, if not addressed, "minor accidents" might turn into real crises of democratic civil-military relations.

Adequate planning and budgeting

Defense planning and budgeting are key areas in evaluating the management effectiveness of the security and defense sectors. Most Western advisers to South Eastern European countries point out primarily to some deficiencies in planning and budgeting.[10]

First, MODs are not yet able to fully take responsibility while the General Staffs still keep significant functions on defense planning. The pool of civilian experts within the MODs is not yet ready to take over, while the military has to manage things, especially procurement. The civilians need to improve expertise while the military should avoid conservatism, old procedures and red-tape bureaucracy. Current practices of splitting planning responsibilities between the MOD and the General Staff (euphemistically called "shared responsibility") increase time working and duplicates papers and bureaucracy. Bulgaria seems to be an example in case, having one of the largest defense bureaucracies in South Eastern Europe (roughly 2.200 in the MOD plus 600 in the General Staff). In Romania, an increased number of civilians in the MOD has not always lead to a decrease of military personnel in the General Staff. Larry Watts (2001) rightly points out that before 2000, "Along with the lack of reliable state budget and expertise shortcomings, civilian control

over budgeting was also hindered because responsibilities had long been divided between the MOD and the General Staff, specifically regarding procurement."[11] In Bulgaria and Romania, the situation has completely changed after 2001 with the introduction of PPBES assistance from the US,

Second, in the last decade the poor allocations of money for defense affects medium and long-term planning and budgeting. Successive revisiting of the defense plans were imposed by the diminished financial resources allocated by the Government. Romania and Bulgaria have faced difficulties of economic reform that have reflected into diminished defense budgets over years. The economic crisis in Bulgaria in 1996-1997 put the military budget under serious strains. In Romania, the defense budget roughly reached 2 % of the GDP in the last decade (except 1998 when toppled to 1.77%). In both Romania and Bulgaria funds are considered insufficient for the task of reform and integration. Slovenia has performed better financially, but no significant increase of defense budget has yet been seen. It is expected that the progress of economic restructuring to offer a better basis for defense allocations in Romania and Bulgaria. NATO membership will certainly require revisions of defense budgets of the new members. Political decision is expected to bring defense budget to the standard line of NATO countries in all new admitted countries.

Third, with the MAP and the Annual National Program (ANP) the professional basis was consolidated for adequate defense planning and budgeting, especially with the second MAP cycle (2000-2001). MAP objectives, mutually agreed between candidate countries and NATO, had to be fulfilled through effective planning and adequate budgeting. Furthermore, NATO membership will require adapting Alliance's current standards and procedures on planning and budgeting in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia. For that to happen, adequate budget allocations have to be made in each South Eastern European country.

Coherent implementation of defense policies

Defense policy implementation has also moved to a better situation over the years. Compared with policy implementation in other sectors, defense and security have enjoyed a better situation, but have exposed similar weaknesses, especially incoherence. On the one hand, wise political decisions have stocked down the road because of unreformed middle and low level bureaucracy that was tasked to implement it. Personnel policies, for instance, have faced resistance and delays until "right" time has come. In Bulgaria, redundant military personnel survived as late as 1998. In Romania, downsizing delayed up to 1996 when the new Government of Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea pushed for hiring redundant military professionals. On the other hand, frequent changes of defense planning drafts and of people responsible with planning have tended to overwhelm the MOD bureaucracy. However, more coherence, continuity and medium-term policy implementation have occurred with the MAPs and ANPs. As a result, in 2002, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia all have clear medium and long-term defense policy objectives to implement.

3. Enlarge public education on security

The increasing civilian education on defense and security matters in South Eastern European countries reflects the current trend of changing strategic culture. Subjected to Soviet propaganda and used to think in terms of military threats during the Cold War, after

1991 the public in South Eastern Europe is more attentive to notions such as security risks, terrorism, regional trafficking and the like. Ethnic conflicts and political turmoil in the Balkans contributed to a better understanding of the civilian aspects of security and the importance of integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures. However, public education in general and civil-military professional education in particular would have to strengthen this trend. State and private universities would have to further develop education on international relations, security studies, defense economics, European and Euro-Atlantic security. Bulgaria and Romania have developed some incipient forms already, educating a small number of civilians within the military education system and providing access of the military personnel to civilian universities. Slovenia educates all of its military professionals at the civilian university in Ljubljana and takes the advantage of professional education abroad (such as the IMET).

