Victims of Success? Post Victory Alliance Politics

NATO Research Fellowship Final Report

submitted by

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Given the anarchic setting of international politics, a number of outcomes, though familiar and repetitive, are nonetheless puzzling. Among these, the fact that over the long run gains do not tend to cumulate; that world empire has never occurred; and that defeated states are rarely divided among the victors in war but are usually reintegrated into the system within a matter of years. Contemporary balance of power theory provides a parsimonious framework within which to analyze these puzzles and has provided answers that appear logically compelling by way of a particular model of alliances under anarchy.

Central to the story of alliance politics under the balance of power is the notion that alliances are generally fluid and tend to collapse once victory is achieved.[1] The logic behind the standard argument is twofold. First, in the wake of victory, members of the winning coalition fall out over the division of the booty. Relative gains concerns of the victors make continued cooperation problematic. Second, with the defeat of the major threat, the balance of relative capabilities in the system shifts. Because of anarchy and the security dilemma, allies come to see each other as the only remaining source of potential threats to their own security. Thus, members of the victorious coalition begin to balance against one another; the territory of losing states is rarely divided amongst the victors; and the allies do not move from victory to expansion in an effort to dominate the system.

With little empirical research to support such claims, it is interesting that they have attained the status of received wisdom in contemporary international relations scholarship.[2] Yet widespread acceptance of these hypotheses is more than a question of the sociology of knowledge. Indeed, much of the pessimism with which many contemporary policy-makers, foreign policy elites, as well as

neorealist scholars, view the prospect of European stability and the persistence of the western alliance--absent the reemergence of a credible Russian threat to the security of central Europe--reflects a general acceptance of the conventional wisdom and the logic of alliance politics under anarchy. Thus, in the pages of Foreign Affairs one reads: "In the absence of an overriding threat...the inclination on both sides of the Atlantic has been to emphasize no unity but the difference and incompatibility of Europe and America."[3] Similarly, the premier neorealist scholar, Kenneth Waltz, argues: "NATO is a disappearing thing. It is a question of how long it is going to remain a significant institution even though its name may linger on."[4]

Despite its logical appeal, the claim that alliance fallout in the wake of victory is a robust phenomenon lacks empirical validity. Indeed, upon examination, the standard argument appears to account for but one of the cases generally cited as exemplars of the fallout phenomenon, the collapse of the World War II coalition, and then only in attenuated form.

Although the evidence shows that wartime alliances sometimes break up after victory, the reasons are multiple. In cases where alliance collapse can be attributed to post-victory disputes, such disputes were not the result of relative gains concerns, or direct reflections of the balance of military capabilities as balance of power theory asserts. Rather, they were the result of political or ideological differences between the allies. History suggests that disagreements over the normative framework of the postwar settlement, the principles according to which post-war politics will be legitimated, are more often the cause of alliance fallout.

This essay examines the historical record in an effort to evaluate the claim that allies fall out in the wake of victory. After first demonstrating that the phenomenon is regarded as robust in a

representative sampling of international relations scholarship, I then review the standard balance of power explanation. An expanded set of hypotheses on alliance dissolution is then presented, after which I examine the cases most often cited by balance of power theorists in support of their theory.

Two methods of testing are employed. First, a congruence test: does the outcome correspond to the prediction? That is, do allies fall out in the wake of victory? Second, when intra-alliance disputes are evidenced, a process tracing methodology is employed in an effort to establish the causal mechanisms producing such disputes. Are intra-alliance disputes in general a function of relative gains concerns and/or the security dilemma?

I find that only one case appears to bear out the logic of the balance of power explanation, and then in quite limited fashion. Indeed, on balance, the cases raise serious questions about a range of hypotheses deduced from contemporary (neorealist) balance of power theory. The concluding section links the empirical findings with more general debates on the nature of international politics as well as current debates on the future western cooperation, in particular, the prospects for the continuation of the NATO alliance.

THE PHENOMENON OF ALLIANCE COLLAPSE

In what is arguably the most theoretically informed study of alliances, Stephen Walt writes: "As many observers have noted, victorious coalitions are likely to disintegrate with the conclusion of peace. Prominent examples include Austria and Prussia after their war with Denmark in 1864, Britain and France after World War I, the Soviet Union and the United States after World War II, and China and Vietnam after the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. This recurring pattern provides further support for the

proposition that balancing is the dominant tendency in international politics and that bandwagoning is the opportunistic exception."[5] Walt is correct on at least one point. The notion that alliances "collapse" in the wake of victory is often repeated in the scholarly literature.

Thus, Arnold Wolfers argued that "...alliances break up when the common danger lessens or disappears...."[6] Similarly, following his analysis of diplomacy following the Napoleonic, First, and Second World Wars, William Riker writes: "From these three instances of the end product of total war one can readily conclude: the winning coalitions of total war do not long survive victory."[7] And Raymond Aaron argued that rivalries amongst victorious allies "fatally diminish the effectiveness of the coalition."[8]

THE BALANCE OF POWER AND ALLIANCE COLLAPSE

With no over-arching authority able to enforce agreements and limit resort to force in the relations among states, it is puzzling that victory in one war does not appear to produce gains which can readily be applied to produce further advantage through expansion.[9] Although aggressors sometimes succeed in expanding control over territory, at times achieving empire, over the course of history, military gains do not seem to cumulate in such fashion as to make world empire possible. Historians, economists, as well as political scientists have proffered a number of theories to account for the persistence of international politics; the lack of world empire.[10]

One account for the persistence of a system comprised of a multiplicity of independent state actors is provided by modern theories of the balance of power.[11] Thus, Robert Jervis argues that if four rather weak assumptions are met, "the fates of individual units rise and fall, [yet] states and much the

pattern of their interaction remain. The system is never transformed from an anarchical to a hierarchical one."[12] Although Kenneth Waltz argues the requisite conditions are but two [13], balances of power are said to form and reform "whether some or all states consciously aim to establish and maintain a balance, or whether some or all states aim for universal domination."[14] The maintenance of the system is the unintended by-product of self regarding states pursuing their interest in survival.

Waltz discusses two forms of balancing behavior, "internal" and "external" balancing. Internal balancing is held to predominate in the strategies of great powers under conditions of structural bipolarity, whereas external balancing--alignment or alliance--is said to predominate under multipolarity.[15] Of interest here are the claims of balance of power theorists regarding patterns of external balancing, more precisely the causes for alliance formation and dissolution.

The most obvious precipitant to alliance formation is the emergence of a powerful state with expansionist aims. States' continued independence requires that no one state gain sufficient strength to dominate the system. Consequently the theory expects weaker states to pool their resources in an effort to balance the capabilities of the aspiring hegemon.[16] But balance of power theory as elaborated by Waltz predicts alliance formation not only in the presence of an *aspiring* hegemon, but also in the presence of states with hegemonic *potential*. Thus, Waltz argues that states balance against capabilities as well as threats.[17] The proclivity is most pronounced when the security dilemma is severe.[18]

Because capabilities are never absolute[19], the incentives for alliances are seen to vary as the distribution of capabilities in the international system shifts. This point is critical, for it provides the link

between conditions which give rise to alliances, and the causes which are held to account for alliance collapse.

