

Office for Information and Press, Brussels
Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow

“The West” in Russian Mentality

Prof. Guerman Diligensky,

Dr. Sergei Chugrov

Summary

Russia's attitudes to the West, i.e. to the basic values of Western/Atlantic civilization, to Western democratic institutions, has turned into one of the most important factors of Russia's development and dynamics of modern global situation. In Russia, it derives from its inherent problem of its "choosing the path of development," which repeatedly emerged in the past. In global context, the world's landscape of the new century in many respects depends of Russia's being close to or hostile to the West in social, cultural, and political dimensions.

This paper is far from pretending to be an integral analysis of these crucial problems of modern and future developments of the world history. Its aim appears to be more modest -- to make an attempt to analyze what influence the dynamics of dominant public opinion, public mood and attitudes toward the West exert on efforts to solve these problems. The central thesis of this paper is that the complicated national attitude to Western values explains many of the zigzags of Russian policy.

The **Introduction** represents different archetypical features of the Russian mentality.

In the second section, **The West and Ideological Conflicts in Post-Communist Russia**, the authors analyze the factors that influenced Russian attitude toward the West and Western values during the past ten years. They show that antagonism between ardent "Westernizers" and "national patriots" is a conflict between two minorities embracing in sum about 30 percent of the adult population

The third section **Western Values and Mass Consciousness** deals with Russian interpretation of basic rights and freedoms. The authors show that it somewhat differs from the Western one and focuses more on socio-economic rights than on political freedoms. Unfortunately, one of the most important components of the Western civil culture -- respect for law and universally accepted social norms -- has found no substantial support in Russia.

The fourths section **The West: Partner or Foe?** deals with the evolution of relations between Russia and the West from demonstrative friendship and partnership in the beginning of the last decade of the 20th century to rather serious conflicts in its end. It coincides with the decline of the Western models' attractiveness and strengthening of virulent nationalism in Russia. However, the authors stress that this link should not be viewed

5

simplistically. Acceptance or rejection of the Western patterns are based on both rational (reflective) and spontaneous (subconscious) comparisons of the Western living standards and one's own standards as well as one's own capacities to achieve these standards. The authors compare the results of different public opinion polls on the NATO military action in Kosovo and on the 1999-2000 Russian military campaign in Chechnya.

Among the **conclusions** is the following. Developments in Russia due to the process of globalization will undoubtedly exert certain impact on the emerging future landscape in the 21st century. Russia's isolation from the Western world, its growing backwardness and its losing incentive for modernization could become a source of new international tensions and new threats with unpredictable consequences. At the same time, Russia's modernization and its getting out of crisis, strengthening partnership with the West could contribute to a more balanced pace of globalization.

I. Introduction: Russian Cultural Archetypes and Their Evolution

The main sources of the Russian's attitudes towards the West are domestic and international developments and their interpretation by the mass media. However, these attitudes cannot be attributed uniquely to modern socio-political and information processes. They may be explained as a cultural phenomenon and in this context, they appear to be a product of not only actual experience but of former experience as well. This phenomenon replicates in different forms so-called traditional archetypes of national consciousness stemming from the past. We would argue that Russian perceptions of the "alien nations" (and first of all, the Western world) form a coherent structural component of the national consciousness in regard of national identity. Perhaps, it differs somehow from the self-consciousness of many occidental and oriental peoples that formed their national identity without any persistent references to the "alien nations."

"The paradigm of Russia's opposition to the "West" emerged only in the 19th century in the wake of the wars waged by Napoleon. It reveals some traits of a late 'social myth,'" notes Yuri Levada.(Levada 1993, 180, 181). All facets of the "image of the West" are a distorted and mirrored reflection of the self-image, i.e. or the perception of the self and of own values). Russians always viewed the West "with hatred and love" (an expression from Blok's poem "The Scythians"). And now, too, Russia's attitude toward the West is a sort of a mixture. Some sociologists attribute this psychological anomaly, in part, to the fact that admiration of the marvels of Western technology, that was used with terrible effectiveness on the battlefields of World War I and that has been retained in the nation's genetic code. In this context, interest to the West was marked by distrust and envy and it is a reflection of own anxieties or hopes. This specific attitude may be explained by dramatic turns of Russian history.

Until 1480, during about three centuries, Russia was isolated from the Christian West because of the spell of Tatars. Some researchers see in this painful experience the sources of Russia's traditional adherence to non-freedom as well as of Moscow's intrinsically aggressive attitude towards neighboring countries. From this period Russia inherited institutional structures, which appeared to be closer to Asian despotism than European absolutism. Russian authoritarianism was perhaps personified by Ivan the Terrible.

Later Peter the Great, while visiting one of the British battle ships, wanted to watch a traditional corporal punishment in the fleet (whipping with a seven-tailed jack-o-seven) and could not understand why the captain opposed his wish, there being no sailors who deserved to be punished. In Russia this circumstance might not have been viewed as an obstacle (Fyodorov, 1997, 133 - 138). On the other hand, Petrine Russia may serve as a spectacular example of the controversial Westernization of the country.

Russia turned out to be one of the countries most hostile to the French Revolution. The old-times vision of ideal society in Russia appears to be a religious community that had no need of defending formal rights and freedoms since their place is already occupied by the Love and the God -- ideals but not law are supposed to be a guideline. In reality, there was a mixture of legal and religious rules resulting in a unstructured complex network of relations between individuals and the state. This sort of collectivism paralyzed much individual responsibility. In reality, traditional ethical norms are often in conflict with the law. In extreme form, under Love, slavery is a happiness.

The millennium-old history of Christianity in Russia allows us to speak of the dual role played by the Orthodox branch of Christianity in forming attitudes toward the West and a specifically East Slavic worldview. There is a wide-spread opinion that a fundamental incompatibility of views between Russia and the West derives from the idea that Russia, in adopting the Eastern Orthodox faith, cut itself off from Europe. In this scheme, Russia's Byzantine orientation resulted in a conservative, anti-intellectual, and xenophobic worldview that became increasingly isolated from the mainstream of European history for a number of centuries, and Communism is perceived as a modern form of Orthodoxy.

On the other hand, many scholars (for example, Reinhardt Wittram, prominent German biographer of Peter I, and professor at Gottinger University), argue that there never was a serious gap between Russia and the West, citing as a main argument the canons of the Eastern Orthodox faith itself. The Russian Church manifested its European character in two features that would have been alien to it as well as rejected by it: long-lasting intolerance and dependence on the state. Maybe these arguments should be challenged - the field of contact between the Eastern and Western branches of Christianity is much broader - but the conclusion, in our view, is much the same.

However, let us say instead that the Russian Church manifested its European character by virtue of its common roots, moral and ethical principles, and symbol of faith.

The primordial political culture of Russian society contains elements of duality. Russia's strong peasant community (*mir*) emerged as a complex phenomenon with many elements of a parochial isolated community based on the idea of sacrificing individual rights for the sake of collectivist values. This imperative has turned out to be disastrous for Russia, leading to bloodshed and martyrs. Even many Russian intellectuals of the 19th century demonstrated their rejection of law and put ethical norms in place of law. Thus the Russian legal tradition is weak.

Nevertheless, it is easy to see a counter-tendency. Katherine the Great, inspired by her contacts with French Enlightenment figures, initiated elections to the so-called Legislative Commission in 1767 to consider the problems of rights. After 1861, Tsar Alexander II initiated a discussion of reforming the state's legal system in order to give rights to the representatives of new estates. Peter Stolypin, Russia's then controversial prime minister, forcibly moved peasants to Siberia, but nonetheless moved the country closer to European standards.

This conflictual nature of Russian society played a very important role in its national self-identification in terms of its relationship with the European civilization. By and large, the results of Petrine reforms appeared to be far more tangible in cultural sphere than in socio-economic and political spheres. There was no more cultural isolation, and Russia found itself compatible with Western values. On its early stage of development, there were powdered wigs and French aristocratic culture, but then came new books, new ideas, universities and academies; a new layer of society with European education emerged. This layer was far from being dominant but nevertheless it represented a new material and spiritual culture within Russia's traditional society. Not only the noble estate but Russia's general population got acquainted with Western values, especially in the period of Napoleonic wars, when Russian soldiers crossed Europe. This new knowledge inspired the society to compare Russian and Western social and cultural patterns. It was an extremely important shift in evolution of national and self-identification psychology. Since Petrine times, Russian society faced the problem of finding its own place in Europe. Actually, Peter the Great formulated a national goal as a "return to the framework of the world civilization." However, the absence

of transmission belts for modernization as well as Russia's underdeveloped social structures hampered Westernization of Russia. At the same time, those factors were sources of Russia's adherence to the Western values having turned into a crucial task. Hence psychologically frustrating nature of Russian perception of the Western experience.

Russia's participation in European affairs, especially after the 1815 Vienna Congress, obviously contradicted its self-perception of being treated as a low-profile, semi-barbaric, and Asiatic country. This seems to be a source of duality and modality of national identity. This self-perception combined Russia's strife for "grandeur" and a high-profile place in the world, as well as its feeling of being treated as a humiliated second-rate country. Hence its self-perception of being juxtaposed to the Western experience. On the one hand, Russia wanted to follow the lead to the West and to borrow its values; on the other hand, Russia was resolute to defend its "distinctive path of development." As these tendencies were intertwined in the framework of Russia's search for identity, their conflict is something more than a banal opposition of traditionalism and modernism.

