Introduction

From the beginning of the 90's the future of the European security was linked to the vision of the replacement of the old bipolar structures with new co-operative ones. These would lead to the establishment of a new Pan European co-operative security regime, in which the new challenges and risks would be dealt. Although the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) could constitute the main forum in which a new effort would develop, mainly because of its membership which includes the United States, Canada and Russia, ÍÁÔÏ has emerged finally as the main organiser of the new European security architecture.

Ten years after key elements of the new European security include a transformed and expanded NATO and a European Union committed to pursue a common defence and security policy. The first steps have been already made, but are they in the right direction, do they promote the desirable co-operative security regime for the whole Europe? The study examines how the European security structures evolved after the end of the Cold War by exploring the policies of the US and the major European actors with an eye to evaluate the progress that has been made towards the establishment of a new co-operative perception of security throughout Europe.

In the first chapter the parameters of the European security in the post-Cold war environment are examined. Since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the break-up of the Soviet Union significant changes have taken place in Europe. But not everything has changed. The U.S. security interests in Europe not only remained undiminished but they increased further, because of the unique position that the US obtained in the world affairs. Furthermore, the policies of the major European states retained the daedalus character, which in the past prevented them from expanding the European unification attempt in the area of defence and security. It was in that context that the European and Atlantic security policies had to be developed in order firstly to handle the new risk and challenges to European security, and secondly to promote co-operation in three levels: at a transatlantic level, at a European and at a pan-European level, which includes Russia and other former communist states.

This twofold hard task was considered to be fulfilled by the adaptation of the European security institutions to the new conditions. Chapter two describes how NATO, Western European Union and the European Union tried to co-ordinate their adaptation process in order to promote co-operative arrangements in security and defence issues. While Europe found itself trapped in the contradictions between the policies of France, Britain and Germany, the U.S., through NATO, became gradually the basic organiser of the new European structures by adapting NATO. But it was after 1995, when priority was given in practice to the U.S. approach to co-operative security for Europe. And that was inevitable since the Europeans were not effective enough to meet the challenges of the future.
In Chapter three, the study further examines the continuing process of NATO's transformation, and the efforts of the major European states to materialise the vision of an autonomous but compatible to NATO European security and defence policy. As far as NATO is concerned, emphasis is given on the "open doors" policy, which includes the enlargement of the alliance, the relations with Russia and the other states of Eastern and Central Europe, and to the NATO/ESDI/WEU-EU arrangement which was designed to promote the updating of the transatlantic link. As far as the Europeans is concerned, the decisions taken during the last five years are described with a critical approach, which questions the declared willingness for giving the EU the appropriate means to play its full role on the international stage.

Finally, by using the Kosovo crisis as a case study, in chapter four the study argues that neither NATO nor EU was not properly prepared, after ten years of efforts, to address the new crisis in Yugoslavia in a co-operative way. The EU and WEU were involved in the management of the crisis only within a borderline, the major European states prove one more time that their national policies and aims faces a great lack of harmonisation, and NATO's policy in Kosovo demonstrated the difficulties that faced in this case to promote co-operative actions. The study concludes that unless, the U.S. decides what to do with its power and the major European states what kind of Europe they want, it will not be easy to meet the challenge of co-operation.
1. Parameters of European Security in the Post Cold War Era

From the beginning of the 90's the future of the European security was linked to the vision of the replacement of the old bipolar structures with new ones of a co-operative character. The challenge was double. First it was not certain whether the co-operation regime would be sustained at the Euro-Atlantic level but also at the western European one, as the external threat which brought together the allies in the past was over and the end of the Cold War was raising doubts about their ability to continue to co-operate versus their propensity to disintegrate. Secondly, in the level of the East-West relations, it was not clear if their older confronting character could be overcome and consequently in what way something like that could be achieved.

In the post-Cold War framework the concept of the co-operative security emerged as the appropriate tool for establishing a new Pan-European security order. But it should be noticed that at that moment it was not clear what the concept of the co-operative security exactly suggests or how it would be implemented, although it was in circulation since the 1970s. In contrast, the use of the term reflected to a great extent the International Community's fond hopes for a new world without dividing lines, where security would be indivisible and the means of its protection would be collective. But which were the new menaces to the European security?

1.1. New challenges and risks

The end of the cold war and the subsequent changes in the international security environment have raised new possibilities and expectations for the creation of a new peaceful and stable Europe at a political level. The fall of the Berlin Wall (November 1989) and the subsequent evolutions in Eastern Europe, the German unification (October 1990), the demise of the Warsaw Pact (April 1991) and the dissolution of the Soviet Union marked the beginning of a new era, in which the political, economic and military East-West conflict has disappeared, as the nuclear threat has, too.

The optimism about the peaceful future of the European continent is illustrated in a very characteristic way in the Paris Charter, which was signed on 21st November 1990 by all the member states of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE and then OSCE), which functioned as a forum for the political deliberation between the two blocs during the Cold War. In the first chapter entitled "A new era of Democracy, Peace and Unity", it is officially declared that "The era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended."

In this context, emphasis was given on the development of a new co-operative security system for Europe and on the emerging of CSCE as the statutory frame in which this new security system should evolve. Former communist states were the most ardent

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supporters of this perspective initially. In their Moscow Declaration on 7th June 1990, the Warsaw Treaty members called for the overcoming of the division of Europe and for the initiation of a continuous and comprehensive institutionalisation of the CSCE process.\textsuperscript{3} In a relevant article, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic at that time, mentions: "However, it is quite possible that, by the turn of the millennium, NATO members themselves will come to the conclusion that the further existence of the Alliance is unnecessary. [...] There is no doubt that the solving of security issues on a bloc or inter-bloc basis has become outdated and that it is the CSCE framework itself that provides the spring-board for the future."\textsuperscript{4}

At the same time, others didn’t share this optimism. Grave concerns have been expressed about the future of Europe, which were mostly based on the "long peace" Hypothesis, which John Lewis Gaddis\textsuperscript{5} had developed in his book, entitled The Long peace, two years earlier. According to that hypothesis, the absence of war in Europe since 1945 has been due to the bipolar distribution of military power, the approximate military equality between the two Alliances and the fact that each super-power was armed with a large nuclear arsenal.

One of the most characteristic articles, entitled "Back to the Future. Instability in Europe After the Cold War", questioned the diffusive optimism about the European future. In his article John Mearsheimer argued that "... the Cold War was principally responsible for transforming a historically violent region into a very peaceful place. [...] the demise of the Cold War order is likely to increase the chances that war and major crises will occur in Europe. Many observers now suggest that a new age of peace is dawning; in fact the opposite is true."\textsuperscript{6}

In fact, at that unique historical moment both approaches, extreme optimism on the one hand and absolute pessimism on the other, were right to some degree. Optimism was justified because the possibilities of a nuclear first strike or a conventional surprise attack, and, even worse, those of an inadvertent nuclear war or an intentional escalation in Europe, had disappeared. Pessimism was also justified because of Europe's history. In relation to this Sir Michael Howard (President of the International Institute for Strategic Studies) pointed out in an article on Europe’s traditional attitudes towards war, entitled "Europe - Land of Peace or Land of War?", "So we Europeans must understand our past if we are not to repeat it; understand why we have been a land of war if we are successfully to become a land of peace."\textsuperscript{7}

Furthermore, both approaches expressed the same concern, although in a different way, that is what the future of Europe will be since the old security structures have collapsed. In other words, both proponents of optimism and pessimism seem to have agreed on two things: first that the old continent had to face the challenge of establishing a new order of stability, security and peace, and secondly, that the conditions in Europe were and


In these terms, the need for the creation of a new European security architecture was the principal objective and the main question was how to organise the new European security regime. The classical models for world order systems had been already tested. The balance of power model had been associated with the destructive past of Europe, the model of collective defence was not any more especially relevant and the model of collective security had been associated with the failure in applying it during the Cold War. Now it was time for Europe to pursue the establishment of a co-operative security regime.

The term "co-operative" suggests that co-operation is more beneficial than competition in many circumstances and especially in security issues. The base of such a regime, as it was declared in the early nineties, would be the "Co-operative security", which is a process whereby countries with common interests work jointly through agreed mechanisms to: reduce tension and suspicion; resolve or mitigate disputes; build confidence; enhance development prospects; and maintain stability in their regions.\footnote{See: "Cooperative Security: conflict prevention and building mutual reassurance", Wilton Park Conference WPS98/9 In Cooperation with Cooperative Monitoring Center, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, Monday 3 - Friday 7 August 1998.}

So, in that context the need to cope with the following issues emerged:

- The definition of the new threats and dangers for the European security.
- The readjustment of the existing institutions and organisations (of ÎÁÔÏ, WEU, EU and CSCE) to the new conditions.
- The reconsideration and updating of the transatlantic link on the basis of reducing the USA role in European affairs and the European’s taking-on more responsibilities and burdens.
- The re-incorporation of the former East-European countries to the European structures.
- The definition of the role of Russia but also of Ukraine in European security matters.

The initial euphoria gave place to an intense speculation as it was found out that the questions concerning the European Security have not really become much easier to answer since the end of the Cold War. Instead, elements of instability and in some cases even war, have become all too frequent in Central and Eastern Europe after the demise of the communist bloc. The fall of communism has given way to disintegration of multinational states, a painful process of political and economic transition towards democracy and the market economy, and the re-emergence of nationalism as a destabilising factor in the region.

Specifically, the development of chauvinistic passions in Yugoslavia and the civil war, which followed, proved not only that it was not difficult to locate the new forms of danger for the European security, but also that the dealing with these dangers should be rapid. Europe did not have the luxury to elaborate theoretical schemes for a future
organisation of its security. On the contrary, Europe should reorganise its security structures under the pressure of developments at that time.

Because of that, a common consent among European security organisations was developed during the first half of the 90’s, for the new risks and challenges that had to be confronted.

Í ÁÔÏ was the organisation which responded swiftly to these new developments by adopting the new Strategic Concept in 1991. In the relevant document adopted in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on the 7th-8th Nov. 1991, there is a mention of the security challenges and risks, which are described as: "The security challenges and risks which NATO faces are different in nature from what they were in the past. The threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO's European fronts has effectively been removed and thus no longer provides the focus for Allied strategy. Particularly in Central Europe, the risk of a surprise attack has been substantially reduced, and minimum allied warning time has increased accordingly. In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess."

Particularly, the sources of danger are described as follows: a) The adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe. b) The conventional and nuclear capabilities of Russia, which have to be taken into account if stability and security in Europe are to be preserved. c) The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the disruption of the flow of vital resources and the actions of terrorism and sabotage.

During the extraordinary meeting of the Council of WEU Ministers in Noordwijk, Netherlands, on the 14th of November 1994, the subject of which was the formulation of a Common European Defence policy, it was noted that: "The full development of a common defence policy will require a common assessment and definition of the requirements and substance of a European defence which would first require a clear definition of the security challenges facing the European Union and a determination of appropriate responses."

In May 1995, during the WEU meeting of the Council of Ministers in Lisbon, the first document that identifies the potential risks to European security was adopted. The document, which is entitled "Common Reflection on the new European security conditions" identified four broad categories of new risks: a) potential armed conflicts, b) the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, c) international terrorism, organised crime, drug trafficking, uncontrolled and illegal immigration and d) environmental risks.

The common remark between all risk assessments was that the emergence of the new national, religious, ethnic and cultural conflicts in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe constituted the most direct threat to European security. Therefore, dealing with these

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12 WEU Council of Ministers, Common Reflection on the new European security conditions, Lisbon, 15 May 1995. Source: Official Website of WEU.
dangers would be the corner stone for the organisation of the future co-operative structures and for the transformation of the security organisations by redefining their role without creating new separating lines in Europe. This, then, was the framework in which European and Atlantic security policies had to be developed.

1.2. The policies of European States

During the Cold War the security policies of the major European states (U.K., France, Germany) evolved both in the framework of NATO in order to confront the Soviet threat, and on the basis of their national pursuits defined by historical memories and visions inherited by age-long European history. This second parameter of security policies of the three major European states diminished the possibility of extending European integration from economical only to political security and foreign affairs.

In the new era, beginning with the fall of the old bipolar structures, Europe had to assume more responsibilities for preserving its security. The invasion of Kuwait showed that Europe still lacked the political cohesion to provide a military response to events beyond its doorstep. European Community’s uneven response to the Persian Gulf War raised doubts about the plausibility of a common security policy in the near future. Only France and Britain dispatched ground forces to the multinational coalition assembled in Saudi Arabia and those contingents comprised less than one-tenth the number of the US forces there.  

Several statements from European leaders proved the widespread dissatisfaction with the 12-nation community’s reaction to the first global crisis in the aftermath of the Cold War. British Prime minister John Major said that the European response to the war demonstrates the futility of trying to achieve European political Union (including a common foreign and security policy) while Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis acknowledged that developing a joint European defence must be a slow and cautious exercise.  

The "Eurodefence debate" had already emerged and the way of resolving it was a point of intense dissent between European states because it restored old disputes from a past full of conflicts, threatening their ability to co-operate and boosting tendency to disintegrate. The fears about the power and the future role of the reunited Germany, the concerns and conflicting views related to the national ambitions of France and Britain, about the degree of the US commitment to European security, and, as a consequence of the first two, the worries that Europe might revert to its destructive past of power politics, set the frame in which the solutions for the organisation of European security had to be looked for.

13 “Reduced Threat, Budgets Driving NATO To New Strategy as Europe Tries to Unify”, Aviation Week & Space Technology.
15 After what was noticed by Dr. Rockman, a political scientist at the University of Pittsburgh “What we are seeing is the Europe between 1848 and 1914.”, "End of the Cold War Tests Bush, Allies On Foreign Policy", The Christian Science Monitor, August 21, 1992. The question whether Europe will go back to the situation of the 1920s, when national interests overshadowed any common desire by states to form alliances, was also discussed at a meeting in 1993 between U.S. military officials and European security analysts. "U.S., European leaders tell Aspin NATO needs direction”, The Washington Post, September 12, 1993.
In other words, the solution to the "Eurodefence debate" or the debate over Europe's security architecture that had appeared mostly between France, Britain and the reunified Germany was not easy to find out, since the security concerns and relative power considerations in the calculations of the major Western European states vis-a-vis one another, led to multiple dilemmas and contradicting alternatives concerning the future creation of a European common security policy. The decisions taken were not the result of common acceptance; on the contrary, they were the result of continuous compromises in a range of matters. Consequently, not only were these decisions hardly effective, but also the image of a daedalus European puzzle was created, the assembly of which still seems very difficult.

To be more specific, after the end of the Cold War, both Britain and France were seriously worried about German unification and they agreed that it was necessary to examine the scope for a closer Franco-British defence co-operation. Furthermore, both were anxious about the political-military role the United States would play in Europe and how it would play it. It was at this point that the convergence between the policies of the two states stopped and the divergence began.

Britain chose to balance the reunited Germany by preserving the NATO alliance and keeping the United States militarily engaged in Europe. At the same time, by doing this Britain was also consistent to its traditional policy of enhancing its Atlantic ties. So, the British policy was: do whatever to preserve NATO.

France chose to do the same thing (to balance the reunited Germany) by strengthening the European Community in political, economic and monetary issues and forming a European defence identity on an intergovernmental basis and, at the moment, preferably outside the EC context by pursuing an autonomous role for the WEU, which would be responsible to the EC. At the same time, by doing this France was preserving its autonomy in foreign and defence affairs, while it was also consistent to its traditional policy of seeking a special role in European security and eliminating the role of the US. So, the French policy was: do whatever to establish an autonomous European defence identity.

On the other hand, the German Chancellor H. Kohl wanted to assure his European partners that he was committed to "Europeanising Germany", not "Germanising Europe", but at the same time he wanted Germany to regain the status of a power equal to Britain or France. This very idea was expressed in Foreign Ministry’s spokesman H. Schumacher’s statement: "We have abandoned any policy of power politics. Ours is a policy of taking over responsibilities in Europe, with our European partners. One thing has changed: The time when Bonn was carrying out the so-called convoy role of following others is over". In this frame, Germany backed the French initiatives and avoided breaking NATO cohesion while playing a leading part in promoting political rapprochement with Eastern Europe states.

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16 In her memoirs Margaret Thatcher, describing the two meetings between herself and the President Mitterrand in December 1989 and in January 1990 in order to discuss Germany’s reunification, writes: "At the end of the meeting we agreed that our Foreign and Defence Ministers should get together to talk over the issue of reunification and also examine the scope for closer Franco-British defence co-operation.”. Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), p.p. 796-798.

It was in that controversial context that Europe had to move forward. A clash over those conflicting interests and policies was expressed at that time in three inter-locking debates: in the European Community's intergovernmental conference, the Western European Union and the NATO strategy review. During the European Community's intergovernmental conference in 1991, Jacques Dellors, president of the European Commission, supported by Germany, proposed that the EC should have its own defence policy, but Britain did not share the opinion.\(^{18}\)

In an article for the Financial Times, the British Foreign Secretary wrote: "Our approach in the intergovernmental conference is to say: Let us be European but let us not be arrogant or unrealistic. NATO must be an integral part of the future defence of Europe. It provides irreplaceable elements in our security, not just for the time being but permanently. We need to work out in detail how the alliance, the European input and European union will be linked. An approach which emphasised the separateness of Europe would seriously weaken our real security.".\(^{19}\) In addition to that, two months later the Minister said: "We cannot afford to exchange a suit of armour for a husk\(^{20}\) in order to divert France's insistence on promoting an independent European defence identity.

While disputes over the future of European defence were in progress, France utilised the Yugoslavian crisis outbreak, as an opportunity for Europe to take action independently. The French President stated: "If, for legal reasons, the United Nations excuses itself, France expects the European Community to take the initiative of sending troops,"\(^{21}\) Britain expressed its reluctance to accept the idea of a WEU peacekeeping force and during the special meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers of the WEU the idea was rejected.

On October 1991, France and Germany called for the creation of a strong Western European corps army, by strengthening the existing 5,000 brigade, as a step towards giving the region an independent defensive capability.\(^{22}\) They also indicated that military units from other countries in the European Community could eventually join the force. Furthermore, in a letter to other European leaders President F. Mitterrand and Chancellor H. Kohl also proposed that the Western European Union should become the pillar of a joint European security and defence policy. It is remarkable that just two weeks before joining that initiative, Germany endorsed an American plan to strengthen NATO's ties with the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe.

The above mentioned initiative was launched one month before the NATO summit meeting in Rome, where it was expected to define the alliance's new strategic concept, and two months before the EC meeting at Maastricht, where decisions about the future of the European Community and the creation of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) would be taken. In addition, two weeks before the aforementioned proposal, another joint British-Italian one was announced which called for the creation of a European rapid-reaction force, but it emphasised that any regional military group should remain subservient to NATO.

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Britain immediately challenged the Franco-German initiative as a potential threat to NATO. "It does raise some substantial question. We would not support duplication" was the comment of Britain's Defence Minister, T. King. Britain did not confine itself in critical announcements only, but it threatened that no agreement on European defence matters was going to be achieved in the EC summit meeting in Maastricht without the precise definition of the WEU’s future role. At the same time, the U.S. Defence Secretary and NATO Secretary-General strongly opposed to any initiative that could weaken NATO.