Democratic civil-military relations primarily mean civilian responsibility of defining and controlling the role, functions and missions of all ministries and agencies in the security sector, intelligence services included. Therefore, alongside courses on sociology of the military, security studies and the like, that are already part of the civilian universities curricula, civilian education on defense economics, management and even intelligence would have to be initiated as well. No South Eastern European country has a course on defense economics or intelligence yet. Consequently, the finance ministries face management difficulties on financing defense procurement, while the other civil bureaucracies experience shortcomings in controlling the intelligence services.

After September 11th, as the countries of South Eastern Europe have joined the antiterrorist NATO strategy, public information on such issues has lagged behind. International terrorism is on the public agenda, but at a lower level. An increased general and specialized literature on a subject neglected in the past – terrorism – is now filling the information gap. Regular seminars and conferences also contribute to a better knowledge of terrorism as a serious security issue in the 21st Century in South Eastern European countries.

Public education on defense and security is instrumental for the young democracies in South Eastern European countries. Strengthening democratic civil-military relations would not be possible in the absence of a public culture on the relationship between democracy and security, as there is no security without democracy.

4. Adapt assistance to the needs

As mentioned in Section I.1, assistance for building democratic civil-military relations is a form of *real-help* that functions where *self-help* exists. Therefore, assessing the impact of Western (NATO/PfP) assistance to South Eastern European countries requires a proper

definition of the current situation of civil-military relations. This Study tries to assess the impact of assistance alongside the evolutionary lines of civil-military relations. However, one could notice certain deficiencies of delivering assistance over the years.

Such deficiencies are due mainly to an improper definition of the real needs. This study suggests these deficiencies to be addressed in the following ways:

- Balance assistance toward the civilian side;
- Better coordination of assistance programs;
- Enlarge assistance to sensitive aspects of civil-military relations – intelligence and security services;
- Focus assistance, optimize resources and pursue long term programs;
- Monitor results and adapt programs to outcomes;
- Promote new programs of assistance.

Balance assistance toward the civilian side

In the early 1990s, Western scholars considered the post-Soviet military as potentially dangerous for the incipient democracies in Eastern Europe and hence main assistance programs and institutions were designed to prevent such an eventuality. Extensive programs of direct (Mil-to-Mil) contacts and education were started and directed mainly to the military. One example in case is the Marshall Center established in 1994, one of the largest and most active institution in the field of democratic civil-military relations. Later on, it proved that the civilians might themselves jeopardize civil-military relations. The example in case is Albania in 1997 when the Government of the President Shali Berisha generated one of the most serious civil unrest in country's history that in turn disintegrated the Albanian military and required international intervention. In other countries as well, but to a much lesser extent, corruption and politicianism, usually associated with transitional societies, tended to transfer to the military and security sector. Attempts to politicize the military were made in most of the South Eastern European countries while corruption tempted senior military officers. By mid-1990s it had become clear that the civilian expose a limited responsibility toward and less effective management of the defense and security sector.

As a consequence, with the advance of NATO's PfP (such as the introduction of PARP and later on the MAP and ANP) by the end of the 1990s assistance enlarged well beyond the military sphere to include more civilian aspects (economy, democracy, human rights). Eventually, Western assistance "civilianized" itself. At the Marshall Center, old courses of Cold War history were replaced by modern democracy, democratic defense management, defense economics, terrorism and the like. In Garmish, the civilian professors outnumbered the military ones as the civilian-oriented courses did as well. As a step ahead, the DCAF in Geneva started in 1998 with an enlarged civilian basis. An increased number of NATO/PfP

seminars, conferences and round tables addressed the civilian side of the civil-military relationship more often.

From the point of view of this Study, the next level of Western (NATO/PfP) assistance is going to be more and more "civilianized", i.e. to assist the fragile civil society in South Eastern Europe to get acknowledged on current national and international security issues. It is necessary to enlarge public deliberation and civil education on security and sustain the changing strategic culture in these countries. It seems clear that medium and long term public education on security would in turn provide a sound basis for democratic civil-military relations. It is the civilians now that would have to be assisted not to put under stress democratic civil-military relations. For that to happen, Western assistance should adapt to the real needs in South Eastern Europe.