Statesmen can never be certain of others' intentions, consequently assessments of others' capabilities are said to provide the most important cues to statesmen seeking security. Although he seeks to identify the implications of *variations* in the severity of the security dilemma for the prospects of international cooperation, Jervis provides the most oft cited theoretic rational for the hypothesis that the capabilities of others are always regarded with some degree of unease: "No matter how much decision makers are committed to the status quo, they cannot bind themselves and their successors to the same path. Minds can be changed, new leaders can come to power, values can shift, new opportunities and dangers can arise."[20] States are predicted to balance against capabilities, and when considering which side of a divide to join, states are expected to "flock to the weaker side; for it is the stronger side that threatens them."[21]

Increases in the capabilities of a state are predicted to produce efforts by others to balance. Under multipolarity the prevailing pattern is expected to be the formation of defensive alliances. But the defeat of an aspiring hegemon (or the collapse of a potential one) radically changes the structure of the system. In the wake of large-scale conflict, the balance of capabilities is expected to favor members of the winning coalition. Indeed, these powers are expected to emerge from the conflict with an enhanced position in terms of relative capabilities. Although as a general proposition this point is subject to criticism on theoretic as well as empirical terms, such shifts in the distribution of relative capabilities are predicted to lead to alliance collapse.

The shadow of the postwar balance of capabilities may even color intra-alliance debates over the strategy and methods of prosecuting the war. Indeed, Aron locates the seeds of collapse in such debates: "[T]he various ways of winning rarely lead to the same results for all the partners. Logically, each state desires to contribute to the victory, but without weakening itself in relation to its allies."[22] As one-time close allies begin to regard one another as the only remaining source of threat to their security, they begin to reconsider the most effective means of guarding against future intimidation or menace. Mutual uncertainty produces new alignments and leads to the collapse of the victorious alliance:

> In a competition for the position of leader, balancing is sensible behavior where the victory of one coalition over another leaves weaker members of the winning coalition at the mercy of the stronger ones. Nobody wants anyone else to win; none of the great powers wants one of their number to emerge as the leader. If two coalitions form and one of them weakens, perhaps because of political disorder of a member, we expect the extent of the other coalition's military preparation to slacken or its unity to lessen. The classic example of the later effect is the breaking apart of a war-winning coalition in or just after the moment of victory.[23]

Although the defeat of a onetime threat is often regarded as sufficient for the collapse of alliances, the problem is even more difficult when there exists the prospect of dividing up wartime booty. As a general proposition, contemporary neorealist theories of the balance of power argue that states' concerns for their relative position in the international system make cooperation difficult. Thus, Kenneth Waltz argues:

> When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to ask not "Will both of us gain?" but "Who will gain more?" If an expected gain is to be divided, say, in the ratio of two to one, one state may use its disproportionate gain to implement a policy intended to damage or destroy the other. Even the prospect of large absolute gains for both parties does not elicit their cooperation so long as each fears how the other will use its increased capabilities.[24]

For most neorealists, anarchy and the security dilemma always produce sufficient insecurity such that the question of relative gains is never absent. As Joseph Grieco put it, "*[T]he fundamental goal of states in any relationship is to prevent others from achieving advances in their relative capabilities.*"[25] Consequently, when victors discuss the division of the spoils, difficulties in ensuring relative equality in benefits leads to fallout. Hence, Jervis writes:

> [W]hile the state would gain territory and wealth from dividing up the loser, others might gain more, thus putting the state at a disadvantage in subsequent conflicts. Of the Ottoman Empire, a Russian diplomat said: "If the cake could not be saved, it must be fairly divided." ...I think he got it backwards: the cake had to be saved because it could not be divided evenly.[26]

States are expected to leave an alliance when they see that others "are achieving, or are likely to achieve, relatively greater gains."[27] The argument deduced from balance of power theory parallels the arguments on minimum winning coalitions made by Riker. For example, he argues:

> Total war has...this interesting feature: If one side actually wins...then victory, by removing the losers, transforms a (probably minimal) winning coalition into a grand coalition. And, if we accept characteristic functional theory, grand coalitions are worthless. Assuming...that winners in total war retain for some time after victory the zero-sum habits of thought engendered by their very participation in it, then they will reject a coalition of the whole and begin to squabble among themselves....Let us, therefore, examine diplomacy just after the conclusion of total wars to see whether or not victors have fallen out.[28]

Two factors are held to promote the collapse of alliances in the wake of victory, both are said to emerge from and reinforce the dynamics of the balance of power. First, states' concerns for relative position lead them to view with apprehension any state that might potentially pose a security threat, even a one-time ally. Second, disputes over the division of war booty lead to a falling out among the members of the victorious coalition.

ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES REGARDING ALLIANCE COLLAPSE

Common sense (less reliable than conventional wisdom?), a review of earlier scholarship on the politics of alliances, as well as recent work by institutionalist theorists, produce a number of hypotheses regarding the likelihood of alliance collapse in the wake of victory.[29]

First, insofar as alliances come together to perform a function, one might expect such institutions to decay once the job is done.[30] As alliances are costly and require some surrender of unilateral decision-making, we should not be surprised to see sovereign states withdraw from alliances once the perceived benefits of cooperation no longer exceed the costs of continued collaboration.

A second hypothesis is suggested by the recent work of prominent neoliberal scholars who point to the importance of institutionalization as a crucial variable in the prospects for the continued existence of alliances in the wake of victory. Offering an account for the persistence of the NATO alliance after the collapse of the erstwhile Soviet threat, Celeste Wallander and Robert Keohane argue that all alliances are not created equally. They differentiate between alliances which serve merely as tools for capability aggregation in response to an identifiable common threat, and those which, take a more institutionalized form and come to perform a variety of security management functions. Such "security management institutions" may not be directed against a specific threat but rather the myriad security risks associated with international anarchy, including the risk that members of the institution will themselves come to blows. Seen as costly to create, but less costly to maintain, security management institutions are likely to persist even if the original grounds for their emergence no longer obtain. From

the institutionalist argument one can deduce the proposition that alliances which do not develop institutionalized multifunctionality are not likely to survive the defeat of the catalytic threat.[31]

A third possible explanation for alliance collapse is found in the recurring pattern of revolutionary upheavals following a long and costly war, a phenomenon that extends to victors as well as vanquished. Examples include France in 1871; Russia in 1905 and 1917; and Germany in 1918.[32] Successful revolutions not only challenge the domestic constitutional order, but also the prevailing patterns of relations among states. In an effort to justify claims of moral superiority vis-à-vis the values and institutions of the *ancien regime*, revolutionaries often find it necessary to repudiate the former government's foreign policy and alliance commitments.[33] Consequently, the means as well as goals of the war may be called into question by revolutionary regimes seeking domestic legitimacy. Indeed, proponents of second image explanations of foreign policy outcomes would not be surprised to see alliances decay with radical changes in the makeup of their constituent member states.

