FINAL REPORT ON THE PROJECT

TURKEY’S DELICATE POSITION BETWEEN NATO AND THE ESDP
IN A BROADENING SECURITY ARCHITECTURE IN EUROPE

By
DR. RAMAZAN GÖZEN
Associate Professor of International Relations

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
ATILIM UNIVERSITY

ANKARA-TURKEY

JUNE 2002
TURKEY’S DELICATE POSITION BETWEEN NATO AND THE ESDP IN A BROADENING EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

1. Introduction................................................................................................................3-4

2. Toward a New Security Architecture under NATO .............................................4-14

3. Turkey’s Delicate Position in the New Security Architecture.........................14-53


5. Restoration in Progress: Towards a Solution after the September 11 ..........61-69

6. Conclusion: The Future of the Broader European Security Architecture and Turkey........................................................................................................69-71
1. Introduction

When the fifty-year-old Cold War ended in the early 1990s, not surprisingly a number of new developments, some positive and some negative, have emerged. In the midst of these developments, while the old security and political structure in Europe collapsed, a new one hasn’t been established yet. There is an ongoing process to create a new security order “in and around Europe”, which can be called as “Broader European Security Architecture.” Although there are a number of international organisations such as NATO, the European Union (EU), the Western European Union (WEU), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe for establishing a viable security architecture in Europe, two of them, NATO and the EU, have been playing a greater role in the process. While NATO has transformed itself internally and externally towards creating a new security order, the EU has also been trying to have a more capable and effective security and defence policy as a European pillar of NATO’s comprehensive security system.

And quite understandably, almost all of the European countries have been deeply affected, in varying degrees, by these developments and changes. One of them is Turkey. Indeed, Turkey’s Cold War position was radically influenced and modified by the new developments, along with some claims that Turkey is now out of European security and political order.¹

So the main objective of this project is to analyse the impact of very critical and significant developments in the European security architecture on Turkey’s position, including its security, defence and foreign policy. The project was motivated by following questions: How has the European security architecture been being shaped? What is the characteristic of the new European security architecture? Where is Turkey located within this architecture? What is Turkey’s policy toward the European security architecture? And why has Turkey’s position in the European security architecture come to a very “delicate point”? ²

To answer these questions, the project will evolve around three arguments. Firstly, it will be argued that NATO has shown its prowess and dynamism by adapting itself to the new security environment after the Cold War. NATO’s security agenda and arena was transformed in such a way that the new NATO came to encompass whole Europe and around as well as new kinds of security problems that are categorised as non-Article 5 issues. As a result, as the security borders of the European geography broadened in geographical, functional,

institutional senses, NATO acted as an umbrella organisation for the broadening security architecture, under which other sub-formations, one of which is the EU, have also developed.

Secondly, Turkey has got a rather “delicate position” within the emerging security architecture.\(^2\) This resulted from the fact that Turkey’s connection with the new security architecture has been multiplexed at various levels and degrees. Turkey has three levels/types of positions within the new security architecture in Europe: It is located, simultaneously, “at the centre” through NATO, “at the midway” through the EU/WEU, and “at the margin” through the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

Such a multiplexed and multivaried “delicate position” creates some complications not only for Turkey’s own security, defence and foreign policy, but also for the development of the security architecture in Europe. So the third part of the project will focus on the complications of Turkey’s delicate position. It will be argued that Turkey’s delicate position has had some negative outcomes and that it may continue in the future if resolved. Because of that, there has been important efforts to find a viable and respectable formula to end Turkey’s delicate position.

The last section will focus on the efforts made, as well as other possibilities, to find a solution to the “delicate position” especially after the September 11 incident and the ensuing developments.

2. Toward a New Security Architecture under NATO

In the post-Cold War era in which the old security order collapsed, the European continent and its surrounding regions have been passing through a critical period from the end of the Cold War towards a new system in which security, politics, economy, and society are getting increasingly interrelated. Like the world politics in general, the European political and security order is in transition. A new European political and security order has been in the making for a long time, and will continue to be so in the near future. What kind of a structure the European political and security order will have, will determine the security situation not only of the European countries, but also of those countries inside and outside of the European geography. Above all, the concept of security, which is the most basic issue for the human beings, has gained new definitions, understandings, applications.\(^3\)

---


There is now an overwhelming consensus on the notion that the term security has been broadened and multiplied in conceptual, geographical, and functional senses in Europe and in the world as a whole.\(^4\) Conceptually, the term security now implies not only the so-called “hard security”, i.e. feeling secure/safe from foreign military attacks, from the invasion of the foreign armies, and from the danger of strategic or tactical missiles, weapons of mass destruction, and brutal aggressions, as was the case during the Cold War. It also includes the so-called “soft security”, i.e. feeling secure/safe from political oppression, hunger, environmental pollution, social fragmentation, human tragedy, immigration, unexpected effects of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological) so on.\(^5\)

Geographically, the Cold War borders of the European security has broadened from the Western European region to other regions, towards Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Mediterranean region, and even towards the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Although Western Europe \textit{per se} remains as a secure island of peace and stability, it is influenced by the developments around Europe.\(^6\) Thus, functionally, the concept of security now includes social, economic, cultural issues. Not only the state security but also societies and individuals are “threatened” by ethnic nationalism and separatism, terrorism, refugee movements, religious and ideological fanaticism, fatal illnesses (e.g. AIDS), and so on. All these security concerns and developments are not limited to certain countries or regions, but most of the world are equally affected by such developments outside their borders.

In other words, security risks are now interdependent at the global arena. No country is totally immune from these security risks, be it “soft security” problems and “the hard security” problems. There is also an interdependence between the issues of the agenda and between the parts of the arena. As result of these security interdependencies, there emerged a new security complex in Europe\(^7\) which can be named as “Euroasian security complex with transatlantic connection.” It includes the territories and peoples from Transatlantic through the European Continent up to Mediterranean and Central Asian and Middle Eastern regions.

There can be shown a number of evidences and indicators for the existence of interdependence between Europe and the Euroasian security complex. But two of them are

\(^4\) It is mentioned in several sources: For example, “The Strategic Concept 1991”, agreed by the Heads of State and Government, The North Atlantic Council, 8 November 1991, Rome, in \textit{NATO Handbook Documentation} (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1999); Sperling and Kirchner, \textit{op.cit.}\n


\(^7\) For the term ‘security complex’ see Barry Buzan, \textit{People, States & Fear}, \textit{op.cit.}
especially important. The first one is the pattern of wars during the new era after the Cold War. It can be argued that the Gulf War of 1990-1991 and the Balkan War of 1992-1995 affected not only security of the Middle Eastern and the Balkan countries, but also that of most Western European countries in various ways. All of the regional countries felt directly or indirectly the impact on their own security of these wars in various degrees. Almost all countries had the negative consequences of the rise of oil prices and costs of war during the Gulf War, and the negative impact of refugee exoduses, immigrations, the fear of expansion of the wars to the borders of the European Union countries during the Balkan War. And, the September 11 incident also proved that even the superpower can come under a terrorist threat.

The second important indicator of the growing interdependence of security is the expansion of European international institutions towards these regions. In parallel and concomitant to the broadening security environment in Europe, new security understandings, arrangements and mechanisms emerged in order to manage and control the negative consequences of these multiple sources. Two of them, though interrelated, can be taken into consideration particularly due to their conformity with the broadening security architecture in Europe: The first one is the approach called “common security”. It suggests that “security could not be achieved by unilateral means, but only by co-operation on issues of common concern.”\(^8\) Another one is the theory of security community. Indeed, the security community is an outcome of diplomatic, institutional, military and political arrangements. It is a comprehensive framework for security in a certain area. The security community is defined as “a group of people that had become integrated to the point that there is a real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other ways.”\(^9\) The idea of security community argues that “members of such a community not only don’t fight each other, but also don’t hold expectation of war with each other, not that they are necessarily more secure against external attack inside than outside such a community.”\(^10\) These two theories has been being put into practice by NATO and the EU in the broader European security architecture since the end of the Cold War.

---

2.1. Development of the Security Architecture within NATO Framework

First of all, NATO, as the most experienced and capable organisation in the field of military security, has transformed itself and gained a new structure and role. In the light of the critical developments in the Post-Cold War era, NATO adapted and transformed itself in order to cope with new security challenges in such a way as to create a kind of security community framework for a lot of countries ranging from the US to the borders of China in Central Asia and to the Middle East.

NATO’s security architecture can now be defined as a kind of security community because it is composed of “several sovereign states which have dependable expectation of peaceful change”, “expect no bellicose activities from other members”, and therefore “consistently practice self-restraint”.11 The participants are not only the full members, but also all the countries having connection with NATO at various levels. Also, it does not imply that there are no problems and disputes between the countries within the security community of NATO. Indeed, it is possible to see some crises, disputes, confrontations and conflicts between some members at various degrees. The thrust of NATO has been to develop close co-operation and dialogue with all countries, and provide a number of opportunities and mechanisms for them to come together and resolve their problems by peaceful means. Thus, countries prefer talking with their opponent under the NATO umbrella rather than to going to war.

Right at the beginning of the new era in Europe after the end of the Cold War, NATO set its fundamental task in those terms: “To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate and coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.”12

Since then, NATO’s framework has been broadened towards the construction of a security community by the inclusion of new members, partnerships, and dialogues.13 The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, formed in 1997, brings together 44 countries from Europe and Asia. By coming together, signing the EAPC Basic Document, the Partners “reaffirmed their joint commitment to strengthen and extend peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area

---

11 Adler and Barnett, *op.cit.*
on the basis of shared values and principles which underline their co-operation, notably those set out in the Framework Document of the Partnership for Peace.”

The importance of the EACP is that it brings together 44 European and Asian countries and provide a platform for them to resolve their problems by dialogue, co-operation and consultation. Indeed, the communication among so many number of officials within the framework of NATO is a great opportunity for improving peace and stability in the region. Its importance was strikingly expressed by Joseph W. Ralston, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, saying that “As we sit around the table in Brussels, one of the more remarkable things is when we have a meeting with partners…Foreign Ministers…Defence Ministers…Chiefs of Staff from 44 nations talk about [their] common problems. This is a pretty remarkable accomplishment for our area and for the Alliance.”

In addition to political co-operation under the EAPC, The Partnership for Peace initiative launched in 1994 and the Enhanced Partnership for Peace in 1997 brings together 27 countries for joint military actions and other issues, fostering peace, stability and security in the Euroasian security complex with Transatlantic connection. And NATO’s close dialogue with six Mediterranean countries launched in 1994 is also to “contribute to security and stability in the Mediterranean and in Europe whose security is closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean.” And to these, “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation” signed in 1997, and establishment of institutional connection between NATO and Russia in 2002, and ”The Charter for a Distinctive Partnership Between NATO and Ukraine” signed in 1997 must be added as indicators for broadening the borders of the security community in the region.

The new NATO has defined its new role in those terms: “The peoples of North America and the whole of Europe can now join in a community of shared values based on freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. As an agent of change, a source of stability and the indispensable guarantor of its members’ security, our Alliance will continue to play a key

---

15 Joseph W. Ralston, “The priorities for European Security”, *Insight Turkey*, April-June 2001, Vol.3, No.2, p.99-100. When I (the author) visited NATO HQ in Brussels in June 2001, I had a feeling that that NATO has been such a diplomatic and political forum of the Euroasian countries that representatives of these countries gathered and formed a small miniature of the Euroasian General Assembly where they talk about their security and political problems.
17 Ibid, p.105-106.
in building a new, lasting order of peace in Europe, a Europe of co-operation and prosperity.”  

Such a community of states, if not that of societies throughout the region, have got some common security values and expectations. The first and the most important of all is that there is no colossal military threat, like “Soviet Union” in the Cold War, to threaten NATO countries and other non-European parts of the world in general. Ideological and political-military confrontation between the Western Europe and the Eastern Europe no longer exists. Instead, there emerged more conventional and local security problems such as the Gulf War, wars, conflicts and crises in the Balkans, the Armenian invasion of Azarbaijani territory, etc.

The methods to resolve these problems are also transformed. Now, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacemaking, humanitarian rescue operations gained bigger importance than the military fighting and build up. In the case of military confrontations as happened in the Gulf, Bosnia, Kosovo, they were short and limited, just to make peace between the conflicting parties.

As far as the last point was concerned, NATO has also developed new military concepts and structures during the 1990s. NATO’s new concept of “Combined Joint Task Forces” serves this purpose: to make contingency operations, peacekeeping operations and crisis management operations in the region outside the Alliance borders. So it is designed to launch non-Article 5 operations as well as Article 5 operations if needed. Its composition reflects the nature and spirit of the security community because all the aforementioned countries have a right to contribute to its formation, as was seen in the IFOR and the SFOR to bring peace and stability in the Balkans. That was an important achievement for NATO to serve for the peace and stability of the security community.

NATO’s main role is to provide a political platform as well as to launch military operations. However, NATO has wanted burden-sharing for the construction of security architecture in Europe. Thus, NATO has divided some of its responsibilities to other regional organisations in the region.

2.2. Division of Labour in the Construction of the Security Architecture

NATO provides the overall framework and platform for the countries interested in joining the European security architecture. But NATO is not sufficient enough to handle all

---


19 Yost, op.cit., p. 77.
aspects of the security architecture. Therefore, it prefers to have a division of labour among international institutions in the region to achieve the same objectives. “As the security of all Allies is indivisible...The achievement of the Alliance’s objectives depends critically on the equitable sharing of roles, risks, and responsibilities, as well as the benefits of common defence...”

In that respect, NATO declared its readiness and support for the division of labour among the OSCE, the WEU and the EU, and other international bodies interested to co-operate with NATO under the principles of the United Nations.

The OSCE combines the elements of both security interdependencies between the arena and the agenda: The OSCE territory, ranging from Vancouver in Canada to Vladivostok in Russia, comprises all of the Atlantic-European region, but excludes the Middle Eastern, the Caucasus and the Mediterranean territories. Most importantly, the OSCE’s security concept is so comprehensive one as it focuses on the security interdependence among economic, humanitarian and military issues. However, the OSCE does not have the developed and efficient military and organisational capabilities like NATO has got.

The EU plays double roles in the construction of the security architecture in Europe: The first one is to contribute to economic, political and social integration of European countries which are eligible to be a member of the EU, under the framework of the European Union. Thus the EU has been enlarging its amalgamated security community towards thirteen Central, Eastern and Southern European countries at the moment. It has played a very positive role in the adaptation of the Central and Eastern countries from a communist order into democratic one. With its political, economic, social and financial assistance, it integrated them into the so-called “island of peace” or “amalgamated security community” where they developed democracy, human rights and freedom, market economy, social development and so on.

EU’s second role is to contribute to the construction of the security architecture by involving in the resolution of international crises, disputes, human tragedies etc. In the Maastricht Treaty (The Treaty on European Union) of 1991, the EU countries set out a new strategy named as the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), and defined the Western European Union as the organisation responsible for this objective and as a “link” between the European Union and NATO. In other words, the implementation of the ESDI were to be made by the WEU in co-operation with NATO principles and members. Then, the
WEU defined its security and defence tasks in WEU Council of Ministers meeting in Petersberg in June 1992, known as the Petersberg Tasks. They were non-Article 5 tasks such as “humanitarian and rescue tasks”, “peacekeeping tasks”, tasks assigned to combat forces in the context of “crisis management” situations including peacemaking.22

The process accelerated in the 1990s, especially due to the fact that the EU and WEU were not be able to stop the war and the bloodshed in the Bosnian-Serbian war and in the Kosovo war. Having seen that the US and other non-EU countries did not act decisively to stop the war, the EU started to speed up the process and to create an autonomous military force and security and defence policy in order to acquire the capacity/capability to implement the Petersberg Tasks.23 In the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, the EU noted its objective to “integrate” its Common Security and Defence Identity into the EU body by a decision to include the Petersberg Tasks into the EU structure, to take steps towards Common Defence Policy, and to merge the WEU with the EU (Article 17). Later, in 1998 when Britain and France agreed in St.Malo to implement the steps towards a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), a new process entered into the European security agenda.

Soon after the EU Council meeting in Cologne in June 1999 merged the WEU with the EU, thus cutting-off the institutional connection between the WEU and NATO, and putting the non-EU NATO members of the WEU out of the European security arrangements. Indeed, it was a step which also overlooked NATO’s Washington Summit Declaration which had been made just three months earlier in April 1999. Then, the EU’s advance towards an independent security and defence mechanism fastened in EU’s Helsinki Summit in December 1999. There the EU decided to develop a Headline Goal to create a European Army with 60.000 troops by 2003. And in EU Council in Nice in December 2000, WEU’s role in the ESDP formally ended, and the EU created separate organs and mechanisms for the decision-making and operations of the ESDP. A result of that, the EU has set an autonomous path in the construction and operation of security architecture with some complications for all European countries.

22 For the reasons for the development of a EU security and defence policy, see Lord George Robertson, “Turkey and the European Security and Defence Identity”, Insight Turkey, January-March 2001, vol.3, No.1. The text is an edited transcription of the speech the Secretary General gave at a conference organised by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) on 23 November 2000 in Istanbul.