Enlarge assistance to sensitive aspects of civil-military relations – intelligence and security services

In so far, much of assistance was directed toward the MOD's, the armed forces and the Parliaments (Defense Committees). However, intelligence services and other security services are an important part of democratic civil-military relations in South Eastern European countries. If there has been noticed a limited capacity of the civilians to provide responsible control over the armed forces, one could imagine there has been an even more limited capacity for an effective control over the intelligence services. In the last years, successive public scandals in Bulgaria and Romania on the role and functions of the new security services have proved how sensitive this issue is for democracy. In Slovenia, civilian attempts to use military intelligence against political opponents have also been reported. September 11th added new tasks for intelligence services that had little previous experience in the field. Assistance has been employed since then. A first step in this direction was made in summer 2001 when a PfP conference on intelligence was held in Romania with NATO and Partner countries. Such conference only proved how much work is still necessary in the field. It is mainly about how security services should operate within a democratic society. While public opinion was much attentive to the secret police past, it paid less attention to the role and functions of intelligence in a democracy. (For more details in this respect, see Section I.2)

Better coordination of assistance programs

One of the Western (NATO/PfP) assistance programs deficiencies is the lack of coordination. In the field of democratic control of the armed forces, different Western countries have pursued various programs according to their own traditions. Eastern Europeans realized that there is no "unique" Western model of DCAF but rather multiple ones. The US model of "objective control" is certainly different from the German model of

"Innere Führung". As Tim Edmunds pointed out (2001): "[W]hile outreach activity has occurred through international organizations such as NATO or the WEU, these organizations have generally functioned as separate actors in their own right, rather than overall supra-national bodies for coordinating policy. Thus, different (and differing) outreach activities have occurred under the auspices of, for example, the UK MoD, the George C. Marshall Centre, the German MoD, and NATO."[11]

Such limited coordination between assistance programs and institutions have in fact exposed the South Eastern Europeans to different traditions and cultures of democratic civil-military relations that eventually made them understand the need for their own model.
The experience in so far certainly recommends increased coordination of Western Assistance. One way to do it is through role specialization of institutions and countries that provide assistance. One example in case is the DCAF in Geneva. Using the experience acquired in other countries, USAID might develop a specialized role of public information on security issues too, by encouraging civil education through multiannual programs. On a larger scale, as recommended by this study, NATO should take into account an Assistance Office for new members to coordinate a fast and smooth integration of the newly admitted countries.

Focus assistance, optimize resources and pursue long term programs

One could expect Western assistance resources to diminish in the next years. The countries already invited for NATO membership would have to take more responsibilities in the field of democratic civil-military relations on their own. Accordingly, more efficiency will be necessary for the remaining assistance programs.

First, focusing on relevant issues and allocating financial and human resources for sensitive areas is a proper way to an increased efficiency. Western assistance would have to focus on the areas relevant to democratic civil-military relations. As Jans Trapans mentions (DCAF, 2001), previous assistance activities (such as in the Baltic States) have shown a certain redundancy due to overlapping activities and consequent lack of focus . A *Final Report* made by the International Defense Advisory Board to the Baltic States pointed out (1999) some difficulties with the Western experts that can hamper the security sector reforms : "The hard working of young civilians and officers, who are not helped in their work by the plethora of [Western] advice and assistance, often uncoordinated and short-term in nature, offered by supporting nations and organizations, nor by the stream of visitors who have to be looked after, and of external meetings which have to be attended".[12]

Second, establishing long term assistance programs would also optimize resource spending and bring more efficiency into the process. Long term programs should address the sensitive areas, such as increase political deliberation in the legislative, support effective defense management with the executive and encourage public education on security. It will require establishing clear objectives to be achieved, what resources to be spent and what

Western expertise to be necessary.