Ideological difference provides a fourth explanation for alliance disintegration. There is a strong consensus in the literature that ideological affinity is neither necessary nor sufficient for the formation of alliances.[34] Moreover, as many have noted, ideological incompatibility is no obstacle to alliance when states perceive the existence of a serious threat. Thus, Great Britain overcame its aversion to Orthodoxy and absolutism to ally with Russia against Napoleon at Reichenbach in June 1813; republican France and Tsarist Russia concluded a defensive alliance against Germany in 1894; Great Britain joined Tsarist Russia in the fight against Germany in 1914; and the western powers allied with Soviet Russia in the fight against Hitler's Germany in 1942.

However, from the proposition that ideological affinities are neither necessary nor sufficient for the creation of alliances, it does not follow that ideological affinities are unimportant in the analysis of alliance politics or that differences make continued cooperation unproblematic. Existing scholarship in the field suggests that when catalytic threats recede or are defeated, ideologic differences among alliance partners can produce alliance collapse whereas affinities can lead to continued patterns of security cooperation. For example, Joseph Frankel argues that alliances can be concluded between dissimilar states, but that "their duration fully depends on the existence of the common enemy," whereas Raymond Dawson and Richard Rosecrance found that "history, tradition [and] affinity" allowed the Anglo-American alliance to survive the general strains of post-war alliance politics and the specific tensions arising from conflicting interests during the Suez Crisis.[35] Thus, we might expect one source of alliance collapse to be located in ideologic differences which increase in salience once the common threat is defeated or recedes.

Finally, an explanation for alliance collapse may lie in disagreements over the normative framework of the post-war settlement. Major wars serve to discredit not only the aims of defeated states, but often the normative framework of the pre-war international system. To the extent that the causes of war are seen by statesmen to lie in the balance of power system itself, statesmen may aim to restructure the environment within which states seek to promote important values. Robert Jervis argues that major wars undermine many of the assumptions that give rise to the balance of power making great power concert--with continued cooperation of the grand coalition at its core--possible.[36]

However, concert systems generally rest on a shared sense of purpose among the member states: the Concert of Europe on the principal of monarchial solidarity in opposition to liberalism,

nationalism and republicanism; the League of Nations on self determination and collective security.[37] To the extent that members of the winning coalition *cannot* agree on the normative framework of the post-war settlement, one might reasonably expect the alliance to break up. But this is a very different argument than one which rests on division of the spoils and the security dilemma.

VICTORIOUS ALLIANCES: 1814-1945

In this section, the proposition that victorious alliances collapse in the wake of victory, the balance-of-power explanations for the phenomenon, and the alternative predictions and explanations suggested by the previous discussion, will be evaluated against the cases of successful great power coalitions from the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte to allied victory over Nazi Germany in the Second World War. A larger sampling--including cases of small and medium powers as well as cases prior to the Napoleonic Wars--though necessary, is beyond the scope of the present effort. Two questions are addressed. First, post-war relations of victorious allies are evaluated in order to establish whether the alliance collapsed in the wake of victory. In those cases where post-victory disputes did arise or alliances did collapse, the analysis turns to the second question: Why?

The Fourth Coalition

The obvious starting point for this analysis is the final grand coalition that succeeded in defeating Napoleon in 1814. Indeed, Riker cites the case in support of his contention that minimum winning coalitions form only to collapse in the moment of victory.[38] However, the alliance of Russia, Prussia, Austria and Britain, concluded at Reichenbach in June 1813, is remarkable not for the fact that the allies were given to frequent, sometimes serious, post-victory disputes which threatened continued security

cooperation. Rather, the final coalition is remembered most for its durability; the willingness of its members to transcend serious bilateral conflicts of interest in support of a larger shared interest in European stability. Forming the core of the Concert of Europe, the grand coalition survived the stresses and demands characteristic of international politics (in some form) well into the middle of the century, when finally the Crimean War sounded its knell.[39]

Far from producing a fallout, the Second Peace of Paris and the Vienna settlements of 1814-1815 served to provide the victorious allies with newfound purpose: the defense of the hard-won European peace. In service of this goal the four victors recommitted themselves to one another along the terms of the Treaty of Chaumont (March 1814), through yet another alliance, the Quadruple Alliance of November 1815.[40] As Schroeder writes:

> Obviously this alliance served the purpose of mutual security against a revival of French aggression and imperialism or against another threat to the newly established status quo. But no less important for these powers was their general desire to remain allied in order to manage the international system and to solve new problems as they arose. Not only the cataclysms of the previous quarter-century, but also the strains and problems of the final coalition against Napoleon in the period 1812-1814, the conflicts among the great powers that arose during the peace congress, and Napoleon's return from Elba--all combined to convince the great powers that it was vitally necessary for them to make a durable alliance of mutual cooperation and restraint.[41]

By 1818, France was fully reintegrated into the system. However, this did not result from one or another power allying with France bilaterally, rather by way of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (9 October, 1818), which effectively transformed the Quadruple into a Quintuple Alliance.[42]

To be sure, Prussia, the Netherlands, and some of the smaller states of Germany argued for a punitive peace and large-scale annexations after the collapse of the First Peace of Paris. Among the

many reasons Russia opposed the dismemberment of France was the argument that it was necessary for the maintenance of the balance of power. But Alexander's reasoning was not quite that offered by a straightforward relative gains argument: the fear of increased Prussian capabilities. Nor was the Tsar looking to France as an ally against another of the powers. Rather, the Tsar saw a residual French threat as precluding the possibility that Prussia and Austria might choose to pursue independent policies in central Europe. A strong France helped guarantee coordinated policies among the three Eastern monarchies.[43]

Arguing that annexations would be viewed as illegitimate and would produce the sort of domestic instability the powers were determined to prevent, Castelreagh's opposition to the dismemberment of France was even less a consequence of relative gains concerns. The Foreign Secretary also recognized that French recovery was inevitable and concluded that a punitive peace would give cause for *révanche* when the prospects for success improved.[44] And Austria, always the most inclined to grant a moderate peace, likewise opposed annexations more for legitimist than relative gains reasons although she entered into discussions with Prussia in order to guarantee a share of the spoils should Prussian preferences win out.[45]

In the event, a defeated France was left largely intact, allowed to retain the borders of 1790. However, as the previous discussion suggests, one cannot attribute this outcome primarily to a preoccupation with relative gains. That France was reintegrated into the system had less to do with a rush on the part of jealous allies to secure favor with a possible future ally or a fear of unequal division of the spoils, than with the desire on the part of the victors to consolidate peace through expanding the zone of cooperation. This desire was reinforced by fear that the imposition of foreign control over a

nationalized French population would only promote further instability. Detailing the thought of Castelreagh, Kissinger writes:

> If dismemberment represented a guarantee of security...it might be risked despite the disunion which the disposition of the spoils would evoke. But instead, dismemberment would only provoke the military temper of France, without any assurance that the other powers, particularly Russia, would prove resolute in opposing renewed aggression: 'How much better is it for Europe to rest its security on what all the Powers will stand to, than to risk the Alliance by aiming at measures of *extreme* precaution."[46]

Disputes over the division of wartime booty did not lead to fallout, and far from collapse, victory over Napoleon appears to have produced a deeper commitment to cooperation among the members of the grand coalition. Indeed, the period following the Napoleonic wars is characterized by Jervis as the exemplar of a concert system, an altogether different system of international politics under anarchy than that of the balance of power. Similarly, Kalevi Holsti found a significant reduction in the occurrence of war and armed interventions during the Concert and argues that in the subsequent hundred years, there were but 4 wars among the parties to the Paris and Vienna settlements, only one of which--the Franco-Prussian War-- he sees as producing a restructuring of great power relations.[47] Upon close examination, the post-war history of the fourth coalition does not conform to the predictions of balance of power theory.

The Crimean Coalition

Largely successful in providing a baseline against which to measure changes in the central European status quo, the Vienna settlements did not address great power relations with respect to Eastern Question: the issues arising from the decay of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, the failure of the

Vienna statesmen to discuss the question of Turkey proved a consequential and costly oversight, for "by ignoring the problem, the peacemakers failed to provide ground-rules for the future."[48] As a result, the efforts of Russia to assert itself in Turkey created a crisis which exposed critical faults in the Concert and shattered the Holy Alliance of the conservative monarchies, bringing the great powers into the field of battle in the Crimea.[49]

Arising out of a dispute between Orthodox and Latin Christians in the Holy Land, and by virtue of Ottoman recognition of Russia as a spokesman and guarantor of the rights of Christians under Ottoman rule, Russian demands on the Porte produced strong reactions in Britain and France. Early diplomatic support of London and Paris encouraged the sultan to take a hard line in negotiations with Russia and certainly influenced his decision to initiate hostilities in October 1853. With the defeat of the Turkish navy at Sinope in December, the western powers entered the fray militarily as British and French fleets entered the Black Sea. In March 1854 they signed an alliance with Turkey, and on April tenth concluded a bilateral alliance with one another. Having initially tried to avert the war, Austria moved away from neutrality to diplomatic support for the western allies, joining the Franco-British alliance in December 1854 in exchange for a guarantee of her Italian possessions.[50] The fifth of the great powers, Prussia, straddled the Austro-Russian divide maintaining a position of armed neutrality. Among the small powers, Sardinia arrayed itself with the allies, eventually sending 15,000 troops into the field.

With Russia defeated at Sevastapol in September 1855, the powers met in Congress at Paris in February 1856. Within a month, a final treaty was completed based largely on the so-called Four Points of Vienna.[51] The treaty of Paris was largely a status quo document, and for most of the powers,

the Crimean War brought little change. As had been the case with the third coalition, the victors of the Crimean War resolved to defend the status quo in a separate treaty amongst themselves; Austria, Britain and France signed a trilateral guarantee of the Paris accord on April 15, 1856.[52]

To point out that there was no fallout following the victory over Russia is not to say that there existed no strains or feelings of mistrust among the victors. Indeed, although the Austrians had gained the enduring enmity of Russia by providing diplomatic support to the western allies, they did not endear themselves to either the British or the French. Post-war politics would show that Austria was the real loser of the war, but the events which support this conclusion would take years to unfold. At the Congress of Paris, however, the Austrians came under intense pressure to evacuate the Danubean Principalities which they had come to occupy with the retreat of the Russians. But French and British motives for pressing Austrian evacuation had little to do with a fear that Austria would gain in terms of relative capability. (Were the western powers intent on weakening Austria, a better strategy might have been to allow her to occupy the principalities, thus further taxing an already overstretched monarchy.) Rather, Napoleon saw in the question of the principalities a chance to promote Rumanian nationalism and the revision of the 1815 settlements, while the British position seems to have been chiefly a response to strong anti-Austrian currents in public opinion.[53] For its part, Austria tried to suppress the nationalities question, forming a tacit alliance with Turkey on Balkan questions, and attempted to preserve Concert principles which were (correctly) seen as the only means of achieving security for the empire.[54]

The post-war diplomatic dance between France and Russia appears at first to provide stronger support to proponents of a balance of power explanation for alliance dynamics. Indeed, Napoleon III

supported a lenient peace with Russia, and had vague notions of how he might effect *rapprochement*. Palmerston worried about a resurgence of French power after the war as well as a Franco-Russian entente, but saw in alliance the mechanism for controlling France.[55]

For Napoleon, the existing connection with London was more important than the dream of an alliance with St. Petersburg. Although anxious to break apart the Crimean coalition, a proponent of nationalism in Italy and the Balkans was not a likely alliance partner for a conservative Tsar sitting atop a restless multi-national empire absent a strong military threat.[56] Whatever interests there might have been for closer ties between France and Russia, there was no fallout between Britain and France, and even the connection with Austria continued into the years immediately following the Crimean War.[57]

To the extent that there were post-victory strains in the Crimean coalition, these were not chiefly a function of relative gains concerns or the security dilemma. Rather, they reflected the incompatibility of the great powers' conceptions for a European order after the collapse of the Concert system. Britain wished to promote liberalism; France nationalism; Prussia sought German unification; while Austria and Russia wanted little more than a return to the conservative solidarity which had provided for the longest period of great power peace in modern history.

The Danish War, 1864

Steven Walt cites the Austro-Prussian war against Denmark as an example of balance of power dynamics and the phenomenon of fallout in the wake of victory.[58] However, as I have argued elsewhere, the second crisis over Schleswig-Holstein and the resulting war against Denmark resulted from the collapse of the Concert system and the absence of a functioning balance of power

mechanism.[59] The legacy of the Crimean War, coupled with an active French presence in the diplomatic affairs of Europe, created the conditions that made Austro-Prussian aggression possible.