According to some observers and analysts, the ESDP can be a threat to end NATO’s role in the region, and an attempt not able to achieve security.\textsuperscript{24} According to US Secretary of State Madline Albright the ESDP poses a potential problem of creating three Ds: Duplication of the military forces, Discrimination against the non-EU NATO countries, and Decoupling NATO from the ESDP. As a result, it was feared that the ESDP can create risks for building a security architecture under NATO. In other words, some worried that the division of labour can lead to the demise of NATO’s role in the region. The ESDP could be seen as a rival to the NATO. Is it really so?

2.3. NATO-EU Relations within the Security Architecture: Rivals or Partners?

The above developments compel to ask the question of whether the EU is trying to be an alternative and even a rival force to NATO. This would be against the spirit of all NATO documents issued in the post-Cold War era. Nor would it be practicably achievable in the foreseeable future. In other words, the ESDP can hardly be a “rival and alternative” to NATO’s position in the European security order due to legal and political-military-institutional constraints.

From legal perspective, when the documents concerned are assessed, it can be argued that the ESDP is supposed to act only for NATO’s non-Article 5 operations. NATO views the ESDI as an attempt to “share the burden” of the European security problems in a such way that there should be a division of labour. Indeed, it was clearly stated that “By assuming greater responsibility for their own security, the European member countries will help to create a stronger and more balanced transatlantic relationship which will strengthen the Alliance as a whole.”\textsuperscript{25}

In this respect, in January 1994, NATO Heads of State and Government reaffirmed that “the Alliance was the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of the Allies under the Washington Treaty.”\textsuperscript{26}

At their meetings in Berlin and Brussels in June 1996, NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers decided that “the European Security and Defence Identity should be built within NATO, as an essential part of the internal adaptation of the Alliance. This would enable all


\textsuperscript{25} NATO Web Page: http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0401.htm

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.
European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance.”

From NATO perspective, as declared in the North Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels in 14-15 December 2000, the EU’s recent decisions concerning the construction of the ESDP as part of the EU rather than of the WEU did not change the essence of the “division-of-labour spirit for the construction of a new European security architecture as long as two points are taken into account. Firstly, “The Alliance will remain the foundation for the collective defence of its members and continue actively to play its important role in crisis management as set out in the Strategic Concept.” Secondly, “[NATO] underlined, as it did at the Washington Summit and subsequent Ministerial meetings, the importance of finding solutions satisfactory to all Allies to the issue of participation. It noted the provisions agreed by the European Council at Nice for dialogue, consultation and co-operation with non-EU European Allies on issues related to security and defence policy and crisis management as well as the modalities for participation in EU-led military operations....which will also enable non-EU European Allies to raise their concerns when they consider their security interests might be involved.”

To sum up, the EU’s role in the construction and operation of a broader European security architecture in Europe can be categorised into the following points: first, acting as an organisation or model for boosting economic, political and legal dimension of the security architecture in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe, and contributing to the development of democracy, market economy, civil government, and social-economic reforms. Second, acting as an European pillar of NATO in the non-Article 5 military operations if NATO is not involved.

From military-political perspective, too, the ESDP can hardly be a rival and alternative for NATO’s role in the security architecture. There can be shown four reasons for this view: Firstly, the EU does not have enough military capabilities, assets and forces to launch effective operations that may be required for autonomous military operations. Indeed, it would take long time and great expenses to build up a robust European Army and operation facilities and assets for operations. As Aybet concluded “The WEU’s military capability in

---

27 Ibid.
carrying out Petersberg-type operations is depending on NATO and the implementation of this has been worked out in a NATO-WEU framework. This mean that full NATO members and [ex-] WEU Associate members are fully and equally participating in the development of the ESDI, and the ESDI is being developed within NATO as suggested in the Berlin ministerial decisions of NATO in 1996.\textsuperscript{30}

Secondly, there is no overall consensus about the extend of ESDP’s role in the European security architecture: Some countries, the so-called Atlanticist countries prefer NATO to continue as the primary organisation and the transatlantic connection essential for the maintenance of security in Europe; and others, so-called Europeanist countries prefer a more independent European rapid deployment force and army.\textsuperscript{31} Because of these different preferences, and because of its intergovernmental structure which requires “unanimity” in its decision-making process, there need to be a consensus between pro-NATO and pro-EU countries. Otherwise, it cannot be viable and effective.

Thirdly, there are some institutional complexities in the arrangements between NATO and the EU: There are presently 6 non-EU European NATO members (Turkey, Norway, Island, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary); and 4 non-NATO EU members (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden); and several countries which are partners of NATO, but not the EU. This varying connections can complicate the decision making process in most cases.

Fourthly, EU’s potential operations area is not defined clearly. Because some EU countries, for example Germany, have concerns about the “out of area operations”, it should have close co-operation with all the countries concerned. But if the ESDP is limited to the EU members only, its operations in those regions can be very difficult. In particular, the position of the non-EU European NATO countries is very critical not only for the EU operations but also for NATO-EU relations. The EU’s operations in areas in proximity to these countries need NATO assets and capabilities, and NATO’s affirmative decision for their use.

One of such countries whose geographical position is the most critical, is Turkey because it is at the heart of the new security architecture.

3. Turkey’s Delicate Position in the New Security Architecture

After the Cold War, Turkey found itself in such an unstable and difficult international security environment ranging from the Balkans to Mediterranean, Central and Eastern Europe,


Middle East, and Caucasus and Central Asia. As the Cold War security order collapsed and a new and broader security order has been built up, Turkey’s security position has been deeply affected by the developments in the environment. Living in a difficult neighbourhood, Turkey’s agenda has been dominated by serious security issues for the last ten years. The new security environment brought about a range of opportunities and constraints and even risks for Turkish security and foreign policy.

NATO sources indicated that there are sixteen potential crisis points around Turkey: Bosnia-Herzegovenia, Sandjak, Kosova, Albania, Macedonia, Nagorno-Karabagh in Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Abkhazia in Georgia, Georgia-South Ossetia, Northern Iraq, Iran, Syria, Cyprus, Vojvodina, Privlaka, Belarus. Moreover, it is pointed out that thirteen of them closely concerns Turkey.  

Some of these problematic areas have already been blown out in a great scale during the 1990s: The 1990-1991 Gulf War and its negative consequences in Northern Iraq, the Bosnia-Serbia war of 1992-1995, the Kosovo problem, the Armenian invasion of Azerbaijani territory, the Abkhazian problem in Georgia, the Russian involvement in the Caucasus problems, Chechnya uprising, Turkish-Greek crises in the Aegean Sea and in Cyprus, and (though not in the list) the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus, Turkey has already come under the impact of the crises and wars in the region.

As a result, at the end of the Cold War, Turkey’s security position has changed fundamentally from being at the south-eastern flank of NATO to the heart of the new security architecture due to multiplication of Turkey’s security agenda and arena. Unlike the Cold War position, Turkey’s security concerns increased, its security burden became overloaded, and Turkey’s foreign policy was heavily influenced by the security issues, problems, targets. Turkey’s foreign policy adopted a purely Realist perspective, i.e. the prime importance of security over all other concerns due the security pressures. When looked at all those crises and wars in retrospect, challenges to Turkey’s security can be categorised into four groups.

First of all, challenges to Turkey’s security and foreign policy has been multi-directional. During the Cold War years, Turkey’s main security concern emanated mainly from northern direction, the Soviet threat. Therefore, the collapse of the Soviet-communist threat was a positive development due to two factors: firstly the disappearance of the Soviet threat, secondly the emergence of new opportunities in the post-Soviet territories in Central Asia. In the new era, Turkey’s security perspective is influenced by the developments from all

---

directions: the Middle East and the Mediterranean in the south, the Caucuses and Central Asia in the east, Balkans in the west, and Russian factor in the north.

Secondly, Turkey’s security agenda has been multi-functional. It means that Turkey’s security is influenced more by the soft security issues around Turkey, than by the existence of a direct military attack by an enemy. In other words, the “soft security” issues such as terrorism, ethnic nationalism, social and economic instabilities, refugees, weapons of mass destruction and so on occupy Turkey’s security agenda more than ever before.

Thirdly, Turkey’s security agenda has been multi-level. It means that Turkey’s security concerns come from various levels such as international system level, inter-state level, domestic/national level, and individual level. At the international system level, power politics relations among the USA, the European Union, Russia, China and other powers closely influence Turkey’s security. At the interstate level, Turkey has got some special bilateral security problems/relations with some regional countries such as Syria, Iraq, Iran, Armenia, Russia, Greece and Israel. Turkey is influenced by the balance of power game in the region. At the domestic/national level, Turkey has faced a critical challenge from the PKK terror and radical-violent religious fundamentalism under the banner of Islam, and from social and economic problems. Finally, at the individual level, Turkey has had deteriorating human rights record due to the maltreatment by the officials of ethnic, religious and other civil individuals.

Finally, Turkey’s security has been challenged by multi-institutionalisation of international security architecture in Europe. During the Cold War years, NATO was the only security framework to protect Turkey’s security. In the new era, although it is still the most important one as will be analysed below, there emerged new organisations with security agendas in addition to NATO. Due to the above three points, Turkey paid close attention to every international organisation in the region, be it the OSCE, the WEU, the EU, and so on. Turkey does not want to be out of any international organisation whose activities may have implications for Turkish security, defence and foreign policy.

These concerns and developments also brought Turkey’s geopolitical and strategic position in world politics to a difficult point. As Turkey is involved heavily in the European, Asian, Middle Eastern issues, Turkey’s position in the European security architecture has been very delicate. The main reason behind this “delicate position” is the fact that Turkey’s connection with the European security architecture has been very multiplexed and multivared in the recent years. In other words, Turkey’s connection with the developing European security architecture has got three channels and dimensions. Firstly, as a full member of
NATO, Turkey is at “the centre” of the European security architecture through NATO. But, secondly, as an Associated Member of the European Union and the Western European Union, Turkey is at “the midway” of the architecture. Thirdly, the worst has happened recently, and Turkey has been put at “the margin of” the architecture due its marginalisation from the European Security and Defence Policy (the ESDP). The following sections will examine these three channels and dimensions.

3.1. Turkey in NATO: The Central Position

Turkey has been part of the European security since the 19th century in terms of practical international security relations. Turkey’s place was improved into concrete, legal and organisational level when it became the full member of NATO in 1952. This made Turkey automatically a part of the Western European security system. Since then, Turkey’s security and defence policy has been designed mostly in line with its Alliance commitments. This was the case during the Cold War, and continued after the Cold War during the 1990s.33

The connection between Turkey and NATO improved in such a way that Turkey has been an integral (central) member of the European security through NATO. As a staunch member of the North Atlantic Alliance, Turkey has always been an essential and active actor of the European security order. There has indeed been reciprocal interests and benefits between Turkey and NATO during the Cold War: While Turkey contributed to the European security and defence against the Soviet Union in various ways, the Europeans as well as the USA extended security guarantee to protect Turkey’s national and territorial integrity against the Soviets.

After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet threat, there were some arguments that as NATO lost its raison d’eta, Turkey’s role, importance and position for the European security would also inevitably come to an end. However, the developments showed that neither NATO nor Turkey have lost their importance for the European security. As mentioned above, NATO adapted itself to the new security environment in the region ranging from the Atlantic to Asia. Concurrently, Turkey’s role, importance and position was upgraded into the heart of the European security architecture under NATO. As always, Turkey has cherished great allegiance to NATO in the new era, just like NATO admires Turkey’s contribution to the construction of the security order in Europe. It can be seen that there is a

strong concurrence and similarity between the construction of security architecture under NATO and Turkey’s security perspective in the post-Cold War era.

As far as Turkey is concerned, NATO means several things for Turkey’s security, defence and foreign policy. Its importance for Turkey can be summed up under the following points: Firstly, NATO has been the backbone of Turkey’s security and defence policy since 1952. This was the case during the Cold War, and continued to be so in the new era. Situated in a rather unstable and turbulent geopolitical location, Turkey views NATO as an international actor contributing to its stability and security.

Secondly, NATO is the strongest linchpin for Turkey’s vocation into the Western world. As the most important, powerful and influential international organisation in the world, NATO provides a political/security identity for Turkey in international politics. NATO is an international platform for Turkey to express its views and interests about international developments in a rather critical region. There, Turkey develops strong relations with European and transatlantic countries, manifests its interests about security issues in Europe, and can have influence over the developments in the area from the Atlantic area to the Central Asia now. Therefore, because of its institutional, military and political power, Turkey views NATO as the primary organisation for the region around Turkey. Most importantly, because of NATO’s intergovernmental decision-making structure in which each member has got a “veto” power in the North Atlantic Council and other organs, Turkey gains a strong voice in issues concerning European security.

Thirdly, NATO’s broadening security framework in the form of a quasi-security community is very much in line, and overlapping with, Turkey’s security, defence and foreign policy. It can be seen that NATO’s construction of a new security architecture through the establishment of partnership and dialogue with about 50 countries, closely concerns Turkey’s security perspective and interests. As can be seen in NATO’s Security Concept (1999) and in the Washington Summit Communiqué of 24 April 1999, NATO’s security architecture is centred on Turkey’s security environment, or vice versa.34

Fourthly, NATO provides Turkey with a transatlantic connection. Development of Turkish-American relations has been based partly on Turkey’s NATO membership and partly on bilateral level. It is a clear fact that in the post-Soviet era the US remained as the only hegemonic power in the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Thus it was the leading country in the military operations in the Gulf war of 1990-1, the Bosinan

operation, and continues to be there as well as in the Arab-Israeli peace process and now in Afghanistan. As can be seen, Turkey’s and the US’s security agenda and area overlaps in many areas. And in most of these issues Turkey supports the US policy, and vice versa.\textsuperscript{35} Furthermore, Turkey and the US share similar perspective on the construction of European security architecture: both prefers NATO as the main and leading platform for the security arrangements in the Security Community; both wishes that the European Security and Defence Identity/Policy should act as the European pillar of the Western Alliance.

Moreover, NATO continues to be an important security guarantee for Article 5 cases for Turkish security, though its possibility is very small in this age. In that regard, Turkey’s continuing problems with Russia is taken into consideration by NATO. In particular, the development of NATO-Russia disagreements draw Russia into the security architecture within NATO. Although NATO’s concern about the implementation of the CFE is not very strong and effective, the US-Russian meetings about the disarmament brings hope for Turkey’s security. As stated in the Article 36 of the Strategic Concept of 1999 “A strong, stable, and enduring relationship between NATO and Russia is essential to achieve lasting stability in the Euro-Atlantic area”, including its positive effects on Turkish security.\textsuperscript{36}

From NATO perspective, Turkey has been a very crucial asset for NATO during and after the Cold War. As NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana stated,

“Turkey, as an active and valued member of the Alliance, has contributed to the shaping of our common security. Its proximity to the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East and the Mediterranean puts Turkey in the epicentre of change…It is this new role of Turkey that makes this country a major asset in NATO’s new co-operative approach to security. As a country with unique historical and cultural links and as a promoter of regional co-operation, Turkey actively contributes to NATO’s collective defence as well as to its new missions in crisis management and peace support. And, in contributing significantly to the Alliance’s outreach and co-operative activities with non-NATO countries, Turkey has a particular importance in developing the new co-operative security architecture in Europe.”\textsuperscript{37}

One of Turkey’s major contributions to the construction of the European security architecture and to the development of security community is to act as an “mediator” and


\textsuperscript{36} Also in Washington Summit Communique, Points 27 and 33, \textit{op.cit.}

“modifier” for the adaptation of the ex-Soviet countries in the Caucuses and Central Asia into political, cultural, military and economic structure of the Western world. By these means, Turkey’s contribution to the construction of the new European security architecture under NATO has taken various forms such as developing diplomatic and political dialogue and co-operation, military training and education activities, economic and trade co-operation, and social and cultural exchanges with the newly independent Turkish states. Turkey has played a crucial role, if not successful all the time, to guide the ex-Soviet countries in the Central Asia, in the Balkans, the Caucuses, the Mediterranean and the Middle East to establish co-operative relations with the Western world.\(^38\) To mention just a few of such projects vindicates Turkey’s active and hard work for the alignment of these countries into the framework of the new security architecture under NATO.

First of all, Turkey has concluded agreements of co-operation on military training, technical and scientific issues as well as on defence industry with almost 60 countries, including NATO and non-NATO countries in the Balkans, the Middle East, Southern Mediterranean, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, Far East Asia, and even South America. All of these agreements aimed at military security co-operation with a view to develop interoperability.\(^39\) By these agreements, Turkey has been a “security bridge” between NATO and the non-NATO countries.

Moreover, Turkey developed a number of multilateral security projects with countries in the region. The main objective of these projects is to enhance Turkey’s foreign security, defence and political relations as well as to enhance co-operation and dialogue in the region. Turkey’s involvement in these projects serves to the growth of the security community by developing intimate political, economic, military and institutional transactions. Just to mention some of them will prove Turkey’s high and active contribution.