Within Russian intellectual elite, this conflict was conceptualized and resulted in confrontation of different ideological trends. One of them, the Westernizing one, considers rights of the individual to be its corner stone. The other one, Slavophile, accepts authoritarian government and severe restrictions on human rights, while seeing the source of the country's further development in its own particular traditions. The former tradition embraces universal rights, the latter cultural relativism and national particularism. The first tendency pushes Russia towards the West while the second one results in Russia pursuing a policy of self-isolation. **The Westernizing tradition has for many centuries been weaker than the Slavophile one.**

To put it short, Russia has always vacillated between self-isolation and openness to the outer world. A key element of all Russian history, which suffuses the nation's political culture, is the idea of a strong state authority, to which our "native-soil patriots" so love to appeal. This does not mean, however, that the seeds of liberal freedoms were eradicated from the national political culture; they were always there and remain so today. Rather, they are emerging from their suppression (Chugrov, 2000, 149 - 150). If favorable conditions are created, they will emerge from their lethargic state and produce viable shoots in natural, not foreign, soil - in the social and psychological soil that was cultivated in feudal

Novgorod and Pskov (1136 - 1478) with town-assembly (*veche*) democracy, in pre-Petrine Russia with its strong peasant community (*mir*), and in post-reform Russia with the democratic apparatus of the local authorities (*zemstvos*). The fundamental conclusion is that in no way can democracy be considered a "Western invention," and in no way does it introduce a false note into the political culture of the native soil (Chugrov, 1996, 36 - 37).

From the other point of view, the traditions and moral principles of other ethnic groups were always represented as unusual and peculiar. One can agree with those investigators who regard the "foreignness" (*ino-strannost*) complex as the initial point of reference for relating to other nations (a foreigner, *inostranets*, is not only a person from another country but also someone who is *inoi* (different) and *strannyi* (strange)). To illustrate the perception of "other countries" (*inye strany*) let us turn to the brief and grotesque characteristics of European peoples we find in Kuchelbäker in his European Letters. "Italians did not exist as a people for thousands of years, but without existence as a people it is difficult not to be crafty and to be noble and forthright." The French, in his opinion, are "frivolous, as cruel," in their opinions and as insensitive, as children, and hence can be called "the children among European peoples, but spoiled children." Germans, it seems, enjoy his greater sympathy: "Bold often to the point of lunacy in their hypotheses and theories, they were always timid in actual fact; they have never emerged from a state of warship and hence they have never, anywhere, ceased being youths." Kuchelbäker grants the nations inhabiting the northwest of the continent, and in particular the English, the right to call themselves the "men and warriors among Europeans." However, "these strong tribes also had all the shortcomings of a cold maturity--severity, self-interest, and lack of sensitivity." Shifting his attention to the description of the features of Russian national character, this friend of Pushkin and the Decembrists does not begrudge some subtle praises. In Calabria, "which was known in European history for the grossness and wildness of its inhabitants," the traveler discovers a Russian settlement where "many truly educated and enlightened people" gave him "the most positive opinion about their fellow countrymen." Not satisfied with the brief notation of the merits of the Russians, the author describes a doyen of the colony, Dobrov, as "a representative of the outstanding people of our century." One gets a feeling that he is painting the portrait of some ideal creature. His eyes "seem like they want to penetrate into all the secrets of the soul of the person with whom he is

speaking," and in his home "there reigns extreme order, a subtle and refined taste, and splendor without luxury, abundance without waste, order without constraint, thrift without timidity or meanness"; even Dobrov's wife is an "ideal of feminine perfection" (*Vzglyad skvoz. stoletiya*, 115-116).

Let us recall, for example, the ancient Russian saying: "What's healthy for the Russian is death for the German." There is a multitude of such examples, but they are contradictory. Every proverb reflects only one side of the truth and makes it an absolute. To continue this theme of how Russians perceive the German character, we can see a whole range of rather respectful stereotypes --"the Prussian is gut (i.e., good), but the Russian is guter (better)"--to the confrontational--"the Russian puts pepper in German sauce." And, although many such sayings have now fallen into disuse, nonetheless the stereotypes corresponding to them obviously remain hidden in the secret recesses of popular consciousness, exerting an influence on the evolution of a society's political culture by conserving nationalistic conceptions. To explain the processes that take place in national consciousness, it is important to stress that a stereotyped perception of an "alien" ethnic group characterizes not so much that ethnic group as the ethnic group in which the stereotype was formed and is in current use. Indeed, different nations will evaluate any nation state not only in very different but sometimes even in opposing ways. There is no doubt that nationalist stereotypes (and this is a fundamentally important point) are a peculiar projection of "one's own" values onto "others."

As for Russian self-identification in comparison with the West, one should bear in mind that patience is perceived in Russia as exceptionally important value. Russian religious consciousness gives especially high profile to patience (Kasyanova, 109 - 110). In a sense, it is an essential component of national identity as has become a quality conterposed to Western constructive activity.

Multiple examples of this kind show that Moscow faces the following alternative. On the one hand, it may nurture an idea of its "distinctive path of development," which is principally incompatible with the Western path. On the other hand, Moscow may pursue a messianic policy (Moscow is the Third Rome), which is aimed at joining the West.

This conflictual nature of Russian identity reflects one latent and fundamental feature of Russian mentality -- inherent anxiety and lack of stability of

its attitudes and values. From the point of view of history, this inner conflict of Russian mindset looks quite natural as Russian historic development lacked evolutionary features. Short periods of radical transformations (under Peter I, Catherine II, Alexander II, Communism, “perestroika”, and liberalization) often gave place to periods of conservatism and stagnation. Moreover, transformations quite often did not derive from natural evolution of the society but were planned and arranged by the top echelons of power. As a result, every stage of social transformation remained unfinished; new norms, values, and orientations proved capable of only shattering the old ones but failed to replace them. Therefore, essential characteristics of the personality and culture in Russia remained conflicted and uncertain.

This instability in many respects explains Russia’s perception of the Western experience. It makes Russian mentality remind of a sponge: it is highly capable of absorbing different cultural trends and values. Moreover, qualities largely attributed to Russian mentality are flexibility, mobility, and openness to the outer world. In pre-revolution Russia, these qualities were not strong enough to penetrate into mass consciousness, but they remained latent and “dormant” until prerequisites for attractiveness of the Western model were formed in Russia.

These prerequisites came to the forefront with the partial liberalization of the socio-economic life, development of entrepreneurship, and penetration of Western capital to Russia in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The Bolshevik revolution and “construction of socialism” made this tendency fade. The mentioned above patience facilitated the acceptance of a totalitarian style of government after 1917. The very first steps of the Soviet leadership in 1917-1918 provide us with evidence of the new elite’s low opinion of “bourgeois values.” In the 1920-30s, so-called “revolutionary expediency” was the clear excuse for unlimited violations of human rights. Therefore, the new Soviet Russia became isolated from the outer world. Communist ideology transformed critical attitudes toward the West into “proletarian irreconcilability” to the “bourgeois democracy.” The Bolsheviks sought to build a society designed for the people but slid back into totalitarian rule which could be envied by almost all despots in the world’s history. The political culture has continued to move in zigzags despite the best desires of revolutionaries. However, before the World War II and especially during the war, revolutionary internationalism though

conserved in official parlance gave way to great-power nationalism. Ideologically it was nurtured by a slogan of advantages of socialism over hostile Western capitalism.

After the World War II, this divide of the world into the camps of “bourgeois democracies” and “peoples democracies” explains many conflicts with the outer world, including the 1956 and 1968 invasions of Hungary and of Czechoslovakia. As a counter-example, after Stalin’s death, in a way, the Khrushchev “thaw” opened a period of exchanges with the West, thus undermining Soviet isolation. Some see every crack in isolation as at least a long term and indirect step forward in the promotion of Western values. The opposite is also true: any promotion of Western values is a heavy blow at self-isolation.

Thus, a “window of opportunities” opened, and Western mass culture began to penetrate through the “iron curtain.” Comparison of the Soviet and Western structures of consumption was a mortal blow at anti-Western stereotypes of Soviet official ideology. Stagnation of economy and degradation of ideological norms in the 1960s led to a sort of cultural pluralism, though it failed to result in the Western-type ideological or political pluralism. Multiple West-oriented trends mushroomed together with dissidents persecuted by official propaganda.

The improvement of East-West relations in the early 1970s, known as *détente*, actually stemmed from the military parity achieved by the Soviet Union with the United States. But *détente* was quickly followed by a Western foreign policy line emphasizing human rights issues, which forced them to the front of Russian domestic policies. The signing of the Helsinki Agreement on 1 August 1975 was an event of special, albeit ambiguous, importance. On the one hand, Helsinki diplomacy served as a source of the “new thinking.” On the other hand, provisions on human rights in the Agreement were a source of constant irritation to the Brezhnev leadership. Of course, pressure from the U.S. and other Western states was a powerful driving force. However, all we know about the Gorbachev period testifies that it was a bilateral process since Gorbachev, in fact, saw more clearly than any of his predecessors the links between domestic and foreign policy and appreciated that as long as the Soviet Union persecuted dissidents, Soviet relations with the West would be based on mistrust (Brown, 1996).

Yet even after the attempted coup against this new thinking by hard line communists, he still saw a preferred role for his communist party (Amnesty International Report, 1990, 244). In summation to this point, Russia has faced great difficulty in coming to terms with Western values in its own culture, hence the lack of coherence in Russia's policy and its vacillations between East and West. The Russian intellectual tradition is plagued by a paradox: the longing for Russia's modernization, which includes human rights, is matched in intensity only by the fear of it (Chernyaeva, 1997, 45).