The years immediately following the Crimean War have been described as the second "Napoleonic Age."[60] Napoleon III actively supported the cause of nationalism across Europe: the Poles in the Russian empire; Cavour in Italy; Rumanian nationalists in the Danubean principalities; and even signaled a willingness to accede to the cause of national unity in Germany. Whereas the position of Russia had been critical to deterring earlier attempts by Prussia to gain territory in the Elbe duchies, the Crimean War left a weakened Russia forced to withdraw in large part from the affairs of Europe.[61] Napoleon III heightened the Tsar's fears of republican nationalist revolution both in Poland and Russia. The fear of republican nationalism together with the need for a respite from great power competition drove Russia to seek an understanding with Prussia. A strong Germany would deter France from direct intervention in Poland; German unity under a strong dynasty would provide a bulwark against the revolution; and after the Austrian treachery in the Crimea, a Prussian Germany was preferred to an Austrian one.[62]

The pretext for Austro-Prussian aggression against Denmark was a new attempt by the Danish crown to incorporate Schleswig into Denmark, weakening the historic ties between the estates of Schleswig and Holstein.[63] Bismarck took advantage of the Danish king's violation of earlier obligations and pursued a policy of Prussian aggrandizement by enforcing international treaties. In January 1864 Prussian and Austrian troops invaded the duchies, and on the night of 5-6 February, Danish forces were forced to evacuate the famous *Dannevirke*. On February 18, Prussian troops followed the retreating Danes over the border of Jutland, occupying the town of Kolding in Denmark itself. By the opening of

armistice negotiations, the whole of southern Jutland was in German hands. A peace conference opened in Vienna in July, and on October 30, 1864, the King of Denmark ceded to the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria the duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenberg, and agreed to recognize whatever dispositions they made for these territories.

The successful completion of the Danish campaign did not solve the question of the duchies' relationship to Germany or the dual powers. The defeat of Denmark only led to protracted and contentious negotiations between Austria and Prussia over the disposition of the duchies in the context of the larger questions surrounding Confederate reform and German unification. Indeed, within a matter of 2 years, Prussia and Austria would settle their dispute on the field of battle. But to argue that the dispute over the disposition of the duchies produced a fallout would be a distortion of the most vulgar type. For the dispute over the duchies was but a surrogate for a more important underlying conflict over the basis upon which German unity would be achieved; Prussia preferring a strong German state independent of connections with the Habsburg empire.[64]

In fact, contrary to the logic of balance of power theorists, the spoils of the Danish war *were* divided between the victors. In the convention signed at Bad Gastein in August 1865, Schleswig was given to Prussia and Holstein to Austria. But whereas balance of power theorists argue that intra-alliance disputes lead to the preservation of independent actors, the division of the duchies between the German allies did not reflect amity or commitment to further security cooperation. Rather, it was seen by both as a means of buying time. And the apparent equality of the division should not obscure the relative advantage which accrued to Prussia. Schleswig was certainly far more useful to the

consolidation of Prussian rule in North Germany than the far away Holstein was for the consolidation of Austria's strategic or political position in Germany.

Although Prussia and Austria found cooperation impossible to maintain after their victory over Denmark, the reasons are not to be found in narrow disputes over the division of the spoils, nor in straightforward balance of capabilities logic. The conclusion is not surprising, for nothing about the Danish war suggests it was the result of a functioning balance of power system. Austria's alliance with Prussia was not oriented toward balancing against the greatest threat. Rather, much as Britain sought to control France through continuing alliance after the Crimean War, Austria sought to protect against loss in Germany by allying *with* rather than *against* her Prussian competitor. The dispute with Prussia had less to do with the security of the Austrian empire from Prussian military threat, and more to do with the threat emerging from the nationality principle and the threat posed to a Catholic monarchy by the emergence of a strong Protestant power in Germany. For Prussia, the war represented an effort to resolve a domestic constitutional question by means of a military victory. Neither the richness nor the fundamental causes of the Austro-Prussian dispute are captured by the logic of alliance politics offered by balance of power theory.

The World War I Allies

In his essay on the origins of the First World War, Paul Schroeder notes: "The fact that so many plausible explanations for the outbreak of the war have been advanced over the years indicates on the one hand that it was massively overdetermined, and on the other that no effort to analyze causal factors involved can ever fully succeed."[65] With Schroeder's observation in mind, and given the focus of this

essay, no discussion of the origins of the war is offered here. Rather, the following section challenges the notion that post-war relations among the members of the winning coalition conform to the logic of alliance dynamics under the balance of power.

With the defeat of the German threat, indeed the collapse of the German military in the final days of the war, balance of power logic would suggest that the allies should have come to regard one another as rivals and compete for German affection through separate offers of a lenient peace. Russia did conclude a separate peace, and Steven Walt claims the British and French fell out.[66] But there was no fallout, and balance of power theory cannot account for the course of coalition dynamics either in the final year of war or the decade that followed.

1917 was a pivotal year in the relations of the allied powers and provides a good starting point for an analysis of coalition dynamics immediately before and in the years following their defeat of the central powers. The two major changes in the composition of the coalition are well known: Russia dropped out of the war, while the United States entered it.

Of course Russia's defection--first with an armistice in December 1917, then the treaty of Brest Litovsk in March 1918--was a result of the Bolshevik revolution, which, though not unconnected with the long and costly war, had nothing to do with balance of power politics. (Excepting, perhaps, the German decision to give Lenin passage from Switzerland across the Reich. If Lenin could weaken the Czarist regime, it might be brought to sue for peace.) Prior to the revolution, Russia did not seem to be particularly concerned with denying her allies the spoils of victory. Indeed, in February of 1917, Russia and France reached a bilateral agreement whereby France was to be given a free hand in the Rhineland in exchange for Russian gains in Poland once the central powers were defeated.

The second major change in the composition of the coalition was the entry of the United States into the war, the proximate cause of which was the German decision of January to begin unrestricted submarine warfare. Although the United States' declaration of war in April represented the joining of a common effort by a country of immense war fighting potential, America's entry into Europe would prove crucial for more than just the military outcome of the conflict. Lacking a conception of specific interests at stake on the continent, Wilson instead came to see America's role as one of defeating not only the central powers, but a system of European politics which was itself a major cause of the conflict. Thus, although the U.S. entered on the side of the western allies, Wilson maintained the position that the United States was an "associated" rather than "allied" power. America's entry into the war had the effect of changing the allies' goals from the reestablishment of a balance of power on the continent to the promotion of a particular set of ideals.[67]

With the end of the war, France wanted to annex the Saar and detach the Rhineland from Germany.[68] However, it was Wilson's Fourteen Points, not relative gains concerns on the part of the allies, which precluded any significant post-war division of wartime booty amongst the victors; with the exception of the colonies and Alsace and Lorraine, to which France had legitimate historical claims, Germany was left largely intact. Large scale territorial aggrandizement out of the question, post-war discussions focussed on the nationalities question and the issue of reparations.[69]

The latter was to prove the biggest challenge to continued cooperation between the allies, particularly Britain and France, and is often cited as evidence of the phenomenon of post-victory fallout. But a closer look at the nature of the dispute and its eventual resolution undermines such a conclusion. The wartime allies did not begin to balance against one another. Both regarded Germany, though

temporarily weak, to be the major threat to European stability. They disagreed not on the goal of securing France and Europe from a renewed German threat, but rather on the conditions which would facilitate this result. And however much they differed, Poincaré was determined to avoid a Franco-British rupture over the German question.[70]