In the Balkans, Turkey initiated and/or involved in a number of bilateral and multilateral political, economic, military and social projects such as the BLACKSEAFORCE in April 2001, the South East European Co-operation Process (SEECP) in February 2000, the Multinational Peace Force South East Europe (MPFSEE) and the SEEBRIG (South East Brigade) in September 1999, the Southeast European Co-operation Initiative in 1996, the Balkan free-trade zone initiative in October 1988. In the Middle East and the Central Asia,


Turkey pioneered the establishment of the Black Sea Economic Organisation in 1992, and allowed the enlargement of the Economic Co-operation Agreement into the Caucasian and Central Asian countries in the 1990s.


Moreover, and more to the point concerning Turkey’s contribution to the construction of the European security architecture under NATO is Turkey’s involvement in the Peace for Partnership (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council operations. In the light of NATO’s PfP initiative and the 5th paragraph of Point 25 of the Washington Summit Communique, Turkey established a PfP Training Center in Ankara on the 9th of March 1998. Its principle objective is “to provide qualitative education and training support to military and civilian personnel of Partner nations to reach Interoperability Objectives.” All the courses are open to all Partners as well as to NATO Allies. In the Centre, the personnel of the PfP and

non-PfP countries are trained and educated for their adaptation to NATO’s doctrine, principles, tactics, procedures and standards.\textsuperscript{41}

The PfP Training Centre activities are military visits, military school, college and academic training and education or field training and education, various short term courses on a number of topics for interoperability, job training at units, headquarters and institutions, unit/personnel exchange, co-operation in the field of military history, archives and museology, joint exercises, and sending observers to exercises.\textsuperscript{42}

Since its establishment the Centre hosted 1200 participants from 14 NATO, 21 Partner and 2 Mediterranean Dialogue countries,\textsuperscript{43} most of whom were educated and trained in different places around Turkey. The courses/lectures were given by Turkish personnel with NATO and PSO experience as well as by experts and speakers from NATO, Partners, and other national and international institutions. Thus, there has emerged a small miniature of the new security community in which military, academic, technical and political personnel have close communication and exchanges leading to nurturing common understanding and values, just like in the EAPC and PfP meetings at the ministers level in NATO framework. Indeed, it is important to mention that “at every course, importance is paid on the social-cultural activities to help ‘to bridge the cross cultural differences.’”\textsuperscript{44} Also, from 1995 to 1999 Turkey and the PfP countries held a number of joint military exercises in different countries such as the Black Sea, Bulgaria, Romania, Italy, Albania, Republic of Macedonia, the USA, Slovakia, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Hungary, Canada, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Kirgizistan, Slovenia.\textsuperscript{45}

In addition, Turkey paid great importance to NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue.\textsuperscript{46} Being a Mediterranean country and part of the Mediterranean Dialogue, Turkey believes that the Mediterranean dimension is one of the security components of the European security architecture. In that respect, Turkey developed good and friendly relations with the Dialogue countries, signing various technical co-operation agreements in the military field, assuming the task of Contact Point Embassy in Jordan for the period of 2001-2002, and training and educating the officers from the Dialogue countries in the PfP Training Centre in Ankara.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., p.1-19, 22.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid. p.1-18.
\textsuperscript{43} “Turkey’s Security and Its Relations with NATO,” http://www.mfa.gov.tr
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., p.1-19.
\textsuperscript{47} “Turkey’s Security and Its Relations with NATO,” http://www.mfa.gov.tr
Indeed, Turkey participates in the formation of NATO’s decision-making process regarding the Mediterranean security. This is a great advantage and power for Turkish interests in the Mediterranean, unlike Turkey’s sidelined position within the EU’s European Mediterranean Policy.  

To sum up, Turkey and NATO members have been closely interdependent on each other in the construction of the new security architecture broader Europe. On the one hand, Turkey has increased its international position and advantages by using its membership power in NATO decision-making, strategy and operations. On the other hand, NATO has increased its influence over the broadened security environment in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the Caucuses and Central Asia by using Turkey’s strong geopolitical, historical, socio-cultural, economic and even military influence over the region.

If NATO was the only organisation for constructing the security architecture in Europe, Turkey’s position would have been clear-cut and definite, not “delicate”. But, the EU’s quest for building up a security and defence community in Europe closely concerns Turkey due to its important implications on Turkey’s position in Europe. It makes Turkey’s position delicate due to Turkey’s asymmetrically multiplexed connections with the European security architecture. So the following section will look at “the midway” positions of Turkey’s security relations with the new security architecture in Europe.

3.2. Turkey and the EU/WEU: The Midway Positions

Turkey pays close attention to the developments in European security order developing under the framework of the EU. Turkey’s security perspective regarding the European Union is made up of two dimensions: The first one is Turkey’s wish to have full integration with EU’s economic, political, institutional and legal structures, thus becoming a full member of the EU’s amalgamated security community, and, like the Central and Eastern European Countries, being a member of the European family-order in which democracy, market economy, human rights and freedoms, civil society, pluralism are prevalent.

The second dimension is Turkey’s wish to have full integration with the developing security, defence and foreign policy structure of the EU. Indeed, as we stated above, Turkey is already an integral part of the European security through NATO where Turkey shares the security and defence perspective of the other European countries, members and non-members of the EU. However, as the EU countries initiated to develop a European security and defence

---

policy as an extension in Europe of the Atlantic Alliance and also of the European Union, unsurprisingly Turkey wants to join such a formation at a respectable and convenient level and degree. This is only an inevitable target for Turkey to match its associated membership status in the EU. In other words, Turkey wants to be part of this aspect of the European Union too. Just like its objective to be part of EU’s economic, legal, political structures by fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria, Turkey wants to be part of the EU’s security and defence initiative/policy. Just like Turkey has a “Customs Union” in economic and trade fields with the EU, Turkey wants to establish, so to speak, a “Security and Defence Union” in security and defence policy, but with a better deal than that in the Customs Union where Turkey has no role and participation in the decision-making mechanisms.

3.2.1. Security Dimension of Turkey’s Membership in the European Union

Like NATO, the European Union has also been adapting its internal and external system into the new security environment since the end of the Cold War. Its admission of Finland, Austria and Sweden in 1995 enlarged the European security community, contributing to the growth of the security architecture in Europe. EU’s more important contribution to the development of European security came through its developing relations with the ex-Soviet Bloc countries in Eastern and Central Europe, and its decision to admit thirteen Central, Eastern and Southeastern European countries into its structure by 2004. A number of radical and impressive reforms implemented by most of these countries in the light of the Copenhagen Criteria of 1992 resulted in the development of democracy, market economy, human rights, pluralism, the rule of law, and freedoms of thought and expression. As a result, all these contributed to the development of peace, stability and security not only in those countries but also in and around Europe as a whole.

Turkey’s full integration into the European Union and adherence to the values in the Copenhagen Criteria would also contribute to Turkey’s development in the sense of the soft security. Just as the Copenhagen Criteria contributed to the development of security conditions in Central and Eastern European countries, increasing their political, economic, social standards to the level of EU countries, Turkey also aims to be integral member of EU’s security community. These are the values at the heart of European world, and also aimed at by NATO.49 So, Turkey’s drive for full membership is not simply motivated by entrance to the

49NATO is determined to “contribute to building a stronger and broader Euro-Atlantic community of democracies - a community where human rights and fundamental freedoms are upheld, where borders are increasingly open to people, ideas and commerce; where war becomes unthinkable.” The Washington Declaration 1999, Parag. 3, in NATO Handbook, Documentation, op.cit.
EU as an organisation, but also a target for improving Turkey’s security. Turkey’s integration to the EU is one of the Turkey’s security and strategic choice.\footnote{Ali Bulaç, Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye (İstanbul: Feza Gazetecilit, 2001), p.34, 39-40.} As Ambassador Akın Alptuna stated “since the beginning, membership in the EU has been a strategic objective of Turkish foreign policy and must be seen as an integral part of Turkey’s modernisation process.”\footnote{Akın Alptuna (Ambassador, Deputy Under-secretary, the Turkish Foreign Ministry), “Turkey’s European Perspective”, \textit{Insight Turkey}, Vol.3, No.2, April-June 2001, p.72.} If security means “feeling safe and secure in every aspect of life”, Turkey’s security can be improved by its accession to the EU due to the following advantages Turkey will get as a result of its membership in the EU:

* Psychological/Identity: feeling and living in developed European-Western world. If and when the Turkish people improve their condition in the way the EU countries have achieved, it will elevate Turkish people’s feelings and identity from the category of underdeveloped countries to that of developed world.

* Political: democracy, rule of law, human rights and freedoms, civil society, pluralism are the values by which Turkish people will improve their political conditions, solve their problems better and faster.

* Economic: Turkey’s integration with the EU will bring economic development and prosperity, once the criteria mentioned in the EU’s Maastricht Criteria such as low level inflation, controlled budget deficits, state spending and so on are achieved.

* Militarily-strategic: living in peace and co-operation within the framework of the same security community, so that Turkey and the EU countries will eliminate enmities and disputes, and even if there are problems, they will use peaceful means and dialogue.

* Foreign Policy: Turkey will become an island of peace, security and stability in its bordering regions, and will feel more secure of the problems around.

As an associate member of the EU since 1964 and having entered the Customs Union in 1996, Turkey is getting closer to the European Union. In EU Helsinki Summit in 1999, Turkey was declared as one of the thirteen candidate countries for full membership in the European Union. After that, Turkey and the EU took important steps in Turkey’s preparation for full membership: In reply to EU’s demands in the Accession Partnership Document of December 2000 from Turkey to have reforms in several areas, Turkey presented its National Program in 2001, in which Turkey accepted to have several reforms, which are actually execution of the Copenhagen Criteria.
Since then, Turkey has taken important steps in economic, political and legal areas in the light of its National Program. Although there is more time for Turkey to complete these reforms, it is believed that with the completion of Turkey’s full membership into the EU “there will be a closer co-operation in the field of foreign and security policy. Along with other candidate countries, Turkey has already begun the process of integration into the consultation mechanisms established to enable its policies to align with those of the EU as far as possible. In this instance, Turkey has participated in more than 80 percent of EU statements on political issues since Helsinki.”\(^{52}\) Thus Helsinki marks a qualitative new beginning and a process of mutual strategic transformation for both Turkey and the EU.

Yet, as we will see below the Helsinki summit also started an awkward process in the field of security and defence policy regarding Turkey and other 5 non-EU European NATO allies. Turkey’s connection with the ESDI under the WEU was halted. So before analysing this process, Turkey’s security and defence relations with the WEU will be looked at.

### 3.2.2. Turkey and the Western European Union

Turkey participated in the construction of EU’s security and defence identity under the framework of the WEU as the second pillar of the EU integration stated in the Maastricht Treaty. Just like its application for being full member of the EU, it applied for full membership in the WEU in 1991. But, just like the response given to Turkey’s application for full membership, Turkey was offered an “associate membership”, a position parallel to its EU membership level. The EU decided that its full membership into the WEU would be contingent upon its full membership in the EU.

When Turkey, alongside Norway and Iceland, became an “associate member” of the WEU on the 20\(^{th}\) of November 1992 (became effective in 1995),\(^{53}\) a kind of parallel position was instituted for Turkey’s memberships in the EU and in the WEU.\(^{54}\) But that was also an inevitable outcome of Turkey’s integral position in NATO. Indeed, because the WEU was to act as the European pillar of NATO in order to implement the Petersberg Tasks and to develop an ESDI, the non-EU European NATO countries were given “associate member status” within the WEU mechanism. Though not a perfect and fully desirable position for

\(^{52}\) Ibid. p.72.


\(^{54}\) For a brief history the emergence of the WEU and Turkey’s membership story, see Aybet, op.cit., Part Four.
Turkey, it provided a respectable connection for Turkey in the development of the ESDI by the WEU within NATO.

WEU associate membership provided Turkey with a place and some institutional rights in WEU’s decision-making as well as in WEU’s non-Article 5 operations. Turkey’s status in the WEU system granted Turkey a right to closely involve in European security architecture. Most importantly, Turkey had the right to participate in the meetings of the WEU Council, its working groups and subsidiary bodies under certain conditions. In the meetings, Turkey also had the right to speak and submit proposals, but not a right to block a decision that is the subject of consensus among the full member states. But Turkey could adhere to such decisions later if it wanted. Furthermore, Turkey was associated with the WEU Planning Cell through special arrangements, and could nominate officers to the Cell. Moreover, Turkey could take part on the same basis as full members in the WEU operations (as well as in exercises and planning) to which it commits forces. Turkey could also nominate Forces Answerable to the WEU (FAWEU) on the same basis. So by virtue of its NATO membership, it had a say in the WEU operations, is directly involved in the planning and preparation of WEU operations in which NATO assets and capabilities are used within the framework of CJTF. This was an aspect of NATO-WEU co-operation and joint operations for strengthening NATO’s European pillar and the ESDI within NATO.56

All these were very important for Turkey because they ensured that Turkey’s security interests were taken into account. The decisions reflecting the above mentioned arrangements were well balanced and took into account the concerns of NATO members which are not members of the EU.57 Indeed, Turkey actively participated in the work of this organisation and contributed to its efforts aimed at establishing a system where Europeans may undertake Petersberg Type conflict prevention and crisis management operations.

There were several reasons for Turkey’s interest and willingness to be part of the WEU and to involve in the ESDI. First of all, Turkey is already part of the European security order by means of NATO membership. As most of EU countries are also members of NATO, sharing the same platforms, policies etc, it is inevitable that Turkey and these EU countries

---

55 Hüseyin Bağcı, “Turkey and the European security and defence identity- a Turkish view,” in Studien und Berichte Zur Sicherheitspolitik, GASP, 3 Oktober 2000, p. 3-5. For more about the disadvantages of the associate membership status, see Turkish Foreign Ministry, “Document on Associate Membership of WEU of the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway, and the Republic of Turkey,” op.cit.


have got common security concerns in the European landscape. Secondly, Turkey, as the candidate to be member of the EU “family”, shares the same values with the European countries: Turkey as well as the EU countries agree that there should be peace rather than wars; states should have modern regimes; differences should be resolved by peaceful means not by resorting to war. Thirdly, Turkey and the EU countries share the same geography, i.e. the Balkans, the Southeast Europe, the Mediterranean, and even the Middle East and the Caucuses. As stated above, any crisis or war in this geography concerns both Turkey and the EU. Fourthly, Turkey tried to improve its position in this field by being a member of the WEU. Like its objective to be a member of the EU, the same was valid for the WEU. Fifthly, the WEU, by making Turkey an associate member and not giving security guarantees and defence commitments for the disputes between member states of WEU and NATO, tried to make a balance between Turkey and Greece. Thus, as stated in the Document on Associate Membership, the WEU took into consideration the interests of the associate members. Indeed, Greece tried to block Turkey’s full participation into the WEU decision making when the WEU wanted an operation using NATO’s operational assets to which the associate members would be contributing. The Greek blocking was removed by the French government’s compromise proposal in April 1997, making the associate members part of the WEU’s decision-making. Finally, Turkey saw the WEU as an essential dimension of the NATO’s broader security architecture. Thus Turkey’s membership in the WEU was part of its general security perception in NATO.

An important NATO source, which arranged Turkey’s position as well as the relationships between NATO, the WEU and ESDI is the Washington Summit documents in 1999. The Allies meeting in Washington to celebrate the 50th anniversary of NATO reached to a historic agreement/consensus on the evolution of the security and defence mechanisms in NATO. Some points of this agreement/consensus were very important in showing Turkey’s position in the European security and defence system. Moreover, the Washington agreement/consensus laid down some important bases of the security community.

However, an awkward process has developed recently in Turkish-EU relations in the field of “military-defence aspect” of the security since the St.Malo accord and the ensuing developments. That is, Turkey’s associated membership position in the WEU, though not perfectly satisfactory, has been ended as a result of EU’s decision to terminate the WEU’s role in the ESDI, and the ensuing development of the ESDP since then. This development has

59 Cebeci, *op.cit.*, p.6-8.
a potential to marginalise Turkey from the European security system in institutional sense, and, probably, in the substance in the future. So the following section will focus on the process of Turkey’s marginalisation from the institutional dimension of the European security architecture.

3.3. Turkey and The ESDP: The Marginal Position

Turkey’s position in the European security architecture have become troublesome when Turkey was placed at the margin of the ESDP in the wake of two important developments along with their legal documents in 1999: The first one was the Washington Summit and its legal documents in April 1999, which, as will be analysed in detail later, is actually a milestone not only for the Western Alliance as a whole and the European security architecture, but also for Turkey’s (and other non-EU European NATO allies) position in the ESDP. The second one is the Helsinki Summit and its legal documents in December 1999, which commenced a new process not only for the European Union and but also for Turkey’s membership process. In the Helsinki Summit, the EU Council accepted Turkey as one of the thirteen candidate countries for the EU, thus restoring the worsening Turkish-EU relations since the 1997 Luxembourg Summit where Turkey had almost been put out of the list of the next EU enlargement. The Helsinki summit was a big step forward in Turkey’s integration into the first and third pillars because it confirmed Turkey’s integration process in political, economic and legal fields in line with the Copenhagen Criteria. As stated above, these have positive security implications for Turkey and the EU. However, in a rather paradoxical way, in the very same Helsinki Document, Turkey was interestingly distanced from the second pillar of the EU, the ESDP. Turkey’s associated membership in the WEU, which had been underlined in the Washington Summit, became surprisingly worse then before, leading to increasing disagreements and tensions between Turkey and the EU on security and defence issues.

