NATO FELLOWSHIP

FINAL REPORT

KOSOVO, POPULATION FLOWS, AND QUESTIONS OF SECURITY.

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Abstract.
In name of the Kosovo refugees NATO entered a humanitarian field and was partly transfigured into a humanitarian agency during the Kosovo crisis (March – June 1999). The political stake for NATO was that its reputation for competence and its image of respectability and honour depended to an extent on how well it supported the international assistance to the Kosovo Albanian refugees. The stakes were not limited to the immediate Kosovo context, however. The symbolic struggle for reputation and honour resonated directly in the political struggle for the conservation and transformation of the European security complex. The success of the humanitarian operation became an additional element of demonstrating the value of military capital for acquiring political authority in the definition and management of security problems in Post-Cold War Europe. The Kosovo Albanian refugees derived their political significance for NATO from the degree to which they made it possible for NATO to demonstrate the humanitarian value of military capital and the degree to which NATO could politically capitalise on it both in the immediate context of the Kosovo conflict and in the struggle for the definition of the European security complex.
En mars 1998, avec le massacre des cinquante-trois membres d’une famille albanaise à Prekaz, Belgrade engage l’offensive contre les villages du Kosovo, la région devient étanche. Si la cible désignée est l’UCK et sa résistance armée, toute la population est bientôt touchée: en six mois, quatre cents villages sont détruits, cinq cents Albanais sont tués, la guerre jette trois cent mille paysans hors de leurs foyers, dans une opération de terre brûlée. Les civils fuient les combats jusque dans les forêts, où les Albanais deviennent des réfugiés sur leur propre terre.  

I would just like to start by giving you some of the numbers of refugees that have crossed over from Kosovo. The total number of Kosovars who have come to the region - Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro - is 525,000. Into Albania 314,000. Macedonia, the number I had before coming here was 116,000. Since I arrived at NATO Headquarters I have just been informed that another 1,800 - 2,000 have crossed into Macedonia and we expect another 2,000, they have arrived by train, which is a bad symptom. I hope it is not going to be the repetition. The Macedonian government has kept the border open and we will have to make sure that they will be taken to the transit centre and will be processed correctly, and this is what I expect very much is going to be maybe a difficult operation again.  

Today I will visit the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania. Both countries are feeling the direct effects of the Kosovo crisis: the majority of the 800,000 refugees who have fled Kosovo are now there - either with families or in refugee centres. And still many thousands are crossing the border out of Kosovo every day. And each one of the 800,000 has his or her own story of personal tragedy, of a shattered life.  

Tens of thousands of Kosovar Albanians were displaced between early 1998 and June 1999. What do these numbers, this mass of displaced persons signify? For whom are they significant? In what sense? Are they bargaining chips in a process of negotiations? Are they the face of human misery justifying military operations? Are they part of a struggle for self-determination? Are they people in need of assistance and protection? Are they a risk for the domestic stability of neighbouring countries? Are they a sign reviving the shame (and guilt?) of having tolerated genocide half a century ago (and again half a decade ago in Central Africa)?  

The Kosovo refugees have been all this and probably more as well. Their meaning arose from a multitude of dynamics and stakes. This paper deals with how the Kosovo Albanian refugees became a humanitarian question for NATO and with the political

2 Mrs Ogata at NATO HQ Brussels, 14 Apr. 1999 Press Conference by the Head of the UNHCR, Mrs Ogata and Secretary General Javier Solana.  
3 Secretary General of NATO Javier Solana on the Humanitarian Situation, 12 May 1999.
significance of NATO’s humanitarianism. In name of the Kosovo refugees NATO entered a humanitarian field and was partly transfigured into a humanitarian agency. It incorporated a human security interest by converting its military capital into humanitarian capital.\textsuperscript{4} The political stake for NATO was that its reputation for competence and its image of respectability and honourability depended to an extent on how well it supported the international assistance to the Kosovo Albanian refugees. For NATO a key aspect of this struggle was thus how well it managed to hold a credible position in the humanitarian field defined by the assistance to and ultimately the return of the Kosovo Albanian refugees. The incorporation of a human security interest remained inherently precarious. The nature of the humanitarian field puts the military always in an ambivalent position. Even if its supportive role is recognised it remains an outsider for most humanitarian agencies. The symbolic struggle for a humanitarian reputation and authority was further complicated by NATO’s air campaign. Although the humanitarian and military operations were represented (to an extent) as being complementary, they regularly contradicted one another.

The political stakes for NATO were not limited to the immediate Kosovo context. The symbolic struggle for reputation and honourability resonated directly in the political struggle for the conservation and transformation of the European security complex.\textsuperscript{5} This is the struggle for international political authority in the conservation and transformation of the vision of the Post-Cold War European security dynamics and of the principles of di-vision arranged through these dynamics.\textsuperscript{6} There is a structural link between the symbolic struggle in the humanitarian field and NATO’s struggle in the European security complex. In both situations the translation of military power into political power, that is honourable problem-

\textsuperscript{4} “A species of capital is what is efficacious in a given field, both as a weapon and a stake of struggle, that which allows its possessors to wield a power, an influence, and thus to \textit{exist}, in the field under consideration, instead of being considered a negligible quantity.” Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, \textit{An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology}. Cambridge: Polity, 1992, p. 98.

\textsuperscript{5} Buzan et al. define the security complex in their recent book as follows: ‘A security complex is defined as a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another.’ Buzan, Barry; Wæver, Ole; and de Wilde, Jaap, \textit{Security: A New Framework for Analysis}. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998, p. 201.

defining and managing authority, is essentially contested. In other words, the ambivalent position of the military alliance in the humanitarian field is mirrored in its ambivalent position in the European security complex. On the one hand, NATO is a key player in a collective defence game which emphasises the military and diplomatic protection of the member-states against external aggression. On the other hand, NATO increasingly positions itself in a civilisation game in which the construction of a pan-European community of values is at stake. Although the political capitalisation on military capital is relatively straightforward in the collective defence game, it is contested in the struggle about the Pan-European community of values in which dialogue and universal values have to be institutionalised. The conversion of military capital into political authority is challenged by organisations that embody economic capital such as the European Union and more direct value-institutionalising mechanisms such as the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and the Council of Europe. By struggling to demonstrate the value of military capital for the assistance of refugees, NATO struggled to credibly convert its military capital into political capital in the community of values game. One way of establishing this conversion was via a conversion of military capital into humanitarian capital. The success of the humanitarian operation became an additional element of demonstrating the value of military capital for acquiring political authority in the definition and management of security problems in Post-Cold War Europe.