Before analyzing the new situation in mass consciousness in Russia, the authors should turn once more to the archetypes of national mentality since they have accumulated Russian views on national identity as being opposed to Western values. Before the end of the 20th century, the majority of Russians considered themselves to be a nation that does not belong to any of the existing civilizations and is separated by cultural and psychological barriers from both -- occidental and oriental civilizations. In 1999, 60 percent of those surveyed shared an opinion that "Russia is a specific country that is neither Europe nor Asia." However, if the question is put a bit differently ("Are Russian traditions, culture, and history closer to Europe or Asia?"), the share of those who consider Russia to be neither Europe nor Asia drops to 38 percent. At the same time, the number of respondents who consider it to be closer to Europe is 45 percent and to Asia -- only 16 percent. (*FOM. Sotsiologicheskyye soobshcheniya*, 1999, 11, 19). Thus, we can clearly see that Russian attitudes comprise both pro-Western as well as anti-Western views.

So, what is the Russian perception of national identity? Let us turn to a couple of national public opinion surveys conducted in 1989 and 1994 correspondingly in the RSFR and Russia. Below is the break-down of answers to the question: **"What qualities are most characteristic for Russians?"** (in percent):

	1989	1994
openhearted	60	72
hospitable	55	67
patient and tolerant	52	62
unpragmatic	32	39
labor-loving	27	42
irresponsible	22	29

Source: *Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya* (Economic and Social Change. The Monitoring of Public Opinion), 1995, 1, 13.

As one can clearly see, the old stereotypes of critical self-assessment, i.e. lack of pragmatic incentives, lack of responsibility, have been deeply imbedded in national mentality. In the late 1980s and 90s, between one-third to four-tenths of the general population shared these views. In another survey conducted in 1994, 76 percent of the respondents shared an opinion that “Russians do not like to work,” and only 6 percent expressed opposite views. (*Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya*, 1997, 2, 21). Positive compensatory qualities appear to be equally strong and persistent. An average Russian looks at himself/herself as lazy, passive, dependent of circumstances, though rather good-natured in human relations and, above all, stuck to an old principle of patience.

At the same time, the results of the same public opinion surveys demonstrate that stability of traditional stereotypes is far from being absolute. They are subject of changes under pressure of objective circumstances. The period of 1989 - 1994 was a the time of such kind of radical changes. During this period, the socialist state paternalistic system was demolished; a new “wild market” structure emerged. New lines of divide are being formed, which stem from the degree of adaptation of the people to the new environment. Socio-psychological differentiation becomes more pronounced (this can be seen from the above table). Those who failed with their adaptation make use of “compensatory national stereotypes” of a sympathetic (though a bit naive and non-pragmatic) nation with patience as the ultimate value. Others realize that in order to adapt to the new environment they should get rid of these stereotypes and are in search of new qualities compatible with new conditions. Hence the radical change of stereotypes -- the share of the respondents who point at Russians’ being fond of hard labor demonstrated in five years a 1.5 times increase, whereas their adherence to a participative pattern of behavior increased over three times. This may be interpreted as one more symptom of Russian flexibility and “openness.”

In the next section, the authors analyze those factors that influenced Russian attitudes toward the West and Western values during the past ten years.

II. The West and Ideological Conflicts in Post-Communist Russia

One of the most influential factors at work in the late 1980s and early 1990s was an ideological turmoil within Russian political and intellectual elite. It derived from drastic re-orientation of the country's leadership to a *rapprochement* with the West, borrowing Western patterns in modernization of Russia's political and economic system. It was Gorbachev who initiated this shift as he tried to combine socialist and "universal" (in fact, Western) values in the framework of his "new thinking." During the first phase of Yeltsin's rule, this line in ideology and politics was considerably reinforced as the main driving forces of the Yeltsin "revolution" were anti-Communism and liberal values.

The pro-Western and liberal orientation faced a growing resistance from hard-line Communists, the military and special services, "red directors," especially in the military industrial complex. Non-Communist nationalist and anti-Communist intellectual and political forces that had emerged even before "perestroika" period, also challenged the "Western liberalism." In spite of permanent hostile relations between the Communists and non-Communist nationalists (for instance, between the Communist Party and Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's LDPR), they drifted closer to each other ideologically.

It is beyond our tasks to analyze all details of ideological and political alignment of forces in the post-Soviet society. For the purposes of this paper, it is sufficient to provide a generalized analysis of major ideas of opposing groupings.

Leaders of the reformist group do not hesitate to proclaim their "pro-Western" programmatic orientation. For example, Yegor Gaidar wrote in one of his theoretical papers: "Our main goal I consider to be the construction in our country of a stable and, at the same time, dynamic and prosperous Western-type society." Russia's main dilemma can be determined as a purely traditional East-West conflict. According to Gaidar, the principal difference between the Western and Eastern civilizations is a "developed market based on free property rights... Among the world civilizations the Western one proved to be the most efficient."

During the 18th - 20th centuries Russia found itself astride between Eastern (Asian) and Western paths of development. Its being incapable to choose between them looked like a permanent crisis of Russian mentality. "Now the Eastern empire collapsed, and Russia

enjoys a unique chance to change its social and economic orientation and to become a Western-type republic” (Gaidar, 1995, 10, 30,57, 189,199, 202).

The main pillar of “liberalism *à la* Gaidar” is his economic strategy (“Russia’s choice in favor of Western liberalism is, in fact, its joining the most efficient civilization. It appears to be a rational choice.” The principal ideological symbol of this choice is private property. If spiritual leaders of the perestroika period, and the brightest of them, Andrei Sakharov, put above all such values as political freedoms, democracy, human rights, the advocates of radical economic reforms do not pay much attention to these values in their programmatic statements (though, in general, they share these values). Cultural and psychological cleavages between the Russian and Western societies they attribute to purely economic factors. According to Gaidar, a “tradition of a strong legitimacy of property is the principal psychological and cultural backbone, which supports the entire European capitalism” (ibid., 61).

It is evident that economic emphasis of the new liberal Westernizers can be explained not only by their professional interests but, first of all, by the situation in the country in the 1990s. The exacerbation of the economic crisis at the end of the Gorbachev period, assumed new forms under Yeltsin. Primarily, this crisis derived from difficulties and errors of the reformist governments. The major goal for the society was to get out of this crisis, and it overshadowed all other problems. Russian leadership, as often happens in our history, tried to solve the problem by emergency measures and “power activities” of the top state authorities. In this context, the “Westernizing ideology” assumed characteristic features of a technocratism and economic determinism.

Ideological and political opponents of this “Westernizing” liberalism failed to challenge it with the same type of rational argumentation. As a matter of fact, they try to benefit from all disasters that plagued Russia in the 1990s - dramatic GNP decline, impoverishment of the general population, Mafiaization of the country, and sky-rocketing prices, as well as the state’s being incapable to finance expenses on social security, R&D, army, and state apparatus. However, they failed to turn these accusations into a real program. Of course, the Communists benefited from the nostalgic mood of the general population referring to a “happy life” under the Communist rule. However, it was hardly possible to introduce an ideology based on restoration of totalitarian power of those “who

promised a better life but cheated.” Under Yeltsin, neither Communists, nor non-Communist critics of liberalism were able to offer something looking like an real economic ideology.

Since the opponents of liberal reforms proved incapable to counter them in the field of economic rationalism and efficiency, they preferred a metaphysical sphere of nationalist myths and emotions. Actually, there were some serious reasons for such a choice.

First, the liberal orientation toward an alien, Western model was painful for national proud and self-esteem, and this made the liberal paradigm visibly vulnerable. Second, the bulk of the Russian society suffered from the syndrome of dismemberment stemming from the break-up of the Soviet Union and the collapse of its status of a great power. Due to a large proportion of Russians in Ukraine, Moldavia, Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and Baltic states, the dissipation of the Empire was far more painful for Russians than the loss of colonial empires by the British, French, or other nations. The problem of ethnic Russians living in the former Soviet republics remains one of the most traumatic experiences for the post-Soviet Russian consciousness.

Finally, Moscow’s euphoria regarding prospects of its political *rapprochement* with the West and its joining the “club of Western powers” was replaced by disillusionment. It has become clear that in spite of sympathies toward new Russian democracy, the West was far from granting it large-scale Marshall-plan-like assistance. Moreover, the West was not ready to turn a blind eye at contradictions, delays, and errors of Russia’s reformers as well as their failure to strictly stick to Western economic and political recommendations.

Ideology of the anti-liberal forces was nurtured, first of all, by nostalgic expectations of the former Soviet *nomenklatura* that has become an integral part of the new post-Soviet elite. Actually, the consciousness of this old Soviet elite, since Stalin times, has been permeated by a “great-power” nationalism only slightly flavored by Marxist “internationalism.” New conditions made it possible to uncover the face and to ideologically merge with non-Communist nationalist and chauvinist forces.

The main “anti-Western” political force, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), having proclaimed its adherence to the “national patriotic” values, at the same time, failed to soften egalitarianism and anti-capitalist populism nurtured by virulent Stalinism of its supporters and activists. The Communist leaders could not stop praising ideals of recent Communist past. This did not diminish the stamina of its nationalist rhetoric

and turned its ideological platform into a strange mixture of nationalist and “class” principles. Genuine nationalism is incompatible with such a mixture because interests of the nation are its utmost priority that is above all group interests, including those of the “poor,” “working people,” etc. In principle, nationalism can co-exists with any socio-economic system provided it serves the “grandeur of the nation.”

In 1995, the *Dukhovnoye naslediyе* (Spiritual Heritage) political movement was formed assuming a mission of purifying “great-power” nationalist ideology of alien ideas. Its leader **Alexei Podberyozkin**, at the first stage, tried to play the role of the CPRF’s chief of staff, but rather soon he changed the tactics in favor of emphasizing cleavages and accusing the Communist leadership of dogmatism. However, these cleavages were more tactical than strategical ones. Podberyozkin himself having been one of the founders and a co-chairman of the Peoples’ Patriotic Union of Russia, is of an opinion that autonomous status of his political movement facilitates his major task of unifying all national patriotic forces including non-Communist trends, politicians, and media. This status also facilitates “modernization” of the movement, getting rid of extremist trends (xenophobia, chauvinism) and such discredited ideals as Stalinist version of socialism or Russian absolutism of the Tzarist times. Though Podberyozkin and his movement failed to win substantial political weight (The Spiritual Heritage lost the 1999 parliamentary elections and its leader’s showing was rather poor at the June 2000 presidential vote) in the framework of ideology they can be viewed as the most “modern” and representative trend of Russian anti-Western nationalism. In this context, their ideas are far more interesting than vociferous and clownish anti-Communist ultra-nationalism of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy.