After these two events, in a sequence of steps taken by the EU in the field of ESDP, Turkey’s standing within the European security architecture moved from “the midway” to “the margin”, so going from “bad” to “worse”, due to the end of Turkey’s participation in the WEU decision-making process, and of its exclusion from the ESDP’s decision-making process.60 So in the process from the end of the Washington Summit up to now, Turkey-EU relations experienced rather strange ups and downs due to the ESDP process. While the ESDP

---

60 For brief look at this process see Bağcı, “Turkey and the European Security and Defence Policy”, op.cit., p.9-14; and Bağcı, “Türkiye-AGSP: Beklentiler, Endişeler”, op.cit.
process spilled over negatively into the economic/legal/political integration process, Turkey-EU integration process gave a picture of contrasts: rapprochement on the one hand and alienation on the other hand; or aligning with, while distancing from, the EU. Thus we can argue that the awkward process has developed at two dimensions: The first one is on the institutional dimension, i.e. Turkey’s exclusion from the institutionalisation of the ESDP; and the second one is on the substance of political-security relations, i.e. tensions in Turkish-EU relations in general. The two dimensional process created some complications in Turkey’s domestic politics, foreign policy and in NATO-EU dialogue and co-operation, which will be analysed later.

In order to see the development of Turkey’s position in the second pillar, a brief summary of the development and structure of the ESDP is following:

3.3.1. Development of the ESDP

The EU Council declarations in Cologne (June 1999), Helsinki (December 1999), Feira (June 2000), Nice (December 2000), and Leaken (December 2001) took important steps to develop the ESDP. All these decisions paved the way for an autonomous European Army, along with institutional arrangements and mechanisms. By that, the EU aims to complete its three-pillar integration: First Pillar: European Communities/Economic and Monetary; Second Pillar: Common Foreign and Security Policy; Third Pillar: Justice and Home Affairs.61

As a result of these developments, the ESDI have changed its characteristics from being an “Identity” within the WEU to a “Policy” within the EU. This was mainly due to the fact that Article 5 of EU Cologne Declaration urged to take a “new step in the construction of the European Union” towards a Common European Policy on Security and Defence, also named as “European Security and Defence Policy.” But that “Policy” was of course to be based on the European “Identity” in terms of politics and security.

The EU declared that the ESDP was to be functional only for the Petersberg Tasks, i.e. non-Article V tasks of NATO and the Brussels Treaty. To fulfil this kind of operations, it started to build up a new institutional, political, and military structure, leading to some problems in the existing mechanisms concerning NATO, the WEU and the EU. In other words, the EU’s start of a new institutional, political and military process for the construction of the ESDP had implications on those countries which are not member of the EU, so-called non-EU European NATO Allies (Turkey, Norway, Island, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary),

---

61 For example, Klaus-Dieter Borchardt, The ABC of Community Law (Brussels: European Commission Directorate-General for Education and Culture, 2000).
particularly on Turkey, on NATO’s position *vis a vis* the European security architecture (in the view of the Washington Summit Document), and finally on the construction and development of the security architecture under NATO in general. All these developments can be categorised into three groups: First, the decision-making mechanism. Second, military capabilities and operations as well as non-civilian military crisis management. Third, modalities to include the non-EU European NATO Allies, and the modalities to establish transparent dialogue and co-operation between the EU and NATO.

### 3.3.1.1. ESDP Decision-Making Mechanism

As far as the decision-making mechanism and process is concerned, the EU, having merged the WEU into its “second pillar”, finished the WEU’s role in the European Security and Defence Identity as stated in the previous documents. The WEU’s decision-making mechanism about the ESDI was put aside. Instead, the EU Council was designated as the supreme organ to take decisions to implement the ESDP for the Petersberg Tasks. As stated in the EU’s Cologne Summit on the 4th of June, 1999, “The Council of the European Union will be able to take decisions on the whole range of political, economic, and military instruments at its disposal when responding to crisis situations…and have the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union, the Petersberg Tasks.”

With this decision in the Cologne Summit to merge the WEU with the EU, not only did Turkey lose its WEU associate membership, but also NATO-WEU co-operation and dialogue as stated in the Washington Summit became void. With this absorption, the EU took over the WEU functions, started to set up a new organisational framework in order to develop a ESDP.

With this resolve to have an autonomous decision-making structure, in the Helsinki Summit, the EU offered, as a consolation price, “the necessary dialogue, consultation, and co-operation” with NATO and its non-EU members, other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU as well as other prospective partners in EU-led crisis management. Thus the EU’s decision-making was limited to the EU’s full members only, while all others, irrespective of their importance, acquisitions and connections with the European security

---

62 All information in this part regarding the arrangements about decision-making were received from the EU Council Documents in Cologne, Helsinki, Feira, Nice and Leaken Summits.


64 The ESDP’s decision-making organs are the General Affairs Council, Political and Security Committee in Brussels, Military Committee, and Military Staff, all coming under the EU Council.
architecture, were put at the margin of the ESDP decision-making. Meanwhile, the non-EU countries were categorised into three groups: non-EU European NATO members; candidate countries waiting for full membership in the EU; and those countries which are related to the European security architecture such as the non-EU PfP countries. In other words, ESDP decision-making mechanism created such a structure which put the EU members at the centre, and the others at the margin, the latter serving only as a “contributor” to the ESDP. Most importantly, the EU emphasised that those at the margin should have “full respect for the decision-making autonomy of the EU and the single institutional framework of the Union.”

The marginal countries were connected to the ESDP with a “consultative function.” In EU Feira Summit, the EU defined “a single, inclusive structure in which all the 15 countries concerned (6 non-EU European NATO members and 13 candidates for accession to the EU) can enjoy the necessary dialogue, consultation and co-operation with the EU”. In the Nice Summit, the EU set up “permanent consultation arrangements” designed in consideration with the “non-crisis periods” and “crisis periods.” Thus, the 15 countries will have varying positions within the EU decision making process.

During the non-crisis periods, the consultation on ESDP matters will be held at “a minimum of two meetings in the EU+15 format during each Presidency,” and also “a minimum of two meetings in EU+6 format with six non-EU European NATO members.” Furthermore, one ministerial meeting will be held with all of the 15 and the 6 together. Similar consultation arrangements were conceived at the Military Committee level as well as exchanges at military experts level. And those countries wishing to be involved in EU military activities, may appoint an officer accredited to the EU Military Staff who will serve as a contact. A minimum of two information meetings will be held during each Presidency for these officers from the 15 and the 6 countries, which could for example address the question of how the follow-up of crisis situations should be handled. But depending on the requirements, extra meetings may be organised for each cases. But, all of these meetings are seen as “consultations” and as a “supplement for those meetings held as part of CFSP enhanced political dialogue.” The only credit for the non-EU countries is their right “to submit proposals” during the meetings, but with no guarantee of consideration.

---


66 The 15 countries are non-EU European NATO members (Turkey, Norway, Iceland, Hungary, Poland, Czech) and the candidate countries (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech*, Estonia, Hungary*, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland*, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Turkey*). “*” refers to the duplicate countries.
During the crisis periods, which are divided into two phases as “pre-operational phase” and “operational phase”, the same pattern was maintained more or less, with some exceptions. In the pre-operational phase, as agreed at Helsinki and Feira, “in the event of a crisis, dialogue and consultation will be intensified at all levels, including ministerial level, in the period leading up to the EU Council decision.” When a crisis develops, these intensified consultations will provide an opportunity for exchange of views on situation assessment and discussion of the concerns raised by the countries affected, particularly when they consider their security interests to be involved. When the possibility of an EU-led military crisis management operation is under consideration, the aim of these consultations, which could be held at politico-military experts level, will be to ensure that the countries potentially contributing to such an operation are informed of the EU’s intentions, particularly with regard to the military options being envisaged. In this respect, once the EU begins to examine in depth an option requiring the use of NATO assets and capabilities, particular attention will be paid to consultation of the six non-EU European NATO members.

In the operational phase, *once the EU Council has chosen the strategic military option(s)*, the operational planning work will be presented to the non-EU European NATO members and the other candidate countries which have expressed their intention in principle of taking part in the operation, to enable them to determine the nature and volume of the contribution they could make to an EU-led operation. Once the Council has approved the operation concept, having taken into consideration the outcome of the consultation with third countries likely to take part in the operation, these countries will be formally invited to take part in the operation according to the arrangements agreed in Helsinki. That means that the non-EU European NATO members will participate, if they so wish, in the event of an operation requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. Where the EU does not use NATO assets, they will, on a decision by the Council, be invited to take part in operations.

Thus, the involvement in the operations of the non-EU European NATO members depend first on the EU’s use of NATO assets and second on the invitation by the EU Council. In operations requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, operational planning will be carried out by the Alliance’s planning bodies, and the non-EU European allies will be involved in planning according to the procedures laid down within NATO. In autonomous EU operations, operational planning will be carried out within one of the European strategic level headquarters. In autonomous operations in which they are invited to take part, the candidate countries and non-EU European allies may send liaison officers to the European Military Staff bodies at strategic level for exchanges of information on operational planning and the
contributions envisaged. The states concerned will provide the EU with an initial indication of their contribution, which will then be further specified during exchanges with the Operation Commander assisted by the EUMS.

All those countries involving in the EU-led operation and contributing military forces are made up of “Committee of Contributors”. The Committee of Contributors will play a key role in the day-to-day management of the operation. It will be the main forum for discussing all problems relating to day-to-day management having regard to the measures taken by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) in this field. The deliberations of the Committee of Contributors will constitute a positive contribution to those of the PSC. The PSC, which exercises the political control and strategic direction of the operation, will take account of the views expressed by the Committee of Contributors. All EU member states are entitled to be present at the Committee’s discussions irrespective of whether or not they are taking part in the operation, but only contributing States will take part in the day-to-day management of the operation. Non-EU European NATO allies and candidate countries deploying significant military forces under an EU-led operation will have the same rights and obligations in terms of day-to-day management of the operation as EU Member States taking part in the operation. The work of the Committee of Contributors will be conducted without prejudice to consultations in the framework of the single structure including non-EU European NATO members and EU candidate countries.

To sum up, while the EU created “an autonomous decision-making structure for the ESDP”, the non-EU countries were put at the margin where they are entitled only to involve as “consultant” countries, and whether their views, interests, and participation will be taken into consideration depended on the decision of EU decision-making organs. And in some cases it might be expected that because of intergovernmental nature of the EU’s decision-making regarding the ESDP pillar, the participation of non-EU countries even in the consultation process will be contingent upon unanimous voting in the EU Council. This may be a problem and concern for non-EU European NATO members in such operations where the EU did not use the NATO assets and capabilities. As will be shown below, this is one of the points which makes Turkey concerned about the ESDP process.

3.3.1.2. ESDP’s Military-Operational Capabilities

The Cologne Summit stated that the EU Council should have the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union, the ‘Petersberg Tasks’. To this end, the Union must have the
capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.

To strengthen its military capability, the EU chose two ways: one by the member states’ efforts to improve their military capability; and the other by using the NATO assets and capabilities in the their Petersberg Task operations. As regards military capabilities, member states need to develop further forces (including headquarters) that are also suited to crisis management operations, without any unnecessary duplication. The main characteristics include: deployability, sustainability, interoperability, flexibility and mobility.

In this respect, the member states have set themselves the “Headline Goal” in the Helsinki Summit: By the year 2003, co-operating together voluntarily, they will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg Tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements.

However, despite members states’ efforts, the EU will need NATO sources for the following reasons. Firstly, most of the EU members’ assets and capabilities are assigned to NATO. Therefore, their assets and capabilities has to be “double hatted”. Secondly, construction of similar military capabilities creates duplication. Therefore, the duplication of the military forces has to be prevented for saving money and time. Thirdly, in any case it would take long time, be very costly, and be even difficult for the EU countries to achieve it. Therefore, the EU will have to use NATO assets and capabilities for its autonomous EU-led Petersberg Type operations.

The Cologne European Council Declaration put forward two alternative ways which the EU could implement Petersberg Tasks: First, the EU-led operations with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities in accordance with the Berlin decisions in 1996. Second, the EU-led operations without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities.67 While in the first alternative, the decisions regarding the operations has to be made by the involvement of the NATO members in the North Atlantic Assembly, in the second alternative because there would be no recourse to NATO assets, the decision to start, conduct and end an EU-led operation would be made by the EU Council, not going through the NAC. That meant that the EU could take autonomous operations without the participation of the NATO members.

67 Cologne European Council, op.cit., and Aybet, op.cit. p.53.
In the EU-led operations without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, the EU could use national or multinational European means pre-identified by Member States. This will require either the use of national command structures providing multinational representation in headquarters or drawing on existing command structures within multinational forces. Further arrangements to enhance the capacity of European multinational and national forces to respond to crises situations will be needed.

In the EU-led operations having recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, including European command arrangements, the main focus should be on the following aspects: Implementation of the arrangements based on the Berlin decisions of 1996 and the Washington Summit decisions of 1999. In those decisions, NATO had extended its support to the EU-led operations under certain conditions as stated above.

3.3.1.3. The EU-NATO Co-operation

As the EU countries ended the role of the WEU and the possibility of the previously decided NATO-WEU co-operation, the EU asked NATO to develop co-operation between the two organisations and replace the NATO-WEU co-operation mechanisms. In this respect, the EU approached NATO in order to benefit from the Alliance’s assets and capabilities, as well as from the Alliance’s force planning expertise at the military/technical level for the materialisation of the EU’s Headline Goal. In addition, there were developed four ad hoc working groups with the participation of representative of member states of both organisations.

The main issue in those joint gatherings was to make the necessary arrangements for the materialisation of the ESDP, for the modalities for the EU access to NATO’s assets and capabilities adopted in the Feira and Nice Summits. In the Nice Summit, the EU Council asked “permanent arrangements” from NATO in the light of EU-NATO consultation and co-operation on the implementation of Paragraph 10 of the Washington Communique in 1999. 68 It was stated that “the European Union suggests that the arrangements between the two organisations for the implementation of Berlin Plus should be as follows”

1. The European Union will have **guaranteed permanent access** 69 to NATO’s planning capabilities.

---


69 In Cologne European Council Declaration it was worded as “assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations”; *Declaration on...*
2. Presumption of availability of pre-identified assets and capabilities.

3. Identification of a series of command options made available to the EU.

Right after the Nice Summit where the aforementioned regulations were made, the EU Council informed the North Atlantic Council of its Nice decisions, and demanded in December 2000 the above three points for the realisation of the ESDP. Then, the issue was deliberated in the North Atlantic Council meetings from December 2000 onwards and in the joint meetings of North Atlantic Council and EU’s Political and Security Committee from February 2001 in Brussels.

These institutional developments aside, the main issue was the position of the non-EU European NATO allies in NATO-EU co-operation. Although the EU demanded “full respect to its autonomous organisation as different from NATO”, it was asking “military assistance” from NATO. In other words, the non-EU European NATO allies were asked “military participation and contribution to the EU-led operations”, but denied from “political participation and contribution to the decision-making side of the EU-led operations.” That was a rather “unjust!” approach to them.

That is why, the way that the EU constructed its institutional structure regarding the decision-making process and the military capabilities in order to plan and implement the Petersberg Tasks in the view of its ESDP, was opposed by those countries whose position in the ESDP and in the implementation of the Petersberg Tasks had been marginalised. Most of the non-EU European NATO members which had been part of the WEU, were to be influenced negatively by these developments. But, of these countries, Turkey was the most affected country for two reasons: 1) Unlike Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic, Turkey would unlikely be a member of the EU in the near future. Thus it is unable to participate fully in the aforementioned decision-making process of the ESDP under these circumstances. On the other hand, given that Turkey is already an associate member of the EU, why should Turkey be put fully out of the Second Pillar of the European integration ? 2) In contrast to Norway and Iceland, Turkey is at the heart of a very unstable region, playing a very important role in a very unstable region in support to the Western interests as well.

3.3.2. Turkey’s Policy towards the ESDP

In general, Turkey gave “positive” response to the EU’s attempts to have a security and defence identity. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that “If the European nations require arrangements in security and defence matters, it is a choice that Turkey would only
“Turkey, as a [central] European member of NATO, believes that Europeans should shoulder their responsibility better in the Alliance for the security of the continent. Thus, Turkey from the outset has supported the ESDI to develop within the Alliance through the WEU.”71 And “Turkey, as a candidate for EU membership, has also supported this organisation’s ambitions and indeed historical goal of acquiring a security and defence dimension through its ESDP.”72 As a manifestation of this support Turkey has informed the EU of its readiness to participate, and extend military forces, in the realisation of the Headline Goal. Then, Turkey pledged 6,000 troops, aircrafts, ships, all make Turkey the fifth largest contributor to the Headline Goal.73

As Ambassador Onur Öymen argued, Turkey’s policy or approach towards the ESDI is based on four points: protecting Turkey’s national interests (national); respecting and honouring the legal documents in principle, i.e. the documents taken by NATO in the 1990s, but in particular the Washington Summit documents (principle); preserving NATO’s position and integrity in the European security architecture (institutional); and strengthening European security (substantial).74

In other words, Turkey believes that the ESDP should take into consideration the following points: Firstly, Turkey’s integral position in the European security architecture as well as Turkey’s national security, defence and foreign policy concerns should not be harmed in any way. Here the most important issues are the so-called “participation issue”, Turkey’s multidimensional security problems, and Turkey’s delicate relations with Greece. Secondly, it should take into consideration the future of NATO and its important role in the construction of the European security architecture, and its acquis. Thirdly, it should ensure that the European security architecture is constructed “whole and free”. In the light of these preferences, Turkey’s perspective of the ESDP is based on some reservations.