In the first section, I develop how NATO entered a humanitarian field in Kosovo and how this field requires of participants to articulate and incorporate an interest in universal values rather than a strategic self-interest. The humanitarian field pre-disposes agencies towards disinterested practices. Then I look at the main strategies that are involved in the transfiguration of NATO into a (contested) humanitarian agency. I deal extensively with the symbolic question, that is the development of a contested but also recognised humanitarian reputation. In that context the ambivalence which surrounds NATO’s humanitarian identity is the key issue. In the concluding part, I briefly look at the political significance of NATO’s humanitarianism in both the Kosovo conflict and the European security complex.
**NATO, Refugees and The Humanitarian Field.**

The displacement of Kosovo Albanians featured as a concern in NATO’s public statements on the Kosovo crisis from early 1998 onwards. For example, in the first half of 1998, the Albanian delegation seems to have regularly and to an extent successfully raised the issue of the Kosovo crisis in the framework of the Partnership for Peace. On 27 March 1998 NATO decided to send eight groups of experts to Albania in the following weeks. Among them were experts in the area of civil emergency planning who were going to help the Albanians prepare for a large inflow of refugees in the border regions.\(^7\) Although there may have been a humanitarian side to its concern, of what I can gather from *Atlantic News*, the discussion in NATO was dominated by the possible impact of violence in Kosovo on regional stability. It is in this framing that we have to understand decisions like the NATO Permanent Council instructing the Political Coordination Group to study the possibility of developing a security belt at the border of Albania and the FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).\(^8\) In addition, there was also an interest in developing the substantial significance of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework. Albania mobilised a PfP mechanism by requesting a 16 + 1 meeting on Kosovo.\(^9\)

Before the Rambouillet negotiations collapsed and Operation Allied Forces started, NATO was not extensively involved in humanitarian actions for Kosovo Albanians. Although there were initial contacts with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and although the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) began to assist the UNHCR in June 1998, NATO’s main field of action was the diplomatic one.\(^10\) In this field, the displaced persons emerged first of all as a sign of the human misery generated by the Serb leadership, the Serb military, the police and paramilitary groups. This situation justified to an extent NATO’s support of the search for a

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\(^7\) *Nouvelles Atlantiques/Atlantic News*, Vol. 32, No. 3015, 3 June 1998, p. 2


political solution and the use of military threat against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in support of the diplomatic process. The statement of the Under Secretary of Defence, Walter Slocombe, about the decision of the North Atlantic Council authorising SACEUR to issue an ACTWARN ‘for both a limited air option and a phased air campaign in Kosovo’ indicates this: 11

This NATO action ... sent a clear message that Milosevic has got to stop the offensive against the civilian population of Kosovo, has got to withdraw the forces that have been sent in to carry out this campaign of repression, has got to take the actions necessary to allow internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their homes and allow non-governmental organizations to operate and to provide the necessary relief and to begin serious political engagement toward negotiations for an interim settlement that will provide a basis for autonomy for Kosovo within the framework of Yugoslavia. 12

Although the displaced Kosovo Albanians are an important aspect of this discourse, assistance and protection for these people is not what NATO provided in the diplomatic process nor in the ACTWARN. Protection was to form the withdrawal of the Serb forces as a result of the threat. The threat of air strikes also aimed at facilitating humanitarian assistance to the internally displaced persons. One of the purposes was that the Serb leadership would allow NGOs to organise relief operations. Hence, one could argue that the military threat also tried to facilitate the humanitarian practices. But this is not the same as supplying assistance. 13

Although NATO used humanitarian language before, the refugees and displaced Kosovo Albanians only transfigured explicitly into a direct humanitarian policy question shortly after the negotiations on an interim peace agreement for Kosovo in Rambouillet were suspended on 19 March 1999. This change was triggered by the fact that Kosovar refugees were pouring out of Kosovo into neighbouring countries and into Montenegro after the suspension of the negotiations, by the increase in the Serb use of force and by the launching of the air strikes. The first two days after Operation Allied Force had started, about 15000

11 An ACTWARN is not an authorisation to use force but it increases the level of military preparedness and allows the planning of the assets required for the air operation.
13 Ibid.
Kosovo Albanian refugees showed up in the FYROM and approximately 18000 remained in Albania. The number of refugees would dramatically increased over the next two weeks. By April 2nd the UNHCR estimated the total number of Kosovo Albanian refugees at 230000. Still according to UNHCR figures, on 4 April the number rose to 350000 refugees, on 6 April to 400000, and by 20 April 650000 Kosovo Albanians had fled from Kosovo. By the time the military technical agreement was signed (10 June 1999) and the air campaign was suspended (11 June 1999), the total number of people forced from their home in Kosovo was estimated at 1.5 million, of which approximately 800000 had fled Kosovo.

The refugees and displaced Kosovo Albanians quickly became an object of humanitarian policy for NATO (in addition to featuring as a face of human suffering that partly justified NATO’s participation in the diplomatic process and the launching of its air campaign). The position of NATO changed in the sense that it did not only emerge as a military and diplomatic alliance but also as a humanitarian agency, that is an agency which directly enacts a humanitarian field. NATO built tent camps, coordinated humanitarian

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18 A field is a historical set of relations between positions characterised by its own logic. It is a site of specific social practices. The actors, who have a particular position in the field, struggle over the possession of a specific species of capital that gives them access to particular profits. The struggle can also be about changing or preserving the specific logic that defines the field and the relations between the positions. The field is also a structure of domination and subordination and the site of a struggle for preserving and changing the relations of domination. In Bourdieu’s own words: ‘In analytic terms a field may be defined as a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions. These positions are objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and potential situation (situs) in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relation to other positions (domination, subordination, homology, etc.).’ Pierre Bourdieu & Loïc Wacquant, Op. Cit., p. 97.
actions, offered protection, etc. In other words, it used part of its resources for assisting and protecting the refugees. The difference between NATO’s humanitarian claims before and after 23 March 1999 was that NATO directly operated in a humanitarian field shortly after 23 March.19

In the humanitarian field practices are arranged on the basis of an interest in human security and insecurity. The interest of the field does not refer to an end of instrumental, conscious actions of the agents, but rather to what makes it worth playing in that field. Humanitarian agents are caught up or predisposed to being caught up in the quest for human security.20 What is this human security interest to which these organisations are predisposed? In its most general terms, the concept refers to a specific ground upon which protection and assistance can be provided by international and transnational agencies. This ground is a threat to people’s lives and freedom which cannot or is not alleviated by the state of which they are citizens and/or habitual residents.