Under these circumstances, the European states came to the first compromise for the future role of Europe in defence and security matters. With the Maastricht Treaty the first Common Foreign and Security Policy has been established which, could lead to the creation of a common European defence in the future. In addition to that, a double role was assigned to the Western European Union. It should evolve not only as the defence component of the EU, but as the European pillar of NATO as well. This was just the beginning of a constant procedure of determining the future European Security and Defence Identity through compromises in multiple levels of national policies of France, Britain, and Germany.

As Robert J. Art points out, "Neither European Political Union nor European Defence Identity makes sense unless we understand that security concerns and relative power considerations continue to play an important role in the calculations of the Western European states vis-a-vis one another. [...] Closer economic relations will not work unless security concerns are properly dealt with first. Therefore, if Europe as a whole is ever to achieve a large measure of peace, Western Europe must play a central role, but it will be unable to do so unless its own nightmares are held in check.".

Two years after the first "European compromise", in a Report entitled "A European Security Policy" submitted to the Assembly of Western European Union in its fortieth ordinary session in November 1994, on behalf of the Political Committee it was noted that "A European defence policy and, even more so, a European defence is dependent on the achievement of a European security policy based on a joint perception of risk and threats to European security, and a joint concept of the ways in which this security should be guaranteed." The same report, following a comparative analysis of the defence white papers of the three main European actors (France, UK and Germany), concludes that "While these three documents all allude in one way or another to the importance of European and transatlantic co-operation, it is nevertheless clear that the aims of the policies of the countries in question are

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25 "The U.S Defence Secretary, R. Cheney ��ेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेेे்."
defined in terms of purely national interests. [...] However, in the foregoing documents there is nothing to imply that the harmonisation of national interests constitutes an important goal...".  

A Security and Defence Policy is a deep reflection of a nation's culture and the sense of its role in the world. As the Gulf War and the conflicts in former Yugoslavia demonstrated, Europe is blessed with many diverse cultures.

1.3. USA's continuing security interests in Europe

The other main actor in the development of the framework of Euro-Atlantic security policy is the United States. For 45 years, the American leadership in world affairs has been tightly linked to the US military presence in Europe and the containment of the Soviet threat. The following statement by US Secretary Acheson is indicative of the role that Europe played in the national security of US: “We have learned our history lesson from two world wars in less than half a century. That experience has taught us that the control of Europe by a single aggressive, unfriendly power would constitute an intolerable threat to the national security of the United States. We participated in those two great wars to preserve the integrity and independence of the European half of the Atlantic community in order to preserve the integrity and independence of the American half”.

The decision of the United States after World War II to participate in a regional defensive alliance represented a fundamental change in American foreign policy, as the definition of national security until 1940 was limited mainly to the protection of domestic tranquillity, US borders and neighbouring areas in the Western Hemisphere.

Among the accomplishments of the immediate post-war period was the creation of NATO. Although the primary rationale for this Alliance was the Soviet threat, a significant secondary result was the integration of the Federal Republic of Germany into Western Europe. In much of the continent, US commitment to NATO was seen as an important balance to Germany’s potential power. As it has often been mentioned, during the Cold War the West relied on NATO “to keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down”.

The dissolution of the Warsaw pact, the crumbling of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany clearly changed the purpose of the Alliance, founded to counter the threat from those entities. America, the core actor in NATO, is seen as the strongest free nation, both economically and militarily. The rapidly changing geopolitical environment is reviving the seeds of nationalism, the spread of weapons, instability, vast migrations, ecological damage, festering poverty and separatist violence. So, the US had to...
redefine its role on the international scene. Now that the Warsaw Pact has disbanded and the US presence is shrinking, what happens to the American leadership in Europe? Do the United States still have security interests in Europe?  

As the US learned its lessons from the past, decided that its interest in Europe remained vital. It has to be recalled that twice in this century the United States, after having withdrawn from Europe, had to return to sort out the awful mess that had ensued. After World War II everybody disarmed and went home, it was then that the US had to come back and create NATO.

As the only institutional link the U.S. had in Europe was NATO, its main goal in the new transformed world in the early 1990s, was the reaffirmation of NATO's role as the central security institution in Europe. NATO was viewed as America’s only hope to retain its political influence in Europe, as the Continent grew increasingly integrated. As Secretary of State James Baker said: “We think it’s still very important to maintain our commitment to the security of Europe. It is very important that it continue and it will continue”.  

But this commitment and the Washington’s desire to shift more of the financial burden of defending Europe to its NATO partners were not matched with a willingness to consider a larger security role for institutions other than NATO. Ever since NATO was established, US political leaders have been urging the European nations to assume more responsibility for their own defence and to pay a larger portion of the cost. Washington has also consistently expressed its support for greater European unity on both economic and security matters. Despite such official enthusiasm for a strong “European pillar” to support NATO, US policy-makers have, in reality, been ambivalent about European allies; taking greater initiative.

During the Cold War, Washington viewed with suspicion any signs that European powers were pursuing independent policies, such as Bonn’s Ostpolitik strategy in the 1970s or Chancellor Kohl’s reunification overtures to Moscow in the weeks following the opening of the Berlin Wall. What the US has always wanted is the best of both worlds: a democratic Europe strong enough to relieve the US from some of its security burdens, but no so strong as to challenge US primacy.

Washington’s uneasiness about a meaningful European security role has become even more apparent regarding their European allies taking greater initiative. Secretary of Defence Cheney’s opposition to the creation of a “rapid reaction force” under the auspices of the European Community is merely one manifestation of that ambivalence.

The U.S. has backed the development of a European security organisation that would bear more responsibility, project a European voice, cooperate with NATO and be able to act outside the NATO area. But when WEU foreign and defence Ministers supported the idea of the WEU becoming the European security and defence pillar, the US


sent a letter to the WEU capitals voicing concern about a WEU caucus approach in NATO.  

Thus the controversy over whether there should be an autonomous European defence, led the US Ambassador to NATO William Taft to say: “Any attempt by the Europeans to take over their own defence would be viewed with suspicion by Washington. The US public won’t understand any proposal to replace NATO with a different mechanism to undertake its fundamental role of deterrence and defence”.  

This stance emerged in a very characteristic way, during the Rome Summit in 1991, when President Bush called on allies to affirm their support for continued US military presence in Europe: “Our premise is that the American role in the defence and the affairs of Europe will not be made superfluous by European Union. If our premise is wrong—if, my friends, your ultimate aim is to provide independently for your own defence—the time to tell us is today”.  

German Chancellor Kohl moved to allay US concerns about its continued role in Europe. He called a united Europe without NATO “unthinkable”. French President Francois Mitterrand said NATO would continue to play a key role, but that more room should be made for the European Community.  

In the year that followed, similar controversies in key issues, such as transatlantic military ties, how to "rescue" Eastern Europe, farm trade etc, became more frequent. France sought to build a new European armed force outside NATO. The US wanted NATO to retain the main role. France was convinced that the European Community could only achieve a distinctive role on the world stage by acting more independently from the United States. The resurrection of Cold War language such as that used by President Bush in January 1992, when he accused the European Community of hiding behind an “iron curtain” of protectionism-appears symptomatic of the new hostility. Bush’s words provoked an angry response from Mitterrand: “France is not ready to bow to American demands, nor to submit to the interests of any other country”. These tensions seemed to ease when both France and US engaged in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  

Under Clinton administration, the US commitment to Europe and therefore to NATO remained undiminished. The US has been open to work out a new kind of security partnership between the Americans and the Europeans. “Clinton feels this new European defence identity is something to be welcomed. It’s time for a new page to be turned and there is a new openness on both sides to do so”.  

But, the fact was that apart from the studies and the talks about European defence by the Europeans, in many circumstances only the US was prepared to act if such a need emerged. Talking about a common foreign and security policy for Europe, part of a new  

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dividing up of security responsibilities with the United States, sounded hollow when the European powers proved themselves unable to do anything useful about the war between Serbia and Croatia. Yugoslavia was a European nation and a European responsibility. Washington left the leadership to Brussels and promised its backing. It resulted in failure.\textsuperscript{43}

As US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs at that time, Richard Holbrooke later stated: “Unless the United States is prepared to put its political and military muscle behind the quest for solutions to European instability, nothing really gets done.”\textsuperscript{44} Even critics acknowledge that nothing moved without America.

During the direct negotiations in Dayton, Ohio, where the Presidents of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia sought for a peaceful settlement in Bosnia, US President reaffirmed its country interests in Europe: Making peace in Bosnia is important to America. …Making peace will prevent the war from spreading. So far, we have been able to contain this conflict to the former Yugoslavia. But the Balkans lie at the heart of Europe, next door to several of our key NATO allies and to some of the new, fragile European democracies. If the war there reignites, it could spread and spark a much larger conflict, the kind of conflict that has drawn Americans into two European wars in this century…. Making peace will advance our goal of a peaceful, democratic and undivided Europe, a Europe at peace with extraordinary benefits to our long-term security and prosperity, a Europe at peace with partners to meet the challenges of the new century -- challenges that affect us here at home like terrorism and drug trafficking, organised crime and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Our enduring interest in the security and stability of Europe demand it.”\textsuperscript{45}

The U.S. security interests in Europe remain unchanged until nowadays, despite the profound changes that have swept Europe since Clinton took office eight years ago. Key elements of the new Europe include an expanded NATO alliance and a European Union committed to accepting new members among its former adversaries. NATO expansion resulted in a new European security system and an affirmation of Washington’s commitment to Europe.

In her preliminary comments on NATO enlargement, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary Albright stated: “The United States has important security interests in central and eastern Europe. If there were a major threat to the peace and security of this region, there is already a high likelihood that we would decide to act, whether NATO enlarges or not. The point of NATO enlargement is to deter such a threat from ever arising”.\textsuperscript{46} The Secretary of Defence William Cohen in his Statement before the same Committee, noted: ”NATO enlargement is critical to protecting and promoting our vital national security interests in Europe. If we fail to seize this historic opportunity to help integrate, consolidate, and stabilise Central and Eastern Europe, we would risk paying a much higher price later.”.

NATO’s enlargement was a symbol of the fact that, contrary to what everybody was expecting after the end of the Cold War, there was more of America in Europe, not less. As Secretary of State Albright said in an interview: “Those interests we have in a stable Europe, that have led us to deploy forces in Europe, that have led us to enlarge the NATO

\textsuperscript{43} “Europe Doesn’t Do the Jon”, The SUN, November 14, 1991.
\textsuperscript{44} “Europe’s Dallying Amid Crises Scares Its Critics”, International Herald Tribune, February 8, 1996.
\textsuperscript{45} Bosnia Negotiations: Statement by President Clinton, Office of the Press Secretary, October 31, 1995.
\textsuperscript{46} Albright Testimony on NATO Enlargement, Office of the Press Secretary, 4/23/97.
alliance are the very same interests that are at stake. They're not the same, specific facts, but the interests are the same. The stability of Europe is a vital interest of US national interests.\textsuperscript{47}

Zhigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Adviser, in his book entitled "The Grand Chessboard", explains why:\textsuperscript{48} The collapse of the enemy left the USA in a unique position. They became both the first and the only real major universal power. (p. 31). For America the major geopolitical gain was Eurasia. (p. 63). Europe is the substantive geopolitical bridgehead of USA in the Eurasian continent the logistical interests of USA are huge [...] NATO is barricading directly the American political influence and military strength in the Eurasian continent. At this point of American-European relations, while the allied European nations are still depending on USA protection any expansion of European influence is becoming a direct expansion of US influence. Reversibly, without tight transatlantic bonds American primacy in Eurasia is not in force. (pp. 109-110).\textsuperscript{49}

In other words, American presence in Europe helps also vital US interests in other places. As Secretary Albright has often stated: "US as a global power with interests and connections on every continent, ... we have a vital stake in creating and sustaining the conditions for global prosperity."\textsuperscript{50} or “America is a global power with global interests. To protect those interests, it is important that the United States be fully and appropriately represented in key capitals around the world"\textsuperscript{51} These global interests such as the democratic and free market reforms in Russia,\textsuperscript{52} the expansion of co-operation and the narrowing of differences with China as it emerges as a key Asian and global power,\textsuperscript{53} the routes to oil supplies in Caucasus and Middle East regions, are served with U.S. presence in Europe. And the U.S. presence in Europe was considered to be best served through the pursuing of a strategy that ensures primacy but in a co-operative context where the Europeans would assume more responsibilities and burdens, former adversaries become partners and the U.S. retain the prerogative of selective engagement in European security matters.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{47}Interview on CNN, Secretary of State Albright, 6/10/99.
\textsuperscript{48}In March 200, Secretary Albright in her remarks at Aspen European Dialogue stated that “Professor Brzezinski taught me everything I know while at Columbia, and then how to apply that knowledge at the National Security Council in the 1970’s.”.
\textsuperscript{49}The extracts come from the Greek version of the book, that is why there may be differences from the original text, which, however, don't change the initial meaning. See: Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, (Athens: Nea Sinora, 1998) (in Greek).
\textsuperscript{50}Albright's address on International Economic Leadership, 97/09/18.
\textsuperscript{51}Senate Foreign Relations Committee Approval of Ambassadorial Nominations July 30, 1997.
\textsuperscript{52}Pickering: International Affairs in the 21st Century, 97/11/18.
\textsuperscript{53}Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Statement before the Senate Finance Committee, Washington, D.C., June 10, 1997.
2. The European Security Institutions: A first attempt to achieve co-operative security

Until 1990 there was a broad functional division in security matters among NATO, European Community and Western European Union, while CSCE functioned mostly as a political forum for consultations among its member states. This neat division did not survive at the end of the Cold War, all four institutions had to adjust to a very different security environment, where no single organisation could handle the whole European security process. Although the need for a co-operative security system within the context of CSCE was acknowledged in official documents, priority was given in practice to the U.S. approach to co-operative security for Europe. And that was inevitable since the Europeans were not effective enough to meet the challenges of the future. The U.S. through NATO became gradually the basic organiser of the new European co-operative structures by effectively adapting NATO to the new situation.

2.1 The North Atlantic (Political ?) Organization

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was formed against the backdrop of emerging tensions after World War II. It has been argued that NATO had been a European initiative from the beginning: it was as explicit an invitation as has ever been extended from smaller powers to a great power to construct an empire and include them within it. On April 4, 1949, in Washington, DC, the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, and the United States signed the North Atlantic Treaty, the political framework for a defensive alliance designed to prevent aggression, or, if necessary, to resist attack against any alliance member. On September 17, 1949, the first North Atlantic Council session was held in Washington and in December 1949 adopted the Alliance's first strategy which approved plans for the defence of Western Europe including US use of nuclear weapons, if necessary, to defend NATO nations.

During the Cold War, NATO's collective defence strategy was primarily based on the principle of deterrence. Given the marked inferiority of allied conventional strength in Europe, the NATO guarantee rested primarily on the nuclear superiority of the United States and the so-called strategy of "massive retaliation". In the conclusion of a 1967 comprehensive review of NATO strategy, the alliance adopted a revised approach to its common defence, based on a balanced range of responses, conventional and nuclear, to all levels of aggression or threats of aggression. The basis of the new concept of "flexible response" was the belief that NATO should be able to deter and counter military force with a range of responses designed to defend directly against attack at an appropriate level, or, if necessary, to escalate the attack to the level necessary to persuade an aggressor to desist.

56 For a detailed analysis and a historical overview of NATO's Strategy Documents, see: NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969, Edited by Dr. Gregory W. Pedlow, (Chief, Historical Office Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in collaboration with NATO International Staff Central Archives). Source: NATO’s official Website.
57 Flexible response is the accompanying nuclear strategy, which envisages meeting an overwhelming conventional attack first with battlefield and then more destructive strategic nuclear weapons.
At the same time, the Alliance accepted the recommendations of the report written by former Belgium Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel and entitled "Future Tasks of the Alliance" which outlined the need to work towards the achievement of disarmament and balanced force reductions. The maintenance of adequate military forces would be coupled with an effort to improve East-West relations. On May 30-31, 1972 NATO agreed to start the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe; members also proposed talks on Mutual Balanced Force Reductions.

Soviet deployment of new mobile theater nuclear missiles (SS-20s) called into question the accepted NATO strategy of deterrence based on the concepts of forward defence and flexible response and lead to a decision in 1979 to modernise its defensive capability. NATO decided to deploy Pershing II missiles in Europe if the Soviets refused to negotiate withdrawal of SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe. The resulting "dual-track" decision by the Alliance combined arms control negotiations with appropriate responding to the increased imbalance created by the new Soviet systems. Alliance governments agreed to deploy U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles in Western Europe.

The successful conclusion of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987, while eliminating all Soviet and U.S. land-based, intermediate-range missiles, required a new appraisal of NATO's policy. In response, the alliance developed its "Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament," which provided a framework for alliance policy in nuclear, conventional, and chemical fields of arms control and tied defence policies to progress in arms control.

Through this brief retrospection, it is ascertained that NATO has made successive readjustments of its military doctrine in order to cope with the changes in the framework of the security environment. But during the early 90’s NATO dealt with a different challenge since the radical changes that occurred in the international scene questioned its cause of existence.

2.1.1 The new strategic concept

Until the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe began in 1989, the confrontation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO had dominated the world politics. The Warsaw Pact, which had 5 million troops and ensured Moscow's domination throughout the Eastern Bloc, began on May 14, 1955 as a response to the West Germany's entrance into NATO. Since the countries of Eastern Europe broke away, one by one, from the Soviet sphere of influence in 1989 and the Kremlin spoke of the end of the cold War with the West, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact was considered inevitable.

Europe's new security milieu affected the future role of NATO. In the past several years’ efforts to reconfigure NATO have led to doctrinal changes and unilateral force reductions. An alliance for common defence cannot reinvent itself without a new unambiguous adversary. So for NATO it was the to-be-or-not-to-be question: Who needs NATO any more, now that the Soviet Union is no longer a threat? At the same time many countries challenged the alliance's continued existence.

58 See, The Harmel Report : full reports by the rapporteurs on the future tasks of the Alliance. Source: NATO’s official Website.
59 Forward defense refers to the alliance's conventional force posture, which required large numbers of troops along NATO's eastern borders, mostly in Germany.
questioned the relevance of NATO after the Cold War and feared a neglected gray zone between Western Europe and Russia.

As it was becoming clear the new dangers to Euro-Atlantic security did not lie in threats of a direct armed attack, but rather in trans-national perils (ethnonationalist rebellion, migration, terrorism) against which the armoured divisions of NATO had no effect. In recognition of the radical political changes in Europe and the improved security environment, the Ministers mandated a fundamental review of the Alliance's political and military strategy.

In July 1990, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) issued the "London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance" trying to adapt to the new realities in Europe mostly by enhancing the political component of the Alliance. The Ministers pledged to intensify political and military contacts with Moscow and with Central and East European capitals and to work not only for the common defence but to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe as well. They underlined the need to undertake broader arms control and confidence-building agreements to limit conventional armed forces in Europe.