---

72 Turkish Foreign Ministry, ibid.; Ziyal, ibid.
74 Öymen, op.cit. 2001, p.57.
**NATO First:*** As a staunch and dedicated member of NATO, Turkey believes that the NATO’s role, effectiveness, coherence and solidarity should never be put into risk by the EU or any other initiatives; that NATO should remain as the effective alliance for European security with a transatlantic connection. Indeed, the indivisibility of security of the Euro-Atlantic area still calls for a strong transatlantic link. “Leading role of NATO as a core organisation in Euro-Atlantic security should be preserved. In any emerging crisis situation NATO has to have a determining and prominent role.”75

In the words of Ambassador Öymen, NATO “will continue to be the primary organisation of Europe and the wider Euro-Atlantic area. In case of future crisis in our continent NATO should always be the first option. That is to say, EU can intervene and take leadership of a peace-keeping operation in Europe only when NATO chooses not to do so.”76 And this is view not surprising in the view of Turkey’s integral position in NATO.

Nevertheless, Turkey is concerned that the way the ESDP is being constructed, especially the arrangements concerning the position of the non-EU European NATO members within the ESDP, has a potential to put aside the guiding principle of the “inclusiveness” which existed in the construction of the security architecture within NATO.

Turkey is concerned that if the EU’s autonomous decision-making mechanisms and operations create a division leading to a decline in NATO’s role in the region, this would lead not only to the demise of NATO, but also to that of Turkey’s position in the region. As stated above, because NATO membership provides several advantages for Turkish foreign and security policy, NATO’s declining position would create a kind of uncertainty and vacuum for Turkish security perspective. Given that Turkey is not a full member of the EU and not an actor within the ESDP, Turkey’s connection with the European security architecture could be damaged to great extent. That is why, Turkey looks at the ESDP process from where it is, that is, from its NATO membership and advantages.

**The Washington Summit Consensus:** In line with the NATO First attitude, Turkey believes that the Allies should respect the NATO *acquis* adopted during the construction of the European security architecture in the 1990s. This demand is mainly based on the legal foundation of the Washington Summit consensus, the aspects of which were reflected in the documents adopted in the Summit (*the Communique, the Declaration and the Security

---


Concept). The important aspects of this consensus included all of the aforementioned three points: i.e. Turkey’s position, NATO-WEU co-operation, and the characteristics of the European security structure.

In the eve of the Washington Summit Turkey was fearful of being excluded from the developments in European security and defence matters since the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. It anticipated that the EU was about to set up an autonomous institution for the EU members only, and that such a formation could and would marginalise Turkey’s position. In addition, before the Washington Summit, Turkey knew that the EU would demand from the Allies to have guaranteed access to NATO assets and capabilities, and that the USA would accept it for the sake of the maintainance of the division of labour and burden sharing.

Fearing that such a possibility would have negative outcomes for Turkey’s position within the European security architecture, Turkey pursued a hard diplomatic struggle to convince the Allies in Washington Summit to take Turkey’s (and other non-EU European NATO allies) position into consideration. Turkey’s hard diplomacy played an important role in persuading the allies to reach to a consensus. As a result, they used a careful wording in the documents, so that Turkey’s interests as well as NATO’s role in the future could be upheld.77 As Öymen noted “this mutually satisfactory result could only be attained because of the flexibility shown by Turkey in the Summit.”78

At the end of the Summit, Turkey was satisfied with the documents and extended consent to the decisions. Turkey’s hard diplomatic struggle produced an “acceptable consensus” among the Allies. From the Turkish perspective, the Washington consensus provided important support and basis to Turkey’s claims about the ESDP: Turkey’s position within the European security architecture was confirmed by the allies. As a member of both organisations (NATO and the WEU) Turkey’s connection with the ESDI was also recognised. Participation of the allies in the EU-led operations was underlined. Because Turkey also had an associate membership in the WEU, if not as strong as the full members, Turkey could participate in the strategic planning, operations and command of the EU-led Petersberg Type operations around Turkey. Turkey had the right to take part both in 1) a WEU-led operation with NATO support, including its preparation and planning with full and equal rights, and in 2) an autonomous WEU operation with equal rights if it declared its readiness to take part by making available a significant troop contribution. 3) Finally, as NATO-EU mechanisms will be built on the existing NATO-WEU mechanisms, Turkey, as a member of both, had the right

77 Hürriyet, (Turkish daily newspaper), 27 April 1999.
78 For more see Öymen, op.cit., 2001 ss.54-55.
to participate in the organs the EU is going to set up. In short, the Washington Summit consensus recognised the WEU acquis as the basis of future work for the European security architecture.\(^7^9\) It accepted that the development of the ESDI will be constructed on the existing mechanisms around NATO and the WEU.

As the EU started to build up the ESDP in the way as we stated above, most of the points in the Washington Summit was not taken into consideration. Or, we can say that the EU and Turkey disagree on the way the Washington Summit consensus should be put into practice. The main disagreement emerges from the differences of Turkish and EU officials about the interpretation of the Washington Summit documents. They have different approaches to the Washington Documents: The EU Council concentrated on the Paragraph 10 of the Washington Communique where the Allies declared “stand…for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged military” and so on. However, Turkey argues that that article should be read in the view of the Paragraph 9 (parag. d) in particular of the Washington Communique and Articles 17 and 30 of the Strategic Consensus, where “the full participation of all Allies” and “the use of NATO assets and capabilities by the EU on case-by-case basis and by consensus…” were formulated respectively. The EU’s arrangements for the participation of the non-EU European Allies in its crisis management process did not comply with these articles.

Thus Turkey views the process from the Cologne Summit onwards in the construction of the ESDP as a divergence from the spirit of the Washington Summit agreements. Thus, the EU’s approach to the Washington Summit documents was seen as a violation of “…principle and respecting and honouring the international agreements.”\(^8^0\) By following this way, the EU made one-sided interpretation of the Washington Documents: trying to “secure assured access to NATO planning capabilities without fulfilling the EU’s own responsibility to make the relevant arrangements for participation.” For, “the crisis-based participation model, covering only consultation as foreseen by the EU Nice Summit, is not suitable for Turkey.”\(^8^1\)

Indeed, the Washington Summit documents should be taken as an important “agreement” or “consensus” among the Western Allies to continue the division of labour and the arrangements to be followed by the allies for management of the security affairs in Europe. According to the Washington “consensus”, the division of labour was organised in

\(^7^9\) “The Turkish General Staff View on ESDI”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol.3, No.2, April-June 2001, p.87-8.

\(^8^0\) Öyemen, *op.cit.*, 2001, p.57.

\(^8^1\) The Turkish General Staff, *op.cit.*, 2001, s.88.
the following points. From these points it is possible to make conclusions about Turkey’s position in and relations with the WEU in particular and the security architecture in general.

Turkey’s claims was based on the following points in the Washington Summit documents:

* NATO will continue to be the “essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty.” (Strategic Concept, Article 25). Thus the decisions concerning the European security should be decided by the NATO Council, because under Article 41, “the security of all Allies is indivisible.”

Then, the EU’s plan to have autonomous decision-making institutions and process and EU-operations excluding any of the NATO allies is not in line with the above. Creating such non-NATO institutions will start a “divergent path” in the construction of the European security architecture. This would create divisions in both institutional and practical levels.

*NATO welcomes and supports the development of the ESDI within the Alliance on the basis of the decisions by the Allies in Berlin in 1996 and subsequently, “The ESDI will continue to be developed within NATO” (Strategic Concept, Article 30). The development of a CFSP by the EU includes a common defence policy. Such a policy, as called in the Amsterdam Treaty, will be “compatible with the common security and defence policy established within the framework of the Washington Treaty.”(Strategic Concept, Article 17). NATO “acknowledges the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged.” (Washington Summit Communiqué, Paragraph. 9, a).

“The Alliance and the European Union share common strategic interests…Both organisations make decisive contribution to peace and stability on the European continent. Co-operation between the two organisations on topics of common concern, to be decided on case-by-case basis, could be developed when it enhances the effectiveness of action by NATO and the EU.” (Washington Summit Comm., Parag. 40).

According to the above paragraph, the EU’s demand for “guaranteed access to pre-identified assets” is not in line with the condition “case by case basis”. Thus Turkey believes that NATO can extend such assets and capabilities for EU-led operation on the “case by case basis”, i.e. depending on the type, magnitude, location of the crisis, and on Turkey’s own interests.

*The ESDI will be built in such a way as to develop co-operative arrangements and mechanisms between NATO and the WEU and the EU if necessary. (Strategic Concept, Art.
30). “As this process goes forward, NATO and the EU should ensure the development of effective consultation, co-operation and transparency, building on the mechanisms existing between NATO and the WEU”. (Washington Summit Comunique, Parag. 9, b.)

Thus the NATO Summit documents acknowledged that the EU might at some point take over the role of the WEU in the existing NATO-WEU framework planning capabilities. But such an eventuality should be “built on the mechanisms existing between NATO and the WEU. Accordingly, the ESDP is supposed to accept the WEU acquis into its EU structure. But as seen in the above analysis of the WEU and the ESDP, this is not the case.

* NATO’s support to the development of the ESDI will be in the form of “making available assets and capabilities for operations under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed.” (Strategic Concept, Art. 45). “It will enable all European allies to make a coherent and effective contribution to missions and activities of the Alliance as an expression of our shared responsibilities.” (Strategic Concept, Art. 30).

Thus, while the ESDI should be developed as an European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, all European allies should be included into such a formation for the sake of “division of labour.” Provided that, all the European allies are obliged to contribute to the EU operations with or without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities.

* Even the provision of the assets and capabilities to the ESDI process is conditional on the following points:

- They will be made available for “operations in which the Alliance is not engaged militarily”…under the WEU” (Strategic Concept, Art.30). If and once the Alliance takes it under its agenda, then the EU will have to transfer it to NATO.

- Because the “EU’s development of security and defence dimension will have “implications for the entire Alliance, all European allies should be involved in it, building on arrangements developed by NATO and the WEU.” (Strategic Concept, Art. 17). As stated above, the ESDP should take into consideration that any EU-led operation will have “implications for the entire Alliance” more or less, this or another way.

*“[T]aking into account the full participation of all European allies if they were to choose”.(S.C., Art. 30). “We attach the utmost importance to ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European Allies in EU-led crisis response operations…”(Washington Summit Communique, Parag. 9, d.).

---

82 Aybet, op.cit., p.53.
This is the most important point about Turkey and other non-EU European Allies because it clearly states that they should be entitled with “full participation.” Then the EU’s new “arrangements” proposed by the Nice Summit is totally in contradictory to this point.

* The provision of such support will be made “on the basis of separable but not separate NATO assets and capabilities.” (Strategic Concept, Art. 49; Washington Summit Communique, Parag. 9, e.)

*“It will reinforce the transatlantic partnership” (Strategic Concept, Art. 30)

* The assistance and contribution to the European Allies will be made on “case-by-case basis” (Strategic Concept, Art. 30); “by consensus” (Strategic Concept, Art. 30) within the NATO. This is the article which legitimates Turkey’s veto in the North Atlantic Council. Turkey argues that the “guaranteed access to pre-identified assets” can be made only on “case by case basis” by the “consensus” in the NAC.

*NATO adopted to have “the necessary arrangements for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance for [the WEU-led] operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily.” And “the Council in Permanent Session will approve these arrangements.” (Washington Summit Communique, Parag. 10)

Thus, the decision about the access by the EU to the Alliance assets and capabilities will be made by NATO’s political decision-making organ. This is in compliance with the primacy of NATO and with the spirit of the division of labour. However, there appears a paradox between the concept of “case by case basis” and the concept of “the ready access”. It can be resolved only in such a way that NATO Council and WEU Council will determine the ranges of arrangements and mechanisms to decide about the use by the EU of NATO’s assets and capabilities, because whole affair is based on the co-operation between NATO and the WEU. Because the WEU Council was merged with the EU, such arrangements and mechanisms is supposed to be decided by NATO and EU jointly in the view of the WEU acquis.

*Finally, the Allies agreed that “The Strategic Concept will govern the Alliance security and defence policy, its operational concepts, its conventional and nuclear posture…The Alliance will continue to …help build an undivided continent by promoting and fostering the vision of a Europe whole and free.” (Strategic Concept, Art. 65)

In conclusion, the Washington Summit documents reflect the spirit of “division of labour” in the non-Article 5 operations in and around Europe. Therefore, its arrangements confirm the agreements and decisions made by the Allies since the end of the Cold War. Most of the points in the Washington Summit documents confirm and build up over the previous documents. However, because it also accepted a new Strategic Concept for the Alliance for
the 21st century, it can be regarded as a milestone for the future of the Alliance. Secondly, they also reiterate the fact that NATO is interested in building up a security architecture in and around Europe, including the Mediterranean, the Balkans, the Caucasuses, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Thirdly, all the documents should be regarded as “sources on international law” with which the signatories committed themselves for a new Alliance Strategic Concept.

*Europe, Whole and Free:* One of Turkey’s objectives about the ESDP is concerned with the nature of the European security structure. As was also mentioned in the Washington Summit documents, Turkey is in favour of “a whole, undivided and free Europe.” There should not be groupings, blocks and fragmentation between the Allies. Thus, as Ambassador Ömür Orhun stated “Our concept of security should be all-embracing one, taking into account the security needs of all countries, and taking care not to create new divisions, zones of influence or grey areas.”

Turkey believes that this can be achieved only by broad security conception and overarching institutions such as NATO. According to Ambassador Öymen, it is a vital instrument for an effective, strong transatlantic link, which enables the indivisibility of security in the Euro-Atlantic area. We should preserve the link. Thus NATO should play a leading role as a core organisation in the area in any emerging crisis.

In this perspective, Turkey supported, though having some reservations, the expansion of NATO towards the Central and Eastern Europe and now towards the Balkans, (Romania and Bulgaria).

In that spirit, Turkey improved its dialogue and co-operation with Central and Eastern European countries over the years since the end of the Cold War. At the end of a conference in Ankara participated by official representatives of these countries, the remark by made Ambassador Erhan Yiğitbaşoğlu reflects Turkey’s broad security perspective very well: “This seminar pointed out that we share common economic, political and security interests that actually unites us in our search for prosperity, peace, security and stability...We don’t want new divisions, new influence zones and second class citizenship in the emerging new Europe.” To achieve this objective, “there should be a congruence between the

---

enlargements of NATO, the European Union since these organisations have many things in common. No country should be excluded from these organisations. Turkey objects the understanding that it should remain as an integral member of NATO, but only as an associate member of the EU.”

**Participation Issue:** Turkey’s main policy objective about the ESDP is to have participation in the formation and decision-making process of the ESDP. Turkey should not be put aside or excluded from the central mechanisms of the ESDP process for three reasons: The legacy of the WEU, i.e. the WEU *acquis*; being an “integral part of NATO, i.e. NATO *acquis*; and Turkey’s geo-strategic importance in the region.

Due to its marginalisation from the construction of the ESDP process and decision-making institutions, Turkey is not satisfied about the EU’s “permanent arrangements for consultation and dialogue with the non-EU European NATO Allies” which was developed in Cologne, Helsinki, Fiera, and finalised in Nice, for the following reasons:

Firstly, the model is not satisfactory because Turkey is not given a right to participate in the main decision making units such as the General Affairs Council (at the Ministerial level), the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee, and the Military Staff, where the EU will decide where, when, how it will have operations. Instead, Turkey and other non-EU European allies are offered two consultations per presidency in peacetime, and “deep consultations” in crisis times. That is not a big formula because, as a Turkish General argued, “Actually we don’t have any restrictions on consultations with any of our European Allies. So it is not a privilege for Turkey.”

Secondly, the EU’s consideration for Turkey’s participation in the Petersberg Task operations is important and positive. But it will be only within the framework of the Committee of Contributors which does not bear any responsibility for the strategic control and political direction of the operations, which is decided by the Political and Security Committee and the EU Council, in which Turkey does not involve. Furthermore, the non-EU allies were offered only a day-to-day conduct of operations through the ad hoc Committee of

---


90 The Turkish General Staff, *op.cit.*, 2001, p.88.
Contributors. This is not a substantial involvement. And such a position gives Turkey only a “sub-contractor role for the ESDP”, which is totally unacceptable.\(^91\)

Thirdly, interestingly, such decisions will be made by the EU Council in which the non-NATO EU members (Ireland, Austria, Finland, Sweden) will have a role and say. Indeed, that is both unjust and non-practicable because of their “neutral” positions and non-involvement in the security and defence issues during the cold war and after.