The failure of the state can have a variety of grounds and does not necessarily imply that the state itself is actively threatening its citizens, such as by persecuting people who have a specific political opinion. Natural disasters which create needs beyond the state’s resources can be a ground for humanitarian action, as well. State failure motivates a new

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19 Humanitarian organisations were present in Kosovo before 23 March 1999. After new assaults on Kosovo Villages in an attempt to surround the region of Drenica, one of the strongholds of the KLA, in early 1998, the level of violence increased again in Kosovo. As a result several hundreds of thousands of people were displaced within Kosovo in 1998 and in the first quarter of 1999. Humanitarian organisations like MSF (Médecins sans Frontières), the Red Cross, UNICEF, the UNHCR and Foundation Mother Teresa were assisting these displaced Kosovo Albanians within Kosovo. NATO, however, was not extensively participating in this field in which humanitarian assistance is the defining issue. See the report Myriam Gaume made of her three weeks travel with Médecins sans Frontières: Myriam Gaume, Op.cit.; and, Shep Lowman and Amelia Bookstein, ‘Time Running Out in Kosovo’. The Washington Times, 21 September 1998 [http://www.refintl.org/cgi-bin/docfinder.pl?file=440998CL.OPE.html]


20 This notion of interest is explained, as is its reliance on a theory of belief which interprets beliefs as the incorporated schemes of perception and appreciation through socialization in contrast to a concept of belief as a conscious common knowledge, in Pierre Bourdieu, Practical Reason. Cambridge: Polity, 1998, pp. 75-91.
ground for protection, that is the humanity of these people. In other words, human security policies transfigure citizens or habitual residence into ‘naked’ human beings with a legitimate need for protection and assistance deriving from (threats to) their humanity. Therefore, human security articulates a universal interest. Citizenship and the protection and assistance associated with it receive their significance in the context of a particular state, but humanity belongs to all human beings, irrespective of their citizenship.

Human security articulates a universal interest. The agencies evoking the human security interest cannot claim to (primarily) serve their own self-interest. A human security game predisposes agencies to disinterested acts. The human security interest emerges in a universe in which ‘it is better to seem disinterested rather than interested, as generous and altruistic rather than egotistical’. Humanitarian practices cannot articulate an economic or other self-interest as the main stake in the field. In relation to human security it is disconcerting and symbolically self-destructive to claim that one acts out of egotistical interests. What the interest of human security and the notion of humanity specifically refer to is a complex issue. It is a subject of the struggle in the humanitarian field but also in the more general international political field. The definition of human rights obviously takes a prominent place in this struggle.

Important for our discussion is that refugees and displaced persons have the capacity to trigger an interest in human security and to structure a field of humanitarian practices arranged in relation to this interest in a specific context. The Kosovo Albanians emerged in and helped to trigger the humanitarian field. In relation to the field they became a figure of a persecuted people requiring assistance and protection from states and international and transnational organisations. However, the displacement of people by itself, need not necessarily create an interest in human security. A humanitarian field must be brought into

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21 This may also have as a consequence that refugees loose their political voice, or, in other words, the refugee regime strips the refugees of their capacity for political agency. This has been argued among others by Hannah Arendt and Peter Nyers. 
existence through the humanitarian practices of agencies with an interest in human security that are responding to - and thus also co-constituting - this request for help. In other words, a human security interest and a related humanitarian field are the result of the work of agencies and the deployment of humanitarian technologies.

The humanitarian technologies are mechanisms of arranging assistance and/or protection (defined in terms of non-refoulement and asylum) of refugees and/or displaced persons. These consist of institutionalised know-how and procedures. Together with the material resources such as air planes and vehicles, these mechanisms constitute what could be considered the humanitarian capital. This is - to paraphrase Bourdieu - what is efficacious in the humanitarian field, both as a weapon and a stake of struggle, which allows the possessors of that capital to wield a power, an influence, and thus to exist, in the humanitarian field, instead of being considered a negligible quantity.23 The position of the agencies in the field depends on the volume and the structure of the humanitarian capital they possess.

If NATO can be considered as having restyled itself into, among others, a humanitarian organisation, as a consequence of its engagement in the Bosnian and Kosovo crisis, then NATO became a specialised agency which developed a capacity for humanitarian practices and articulated an interest in human security. This implies that NATO has obtained humanitarian capital, that is capital which is at stake in the humanitarian field and which makes it possible for it to wield power in the humanitarian field.

How did a military alliance develop a capacity for humanitarian action which made it possible for this organisation to be integrated in the humanitarian field? The development of NATO’s humanitarian capital evolved from four strategies:24

- the conversion of military capital into humanitarian capital

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24 The notion of strategy does not necessarily imply a utility maximising agency which consciously decides about specific paths of action to obtain the maximum benefit at the least cost possible. It simply refers to the idea that the humanitarian capacity has to be manufactured over time and through active practices of conversion.
• the development of a network of cooperation with humanitarian organisations (social capital)
• the development of a capacity to coordinate humanitarian practices (organisational capital)
• the development of symbolic capital, that is the recognition of being a legitimate participant in the field.

The conversion of military capital.

The key issue for NATO was to convert its military know-how and capabilities into humanitarian practices. More specifically, the conversion question referred first of all to the process through which NATO gained humanitarian credits - through the provision of human security in the Kosovo refugee crisis - by means of its military capital. A standard example of the conversion of capital is the conversion from economic capital (money and material wealth) into cultural capital (knowledge, skills among other obtained through education) and vice versa. In many modern societies, economic capital allows one to buy cultural capital, that is education materialised in diplomas, and the possession of specific forms of cultural capital, in its turn, allow one to obtain economic capital among others because particular diplomas give access to better paid jobs.²⁵

The conversion of military capital into humanitarian capital is first of all a technical question. It depends on the degree to which the equipment, the command structure, the operational and tactical procedures and routines, the organisational dispositions of the people in the command structure and those implementing the decisions can be adapted to the requirements of humanitarian operations. It differs from the symbolic struggle which focuses on the recognition of the position of the military in the humanitarian field.