One can make a judgment on “purity” of Podberyozkin’s nationalism from his striking capacity to absorb practically all ideas including those that seem to be absolutely incompatible with each other. For instance, in his book Podberyozkin argues that “all attempts of restoration of the old regime,.. as well as of artificial implantation of Western ideas in Russian soil are doomed to failure.” At the same time, the Spiritual Heritage proclaims in its program its adherence to “the non-interference of the state in private life,.. genuine respect of human rights, human dignity, guarantees of economic and political freedoms, non-interference in legal activities of public organizations, political parties, and religious associations.” At the same time, the program emphasizes its being in

congruence with the views of the advocates of the socialist path of development and mentions “positive experience of socialism, its achievements in the recent past.” Thus, pro-Western ideas of human rights, civil, economic, and political freedoms peacefully co-exist with “reanimation” of socialism.

The Spiritual Heritage’s program rejects “the liberal model of development that is alien to Russia and leads the country to an impasse.” It proclaims Russian spirituality “incompatible with liberalism and radical democratic models.” However, parallelly it backs the goals of “Russia’s democratic revival,” “minimal state interference in economics,” “respect of private property rights,” and “genuine privatization.” And above all, in Podberyozkin’s view, Russia’s path of development is “the path of Russian Communism!” To put it short, in works of the leader of the Spiritual Heritage and in the documents of the movement, the advocates of different ideologies -- Communists, nationalists, and liberals -- can find some of their basic ideas.

This ideological “vegetable soup” and striking capacity of its “chief creator” to say simultaneously “yes” and “no” may produce an impression of being a “theoretical delirium. «Such a verdict seems to be not quite appropriate, however. Podberyozkin’s real goal was to form in the mass consciousness a “patriotic” ideology, modern national idea, which could become “a strategy of development for the State and the Nation.” Its concrete message is quite obvious: “By and large, all Russia’s activities inside and outside national borders should be connected to the strategic goal of restoration of the great state, its turning into the world intellectual and spiritual leader, into the vanguard of the Slavic peoples and into the nucleus of the future Eastern Empire.”

This flourishing rhetoric hides rather concrete short-term goals: “We must do our best to restore Russia in its borders of 1990 by means of peaceful and democratic means, and it does not matter whether it is called Union, Empire, or otherwise.” Taking into consideration the current state of affairs in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and, first of all, Moscow’s relations with the Baltic states, it is hardly possible to take seriously this reference to “peaceful and democratic means.” And though the question of what could become this Eastern Slavic empire or Russian or Soviet empire remains open, it is clear that the main target of Podberyozkian national idea is not so much inside Russia as outside the country. Its essence is in restoration of the “empire” and strengthening its

influence in the world. Podberyozkin is ready to make use of any political or ideological resources -- be they democracy or authoritarianism, values of free market or Communism, -- only if they help consolidate Russian society around this goal. In this logic, the West is Russia's main foe; even nowadays it tries "to deprive Russia of sovereignty and independence."

"Russian idea" in the Spiritual Heritage's interpretation is essentially an idea of mobilization of all material and spiritual resources of the nation with the end of restoration, reincarnation, and widening of the Great Empire. The scenario is quite traditional and was consequently implemented by many Russian rulers from Ivan the Terrible to Stalin and Brezhnev. In this sense, Podberyozkin's movement actually safeguards historical heritage. In the old times as well as nowadays, its implementation conserved economic and social backwardness, archaic structures, poverty and absence of freedom for the general population. As a matter of fact, the main prerequisite for mobilization is a despotic, authoritarian state, which dominates the society and personality. The following statement is especially typical for Podberyozkin's "logic," which is based on bringing together incompatible ideas: "the world view of a 'great power' patriot should be focused on human personality, its development, and self-realization, whereas the state with its institutions should serve as the most efficient instrument of such a development, and sometimes, the only one" (Podberyozkin 1998, 16, 22, 40, 56, 117, 269, 274, 275, 282). The subordinate clause in this citation, in fact, directly contradicts the meaning of the main clause: it is hardly possible to discuss development and self-realization of a personality if the "state institutions" determine how and in what direction it should develop and realize its potential! Thus, the polemics of the modern Westernizers and Slavophiles (or rather "great-power" nationalists) hide confrontation of opposite concepts of Russia's path of development: based either on efficient market economy and liberal society or on suppression of economic, cultural, and other spheres of social life.

For an advocate of the former path of development the image of the West plays the role of an attractive pattern; for a protagonist of the latter one -- the role of a scare-crow and an anachronism (Podberyozkin, *ibid.*, 43).

In their fight for influence, both liberals and nationalists have their trump-cards and vulnerable points. Liberal ideology correlates with rather traditional, though a bit vague,

Russian dream “to live as all other people live,” with a perception of the West as a well-to-do, stable and civilized society. Due to a series of intensive contacts with the West, this perception has become deeply rooted in the mass consciousness. An opinion that the Western society faces a crisis is widely aired by the “patriotic” propaganda. However, it sounds rather abstract for rank-and-file Russians and it often has nothing to do with their current concerns. Neither “lack of spirituality,” nor criticism of the “consumption society” intimidate Russians as they know pretty well from their own experience that “one cannot eat spiritual food” living below subsistence level, which is almost nothing in comparison with Western standards. Far more fearful may be prospects of military conflicts that may derive from the “struggle for empire.”

The “patriotic” trump cards are national humiliation and failure of attempts to quickly switch to the “Western path” in the 1990s. The authors withstand from analyzing the sources of this failure, but in any case, the basic paradigm of Russian liberals contained some elements that significantly limited their potential influence. In essence, this paradigm was focused upon an ideal (and not practical issues) of a free market that had inspired the “conservative wave” of the 1970s and 1980s and economic course chosen by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. Hence the vague and somewhat conflicted attitude of the Russian liberals toward social aspects of the market modernization.

In his analysis of modern “social capitalism,” Yegor Gaidar diversifies two versions of its “socialization”: on the one hand, the state regulation and social reformism (including different social guarantees -- medicare, education, labor market, pensions, tax exemptions, etc.), and, on the other hand, “traditional values of liberalism” and “active budgetary and monetary policy of the state.” Gaidar clearly prefers the latter version and argues that the “state regulation and social reformism help avoid the explosion of passions” but “fail to guarantee economic progress.” The first pattern is likely to result in “blocking economic progress, budgetary crisis, growing inflation and, finally, in stagnation and unemployment.” At the same time, Gaidar thinks that the choice between the “social state” and free capitalism is not actually important for Russia: “let us change the system and construct the basis of Western society, and only after that these problems become important” (Gaidar, 1995, 38, 39, 190). From the point of view of the rational choice theory, this conclusion seems to be impeccable, but for the general population of Russia, its own financial situation

appears to be the most important issue. **The start of reform resulted in a substitution of civil-political for socio-economic rights.** Under Communism, the general population, lacking political freedoms, nevertheless benefited from social welfare. This welfare system, although sometimes a disaster, with hours in line at a doctor's office, by and large guaranteed minimal standards of socio-economic rights (Chugrov, 2000, 152). **The reform era brought in political freedoms but has also almost demolished the old system of social guarantees.** This inversion of civil-political and socio-economic rights was immensely painful for the general population, especially in the provinces. From the point of view of an average Russian, freedom of speech has led to pornography and propaganda of violence, and freedom of conscience threatened to turn into the importing of pathological sects. Thus those who lost during the reform period consider liberal values mostly as moral decay, excessive luxury, and, above all, "Mafiaization of Russia." These deviations, being generally attributed to Western values, result in lingering doubts concerning civil-political rights. Devoid of socio-economic rights, the general population is in poor position to benefit from political freedoms.

Russian liberals called the people to adapt to the "wild market," on the one hand, and a promised a better, wealthy life, on the other. The first part of the message contradicted traditional attitudes of the Soviet people and was met with understanding only by a limited part of the general population. The second part of it could have good chances for success if the people were able to understand how and why the free market would bring to prosperity the majority of the people and not only a few. However, the number of people capable of assessing potential benefits is obviously limited. The majority seems to be incapable of understanding the essence of reforms. Anatoly Chubais and other liberals admitted they had made a mistake having left the population without explanation of their goals. In fact, they have committed even worse mistake: they have encouraged the people promising them better life and cheated. Essentially rational doctrine of liberal Westernizers in its PR version acquired Utopian and mythological traits. No wonder that the traditional Communist and nationalist myths left behind liberal myths that had no roots in national mentality. The Communist mythology is based on people's memory of the paradise lost (i.e. grandeur of the Soviet empire) and of their very modest and restrained, but nevertheless quiet and stable, existence under Communism.

Comparison of traditionalist and liberal messages shows they have at least one common feature -- both fail to reflect everyday socio-economic interests and needs of the general population. Nationalists are rather vociferous while emphasizing these interests and needs but, in fact, they are driven by the ultimate goal of restoration of the Empire. In their view, social justice is nothing more than a populist slogan, which has little to do with the *Realpolitik*. Westernizers tend to consider satisfaction of these interests and needs to be a goal, that will be attained in future as a result of a long process of economic liberalization. Therefore, none of these two doctrines enjoys substantial support from the general population and is capable to turn into their ideology.