Fourthly, even when an EU-led operation uses NATO assets and capabilities [in Turkey], the EU does not provide Turkey with the right to participate in the strategic control and political direction of the operations.\(^92\) The Feira model of EU+6 and EU+15 (at the PSC and ministerial level, later improved by Nice model), negates the inclusiveness principle for the European security” and indivisibility of the security of all allies on the basis of NATO-WEU arrangements, as decided in the Washington Summit. It also offers a regular and permanent, but only a few, participation for the non-EU countries.\(^93\)

So Turkey would like the EU to develop this model in such a way that the EU-6 should cover daily consultations on a more frequent, permanent and regular basis. This would provide Turkey with a role in decisions taken by the 15 full members of the EU, which is very consistent with what Turkey had within the WEU. Indeed, “participating without a right of veto in the decisions taken by the EU does not upset the EU’s legality.”\(^94\)

Finally, the EU does not offer any role for non-EU allies in non-military aspects of crisis management. Indeed, Turkey is very active and keen on this field as was seen in Turkey’s contribution to the Bosnia and Kosovo cases and to the re-construction of Afghanistan after the September 11. Indeed, as stated above, Turkey would like to contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management in political, military and non-military terms. So it is not satisfied with the EU arrangements for dialogue, consultation and co-operation with the non-EU European NATO members. It would like to have participation in the decision-making as well as in the preparation and planning of the EU-led operations.\(^95\)

_Turkey’s “Near Abroad”: _Turkey is highly sensitive and interested about EU’s Petersberg Tasks operations in Turkey’s “near abroad”, with or without recourse to NATO


\(^92\) The Turkish General Staff, op.cit., 2001.

\(^93\) For a detailed analysis of the Feira decisions, Orhun, op.cit. 2000.

\(^94\) The Turkish General Staff, 2001.

\(^95\) Orhun, op.cit., 2000, p.120.
assets and capabilities. As stated above, in the post Cold War era, Turkey’s own security faced a number of challenges in multiple ways. Turkey is located at the centre of unstable regions, the Middle East, the Mediterranean, the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Central Asia. It has historical, socio-cultural, political-strategic and military connections with all these trouble sports. Because of that, any crisis in the “near abroad” influences Turkey’s security.

And, Turkey’s role and power in the region is well-known, so no operation in the region would be possible without Turkey. Ambassador Sergio Balanzino underlined Turkey’s position very well:

“I cannot imagine a scenario for EU-led crisis management operations that does not involve Turkey in one way or another. Simply put: if the crisis is very serious, NATO will be involved including Turkey [in which the ESDP will not have a role]. If the crisis is less prone to escalation, but still requires a significant amount of force, then the EU may lead, but only with the help of NATO- again Turkey will be involved. If the crisis is at the lower end of the spectrum, the EU may act autonomously, but if it is an operation that affects Turkey’s security or Turkey’s vital security interests, it will obviously be in the interest of the EU to at least solicit Turkey’s views and most importantly to seek its active contribution in resolving the crisis.”

Now let’s look at the possibilities regarding Turkey’s position in EU-led operations: In the first alternative where NATO will have both strategic and political control of the operation, like those in Kosovo and Bosnia cases, Turkey’s participation in both dimensions is not questionable. That is, Turkey will be involving in both decision-making and operations due to its NATO membership and voting rights in the North Atlantic Council. So there is not much problem here.

But there may be problems in the later two scenarios in which the EU will have strategic and political control of the operation because NATO as a whole is not involved directly. And the heart of the problem lies, from Turkey’s perspective, in the management of such operations.

In the second scenario where the EU has a Petersberg Type operation using the NATO assets and capabilities, thus requiring Turkey’s NATO assets and capabilities, what will be Turkey’s position? According to the EU documents, if Turkey wishes, it can participate in

---

such an operation, assign its forces to the operation, and have consultation with the other contributors during the operation, but it cannot participate in the EU decision-making process about the conduct of the operation, including the decision to end the operation. So Turkey will not be in the “kitchen where the food is cooked.” This is what makes Turkey’s position rather delicate. Therefore, if the EU is to use Turkey’s NATO facilities and to have co-operation with Turkey, Turkey should involve not only in the operations but also in the military and political decision-making process. That was the position which Turkey partly enjoyed in the WEU, and confirmed in the Washington Summit.97

This position looks like Turkey’s position in the Customs Union with the EU, a fact which is opposed by many Turkish experts because of Turkey’s lack of participation in the determination of the Customs Union rules, regulations and decisions. Here Turkey is at the implementation side of EU Commission decisions about the Customs Union.

Moreover, the EU Council meeting in Nice decided that Turkey, as one of the 6 non-EU European Allies, should provide “guaranteed (assured) access” to Turkey’s NATO planning capabilities for EU use during an operation. The issue of “guaranteed access” to Turkish facilities is something like “giving blank cheque” to your supplier for unpredictable and uncertain deals in the future. Especially, if you don’t know what the supplier will deliver to you in return for the cheque, it would be very a risky payment. So, it is better to make the payments “by cheque purchase by purchase”, so that you don’t lose money, and break you relations with the supplier. This analogy looks like Turkey’s argument for providing the EU with Turkey’s NATO assets on a case-by-case basis, as stated in the Strategic Concept of 1999. In the words of Turkish Foreign Minister İsmail Cem, it would put Turkey into a “watcher position.”98

Furthermore, in any operation around Turkey, the EU will need to use Turkey’s assets and capabilities such as air basis, air space, military infrastructure, and, the last but not least, the intelligence facilities. These are parts of Turkey’s NATO commitments, but belong to the Turkish people, so they should serve Turkey’s interests first. Therefore, Turkey should be part of the decision-making regarding the EU operations around Turkey. Turkey can allow the use of these assets only if it is suitable to its own national interests. That is why Turkey would give such a permission on “case-by-case basis and by consensus” as stated in the Article 30 of the Strategic Concept.

---

97 Personal interview with Serdar Kılıç, Deputy of Turkey’s Permanent Representative to NATO, 05.06.2001, NATO Headquarters, Brussels.

And Turkey would not give permission to the use by the EU or any other organisation of its assets and capabilities in such operations that will harm Turkey’s security interests. In order for Turkey to give such permissions to the EU, it is essential and vital that Turkey should “participate” in the preparation, conduct and control of the operations. That is the principle reason behind Turkey’s insistence to participate in the decision-making mechanism and the military capability of Headline Goal being developed by the EU. Indeed, Turkey would not like to give such a commitment which might create problems in the future.

In the third scenario of EU-led operations, the EU launches the operation with the contribution of the EU Member States and by using the Headline Goal forces which are planned to be completed by 2003. In such operations which will be led by a Framework Nation, the EU will lead the operation at all levels, but will invite the others to contribute to the EU-led operation by providing facilities and forces. The invitation to the operation will be made by an unanimous voting of the EU Council. This has the possibility that if one of the members of the EU Council “vetoes” the participation of any non-EU country, that country cannot participate even in the operational side of the ESDP.

The Greek and Cyprus Factor: When and if the EU has autonomous operations without recourse to the NATO assets and capabilities, Turkey might be excluded from such operations totally because the EU Council where the unanimity voting is valid may fail to invite a non-EU country. To be blunt, there is always the possibility that Turkey’s participation into such operations might be “vetoed” by Greece and even by the Greek Cyprus after it becomes full member in the future. Such operations might be directly related with Turkish-Greek problems or might be different. In each case, there is the possibility that Turkey might be excluded from an EU-led Petersberg Type operation around Turkey’s security environment even if Turkey wishes to participate. To be honest, this worries Turkey due to the fact that Greece and even the Greek Cyprus may veto Turkey’s participation into the EU-led autonomous operations, and that Greece might wish to use the ESDP to increase its influence over Turkey. That is why, Turkey uses its “veto” in the North Atlantic Council now, before Greece or the Greek Cyprus use their “veto” in the EU Council in the future.

This is not without evidence. Greece had blocked Turkey’s membership in the WEU until 1997.99 As will be seen below, Greece reiterates its policy to block Turkey’s acquisition of a place in the ESDP. So, the recent problem is partly a reflection of the classical Turkish-

99 Cebeci, op.cit.
Greek competition to enter into international institutions in order to counter balance each other in the international platforms.

It is even argued that Greece might try to press the EU to have a Petersberg Type operation on Turkish-Greek problems in Cyprus and the Aegean Sea. It can use the ESDP as a leverage on Turkey. Greece doesn’t want to see Turkey as art of the ESDP process in both dimensions, but may wish to use it against Turkey in order to “protect Greece against Turkey.” In this respect, Greece wishes to use Turkey’s ESDP participation issue as a “card” for the resolution of the Cyprus problem in its favour.

So far we have looked at the issue from the Turkish perspective. Now, we should also look at it from the EU’s side. This will be helpful to understand why did the EU have such an institutional structure which excludes Turkey and other non-EU European NATO allies from the process?

3.3.3. EU’s Response to Turkey’s Policy towards the ESDP

EU’s arguments about the position of the non-EU European NATO members, Turkey in particular, was based on the following points:

EU-Only Institutionalisation: First of all, the EU developed the ESDP as a part of the EU integration process, thus it believes that only the EU members can have full participation in the decision-making institutions and process. The same problem is valid for the other 5 non-EU NATO allies as well as others categories. But, as stated above, Turkey’s case is different from the others. Norway and Iceland do not want to be full member of the EU; and Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic will be part of the Union in the near future. So eventually they will be part of the ESDP decision-making. Unlike them, Turkey wants to be part of all pillars of the EU integration process, but is not ready yet.

The heart of the problem here is whether the European security can be limited into the institutional arrangements and limitations? Can the European security be confined to the EU-only members? As stated above, it is not easy to achieve because there is an interdependence of security between the arenas and agendas in the broader European security architecture. The Balkan wars clearly showed that the EU countries and Turkey were all affected by the Bosnian tragedy. Although Turkey and some of the EU countries had differences and different interests over the Balkan wars, both Turkey and the EU countries were interdependent into each other for the resolution of the war. Thus they involved in the peace-keeping forces of IFOR, SFOR, and KFOR, and in the regional schemes to establish peace in the region. The same is true for other problems around Turkey.
In other words, Turkey and the EU are bound to come together particularly for dealing with those crises or problems in the region around Turkey. As mentioned above, Turkey’s “near abroad” is full of crisis spots with security implications for both the EU and Turkey. Turkey is surrounded with unstable regions where the EU has also interests.

**European Identity:** ESDP is not simply a security and defence project, but a planned construction of the European identity. So, the EU officials argue, the primary legitimacy for being a member of the ESDP is to have the required “European identity”.\(^{100}\) Turkey’s failures in Copenhagen Criteria and Helsinki Summit decisions delay Turkey’s attainment of the European identity. The EU countries criticise Turkey for not performing reforms in domestic politics and not resolving its problems with Greece in the Aegean Sea and in Cyprus. According to the EU, if Turkey fails to fulfil well the Copenhagen Criteria in order to resolve its domestic political, economic and legal problems, Turkey could not be a full member of the EU-led security community. Moreover, Turkey does not try to create a peaceful, stable and secure environment in the region, and to eliminate the EU fears about the soft security threats in and around Turkey. In short, Turkey is not ready to enter the EU’s European security “identity”. Instead it is a burden for the ESDP.

**Security Consumer:** Thus, Turkey is seen not only “unsuitable” to the European identity, but also a “security burden or consumer” country.\(^{101}\) By “security consumer”, it is meant that Turkey is overburdened by a number of hard security problems in and around Turkey. And this creates, rather than solve, problems for the EU’s security community. Turkey’s over-emphasis on military security (hard security), and under-emphasis on social-economic-cultural-political aspects of security (soft security) could have negative implications for the construction and realisation of the ESDP. That is why, Turkey is not ready yet to fully participate in the ESDP deliberations, at least until it is part of the other pillars of the EU integration.

In that respect, one of EU’s soft security concerns is the migration issue and its negative impact on the EU societies. EU’s prosperity is attracting other people into the EU market in various ways, be it as legal workers, refugees, asylum seekers, illegal smugglers, and so

---


In the wake of growing migration into the EU markets from Eastern and Central Europe, the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the Middle East and so on, EU societies have been facing a social-security syndrome.

So the EU fears that Turkey’s own democratic deficit, human rights problems, problems in the expression of Islamic identity, and uncontrollable migration are problems that can spill over into, and threaten, EU’s social structure.103

Another EU concern is thus about Turkey’s geopolitical location. There is an argument that the EU views Turkey as a Middle Eastern country, and will never accept it as a full member.104 Therefore, it is argued, Turkey’s eastern borders should not be EU’s eastern borders as well. They argue that Turkey’s participation in the ESDP decision-making could dilute the decision-making process, and overextend EU’s security borders and concerns up to the Gulf region and Asia as a whole.

All these arguments imply, among other things, that Turkey’s approach to security issues is not fully consistent with EU’s approach to create a security community in European continent based on soft security understanding. They also imply that unless Turkey completes its reforms, and pursue a soft security approach to the problems around Turkey, it could not be a part of the ESDP, unable to have a “participation” in the decision making process of autonomous EU-led operations.

4. Complications of the Delicate Position

Turkey’s “delicate position” particularly in the wake of the ESDP process and the marginalisation of the non-EU European NATO allies, has produced, rather unsurprisingly, some complications. They can be categorised into three different points: firstly, NATO-EU Co-operation was disrupted; secondly, Turkey-EU relations were paralysed; and thirdly, the ESDP could not be put into operation.


103 These were the problems which were discussed in a conference on Turkey at the Gates: Possibilities and Problems of the EU Entry, Potsdam Spring Dialogues, organised jointly by the Development of Peace Foundation and Welt Trends, 11 April 2001.

104 For example, Ian O.Lesser, “Türkiye’nin Batı’ya Gelişen Güvenlik İlişkileri” in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds.) *Türkiye’nin Yeni Dünyası: Türk Dış Politikasının Değişen Dinamikleri*, transl. By Hür Güldü (İstanbul: Alfa, 2002).
4.1. NATO-EU Co-operation Disrupted

The most important aspect of the ESDP is to establish co-operation, dialogue and transparency between NATO and the EU. However, this could not be achieved because of divisions and problems among the NATO members regarding the operationalisation of the ESDP. The main reason is the differences of opinion among the member countries about the NATO-EU co-operation.

Turkey has been very insistent that such a co-operation should be based on respect to national interests and views of the member countries. So Turkey’s demands for NATO-EU co-operation is mainly to correct the problems in the ESDP, especially the participation of the non-EU NATO allies *vis a vis* the EU request to have “guaranteed access to NATO assets and capacities.” Indeed, because NATO relies on the priority of the national interests which is the heart of NATO’s decision-making system, it is quite obvious for every NATO member to give priority to its security interests. In this respect, Turkey wants to achieve its objectives regarding the formation and operation of the ESDP, as stated above. And NATO is the only important international platform for Turkey to express its demands and objectives in the ESDP issue. Thus Turkey became assertive to preserve its place in the European security architecture. Turkey’s assertiveness came to the point that it blocked NATO decision making process so as to obtain a decision meeting Turkey’s demands from the EU.

True, Turkey has been the most assertive ally to put forward some conditions for a EU-NATO co-operation for the realisation of the ESDP project. However, Turkey is not the only country asking the review of the ESDP arrangements. Indeed there are mainly two blocks of countries within both NATO and the EU. They are divided into two groups about the way the ESDP should be constructed and operationalized. On the one hand, there are those countries, called as Atlanticists, which favour that NATO should preserve its priority for the European security over the ESDP. They are led by the USA, the UK, Norway and Turkey. On the other hand, there those countries, called as Europeanists, which favour that ESDP should be more independent from NATO’s decision making, operations and strategic control. They are led by France and Germany.

Thus, Turkey’s position was mainly supported by US and UK officials. US officials have expressed their support to Turkey’s views and position. For instance, US Secretary of Defence Donal Rumsfeld opposed the exclusion of the non-EU European Allies from the ESDP, and feared that it would shaken NATO’s existing position and stability, and risk the Alliance solidarity.105 US’s ex-Secretary of Defence William Cohen argued that the non-EU

---

European NATO allies should have full participation, not stand as watcher, in the planning of ESDP operations regarding their national security interests. Another Atlanticist, UK Chief of Staff General Sir Charles Guthrie argued that French insistence of the full autonomy of the European Army from NATO’s command and control would bring risks to create division in the Alliance, and to start a process of US withdrawal from NATO. He also warned that in such a case the UK could withdraw its troops from the European Army. And it is needless to say the non-EU European NATO Allies have similar opinions about the ESDP process. Nevertheless, of these, only Norway is of the same opinion with Turkey.

On other hand, the Europeanists, particularly France argued that the European Army will maintain its autonomous identity with its own command and planning capacities. France is the most ardent supporter of the ESDP’s autonomy from NATO, and thus the exclusion of the non-EU European NATO allies from the ESDP. That is why, Turkey and France came head to head in NATO-EU co-operation meetings throughout the year 2001.

But, it must be stressed that Turkey also came under the US pressure not to procrastinate its veto over NATO-EU co-operation. It was reported that US President Bill Clinton asked Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit to avoid using veto on the NATO-EU co-operation. The US fears that if the problem prolongs and a formula cannot be found for the operationalisation of the ESDP, then the EU countries would break away and try to build up their own military capabilities, and there would be much feared “duplication, decoupling and discrimination.” Turkish Prime Minister did not accept such a demand because for Turkey the participation in the ESDP has more dimensions other than the NATO-EU co-operation *per se*: Turkey would have greater risks if totally excluded from the ESDP decision-making.