At the technical level, the conversion of military into humanitarian capital is to an extent a non-question because the military has an inherent capacity to perform humanitarian practices. As the UNHCR states in The State of the World’s Refugees 1993:

The difficulties of supplying an army in the field have much in common with the problem of assisting large numbers of displaced people affected by war. The logistical capabilities of military organizations and their ability to deploy rapidly, mobilizing transport and communication as well as supplies for immediate survival, can provide an indispensable lifeline in refugee emergencies taking place in the midst of armed conflict.\(^\text{26}\)

In other words, the logistical technologies and skills which have been developed for use in a military field structured around war can be easily transplanted into a humanitarian field which is structured around the assistance and protection of victims. This implies that the incorporation of a human security interest by the military can develop relatively smoothly in so far as it depends on the capacity to assist human beings in complex emergency situations. The main obstacle to that endeavour would be internal and external agencies contesting the presence of a military organisation in the humanitarian field. But that kind of obstacle is a matter of symbolic capital, to which we will return below.

The ease whereby logistical technologies and skills can be transplanted from the military to the humanitarian field partly explains why NATO could so rapidly respond to the refugee crisis. The logistics, such as airlift capacity and troops with the skills and command structure to build camps, were already in place in FYROM and Albania. These were positioned in the area in an earlier phase of the crisis, among others to assist, if required, with the emergency evacuation of the OSCE’s Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) personnel.\(^\text{27}\) The troops and capacity could be easily redirected from their military role to relieving refugees and assisting humanitarian organisations. NATO also set up specific command and troop structures for its humanitarian mission shortly after 23 March 1999. The main example was Operation Allied Harbour, which was launched in mid-April. That operation provided 8000 troops stationed in Albania to ensure the transport, safe arrival, and distribution of aid.\(^\text{28}\)

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\(^{27}\) This mission was set up after Serbia had agreed to comply with the demand to stop the violence in Kosovo in October 1998. The KVM was withdrawn from Kosovo on March 20th 1999.

Operation Allied Harbour was the first operation that NATO developed specifically for a humanitarian mission and that went beyond supporting humanitarian organisations.\(^{29}\)

There are number of indications, nevertheless, that the conversion did not happen as automatically at the technical level. Two issues stand out that suggest additional work was required to render the military capabilities and skills of NATO operational in a field structured around a human security interest. First, NATO organised training seminars to promote understanding and to improve cooperation between the military and humanitarian organisations. As an example, from 10 to 12 February 1999 NATO and Switzerland co-sponsored a workshop on humanitarian aspects of peacekeeping. The aim of the workshop was to promote mutual understanding on practical questions of cooperation and coordination of agencies engaged in humanitarian situations. Among the panelists were organisations such as the UNHCR, the OCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the European Commission Humanitarian Office, the Office of the High Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR).\(^{30}\) The fact that this workshop was organised, may be taken to reveal an awareness that the mutual deployment of military capital and humanitarian capital in the humanitarian field would require adaptation from both the military and the humanitarian organisations.\(^{31}\)

The second issue is that there are indications that the command structure and routines of military of military organisations differ from structures and routines of humanitarian organisations. While humanitarian agencies tend to have a more decentralised command structure the military work on the basis of a hierarchical structure that clearly defines who is in command. The military, moreover, standardise their procedures to a greater extent, so as to limit uncertainty. Humanitarian organisations are more prone to positively value

\(^{29}\) Ambassador Sergio Balanzino, *Op. Cit.*, p. 4


\(^{31}\) This is probably not the only function of these seminars. Most likely they also play an important role in the development of networks (social capital) and recognition (symbolic capital). The need for mutual understanding is also expressed in an article in NATO Review by the Delegate of the ICRC to the European Union: Thierry Germond, ‘NATO and the ICRC: A partnership serving the victims of armed conflicts’, *NATO Review* Vol. 45, No. 3, 1997, pp. 30-32 [Webedition: http://hq.nato.int/docu/review/articles/9703-9.htm]
improvisation. These differences result in difficulties, misunderstandings and tensions on the ground.\textsuperscript{32} Another example of tensions arising from differences in operational requirements is suggested by UNCHR Sadako Ogata, in an interview with \textit{Libération} about the relations with NATO.

Relations are complicated, but I am trying to make them simpler. I have asked NATO to share information on displaced populations that it picks up through its air surveillance, but so far it has refused to do so ... The UNHCR must conduct this humanitarian operation, but can only do so with increased contribution from NATO Countries which have the means necessary for action on this scale.\textsuperscript{33}

Military organisations do not willingly share intelligence with other organisations since they reason that it could help military opponents to evaluate their intelligence capacity. The latter is normally understood to weaken one’s military capacity in the context of the military field.

These examples imply that even if military capital is fully geared towards humanitarian operations, it remains to an extent a specific form of capital which continues to be partly alien to the decision-making and implementation structure of humanitarian organisations who primarily define humanitarian capital.\textsuperscript{34}

These two elements indicate an awareness of the difference at the operational level between humanitarian and military skills, knowledge and routines. However, they do not necessarily imply that a successful conversion of military capital into humanitarian capital is impossible or even difficult at the technical level. Rather, they indicate that buying humanitarian credits may require negotiating, retraining, coordinating, and adapting procedures, knowledge, skills, etc. In other words, adequately capitalising on military capital in the humanitarian field requires some kinds of work and it is contested not only at the symbolic level (as we will argue below) but also at the more technical level of decision-making and implementation routines, skills and procedures.


\textsuperscript{34} See also José Maria Mendiluce, ‘Meeting the challenge of refugees. Growing cooperation between UNHCR and NATO’, \textit{NATO Review} Vol. 4, No. 2, 1994, pp. 23-26.
Social and organisational capital.

NATO’s strategy to incorporate a human security interest is not limited to its deployment of military capital in support of humanitarian organisations. The organisation also developed social and organisational capital related to an interest in human security. Social capital is the capacity derived from being part of networks and from relations of acquaintance and mutual recognition.\(^{35}\) Organisational capital refers to a capacity to coordinate and organise complex practices involving a variety of agencies.