The conflict between Westernizing and “native-soil” doctrines appears to be conceptual for intellectuals (“either - or” pattern), however, for the general population this conflict is somehow blurred and badly articulated (Kholodkovsky, 1998, 64). According to public opinion surveys, in the mid-1990s, the share of Russians who think the country should entirely or partially adhere to Western values was about 15 percent (one-third of them were entrepreneurs and university students, over one-fourth were managers and young people from 16 to 25 years old) (Klyamkin, Lapkin, 1995, 82). Thus, “Westernizers” in Russia seem to be a marginal group; only in elite strata, among young people, “children of perestroika” their number is more substantial. The number of advocates of “traditional Russian values” are three times higher (Klyamkin, Lapkin, *ibid.*). However, their choice appears to derive from vague emotions of national self-respect and has little to do with ideological or political motivation.

The degree of influence of the national patriotic ideology reflects relatively low status of its key value, patriotism. Thus, in 1998, only 10.5 percent of respondents pointed at patriotism as the most important value (*Sovremennoye rossiiskoye obshchestvo*, 23). In 1999, only 16 percent included patriotism into a list of slogans of a party they were inclined to vote for at the elections (*Soobshcheniya FOM*, 1999, No. 49, 32 -33).

This strikingly low rating of patriotism has nothing to do with the level of respect to the land of fathers in the society but demonstrates the low-profile attitude of the population toward ideas of militarism and “mobilization society” associated with the slogan of imperial restoration. In 1998, 76.3 percent of respondents assumed that Russia should achieve economic rise in order to raise its prestige in the world, and only 10.6 percent said that

Russia “should strengthen its military might.” The priority of the “great-power” status over personal freedoms and rights is far from being a conventional wisdom. In 1998, 26.3 percent said they shared an opinion that “freedoms and human rights are valuable enough to sacrifice the great-power status.” 31.5 percent said they were of opposite opinion and 25 percent took an intermediate position (*Sovremennoye rossiiskoye obshchestvo*, 21).

It is note-worthy that such values as justice, human rights, order and security attract 2 - 3 times more supporters than patriotism. At the same time, the “patriots” are 1.5 times more numerable among the people with higher education: abstract ideas are absorbed better by elites and educated people since other people are more preoccupied with everyday concerns.

A major cleavage has emerged between the notions of “liberal rights” and “order.” In the nostalgic public view, the former turn into a synonym for disorder. As a result, **many people appear to believe that the government should regulate people** speaking out against it and foster appropriate social attitudes and values. Paradoxically, the bulk of advocates of civil responsibility -- a group one would expect to be particularly likely to support human rights -- express concern at the excess of political freedom and free speech, as well as a belief that the government should take more of a role in guiding society (Chugrov, 1996, 47).

One can also see the rejection by some Russians of universal human-rights norms, since they are considered by many to be uniquely Western ones. One can also understand the strong pressure upon the Kremlin to assume generally anti-Western policies, and thus save Russia from deterioration under the Western dominated international system. Even some politicians of the new generation stress the vital necessity for Russia not to align only with the West but to search out its own path.

What are the transmission belts of these anti-Western attitudes to the process of decision making? Some interest groups and non-governmental organizations try to pressure the Russian government into pursuing more anti-Western policies, making use of negative and sometimes distorted perceptions of the human rights issue by the public opinion. A part of the Russian establishment, discouraged by military cuts, stands to gain from the exacerbation of international tensions. Vested interests of the military and the law-enforcement organizations make some of them hostile to the West. As for foreign policy

decision making, one of recent surveys of 113 representatives of the Russian foreign policy elite showed that 52 percent of them adhered to Western-type democratic principles while 45 percent consider themselves to be advocates of Russia's distinctive way of development. In general, **antagonism between ardent “Westernizers” and “national patriots” is a conflict between two minorities embracing in sum about 30 percent of the adult population** (Diligensky, 1999, 42).

III. Western Values and Mass Consciousness

The general picture of attitudes of the Russian society toward the West is far more ambivalent; it is shaped under influence of a number of conflicting factors. Among these factors one can single out a cognitive component of corresponding attitudes, i.e. perceptions of the Western way of life that are deeply rooted in Russian mass consciousness. Vladimir Lapkin and Vladimir Pantin's analysis of the 1993 - 1996 public opinion polls demonstrates that these attitudes do not differ much from archetypes described above. The respondents attribute to the West such qualities as entrepreneurial talents (42 percent), wealth (39 percent), inviolability of private property (37 percent), free choice of models of thinking and behavior (33), well-paid labor (32), professionalism (30), guarantees of political rights (29), and non-interference of the state in private life of its citizens (29 percent) (Lapkin, Pantin, 1998, 20). It is also interesting to note that these values often do not correspond to the real hierarchy of values in the West and reflect more unsatisfied needs of Russian respondents. Thus, in American world view, “material values” (wealth, profits) occupy far more modest place, than in Russia. At the same time, such a value as tolerance, which is rather important for the Americans, is not identified by Russian as a “Western” value (*Monitoring obshchesvennogo mneniya*, 1997, 6, 34; 1998, 3, 12). This “substitution” of one's own “insufficiencies” and “shortages” by others' values (“principle of mirror” in Yuri Levada's words) is very typical for the image of the West in Russian consciousness.

From psychological point of view, it means that the cognitive component of the attitude is under influence of motivational component. Even more spectacular this impact can be seen in “filtration” of Western values, or selection of those values that are perceived as the most acceptable for Russian environment. In contrast to the case of identification of Western values, when Russian respondents simply answer questions, they far less often

mention “business talents” and “inviolability of private property” (21 percent), “wealth” (13 percent), “non-interference of the state in private life” (19) and they do not mention at all the word “entrepreneurship,” which occupied the top place in the former case. However, in the latter case, one can find “professionalism” at the top line on the list (30 percent) followed by “free choice of models of thinking and behavior” (23 percent) (Lapkin, Pantin, *ibid.*, 21). Such a high rating of professionalism can be explained by its being perfectly compatible with traditional Russian (*masterstvo* -- high skills) and Soviet values stemming from widely-spread and relatively prestigious special education and high proportion of skilled specialists in the Soviet society. At the same time, it is due to a lack of professionalism that Russians tend to explain the country’s backwardness.

Sociological data demonstrate a high-profile place of the Western model in today’s Russian society. In late 1992, one year after the start of market reforms, 34 percent of respondents pointed at this or that version of the Western model as “the most reasonable path for Russia” (11 percent mentioned “capitalist society like in the USA”; 23 percent - “social democratic society like in Sweden”). Fourteen percent preferred “society of socialist type like in the Soviet Union”; and 23 percent pointed at the “specific Russian path” (VTsIOM, 1998, 9). In spite of poor results of reforms, the majority of those surveyed constantly supports Russian integration with the outer, first of all, Western, world. In 1994, 71 percent of the respondents shared an opinion that “Russia join the world economy, policy, and culture as soon as possible” (*Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya*, 1997, 2, 21). In 1997, when the failure of radical reforms was evident to everybody, 47.1 percent of the respondents chose “a state with market economy, democratic institutions, and respect for human rights” as a model for future Russia, while only 17.7 percent pronounced in favor of “a state with clearly specific system and distinctive path of development”; and 20.6 percent -- in favor of “a socialist state with the Communist ideology like USSR” (Zubov, 1998, 97).

To understand the problem one should understand the concrete interpretation of the “Western way of development” by those who advocate it. Their number, in fact, is not small and is between one-third and a half of the population. It is evident that they are induced above all by high living standards in West, its material culture, comfortable conditions of life, strong and efficient economy -- advantages that are especially visible against the background

of the impoverishment and economic hardships in Russia. In one of the 1998 public opinion polls, the respondents had to explain the criteria for their choice of a pattern for Russia. The most wide-spread answers were the following:

- “countries with high living standards”;
- “well-to-do countries”;
- “Canada as a pattern for agriculture, Germany for industry, Sweden for social environment”;
- “any developed country”;
- “any country where people live better”.

A far more difficult task is the analysis of attitudes toward basic Western values. The shortest and most axiomatic formula of these values for their advocates is hidden in a dual definition of the West as a “free and democratic society.” For Western residents both parts of this definition are inseparable and almost synonymical. In modern Russian society, the linkage between the two notions looks somewhat different: freedom is not linked to democracy and is estimated higher. Freedom seems valuable to about one half of Russians (47 percent), and democracy is significant only for about one-fifth (21 percent) (Lapkin, Pantin, 1998, 29). According to public opinion surveys, the majority considers freedom of press to be one of the principal achievements of democratic reforms; about a half of the population think that principal achievements are the freedom to go abroad and freedom of entrepreneurship (see, for example, *Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya*, 1995, 1, 19).

Significantly lower the Russians evaluate the right of free participation in political activities. Thus, in 1994, only 29 percent of the respondents shared an opinion that free multiparty elections were a positive result of reforms; 33 percent thought that this innovation had brought more harm than benefits; 23 percent considered right for strikes to be useful and 36 percent -- harmful (ibidem). In 1998, only 23.3 percent of those surveyed assumed that the emerging of associations and NGOs was good for the Russian society; 28.8 percent attributed no importance to this fact; and 21.5 percent had no opinion regarding the question (*Sovremennoye rossiiskoye obshchestvo*, 27, 28).

The gap between freedom and democracy is deeply rooted in traditional, archetypical features of Russian mentality. The dream of freedom has always been one of

the most powerful driving forces in Russian history full of conflicts with despotic regimes of tzars, bureaucrats, and landlords. However, **Russian interpretation of freedom differs from that in the West.** In the latter case, it is imbedded in stable social order, in a strong system of political and legal institutions, and is governed by law. In Russian interpretation the freedom is closer to the notion of *volya*, which in West-European languages may be translated as “will,” “volonté,” “Wille,” and, according to Russian philosopher Georgy Fedotov, has the meaning of “being able to live in conformity with one’s own will, without being disturbed by any social restrictions...” (Fedotov, 1996, 183). This kind of freedom, unrestricted by social norms and law, usually reflects escapism rather than a desire to establish new social order. This is one of the basic sources of psychological incompatibility of such an interpretation of freedom with democracy.