The Versailles Treaty established the principle of German obligation, and the Reparations Commission eventually set a figure of 132 billion gold marks, to be paid in annual installments of 2 billion marks plus annual payments amounting to 26% of the value of German exports.[71] Difficulties emerged in the latter part of 1921 when it became clear that Germany would not meet her second payment to France. The French position was simple: Germany had an obligation, Germany had to pay. France's insistence on German fulfillment of the reparations obligation was in large part motivated by security concerns and came to be seen as the test of whether the Versailles system would remain intact. A Germany saddled with an onerous debt obligation would be a weak Germany, and France required German funds to rebuild its own capabilities. But the French faced a dilemma: only a strong and well organized Germany would produce the balance of trade surplus necessary to meet its reparations obligations, but such a Germany would represent a potential threat to French security.[72]

To be certain, some in Britain betrayed an atavistic fear of the reemergence of French hegemony.[73] However, the chief concern for the architects of British foreign policy was the restoration of economic stability to the continent, which was seen as a necessary precondition for political stability. Thus, Britain granted the Germans a moratorium on reparations payments in December 1921 and urged the French to adopt a more lenient position. The British and French agreed on the goal of securing

Europe, but disagreed on the means. The actual course of the British-French dispute on the issue of German reparations need not concern us here[74], but two developments are of interest.

First, in an effort to coerce German payments, France and Belgium occupied the Ruhr in January 1923. Were the British seriously concerned with French hegemony on the continent, or the unequal division of the spoils of victory, such a move would have provoked a strong response. In the face of the French occupation, however, the British were nothing more than "a passive bystander."[75]

Second, rather than provoke a British effort to balance against France, the Ruhr episode seems to have induced all sides of the dispute to recognize the need for a negotiated solution to the issue. With American assistance, an agreement was reached in the Spring of 1924 with the adoption of the Dawes Plan. Moreover, the successful resolution of the reparations issue spurred the erstwhile disputants to further efforts at political cooperation; in October 1925, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Poland signed a collection of instruments which came to be known as the Locarno Pact.

Locarno represented a ratification and clarification of major components of the Versailles Treaty: Germany guaranteed the Franco-German frontier, and the powers agreed to resolve disputes in accordance with procedures established in the pact's arbitration conventions. In a sense, it provided rules of the road for post-war European politics. Britain's Foreign Minister Austen Chamberlain characterized Locarno as an effort to prevent another world war by "calming French nerves, by bringing Germany into the Concert of European Powers, and by adjusting the relations between Germany and the West through negotiation and with a minimum of coercion."[76] Although it did not succeed in fully reconciling Germany with her neighbors, Locarno was not inconsequential. The principle of resolving

European disputes through compromise and consensus prior to unilateral action was institutionalized in the practice of frequent informal summits among the ministers of Europe. "To be a good European during the Locarno era...meant that one did not take unilateral action. One went to Geneva four times a year and there consulted with the other members of the Council of Europe and attempted to act in concert with them."[77] And although there remained serious disagreements among the powers of Europe, these did not lead to a renewal of armed hostilities, at least as long as the fathers of Locarno--Stresemann, Briande and Austen Chamberlain--remained in office.

Balance of power theory would suggest that absent a strong common threat, Britain and France would find it extremely difficult to maintain security cooperation after their defeat of Germany. Yet despite serious disagreements regarding the best means for securing the hard won peace, Britain and France did not fall out. Rather, the common experience of a long and costly war appears to have inspired in each a strong desire to avoid a rupture. Europe did not return to unconstrained balance of power politics after the great war, but instead a form of concert diplomacy emerged in the form of Locarno. Although weakly institutionalized, Locarno did provide some measure of stability to the relations of the allies and former belligerents alike, at least until the dramatic events of the thirties overwhelmed it.[78]

The World War II Allies

The origins of the Cold War are certainly to be found in the falling out between the western allies and the Soviet Union which began even before the defeat of the Third Reich. Indeed, of the cases analyzed here, the break-up of the World War II alliance best fits the predictions made by balance of

power theorists. The fit between the prediction and the outcome is, however, not perfect. Although the British and the Americans fell out with the Soviets, much of the allies' behavior is inconsistent with the hypotheses deduced from balance of power theory. Important causes of the fallout had little to do with simple balancing behavior or a concern with relative gains.

Because scholarship on the origins and course of the Cold War is both extensive and vituperative, the present discussion will satisfy none interested in the particulars of the case. The reader is encouraged to view this effort for what it is: a test of the empirical validity of a particular theoretic claim.[79]

The allies approached the question of the post-war settlement from three perspectives.[80] Discussing the post-war division of Europe with Anthony Eden as early as December 1941, Stalin pursued a spheres of influence plan which by definition included sizeable increases in territory and influence for the Soviet Union. Roosevelt drew on both realist and idealist currents in American thought, and while recognizing the need for a limited sphere of exclusive influence for the Soviets in Eastern Europe, sought to construct a system of security based on the concept of the "four policemen."[81] Churchill was alone among the leaders of the big three in promoting a course of action which corresponds with the predictions of balance of power theory: he sought to restore France to the ranks of the great powers and he opposed the division of Germany.

Although derived from a particular conception of the balance of power, Churchill's alliance policies should be embarrassing for neorealists. For once victory was in sight, Churchill sought to balance the Soviet Union, not the United States.[82] That is, Churchill flocked to the stronger side of the alliance, not the weaker as Waltz predicts. An explanation based solely on the post-war balance of

capabilities is insufficient with regard to British policies. Neither can the explanation rest on a rational short-run calculation of national interest. The British paid a heavy price for maintaining the close link to the United States: the loss of empire.[83] Clearly British alliance choices were driven by a longer-run calculus which saw in the Soviet Union the greater threat to British values, but this calculus is not caught in overly simplistic notions of the balance of capabilities or relative gains.

If one were tempted to discount prior idealistic pronouncements as rhetoric, the decision to settle for nothing less than the unconditional surrender of Germany announce at Casablanca in January 1943, demonstrated that Roosevelt was pursuing a strategy inconsistent with basic tenets of the balance of power model. The demand for unconditional surrender, coupled with Hitler's determination to fight to the finish meant the removal of German power from the European balance and an immeasurable increase in the relative position of the Red Army, itself devastated by the war.[84] At Yalta (February 1945), with the Red Army already in control of most of Eastern Europe and Stalin already busy constructing pro-Soviet regimes, Roosevelt pressed Russia to enter the war against Japan and agreed to large post-war gains in Manchuria and the Sea of Okhotsk in the process. Balance of power concerns did not lead the United State to oppose Soviet territorial gains. Moreover, U.S.-Soviet disputes did not prevent the division of the spoils: Germany was divided.[85] Rather, once serious disputes emerged, they served to both perpetuate and legitimate that division.

In contrast to the straightforward predictions of balance of power theory, the United States did not display any reluctance to grant the Soviet Union some amount of territorial gain, and would not have reacted negatively if Stalin had settled for the incorporation of the Baltics into the Soviet Union, the westward adjustment of the Polish borders, and the territorial gains promised in an effort to secure

Soviet participation in the war with Japan. Indeed, there was a strong belief in American decisionmaking circles that the U.S. could look forward to a period of continued cooperation.