In 1998 NATO explicitly developed humanitarian organisational capital through the creation of an institutionalised disaster response capacity. This capacity has two major institutional components. The first is the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit (EADRU), an institutional forum which can be organised on the request of an EAPC (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council) state that is hit by a major disaster. It is not a permanent organisation. It consists of a mix of national elements (e.g. rescue and medical supply and transport) which are volunteered by EAPC countries. The contributors decide on the deployment of these elements and they also bear the costs of the operation.\(^{36}\)

The second component of the disaster response capacity is the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC). This Centre is a small but permanent institution, which was inaugurated on 3 June 1998. It has six to seven permanent staff. Staff can be increased in case of a major emergency. The task of this institution is ‘to coordinate the response capabilities of the 44 member countries of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) to ensure a prompt and effective disaster assistance to the United Nations’.\(^{37}\) In case of a disaster, EADRCC will develop appropriate plans and procedures for the use of the EADRU. In principle its responsibility is limited to technological and natural disasters. In practice the EADRCC may have become involved in the complex emergency situation in


Kosovo because it was the only instrument available for the EAPC Countries to coordinate their humanitarian responses to the crisis.38

The EADRCC converts the mechanisms and experience in civil-emergency planning - which during the Cold War focused on supporting the survival of society in case of a major war39 - into a humanitarian capacity. It does not have a pool of material resources, such as airplanes or stocks of relief supplies, which could be used in case an emergency situation emerges. The strength of this Centre rests on its capacity to coordinate humanitarian actions of EAPC member states with the UN. A good example of its organisational capital is the coordination of humanitarian aid flights, as described by Ambassador Sergio Balanzino:

The massive expulsion of refugees from Kosovo (...) prompted many nations spontaneously to fly relief supplies into those countries. Initially, none of these operations was coordinated with UNHCR. In order to allow UNHCR to develop a more comprehensive picture of what humanitarian assistance was being provided, the EADRCC proposed an arrangement whereby humanitarian aid flights into the region would be given air clearance only after they had been verified and prioritised by UNHCR. The EADRCC brought together the major players in air clearance (...) in order to develop an agreed set of procedures which is being successfully used to coordinate humanitarian and military flights.40

NATO also developed - or at least tried to develop - social capital in the human security area through networking with humanitarian organisations. The information available to me on this issue does not allow me to realistically assess the nature and the importance of the humanitarian network including the degree to which it is institutionalised. NATO’s public discourse, nevertheless, contains indications that the organisation tried to develop social capital in the humanitarian field. In its official representation of the EADRCC NATO emphasised the new centre would not replace but support the relevant UN bodies such as the OCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance) and the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). Ambassador Sergio Balanzino,

moreover, suggests that the EADRCC began to assist the UNHCR as early as June 1998.\textsuperscript{41} In its public discourses NATO regularly refers to cooperation with a variety of humanitarian organisations. Cooperative action is important for developing social networks. It implies the development of contacts between staff, and if the cooperation develops over a longer period, these contacts may become institutionalised.\textsuperscript{42} In addition, the exchange of staff hints at the development of social capital. NATO was seen to send a liaison officer to the UNHCR.\textsuperscript{43} The organisation of joint seminars and workshops may be taken to contribute to the creation of a network of connections and acquaintances, as well.

**Symbolic capital: the ambivalent status of the military in the humanitarian field.**

So far, I have argued that at a technical level NATO converted its military capital rather easily into humanitarian capital. I have also shown that NATO developed organisational capital specifically geared towards the humanitarian field and that there are some indications that the organisation tried to develop social capital in the humanitarian area. For a successful transformation of NATO into a humanitarian agency, however, the symbolic work is the most strenuous. All humanitarian agencies perform symbolic work in the humanitarian field. An essential part of humanitarian capital is the capacity to produce humanitarian common sense, that is a capacity for ‘legitimate naming as the official - i.e. explicit and public - imposition of the legitimate vision’ of the humanitarian field.\textsuperscript{44} In the humanitarian field, quite like in other fields, agencies bring into play the symbolic capital that they have acquired in previous struggles.\textsuperscript{45} For an organisation that provides military or converted military capital to the humanitarian field, however, specific challenges must be met for “the acquisition of a reputation for competence and an image of respectability and honourability”\textsuperscript{46} in the interest

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{41} *Ibid.*, p. 2
\item \textsuperscript{42} Obviously, a thorough evaluation of the significance these practices had for the appropriation of a significant volume of social capital in the humanitarian field requires a longer time perspective. It also requires that one examines the social spin-off of this cooperation in other documents than the indications given in the available public discourse of NATO.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Press Statement by the Secretary General of NATO, 1 April 1999.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*. *Op. Cit.*, p. 239.
\item \textsuperscript{45} *Ibid*.
\end{itemize}
of human security. This may be taken to be a consequence of the inherently ambivalent position of military agencies in the humanitarian field. The agencies can be active in the humanitarian field but they will remain strangers to that field. The precarious position of NATO was intensified because it simultaneously enacted multiple roles in the Kosovo conflict.

NATO is not an obvious candidate for developing a stake in humanitarian practices. It is largely a military organisation which organises a system of military and diplomatic guarantees against external aggression. Even now that NATO identifies itself more explicitly as a project for constructing a community based on shared values, its possession of the most significant volume of military capital in contemporary Europe is one of the key factors which makes it different from other community building instruments like the OSCE and the EU. 47

When a military organisation develops an interest in human security, it is usually not unambiguously welcomed within the field in which humanitarian organisations operate. 48 Some organisations will radically oppose the involvement of the military, for example, in the context of the Kosovo crisis the president of MSF (Médecins sans Frontières) stated that a humanitarian intervention supported by force is a contradiction.49 Others re-act more moderately and accept the need for support from the military while expressing, nevertheless, a concern about the problems the military may pose for humanitarian operations. For example, while accepting that military force may support humanitarian operations under particular conditions, the UNHCR also immediately warns about the difficulties involved:

The co-ordination of humanitarian efforts with political and military actions in refugee-producing conflicts is not without its difficulties. It blurs traditionally distinct roles and,


if mismanaged, could compromise the strictly neutral character of humanitarian aid, which is the best guarantee of access to people in need.\textsuperscript{50}

The opposition to and concern about the involvement of the military in humanitarian operations actually has a more general and historical ground than plain practical difficulties. Humanitarian practices often deal with the disastrous consequences that the use of military force has for human beings. The Red Cross, for example, has provided soldiers and other victims of war with medical help. Its assistance to soldiers rests on transfiguring the soldier into a suffering and needy human being. This process replaces the soldier’s military value with his/her human value. If this is indeed a paradigmatic example of humanitarian practices, then the transformation of a military alliance into a humanitarian agency is very likely to have an estranging effect and to become contested within the humanitarian field.

Military force and technology are developed in the framework of a field which is structured around an interest in deterring and/or fighting an enemy rather than an interest in assisting and relieving the victims of violence. Therefore, the military necessarily incorporates an interest in producing rather than relieving human insecurity. This partly explains that although military capital can be set at work relatively easily in a humanitarian field, military agencies remain strangers in that field.

In a situation in which the support of NATO to an extent was required and also recognised by some humanitarian agencies, especially the UNHCR, that support generated tensions and ambivalence in the humanitarian field. Consequently NATO’s ambiguous and contested position in the field was not altered by the fact that NATO troops were erecting tent camps and supplying food, medical aid and water purification plants, that they were increasing EADRCC (Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre) staff, were deploying a forward Head Quarter in Albania to support the UNHCR, were airlifting refugees out of the region, and were helping to redistribute refugees from overcrowded refugee camps.