Russian democratic tradition’s being weak is well-known. This weakness turns into a serious obstacle for borrowing democratic values and, above all, democratic practice by the post-Soviet society. It is true that Russia has developed multi-party system, and free press, it has held democratic elections. However, paradoxically, while the elections were a triumph for the process of democratization, the results threatened to undermine democracy itself: never in Russian history have the Communists been as legitimate as they are now. Their victory could herald the abolition of Western-type institutions and a return to authoritarianism. Therefore, I argue that the emergence of Western-type democratic institutions is a crucial but not sufficient prerequisite for Russia’s transition to democracy. Russia’s democratic institutions are not rooted in long democratic practice. They coexist with the centuries-old traditions of authoritarian rule.

All the above mentioned negative factors obviously damaged the prestige of democratic values, but they were not strong enough to discredit the Western democratic model. They seem to have convinced many Russians that the “principles of Western democracy are incompatible with Russian traditions” (FOM 94P18; *Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya*, 1995, 2, 8; VTsIOM, Public Opinion Poll 96-4). However, in 1996, 70 percent of the respondents chose the Western countries as a pattern of development for Russia, and only 12 percent preferred USSR, Cuba, North Korea (FOM, Public Opinion Poll 96 OSP). The image of democracy in its Western version plays a role of

the ideal for many Russians. “Nothing better has been invented,” they use to say (VTsIOM, Public Opinion Poll 96-4).

The essence of this ideal is rather vague. Usually, it derives from a protest against old, Soviet, and new, post-Soviet, types of authoritarianism. In 1993, only 9 percent and in 1996, 12.7 percent of the respondents said they had a clear idea of democracy; correspondingly 50 and 41.3 percent said they knew “little on what it really is” or gave no answer. In 1996, the majority (56.5. percent) said they shared the opinion that “the main problem of strengthening democracy in Russia is that the people are unaware of what would be better for them” (*Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya, 1995*, VTsIOM, 1995, pp.2, 7-8;VTsIOM Opros 96-4).

Though Russian democratic ideals are usually somewhat unstable they strongly correlate with concrete needs and aspirations. If a certain part is adhered to the ideals of freedom, the majority of Russians stick to what they dream of but lack in everyday life (this may be one of essential characteristic features of every social ideal). Let us refer to the mentioned above “substitution” of socio-economic rights for political freedoms. **The majority of Russians clearly preferred socio-economic guarantees provided by the paternalistic Communist state. As they failed to get financial compensation for those guarantees they began to dream of restoring the “lost paradise.” This, of course, cannot, but exert powerful pressure upon formation of their perception of democracy.**

As it is clear from public opinion polls, the majority of Russians consider such democratic values as human rights to be the locus of control for democracy, and, at the first glance this does not differ greatly from Western point of view. However, the difference is great since Russians tend to interpret the human rights somewhat differently and think socio-economic rights to be more important than political freedoms. For example, in 1994, the break-down was the following (in percent):

education and social welfare	64
well-paid labor	49
guaranteed living standard	33
...	
freedom of press	18

freedom of conscience	14
free exit from the country	11
free elections	9

(*Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya*, 1995, 2,8).

As we see, in spite of the original meaning of the word “democracy,” Russian perception of democratic values does not pay much attention to “the power of people.” As another example we can point at very eloquent results of another public opinion poll of mid-1990s: the definition of democracy by the formula “the authorities are elected by the people” was shared by only 5 -7 percent of respondents; and the formula “the authorities should respect human rights” (perhaps in the mentioned above sense) got support from 29 percent (*ibidem*).

Why does Russian mentality seem to cherish the idea of a paternalistic state?

First, negative results of the liberal “Westernization” in social sphere are giving birth to nostalgic protest. According to our observation, even some layers of intellectuals, who were ardent partisans of Western values, now have lost their sympathies for them (*Diligensky*, 1998, 84).

Second, Russian perception of the Western model is not coherent: the most attractive pattern is represented by countries with developed welfare system. According to multiple public opinion polls, the majority of respondents prefer a “social democratic” pattern to a “capitalist” one, a West-European experience to an American one. The most attractive pattern appears to be that of Scandinavian countries, especially Sweden (*VTsIOM*, 1998, 9. *Public Opinion Foundation*, 96 OSP poll; and *Diligensky*, 1998, 67, 71).

This “paternalistic syndrome” exerts the most powerful impact on the Russians’ perception of the Western economic system. We would argue that the Western principles of a market economy are accepted by the Russian consciousness easier than the Western democratic norms. There is little doubt that the majority is sympathetic with the market and private property (*VTsIOM*, 1998, 9), but when the questions are put a bit more concretely, it becomes obvious that only minority of the people is ready to accept privatization of industrial giants, banks, transportation system, etc. Many of them are ready to recognize nothing more than privatization of small retail shops and restaurants (*Monitoring*

obshchestvennogo mneniya, 1993, 1,21). Many Russians share an ideal of an “absurd combination of economic dictatorship and political freedom” (Lapkin, Pantin, 1997, 81). “Economic dictatorship of the state” is often viewed as a necessary condition for paternalistic social system. Perhaps, the most incomprehensible for the Russian mentality appears to be the Western ideal of relationship between a personality and the society, a citizen and the state. The notion of civic society since the perestroika period has been widely spread in Russia with the help of mass media and democratically-minded intellectual elite. However, nowadays, in our opinion, it is possible to speak only about the most early, initial stage of emergence of such a society. An average Russian is convinced that that all problems that the country is facing should be solved by the state authorities and is reluctant to join NGOs. In this respect, the majority of democrats do not pay much attention neither to the forming independent associations, nor to self-government at municipal level (*Sovremennoye rossiiskiye obshchestvo*, 27, 28). In other words, the maximum opportunities enjoy those organizations that provide minimal chances for citizens’ participation.

Unfortunately, one of the most important components of the Western civil culture -- respect for law and universally accepted social norms -- has found no substantial support in Russia. On the one hand, restoration of law and civil culture are among the main priorities for Russians who are sick and tired of chaos and voluntarism of authorities. On the other hand, the authorities are considered to be responsible for all these plights and are expected to change the situation.

From institutional point of view, Russia has already introduced Western-type legal system. Nevertheless, the majority of the people do not believe in it and rarely addresses to courts to defend their interests. The formula of "law and order" has got little sense in Russia and could be easily replaced by another one -- "justice and order," and this is not the same. For instance, the decision of the three leaders (presidents of Russia, Ukraine, and Belorussia) to dissolve the Soviet Union in December 1991 still raises some questions of the legal order. The behavior of both Yeltsin and his opponents Rutskoi and Khasbulatov in the summer of 1993 are pointed examples of a prevalence of political goals predominating over the rule of law and respect for institutional process and structure. Neither side was willing to compromise, each was willing to violate the emerging

rule of law. Yeltsin dissolved parliament and ignored the ruling by the Constitutional Court of Russia that he could not do this. Similarly, according to the constitution, the parliament speaker Khasbulatov had no authority to attempt to replace Yeltsin with vice president Rutskoi. The crisis and violence could have been averted if either side had showed greater flexibility on the holding of new elections. Rather than compromise to protect the emerging democratic institutional structures and process, they engaged in the place politics of the czars. And in 1995, 40 percent of the respondents said they considered it appropriate to avoid laws without violating them (VTsIOM, 95-6 poll, "democracy"). These examples demonstrate that the persistent and - even today - stereotypical notion of law as an obstacle to policy is still not overcome in Russian society (for details see: Chugrov, 1996). Conflict between modernization and traditionalism is the main driving force of socio-psychological differentiation of post-Soviet society (Khenkin, 1996,49; Kholodkovsky, 1998, 68; Diligensky, 1999, 38-41). We would argue that psychological sphere is far more important than ideological or political ones as the majority of Russians are driven by psychological attitudes or stereotypes. What is especially striking is that opposite tendencies -- traditionalist and new individualist -- are usually interwoven in consciousness of the same categories of people.

Currently, psychological significance of the Western model is changing: it is not only an incentive for shifts (or an obstacle) but a symbolic incarnation of a modernization tendency; it provides pro-Western tendency with appropriate images, terminology, and cultural patterns. The opposite tendency, anti-modernizing one, has its own symbols, "socialist" images and patterns. However, these symbols are rejected by a significant part of Russian electorate. Its mentality is neither pro-reform nor anti-reform; it is clearly ambivalent vacillating between pro-Communist nostalgia and temptations of new life and aspirations. Therefore, this group considers "national symbols" to be most appropriate: they provide valuable opportunity to simultaneously criticize Western as well as Soviet patterns enjoying right for selection and combination of conflicted components. The cleavage between pro-Western and "native-soil" stereotypes reflects the old conflict between the modernizing and conservative tendencies. However, this "native-soil" ideology helps soften the conflict and avoid hard-line Communist conservatism.

“National” values appear to be shared by a large part of the Russian elite. After a short period of market reforms, political power in the country has concentrated in the hands of the central and regional bureaucracies. Unlike the Soviet bureaucracy, they are highly interested in profits. This new bureaucracy merges with entrepreneurs forming a conglomerate of business bureaucratic elite, which is interested in the strengthening its powers and conserving political and socio-economic *status quo*. It is against both -- the restoration of old Communist regime and continuation of reforms. The only ideological symbol that matters is the State under their control. In this logic, the only purpose of this state is a reproduction of the their powers. “National idea,” and “national interests” appear to be the most appropriate form for reproduction and legitimization of *status quo*. Hence the drifting of the Russian elites toward nationalistic symbols.