Policy disagreements between France and the United States were blocking NATO progress towards formulating the alliance's post-Cold War. More than a year after the fall of the Berlin wall, the future of NATO was so murky that an alliance-wide summit devoted to the subject had been on hold.

France and the US had been at loggerheads since London summit over their respective visions of NATO's role in the post-Cold War world. The US wanted to decrease its military responsibilities in Europe in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe, but without relinquishing political influence. Therefore, the US backed an expanded role for Europe, but it also wanted to revamp NATO as a more political body with a broader reach. France, pointing to the disappearing threat from the Soviet Union, envisaged a diminished NATO, with political control of European security policy transferred to European community. France wanted to create a stronger Europe, but with an independent security and defence identity. Arguing that the US is unwilling to give Europeans any leadership role within NATO, France opposed to efforts to give NATO new political tasks.

On March 7, the president of the European Commission proclaimed that a common defence policy, written into the Treaty of Rome, is an essential goal if the Western alliance is to remain effective. Jacques Delors said that the Gulf crisis, in which the EC failed to offer a united response to Iraqi aggression, had provided an object lesson on the EC's present limitations. Without a common defence policy Europe would never be able to face its international responsibilities. Delors said the EC had to face that challenge.

Since then, NATO moved forward very fast. In its ministerial meeting in Copenhagen in June 1991 France lost a vigorous debate on the breadth and depth of NATO's future political role in Europe. Foreign ministers decided against a French-led effort to limit NATO's purview to strictly military matters. In a June 7 statement, the ministers endorsed

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63 "NATO without the Pact", The Sun, April 2, 1991.
the US position that NATO should be the key forum for both political and military decisions involving the security of NATO members.

In August 1991, the West's reaction to the failed coup that temporarily toppled Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev confirmed the largely political role the NATO alliance has assumed in the post-Cold War period. Throughout the Soviet crisis, NATO's central command, its bulwark against a Soviet invasion, went about peacetime activities without a break. NATO was the forum for the West's collective reaction to the coup. The European Community also voted to suspend $1.145 billion in technical and food aid until the Soviets re-establish democratic reform.67

But NATO offered the chance for the leaders of Western Europe and the U.S. to address the crisis collectively. The August 21 NATO gathering was a meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the organization's foreign ministers, rather than the Defense Planning Committee. During their deliberations, NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner was summoned to take a telephone call from Boris N. Yeltsin, president of the Russian republic and the leader who put down the revolt.68 Yeltsin told Woerner he had assumed control of the military in Gorbachev's absence and that the Red Army's tanks were withdrawing from Moscow. That the ad hoc leader of the Soviet Union would be consulting with the secretary-general of NATO at such a moment reassured members that their judgement at the 1990 London summit had been correct.

Soviet coup prompted rethinking of security arrangements in Europe.69 British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd implied that the West could look forward to an even more co-operative relationship with the Soviet Union than it has had in the last two years. US Secretary Baker said that "The crisis has demonstrated the importance of NATO Alliance first as a political instrument for supporting democracy and reform in Eastern Europe as well as the Soviet Union, second as a forum to co-ordinate a Western response to common political as well as military challenges, and third as a firm bulwark for our common security.".70

NATO Secretary Manfred Woerner said that the new situation emerged after the soviet coup had failed, has forced NATO to review its strategy, which was two years in the making and scheduled to be unveiled in Rome. This grand strategy has been overtaken by events in the Soviet Union.71

In the light of changed circumstances, in November 1991, the Rome Declaration on Peace and Co-operation further underlined NATO's intention to redefine its objectives by adopting the alliance's "New Strategic Concept".72 The New Strategic Concept identifies that the threat of a massive full-scale Soviet attack, which had provided the focus of NATO's strategy during the Cold War, had disappeared but at the same time new broader challenges to alliance security interests, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional instability, and terrorism had emerged. The Alliance acknowledged that these risks

72 The Alliance's New Strategic Concept Agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7th-8th Nov. 1991. Source: Official Website of NATO.
were less predictable\textsuperscript{73} and beyond the focus of traditional concerns. Instead of an identifiable foe, NATO saw "economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes," as being flash points against which the alliance's members need protection.

In that context the strategy adopts a broader approach to security, centered more on crisis management and conflict prevention while at the same time pursuing political efforts favouring dialogue with Russia and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In order to fulfil its new tasks the alliance recognises, first that "the creation of a European identity in security and defence will underline the preparedness of the Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility for their security and will help to reinforce transatlantic solidarity." and second that "Other European institutions such as the EC, WEU and CSCE also have roles to play, in accordance with their respective responsibilities and purposes, in these fields.".

The declaration also outlined the alliance's future tasks in the context of a framework of interlocking and mutually reinforcing institutions, including the European Union, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Western European Union (WEU), and the Council of Europe, working together to build a new European security system. However it keeps the main responsibility for the alliance itself since "the extent of its membership and of its capabilities gives NATO a particular position in that it can perform all four-core security functions. NATO is the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty."\textsuperscript{74}

As far as the military strategy is concerned, the new strategic concept provided that the Alliance will maintain a mixture of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe, although at significantly lower levels. To ensure effectiveness, alliance forces must become increasingly mobile to respond to a range of contingencies and must be prepared for flexible build-up to react to regional instability and crises. Collective defence arrangements will rely on multinational forces within the integrated military structure. Nuclear forces continue to play an essential role in Allied strategy but will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve stability.

With the adoption of the new strategic concept NATO's first attempt of adjusting to the new security environment was completed and the basic axes of future action concerning further approach of NATO's internal and external dimension of adaptation were determined.\textsuperscript{75} NATO remained basically a defence coalition but since a clear threat did not exist, the transformation into a European security organisation capable of dealing with crisis in Europe and to perform multilateral peace operations

\textsuperscript{73} NATO General Secretary Manfred Woerner characterized the situation as "a lot of risks that you cannot clearly define.", "NATO's New Strategy Stresses Mobility for 'Crisis' Management", \textit{Aviation Week & Space Technology}, June 3, 1991.

\textsuperscript{74} It was the response of USA and Britain to the dispute about USA and NATO role in Europe In his comment the U. S. President George Bush had said that if European officials believed that the U. S. should not be on the Continent, it was the time to say so. The comment was aimed at France, which wanted the European defense forces to work "in parallel" with NATO. Britain championed the opposite view, that any separate European force must be a "pillar" for NATO. "NATO Strategy Review Moves Faster On Political Rather Than Military Front", \textit{Aviation Week & Space Technology}, November 11, 1991.

was promoted. Before assuming this new role, NATO's legitimisation in three levels (internal-allied, relations with the former USSR and international institutions) had to precede. Based on these objectives NATO's further transformation was promoted.

2.1.2 The Adaptation Process

Following the adoption of the new strategic concept, NATO was deeply involved in a complex process involving both internal and external adaptation. The first dimension of adaptation describes the transformation process of NATO's internal structures the objective of which was first the upgrading of European allies’ role in defense and security matters, and second the development of a new command structure capable of coping with the demands of NATO's new role. To that twofold end two new interrelated concepts developed in the framework of NATO. The first was the European Security and Defence identity (ESDI) and the second the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs).

Discussions about the enhancement of European role within NATO began in the early 90's while the CJTF concept was launched in late 1993. The milestone for further development of these concepts was the January 1994 NATO summit in Brussels, which endorsed streamlining the internal structure of the Alliance, in order to prepare NATO for new roles and missions. Specifically, in the adopted Declaration it is mentioned that "We have agreed: to adapt further the Alliance's political and military structures to reflect both the full spectrum of its roles and the development of the emerging European Security and Defence Identity, and endorse the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces". ⁷⁶

ESDI provided the solution to the puzzling of the early 90’s concerning US aspiration of reinforcing European role within the NATO framework and to the dispute between European states whether Europe should promote an autonomous defence and security identity. The issue of how Europeans could develop a common foreign and security policy which might lead to a common defence policy, without duplicating and weakening NATO was resolved through the elaboration and implementation of the ESDI. As the EU would develop its common foreign and security policy in order to achieve a common defence policy, NATO would continue to develop the ESDI in order to enable Europeans to take more responsibility for their own security and defence, working within the Alliance.

Since the Maastricht Treaty, which had established the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), stipulated that it was the Western European Union's task to elaborate and implement defence-related decisions and actions of the European Union, while at the same time WEU was the European pillar of NATO, the proper channel for developing ESDI was the establishment of an evolving and effective co-operation between NATO and WEU. The Brussels Declaration mentioned characteristically:

"We support strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance through the Western European Union, which is being developed as the defence component of the European Union. The Alliance's organisation and resources will be adjusted so as to

facilitate this. [...] We therefore stand ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy. We support the development of separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security.”

In order to fulfil this provision NATO adopted the CJTF concept. One month later, in an article, the Secretary General of NATO, M. Woerner described the concept by writing: “The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept represents the next logical step in this adaptation of our force structures. It will provide the flexibility that would be required to allow NATO and non-NATO forces to act together in peacekeeping and other contingency operations. Using a “building bloc” approach, command elements could be detached from major NATO commands for operations under NATO or, where NATO decides not to become involved, under WEU auspices. The concept therefore provides a mechanism for cooperation with units from states that are not part of the Alliance’s integrated military structure, or with units representing other organisations. In this manner, forces can also be created to permit Allies to act jointly with Cooperation Partners or other states.”

The second dimension, the so called external adaptation, refers to the institutional reinforcement of the relations between NATO and former Warsaw Pact states (including Russia) according to the "open doors" policy and to the expansion of the Alliance. At first, many East Europeans leaders believed the best solution was to create new structures under the umbrella of the CSCE. The futility of the CSCE’s condemnation of Soviet use of force in the Baltics made them sceptical whether CSCE could fill that role. One of the most outspoken proponents of the CSCE, Czechoslovakia’s President Vaclav Havel said: "NATO is Europe’s only functioning democratic security structure". Most Central and Eastern leaders were seeking alignment with the West to balance their geographical proximity to Russia, and their continuing economic dependence on it.

Although in the London summit NATO heads of state proposed friendly relations with their former adversaries and there have been named diplomatic liaisons, since then NATO leaders worried that too close an embrace with the East Europeans would isolate Moscow and heighten concerns of Soviet military and political hard-liners. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the German foreign minister said that it would be unwise for East Europeans to try to join NATO. In February 1991, a high level NATO team discouraged any embarrassing application for NATO membership from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. As the first East European head of state to pay a visit to the headquarters of the NATO, Havel appealed for closer relations between NATO and the new democracies of Eastern Europe to ease the dangers of a security vacuum created by the collapse of Warsaw

80 “East ends its military alliance”, The Washington Times, April 1, 1991. The official Tass News Agency warned former members of the Pact, that they would threaten Soviet security interest if the joined the rival alliance.
In an effort to ease the concerns of Eastern European countries still worried about a possible return of soviet occupation forces, so that these former Warsaw Pact countries would stop asking to join NATO, the Alliance declared that “any coercion or intimidation” aimed at the countries of Central and eastern Europe would be treated as a matter of “direct and material concern” to the 16 member of NATO. In its ministerial meeting in Copenhagen in June 1991, the Ministers of the NAC stated with emphasis that their purpose was not "to isolate any country, nor see a new division of the Continent."

NATO Secretary Manfred Woerner disclosed that during the Soviet crisis in August 1991, NATO reinforced its links with the former Soviet satellites of East and Central Europe. NATO had declined requests from these countries for Western military protection during the past two years out of fear of provoking the Soviet Union’s reaction. The military implications were not lost on the Central Europeans who used the coup to reassert their interest in joining the Alliance. As word spread that the revolt failed, the Baltic Republic of Latvia declared independence, joining Estonia and Lithuania in splitting with the Kremlin. The failed hard-line coup in Moscow has also caused a virtual revolution in the Ukraine, which had been counted on as a conservative communist bastion that would join Gorbachev’s new Soviet Federation. Ukrainian independence followed some days later.

Thus, the following Rome meeting created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in order to develop an institutional relationship of consultation and co-operation on political and security issues between NATO and its former adversaries. This initiative culminated in the participation of Foreign Ministers and representatives from the 16 NATO countries, six Central European countries, and the three Baltic States at the inaugural meeting of the NACC in December 1991. At the second NACC meeting in March 1992, the new independent states of the former Soviet Union became members, except Georgia, which was admitted the following month. Albania joined the NACC in June 1992.

The Brussels Summit, in 1994, launched the Partnership for Peace (PfP), which expands and intensifies practical political and military co-operation between NATO and countries of central Europe and former Soviet republics, as well as some of Europe’s traditionally neutral countries, and allows them to consult with NATO in the event of a direct threat to their security. The program, conceived at the time by US Secretary of Defence Les Aspin, was intended to encourage non-NATO members to develop civilian cooperation.

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85 Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Statement issued by the North Atlantic Council, Meeting in Ministerial Session in Copenhagen, 6-7 June 1991. Source: Official Website of NATO.
90 Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, Press Communiqué S-1(91)86 Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome 8th Nov. 1991.
control of defence ministries and to start joint planning and joint military exercises with NATO.92

Since NATO's new post-Cold War military strategy, CIS states have responded with everything, from requests for associate membership status in the NATO alliance to joint training exercises. Although PfP does not extend NATO security guarantees, it was the initial effort to achieve some of those aims. But it was also a mechanism for creating co-operative relations with the former adversaries. In Brussels, NATO leaders also welcomed an evolutionary expansion of NATO membership to include new democracies in the region. A study on NATO Enlargement was also initiated by NATO Foreign Ministers in December 1994 and published in September 1995.93

While promoting the internal and external adaptation of NATO, emphasis was put on developing the organisation's new role in peacekeeping operations. At the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo (June 4, 1992) NATO Foreign Ministers affirmed for the first time their readiness to support peacekeeping activities under the auspices of the OSCE on a case-by-case basis in June 1992.94 On July 1992, the OSCE at the Helsinki follow-up Conference expressed its approval for CSCE peacekeeping activities by NATO. On the same day the North Atlantic Council agreed on a NATO maritime operation in the Adriatic, in co-ordination with the WEU, to monitor compliance with the UN embargo against Serbia and Montenegro.

In September the NAC agreed on measures to make Alliance resources available in support of UN, CSCE, and EC efforts to bring peace in former Yugoslavia. NATO began enforcing UN economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro and the arms embargo against former Yugoslav states (Operation Sharp Guard) on November 18, 1992. On December UN Secretary General requested access to NATO contingency plans for possible military operations in former Yugoslavia, including enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina, establishment of safe havens for civilians in Bosnia and ways to prevent the spread of conflict to Kosovo and the Former Republic of Macedonia. As the crisis in the former Yugoslavia was evolving and the EU was unable to act effectively, NATO, gradually turned out to be the principal organisation dealing with the crisis.

NATO enforced a UN Security Council resolution banning military flights (the "No-Fly Zone") over Bosnia-Herzegovina since April 12, 1993. On June 8, 1993, an agreement was reached to place the NATO/WEU Adriatic task force under the operational command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Similarly, the intensive NATO air operations over Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the threat of UN-sanctioned air strikes, constitute the largest ongoing series of military air missions flown over southern Europe since World War II.95 Following its August 1, 1995 declaration that direct threats or attacks on UN-designated "safe areas" would prompt a decisive response, NATO initiated an extensive two-week-long air and artillery campaign on Sarajevo. Subsequent to September and October agreements on a Bosnian cease-fire and other measures, NATO completed preparations to implement the military aspects of Dayton Peace Agreement. In December 1995 UN...

94 para. 11, www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95c920604a.htm
95 "NATO over Europe: Bosnian air ops test NATO/U.N", Aviation Week & Space Technology August 30, 1993.
peacekeeping forces (UNPROFOR) handed over command of military operations in Bosnia to the NATO-led multinational Implementation Force (IFOR).

Through the above mentioned actions NATO succeeded in passing the first crucial test to its process of transformation. It was the first time in its history that NATO carried out "out-of-area" combat missions. NATO managed to tide over the previous restriction of the alliance mandate to safeguard the territory of its member-states. Furthermore, NATO achieved that, in general, in a co-operative way. First, the military action was the outcome of co-operation and co-ordination with UN and it was based upon the resolutions of UN. However since the first co-operation of UN and USA, there had been a difference of opinion concerning when, how and in which cases UN had to interfere in regional conflicts.

Secondly, during the NATO crisis management in Bosnia, the USA made efforts to include Russia in activities and, to a large extent, avoid actions which could be interpreted as a provocation by the latter. The participation of Russia in IFOR in January 1996, was the first example of Russia and NATO working together, although a clearly discernible cooling of relations became evident when NATO began internal deliberations in 1995 on enlargement. But it was a big step towards the establishment of a co-operative security regime since one of the prerequisites is the members of such a regime to agree on principles, roles and norms not only for peacefully reducing conflict between them but also for their intervention in the conflicts of states outside their sphere of co-operation.

2.2 The Vision of a European Security & Defence Policy and the WEU

For almost 40 years, the European unification attempt that had begun in the 50’s with the formation of the European Community did not include collaboration in the area of defence and security. The failure of the Pleven plan, which resulted from a French attempt to prevent the re-establishment of the German army by forming a European Defence Community and therefore creating a European army,

97 NATO's Role in Bringing Peace to the Former Yugoslavia, NATO Basic Fact Sheet No. 4 (March 1997). M. Woerner, NATO's then-Secretary General apparently annoyed by the criticism exercised on NATO about the alliance's limited actions, said repeatedly that the United Nations had to lead the way on the former Yugoslavia. See: "NATO Talks Fail to Reach Accord on Bosnia Plan", The New York Times, May 26, 1993.
98 The United States expressed the opinion, that agrees to send armed forces on peace-keeping missions only if its vital interests are at stake and if these missions are placed under the direction of NATO or a coalition similar to the one formed for the Iraq Operation. For the disagreements between the UN and the USA See: Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Don't make the U.N.'s Hard Job Harder", The New York Times, August 20, 1993. "Clinton Seeks Limits On Peace Keeping", The Washington Post, September 27, 1993.
100 For further analysis see: Daniel Lerner & Raymond Aron, France Defeats EDC (London: Thames & Hudson, 1957), passim.
demonstrated that the attempt for unification had to be confined to the field of economy only. Besides, the reasons that led to the French initiative did not apply after Germany’s entrance in NATO. Germany would begin arming itself while armament control would be performed by WEU.

Under different circumstances this time, in the early 60’s, three years after the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom, which were essentially economic, France came up with a new proposal known as the "Fouchet Plan". This plan anticipated the formation of a statutory framework of collaboration for Foreign Affairs and Defence within the EEC. However, it was not widely accepted and yet another attempt failed. The bipolar structure of the international system imposed coiling around USA through NATO against the Soviet threat.