What appears to have proved decisive for the fallout was Stalin's failure to allow free elections and his insistence on communist governments in Eastern Europe. Thus, in the Fall of 1945, Secretary of State James Byrnes "publicly declared that the United States sought neither to impose hostile governments on the Soviet Union's periphery nor to encourage behavior unfriendly to it. Indeed, Byrnes proclaimed a willingness to accept the notion of an 'open sphere,' wherein Eastern European governments would conduct their foreign and defence policies within parameters set by the Kremlin....The caveat, however, was that the Kremlin had to refrain from intervention in the strictly internal affairs if these countries and to accept the principles of open and non-discriminatory trade, free elections, and the unimpeded movement of Western journalists."[86] Whether the Soviets actually violated the agreement, or whether there were honest disagreements over what was actually agreed to at Yalta, with the Clifford-Elsey report in 1946 the Truman administration came to the conclusion that the Soviets were in breach of their post-war obligations.[87] In hindsight, the fallout appears almost inevitable; in a sense, overdetermined.[88] Responsible scholars can use the actual course of events to demonstrate the plausibility of a number of explanations. One method of assessing the plausibility of the claim that the distribution of capabilities alone provides a sufficient account for the fallout, is to engage in a counterfactual though experiment: Absent the ideological dispute, would the fallout have come about?[89] That is, if the Soviet Union had been a well established liberal democracy in 1945 would there have been a Cold War?

Would a democratic Soviet Union have manipulated elections across Eastern Europe? Would a democratic Soviet Union have attempted to destabilize Turkey, Greece, and Italy? Would a democratic Soviet Union have insisted on appropriating East German industry and resources? Would a Soviet Union committed to liberal ideals have seen in Britain and the United States the sort of threat requiring the buildup of massive offensive potential?

The degree to which neorealism can account for the origins of the cold war turns on one's answer to these questions. Given the ability of statesmen with convergent values to avoid fallout after the Napoleonic, Crimean and First World Wars, I am skeptical of the claim that the balance of capabilities alone accounts for the inability of the United States and the Soviet Union to continue meaningful cooperation after the defeat of Nazi Germany and Japan. Had the two sides found it possible to agree to a set of principles according to which post-war politics could be judged legitimate, the outcome would in all likelihood have

been quite different.

CONCLUSIONS

The proposition that allies tend to fall out in the wake of victory, has attained the status of conventional wisdom in contemporary international relations scholarship. However, a review of cases from the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte to the allied victory over Nazi Germany leads to the conclusion that the phenomenon of alliance fallout is not robust. Indeed, the evidence suggests that fallout is rare, and that post-victory cooperation, though not easy, is not impossible to maintain. Although no alliance is likely to prove permanent, the cases demonstrate that post-victory alliance collapse is rarely

immediate. Contrary to both the predictions of neo-realist theories of the balance of power as well as a the logic of a straightforward functionalist argument, the process of alliance decay and structural realignment occurs over the course of years, sometimes decades. No doubt many neo-realists will object to the conclusions offered here with the argument that what has been identified is simply a delay between the defeat of a common threat and the collapse of the victorious alliance. However, this is neither consistent with what they have argued to date, nor is the objection founded on a deduction informed by the logic of their theory. Without careful specification of the mechanism which accounts for the delay between the defeat of the common enemy on the one hand, and alliance collapse on the other, efforts to rescue neorealism from the empirical record by appealing to a "lag" must be rejected as *ad-hoc*.

Further research is required before one can evaluate the fit between the empirical record and the hypothesis deduced from neo-institutionalist theory. Wallander and Keohane argue that highly institutionalized alliances that come to perform a myriad of security management functions are likely to survive the defeat of the catalytic threat which gave rise to them.[90] Historically, the most robust alliances did show increasing levels of institutionalization and many came to address a broader range of security questions than merely balancing against the onetime threat (Concert of Europe, Locarno). However, unlike NATO, most of the institutionalization and growth in alliance mandates occurred *after* victorious wars rather than before. Thus, based on the evidence presented here, one cannot conclude that pre-existing high levels of institutionalization and multifunctionality allowed victorious allies to overcome post-

victory disputes and tensions. Indeed, increased institutionalization and scope may reflect the same underlying causes which produce robust alliances.

The case studies were designed primarily to test the dominant theory of alliance politics and demonstrate that the neo-realist understanding of the balance of power is seriously flawed. Although no alternative theory of alliance politics will be offered here, four lines of theoretic inquiry are suggested by the analysis.

What's the Baseline?

Whether post-war relations among the members of a victorious coalition are characterized as cooperative or conflictual will rest to some extent on the analyst's baseline of reference. Should post-war relations be judged in comparison to pre-war or war-time relations?

Wars threaten the continued autonomy of states and place unusual demands on both state and society. Coalitional wars place unusual demands on members of the coalition. There is no theoretic argument from which to conclude that one should evaluate the degree of conflict or cooperation in the post-war relations of one-time allies against the nature and form of cooperation within the wartime coalition. The existence of conflicts of interest, concerns over relative position and prestige, as well as differences over the means by which to achieve common goals are normal and inherent to politics under anarchy--indeed, social life in general. Most realists, institutionalists, and constructivists would agree: politics continues in the wake of victory.[91]

When do post-victory disputes constitute cases of fallout? The arguments of balance of power theorists provide criteria for coding. These are: 1) efforts to balance against one-time allies; and 2) a

failure to agree on the division of booty because of relative gains concerns. In the cases examined above, there were no fallouts over the division of wartime booty, and in only one case--postwar U.S.-Soviet relations--was there clear evidence of external balancing against a former ally.

Same Problem, Many Solutions

The case data show that the strongest propositions deduced from contemporary theories of the balance of power--here on the prospects for post-victory cooperation among allies--are contradicted by the empirical record.[92] Weaker propositions are not so much incorrect, as unuseful. As already noted, post-victory relations among members of the coalition are not unproblematic. Neorealist theorists correctly point out that concerns over relative position and conflicts of interest are never absent in international politics. This is illuminating, but the light is of low wattage.[93] To say that states always regard one another with some degree of suspicion, that they fear challenges to their autonomy, and compete for some measure of relative advantage, tells us nothing with regard to how states will endeavor to secure stability, security, and status. If one problem has many solutions, identifying the problem is but the first step toward explanation.

The cases provide clear evidence that in alliance politics the same problem often has many solutions. Thus, after the defeat of France, the Tsar feared the collapse of his alliance with Austria and Prussia. In an effort to maintain cohesion among the Eastern Monarchies he pushed for a lenient peace with France. That is, the Tsar sought to manipulate the balance of power to prevent fallout. Fear of the reemergence of independent foreign policies also took root in Palmerston's calculations after the Crimean War. But rather than seek to strengthen Austria or Russia in an effort to constrain Napoleon

III's range of choice, Palmerston pursued his objective through the negotiation of a new treaty of alliance with France. Russia faced the same problems vis-à-vis her allies in 1814 as did Britain with hers in 1856. But identifying the problem suggests little with regard to the solution.