The articulations of a human security interest consequently engaged NATO in a symbolic struggle in the humanitarian field, that is a struggle about humanitarian reputation.

and authority. To make its humanitarian operations credible – and to be able to capitalise on its humanitarian operations – NATO developed symbolic strategies aimed at converting its humanitarian practices into a humanitarian reputation. One example of the symbolic work is that NATO publicly articulated a subordinate position in the field while it provided essential support - certainly in the first weeks of the refugee crisis. In other words, the public discourse was one of ‘we are strangers to this field and we are just helping out until the proper humanitarian organisations can take over’. But, at the same time NATO became to an extent vital to the humanitarian field. This strategy clearly articulated that NATO is very active in the humanitarian field but paradoxically does so by presenting the alliance as essentially ‘an outsider turned into a temporary servant’. This is a strategy of reducing the significance of its humanitarianism, thereby confirming the traditional position of military agencies in the humanitarian field. But it is also a strategy through which NATO makes it more easy for other agencies to perceive NATO’s humanitarian functions in a more positive sense. NATO may symbolically capitalise on it in later struggles.

In the above, the ambivalent position of NATO was explained as a specific case of tensions triggered by any deployment of the military in a humanitarian field. However, in the case of Kosovo, the ambivalent status of NATO was further exacerbated because it was simultaneously active in the humanitarian and the military field.

Both the humanitarian and the military field became central to the crisis shortly after the negotiations in Rambouillet were suspended. Immediately after that suspension, the NATO Secretary General consulted with the member states about launching air operations in accordance with the authority delegated to him by the North Atlantic Council of 30 January 1999. On 22 March the North Atlantic Council authorised the Secretary General of NATO to decide after consultation on a broader range of air operations. The next day the Secretary General directs SACEUR to start air operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On 24 March the Secretary General made a Press Statement saying ‘I have been informed by SACEUR, General Clark, that at this moment NATO Air Operations against targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have commenced’. This does not mean that the air strikes launched the military field into existence. NATO military action commenced most explicitly
when on 24 September 1998 the North Atlantic Council authorised SACEUR to issue an
ACTWARN ‘for both a limited air option and a phased air campaign in Kosovo’, but only
by effectively starting the bombing, the military game became more prominent as a separate
field of practice. Military plans were put into effect. Military decision-makers faced the
paradoxes and frictions of both the virtual and real battlefield. The military campaign became
a major concern for decision-makers, to an extent irrespective of its relation to the
diplomatic field. As a result NATO confirmed its military status of being a war machine, that
is an organisation primarily designed to deter war by military means, and in case this fails, to
effectively use its military capacity.

Symbolic practices emerged that were aimed at making the double employment of
NATO’s military forces compatible or at moderating the contradictions between the human
security interest and the military interest. There were many instances in which a particular
military action triggered a symbolic struggle in the humanitarian field. For example,
throughout the Kosovo Albanian refugee crisis NATO had to handle the positive correlation
between the emergence of massive refugee flows and the start of the air campaign. NATO’s
discourse continuously denied that it had any responsibility for the refugee flows, and instead
blamed Milosevic for the refugee crisis or emphasised that the ethnic cleansing had already
been planned before the NATO operations began.\footnote{For example: \textit{Press Statement by the Secretary General of NATO}, 1 April 1999; Daily Press
3096, 2 April 1999, p. 3.}

But there were also more subtle statements as when NATO spokesman Jamie Shea referred to the number of refugees and
displaced persons at a press conference in early April 1999. He then referred to the number
of refugees since the beginning of the crisis in March 1998, thereby separating the start of
the refugee crisis from the launching of the air campaign.\footnote{\textit{Nouvelles Atlantiques/Atlantic News}, Vol. 33, No. 3097, 7 April 1999, p. 1; \textit{Nouvelles
Atlantiques/Atlantic News}, Vol. 33, No. 3098, 9 April 1999, p. 1}

The ambivalent status resulting from the double employment of NATO’s military forces
was also very visible in the symbolic struggle that was triggered by NATO’s bombing of a
group of refugees in Korisa, in mid-May 1999.\footnote{\textit{Nouvelles Atlantiques/Atlantic News}, Vol. 33, No. 3109, 19 May 1999, p. 2.} This was an especially tragic case of the
more general problem that one part of NATO’s military machinery was producing human misery and victims – the so-called ‘collateral damage’ - while another section of this same machinery was claiming to relief human misery resulting from the conflict. The so-called ‘collateral damage’ made the credibility of NATO’s humanitarian claims vulnerable to pressures emphasising that it violated fundamental rules of humanitarian law. Amnesty International regularly expressed this concern to the Secretary General of NATO.

Following each of these attacks [in which civilians were killed], Amnesty International wrote to NATO Secretary General Javier Solana with specific questions about the adherence of NATO forces to fundamental rules of humanitarian law. These include the prohibition of direct attacks on civilians and civilian objects and the prohibition of attacks on military targets expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life “which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” Other rules require specific precautions to be taken when launching attacks, including desisting from an attack if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or the attack risks being disproportionate.

On many occasions could NATO be seen to be aware of its ambivalent position. It struggled hard to keep up an image that the military and humanitarian operations were compatible rather than contradictory to one another. The Secretary General of NATO stated already on 23 March 1999:

It [the military action] will be directed towards disrupting the violent attacks being committed by the Serb Army and Special Police Forces and weakening their ability to cause further humanitarian catastrophe. Our objective is to prevent more human suffering and more repression and violence against the civilian population of Kosovo …

The examples given above have shown nevertheless that the military use of its forces resulted in incidents which made NATO’s position in the humanitarian field even more precarious. For humanitarian agencies these incidents made it even more difficult than it already tends to be in complex emergencies to sustain their claim that they are neutral or beyond politics (which is often seen as an important source of enabling humanitarian practices in a conflict situation).