Finally, the only successful attempt was the formation of the European Political Co-operation (EPC) in 1970. The aim of EPC was an informal collaboration and deliberation among members on matters concerning Foreign Affairs. From 1970 to 1986, the members of the European Communities confined to this collaboration, on the basis of informal agreements without permanent structures, even though a series of proposals for daring steps towards European unification, including matters of defence and security were submitted during this period. The Single European Act in 1986, which reformed the European Communities, made a special reference to the European foreign policy co-operation and a "EPC" Secretariat was established. But the Single Act does not refer to a "common foreign policy" and the divide between the activities of the Communities and those of EPC remained unquestionable.

2.2.1 The Maastricht Treaty

With the Maastricht Treaty, which was signed on February 7th, 1992 and came in force on November 1st, 1993, Europeans made the first step towards determining Europe’s role in defence and security matters in a statutory level. Before that NATO’s new strategic concept had been adopted, in which it was pointed out that there would be a future European security and defence identity through the framework of NATO. At the prelude of the agreement the members of EU stated their determination to apply a common foreign and security policy, including the future formation of a common defence policy, that, in a given time, may lead to common defence. This Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was enacted with article J Title V of the Treaty.

The establishment of a systematic collaboration among members, the adoption of common positions and the gradual application of common actions in fields of important common interests for the member states would be necessary to materialise the CFSP. (article J.2, J.3). As for matters concerning defence, it was decided that the Western European Union (WEU) constitutes the appropriate statutory framework.

within which the development of the defensive dimension of CFSP would evolve. Specifically, in the article J.4.2 it is mentioned: "the Union requests the Western European Union, which is an integral part of the development of the European Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications.". Furthermore, in a relevant Declaration annexed to the Treaty, it is stressed out that the development of an authentic European security and defence identity will be promoted in a complementary to NATO way.\textsuperscript{103}

The signing of the Treaty would have been a unique moment in European history if the outbreak of the Yugoslavian crisis and the failure of the 12 members of EU to apply consistent and common policy while confronting the crisis had not occurred. While the Intergovernmental Conference was in progress, in order to adopt the definite plan of the Treaty, it was assessed that the Yugoslavian crisis was an opportunity for EU to prove its capability to handle a crisis that constitutes a threat for its stability and security.\textsuperscript{104}

The facts did not confirm these expectations. On the contrary, the facts proved the European states’ inability to agree on a common strategy in order to confront the crisis, bringing to surface the lack of political will for harmonisation of national choices for defence and security matters.\textsuperscript{105} With the absence of substantial politics for convergence of opinions, the June ’91 declarations concerning the Yugoslavian crisis composed a major blow to EU’s future credibility. As stated by Henry Kissinger “The Western democracies, with the best intentions, made the likely inevitable”.\textsuperscript{106}

Two years later, the newly formed EU found itself in the difficult position to account for an unsuccessful CFSP, just after the Maastricht Treaty came into force. Furthermore, Europe has shown that, from the moment the United States avoids involvement, as in the case of the first stages in the Yugoslav crisis, its military means of action remained limited. It was not even ready to group the forces of WEU member states under a single command even in application of measures decided by the United Nations.

It was not only that negative situation which was undermining the future of the European CFSP, but also the provisions of the Treaty itself that described the aims and the means of materialisation in a vague way, reflecting the confusion prevailing during the works of the Intergovernmental Conference and the inability of the members to adopt a common vision of Europe’s future. The period between the summit in Maastricht and the time that the Treaty became effective, was characterised by uncertainty concerning EU’s future.\textsuperscript{107}

In the following years until the revision of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU members, in some cases, succeeded in harmonising their policies and applying

\textsuperscript{103} Declaration on The Role of the Western European Union and its Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance, Maastricht, 10 December 1991, Source: official website of WEU. For WEU’s role in European security according to the Maastricht Treaty see below.
\textsuperscript{104} According to Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, Jacques Poos the EU’s intervention in Yugoslavia was "the hour for Europe, not the hour of the United States", Los Angeles Times, “EC Urges End to Yugoslav Violence, Threatens Aid Cut”, June 29, 1991.
\textsuperscript{106} International Herald Tribune, 21 September 1992.
common actions through CFSP. For example, in 1994-95, one of the first joint actions by the European Union in the framework of the CFSP concerned the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. During the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NTP) Review Conference in April-May 1995, the country members of the Union played an essential role in ensuring the indefinite extension of the NPT, although the European too often appeared divided during the discussions.108

What became obvious during the following years was the radical disagreements among members about Europe’s role in security and defence matters. The Maastricht Treaty provisions concerning CFSP were the product of a compromise between the so-called "Atlanticists", led by the UK, and the so-called "Europeanists", led by France and Germany, as well as their disagreement whether Europe should claim an autonomous security and defence identity. At the same time, the evolution of Franco-German collaboration109 gave the impression that the breach between the two approaches was becoming wider and that the cohesion of the two countries could be disturbed easily since their opinions contradicted. As a result there was an increased confusion about what Europe's role was going to be.

It has been written that "The Maastricht Treaty of December 1992 marked the striking of a relatively fragile security bargain among the Europeanists and the Atlanticists: in the short term recognizing NATO’s primacy but clearly defining the path for future independent Europeanist evolution.".110 In the middle of this security bargain there was WEU and the question of how its future role would evolve.

2.2.2 The past of WEU: A guide for the future

The end of the bipolar confrontation in Europe created a unique opportunity for the WEU to redefine its future role in European security matters, after a long hibernation period imposed by the conditions created after the end of the Cold War.

The extent of this involvement is related to the course of events taking place in NATO and EU since WEU was initially connected to the newly formed at that time NATO, and subsequently, to the different pursuits of the European states concerning the creation of an autonomous European rallying in defence and security matters. Any notion referring to WEU’s new role should include a brief account of its history in retrospect.

The reasons for WEU’s formation can be found in the conditions created in post-war Europe. The main concern of the European states was to prevent the reappearance of a revisionary power in the Continent. In this framework the European powers (France, UK


and the members of BENELUX) signed the Brussels Treaty on March 27th 1948. The Treaty established a political and military collaboration forum, through the formation of the Western Union, known as the Brussels Treaty Organisation, the forerunner of today's Western European Union. As far as the main aim of the Organisation is concerned, at the prelude of the founding Treaty it is mentioned that the members are determined "To afford assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in maintaining international peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression; To take such steps as may be held to be necessary in the event of a renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression".

Developments in the international scene forewarned of the deterioration of USA-USSR relations and disorientated the security priorities of the European states. Germany was not the threat any more. It was the USSR. And the question was USA's involvement in European security. The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949 and NATO’s creation achieved this. In December 1950, the newly formed defensive mechanism of Western Union was handed over to NATO.

The pending matters, mainly formerly revisionary Germany’s reaccession in the European security structures in a way that French and British concerns could be overcome, were settled in the Conference that took place in London between September 28th and October 3rd 1954 with the participation of the five members of the Western Union, Germany, Italy, USA and Canada. On October 23rd the agreements, including the revised Brussels Treaty that enacted the succession of the Western Union by the WEU, were signed.

From the day of its formation until 1973, WEU, despite its limited action, contributed to solving three crucial problems concerning the restoration of inter-European post-war balance. Specifically:

- It functioned as a safety valve for the incorporation of Western Germany in the euro-atlantic security system. Right after the foundation of WEU, the occupation regime was brought to an end and both WEU and NATO accepted Western Germany. Furthermore, the revised Brussels Treaty guaranteed Germany's right to be rearmed. France and Britain would perform armament control.
- It contributed decisively to solving the dispute over the control of the industrial region of Saar, which caused tension to German-French relations.
- It functioned as a forum on the collaboration between Britain and the six members of EC until Britain joined the European Communities.

111 France and Britain’s signing of the Dunkirk Treaty in March 1947 had preceded. It concerned the confrontation of Germany in case it attempted to employ a dynamic revisionist policy. The creation of the organization of the Brussels Treaty was the result of British initiative for expanding the Anglo-French alliance by forming a new allied conveyor with the participation of the BENELUX countries.


113 It has been said that the Brussels Treaty was used as a diplomatic tool for USA's involvement in European security. According to Alfred Cahen (former Secretary-General of the Western European Union) "the signing of that diplomatic instrument was to play a major role in the launching of the Atlantic Alliance and NATO. President Truman told Congress that a great step had been taken along the road towards the building of Europe's defence, adding, "This development merits our unqualified support. I am sure that America will take the measures necessary to provide the free countries with any assistance that their situation might call for". Alfred Cahen, The Western European Union and NATO, Brassey’s Atlantic Commentaries No.1 (UK: Brassey’s, 1989), p. 2.
It should be noted that even though WEU’s contribution to handling the above mentioned matters was important, further activation of the WEU in European security matters faced constraints caused by both the structural pressure applied during the Cold War and the definite choice of Europeans that NATO remained the cornerstone of European security. Consequently the WEU gradually came to a state of hibernation during the 70’s.

At the beginning of the 80’s the reactivation of the WEU with the adoption of the Rome Declaration, favoured a double cause: the prevention of EPC expansion to security matters and the boosting of American commitment to ensure European security. A number of coincidental factors preceded: the Genscher initiative in November 1981, that intended to expand the EPC in defence and security matters, Reagan’s “Strategic Defence Initiative” (SDI) in 1983 without consulting with the Europeans and the “Euromissile crisis” that created the impression that the transatlantic link with Europe had loosened.

A further boost to WEU’s revival was given after the Reykjavik Summit meeting in October 1986. Negotiations between the two Super-Powers for the withdrawal of medium range nuclear weapons, posed essential security dilemmas to the Europeans. Could the Europeans still depend on the nuclear shielding of the USA? If not, should they just reinforce NATO’s European pillar or should they create an autonomous European defensive system? The response to these questions defined the future nature of the WEU.

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114 Besides article IV of the founding Treaty states: “In the execution of the Treaty, the High Contracting Parties and any Organs established by Them under the Treaty shall work in close cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.”. Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-defence Signed at Brussels on March 17, 1948, as Amended by the ‘Protocol Modifying and Competing the Brussels Treaty”, Signed at Paris on October 23, 1954. Source: Official Website of WEU.

115 It is indicatively mentioned that it was a period of inactivity for the WEU Council’s functions, while between 1974 and 1977 the post of Secretary-General remained vacant. In many cases the Council refused to answer Assembly’s questions explaining that the European defensive collaboration was not mature enough to express a common position.

116 For WEU reactivation by the Rome Declaration see: Panos Tsakaloyannis (ed.), The Reactivation of the Western European Union: the Effects on EC and its Institutions, European Institute of Public Administration (Maastricht: The Netherlands, 11985), passim.

117 Because of the French and Belgian governments’ initiative, two Foreign Affairs and Defense minister meetings that led to the adoption of the Rome Treaty took place in Rome (26th and 27th of October). Article 3 of the Declaration mentions: “Conscious of the continuing necessity to strengthen western security and of the specifically Western European geographical, political, psychological and military dimensions, the Ministers underlined their determination to make better use of the WEU framework in order to increase cooperation between the member States in the field of security policy and to encourage consensus. In this context, they called for continued efforts to preserve peace, strengthen deterrence and defence and thus consolidate stability through dialogue and cooperation.”. WEU Council of Ministers Rome Declaration, Rome, 27 October 1984. Source: Official Website of WEU.


In October 1987, WEU’s Council adopted the “Hague Platform” (The Platform on European Security Interests). The platform made the choice to promote the European defence effort within the Alliance by reinforcing NATO’s European pillar clear. In Part É para. 4 it is remarked that: "We intend therefore to develop a more cohesive European defence identity which will translate more effectively into practice the obligations of solidarity to which we are committed through the modified Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties."

However, the stated intention to upgrade the WEU by improving relations with NATO did not come along with statutory reform that could transform it into an effective organisation for dealing with the operational tasks of defence matters. The emphasis which was given on the nuclear arsenal of France and Britain and their decision to retain their autonomy of nuclear prevention capability regardless developments in USSR-USA relations was impressive. It can be said that the Platform was British and French politics’ reply to the nuclear disarmament negotiations of this period of time.

Until the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the WEU with its reactivation marginally developed its operational role in crisis situations as for example during the Gulf Crisis.

2.2.3 The new co-operative role: Defence component of the EU and NATO’s European Pillar

Through a parallel process of NATO’s transformation and CFSP promotion by the EU, the WEU had to develop a double role: as the defence component of the process of the European unification (according to the Maastricht Treaty) and as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance (according to the Rome Declaration 1991). To become, in other words, the operational link between I ÁÔÏ and EU, and to materialise the co-operative upgrading of the transatlantic link. The Declaration of "The Role of the Western European Union and its Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance", 123 which annexed in the Maastricht Treaty, is the first post-Cold War document that describes WEU’s new role and remarks on the need to develop a close working relationship with the EU and NATO, and to strengthen WEU’s operational role by examining and defining appropriate missions, structures and means.

Source: Official Website of WEU.
121 Specifically the Declaration mentions: “The independent forces of France and the United Kingdom contribute to overall deterrence and security.” (part II, paragraph 4). “In the nuclear field also, we shall continue to carry our share: some of us by pursuing appropriate cooperative arrangements with the US; the UK and France by continuing to maintain independent nuclear forces, the credibility of which they are determined to preserve.” (part III, paragraph a.3). For a relevant analysis see N.Witney, O.Debouzy, R.A. Levine, Western European Nuclear Forces, (RAND, 1995), passim.
122 As the Political Director of WEU, Alyson Bailes, pointed out: "But at this stage WEU’s role was still largely limited to a "talking shop"; and though a couple of European naval operations in the Gulf were put nominally under a WEU flag, this was a matter of coordination between the nations involved with no real central mechanism of command." Speech by Alyson Bailes, Political Director WEU, Europe and the United States: Organizing the Cooperation between NATO and WEU/EU (DGAP Summer School, Berlin, 20 August 1999). Source: Official Website of WEU. As for WEU’s role during the Gulf Crisis, see: Willem van Eekelen, ‘WEU and the Gulf Crisis’, Survival, 32(6) (November/December 1990). Michael Chichester, "The Gulf: The Western European Union Naval deployment to the Middle East", Navy International, 96 (2) (February 1991).
123 The Role of the Western European Union and its Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance, Maastricht, 10 December 1991.
The WEU had to accomplish a complex task in order to achieve an effective transformation enabling it to fulfil its future role because:

- The lack of homogeneity among members of the three organisations imposed a problem that should be overcome. Both NATO and EU included nations that were not WEU members. How could the WEU function as the statutory link between the two for European defence and security matters?
- The field of action should be determined. Operational capabilities (structures and means) compatible to NATO, should be promoted.
- The relation of WEU between NATO and EU should be defined precisely.

In order to overcome the first problem, in 1991, at Maastricht, WEU Members invited States, which were Members of the European Union (Greece, Denmark, Ireland) to accede to WEU, or to become observers if they wish so. Greece became the tenth Member State in March 1995. Ireland and Denmark also joined the Organisation with Observer status. Subsequently Austria, Finland and Sweden, became Observers following their accession to the EU in 1995. Simultaneously, other European Members of NATO were invited to become Associate Members of WEU in a way which would enable them to participate fully in the activities of the Organisation. Iceland, Norway and Turkey became Associate Members at that time.

The status of Associate Partner was created in Kirchberg in May 1994. It covers the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which have signed a Europe Agreement with the European Union. Thus, from 1994, WEU welcomed as Associate Partners the 10 new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Since 1991, WEU has developed a framework within which an increasing number of European countries have become associated with its activities. In 1995, there were 25 countries in the WEU family of nations, encompassing four types of status: Member State, Associate Member, Observer and Associate Partner. Only the 10 Member States were signatories to the modified Brussels Treaty and have full decision-making rights in WEU. The other 15 countries have been associated with WEU activities. The shape, which was finally adopted instead of reinforcing the efficiency of the Organisation, it created a "Daedalus" framework in which decisions for action had to be taken.

Concerning the promotion of WEU’s operational role, on June 19th 1992, the Council of WEU defined the missions that would be carried out by the organisation known as the "Petersburg tasks" that included three mission categories: a) humanitarian and rescue tasks, b) peacekeeping tasks and c) tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

Furthermore, it was decided that a planning cell would be established under the authority of the Council, that would be responsible for: a) preparing contingency plans for the employment for forces under WEU auspices; b) preparing recommendations for the necessary command, control and communication arrangements, including standing operating procedures for headquarters which might

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124 See: Document 1360, Assembly of Western European Union. The enlargement of WEU, Report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr. Ward, 19th April 1993.
be selected, c) keeping an updated list of units and combinations of units which might be allocated to WEU for specific operations. Finally, the first steps which set the general framework for military units answerable to WEU were taken. WEU member States declared that they were prepared to make military units available from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the authority of WEU.

At the ministerial meeting on 22nd November 1993, it was made clear that the European corps (Belgium, France, Germany/ later Spain and Luxembourg participated), the Multinational Division (central), consisting of units from Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, and the UK/Netherlands amphibious force had already been declared as multinational forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU). In the Kirchberg declaration of 9th May 1994, the Council of Ministers of WEU has confirmed the importance which it attaches to the continued operational development of WEU. In 1995, a permanent fund to cover the start-up costs of any WEU operation was created in WEU’s budget. Other measures aimed at developing the WEU’s operational capabilities include the establishment of the Satellite Centre in Torrejon, Spain, the creation of a Situation Centre.

Some progress was achieved on the question as to how transatlantic relationships in security and defence matters and specifically co-operation between WEU and NATO might be developed. Regarding the development of close working links between the two organisations, even though since 1991 a number of common Council sessions of WEU and NATO had taken place, it was not until May 1996 before a Security Agreement was reached between NATO and WEU permitting the exchange of classified information and documents between the two organisations. The concept of CJTFs, which was intended to provide a mechanism for an effective co-operation with WEU, remained in the papers until 1996, as little progress was made on developing the modalities of such a co-operation. In addition the fact that both WEU and NATO considered they would have responsibilities in peace operations and crisis management, meant that the division of tasks between them would become a practical problem which had to be resolved.126

There has been less progress in the working relationship between the EU and WEU, mainly because of the European members’ inability to materialise the predictions for the CFSP. The first application of provisions set out in the Maastricht Treaty with regard to the WEU (article J.4.2) occurred, for example, in November 1996 when the Council of the EU adopted a decision requesting the WEU to examine how it could contribute to the EU’s humanitarian efforts in support of the refugees and displaced persons in the Great Lakes region in Africa. That was the main reason why WEU has been margined in the Yugoslav crisis. As it was noticed “WEU can play a credible and effective role in this area only if all the governments give a decisive political impetus to the achievement of the various projects to which the Council and

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126 In this framework the worry of WEU’s being pushed aside was often expressed, following the continuously growing role of NATO in crisis management matters. See, for example: Document 1388, Assembly of Western European Union. WEU Assembly proposals for the forthcoming NATO summit meeting, Report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr. Baumel, 8th November 1993. Document 1548, Assembly of Western European Union. The future role of WEU, Report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr. Liapis, 13 November 1996.
its subsidiary organs are committed.".  Although WEU had an operational deficit in order to barge in the Yugoslav crisis, the reality was that the WEU suffered more from a political deficit.