Monitor results and adapt programs to outcomes

The outcomes of assistance programs have always been difficult to assess. As building democratic civil-military relations is a process and not a static situation, the impact of assistance is indeed difficult to monitor. However, there are certain indicators that could be measured. One of these refers, for instance, to the role and influence within the South Eastern security establishments of the people educated into Western (NATO/PfP) institutions. From this point of view, it is clear that Western educated civilians and military have played a tremendous role in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia. In Bulgaria, in spite of a low profile of the Western educated civilians and military before 1997, the situation completely changed thereafter. In Romania, most flag officers took at least a course if not more at a NATO member country military academy. One of the Chiefs of the General Staff graduated Marshall Center in 1995. In Slovenia, the proportion of Western educated civilians and military is even higher (See Section II.3 of this Study for details).

Even being difficult, monitoring the outcome of assistance programs would help to tailor the assistance resources, to correct the programs and to reorient targets and assistance tasks. Assessing assistance on medium and long term as well on specific short term programs seems to be the proper way of matching the needs of the newly admitted NATO countries in South Eastern European with the Western current expertise and foreseeable resources.

Promote new programs of assistance

Most suggestions from the above also point to the idea of new forms and programs of Western (NATO) assistance for democratic civil-military relations in South Eastern European countries. The USAID experience achieved in South American countries on civil education on security might be used for South Eastern European countries. It envisages, for instance, support for independent NGO's and think-tanks to draft alternative security and defense policies, sustenance for public education on security within the civilian education system, encouragement for journalists to improve their knowledge on security.

Notes:

1. Andrew Michta. "Introduction", in Graeme P. Herd (Ed.), *Civil-Military Relations in Post Cold War Europe*, Conflict Research Studies Centre, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, UK, December 2001, p. 2-3. Professor Michta's observations are based on a Hudson Institute study of November 2001 and a previously assessment made by Jeff Simon and Marco Carnovale, called by Michta the "Carnovale-Simon test".
2. Chris Donnelly, "Defense transformation in the new democracies: A framework for tackling the problem", in *NATO Review*, no. 6/1996.

3. Marybeth Ulrich, "Developing Mature National Security Systems in Post-Communist States: The Czech Republic and Slovakia", in *Armed Forces and Society*, Spring 2002, Vol. 28, no. 3, p. 404.
4. Daniel Nelson, "Armies, Security, and Democracy in Southeastern Europe", in *Armed Forces and Society*, Spring 2002, Vol. 28, no. 3, p. 449.
5. One of the modernization issues in Eastern Europe has been the persistence of "forms without substance", as defined at the end of the 19th century by the Romanian sociologist Titu Maiorescu, resembling the functional deficiencies (lack of *substance*) of Western-like institutions (the *forms*).
6. Neil Grayston, "Democratic Control of the Armed Forces of Slovenia – A Progress Report", by, UK Defence Advisor to the MOD of Slovenia, in Graeme P. Herd (Ed), *Civil Military Relations in Post Cold War Europe*, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, UK, 2001.
7. Plamen Pantev, "Analysis and Conclusions", in Plamen Pantev (ed.), *Civil-Military Relations in South Eastern Europe*, p. 206, 2000.
8. Similar situations are to be seen in other NATO candidate countries, such as Slovakia. See for details M. Ulrich, op. cit. p. 418.
9. Quite significant, this practice is mentioned by a foreign adviser to the MOD in Slovenia. See Neil Grayston, op. cit. P. 9.
10. See, for instance, Grayston, op. cit.
11. Tim Edmunds, "Promoting Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Central and Eastern Europe: Lessons Learned and Future Research Agendas", TCMRCC Project, 2001 at http://civil-military.dsd.kcl.ac.uk
12. See Jans Trapans, "Security Sector Reform in Central and Eastern Europe. The Work of Civilians and the Military", DCAF 2001, p. 11, at http://dcaf.ch

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECCOMMENDATIONS

The progress of democratic civilian control of the military is quite remarkable in South Eastern Europe countries. In early 1990s both civilians and military realized what they had to do, but very few knew how to do it. Civilians were satisfied the military were in the barracks, while the military were happy the civilians would no longer enter the barracks. In a rather short term, there had been put in place the basic constitutional procedures and the primary institutional capacities for democratic civil-military relations. Both civilians and military better understand now the roles, the functions and the procedures of democratic relationships.