The ambivalent status of NATO in the humanitarian field was further increased by a third factor. In addition to a human security game and a military game, NATO was also involved in a geopolitical, strategic game. It articulated an interest in the maintenance of stability and security in South Eastern Europe. Since early 1998, The diplomatic mechanism of the Partnership for Peace was used to support the neighbouring countries, and in particular Albania. The main concern was to prevent the violence in Kosovo from spilling over in regional instability. This interest continued to be articulated in NATO practices throughout the Kosovo crisis. After the Kosovo Albanian refugees poured out of Kosovo into Albania, FYROM and Montenegro, the discourse partly partly constructed the refugees as a factor that would be potentially destabilising the region and in particular FYROM. When the refugees started moving out of Kosovo in great numbers, they consequently connected a strategic question about regional stability to a humanitarian dynamic resulting in an overlap between the regional stability game and the humanitarian field. For example, accommodating refugees in camps, pressuring the government of the FYROM, promising an activation of Partnership for Peace mechanisms, air-lifting refugees out of the FYROM, etc. were constructed as being significant both for the humanitarian cause and for the more traditional, geopolitically defined stability interest. Tony Blair explicitly addressed the coexistence of the two interests at a press conference at NATO Head Quarters (20 May 1999):

Milosevic must understand this, that we have embarked upon this action not simply because there is a strategic interest of NATO engaged, there is such an interest and I can make to you all the arguments about how important it is strategically for NATO that we are engaged, but we have embarked on it for a simple humanitarian reason and cause and we are not going to allow Milosevic to get away with this policy of ethnic cleansing, we will defeat that policy.


58 For another example: The response of the Secretary General to a question by Antoine Guillau (TF1) at the Press Conference by Secretary General of NATO 12 April 1999.
The cross-over between the stability game and the humanitarian field with regard to the refugee crisis easily triggered questions about the sincerity of the Alliance’s human security interest. A cross-over between a humanitarian interest and a traditional self-interest necessarily raises problems about the disinterested nature of the agency which enacts both interests at the same time. But this is especially the case for NATO. NATO remains primarily a military alliance in the eyes of many political and humanitarian agencies and therefore it is more easily recognised as a serious player in the geopolitical stability game than it is in the humanitarian game. This awareness became a source for contesting NATO’s articulation of a human security interest. It thus became another issue involved in the symbolic struggle about the recognition and contestation of NATO’s reputation and authority as a humanitarian agency. NATO again emphasised the compatibility between the two interests while its critics invoked the double interest to contest the credibility of NATO’s attempts to incorporate a human security interest.  

To conclude, despite NATO’s humanitarian activities its position within the humanitarian field remained contested. This resulted first from the inherent ambivalence surrounding the deployment of the military in a humanitarian field. It was later exacerbated by NATO’s activities in a military and a geopolitical field. These activities often led to situations in which the credibility of NATO as a humanitarian agency came under pressure. As a result, the conversion of military capital into humanitarian capital also required a significant amount of symbolic work in the struggle to support NATO’s position and authority in the humanitarian field.

An example of stating the compatibility between the different interests: “Today we confirm that we will play a full part in a comprehensive approach to stabilize this region. Such an approach which should address the political, economic, security and humanitarian aspects must involve a number of institutions but let me say that NATO will have its role to play”. Secretary General Javier Solana, *Press Conference*. 12 April 1999.
The political significance of NATO’s humanitarianism.

In the above I have looked at how NATO articulated a human security interest and at the different elements of the transfiguration of NATO into a humanitarian agency. This is an interesting issue in itself. Given NATO’s prominent role in both the Kosovo crisis and the struggle about rearranging the European security complex, however, the question arises ‘What is the political significance of NATO’s humanitarianism?’ This question is about how the articulation of a human security interest converts into political authority. Political authority refers to the capacity of legitimate naming of a problem, the setting in which the problem emerges and the dynamics through which the problem is managed. In other words, the political significance of acquiring humanitarian capital depends on the extent to which it feeds into authority to conserve or transform the social world through conserving or transforming visions of this world and its principles of division.60 Given that NATO developed its humanitarian capital in relation to the Kosovo Albanian refugee crisis, this question is about the political significance the refugees had for NATO.

During the Kosovo crisis the credible articulation of a human security interest became a political stake for NATO. After the refugees flowed out of Kosovo, its political reputation became entangled with the effective provision of humanitarian assistance to the refugees and the objective to guarantee the refugees a safe return to Kosovo. To an extent this was the result of the discourse about the Kosovo conflict that NATO had developed since mid-1998. NATO’s discourse extensively justified its involvement on the basis of the humanitarian needs of the Kosovo Albanians and the violation of human rights.61 Consequently, NATO partly defined the stakes of the conflict in terms of a human security interest. This position, which incorporated the need to alleviate human suffering, became a major issue once the images and stories about the Kosovo refugees and with it the

61 For example: ‘But can we afford to enter the 21st century without having addressed the unresolved challenges of this 20th century? Should be speak of a united Europe when parts of this Europe remain at war? The sad truth is: massive human rights violations are being committed on our doorstep. The Kosovo crisis may be regional in origin – yet its negative implications are being felt across the entire Euro-Atlantic area.’ The Secretary General of NATO, Javier Solana, A strategy for the 21st century. Lecture in Berlin, 1 February 1999.
Another example is that NATO repeated that ‘to prevent human suffering and more repression and violence against the civilian population of Kosovo’ was among its primary objectives.
humanitarian field became a key factor in the political spectacle of the Kosovo conflict. The political spectacle refers to the creation and circulation of symbols in the political process. Politics emerges in the spectacle as a drama in which meaning is conferred through evoking crisis situations, emergencies, political rituals and political myths. In the Kosovo crisis, the images of refugee flows took on a ritualised form, suggesting a battle between barbarous forces and the civilised world.

What we have seen in Kosovo in the last few days is a direct challenge to all the values on which we are building our new undivided Europe. Milosevic and his government are the antithesis of all we value. So, we cannot tolerate the behaviour of a more barbarous age in a Europe which is striving towards a more united and more enlightened future. Our cause is a just one. It is our duty to fulfil it.

This framing, combined with a representation of the conflict as a battle between good and evil, aimed at creating docile spectators by making it difficult to question the action of the civilised agencies whose cause is just and who act out of a moral duty. These ritualised symbolic forms tend to associate all critical voices with the barbarous and/or evil forces. Symbolic forms are therefore manufactured in the political spectacle which allocate roles to the agencies involved and which render political decisions legitimate or illegitimate by evoking threats or reassurances. Once it has become part of the political spectacle of the Kosovo conflict, the representation of the refugees and NATO’s practices towards these refugees became a key element in the struggle for the appropriate and effective governance of the Kosovo conflict.

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64 An interesting illustration is the reporting on the Hutu refugee camps after the Rwandan genocide. Some of these camps allowed Hutu Power which organised the genocide to reorganise themselves after they fled from Rwanda. But by picturing the camps as refugee camps, the perpetrators of the genocide emerged as victims, making it more difficult to sustain a critique of the international support of these camps. Philip Gourevitch, *We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families*. Stories from Rwanda. London: Picador, 1999.