127 Document 1418, Assembly of Western European Union. European Security: crisis-prevention and management, Report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr. De Puig, 11\textsuperscript{th} May 1994, p. 11.
3. Shaping European Security: The 2nd Attempt

While the co-operative process in Europe was just at the beginning, it was after the Bosnian crisis that the U.S. vision of creating a co-operative security system that pursues the US interests in Europe started being materialised thoroughly. The theoretical base of this policy had already been defined. In 1993, a paper on NATO's future by three American analysts at the Rand Corp. -Ronald Asmus, Richard Kugler and Stephen Larrabee, outlined the appropriate American policy for Europe, provoking the most stir in the United States. According to the above mentioned analysts "A new U.S.-European strategic bargain is needed, one that extends NATO's collective defence and security arrangements to those areas where the seeds for future conflict in Europe lie: the Atlantic alliance's eastern and southern borders.".

They argued that although the conflicts would occur in Europe's periphery, they would be central to European security. After defining the main threat to the European security they concluded that "the obvious tool for this new Western strategy is NATO" and proposed six steps in order to adapt the Trans-Atlantic relationship to the new challenges. These steps were:

- The transformation of NATO "into an alliance committed to projecting democracy, stability and crisis management",
- the harmonisation of interests between the U.S. and its European allies mostly by a "Franco-American rapprochement",
- "Germany's strategic emancipation",
- "the integration of Visegrad countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech republic and possibly Slovakia) into both the European Union and NATO",
- the expansion and deepening of "security dialogue with Russia", the development of "a constructive Ukrainian policy" and finally
- the militarily reorganisation of the alliance in order to "improve NATO's capability to conduct military operations beyond its borders".

It was in that context that the US further pursued its co-operative security policy in Europe and the basic instrument would be the new, transformed NATO.

3.1 NATO at fifties

In September 1994, a study on NATO Enlargement was initiated by the Alliance and published one year later in September 1995 outlining the arrangements of the Enlargement. As U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated "At last December's NAC, we launched the first phase of NATO's enlargement. The NATO enlargement study, which the alliance recently completed, will form the foundation of our enlargement effort.".

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130 95/12/05: Intervention By Secretary Of State Warren Christopher At The At The North Atlantic Council. Source: U.S. Department of State.
Thus, by mid 90's NATO had studied the whole question of its enlargement, the materialisation of which started after 1995 and a large boost to the process of the organisation's transformation was given.

3.1.1 The "Open Doors" Policy

NATO's eastward expansion stirred a heated policy debate that went on in Washington since 1993. Foreign policy thinkers, such as Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger, were writing articles drawing attention to the potentially destabilising security vacuum in central Europe. Prominent officials from State Department like Strobe Talbot, or from Ministry of Defence like Joseph Nye remained sceptical. Finally the Clinton administration overcame its initial caution and the Pentagon's scepticism about expanding NATO. In November 1994 US President B. Clinton stated that "The question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members, but when and how".

At that time major NATO members had agreed on a formula under which NATO would offer membership to the countries of Eastern Europe. The following standards might be met so that a nation to be able to be admitted to the Organisation: An irreversible commitment to democracy; civilian control of the military; military forces independent of security services; military equipment and communications interchangeable with those of NATO members. The doubt about the prospect of the organisation's enlargement had come to an end.

Russia did not welcome that prospect at first, even though the Russian President had not rejected the likelihood of Poland's entry to NATO a year earlier, but it receded a few months later. The Russian Foreign Minister, Andrey Kozyrev, characterised NATO's advancement eastward as an "unfriendly step" and emphasised that "If the West is willing to assist us in solving this problem, (to persuade public opinion that a great Russia is the Russia of Andrei Zakharov and not of Vladimir Zhirinovsky), it should shape its policy toward Russia in such a way to avoid stoking the national humiliation complex." As a response to NATO's intentions, Kozyrev stunned NATO foreign Ministers in Brussels in December 1994, when he refused to sign documents to formalise Russia's military co-operation with NATO.

Russian President's, B. Yeltsin, statements were expressed in a more intense tone, and he warned the West that allowing former Soviet satellites to join NATO soon could "sow seeds of mistrust" and plunge the region into a "new cold peace". During their one to one meeting in Moscow in April 1995, President Yeltsin urged Clinton three times to delay NATO expansion beyond year 2000. Clinton rejected

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the appeal arguing it was in Russia’s interests to keep America in Europe and NATO's enlargement was the best way to achieve this goal.

Although Russia was unlikely to bless NATO's expansion, in 1995 the immediate purpose of Russia's policy was to discourage a rapid NATO expansion hoping that it could prevent or at least influence any expansion in the distant future. The change became obvious when Russian officials proposed reaching a non-aggression pact with NATO if the Western alliance ever decided to admit new members such as Poland or Hungary.\footnote{"Russia Intends to Pursue Guarantees From NATO", The Washington Post, March 11, 1995.} The determination of the U.S. to press on, with or without Russian approval,\footnote{This attitude, on behalf of the American government, had caused much internal debate over the advisability and correctness of NATO's eastward expansion. See: Fred C. Ikle, "How To Ruin NATO", The New York Times, January 11, 1995. Michael Brown, "Should NATO membership grow?", The Washington Times, January 22, 1995. Zbigniew Brezinski, "Correcting our Russian policy course", The Washington Times, February 24, 1995. "A new U.S. doctrine for a new world", The Washington Times, April 18, 1995. Thomas L. Friedman, "The Cold Peace", The New York Times, April 26, 1995.} was the main factor for this change in the Russian policy and the value for the moment was a close linkage between Russia and NATO. West was willing to offer some assurances to Russia. As stated French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe, "We should consider an agreement, treaty or charter between the Atlantic alliance and Russia in parallel with the enlargement of NATO,\footnote{"EU tries to woo Russia on Chechnya, NATO issues", The Washington Times, March 20, 1995.}"

In order to smooth the relations with Russia, the Clinton Administration made written assurances to President Yeltsin that Washington had no objection in principle to the “new Russia” becoming a full member of the alliance.\footnote{"US Offers Assurances on NATO", The Washington Post, May 8, 1995. “Russia in Line for partial NATO membership”, The Washington Times, March 23, 1995.} The Clinton message caused some nervousness among US Allies, several of which said that Washington was trying to move too fast on the expansion of NATO and the development of a “parallel track” of negotiations with Russia.\footnote{"We are absolutely committed to the goal of NATO enlargement. The Russian Government knows that. We're also committed to the goal of a Russia-NATO relationship that would proceed on a separate track but at about the same speed as the process of NATO enlargement.", Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State 95/12/12.} A previous statement of German Defense Minister Ruehe is characteristic: “If Russia were to become a member of NATO it would blow NATO apart. It would be like the United Nations of Europe, it wouldn’t work”.\footnote{"Allies Seek New Ties to Bind NATO", The Washington Post, September 12, 1994.}

During the May 1995 meeting between the U.S. and Russian President, Boris Yeltsin announced that Russia would formally begin the initial stage of NATO membership (PfP) and join in a broader security dialogue.\footnote{"Clinton and Yeltsin Find Way To Easy Strains at Least a Bit", "The Growth of NATO: Will Moscow Go Along?", The New York Times, May 11, 1995. “NATO's New Partner”, The Washington Post, June 6, 1995.} The NATO-Russia dialogue began on June 1, 1995 with a symbolic session on the margins of a NATO ministerial conference, where Russia's Foreign Minister stressed the need for NATO reassurances that Russia is not still the enemy.\footnote{"NATO and Russian Officials Meet to Try to Forge Closer Link", The New York Times, June 1, 1995.} Since then, the enlargement process will move fast while at the same time the relation between NATO and Russia will reach a new level.
In its June 1996 Berlin communique, the NAC reaffirmed the continuing work on enlargement and declared that “The process of enlargement is on track”. In September 1996, Secretary of State at that time Christopher called for the establishment of an Atlantic Partnership Council (now Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, EAPC) which would integrate PfP and the NACC to give Partners a stronger voice with the Alliance and would provide a deeper cooperative and consultative relationship between NATO and Partners on such issues as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian missions as well as search and rescue ones, and PFP exercises. At the December 1996 NAC meeting, the Ministers approved of a comprehensive package of PfP enhancements, including greater Partner participation in decision making and expanding the scope of PfP operations to include peace enforcement.\footnote{Press Communique, M-NAC-2, (96)165.}

In addition, in December 1996, the Ministers called for a summit meeting in July 1997 at which one or more countries would be invited to begin accession negotiations with the Alliance, with a view to welcoming the first new members into NATO by the 50th anniversary of NATO, in 1999. However, as NATO’s enlargement had become reality, there was the need for a way to upgrade and further strengthen the relations with Russia. The EAPC was too little and the veto was too much.

The solution lay in the signing of the Founding Act, which helped pave the way for the accession of the three countries.\footnote{See: Karl-Heinz Kamp, The NATO-Russia Founding Act. Trojan Horse or Milestone of Reconciliation ?, Aussen Politik, Vol.48 (4/97).} This procedure aimed to satisfy Russia’s permanent requests that Russia’s relationship with NATO be different from those of other non-members.\footnote{“NATO’s moment of Truth at Hand”, The Washington Times, May 10, 1995.} Before the July Summit, on May 27, 1997 in Paris, NATO and Russia signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation.\footnote{Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, Paris, 27 May 1997.} The Founding Act provided the basis for a co-operation between NATO and Russia. A Permanent Joint Council (PJC) would guide NATO-Russian relations through consultations, co-operation and, where appropriate, joint-action.

The document, did not satisfy Moscow’s initial demands concerning the consolidation of the right for veto with respect to key NATO decisions, as the estimated consultations would not concern internal matters of either Russia, NATO or NATO member states. However, Russia could acquire a de facto political weight in the evolutions to come. The PJC held its inaugural meeting in New York in September, 1997. Russia established military liaisons at SHAPE and other command points, while in addition the Founding Act provided a NATO Information Office in Moscow.

Following this evolution in NATO-Russian relations, at the July 1997 Summit meeting in Madrid, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary were invited to begin accession talks,\footnote{According to Nicholas Burns, Department of State Spokesman : “There are two important factors that we think should guide the discussion of enlargement. First, any new member invited into NATO ought to meet a test of effectiveness or credibility, meaning that new members ought to strengthen the Alliance, not weaken it. They ought to be ready to take on the obligations of membership and not just enjoy the rights of membership. Secretary Albright said again today what she said in her speech last} however, the Madrid Declaration clearly stated that the Alliance
remains open to new members and will maintain an active relationship with those nations which may express an interest in NATO membership, now or in the future. The Madrid summit stated the open-door policy towards membership in NATO that is, that the alliance would be open to countries that are interested in membership, able to take on its responsibilities, and whose membership would serve the interests of European security and stability. At the Madrid Summit in July 1997, NATO explicitly mentioned Slovenia, Romania and Baltic countries as particularly deserving of consideration the next time around (Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation, 8th July 1997, para. 8). Furthermore, NATO and Ukraine, which has been one of the most active members of the Partnership for Peace, formally signed a Charter on Distinctive Partnership in July 1997.

On March 12, 1999 during the 50th anniversary NATO Summit in Washington, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic officially joined the Atlantic Alliance as new members. President Clinton welcomed the new members, saying their presence will make the United States safer and NATO, stronger. “For years they struggled with dignity and courage to regain their freedom. And now they will help us defend it for many years to come.” Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov called the expansion of NATO “a movement in the wrong direction. All European states must cooperate in creating a joint security system. All European states must work together in the interests of all countries rather than of separate groups.” he said.

The Washington Declaration stressed for one more time that “… Alliance remains open to all European democracies, regardless of geography, willing and able to meet the responsibilities of membership, and whose inclusion would enhance overall security and stability in Europe.” At the Washington Summit NATO launched the Membership Action Plan initiative, as a mean to assist countries aspiring to NATO membership. The nine countries that have declared an interest in joining NATO and are participating in the MAP was Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Although NATO secretary General George Robertson, stated that no enlargement decisions will be made before 2002, NATO committed itself to an open enlargement process.
3.1.2 The Daedalus arrangement: NATO/ESDI/WEU-EU

As it has already been mentioned one major development in the early nineties was NATO’s decision to adapt its standards to the growing European capabilities in the security field in order to “allow the Europeans to address their concerns within the context of the transatlantic alliance”. France's partial rapprochement with NATO, especially after the announcement in 1995 by the French defence minister his country's intention to improve relations with NATO, opened the way for further enhancement of the European role, known as the European Security and Defence Identity, within NATO.

France had not given up its strategic goal of minimising American influence in Europe, but as long as WEU was unable to supplant NATO, France became willing to co-operate with the Alliance. France’s decision to pursue the ESDI within the Alliance was the main cause of a general agreement in the principles of ESDI at Berlin. At the June 1996 North Atlantic Council Ministerial NATO Foreign Ministers agreed that the European role would be developed within the Alliance and that the ESDI would include the development of "separable but not separate" European capabilities, under the CJTF concept, which could be made available to undertake independent European missions led by WEU.

US Secretary Christopher in his Address to the North Atlantic Council acknowledged the role France played in this matter: “Today, we have agreed on a process by which we can make NATO assets available for military operations led by the Western European Union, and we will develop European command arrangements within the Alliance that preserve NATO's transatlantic foundation. Our progress today was made possible by France’s decision to take part more completely in the work of NATO. President Clinton and I warmly welcome President Chirac’s historic choice to pursue ESDI within the Alliance. France has now rejoined the Military Committee; its Defence Minister will now once again participate in NATO Defence Minister meetings; its soldiers are playing a critical role under NATO command in Bosnia; and it is playing an indispensable part in our common effort to build a new NATO in a secure and undivided Europe”.

But since not all the details had been settled up, more work had to be done. Talking about the work on the principles that were accepted in Berlin about ESDI, French Foreign Minister Herve De Charette stated in a joint press conference with US Secretary Albright: “I think one should never underestimate the work that was done but we have indeed quite some work to complete before the whole matter can be considered as fully accepted. The question is very simple. It is based on shared responsibility between the Europeans and the Americans.”

The Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation issued by the Heads of State and Government at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (8th

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156 Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright; Secretary of Defense William Cohen, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, and White House Press Secretary Mike McCurry, Press Briefing on NATO Summit, Madrid, Spain, July 8, 1997.
158 North Atlantic Council Address, June 3, 1996.
July 1997), stated: “... the Alliance is building ESDI, grounded on solid military principles and supported by appropriate military planning and permitting the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU. ...We direct the Council in Permanent Session to complete expeditiously its work on developing ESDI within NATO, in cooperation with the WEU.”.

At the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Luxembourg on 28 May 1998, Ministers welcomed progress on the elaboration of arrangements for ESDI within NATO, including the transfer, monitoring, return or recall of NATO assets and capabilities, focusing on a framework for an agreement between NATO and WEU. Therefore, while through the aforementioned process emphasis was given on the materialisation of the ESDI through the enhancement of the working relationship between NATO and WEU, so that the later could be able to conduct crisis management operations where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged, the Franco-British rapprochement created new data.

In a surprising move towards the European Defence, in December 1998, France and Britain, during their summit at Saint-Malo, pledged to work together to create a framework to provide the EU with autonomous military action, either within or outside of NATO, in response to crises. The two nations also explored ways to consolidate procurement and R&D efforts as well as military forces to provide the muscle to back up a common EU security policy. British officials stressed that whatever the outcome, the transatlantic relationship underlying NATO is at the heart of European security and must be protected. The leading role played by the U.K., the U.S.’ closest ally, in this process helped allay fears in Washington that such moves may weaken transatlantic ties.

The US found this initiative very important although some worries were expressed. According to Secretary Albright: “what happened there was very important. There is a reason for the Europeans to find an identity in their own defence, but this is a thing that cannot be a duplication or discrimination. It is a manner by which the Europeans can share in the work of NATO. It is something that cannot hurt NATO because this is the most important alliance. But we think it is very important that the Europeans work in this manner because it is something that helps us in burden sharing.”

This development, however, could severely overturn whichever progress had been achieved until then in view of the materialisation of the ESDI, as the Franco-British initiative by-passed the figure NATO-WEU-EU on which the efforts to develop ESDI had relied. It was in that context that some voices raised some concerns about ESDI concept: “If ESDI is misconceived, misunderstood or mishandled, it could create the impression - which could eventually lead to the reality - that a new, European-only alliance is being born out of the old, trans-Atlantic one. If that were to happen, it would weaken, perhaps even break those ties that I spoke of before - the ones that bind our security to yours. We, on our side of the Atlantic, have another concern as well: it is essential that ESDI not take a form that discriminates against those Allies who are not members of the EU.”

161 12/8/98 Albright newscon at NATO Headquarters.
162 “A New NATO for a New Era”, Deputy Secretary Talbott, Address at the Royal United Services Institute, London, United Kingdom, March 10, 1999.
At the NATO Washington Summit (24th April 1999), Ministers approved of the work completed on key elements of the Berlin Decisions on building the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance and decided to further enhance its effectiveness; and launched the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI). So, the development of ESDI, coupled with an emphasis on improving European defence capabilities since it had become clear that there is a clear gap between U.S. and European military capabilities and that NATO must prepare for the future by developing systems that affect the mobility, the flexibility and the survivability and sustainability of its forces, having to operate many times in very austere circumstances.  

At Washington Ministers reached a basic understanding. NATO is the preferred institution to act "wherever possible." At the same time, they recognised that the Alliance might not act. And in those circumstances, they agreed to make NATO assets and capabilities available to the WEU or "as otherwise agreed". This last phrasing accompanies every Washington Summit Communique's reference to ESDI, showing in that way the confusion prevailing concerning the question whether the WEU would still constitute the proper channel for developing ESDI, or not.

For the U.S. the marginalization of the WEU did not cause any particular worries as what mainly interested, and still does, regardless the way the European members will choose to promote ESDI is:

- First, to make sure that the European Security and Defence Identity will continue to be developed within NATO.
- Secondly, in case the European Union gives a further impetus to its efforts to strengthen its security and defence dimension, to ensure the role of non-EU Allies as full participants.

As EU turned for the first time its interest in improving the military capabilities of its member states, in the US fears of the implications these efforts might bring to the NATO-EU link were expressed again. Despite the often positions like “...we all share the view that ESDI must reinforce trans-Atlantic ties, improve European defence capabilities, while avoiding duplication and serve as a bridge, not a barrier, to close relations between the EU and NATO”, the same policy-makers have raised in other fora these concerns and some of their statements are characteristic of this criticism:

“...So we want them to share the burden and we have, in fact, thought it was important for the Europeans to have what is called a defense identity. But our differences at the moment are over the following issues. We believe that this European defense identity should be within NATO and it should not duplicate NATO activities. It should not discriminate against those countries that are not a part of NATO or the EU and it should not, in fact, in any way diminish or de-link the United States from...

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Europe. So we are into a very nuanced discussion as to how the Europeans describe their defense identity and as to whether it is separate on the outside of NATO or is connected to it. But we do believe that Europe needs to carry its share of the burden and we agree with that. We just don't want it to be duplicative or discriminatory or de-linking.”.  