The invitation launched in Prague on November 21, 2002 for Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia to join NATO represents a recognition of their progress in fulfilling the Alliance's membership criteria.

In late 1990s, according to NATO/PfP criteria, Romania moved ahead from a situation of inconsistent policy reform of the military to a more coherent and responsible one. For Bulgaria the prospects to enter NATO created the incentives to make a real reform of the military while for Slovenia the prospects for NATO membership eventually created the conditions for building a real military at all.

During the process, the Western (NATO/PfP) assistance was instrumental in building democratic civil-military relations in South Eastern European countries. Now it seems obvious that none of these countries would have performed better in the absence of the NATO/PfP assistance programs. One could say on the contrary. However, the democratic civil-military relations in South Eastern Europe is a matter of degree and, hence, lots of things still need to be done.

First, as pointed out in this Study, there is a clear legal framework for democratic control, civilian leadership on defense is uncontested and parliamentarian oversight is a current practice. Furthermore, changing attitude of the officers corps is in due course while the resurrection of the civil society and extended public education on security are to produce a new strategic culture in South Eastern European countries.

Second, Western (NATO/PfP) assistance has been instrumental in building democratic civil-military relations in South Eastern European countries. Programs and funds specifically designed to assist democratic civil-military relations have generated "models" and "practices" to be assimilated by the new democracies. A large number of civilians and military people are educated abroad. Almost half of Slovenia's officers are educated in NATO countries. More than 250 civilians and military from Romania and Bulgaria benefit of Western education and training on a yearly basis. On the site, domestic programs on democratic civil-military relations were designed with NATO/PfP assistance. Western institutions such as the Marshall Center in Germany have developed specific assistance programs for building democratic civil-military relations. Training centers in South Eastern European countries, such as the one in Brasov, Romania, have enlarged and complemented assistance programs in the "spirit of PfP'.

Third, as some of the most dedicated Western students on East European civil-military relations already pointed out – Chris Donnelly (1996, 1997), Marybeth Ulrich (1999), Jeff Simon (2000), Tim Edmunds, Anthony Forster, Andrew Cottey (2001), Graeme Herd (2001), Daniel Nelson (2002) and Larry Wats (2002) – there are certain things still to be done as to achieve full democratic civil-military relations in (South) Eastern Europe. These relate mainly to insufficient civilian (parliamentarian) deliberations and political responsibility on security and defense issues, inefficient executive management and incomplete professionalization of the military.

On the one hand, admission into NATO will most probably make these deficiencies more visible, but, at the same time, it will create conditions for the proper solutions if right analysis and decisions are to be taken. Broadly defined, democratic civil-military relations means effective democratic management of the security sector and of the military institution and hence effective participation into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of the new member countries. Membership is about countries and not only about the military. The civilian side is as much important as the military.

On the other hand, admission into NATO would have to take into account a presumably increased need for assistance for South Eastern European countries. It is the history of the North Atlantic Alliance before 1989 and the experience of the first wave of enlargement in 1997 that the new members cannot do it alone. Mutual security assistance remains a major policy for integrating new members into the Alliance. This Study points out that assistance in not mainly about money, but about involvement. It means providing expertise, policy transfer, better coordination and medium and long term assistance programs.

Fourth, any attempt to reconceptualize civil-military relations of the NATO invited or still candidate countries has to take into account the domestic experience and expertise. Plamen Pantev (1997, 2000) rightly stress the importance of a national definition of civil-military relations: "It would be unfair to judge the Western support as differentiated: it has produced differentiated results, depending on the different national social, political and economic processes." Therefore, for short and medium term foreign assistance is paramount, but on a long term the prevailing resources for sound democratic civil-military relations are with the domestic society. NATO membership is about burden sharing among allies and the new members would have to take full responsibility on their obligations. The sooner the better.

As resulted from this Study, the current situation of civil-military relations points out to the important contributions Western (NATO/PfP) assistance made for building democratic civil-military relations in South Eastern European countries as well as the necessary steps ahead.