Adherence to different competing ideas and symbols is unstable and is under influence of economic and political situation. For example, according to the results of a 1997 poll, 17.7 percent of the respondents pronounced in favor of Russia as a “state with distinctive path of development” -- this was 2.6 times less than the share of respondents who favored the “Western path” (VTsIOM, Express analysis 97-5). One year later, 57 percent chose the “Russia should stick to its own specific path” formula, while only 10 percent said that Russia should “choose a capitalist path” (i.e. follow the lead of the West) (*FOM-Info*, 1998, 26,3). Such substantial difference can be explained by the use of the word “capitalism” with strong negative connotation in Russia. In practice, a large part of the population easily switches from one formula to another.

It is also obvious that between 1992 and 1999, the share of critics of the Western path gradually increased. In 1996, the Western pattern of life was chosen by 20 percent, “socialist pattern” -- by 11 percent, and “traditional Russian” one -- by 47 percent of the respondents (*Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya*, 1997,, 2, 31). Russian sociologists detected the development of new Russian nationalism (Levada, 1994, 15) or “neotraditionalism” (Gudkov, 1997, 31). This conservative trend was instigated by frustration of national consciousness stemming from the collapse of the imperial grandeur as well as from difficult adaptation to new realities and from disillusionment in Western-type reforms. Innovations and Russia’s new openness to the outer world seemed to be scary and received negative assessments in mass consciousness.

Finally, absence of guaranteed compensation for following the lead of the West seems to be a key factor in this psychological mechanism. It explains the strengthening of anti-Western and traditionalist trends. Actually, the people try to harmonize their attitudes with possibilities, aspirations with chances, strategy with opportunities (French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu calls it *habitus*). This is why nationalist ideals are rather vague. According to a public opinion survey, 39 percent of respondents say the “core of Russianness” is in “our ancestors,” 36 percent -- in “old Russian towns, in Siberia” (*Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya*, 1997, 2,31). It goes without saying that such vague ideas cannot be strongly motivated. In fact, nationalist version has no effective positive program.

IV. The West: Partner or Foe?

Evolution of relations between Russia and the West from demonstrative friendship and partnership in the beginning of the last decade of the 20th century to rather serious conflicts in its end coincides with the decline of the Western models' attractiveness and strengthening of virulent nationalism in Russia. However, this link should not be viewed simplistically: “the worse the relations between Russia and the West (USA, NATO, EC) are, the less Russia tends to be attracted by the Western model.” There is enough evidence from sociological surveys that attitudes towards the foreign policy goals often demonstrate lack of any stability. This may be explained by different nature of socio-psychological sources of the “image of enemy” and “image of partner.” Acceptance or rejection of the Western patterns are based on both rational (reflective) and spontaneous (subconscious) comparisons of the Western living standards and one's own standards as well as one's own capacities to achieve these standards.

Attitudes to the West as a global political force reveals its rather emotional nature in Russia. Several generations of the Soviet people have accumulated negative emotions vis-à-vis the West, which are deeply imbedded in consciousness of the population. This was due to stereotypes of “a besieged fortress” before the World War II and of the “struggle between two social systems” after the war. These negative emotions became far less intensive in the Gorbachev's perestroika period but they intensified immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union and of the “socialist camp,” and with Russia's losing its great-power status. Rational explanations of these developments by inherent drawbacks of

the Soviet state and its crisis are accepted only by layers of population with higher education. Many point at the “Western behind-the-scene pressure” as the main source of Russia’s new low-profile status. This status of a “humiliated nation” is widely perceived as a natural result of the “defeat in the Cold War.”

The mentioned above emotional sources of self-perception can explain how the current geopolitical situation turns into a sort of political mythology. In 1994, 42 percent of the respondents shared the opinion that “Russia has always faced hostile attitude in the West; and now nobody wishes Russia any good,” and 38 percent said they do not share that opinion (*Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya*, 1997, 2, 21). In 1996, one-third of those surveyed said that Russia living standards are low because “the West’s benefits from this” (*Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya*, 1997, 1, 7). In 1997, 51 percent shared an opinion that Russia’s opponents are major Western countries that “want to solve their problems at the expense of its interests.” Forty four percent said that NATO “is still hostile to Russia” and only 25 percent chose the opposite point of view: “the former confrontation has lost its sense.” Thirty seven percent considered military threat for Russia to be plausible, and 47 percent rejected this point of view . In 1998, 15 percent said they believed in existence of an international conspiracy against Russia; 19 percent partly believed; and 43.3 percent said they did not believe (*Sovremennoye rossiiskoye obshchestvo*, 21). In compliance with these views, pro-Western tendencies in Moscow’s foreign policy face wide-spread criticism. In 1994, 46 percent of the respondents said the country’s leadership “betrays Russia’s national interests” (*Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya*, 1997, 4, 10). In early 1999, 75 percent accepted an opinion that Russia “depends on the West too much” (*FOM*, 1999, 45 , 36).

These perceptions of the Western goals and assessments of Russian foreign policy are usually shared by people with low level of education, by peasants, workers, pensioners. The younger generation tends to share quite opposite views. However, even among the people with higher education, the share of those who criticize the West is roughly the same as the national average. Anyhow, such views are especially wide-spread among “red directors,” the military, employees of law-enforcement organizations.

As a matter of fact, anti-Western views are far from being based only on political myths and phobia. They are rather often provoked by activities and declarations of

economic and political circles of the Western countries, positions of some mass media and by vacillations of the NATO countries vis-à-vis Russia. The public opinion in Russia, including some intellectuals and well-informed groups, still considers the NATO's goals after the end of the Cold War to be rather vague. At the same token Russia's public opinion is unaware of the reasons for the NATO eastward expansion.

Of course, Russia's perception of the West is influenced by primitivization of its image and attempts to reduce it to the "image of enemy," of a scapegoat responsible for all our sorrows and concerns. Unfortunately, the large scope of multi-faceted Western perceptions of Russia are often reduced to two or three negative positions proclaimed by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, or Heritage Foundation.

All above mentioned examples characterize the situation prior to the 1999 NATO military action in Yugoslavia and the "second Chechen war." The operation in Yugoslavia drastically strengthened an anti-Western trend in the Russian public opinion. Even more, it looked like Russians were ready to radically break with the West, especially with the USA. The share of those who sympathized with the USA dropped from 57 to 14 percent. Anti-Western phobia have become stronger and more persistent: in comparison with 1996, the share of those who think Russia has external enemies increased from 44 to 73 percent; from one-third to a half increased the share of those who consider the USA as such an enemy. In April 1999, 70 percent of the respondents assumed that the NATO military action in Yugoslavia was a direct threat for Russia's security (*Soobshcheniya FOM*, 1999, NN 12, 31, 32; 43, 35, 37; 44, 23, 25, 47).

Russian public opinion was certainly greatly influenced by pro-Serbian stance of the country's leadership and major part of mass media. Neither the former, nor the latter paid enough attention to ethnic cleansings in Kosovo. Only a few TV channels and newspapers criticized policies pursued by Milosevic. However, the factor of distorted information cannot alone explain the fierce reaction of the Russian society.

In April 1999, 45 percent of the respondents said they were aware of Western argumentation for the military action; 13 percent considered both parties of the conflict to be guilty; 6 percent lay the guilt only on Yugoslavia. Almost one-third said Yugoslavia should allow NATO's deployment of its forces in Kosovo as a condition for the stopping of the bombings of Yugoslavian town and villages. This means that the significant part of Russians

had an adequate idea of what really happens in the region and criticized only inhuman methods of the settlement (“no one has the right to bomb the civilian population in order to curb Milosevic”). The majority, including many of those who were aware of the NATO’s arguments, did not believe in the Atlantic sincerity; only 3 percent of those surveyed in April believed that NATO’s goals were based on the desire to defend ethnic Albanian’s rights. Other respondents pointed at such motives for the military action as demonstration of force, attempts to impose control over other countries, preparation of actions against Russia, efforts to establish American hegemony in Europe, economic interests, and dislike for Milosevic’s regime (*Soobshcheniya FOM*, 1999, NN 48, 36).

Criticism of the West even persevered in the end of 1999 due to the Western perception of the developments in Chechnya. The absolute majority of Russian politicians, journalists, and rank-and-file citizens are convinced that the West is incapable and unwilling to see real sources of hostilities in Chechnya. Provided the West has demonstrated no constructive position concerning the Chechen terrorism, the Russian society tends to interpret the Western criticism as a strengthening of anti-Russian line in Western policies. This part of Russians is also convinced that the West sticks to “double standards”: Western public opinion considers bombings of Yugoslavia moral whereas similar Russian activities in Chechnya -- inadmissible violation of human rights.

This aggravation of anti-Western emotions in the spring and summer of 1999 (emotional modus) resulted in growing rejection of the Western model (rational modus) and in growing isolationism. According to a public opinion poll conducted in June 1999, 69 percent of the respondents said they shared a formula that “Russia should choose its own distinctive path of development,” and only 23 percent said Russia “should search for guidelines in the framework of the world civilization.” Sixty two percent assessed the transformations in Russia of the last decades as a “loss of Russian unique cultural features under sweeping wave of pressure from the West,” and only 21 percent thought that “Russia returns to the world community after a long isolation.” Even among young people under 30 who tend to sympathize with the Western pattern, now only 30 percent favored the “guidelines of the world civilization,” and about 64 percent backed the isolationist stance (*Soobshcheniya FOM*, 1999, 52, 50).

Is it possible to call the worsening of Russian relations with the West and the growing criticism of the Western model a temporary phenomenon, one more oscillation of a pendulum or is it a symptom of a long-term tendency?