3.2 EU’s CFSP: Beyond Amsterdam

3.2.1 A new type of missions and capabilities for EU

The question of reinforcing the efficiency of the CFSP preoccupied the European members at the 1996-1997 Intergovernmental Conference for the review of the Maastricht Treaty. Besides, as the EU Commission had pointed out about CFSP's policy in a report on the function of the Maastricht Treaty "the aim of a substantial improvement has not been achieved".  

Such an effort was made in the Amsterdam Treaty, which was officially signed on the 2nd of October 1997. If one reads the provisions for the CFSP of the Title V of the Amsterdam Treaty and the previous Maastricht Treaty in parallel, one can come to the conclusion that neither this time had there been any important progress towards a meaningful explanation of the CFSP aims and the ways to materialise it. On the contrary, one could claim that, including the protection of the Union's integrity as well as its external borders' (Title V, article J.1) in its aims, the breach between the aims pursued and the chances of their materialisation is becoming wider.

It should also be noted that in the new Treaty there are some provisions, which strengthened CFSP to some degree. One of the Treaty's innovation was the establishment of "Mr. CFSP" the High Representative for the common foreign and security policy (Title V, article J.8), as well as the anticipation of creating a new "foreign policy planning and early warning unit" which would function under High Representative's responsibility, (Declaration to the Final Act on the establishment of a policy planning and early warning unit). With both these anticipations the EU seems to acquire an institutional structure concerning the management of CFSP's matters.

In addition, two new elements of the Treaty gave out a clearer picture of the Union's future role in defence and security matters. The first one has to do with the explicit phrasing of the prospect of WEU's integration into the EU, in contrast with the Maastricht Treaty, which simply implied such likelihood. Namely, in Title V, article J.7 it is mentioned that: "The Western European Union (WEU) is an integral

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168 It is about the outcome of one more compromise among France, Germany and Britain. At the Amsterdam Summit France and Germany (with support from other countries) put forward a proposal calling for a common European defence including the full integration of the WEU into the EU. This project was stopped by Britain and the neutral countries. "Paris and Bonn Launch European Defence Plan", The Guardian, March 22, 1997.
part of the development of the Union providing the Union with access to an operational capability notably in the context of paragraph 2. It supports the Union in framing the defence aspects of the common foreign and security policy as set out in this Article. The Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide."

The second element regards the clearest definition, in a minimal way of course, of the matters which are referred to in the provisions anticipating the progressive formation of a common defence policy and concerning the conduct of the so-called Petersburg tasks. Namely, in Title V, article J.7.2 it is mentioned that: "Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking."

Before the Amsterdam Treaty has even taken effect, the debate on the creation of a European defence identity has been reopened. But this time it was Britain, not France, who introduced it. The President of the Assembly of WEU, describes the British initiative in the following terms:

"It was at an informal meeting of the European Council on 24 and 25 October 1998 at Portschach, Austria, that Mr. Blair made his statement on the United Kingdom's revised position. No official text was released of the contributions made by those present at the Portschach summit, but press reports reveal that it was the British Prime Minister who introduced the debate on security and defence policy. […] He appears to have argued that three solutions were open to the Fifteen: developing a European Security and Defence Identity within NATO; merging WEU and the European Union and finding way in which WEU, NATO and the European Union could work in conjunction with one another. In a press conference he gave on 25 October, Mr. Blair made the point that: 'We are at the very beginning of that debate, we need to get the institutional mechanism right, we need to make sure that that institutional mechanism in no way undermines NATO but rather is complementary to it.'".169

What followed that initiative was two summits, one Franco-German and one Franco-British, and of course the last one attracted the most attention. The British-French Summit took place in Saint-Malo, France on 3 December 1998, where Britain and France reached a 'historic agreement' outlining a common defence policy for Europe. As the French Foreign Minister Juppe at that time had stated: “The Franco-German partnership is the driving force of the European building. But a Franco-German management of Europe would be a bad idea... We must maintain close collaboration with our other partners”.170

In the joint Declaration issued at the Summit the two states emphasised that "The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the

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international stage. ", and expressed their determination to unite their efforts in enabling the EU to give concrete expression to the following objectives: 171

- "The Council must be able to take decisions on an intergovernmental basis, covering the whole range of activity set out in Title V of the Treaty of European Union."
- "... the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises."
- "...the collective defence commitments to which member states subscribe (set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Article V of the Brussels Treaty) must be maintained."
- " Europeans will operate within the institutional framework of the European Union."
- "... the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU. In this regard, the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO's European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework)."

Following French Prime Minister L. Jospin's statement, during the Press Conference after the Summit, the agreement was possible because " The United Kingdom has moved on this matter, we moved too and I think that we need to do that in looking to the future defence and security policy for Europe, it is necessary that policy goes forward through actions like this." 172 It was about one of the scarce times when these two countries had harmonised their positions on European defence and security issues to such a degree. That is why the meeting was characterised as "historic" by the Press.

At the Vienna European Council, on 11 and 12 December 1998, the Fifteen, although they didn't take decisions of an institutional nature, they stressed that "The European Council welcomes the new impetus given to the debate on a common European policy on security and defence. .... It welcomes the Franco-British declaration made on 4 December 1998 in St Malo." 173

However, while the Europeans were busy looking for ways of a substantial reinforcement of the European security and defence identity, the resurgence of the crisis in Kosovo found Europe unprepared again. At the time when NATO's operations in Kosovo started (in March 1999), the EU mainly focused on accusations of financial scandals which were revealed and led to the resignation of the European Commission. While NATO was ready to operate, the Europeans were looking for

ways to deal with the crisis which had emerged in the EU itself, at the Berlin's meeting.  

This fact in combination with, at least initially, the EU's limited participation in the diplomatic effort of finding a political solution pointed out its inability to play an important role in the developments. It is characteristic that the EU delayed discussing its further participation in the Kosovo crisis at a special meeting (not until mid April), whereas it proceeded to the appointment of the Finish President, Martti Ahtisaari, as an international mediator in the Kosovo conflict on the 17th of May, that is two months after the crisis had started. However, one should not forget that the EU's delay was the choice of the European States, mainly the three big ones, as neither France nor Germany wished EU's participation through WEU, as they had done at the beginning of the 90's during the first Yugoslavian crisis.

Just like in the past, the European members hurried to announce their political will for the development of the European security and defence policy. On May 10, 1999 European Union defence ministers pledged in Bremen to work towards a common security policy by December 2000, acknowledging they had a long way to go. German Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping admitted it was a "tight timetable" given the persistent shortcomings of Europeans in defence matters. Europeans lacked sufficient airlift capability to move troops, hardware and humanitarian supplies, their satellite capabilities paled compared to those of the United States, and they had no joint command and control system. But, despite the difficulties, the German Minister of Defence announced that: "The defence ministers meeting was a ... starting shot for the concrete development of a common security and defence policy in Europe." In fact, Kosovo could really constitute, as it has already been mentioned, the military "Euro" to lead to the creation of a European security and defence identity in the same way as the Euro represents the economic and monetary unification?

EU leaders debated the issue in more detail at a summit in Cologne on 3-4 June and this time everyone seemed to be on board. The European Council decided to embark on a new course designed to give Europe credible means for taking action in response to regional crises, by means of a strengthened Common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The principal decision taken by the European Council was that EU would have to be able to carry out the so-called "Petersburg tasks" in an autonomous way without having to avail itself of WEU. It must have the capability to conduct EU-led operations either using NATO assets or without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities.

To this end the European Council declared that "the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO." and tasked the "General Affairs Council to prepare the conditions and the measures necessary to achieve these

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175 "EU summit over Kosovo calls for larger EU, UN roles", ITAR/TASS News Agency, April 14, 1999.
178 From the Professor at the University of Berlin, Ulrich Beck. See, "In Uniting Over Kosovo, a New Sense of Identity for Europeans", The New York Times, April 28, 1999.
objectives, including the definition of the modalities for the inclusion of those functions of the WEU which will be necessary for the EU to fulfil its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg tasks.\textsuperscript{179} The decisions required to achieve these objectives are to be taken by the end of the year 2000. The European council considered that "In that event, the WEU as an organisation would have completed its purpose.". In addition the EU agreed to appoint Javier Solana, then Secretary General of NATO, as its High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy.\textsuperscript{180}

In November 1999, European leaders announced their plans to create within three years a rapid reaction force that could field 50,000 soldiers and 300 to 500 aircraft for up to a year to a future conflict like the one in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{181} The principal European defence and foreign ministers agreed loosely on this goal in Luxembourg, while on a following meeting in London Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain and President Jacques Chirac of France reaffirmed both countries' determination to cooperate so that Europe could take care of its own military problems if the United States was not available to help.

In the EU Helsinki summit on 10-11 December 1999 focus was given on developing the Union’s military crisis management capability, although there was a mention of the reinforcement of its non-military crisis management capabilities. The EU decided to create by the year 2003 a 60,000-man rapid reaction force that can be sustained up to a year. It was also decided that a non-military crisis management mechanism will be established. Finally, at the Helsinki NATO's central role in the collective defence and crisis management was recognised, while it is stated that the EU can act “where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged.”.\textsuperscript{182}

But this provision does not specify the exact link between the EU and NATO and how it will work. The American view is the following “Done right, ESDP can strengthen all of us. There are some issues for us: NATO First. We believe that crises require swift, coordinated action. If NATO members and partners wish to join an effort, it would be fruitless, even dangerous, to delay action while a debate took place over whether the EU or NATO will lead. NATO should lead”.\textsuperscript{183}

Whether France and Britain are in full accord on the relationship that any future European force should have with the NATO alliance is less clear. British Defence Secretary, Geoff Hoon, said, “What we want to see is a stronger European contribution to NATO. I accept that different countries have different views. But what Britain will do is negotiate effectively to ensure, first of all, that European nations can pull their weight within NATO military operations but at the same time preserve the essential link with NATO.”.

\textsuperscript{180} Henry Kissinger used to say that he wished that he had one phone number to call in Europe to find out what Europe's foreign policy was. Well, now, there is.
\textsuperscript{182} Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10 And 11 December 1999.
But France's foreign minister, Hubert Vedrine acknowledged that France was out in front of some of its allies in arguing that a European reaction force should be able to operate with complete autonomy even if it was put together from units that formally belonged to the alliance. "If the Americans and we Europeans ourselves had decided that Europeans should take charge of operations against Serbia, that would not have been possible," French Defence Minister Alain Richard said. Speaking to his European Union colleagues in Brussels, Belgium, about the need for stronger European defences in a meeting on Nov. 15, Richard did not say a word about the relationship that a European military staff would have to NATO. 184

Particularly French President Jacques Chirac, in an attempt to divert USA's worries, declared: "The Americans kept saying Europe had to do more for its own defence, so we finally said, all right, we will," "Now you shouldn't criticise us for doing what you wanted us to do," While France's foreign minister stated "The United States has to make a choice, "They have always been for sharing the burden. They've never been much for sharing the decision-making. Obviously, there are some real questions we have to answer, such as how are we going to organise this so as not to interfere with the alliance. We are well aware that it's complicated." 185

While there is growing consensus on the need for Europe to restructure its defences, many of the European allies are actually cutting on military spending. U.S. Defence Secretary William Cohen criticised Germany for spending only 1.5 percent of its gross domestic product on defence, by saying that "The decisions Germany makes in the next few months and years will have a profound and lasting impact on the capabilities, not only of this nation, but of the alliance as a whole.".

But the main concern for the U.S. is that the new push for an independent European military arm will divert resources and attention from NATO. Lord Robertson, Secretary General of the NATO alliance, defending the EU's effort assured that U.S. fears that an independent European defence would weaken Trans-Atlantic ties were groundless stating that "Those who are nervous in the United States that with the Europeans carrying more of the burden, that they would break away, are wrong.".

3.2.2 Does the WEU Have a Role?

The Amsterdam Treaty in order to enhance the EU's CFSP established the provision that "The Union will avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The competence of the European Council to establish guidelines in accordance with Article J.3 shall also obtain in respect of the WEU for those matters for which the Union avails itself of the WEU. When the Union avails itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions of the Union on the tasks referred to in paragraph 2 all Member States of the Union shall be entitled to participate fully in the tasks in question.", (title V, article J. 7.3).

The aforementioned anticipations, in relation to the Maastricht Treaty, too, resulted in an hierarchical grading in the relationship between EU and WEU. While the later was expressing a balanced relationship between the two organisations,

following the anticipation that "The union requests the Western European Union (WEU), ... to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications", the Amsterdam Treaty established instead a relationship in which the EU avail itself of WEU and WEU elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the EU without having the alternative to turn down those decisions.\textsuperscript{186}

Of course the advisability of the aforementioned anticipations should be interpreted in the light of article J, 7.1, in which it was mentioned that: "The Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide. ".

The "Declaration of the WEU on the Role of Western European Union and its Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance" which was adopted by the WEU Council of Ministers on 22 July 1997 and attached to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference concluded with the signature of the Treaty of Amsterdam on 2 October 1997, described the future role of WEU in the European security and defence matters, in the above mentioned context.

Following the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty and the NATO Summit in Madrid, there was a common perception that WEU became finally an organisation with a clearly defined role, since the Amsterdam and Madrid decisions have put an end to the debate about its future as an institution. This optimism illustrated in the Erfurt Declaration of 18 November 1997, where the Ministers of WEU declared that "The enhancement of WEU's pivotal role between the European Union and NATO remains therefore a high priority on WEU's agenda".

Since the WEU still remained the basic institutional link for the development of the ESDI within NATO, emphasis was given on elaborating further the operational capabilities so that the WEU to be able to conduct WEU-led crisis management operations. But, after the signature of Amsterdam Treaty, WEU has been involved in only one joint action with the EU, the mission of the Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE)\textsuperscript{187} in Albania, while the possibility of a WEU-led operation in the CJTF concept was still a distant likelihood. But of course that was not the fault of WEU. "With NATO still in the process of developing a new Strategic Concept, and EU absorbed by the consequences of monetary union, the blame cannot be put at the doorstep of WEU, which remains 'on hold', ready to operate for both of them", as Mr. Guido Lenzi, former director of the WEU Institute for Security Studies, pointed out.\textsuperscript{188}

During the escalation of the Kosovo crisis, at the beginning of 1999 it became obvious that the European countries still lacked the political will for mobilising the WEU.

After the resumption of the debate, following the initiatives by Britain and France that led to Saint-Malo process, on how a European security and defence policy might be achieved, the future role of WEU has been seriously challenged. Especially the main


\textsuperscript{187} MAPE has assessed the operational capabilities of Albanian police units and tailored training needs accordingly. Akey part of MAPE’s work has been also to provide advice to the Ministry of Public Order on restructuring the Albanian police.

challenge that WEU faces after the EU Cologne and Helsinki summits is to fall again in an abeyance situation, following the anticipation of the transfer of the operational functions and mechanisms of the organism into the EU by the year 2000. This anticipation cancels the new successive roles which the two Treaties of the EU (the Maastricht one and the Amsterdam one) had reserved for the WEU.

As far as the future of the organisation is concerned, although at the Cologne Summit the European Council declared that after the "inclusion of those functions of the WEU which will be necessary for the EU to fulfil its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg tasks the WEU as an organisation would have completed its purpose", it has not been clear yet whether the WEU will stop existing as an organisation or it will go back to the status it had before the 90's, that is to say a defensive organism in hibernation, even though the second possibility seems to be prevailing.

What is quite surprising is the swing of the French policy mainly but also the German policy in whatever concerns the role of the WEU. Two years before the Cologne Summit, the same countries submitted to the Intergovernmental Conference a separate document containing four articles setting out three phases for the full integration of WEU in the European Union.189 What has changed? Whatever has changed it is important to notice that the vision of integrating the WEU into the EU in the medium-term future was a kind of an unrealistic task.

There were and still are outstanding problems for the full integration of WEU (including article V of the modified Brussels treaty, which provides the mutual assistance obligation) into the EU:

- some EU member states, with a tradition of neutrality have difficulty in accepting the idea of a common defence
- some countries especially UK do not want the EU to take on the responsibility for common defence
- it has already been decided that a ESDI should be developed within NATO, but three European member states of NATO do not belong to the EU
- the European countries do not share the same vision about the final objective of European integration, including the fields of defence and security.

However, the abolition of an authentic European defensive organisation, which in the post-bipolar environment was strongly associated with the prospect of the creation of a Common European defence, will create serious doubts about what extent the European enterprise can really reach. The aforementioned is proved by the "Message from the WEU Assembly to the Governments and parliaments of Europe": "By not making a commitment to a common defence an obligation for the European Union, as the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties envisaged for the long term, the Cologne programme runs the risk of radically changing the very purpose of EU construction". "European construction must encompass a common defence. […] For as long as that is impossible within the framework of the Treaty on European Union, the modified Brussels Treaty and Article V in particular, must be preserved."190

189 Document 1564, Assembly of Western European Union, Maastricht II: the WEU Assembly's proposal for European cooperation on security and defence, Report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr. Antretter and Mrs. Squarcialupi, 9 May 1997, p.p. 34-39.

Ten years after the end of the Cold War the key elements of the new European security include a transformed and expanded NATO and a European Union committed to pursue a common defence and security policy. Even though the relevant decisions were taken in 1999 in NATO's Washington Summit and in Cologne and Helsinki EU's Summits respectively, the year 1999 was in fact less a deadline than a starting point for the construction of a new system of security and defence on the basis of achieving lasting and viable co-operative arrangements.

A decade before the challenge was to address the problems of the emerging new threats and dangers for the European security, the readjustment of the existing institutions and organisations to the new conditions, the reconsideration and updating of the transatlantic link, the re-incorporation of the former East-European countries to the European structures and the definition of Russia's role in European security matters. The first steps have been already made, but are they in the right direction, do they promote a new co-operative security regime for the whole Europe? Unless U.S. decides what to do with its power, and the major European states decide what kind of Europe they want, it will not be easy to meet the challenge of co-operation, as the crisis in Kosovo has shown.

4.1 European National Policies and Kosovo Crisis

After the crisis in Kosovo and the NATO's elevation, for once more, as the only organisation which can manage crisis situations that could be a threat to European security, the most outlined conclusion was that Europe is short of the necessary operational and military capabilities in order to act in an autonomous way. However, the biggest difficulties in forming an autonomous European security and defence policy, which were not overcome till recently, concern the harmonisation of the national policies of the three European leading countries.

As it has been said, the problem is the lack of political will. It is not that Europe has the same military strength as the U.S., but if one considers European countries' defensive potential as a unified one, this potential is not at all insignificant and crisis management, as the one in Kosovo, is definitely within its capability. There is no common conception of the European defence and the differences in this section are the source of Europe's weakness. The case-study analysis of the crisis in Kosovo offers an outstanding analytical tool for the detection of basic axons of the foreign and defensive policy of Britain, France and Germany. The incompatibility of their pursuits during the crisis, not only did it make any reference to the European security and defence identity impossible, but it also put NATO's cohesion in danger.