The political spectacle consequently connected the effective provision of humanitarian assistance to the refugees to the struggle for political credibility.\textsuperscript{65} Hence, the development of humanitarian capital was not only relevant for the struggle about taking and conserving a credible position in the humanitarian field. Guaranteeing a credible incorporation of a human security interest also directly translated into political credibility for NATO in the Kosovo conflict. This means that the conversion of military into humanitarian capital and the symbolic strategies triggered by NATO's ambivalent position in (relation to) the humanitarian field, were for NATO also part of a strategy to politically capitalise on its humanitarian practices. The political significance of these practices depended on the degree to which they helped to convert NATO's military capital into political capital in the context of the Kosovo conflict.

The political significance of NATO's humanitarianism also went beyond the Kosovo conflict as such. The humanitarian practices were directly relevant for the struggle for international political authority in the definition and management of the security dynamics that have characterised the European security complex after the Cold War.

With the break down of the Cold War structure the position of NATO in the European security complex became precarious. Although NATO still upheld the strategy that the survival of its member states depended on the effective use of the military capital it possessed, the political relevance of the military game rapidly diminished.\textsuperscript{66} The relevance of military capital for governing the post-Cold War security dynamic was increasingly questioned. This is indicated by the cuts in defence budgets and by the move from a conscript to a professional army in some European countries, etc. This Post-Cold War climate positioned NATO in a new situation in which its political relevance was at stake. Why would a military alliance which, is so strongly tied up with the Cold War framework as NATO, be needed in a Post-Cold War security dynamic? In addition to the traditional

\textsuperscript{65} The struggle for political credibility in the political spectacle was a complex game in which many crucial elements were at stake. Among the most visible were the preservation of cohesion between the member states, the manufacturing of domestic support both among the wider public and the political parties, and the international perception of NATO's actions.

\textsuperscript{66} For a recent affirmation of the importance of military capital: \textit{The Alliance's Strategic Concept}. Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23\textsuperscript{rd} and 24\textsuperscript{th} April 1999.
military question of defence against external aggression, which has not disappeared, NATO faced a political game in which its authority to govern security dynamics was at stake. Economic and diplomatic capital quickly gained in importance, without however, rendering military capital irrelevant. But it was more difficult to convert military capital into political authority in the struggle for the domination of the governance of European security dynamics after the Cold War.

In response this situation, NATO articulated a civilisational strategy that was aimed at the creation of a pan-European community of values. Its emphasis is not on defending the member states of an alliance but on integrating states into a particular form of life characterised by the liberal values of democracy, the free market and respect for human rights. The game in which this strategy operates is characterised by a struggle for the inclusion in (and therefore also exclusion from) a ‘family of states’ through the articulation of values. The civilisation strategy also articulates an interest in defending the universal European values in places where they are violated. But, the military is not generally considered to be a major instrument in this struggle. Diplomatic instruments like the Partnership for Peace, economic capital which supports the spread of the free market, and international legal or other kinds of rule-setting capital which regulate the respect for values are more important in this strategy. Consequently, military capital does not convert quickly into political capital in the community of values game. Moreover, in this game the relevance of military capital is contested. The values which are at stake exclude a military sustained expansion of values, as is most explicitly articulated in the Helsinki principles of 1975 which still play a norm-setting role.

67 Although one could argue that NATO also faced similar political games on several occasions during the Cold War (e.g. during the nuclear missile crisis in Europe during the 1980s), it is generally agreed that NATO’s political relevance has become questioned to an unprecedented degree in the 1990s.


69 ‘… I look forward to the day when we will be able to welcome a democratic Yugoslavia back into the European family …’ Javier Solana, *Article for the International Press ‘NATO United to succeed’*. 12 May 1999.

This situation is to an extent homologous to NATO’s position in the Kosovo conflict. Both in Kosovo and in the European security complex NATO articulated a military and geopolitical strategy aimed at reproducing a game in which military capital is made directly politically relevant. It simultaneously developed a strategy in the interest of supporting pan-European values, which include the value of assisting and protecting human beings in need. In both security spaces military capital was contested. Moreover, NATO situated itself in an ambivalent position in which it simultaneously played a military and geo-strategic game structured around an interest in the military and diplomatic protection of European security and stability on the one hand, and a humanitarian – or, more generally stated a value-oriented - game in which the refugees became a symbol of the battle between good and evil, civilised and barbarian, light and dark on the other hand. The homology between NATO’s position and the related strategies in the Kosovo conflict on the one hand and its position and related strategies in the struggles for political authority in the European security complex made it structurally possible to directly capitalise in the Post-Cold War European security game on the political and humanitarian capital acquired in the Kosovo conflict.

As already indicated previously, the problem for NATO has been that its military capital has remained a key element determining its political identity in the European security complex. Despite the civilisation strategy, its military capital is key to differentiating it from other community building agencies. Therefore, it continues to be important if not crucial for NATO to politically capitalise on its military capital.

In the Kosovo conflict, NATO was involved in a struggle for the revaluation of military capital both in the more traditional defence game and in the community of values game. Through the air campaign NATO demonstrated its capacity to deploy its military capital in a conflict to preserve regional stability and to affirm civilisation against a barbarian force. Beside the military campaign the conversion of its military capital into humanitarian capital added to the revaluation of military capital, as well. For NATO, demonstrating the value of

its military capital in the humanitarian field confirmed that military capital is not only important to protect the community of values and the member states against external challenges. Military capital can also play a role in the protection and affirmation of human rights through the relieve of suffering and the provision of assistance to refugees. In other words, NATO converted its military capital into political capital – that is, reputation and authority in the European security complex - by demonstrating how military capital is necessary for the stakes in both the collective defence game and the community of values game. These stakes are European stability, the protection of the boundaries of the community of values and the assistance of victims of practices which violate the values the community shares. It is also in this sense that the refugees were most explicitly significant for NATO in the context of the struggle for political authority in the European security complex. The refugee crisis and its importance in the political spectacle triggered the articulation of a human security interest in NATO. In its humanitarian practices it converted military capital into political capital via its conversion into humanitarian capital. In other words, the Kosovo Albanian refugees derived their political significance for NATO from the degree to which they made it possible for NATO to demonstrate the humanitarian value of military capital and the degree to which NATO could politically capitalise on it both in the immediate context of the Kosovo conflict and in the course of the struggle for the definition of the European security complex.