1. *The important role of Western (NATO/PfP) assistance:*

In early 1990s, few people in the West envisaged the magnitude of the transformation in the former Eastern block. Even fewer people in the East thought how much the Western strategists would get involved in the Eastern European transformation process. In that environment of hope and uncertainty, NATO was one of few institutions to take the lead in shaping a new course of the East-West relationship (see Section II.1). The political and military dimensions of a post-Cold War transformed Alliance made the new East-West relationship possible (Section II.2) NATO's Partnership for Peace initiated a complex process of security and defense cooperation in Europe to an unprecedented scale, with military and security assistance playing a significant role. One should notice a new form of military and security assistance that emerged with the PfP - the *assistance for reform and integration*. The impact of assistance for building democratic civil-military relations was assessed in this Study alongside three main lines: civilian leadership, military professionalization and the civil society.

2. *Asses the assistance impact:*

Western (NATO/PfP) cooperation and assistance contributed to a large degree in all aspects of building democratic civil-military relations in South Eastern European countries. While the general assistance impact could only be estimated, specific programs could be more exactly evaluated. Education abroad and foreign advisors at home seem to be more efficient than other forms of assistance (see Section II.3). Regional medium and long term assistance programs are also providing better results than the bilateral ones due to their potential to initiate "competition" among the recipient countries.

Thinking about assistance, there are differences between perceptions and realities, that I observed with the people I talked to. Usually, the Westerners perceive assistance as a process of *institutionalization* of

democratic civil-military relations in terms of capacities, procedures and effectiveness while the Easterners look for people attitudes and behavior in the sense of *professionalization* in terms of culture and mentalities. In practical terms it is rather difficult to exactly quantify the assistance impact on building democratic civil-military relations. Domestic evolutions are accompanied by foreign assistance programs and hence are difficult to separate from each other. This Study recommends creating a NATO office to deal with assistance programs for the newly invited countries.

3. Adapt assistance to the needs:

As mentioned in Section I.1, assistance is a form of *real-help* that works where *self-help* exists. In the early 1990s there have been observed difficulties in matching the Western expertise with the Eastern needs and the lack, at that moment, of a proper infrastructure for both to deliver and to receive assistance. Since 1994, NATO's PfP became a proper vehicle to deliver assistance and to develop infrastructure to receive it in the partner countries. In the late 1990s, PARP and Membership Action Plan further developed capacities for both delivering and receiving assistance. Due to PfP "supremacy" much of assistance went through military channels and less through civilian ones. This Study points to the need to design and implement specific assistance programs for the civilian side as well. Such aid organizations as USAID might develop programs designed to improve civil education and increase public participation in issuing defense and security policy. Also this Study points out that after 1997 assistance programs multiplied by countries and by sectors and a certain lack of coordination was observed. At the same time it realized that significant sectors of civil-military relations such as the secret services remained outside assistance. Hence, all three South Eastern European countries invited at Prague need to redefine their civil-military relations as to include intelligence services. Romania and Bulgaria are first in line.

4. Better understanding of transitional societies:

Recent works on post-communist countries depict the uneven evolution and country differentiation within the former Eastern block. Capitalism is still in the making in Eastern Europe. After more than a decade of transition there are competitive democracies and concentrated political regimes alongside with war-torn societies and non-competitive political regimes. Such differentiation has generated different patterns of civil-military relations in different countries. The chances for democratic civil-military relations are higher in the countries with a strong civil society (developed networks of deliberative associations) and responsible civilian political leadership. Otherwise, as pointed in Section I.1, "transition is not from plan to market, but from plan to clan". Therefore, the role of civilian political leadership in transitional societies is essential: it is about vision, determination and democratic political action. Assistance is to go along the societal infrastructure that strengthens democracy and not the groups (clans) that only benefit of it. The invitation in Prague on November 21, 2002 will put more pressure on the administrative infrastructure of Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia, in general, on the political infrastructure, in particular. Obligations that are to be fulfilled would put at test the political leadership in these countries before full membership of NATO would be achieved.

5. Reconcpetualization of civil-military relations in (South) Eastern countries:

A reassessment of civil-military relations in South Eastern European countries (Section I.2) shows that the assumption of subjective civilian control over the military as being specific prior to 1990 was partially right. Limited professionalization (what this study calls the "pampered soldier") had meant a strong civilian political control, even civilian abuse of the military. After 1990, the civilian leadership was not contested as there was to tentative praetorianism too. On the contrary, there have been reported civilian misunderstandings and lack of responsibility in the field of civil-military relations. Such aspects ask for a

reconceptualization of civil-military relations in (South) Eastern Europe. This Study points out the concept of *tentative professionalization* of the military and reveals the equal importance of the civilian dimension in democratic civil-military relations. One could call it a process of responsiveness of the civilians and of professionalization of the military.