192 Luis Maria de Puig, President of the Assembly of WEU, "Kosovo: Europe's weakness", Letter from the Assembly, No 30, May 1999. See also the relevant analysis: Dominique Moisi, Dreaming of Europe, Foreign Policy, Nu. 115, Summer 1999.
The period of the agreement: The bombings, acceptable tool for Milosevic's compliance

NATO began its operations against Yugoslavia on the 24th of March 1999 with the declared purpose of avoiding an upcoming humanitarian disaster as a result of President Milosevic's policy in Kosovo. Before this, there was the 1998 crisis and the negotiations in Rambouillet in February and in Paris in March, under the aegis of the Contact Group in which Britain, France and Germany took part. Since the beginning of the crisis all three of them appeared aligned with the American policy of using military power to make President Milosevic comply with the demands stated during the previous negotiations.

Two days after the beginning of the operations, on the 23rd of March, the French Prime-Minister Lionel Jospin, in a speech to the French National Assembly stated characteristically: "Our country, you know, has done all it can in order to find a political exit for the crisis in Kosovo, ... the use of force became unavoidable". Even when it came to the legitimacy of NATO's bombings, the French Prime-Minister justified NATO's initiative by saying: "While there was an emergency, it was up to us to take responsibility, notably within the Atlantic Alliance (NATO)."

Aligned with the French Prime-Minister, the German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder stated, two days before the beginning of the operations, that there were very small chances for a peaceful solution to the crisis. While referring to the humanitarian situation in the area he stressed that: "It is time to bring an end to the brutality."

In an equivalent speech in the British Parliament on the 23rd of March, the British Prime-Minister, Tony Blair, mentioned that: "Britain stands ready with our NATO allies to take military action". In addition, following his statements after the beginning of the operations he presumed that NATO's action was drawing its legitimacy from the Security Council's resolutions which invited Milosevic to comply with what was agreed, while he also supported that a further mandate on behalf of the UN is not necessary to make it legal.

The support of NATO's operation from the three countries was not restricted only to the justification of the necessity of conducting it, but it also had an operational character through the supply of means and military forces.

More specifically, the German Ministry of Defence announced that the German Air force was prepared to take part in NATO's air-strikes campaign and that over fifteen Tornado warplanes with 500 soldiers would participate in the military operations against Yugoslavian targets. At the same time, Germany made its UAV’s available and also some service-bases for the US aircrafts. This position shows that Germany has abandoned the district role, which it had during the crisis in Bosnia, claiming a more substantial one.

For a critical approach of the subject, See: Charles Krauthammer, "The Short, Unhappy Life of Humanitarian War", The National Interest, Nu. 57 (Fall 1999).


In the same way, France's response to the air-strikes operations was immediate. As the French Prime-Minister declared in his previously mentioned speech in the French Parliament, forty French warplanes were participating in the first two days NATO bombing missions against anti-air defense systems of the Yugoslav army and 2,400 French ground troops were deployed in FYROM for a future peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. Furthermore, France made a number of PUMA helicopters and UAV's available, while soldiers of the French airforce were moved to Albania with a view to helping the Americans. At the same time, it made a number of airfields available for the service of U.S. aircrafts.

The British contribution with 13,000 ground forces, submarines, aircraft carrier, Harrier and Tornado aircraft, which took part in the bombings from the first days of NATO's operation as well as with the supply of conveniences in British bases, showed the determination of Blair's government to give to its country a primary role in the development of the European defence. This situation differed substantially the current British leadership from the previous ones.

**The First Breach: France and Germany in search for ways of political crisis management**

This unified position of the three European Allies was soon broken through. As NATO's bombing in the area went on with continuously wider kinds of targets and continuously unclear the discrimination between military and political targets, at the beginning of April France asserted the initiative in looking for a peaceful solution to the crisis in Kosovo as well as in having a word in the choice of the targets to be attacked.

According to the statements of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, France's foreign policy, regarding the crisis in question, was coming into a new phase, the main characteristic of which was the pursuit of a peaceful solution through a close collaboration with Russia. In this framework, France developed its contacts with the latter and suggested a plan to follow for the solution of the crisis with an upgraded role of the EU and UN.

This initiative was not at all welcome by the USA and NATO, a fact that put the relationship of the two countries to the test. An indication of this contrast is the article appeared in the British newspaper "Daily Telegraph" which mentions that Washington worries about a direct or indirect potential leaking of information on behalf of France towards Yugoslavia, since France has started to except itself from some NATO's operations.

Although that publication was denied by both the State Department and the French Minister of Defence, the divergence of views between France and USA was obvious, at

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least concerning the legitimisation of NATO's action without previous authorisation from the Security Council. During the NATO's Summit in Washington, the French President Jacques Chirac stated: "There is a wide difference between President Clinton and me on the need to ask the United Nations (before taking action),." 207 In any case, France's request for participation in the process of reaching decisions concerning the operations was satisfied by Washington with the establishment of a "management commission" consisting of the USA, France, Britain, Germany and Italy's Ministers of Foreign Affairs. 208

In parallel with this change in the French policy, the German policy also turned to the pursuit of ways of a peaceful settlement of the crisis, as the reactions against bombings, both in the country and in the governmental coalition, increased. 209 The intensity of the reactions inside the Social-Democratic party forced Schroeder to call an extraordinary meeting where he launched an appeal for the conservation of the unity of the party stating in a characteristic way: "We have a responsibility toward our allies in NATO," "Especially as Germans, our response must be clear: We must never again allow murder, expulsions and deportations to be tolerated by politicians." 210

Almost at the same time as the French initiative, Germany presented a suggestion for a political solution to the crisis in Kosovo with the diplomatic intermediation of Russia. 211 On the 14th of April 1999, following the initiative of Germany which had assumed the presidency of the EU, an extraordinary summit meeting of the EU took place where the German plan was discussed, which anticipated among others a 24-hour pause of the bombings, on condition that the Serbian forces would leave Kosovo and the UN would take over.

In total contrast to these two initiatives, the British position remained stable in the continuation of the operations until Milosevic retreated. As the British Prime-Minister stated, there is no question of negotiation or compromise with Milosevic, we have expressed our demands and aims, which must be fully satisfied. 212

The Definitive Split: The prospect of developing ground forces in Kosovo

But, while the operations went on without bringing the desirable results, the divergence of views on matters concerning the future way of the Alliance's action was becoming more and more obvious. An example of this divergence concerned the question of imposing an oil blockade to Yugoslavia. Germany was vigorously for this position, whereas France was against both the idea of a blockade, for which it felt that there should be a Security Council's decision, 213 and the inspection of the vessels, which would refuse to comply with the blockade. This position forced NATO to decide that its crafts would not use force to stop vessels carrying oil, while the relevant NATO's activity was characterised as "a visit and inspection." 214

207 "United on Kosovo, NATO Looks Ahead, AP Online, April 24, 1999.
211 "German Leader Wants Unity on Kosovo", AP Online, April 12,1999.
212 "Germany Seeks EU Resolve on Kosovo & Germany Offers Kosovo Peace Plan", AP Online, April 14, 1999.
213 NATO: Transcript of press conference given by NATO Sec General, Mr J. Solana, & British Prime Minister, M2 Communications Ltd., 21-Apr-1999.
However, the main point of the divergence concerned the prospect of sending ground forces to Kosovo. Despite the fact that this likelihood had been examined in the Summit Meeting for the 50th NATO’s anniversary on the 25th of April as a potential choice which had divided the allies, Britain brought the question back almost a month later. It should be noted that during the initial discussion of the matter, Chancellor Schroeder, following his statements to CNN, appeared willing to support the dispatch of ground forces in Kosovo if NATO decides to use them. According to the subsequent suggestion expressed by the British Minister of Foreign Affairs NATO should prepare a plan to send ground forces to Kosovo in order to take advantage of the weakening of the Serbian forces by the air strikes.

This time Germany appeared to be opposed to this prospect by rejecting this likelihood and expressing its belief that the intensive bombing could bring the desirable result. This position was supported by other countries, too (e.g. Italy), but France avoided commenting on the suggestion, which showed its silent approval. One month later, in an interview, the French President confirmed the aforementioned appreciation by stating that the uncertainty about the choice of ground forces had to have been maintained in order to discourage Milosevic. In any case, it should be noted that even for this question France felt that there should be a previous Security Council resolution.

In this phase, Britain stood out as a country bearing in public the burden of the support for the sending of ground forces. With this suggestion it pursued to direct the evolutions passing past even the USA (which had sent confusing messages on this matter until then stressing that all the choices are possible and the Alliance should carry on the same strategy until to the end). An indication of the tension of Blair's statements was Clinton's personal intervention in order to urge Blair to stop talking in public about ground operations because these statements created internal alliance problems and made the Russians unwilling to contribute to a diplomatic solution.

Germany turned out to be the biggest opponent to such a choice persisting in the continuation of the double NATO’s strategy (that is air-strikes as well as finding a political solution), following the German Chancellor’s statement during his visit to the headquarters of the Alliance on the 19th of May. Germany had expressed its different view on the subject long before, but this intense opposition was something new. Schroeder's answer on BBC to a relevant question is characteristic: "I will not participate in this specifically British debate on war theories.”

Particularly, Schroeder tried to make his view sound even more serious by emphasising the fact that he was bearing the Presidency of the EU. In this framework Germany activated itself intensively towards the finding of a diplomatic solution with

215 CNN, 25-4-99.
222 Press Conference by NATO Secretary General, Mr Javier Solana and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, 19 May 1999, www.nato.int/docu/speech.
the participation of the UN, EU and Russia.\textsuperscript{224} The fact that Milosevic chose the
German Chancellor to send him a letter to make known that he accepted the proposals of the
G-8,\textsuperscript{225} so that the processes for the adoption of the relevant Security Council
resolution could be accomplished and NATO’s operations stopped, constitutes the
proof of the success of these movements.

The question of NATO’s military strategy continued preoccupying the allies.
Britain insisted on the choice of ground operations and Germany opposed to this
likelihood intensely. Even though the different and sometimes opposite pursuits of the
three main European actors, as they described above, did not lead to a crisis in the
Alliance, they brought to the surface the difficulty the three countries face in
harmonising their policies. This ascertainment was not at all disregarded by the U.S
following the statement of the American Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott,
that there would have been major difficulty in keeping the Alliance’s cohesion,
solidarity and determination if the Serbian leader had not retreated on the 3\textsuperscript{rd} of
June.\textsuperscript{226}

4.2 Hot Topics for NATO’s future policy

The Kosovo crisis revealed many important issues that NATO must take into
account in order to formulate its future policy. Some of them, which are closely
related with the co-operative regime that NATO envisions, are analysed below. First
the outbreak of Kosovo war brought down to earth the american-pushed efforts to
revamp NATO in some sort of global alliance. Second it showed clearly that Russia
and China couldn’t be ignored. Third it revealed for one more time the existing
differences between the Allies concerning UN’s role in authorisation of action. All
these are topics that must be resolved if a true co-operative security regime is to be
established in Europe.

The Out of Area limits of the New NATO

During the early 90s, the “out of area or out of business” was a common
slogan. In Washington’s new strategic concept, the Alliance embraced for the first
time military missions in volatile regions beyond their own borders. The NATO
summit approved a communique that said the alliance must be prepared \textit{“to meet the
challenges of the future”} but did not specify where.

The much-debated initiative, which Secretary General Javier Solana called a
\textit{“road map to navigate the security challenges”} of the next millennium, was hailed by
19 heads of government as a renewed sense of identity and purpose for the North
Atlantic Alliance in the post Cold War era. \textit{“For five years now, we have been
working to build a new NATO prepared to deal with the security challenges of the
new century”} President Clinton told a news conference on the summit's second day.
\textit{“We have reaffirmed our readiness . . . to address regional and ethnic conflicts
beyond the territory of NATO members.”}\textsuperscript{227}

\textsuperscript{224}“German govt seeking to draw Russia into Kosovo settlement”, ITAR/TASS News Agency, April
19, 1999.
\textsuperscript{225}“NATO Sending Tough Terms to Belgrade”, The Washington Post, June 2, 1999.
Before the Kosovo crisis, the U.S. had been trying to persuade NATO members to consider expanding the defensive alliance's reach beyond Europe as a way of maintaining an important post-Cold War role in the world. But most European nations opposed to the idea and had only reluctantly agreed in 1995 to act outside NATO borders by launching limited air strikes against Serb forces in Bosnia and then a peacekeeping mission to halt ethnic cleansing.

In December 1998 US secretary of state Albright reassured US allies that the United States is not trying to create a new global NATO as the alliance planned its future strategic concept. In her remarks she explained that NATO must be ready to deal with threats outside its borders, including a ballistic missile attack that uses a weapon of mass destruction. Her pledge to work together to prevent proliferation of weapons was generally welcome by her colleagues from France and Germany. But they questioned just how far the United States wanted to extend NATO's reach. German foreign minister Joschka Fischer asked her if Korea would be NATO's boundary and quoted her as saying 'no.' However, she did say NATO should have constructive engagement with its partners which include a countries as far east as Kazakhstan.228

NATO's operations in Kosovo demonstrated that the allies still have much work to do to secure Europe's future. So, at April's 50-year anniversary NATO summit in Washington, U.S. officials backed away from a specific call to expand the alliance's global role. According to Secretary of State Albright, although ethnic cleansing won't be tolerated, NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia shouldn't be considered as a precedent for future intervention by the alliance elsewhere. "Every circumstance is unique," Albright told the Council on Foreign Relations. "NATO is a European and Atlantic -- not a global – institution". Albright said that any decision to use force against another country will be made by the President after weighing a host of factors. "Some hope, and others fear, that Kosovo will be a precedent for similar interventions around the globe. I would caution against any such sweeping conclusions."229

NATO's deepening involvement in the Balkans is having a profound effect on the alliance's future, diverting its attention and resources to southern Europe. So difficult were the politics of the war, and so costly the prospect of dispatching 50,000 peacekeeping troops into Kosovo, that the European consensus in NATO now is that this out-of-area gambit may be the last. Many strategists within the alliance expect the Balkans to become an absorbing ordeal that will tie up troops and resources for years. NATO forces are already dispatched in Bosnia, Albania, FYROM; and Kosovo. According to the entire prognosis they are going to be there a long time, possibly like the troops who have been in Korea for half a century. No one could have thought they would be there that long.

While NATO has agreed not to consider additional expansion until the year 2002, the Kosovo conflict has bolstered the stature and strategic importance of Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria, increasing the chances that these nations will be among the next to join the pact. Momentum is certainly halted, for now, for extending NATO's reach to these areas or even to more far-flung interests in Persian Gulf oil, the halt of nuclear weapons and missiles across Asia and the Middle East, or in fighting terrorist crimes on a transnational scale.

228 Voice of America, 98-12-08.
Relations with Russia

NATO's operations in Kosovo made a severe damage to US-Russian and therefore to NATO-Russian relations. Russia felt betrayed by NATO, which won grudging Russian acceptance of the alliance's expansion to take in former Warsaw Pact countries by insisting it was a defensive alliance only.

Some of the implications were mentioned in an article by the Russian envoy on the Balkans Victor Chernomyrdinin: "The new NATO strategy, the first practical instance of which we are witnessing in Yugoslavia, has led to a serious deterioration in Russia-U.S. contacts. I will be so bold as to say it has set them back by several decades... It is impossible to talk peace with bombs falling. This is clear now. So I deem it necessary to say that, unless the raids stop soon, I shall advise Russia's president to suspend Russian participation in the negotiating process, put an end to all military-technological co-operation with the United States and Western Europe, put off the ratification of START II and use Russia's veto as the United Nations debates a resolution on Yugoslavia. On this, we shall find understanding from great powers such as China and India. Of this, I am sure." 230

The fragility of the U.S.-Russian relationship has been highlighted by the fact that only a week after Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott was hailing Russia for playing a constructive international role, he rushed to Moscow to defuse a crisis while British forces confronted Russian and Serb troops at the airport in Pristina. The sudden, unexpected deployment of Russian troops to the Kosovo capital of Pristina, in advance of the international military force (KFOR), has added to the mistrust and tension between the two countries, especially since it came hours after Ivanov promised Albright deployment would not take place before an agreement over Russia's role in KFOR.

Critics say that the Clinton administration has pushed Russia too hard by expanding NATO 231 and prosecuting a war in Kosovo over Moscow's objections while failing to foster a lasting basis for relations with Russia. 232 Although Russia, the largest country in the world, covering more than 10 percent of the total land area of the globe, does not have as much global influence as it once did, it is trying to project power. Moscow sometimes during the Kosovo case felt humiliated when every remark was ignored or dismissed (Yeltsin was ignored when he asked not to bomb Serbia a day before the bombing began).

A paradigm of Russia’s feelings is the complaint of President Yeltzin, clearly bristling over President Clinton's criticism of Russia's military assault on Chechnya, that the United States was not treating Russia with the respect due for a nuclear power. 233 The European countries and the United States have made some allowances for Moscow's conduct of the war, recognising that what Russia is trying to do in Chechnya is very different from what the Serbs tried to do in Kosovo. But they still

pointed out that the Russian tactics could cost thousands of innocent lives. "The continuation of it and the amassing of hundreds of thousands of refugees, will further alienate the global community from Russia." President Clinton said. Those remarks, and mostly verbal criticism by the European Union, provoked chilling ire from President Boris Yeltsin as he was visiting China. "Clinton allowed himself to pressure Russia yesterday. He must have forgotten for a moment what Russia is. It has a full arsenal of nuclear weapons." 234

NATO should expect that it will be harder to enlist Russia’s help in the future. Russia issued one of its harshest rebuttals yet of Western criticism of its Chechnya campaign, describing NATO ministers as cynical and accusing the alliance of trying to worsen the conflict. 235 According to analysts, NATO's strained relationship with Moscow has contributed to hampering membership prospects for the Baltic States, the one-time Soviet republics of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. They border Russia, which would be irritated if they joined. The shift in NATO thinking comes despite the relative success of the three nations in their transition to free-market economies and in easing ethnic tensions with Russian minorities since regaining independence in 1991. 236

Isolated by the West, Moscow tried to consolidate what Russia calls a "strategic partnership" with Beijing. Sino-Russian relations have improved since NATO's Kosovo campaign against Yugoslavia, which both opposed.

**Relations with China**

The bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade has harmed an already battered long-term relationship between the United States and Beijing. The accidental bombing by NATO, which is being portrayed in China as deliberate, played to one of China's historical sensitivities: humiliation at the hands of foreigners. China had repeatedly attacked against NATO over its bombing campaign, to which Beijing opposed from the start.

Apart from Kosovo case, NATO's expansion has alarmed Chinese strategists who see an American-spun web of security relationships from Kosovo to Kazakhstan, Mongolia to Manila, tightening around China's borders. Over the past three years, U.S. forces have also held exercises or seminars with the armies of Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which border China. In a peacekeeping seminar led by the U.S. Central Command at Florida's MacDill Air Force Base in mid-May, officers from neighbouring Mongolia came to observe.