To answer the question one should look at rather distinctive socio-psychological frontiers for the waves of anti-Western emotions. First of all, these frontiers are determined by the necessity to avoid at any price all sorts of contingency situations fraught with military conflict. After the NATO military action in Yugoslavia just began, 86 percent of the respondents said Russia should do its best to resist any attempts to drag it into the conflict with NATO (8 percent thought it to be acceptable); only 13 percent backed the idea of sending arms to Yugoslavia, 4 percent -- of sending volunteers there; and 3 percent accepted the idea of a rupture of diplomatic relation with leading NATO countries (*Soobshcheniya FOM*, 1999, 42, 31, 32; 43, 35, 37; 44, 23, 25, 47).

As soon as the coverage of the conflict provided enough information to the public opinion, the attitudes began to change. Thus, since April till June, the share of those who considered NATO guilty of the conflict dropped from 63 to 49 percent; and the share of those who thought the NATO actions were a threat to Russia decreased from 70 to 64 percent (*Soobshcheniya FOM*, 1999, 52, 50).

It is note-worthy that just at the peak of the hostilities in Yugoslavia, 59 percent (including about half of CPRF electorate) favored closer relations with the USA (only 26 percent were against it). According to another poll conducted in June 1999, 23 percent thought Russia should enhance economic and political ties with Western Europe, 18 percent -- with the USA; and only 11 percent gave priority to the countries of Asia and Middle East (*Soobshcheniya FOM*, 1999, 44, 25, ; 53, 29).

Thus, the West (the USA and Western Europe and its military and political incarnation, NATO) remains an opponent and a source of threats in opinion of a very significant part of Russians. What is really striking, Russians would like to get closer to such an opponent, or in any case to establish loyal relations of partnership. At the same time, this major part of Russians finds it unwise to turn a blind eye at potential threats.

It is easy to see that the current ideology of Moscow's foreign policy in many respects correlates with the analyzed above state of the public opinion. Hence its goals -- to

combine the defense of national interests and Russia's positions in the world with maintaining partnership with the Western community.

Conclusion

The Russian society demonstrates today generally more positive attitudes to the West, Western experience and values than during the Cold War period. This pro-Western orientation is especially strong in such layers of general population as the younger generation, private businesses, and a part of intellectuals. At the same time, this pro-Western orientation produces visible impact on the consciousness of other, rather wide circles of population. This derives from wide distribution of information and from growing pluralism of the society, as well as from *rapprochement* with the West during the last decade of the century.

Nevertheless, such a tendency in many respects remains unstable and ambivalent. The main source of this ambivalent situation is a self-propelled conflict between traditionalistic cultural trend, which demonstrates certain inertia, adherence to old stereotypes and myths, on the one hand, and pragmatic needs and motivations nurturing the modernization tendency, on the other. This or that tendency may dominate in the consciousness of different subcultural and demographic groups, but rather often they coexist in the consciousness of the same social and individual actors.

The most influential factor determining Russia's perception of the West is undoubtedly the internal socio-economic, political and cultural development of the country. However, these processes cannot avoid certain influence from the West. In this respect, different forms of direct Western assistance to Russia is not so important as the general "tonality," or "style" of such policies. Russian national consciousness, as we have shown in the above analysis, is highly vulnerable and very sensitive to any interference or "signals" sent from the West. Any symptoms of hostile aspirations, denigrating attitudes to Russian problems and interests are capable of provoking serious negative shifts in Russia's perception of the West. They can easily damage the image of the Western model and give impetus to nationalistic trends. The opposite is also correct: any gestures of sympathy, compassion, esteem vis-à-vis Russia are capable of strengthening prestige of Western values, its economic and political institutions in Russian society.

Developments in Russia due to the process of globalization will undoubtedly exert certain impact on the emerging future landscape in the 21st century. Russia's isolation from the Western world, its growing backwardness and its losing incentive for modernization could become a source of new international tensions and new threats with unpredictable consequences. At the same time, Russia's modernization and its getting out of crisis, strengthening partnership with the West could contribute to a more balanced pace of globalization. In our view, the Western governments and institutions could considerate these alternative scenarios when shaping their line vis-à-vis Russia.

Bibliography:

Amnesty International Report, 1990, London, 1991.

Berdyaev, Nikolai, *Sudba Rossii* (Russia's Fate), Moscow, 1994.

Bourdieu, Pierre, *Choses dites*, Moscow, 1994.

Brown, Archie, *The Gorbachev Factor*, Oxford, 1996.

Chernyaeva, Elena, "The Search for the 'Russian Idea'," *Transitions*, 4/1 (June 1997).

Chugrov, S. *Rossiia i Zapad: Metamorfozy vzaimovospriyatiya* (Russia and the West: Metamorphoses of Mutual Perception), Moscow, 1993.

Chugrov, S. "Russian Political Culture," in: *After the Revolutions: Democracy in East Central Europe*, ad. by M.Salter, Uppsala, 1996.

Chugrov, S. "Russian Foreign Policy and Human Rights: Conflicted Culture and Uncertain Policy", in: *Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy*, ed. by D. Forsythe, Tokyo - New York - Paris, 2000.

Diligensky, G. *Rossiiskii gorozhanin kontsa devyanostykh* (Russian Citizen of the Late 1990s), 1998.

Diligensky, G. "Differentsiatsiya ili fragmentatsiya?" ("Differentiation or Fragmentation?"), *Mirovaya ekonomika I mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya* (The World Economy and International Relations Journal), 1999, no.10.

Fedotov, G. "Rossiya i svoboda" ("Russia and Freedom"), in. *Russkiye filosofy* (Russian Philosophers), Moscow, 1996.

Fond “Obshchestvennoye Mneniye”, FOM (Public Opinion Foundation), Oprosy (Surveys), (data bank).

FOM-Info (The Public Opinion Foundation Bulletin), Moscow.

FOM. *Sotsiologicheskiye soobshcheniya* (Sociological Information of the Public Opinion Foundation), Moscow.

Fyodorov, V. “K istorii telesnykh nakazanii v Rossii” (“On the History of Corporal Punishment in Russia”), in: *Problemy rossiiskogo zakonodatelstva* (The Problems of Russian Law), Vladivostok, 1997.

Gaidar, Ye. *Gosudarstvo i evolyutsiya* (The State and Evolution), Moscow, 1995.

Gudkov, L. “Russkii neotraditsionalizm” (“Russian neo-traditionalism”), *Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya* (The Monitoring of the Public Opinion), 1997, no. 2.

Kasyanova, K. *O rusском natsionalnom kharaktere* (On Russian National Character), Moscow, 1994.

Khenkin, S. “Rossiiskii elektorat: faktory differentsiatsii i tipologicheskiye gruppy” (“Russian Electorate: Factors of Differentiation and Typological Groups”), *Vestnik fonda “Obshchestvennoye mneniye”* (The Public Opinion Foundation Bulletin), May, 1996.

Kholodkovsky, K. “O kornyakh ideino-politicheskoi differentsiatsii rossiiskogo obshchestva” (“On the Origin of Ideological and Political Differentiation of Russian Society”), in: *Chelovek v perekhodnom obshchestve* (Personality in Transitional Society), Moscow 1998.

Klyamkin, I. and V. Lapkin. “Russkii vopros v Rossii” (“Russian Question in Russia”), *Polis*, 1995, no.5.

Lapkin, V. and V. Pantin. “Russkii poryadok” (“Russian Order”), *Polis*, 1997, no.3.

Lapkin, V. and V. Pantin. “Tsennosti postsovietskogo cheloveka” (“Values of a Post-Soviet Personality”), in: *Chelovek v perekhodnom obshchestve* (Personality in Transitional Society), Moscow, 1998.

Levada, Yu. “Sovietskii chelovek i zapadnoye obshchestvo: problema alternativy” (“Soviet Personality and Western Society: The Problem of an Alternative”), in: Yu. Levada (ed.), *Statyi po sotsiologii* (Articles on Sociology), Moscow, 1993.

Levada, Yu. “Novyi russkii natsionalizm: ambitsii, fobii, komplekсы” (“New Russian Nationalism: Ambitions, Phobia, Complexes”), *Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya*, 1994, no.1.

Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya (The Monitoring of Public Opinion; Economic and Social Change), VTsIOM, Intertsentr, Akademiya Narodnogo Khozyaistva (Academy of People’s Economy), Moscow, 1993 - 2000.

Podberyozkin, A. *Russkii put: sdelay shag!* (Russian Way: Make a First Step!), Moscow, 1998.

Sikevich, Z. *Natsionalnoye soznaniye russkikh* (Russians’ National Consciousness), Moscow, 1996.

Soobshcheniya fonda “Obshchestvennoye mneniye (The Public Opinion Foundation Information Bulletin), Moscow.

Sovremennoye rossiiskoye obshchestvo: perekhodnyi period (Modern Russian Society: Transitional Period), Moscow, 1998.

Vserossiiskii Tsentr Izucheniya Obshchestvennogo Mneniya (VTsIOM) (All-Russian Centre of Public Opinion Research) Surveys (data bank).

Zubov, A. “Granitsy razlomov i urovni yedinstva v segodnyashnei Rossii” (“Fault Lines and Levels of Cohesion in Nowadays Russia”), *Politeia*, 1998, no.2.

About the authors

Professor **Diligensky**, Guerman Guermanovich, Center for Socio-Economic and Political Studies, Director, Institute of World Economy and International Relations; *The World Economy and International Relations* Journal, Editor-in-chief.

Dr. **Chugrov**, Sergei Vladislavovich, Center for Socio-Economic and Political Studies, Senior Researcher, Institute of World Economy and International Relations; *The World Economy and International Relations* Journal, Deputy Editor.