6. *Rethink reform of the military:*

The Cold War fixation on the large Soviet-type military made analysts perceive it as a potential danger for democracy in Eastern Europe, more by its dimension and less by its social and political role. In such a context, most East European countries drafted plans for downsizing the mass armies and for professionalization of the new military. However, some side effects occurred with this process. The lack of clear personnel management criteria delayed downsizing and transformed it in a rushed and rather unproductive way of reform afterwards. A top-down approach encouraged the military people to be less active, conservative and complacent with mediocrity. It also limited initiative at the middle and ground levels. The military people with less bureaucratic orientation, greater flexibility and adaptability should be encouraged to stay in the military. Rethinking personnel management is a need for South Eastern European countries.

7. *Increase competence and responsibility of the civilian masters:*

To a certain extent, the focus on the military side of civil-military relations in early 1990s neglected the civilian side. By focusing almost exclusively on the military people, civilian deficiencies such as lack of expertise and responsibility, superficiality and corruption escaped attention. It was not realized from the very beginning that for civilians being "chief" also meant being responsible. Consequently, in early 1990s civil-military relations moved from a situation of "pampered military" to one of "pampered civilians". The result was that, paradoxically, civilians themselves undermined the process of building democratic civil-military relations. Partial knowledge on defense and security issues, limited responsibility, inefficient management and corruption of the civilian masters have impeded on building democratic civil-military relations.

8. *Redesign a societal role of the military:*

The assumption of "objective control" dominated the approach of the new societal role of the military in South Eastern Europe. The reference was made to the "best available model" from Western literature in the field. In early 1990s, for some, nominating a civilian defense minister was necessary in order to be like "in the West", not because of domestic democratic and civilian leadership needs. Hence it revealed a lack of proper creative solutions and encouraged an imitational attitude. In late 1990s it was then "rediscovered" the traditionally important societal role the military institution plays in South Eastern European countries. The military confirmed its role as a pillar of domestic stability and as the main vehicle of integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures. This role is similar to the nation building concept of the modern era. However, most of new NATO missions would presumably be out-of-area operations and hence it might conflict with expectations of the newly admitted members. Specific assistance programs should be delivered as to address this issue.

9. *Extend the concept and practice of democratic civil-military relations to security services:*

The experience in democratization in other regions of the world and the current situation in South Eastern European countries shows the need to extend democratic civil-military relations to all aspects of security and defense policy (Section I.2). The current understanding refers mainly to the armed forces and less to other military or paramilitary formations. It is recognized the positive role the secret services played in the process of undermining the authoritarian communist regimes and of paving the road to democracy. However, the role and functions of the intelligence services in SEE democracies should be reevaluated.. It is also known that in the new democracies the failure of the civilian leadership to decide the role and functions of security services is a failure of democracy. This is more true for the South Eastern European countries such as Romanian and Bulgaria where secret communist police was an instrument of repression. Current public debates on the role and functions of the intelligence services reveals important steps that need to be done in the field. It is therefore about justice for the past and about democracy in the present.

10. Increase deliberation within the political body and extend education to civil society:
Public support for NATO membership is one of the highest in South Eastern Europe. There is even a public enthusiasm in countries such as Romania (over one hundred thousand people welcomed President George W. Bush on November 23, 2002). However, enthusiasm of the moment should be complemented with education on a long term. As pointed out in Section I.1. it is necessary to develop the *associative* and the *deliberative* functions of the civil society (NOGs, think-tanks, professional associations, free press). For democratic civil-military relations it is also necessary that the public be informed and educated. In South Eastern European countries, strategic education is still done with the military education. Just to mention it, no south Eastern European country has a course on defense economics or intelligence to be taught to the civilians yet. Therefore, public education and civil universities need to include security and defense studies into their curricula. A public culture of being a NATO ally, that share values of democracy, human rights, capitalism and international obligations should be consolidated.

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