An article published in the influential magazine Outlook said the United States had only one goal: "the hegemonic domination of the world". The article said the U.S. plan to "control the world" was based on two prongs, NATO's eastward expansion and close defence ties with Japan. 237 Chinese strategists fear that U.S. moves to

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236 "Russia Calls NATO 'Cynical' Over Chechnya", Reuters, December 3, 1999.
bolster military relations with China's bordering states. Recent reports in the United States have placed China at the top of Americans' list of possible enemies.

China and Russia issued a joint statement filled with attacks on American foreign policy. The statement said that unidentified parties, obviously the United States, are trying to force on the world "a single model of culture, value concepts and ideology" and are violating the sovereignty of countries under the guise of "humanitarian intervention."

The Question of Mandates

The alliance’s bombing campaign against Yugoslavia has set a controversial precedent, attacking a sovereign nation without explicit authority from the United Nations. NATO contended it had authority from previous resolutions. A set of issues surrounds the questions about the authority needed to intervene with force internationally even in the face of major humanitarian disaster and at a time when the concept of sovereignty is used to block such steps.

The dispute is not a new one, but it is still unresolved. In Bosnia, where the United Nations played a central mediating role, UN Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali had asserted that he alone had the authority to approve air strikes. In the end, by agreeing to give the UN Secretary General the right to approve any first strike, the United States backed away from its earlier insistence that Security Council resolutions gave the United States and its allies the power to act on their own initiative.

The debate addresses the fact that the US wants recognition of NATO’s right to take action on its own initiative, while some European countries stress the need for an explicit UN Security Council mandate. French Foreign Affairs Minister Vedrine insisted that missions calling for the use of force should be placed under the authority of the UN, while Chancellor Schroeder made Germany’s position clear: “But the readiness to assume more responsibility also means that international, out of area military missions must be based on an unequivocal mandate under international law. As a rule, this would be a mandate from the UN Security Council or action under the aegis of the OSCE. A community defined by values such as our transatlantic Alliance cannot afford to be complacent on this issue. This principle may only be abandoned in exceptional cases: to prevent humanitarian catastrophes and grave violations of human rights, i.e. when immediate action is urgently called for on humanitarian grounds.”

Opening the last UN General Assembly debate in the 20th century, Secretary General Annan told presidents and prime ministers that "massive and systematic violations of human rights, wherever they may take place, should not be allowed to stand". He said the danger was that others, such as NATO in its bombing of Serbia

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over Kosovo in 1999, would take international law in their own hands if the 15-
member UN Security Council did not enforce its decisions. The French prime
minister said the UN Security Council, where France has veto power, must retain
prime authority over all intervention, even if humanitarian emergencies occasionally
required an exception, as in Kosovo. British Foreign Minister Robin Cook said that
while intervention must always be the last resort, "we have a shared responsibility to
act also when confronted with genocide, mass displacement of people or major
breaches of international humanitarian law. To know that such atrocities are being
committed and not to act against them is to make us complicit in them. And to be
passive in the face of such events is to make it more likely they will be repeated,"
Cook said.243

Russia and China argued that NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia violated
international law and undermined the UN Charter, which says council authorisation is
required to use force against a sovereign state. As permanent members of the UN
Security Council, they spoke out against "the replacing of international law with
power politics and even resorting to force, and the jeopardising of the sovereignty of
independent states using the concepts of 'human rights are superior to sovereignty'
and 'humanitarian intervention'. The Security Council's "status and function should
not be doubted or lessened under any circumstances," they added".244

The two powers baldly rejected the evolving Western doctrine, born of the
carnage in countries such as the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, that state
sovereignty no longer provides cover for gross human rights violations and the
international community has a moral duty to protect citizens from abusive
governments. They declared in a joint communique they would fight the "use of
pretexts such as human rights and humanitarian intervention to destroy the
sovereignty of independent states." Beijing and Moscow want to force the issue
back to the UN Security Council, where their veto gives both countries clouts that
they no longer have in other forums.

Others as the Russian envoy on the Balkans, Viktor Chernomyrdin, appealed
for a stronger Security Council to enable the United Nations to stand up to regional
pressures "We cannot allow the UN role to be weakened," he said in a speech to the
Council of Europe parliamentary assembly (June, 24) which was debating the
situation in Yugoslavia. If not strengthened by reforms, "the UN could follow the
undesirable path taken by the League of Nations, which proved unable to deal with
the rigid, egotistical stance of numerous European powers and collapsed under the
weight of its inconsistencies" Chernomyrdin said.

Opposition grew fastest in the developing world. "NATO is blindly bombing
Yugoslavia" Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee said. "There is a dance of
destruction going on there. Thousands of people rendered homeless. And the United
Nations is a mute witness to all this. Is NATO's work to prevent war or to fuel one?". Such feelings have been exacerbated by the impression that the United States and
NATO have largely ignored the United Nations and international opinion in launching
the air campaign.246

18, 1999.
In Washington summit communique, it is mentioned that Allies "recognize the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security." Chirac hailed this language as "a triumph for French diplomacy." But U.S. officials said it is virtually meaningless, because it does not require the alliance to obtain explicit UN Security Council for NATO military actions beyond its territory.247

The consequences concerning the legal basis for NATO peacekeeping operations were to be found in others instances too. NATO leaders at the summit conference authorised a selective search of ships in the Adriatic suspected of ferrying oil to Serbia through Montenegro. The initiative foundered over concerns raised by France and other NATO governments about the legality of forcibly interdicting tankers in the absence of a formal declaration of war against Yugoslavia or a United Nations resolution. General Naumann indicated the plan is intended largely to deter, not forcibly interdict, noting that NATO's action lacks the legal authority of a United Nations-sanctioned oil blockade. "A 'visit and search' regime does not give us the right to force anyone to abandon his course. So we cannot stop a merchant vessel by the use of force," the general said.

In the case of Chechnya no-one intervened. "Human rights are no reason to interfere in the internal affairs of a state," Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov protested last week, offering the same argument that Russia and Yugoslav President Milosevic made during last spring's NATO air war against the Serbian attempt at "ethnic cleansing" in Kosovo. Beijing kept the same stance: "China's principled stand is very clear. China has always been opposed to interference in other countries' internal affairs by any country in any name. We think that the Chechnya issue is the internal affair of Russia. And I think that most countries in the world have already acknowledged this fact," Zhang said.248

The New York Times wrote that critics of inaction in Chechnya, like critics of inaction in Rwanda, argue that there's a double standard, and so there is. President Clinton offered an answer to that objection early in the Kosovo operation last spring, when he laid out his sense of America's obligation to intervene: when it can. "We can't respond to every tragedy in every corner of the world, but just because we can't do everything for everyone doesn't mean that, for the sake of consistency, we should do nothing for no one," he said.249

The problem of sovereignty and action authorisation, is a cause for tension not only in western Europe but in other areas too. In some instances, divisions within NATO had "prolonged conflicts" which at its most extreme, may lead to NATO's inaction. This problem is far from being resolved and needs to be addressed. But what is clear is that the UN remains the appropriate forum for achieving multilateral solutions and as it has been demonstrated during the Kosovo crisis the U.S. cannot achieve effective multilateralism without the United Nations.250

### 4.3 NMD: A test for Co-operative Security?

Following the above analysis of some topics, which must be resolved in order to have a co-operative security regime, another recent paradigm presents an opportunity to test the real will of the all the main players in European security in overcoming the historical differences between them.

In recent years, United States has turned its interest towards the danger of long-range ballistic missiles from third countries that could reach the country. US have developed, but not yet decided upon a limited national missile defence system that deals with the threats that are anticipated. The goal of this program, whose cost is estimated at up to $60 billion on top of development spending, is simple. Stopping a "rogue" state armed with nuclear missiles capable of striking American shores.

President Clinton has said that he will make a decision later in the year, based upon four criteria: What is the nature of the threat. What is the technological feasibility of the system. What is the cost of the system, and how it is related to other priorities. What the overall effect of such a system on the national security in general is, not just on the immediate threat.

The U.S. would like to do that in the context of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) that is modified in some respects. The bilateral US-USSR treaty bans national missile defences, ensuring that each side could destroy the other and, in theory, deterring either side from launching a first strike. The logic of the ban was that if such a shield were developed, rival nations would simply deploy more and more missiles to penetrate it.

The United States has sought to assure Moscow that a limited defence against a small number of strategic missiles could not neutralise Russia's massive nuclear arsenal. Russia has repeatedly expressed opposition to ABM changes, saying they would undermine the entire arms control regime. As described in a draft U.S. protocol presented to the Russians in January 2000, the first phase of the U.S. missile defence program would involve construction of 100 launchers and interceptor missiles with an upgraded radar in Alaska to meet a possible attack from North Korea. That could be supplemented sometime later with additional 100 launchers at a second site, possibly North Dakota, to meet missile threats from countries in the Persian Gulf.

The existence of such a threat is widely accepted by the Clinton administration and some of its Republican critics, but questioned by some policy experts in US and abroad. Many US policymakers warn that a rogue state might attack the United States even if the inevitable result would be retaliation so massive that the attacking state would be obliterated. Yet, some policy experts question the assumption that there are such irrational rogues. The technological feasibility of this project has also raised many concerns. A respected body of opinion amongst academics says that there is no technical way in which this project can work. The program has already suffered serious setbacks, after prototypes missed mock incoming nuclear weapons.

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In Europe, the U.S. proposal to build a national missile defence (NMD) system is provoking growing alarm among America's allies. President Jacques Chirac of France voiced the fears of many Europeans: "How do you convince (nations) to stop piling up new arms when more powerful countries say it's necessary to develop technologies that put hard-won strategic balances into question?".256

Europeans fear that an American NMD could trigger crises with Russia and China.257 Also, Europeans hold strikingly different views about the threat from "rogue" states such as North Korea and Iraq that Washington says the system is designed to counter. For example, French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine noted that there is no translation for rogue state in French. "It's not a geopolitical category we use. It is difficult for Europeans to imagine one of these rogue states attacking the United States."258

Europeans also differ over the potential effect the system would have on their relations with Russia, and whether a U.S. antimissile program would reassure Americans about European security and thus help keep the United States committed to Europe. Javier Solana, the European Union's foreign policy representative, said Europe fears the cure might be worse than the threat if the U.S. system were to spur Russia and China to take countermeasures such as bolstering their nuclear arsenals and developing decoys that could foil interceptors. Solana also said many Europeans would be outraged if the United States abrogated the ABM Treaty. The following statement of German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer is characteristic: "We have to take care that the ABM treaty is not going to be substantially damaged and that the international arms control regime will be strengthened."259

Finally, Solana said Washington must bear in mind the risk that other NATO allies would feel that a missile defence system just for America would create separate security zones within NATO, one country protected against missile attack, the others not. That could "decouple" the United States from Europe and Canada.

During his visit to Europe US President Clinton, trying to calm fears of a nuclear arms race that would leave Europe vulnerable, promised to share any new missile defence technology with "other civilised nations", a reference to allies in Europe, saying "it would be unethical" to keep it solely for America's protection. It was not clear from Clinton's comments whether he would include Russia among the nations sharing in the technology.260 The EU's foreign policy representative, Javier Solana, said that the dialogue has already started in the context of NATO and he was confident a common understanding could be reached with the United States on the missile-defence issue.261

In the following summit meeting at Moscow President Clinton and President Putin did not narrow the differences over the national missile defence system. Deputy

Secretary of State Talbott stressed that "President Putin made absolutely clear to President Clinton that Russia continues to oppose the changes to the ABM treaty that the United States has proposed since last September. Russia believed that the antimissile plan will undermine strategic stability, threaten Russia's strategic deterrent and provoke a new arms race."

But in an unexpected move, Putin agreed with the American assessment that so-called rogue states pose a nuclear threat and offered a new alternative antimissile plan. "As to new threats that they talk about in the United States, we agree with that. We should create new mechanisms that will protect us from these threats. If you are talking about threats that are directed or could be directed at Russia or at the United States, there are countries that have that capability today that can only do that from their own territory." Putin proposed that the United States and Russia could collaborate on a Russian project to shoot down enemy missiles soon after they were launched (boost phase defence), instead of intercepting warheads on their way down. "So we could jointly put up these umbrellas above potential areas of threat. With this umbrella, we could jointly protect all of Europe."

Walter Slocombe, U.S. Undersecretary of Defence said that US "welcomes the prospect of co-operation in principle, but as a supplement, not as a substitute for the timely deployment of the system which we have in mind." According to the New York Times, American experts outside the administration were more positive, as Putin’s plan might lead to a better system from the point of view of American as well as Russian interests. They argued that a boost-phase system would be far more effective than the US administration's proposal because it would intercept attacking missiles before they reached their full speed and dispersed their warheads and decoys, since "It is a lot easier to put a lid over North Korea than an umbrella over the United States and Eastern Pacific."

Then Putin proposed that Russia cooperate with NATO in the construction of a joint European missile defence system. "Russia proposed working with Europe and NATO to create an anti-rocket defense system for Europe. On one hand, it would avoid all the problems linked to the balance of force. On the other, it would permit in an absolute manner a 100 percent guarantee of the security of every European country." NATO officials were briefed by Russian Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev. As NATO Secretary-General Robertson said after the meeting of the NATO-Russia Joint Permanent Council "We're not in a position to evaluate the points made this morning." Sergeyev would say only that the plan "does not violate or compromise in any way the ABM treaty."

The NMD case presents one more challenge for NATO and European allies to prove that co-operative security is something more than a 18 letter word.

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264 "NATO allies hear details on Russian missile defense plans", CNN, June 9, 2000.
266 "NATO allies hear details on Russian missile defense plans", CNN, June 9, 2000.
Concluding Remarks

The developments in the area of Kosovo, during the first months of 2000 (500 people were murdered), proved for once more the inability of Europe to cope with crisis which could threaten the stability throughout its boundaries. The underperformance revealed during the Kosovo war is matched by the inability of European States to provide an effecting peace keeping in the wounded area.

Despite the similar crisis experienced in former Yugoslavia in 1992, and the pronounced will of the formulation of an indigenous European security policy, the most important conclusion is that Europe, did not succeed in overpassing the difficulties of forming one. Since 1992 several initiatives towards the development of an European Security policy have been taken, i.e. the formulation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the relative arrangements for the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO. While NATO was acknowledged to be in sole charge of collective defence, the autonomous European institutions, EU and WEU would develop the appropriate structures and capabilities in order to deal with crisis situations.

However, the experience of the first Yugoslavian crisis has confirmed, among others, that at present Western Europe needs to make use of NATO mechanisms and assets and the support of the United States when confronted with crisis like the above mentioned. In this context, in the Amsterdam Treaty EU has decided to appoint a High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), to create an early warning and policy planning capability and declared the right to use WEU directly as an instrument for military action under guidance from the European Council. WEU for its part had to built up the politico-military and military structures to launch an operation under European control, and to develop a systematic interface with EU and NATO.

But one more crisis in Yugoslavia, this time in Kosovo, proved that Europe, for the second time, was not appropriately prepared to cope with such challenges. The solution to the security problems of the European continent was given again by NATO. That event caused the Europeans to speculate again on the actions to be taken in order to avoid Europe's being in similar inability in the future. At the summit held in Cologne, the EU declared its determination to move forward some new steps towards the reinforcement of the CFSP especially in the area of crisis management with the development of credible operational capabilities. To this end, the European Council decided the inclusion of those functions of the WEU, which will be necessary for EU to fulfil its responsibilities in the area of Petersburg tasks according to the Amsterdam Treaty. Furthermore, in the EU Helsinki summit, focus was given on developing the Union's military crisis management capability, by creating by the year 2003 a 60,000 man rapid reaction force. At the following summit in Feira (June 2000), the EU by creating a 5,000 man police force recognised the need of civilian intervention as a necessary step to ensure peace.

However, the prospect of a more active involvement of EU in security issues will depend on whether the three main European countries will be able to overcome their inability to share a common vision of the future of the European security and
defence identity. Historical differences and not so common interests complicate the credibility of such a prospect.

Along with Europe’s effort to obtain a defence and security identity and take an active part in the new security environment, NATO has verified one more time its role as the primary framework for European security with the efficient conduct of the crisis in Balkans, the adoption of the new strategic concept, and the realisation of the first phase of the enlargement process. In other words, it has proved itself capable and adaptable.

In addition, it has contributed, to the construction of a new co-operative model of security in Europe, which includes two types of co-operation. The first one refers to the establishment of a new form of security co-operation between Europe and the USA through the reinforcement of the European Security and Defence Identify within NATO and the transfer of more responsibilities to the European countries and institutions. The second type refers to the co-operation on security issues between putative opponents, that is to say among NATO and Russia but also the rest of the former communist countries. The development of Partnership for Peace as a program of military co-operation designed to improve the ability of Allies and Partners for joint action in a crisis; the establishment of a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council which brings Allied and Partner politicians, diplomats and military officers together regularly to consult, exchange information and co-ordinate our policies; the implementation of a Charter for a distinctive partnership with Ukraine; and the signing of the "Founding Act" with Russia which, in order to promote a permanent co-operative relationship between NATO and Russia, are the most well known initiatives that are designed to promote co-operation between NATO and former adversaries.

Even though important steps towards this direction have been made since the beginning of the decade, the Kosovo crisis has shown that co-operation in Europe is still a hard task. Increasingly international problems are not bilateral ones that could be addressed by the above standard mechanism of diplomacy or war, but operate on a much larger scale. They requires states to come together to deal with them or large international organisations to cope with them. The ultimate scope of a co-operative security regime is to provide solutions to the security problems through co-operation.

The Europeans are facing some difficulties in promoting co-operation between them, because their national policies present a lack of harmonisation. Co-operation between US and the Europeans faces also challenges because of the conflicting views about the degree of dependence of Europe from NATO and the US, about the ambiguous american attitude regarding European integration, about the decision-making process in NATO, about NATO's enlargement, about relations with other institutions like UN etc. Furthermore co-operative relation between NATO and other powers like Russia although it is desirable, it will be difficult to be maintained if these nations feel that they face a "Versailles" approach. Excluding Russia, as Germany was punished after World War I, could bear similarly disastrous results.

Co-operative security structures can be build with foresight enough to anticipate the time when new powers will emerge in the international arena: China or India. In twenty years new economic powers may join the European Union: Russia and China are the most probable candidates. In structuring a European security regime, we cannot assume that the United States will remain forever dominant.
Although its role as initiator is indispensable and its contribution of a large share of resources certainly required, future decision making should be distributed broadly enough so that the US does not remain the central pole of the European security tent indefinitely.

In that context, where the daedalus European security is evolving, the prospects for the establishment of a real co-operative security regime for Europe depends primarily on the major powers: US, France, Germany, UK and Russia. Since the co-operative security is a process that depends upon the activity of the participants in co-operation, the main actors in the European security stage have to reconsider if their policy is really promoting co-operation, in terms of providing mutual benefits for all participants. If the security in Europe is indivisible, then the efforts to safeguard it should be common and the case of NMD offers an excellent opportunity for exercising on co-operative arrangements.
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