One of these dimensions is the Turkish-Greek disputes with its reverberations on the division within NATO. Due to their traditional/classical disagreements, Turkey and Greece try to achieve their superiority over the other by using NATO and EU platforms respectively. In that case, Greece uses the EU as an “instrument” to improve its interests over Turkey by using its veto advantages in the EU; whereas Turkey uses NATO as a “counter instrument” to protect its interests against Greece by using its veto advantage in NATO. In other words, one, if not the only, of the critical reasons behind the lack of NATO-EU co-operation on the ESDP issue is the classical Turkish-Greece political rifts.

---

106 http://www.nethaber.com/haber/haberler/0, 1082,33629_6,00.html.
Such divisions and disruptions, if unresolved, would have negative effects on the construction of the European security architecture, on the efficient use of military assets and capabilities, and on the implementation of the EU-led operations around Turkey. Furthermore, in such a case, the Turkish General Staff pointed out, “the EU cannot use NATO assets and capabilities in an automatic and unlimited fashion.”\(^\text{109}\) One such disruption happened in April 2002 when the EU wanted to deploy EU forces within the framework of an EU-led operation in Macedonia, code-named ‘Amber Fox’ to take over the task of NATO forces by using NATO assets and capabilities. This was the first attempt by the EU to operationalise the ESDP. Turkey refused this to happen unless and until a solution was found and Turkey’s concerns were eliminated.\(^\text{110}\)

Moreover, the division within the Alliance on these lines, i.e. the Atlanticists and the Europeanists would have serious damage to the transatlantic connection and solidarity with its economic, political and strategic costs. To put it bluntly and think of the extreme possibility, if NATO’s cohesion and solidarity during the Cold War years disappeared and turned out to be a competition and rivalry among the allies, that would be the worst scenario not for the Alliance and the allies themselves, but also for world politics and security. To think the unthinkable, a possibility of emerging rivalry between the US and the EU would digress the international society towards the balance of power politics of the Cold War years and even back to the nineteenth century. Of course, however unlikely, all these would mean increasing armament and polarisation between the nation-states, resulting in its economic, social, human costs.

### 4.2. Turkey-EU Integration Process Paralysed

There are more reasons and issues other than technical/institutional ones in the development of the awkward process, i.e. in the formation of Turkey’s views about the ESDP and the use of veto in the North Atlantic Council, and in the EU’s putting Turkey at the margin of the ESDP process. These are related with the substance of Turkey’s security, defence and foreign policy as well as with that of EU’s perception of Turkey in particular.

Since the start of the awkward process, Turkey-EU integration process seemed to have drifted away from the main course, even causing damages to the forty-year old rapprochement. Turkish-EU relations have been facing a number of difficulties and tensions. Turkey’s integration process has been paralysed, if not blocked altogether, by inter-subjective

\(^{109}\) The Turkish General Staff, *op. cit.*, 2001, p. 94.

\(^{110}\) *Radikal* (Turkish daily newspaper), 6 April 2002.
perceptions, understandings, priorities and interests. It created inter-subjective misperceptions about each other. It went so far as to the point that there aroused negative feelings against each other.

On these points, Turkey’s understanding of security differed from the EU’s. Turkey looked at the issues more from the hard security perspective; while the EU looked at them from soft security perspective, insisting on the primacy and validity of the values of the EU’s security community, Turkish public opinion referred to its special conditions and problems after the end of the Cold War;

Some Turkish observers in public and official positions perceived that Turkey’s marginalisation from the ESDP meant that the EU never wants to see Turkey as part of the EU integration. In response, some EU officials perceived that Turkey doesn’t not want to reform itself towards the EU standards, but only uses “excuses” to avoid the reform process as indicated in the National Program, and that Turkey is not “serious and willing” to be part of the EU security community with its values. The following paragraphs will have a brief glance at the most important items of growing inter-subjective misperceptions of Turkish public opinion in recent years: The Cyprus Problem, the terror/PKK problem, the Armenian problem, Turkey’s domestic reforms for full EU membership.

On the Cyprus problem, the EU is determined to accept Cyprus as a full member under the leadership of the Greek Cyprus government even before the Cyprus problem is resolved. On the contrary, overwhelming majority of Turkish public view such a membership as a violation of international law as well as disrespect to Turkey’s national interests regarding the Cyprus problem. The EU and Turkish views on the Cyprus problem differs so much that while the EU views the membership into the EU of the Greek Cyprus as part of the expansion of its security community into the Mediterranean region, Turkey views it as an attempt to unite the island into Greece, a long Greek dream of “enosis.” This is mostly true because Greece insist that unless the island should be accepted into the EU, it would block the membership of other countries. Thus, as stated above, Greece is using the ESDP issue and Turkey’s position as a leverage on both the EU and Turkey.111

On the PKK/terrorism problem, some EU countries gave an explicit support to the PKK terrorists in various ways both by giving shelter to the PKK militants and even to Abdullah Öcal, the leader of the PKK in 1999, and by criticising the way Turkey fought against PKK terrorists during the 1990s. Moreover, the EU Council hesitated for long time to place the

PKK into the EU’s list of terrorists. All these EU behaviours created ill feelings in Turkey about the EU, and some opposition to Turkey’s full membership into the EU. Some even think the EU is playing a dirty game to “divide and rule” the Turkish state, just as in the case of the Sevres Treaty after the First World War.

On the Armenian issue, the European Parliament adopted resolutions recognising the alleged Turkish genocide of the Armenians in 1915, thus condemning Turkey’s past. Similarly, this was also reacted by the Turkish public opinion in the same way as EU’s attitude to the PKK/terrorism problem.

Finally, on the Turkish reforms for full membership, the EU increased its pressure on Turkey to complete fundamental reforms in political, economic and legal systems. Here again some of the reforms are concerned with the terror/PKK problem. At the heart of this problem are issues of abolishing “the capital punishment” including Öcalan, allowing “education and publication rights in native languages”, the Kurdish in particular, and abolishing the martial law in southeastern Turkey.

Indeed, all these are very sensitive issues for the Turkish Republic and the Turkish public because most of these demands clash with Turkey’s Realist perception of international politics and national interests. First of all, each of the above issues has historical and negative connotations. The Turkish public opinion are disturbed by the EU’s or any other country’s interference into these sensitive issues because it would remind them of the negative memories of the First World War and after. Secondly, the Turkish people have really suffered great losses because of the terror problem. Almost every Turkish family lost their own or relatives’ sons/daughters during the 1980s and 1990s in the fight against terror. The Turkish public opinion, mainly due to these historical and recent problems, view the EU’s assertive policy behaviour towards these sensitive issues as “attempts to interfere into Turkish domestic politics, to weaken Turkey from within, and eventually to divide Turkey into parts and create independent states in the region.”

As a result of these inter-subjective misconceptions, the development of the awkward process between Turkey and the EU due to the ESDP and the ensuing problems, produced negative complications and outcomes which have undermined the long lasting integration process between Turkey and the EU. As a result, there emerged anti-Western views and reactions in Turkey.

In the midst of the growing opposition towards Turkey’s membership in the EU, there emerged such radical views as arguing that the EU poses threat to Turkey’s own security. A retired General argued that Turkey’s integration with the EU was against, and contrary to,
“Turkish history” and to the Turkish Revolution formed by the Atatürkist thought. If full independence and sovereignty is separated from the Republicanism, there will remain a “corpse”, and this is not Atatürkism.”

Some accused the European countries for clearly supporting PKK terrorism and Armenian allegations against Turkey. Some blamed the EU for exerting pressure on Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to give concessions for the full integration of the whole Cyprus under the leadership of the Greek Cypriots even before the dispute is resolved. The great majority of Turkish public is against such an happening. In reply to these and other crisis points between Turkey and the EU in the awkward process, some argued that that Turkey should look for alternative foreign policy orientations in the East, even including Iran, Russia and so on.

This kind of overtures show how the Turkish-EU relations became tense. If these go to more extremes, it would indeed create worse crisis for Turkey and for the EU countries, which view Turkey’s pro-Western standing and policy as an asset for the West and for the world. Moreover, if these radical reactions spread to state-to-state relations, then the whole structure of Turkey-EU relations would come to a very dangerous point.

Then, one should ask, if Turkey-EU relations are strained and the awkward process gets worse, can European security and defence ever be attained and achieved?

4.3. European Security and Defence without Turkey?

Turkey’s marginalisation from the ESDP process in particular and from the European/Western world in general creates serious setbacks in the maintenance of the European security and defence for various reasons. Given the aforementioned problems in the NATO-EU co-operation, estrangement in Turkey-EU relations, Turkey’s radical turn in foreign policy would create larger problems not only for NATO’s construction of security architecture in broader Europe, but also for the operationalisation of the ESDP properly.

The above question can be answered in two ways. Politically speaking, Turkey would be reluctant to act in alliance with the allies in a future crisis around Turkey. Militarily speaking, Turkey would be hesitant to allow the use of the Turkish military assets and capabilities by the European allies in such crises. Turkish officials declared their determination in this respect: As Turkish Defence Minister Sabahattin Çakmakoğlu bluntly stated, those who plan to have a European security without Turkey should take into account


the risk that Turkey would not permit the use of NATO assets and capabilities, and would continue to use its veto in NATO to prevent such a happening. Moreover, Foreign Minister İsmail Cem stated that Turkey’s contribution to the ESDP will be proportional to its participation in the decision-making of the ESDP.\textsuperscript{114}

Then, given the fact that Turkey is a very influential actor already playing political and military role in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Caucuses, and Central Asia, Turkey’s standing in any crisis is very essential indeed. The EU can hardly launch even non-Article 5 military operations without using Turkey’s planning and intelligence assets. Nor can the European allies be very successful when and if Turkey plays a resisting role in the crisis management operations, and peacekeeping and peacemaking operations.

Furthermore, the European security and defence is not limited to the non-Article 5 problems only, but always include the Article 5 problems. Turkey’s marginalisation from the non-Article 5 operations would have negative effects on Turkey’s contribution to the Article 5 operations. As stated above, today there is not much possibility of an Article 5 threat (i.e a colossal direct military threat), but any of the 16 crisis hot-points can escalate in such manner that NATO may have to use collective defence mechanism, asking Turkey’s contribution. In those situations, the Turkish public and the state officials might be reluctant to act in alliance with the European allies.

Worse, Turkey’s resistance and negative position might prevent the resolution of the crisis. It is appropriate to mention that if Turkey did not act in alliance with the Western allies against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Gulf Coalition could hardly be collaborated and functioned. Turkey’s suspension of very vital Turkish-Iraqi oil pipelines and the use by the allies of the Turkish air basis played a great role in Iraq’s defeat, and the coalition’s victory.\textsuperscript{115}

Finally, Turkey’s multilateral approach to the international security and defence problems can be changed into a unilateral approach. That would mean, the re-nationalisation of the Turkish military forces and policy, and unilateral approach to its own security and defence problems in the region.

All of the above actual and potential complications reflect the dark side of the awkward process. The actualisation of these complications would of course not be good neither for Turkey nor for the European Union nor for the Atlantic Alliance because it would definitely

\textsuperscript{114} \textit{Hürriyet}, 07.12.2000

be at the detriment of European security architecture in particular, and of the broader Euroasian security in general.

Presumably this is the point taken in to consideration by the officials in Turkey and in the Atlantic Alliance and convinced them to find a solution to end the awkward process. Therefore, in the year 2001, there have been serious attempts to this end. There has been considerably important developments and steps initiated by Turkey and the allies in this respect. So the following section will deal with alternative ways of solving the awkward process in particular, and bringing an end Turkey’s delicate position in the European security architecture.

5. Restoration in Progress: Towards a Solution after the September 11?

The September 11 affair has shifted the cards in the broader European security architecture in such a way that the delicate position and the awkward process should be ended, and a viable solution should be found for Turkey to have more secure position in the broader European security architecture. The September 11 affair have created such a new situation that while the international security environment was challenged by terrorism, the allies realised the importance of co-operation and collective defence against terror in the world. In particular, a new kind of international operations came into being in such areas as Afghanistan where international terrorism had shelter and support. Hence, while the concept of broader security arena and agenda re-emphasised its validity and continuity, the allied co-operation, in particular NATO-EU co-operation on security and defence, had to be completed sooner rather than later. At that point, the allies, unprecedentedly uniting against the threat coming from terrorism, showed their support and solemn solidarity for USA under the Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Then came the USA-led operation in Afghanistan to fight against the Taliban regime and to catch al-Qaida terrorists. After the military operation was ended, the allies collectively acted to rebuild Afghanistan.

In the midst of all these developments, Turkey came to the top of international security due to its special position.116 Both the USA and the EU members realised Turkey’s critical importance and position in the fight against terrorism in an area where Turkey has influence and involvement due to its geostrategic, geopolitical and geocultural connections. Turkey, along with the EU allies such as Germany, the UK, France etc., gave quick support to the US military operation in Afghanistan. Like some EU countries, Turkey provided logistical,

political and intelligence support during the military operation by allowing the use of the
Turkish assets and capabilities by US, German and British aircrafts. Furthermore, Turkey
involved in the reconstruction process of Afghanistan by dispatching forces to the ISAF
(International Security Assistance Force) as well as by extending assistance to social, cultural,
and technical reconstruction of Afghanistan. It should be mentioned that Turkey acted in co-
operation with both the EU countries and the USA all the time. That was a kind of NATO
solidarity in Bosnia and Kosovo. Despite some differences of opinion, and lack of full
consensus about the definition of “terror”, and about the way to solve the security problems,
the allies have an overall agreement on the fight against terror.

In the wake of this new situation in which the allies needed Turkey’s support and
contribution for fighting against terror in the region, it was inevitable that the awkward
process had to be ended and turned towards a more positive and rightful way. Thus the
attempts which had started before the September 11 were speeded up in such a way as to
satisfy Turkey’s expectations in order to remove its veto on the EU’s demand for “guaranteed
access to pre-identified NATO assets and capabilities,” i.e. on the NATO-EU co-operation for
the success of the ESDP process. Before going into details of this attempt other alternative
solutions, let’s reiterate Turkey’s expectations from the ESDP:

* Having the WEU *acquis* back again.

* The EU+6 should have daily consultations on a permanent and regular basis, and
providing Turkey with a role in decisions taken by the EU.

* Full participation in the decision-making process of the operations with NATO assets
and operations.

* Respect to Turkey’s national interests and security concerns in such operations
without NATO assets.\(^{117}\)

* The right to rise Turkey’s concerns in the decision-making mechanisms of EU-only
operations in Turkey’s geographic proximity and areas of national interest such as the Aegean
Sea, the Cyprus problems so on.

* Insurance that the ESDP is not to be involved in the disputes among the Allies.

There has been a number of proposals, suggestions, models put forward by different
writers, politicians and strategists in this respect: such as “transferring the WEU *acquis* into
the EU”, “concluding a bilateral agreement between Turkey and the EU”, “occasional full
participation when concerning Turkey’s national interests”, “concluding a Schengen-type

security agreement between Turkey and the EU”\textsuperscript{118} and comprehensive proposal called “European Security and Defence Planning System”\textsuperscript{119}. However, only one of these attempts produced a concrete formula: that is the so-called Ankara Document, which was accepted at the end of the diplomatic negotiations among Turkey, the USA, and the UK in the year 2001, but finalised in 2002 after the September 11. However, it is not the only and ultimate formula. We will suggest three more formulas.

5.1. Minimal Solution: The Ankara Document

The diplomatic negotiations among the US, the UK and Turkey produced the so-called Ankara Document, or the Ankara Text\textsuperscript{120} for finding a solution to Turkey’s veto on the EU-NATO co-operation. The Ankara Document is a mid-way solution to the problem. According to this agreement, apart from previously given rights in the Nice Declaration, Turkey was provided with additional assurances and rights, in return that Turkey will remove its veto on the EU-NATO co-operation, i.e. the EU’s “guaranteed access to pre-identified NATO assets” under the following conditions:

Firstly, in the EU-led operations for Petersberg Tasks without NATO assets and capabilities, the Nice formula was maintained. Thus the non-EU European NATO members can participate in such operations only after an invitation by the EU Council for consultations. But, in any case, the EU assured Turkey to eliminate Turkey’s aforementioned fears by giving security guarantees on the following points:

* The EU will pay due attention to Turkey’s serious concerns and supreme national interests primarily in areas of proximity to Turkey: the Balkans, the Aegean Sea, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkey will be invited to the preparation stage of the EU-led operation in these regions. And the EU Council will primarily take Turkey’s views and concerns into consideration during the decision making process;

* The Peterberg Type operations will not be launched for the resolution of disputes between the allies, or the ESDP will not involve in such cases where a NATO country has vital interests; that means the ESDP will not involve in the disputes between Turkey and Greece such as in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus; and that Greece will not use the ESDP as a leverage on Turkey in their relations and problems.

\textsuperscript{118} Yıldız, op.cit., chapter 5.

\textsuperscript{119} This is proposed by US Secretary of Defence William Cohen, on 10 October 2000, cited in Halil Şimşek, \textit{Türkiye’nin Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisi} (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2002), p.179.

\textsuperscript{120} Öylen, 2002, op.cit.
Secondly, in the EU-led operation with NATO assets and capabilities, the EU-led operations will be able to use NATO assets and capabilities depending on two categories: strategic and non-strategic.

* In the case of the use of non-strategic assets, the EU will have guaranteed/automatic access to NATO assets and capabilities. And, as stated in the Nice formula, Turkey will be able to participate in the operations both as a part of EU+6 and EU+15, and in the Committee of Contributors.

* But in the case of the use of the strategic assets, the EU demands will be decided by the NATO Council on a case-by-case basis. Thus, Turkey will be involving in the making of the final decisions about the EU-led operations by participating in the NATO Council.

Furthermore, in such cases, the Ankara Document provided Turkey with a right to have enhanced consultation in peace-time, and active participation in operational phase in the operations where NATO assets are used. This supports the Washington Summit decisions.

The Ankara Document is an important and big step forward towards the fulfilment of the EU-NATO co-operation. It also provides important progress to meet Turkey’s fundamental concerns relating Turkey’s national interests in the broader European security region. This can be considered as an important achievement because of Turkey’s increasing security burden after the end of the Cold War, as stated above.

However, it cannot be considered as the “final” formula to end Turkey’s delicate position. There can be shown some evidences for this pessimism: First of all, despite the assurances given to Turkey, it doesn’t make Turkey and the other non-EU European NATO allies an actual part of the ESDP process. It is still far beyond Turkey’s status of Associated Membership in the WEU. In other words, the Ankara Document can be seen as a “political and compromise solution” but without “institutional arrangements.” Although the Ankara Document, if approved by the EU members, made “promises and assurances” to Turkey, they cannot be seen as “concrete solutions for the future” unless the institutional connections are established, and unless Turkey is made an institutional part of the ESDP process. The most critical problem, which is Turkey’s participation into the ESDP decision-making process, remains to be unresolved. Turkey is not allowed to participate in the ESDP decision-making process in operations with NATO assets and capabilities; nor is Turkey guaranteed that it will be “invited” to the EU-led operations without NATO assets and capabilities. So for the short term, it can be a transitional solution to make Turkey assured that the EU-led operations requiring NATO’s strategic assets will be decided by NAC on the case-by-case basis. So Turkey will be raising its demands for this kind of operations.
The Ankara Document was given support by NATO and the EU members, except for Greece. Greece vetoed the Document in the EU’s Leaken Summit and in NATO Council meetings in December 2001. In the Seville Summit of June 2002, Greece continued its veto over the EU-NATO co-operation. Greece explicitly stated that the EU should not give guarantees for non-EU countries, and that non-EU countries should never participate in the ESDP decision-making process, fearing that Turkey might be given rights to have influence in the ESDP decision-making. Hence, the Ankara Document could not be put into practice. Now Greece insists that it should be given “security guarantees” by NATO. Thus, the NATO-EU co-operation was locked into the Turkish-Greek competition. And this prevents the operationalisation of the ESDP.

In conclusion, it can be stated that the Ankara Document cannot be regarded as the final and optimum solution for long-term, but only as a minimum solution for a short term to remove Turkey’s veto in NATO. The main reason is that it is not based on concrete institutional and legal basis. Therefore, Turkey’s delicate position will continue in the foreseeable future, until more concrete and durable solutions can be found. The following pages will speculate on three more alternative solutions:

5.2. Satisfying Solution: Making Turkey Associate Member of the ESDP

That is simply to establish a kind of parallelism between Turkey’s associated membership in the first and third pillars of the EU integration and that in the second pillar. In other words, Turkey’s acquisitions in the economic and legal issues can be transferred to the ESDP decision-making structure. This has many advantages: First of all this would end Turkey’s marginal position which developed since the year 1999. Turkey’s integration with the EU would proceed at all levels. And that would encourage Turkey to speed up its work towards full membership in the EU. At least, it would end the complications which, as stated above, have emerged since the Helsinki Summit.

Secondly, Turkey would fully withdraw its veto on the EU-NATO co-operation, thus allowing the EU a guaranteed access to pre-identified NATO sources in a much easier manner than what Turkey accepted in the Ankara Document. In other words, unlike the case of the Ankara Document in which Turkey’s permission for EU access to NATO assets and

---

121 In a joint press conference by George Robertson on behalf of NATO and Belgium Foreign Minister Louis Micheal, Javier Solana and Chris Patten on behalf of the EU expressed their support to the Ankara Document. *Yeni Şafak*, 7 December 2001.
122 For example, *Radikal*, issues 4 - 7 December 2001.
123 *Turkish News*, (Turkish daily newspaper in English), 21-22-23 June 2002.
capabilities is only conditional on some details, in the case of associated membership in the ESDP, Turkey would be more willing to co-operate with the EU because it will involve in the decision-making process at the associate membership level. Though unable to block any EU decision and operation, it will be able to express its opinions and table its proposals to contribute to the formation of the decisions.

Thirdly, that would bring back the Washington Summit arrangements and perspective into life. The allies would have dialogue, co-operation, and transparency under the common and mutual frameworks of the EU-NATO. That would not mean any harm to the EU’s autonomous institutional character because it would continue to maintain its autonomy in the ESDP decision-making process.

Fourthly, the division-of-labour system within NATO, i.e. the EU as the sub-contractor for European security architecture under NATO would work more efficiently. The aforementioned institutional complexities of the European members positions, referred by such acronyms as the non-EU European NATO Allies (Turkey, Norway, Island, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic), non-EU NATO Allies (+ the USA and Canada), the non-NATO EU countries (Austria, Finland, Sweden, Ireland), the EU+15 arrangement, the EU+6 arrangement and so on, would come to end to great extend. If the two institutions can establish common platforms where they can establish dialogue, co-operation and transparent relations, there would emerge what US Secretary of Defence named as European Security and Defence System, leading to a “whole and compact Europe” with transatlantic connection.124

When one mentions that Turkey should be made part of the ESDP’s institutional dimension even at the associate membership level, there is a view that Turkey is trying to enter the EU from the “back door” through the ESDP mechanism. So, the argument continues, Turkey is using its veto power in NATO in order to achieve this objective.

I think this is an unjustified accusation for several reasons: First of all, Turkey was already a part of the EU institution through the WEU associate membership before the awkward process, and now asks no more than the continuation of that position. In other words, the satisfying solution is only to “satisfy” Turkey that it is still part of the European security and defence policy, and not excluded from the system. With that, Turkey neither asks a “full membership” to the EU by this way, “nor tries to gain a “veto power” in the EU Council to block the ESDP process. Turkey only asks that the EU should take Turkey’s security concerns and policies into consideration as stated above.

124 The Turkish General Staff agrees and names it as “unitary system for crisis management”, It would prevent the creation of dividing lines within the EU and NATO. The Turkish General Staff, op.cit.; also by Foreign Ministry, Orhun, op.cit. 2000, p.121
Of course, Turkey would definitely like to be full member of the EU’s second pillar as well as the other two pillars. But Turkey is aware that it cannot be part of it unless it completes its reforms in economic, political, legal issues. Only then, Turkey can be the full member of the ESDP. And that would be the optimum solution for Turkey’s “delicate position” in general.

5.3. Optimum Solution: Full Integration into the ESDP

This is the ultimate solution to end both the delicate position and the awkward process. This would open the way for Turkey to be a part of the security community being developed by the EU for years. However this looks a long-term project. It is contingent upon Turkey’s full integration into the EU. But it is not a dream nor utopia. Once Turkey speeds up its reform process in the light of the Copenhagen Criteria, having genuine integration in the economic, political and legal fields, Turkey would upgrade its soft-security agenda and arena to the level of the EU countries.

Such an eventuality could have positive security implications for Turkey’s foreign, defence and security policy around Turkey. Turkey’s improvement of its standards in line with the modern/contemporary values and policies would spill over into the region in Turkey’s proximity, in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. Turkey’s export of soft-security values such as democracy, human rights, market economy, pluralism, freedoms etc., would improve the conditions in the region around Europe.

Indeed, Turkey has got such a potential. As a bridge between civilisations and communities, Turkey’s attainment of EU values would increase the level of securitisation not only for Turkey itself but also for the European Union as a whole. An important evidence for that is the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC)-EU Joint Forum on 12-13 February 2002 in Istanbul after the September 11 affair. The Forum, code-named as “Civilisation and Harmony: The Political Dimension”, was organised by Turkish Foreign Ministry and participated by 89 countries from the EU and the OIC.\(^{125}\) In the Forum as the widest international gathering after the UN General Assembly meetings, the EU and the OIC countries sought to create a harmonious connection and understanding after the September 11 between the two worlds. It was depicted as “Istanbul Spirit”.\(^{126}\) The Istanbul Spirit reiterated the fact that Turkey has got the potential to act as the melting and meeting point of, or as a

\(^{125}\) http://www.mfa.gov.tr/OIC-EU-Forum.htm

\(^{126}\) Murat Yetkin, columnist, in Radikal, 14 December 2002.
bridge between two geographies, political systems, and cultures, and contribute to the international security by reducing the level of conflicts and misperceptions between the European world and the Islamic world. Thus, that event can be seen as an evidence that Turkey can play a “security provider” role in the region and contribute to the expansion of the EU’s Security Community into the Islamic world in general and to the Euroaisan region in particular. According to Ambassador Volkan Bozkıır, no other country could manage to bring these two worlds under the same framework. Turkey sent an interesting message to both European countries and Islamic World that Turkey, as a democratic, secular and market economy country, could be a model for the Muslim world, and meet them within the same framework.\footnote{127 Interview with Volkan Bozkıır, Deputy Secretary-General of Turkish European Union General Secretariat, 3 May 2002, Ankara.}

Similarly, Turkey, the EU allies and the US have involved for the reconstruction of Afghanistan after the September 11. Turkey gave a positive reaction to the Bonn Agreement in which the EU and NATO allies agreed to eradicate the sources of terrorism by getting rid of the remnants of the Taliban regime and al-Qaida. In this respect, Turkey showed its readiness to co-operate with the EU/NATO allies in building up modern social and technical institution such as schools, television channels, hospitals, infrastructure, police and military service systems. In addition, as stated above Turkey participated in the ISAF, and even took over the command of the force from the UK for six months from the mid-June 2000 onwards. All those should be seen as the indications of how Turkey could act as “security provider” for the European Union’s security community in broader European architecture.

True, the EU has differences with Turkey on the approach to international politics and to foreign policy. But, that does not mean that the EU has enmity, secret agendas, malevolent plans towards Turkey. One should realise that the EU’s perception of security is different from Turkey’s. Karaosmanoğlu has rightly argued that whereas the EU turned inside, trying to build up a security community in Europe per se, Turkey is turned outside, trying to improve its security in Eurorasia.\footnote{128 Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, “Turkey’s Security Policy in Connection with the USA and the EU”, in Hasan Celal Güzel et.al., The Turks, Vol.5, (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Publications, 2002); Ali Karaosmanoğlu, “Türkiye Açısından Avrupa Güvenlik Kimliği: Jeopolitik ve Demokratik Ufuk” in Şabah Çalış, et.al., Türkiye’nin Dış Politika Günlemi (Ankara: Liberte, 2001).} But this does not mean Turkey and EU security perceptions cannot be reconciled: While Turkey becomes a part of the European security community by completing the Copenhagen Criteria, and completing the integration with the EU in all fields,
the EU and Turkey collectively extend the borders of the security community to broader Europe where Turkey and the EU have mutual interests.129

5.4. Perfect Solution: Turkey as Multidimensional Security Provider

The perfect solution for Turkey is to act as an European actor in the region endowed with both hard security and soft security capabilities and policies. In other words, like many of the European Union countries which are integral members of both NATO and the EU, Turkey can develop its own military-security power as well as its economic-political-technical-cultural power. Turkey, having NATO and EU’s support and advantages, could be the “rising star” of the region, acting as a source of stability in all dimensions. Such an eventuality would bring many advantages: First of all, the Turkish nation would improve its power and security in all dimensions. Turkey’s attainment of the EU’s political, economic/financial/commercial, legal, technical standards would improve the soft-security aspect of the Turkish nation. Secondly, an economically developed Turkey would enhance its military-strategic capabilities, positively contributing to the burden sharing in the Atlantic Alliance. Turkey could sustain its own military spending much more easily and efficiently than the case when Turkey receives foreign aid from the allies all the time. Thirdly, Turkey’s attainment of soft and hard military security capabilities would make her a more credible and influential power in the region. Turkey could involve in, and contribute to, not only the military-strategic operations, but also to the economic-political-legal operations in all these places. As a result, Turkey could increase its potential to change the region towards a modern, stable, peaceful environment.

6. Conclusion: The Future of the Broader European Security Architecture and Turkey

At the end of this work, we can make two conclusions, first about the future of the European security architecture, second about Turkey’s position in the future developments.

We live in a world in which security can be achieved only by the co-operation of the countries because the security problems are common and interdependent all over the world. The September 11 tragedy has shown it very clearly. The events since the end of the Cold War as well as the September 11 have also shown that the borders of security agendas and arenas have been broadened in all dimensions. That poses a challenge for the European countries and their organisations such as NATO, the EU, the OSCE, the Council of Europe.

All these organisations have roles to play for the management of security relations. As stated at the beginning, each has its own peculiar function and role in the division-of-labour spirit.

This study has argued that the EU’s attempt to break up this division-of-labour and a narrow approach to the management of the security problems in broader Europe created, and might create, more in the future, complications in the Atlantic Alliance in general and in Turkey’s relations with the EU in particular.

Therefore, the European security architecture should not be arranged by “narrow perspectives”, but by “broad perspectives”, simply because the realities on the ground cannot be understood by and dealt with through “narrow security conceptions”, but only with “broad security conceptions.” To put it more clearly, because we are living in the age of globalisation where borders are much weaker, problems affect much world-wider, and countries and peoples are thus more interdependent on each other, the conception of security should also be globalised. As a result, all countries, regardless of their level of development, prosperity and status, are facing the impact of the security implications of the globalisation. Due to such a broad conception of security in the age of globalisation, arrangements and solutions in the region that were most strongly affected by the end of post-Cold War, i.e. broader Europe, should be based on broad perspectives. Thus, the borders of the European security architecture does not end at the borders of the EU countries per se, but definitely encompasses the surrounding regions. So, both the EU and NATO should work not only for the security and stability of their own regions, but also for the surrounding regions. And both organisations should act in co-operation within the spirit of division-of-labour, and work to find viable, long-term and durable solutions for both hard security and low security problems.

In the construction process of the new security order, some countries have key positions due to their multidimensional, namely broad, security connections with the regions in their proximity. They are sort of “overarching regional powers” having considerable amount of influence and involvement in the region. Russia and Turkey are these sort of countries. Turkey’s important position in its own region is well known. But this work implied argued that Turkey is such a country whose contribution to the European security should be multidimensional: ranging from military-political-diplomatic to economic, social-cultural and technical. Turkey is situated in such a delicate point which can be both an “asset” and also a “burden” for the European security architecture in particular. It can be an asset only if Turkey is fully and substantially integrated not only to the military and strategic structure, but also to the political, economic and social structure of the Western/European security community. Then, Turkey could be a more influential country around its geography in such a way as to
project durable stability, peace and prosperity. Turkey could act as a model country for the regional countries in the region. As a country having the characteristics of both worlds, Turkey could play a more fundamental and effective role than just acting as a military force.

To achieve this necessitates hard work by both Turkey itself and the Western allies. First of all, Turkey should complete its reforms to be a full member of the European Union, and thus develop its economic, commercial and technical capacity. And then, Turkey should approach to, and involve in, the region to expand the borders of security community by employing soft security policies for the resolution of social, political and economic problems in and around Turkey. That would create a more peaceful, secure, and stable region around the EU. So it is advantageous and beneficial not only for Turkey and the region itself, but also for the EU and NATO allies as well.

Thus, secondly, the Western allies, particularly the EU, should take into consideration Turkey’s positive contribution to the creation of a peaceful, stable and secure environment in its own region. In that respect, the EU should clear the way to Turkey’s full integration into the security community, give positive and constructive response to Turkey’s genuine attempts in completing its reforms in the light of the Copenhagen Criteria, and of course, find a viable solution for Turkey’s delicate position. If the EU wants to become a global actor and involve in security and defence issues, it should have close institutional links with Turkey as well as with other non-EU European NATO countries. This is necessary for its operational capabilities. In any case, the EU will need Turkey’s contribution and assistance especially in the Euroaisan region. “The EU’s dismissal failure of policy towards Turkey represents the nadir of EU actorness. Inability to address this issue may ultimately undermine the EU’s broader strategy of close association with its near abroad.”

As for NATO, the allies should understand Turkey’s delicate position and give sympathy to Turkey’s insistence and use of veto for achieving its objective to be part of the ESDP process. This is indeed for the benefit of all the Western allies.

The last word: the future of the broader European security architecture closely depends on where Turkey is, and vice versa. The closer Turkey is into the EU security community, the more securer and peaceful will be both Turkey, the EU and NATO, and the Euoraisan region.

130 Bretherton and Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, op.cit.