Of Course its About Power, But...

Although the cases point to the inadequacy of balance of power theory to explain alliance politics both during and after war, the cases demonstrate that power matters in international relations. Power helps states secure goals. However, unlike money in economic theory, power in international relations is neither a store of value nor a generalizable medium of exchange.[94] Straightforward evaluations of the "balance" of power at any point are thus impossible. The contextual and relational nature of power in social life renders the balance of power explanation for alliance choices, in most cases, meaningless.

Again, the cases are illustrative. In terms of population and territory, Austria should have had a secure place among the ranks of the European great powers. However, the Habsburg monarchy was unable to translate these capabilities into positive outcomes once the spread of nationalist ideology destroyed domestic legitimacy. It is difficult to conceive then of a meaningful measure of Austrian power in the years between 1848 and 1914, certainly a measure that would allow decision-makers to make rational choices which would give rise to a system-wide balance. Similarly, after the Germany's defeat, Britain's fundamental weakness was apparent only to Churchill and his advisors. What does it mean to suggest that the balance of power rested in part on U.S. and Soviet calculations of British power?

How Does the System Operate?

A longstanding debate in the field centers on the degree to which the balance of power operates independently of actor intentions. The two dominant strands of thought are best captured by the works of Kenneth Waltz and Morton Kaplan.[95] Whereas Waltz argues that the balance of power is the unintended byproduct of the coaction of self-regarding units, Kaplan argues that a functioning balance of power requires the internalization of certain rules or lessons by statesmen. The cases analyzed here suggest that both positions are wrong.

Post-war politics appear to present critical junctures where the fundamental nature of the international system is at stake. How states choose to structure their relations has implications for the operation of the system from that point forward. Jervis correctly notes that whether or not balance of power dynamics predominate is a function of the dominant actors' beliefs and practices.[96]

To argue that collective choices matter in political systems is not the same as arguing that outcomes reflect individual preferences. The Crimean War provides a perfect example of the unintended consequences of actions in social systems. In fighting the Crimean War, the Western powers succeeded neither in promoting a new liberal order nor a balance of power. The Crimean War had the unintended effect of creating the conditions which made German unification possible, an outcome that continues to produce system-wide ramifications over a century later.

Lessons for NATO

Based on a faulty reading of the historical record, many statesmen as well as distinguished students of international politics look for the collapse of NATO in the wake of the West's Cold War victory. Mearsheimer is characteristic of the post partum blues. Arguing that the alliance will fallout he sees a bleak future ahead: "Without a common Soviet threat and without the American nightwatchman, Western European states will begin viewing each other with grater fear and suspicion, as they did for centuries before the onset of the Cold War. Consequently, they will worry about the imbalances in gains as well as the loss of autonomy that results from cooperation."[97]

Caution, not pessimism, is warranted. The evidence shows that alliances do not fall out over abstractions. When states perceive their alliance partners to share core values, mistrust does not produce fallout. When allies do fall out, they do so over real political issues, and usually after one has reached the conclusion that the other is unalterably committed to incompatible goals and an aggressive foreign policy. Prussia and Austria fell out over the very real question of how to unify Germany. The Soviet Union and the United States fell out over how to organize Europe.

Each of the cases point to the ever-present concern of states for security, but neither the essence of the disputes nor their resolution can be reduced to an unproblematic conception of "security."[98] When states have divergent conceptions of what is to be secured, fallout appears likely. However, common conceptions of security have proven possible to achieve. Thus, NATO's future probably hinges on the ability of the allies to define a concept of security which allows for orientation in an anarchic system. Toward this end, current discussions over membership and military strategy are misplaced if they are not based on a more fundamental consensus.

The success of Vienna, and to a lesser extent of Locarno, suggests that there is an important role for diplomacy in the widest sense of the term, in promoting such consensus. Durable consensus, in turn, appears to hinge on whether post-war security arrangements attain some measure of legitimacy. Although the analyses of classical realists such as Morgenthau and Kissinger speak to the importance of legitimacy in international politics, the means by which international arrangements come to be viewed as legitimate--either at the level of inter-state discourse, or domestic societies--are unfortunately poorly understood.

ENDNOTES

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[1] Although aware of the preferences of some theorists, I do not differentiate between alliances and alignments in this essay, because for neorealists, the logic underlying patterns of alignment and alliance is essentially the same.

[2] For a similar observation, see Haftendorn 1994.

[3] Harries 1994, 48.

[4] Cited in Hellmann and Wolf 1993, 17. For a detailed exposition of the neorealist position, see Mearsheimer 1990, and idem 1994/95.

[5] Walt 1987, 31-32. An analysis of the first four cases and the conclusions Walt draws from these is presented below.

[6] Wolfers 1968, 268-271.

[7] Riker 1962, 71.

[8] Aron 1967, 44.

[9] Jervis 1997, 131.

[10] The most prominent works by historians interested in this question are Kennedy 1987; Taylor 1954; Dehio 1962; and Gulick 1967. Among economic analyses the most notable are North and Thomas 1973; and Olson 1982. Works by political scientists include Gilpin 1981; Waltz 1979; and Modelski 1985.

[11] In the analysis that follows, "balance of power theory" is taken to be that body of theory most prominently associate with Waltz 1979, with refinements and elaborations in Walt 1987; and Jervis 1987 and 1997. For a comprehensive discussion of the variety of theories bearing the name "balance of

power," see Claude 1989 and the special issue of the Review of International Studies, Vol. 15 (April 1989).

[12] Jervis 1986, 60 and idem 1997, 131.

[13] "Balance-of-power politics prevail wherever two, and only two, requirements are met: the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive." (Waltz 1979, 121.)

[14] Waltz 1979, 119.

[15] Waltz 1979, 168.

[16] Walt 1987, especially chapters 5 and 8; and Jervis 1997, chapter 4.

[17] Waltz 1979, 116-128. Christopher Layne extends the logic and argues that states will balance against a benign United States under what he regards as the current structural configuration of unipolarity. See Layne 1993. In downgrading the importance of states' intentions, or others' perceptions of these, neorealists such as Waltz and Layne part company with traditional realists, who distinguish between the alliance impulses generated by powerful states committed to the status quo and

states which seek its revision. See, for example, Carr 1957; Morgenthau 1978; Kissinger 1957; Wolfers 1962, 117-132; and more recently, Schweller 1994 and 1996.

[18] See Jervis 1978, 167-214.

[19] The statement holds with the important exception of nuclear weapons when second strike capability is secure.

[20] Jervis 1978, 168.

[21] Waltz 1979, 127. See too Snyder 1990, 109. Waltz' student Stephen Walt reintroduces intentions, arguing that threats are a function of offensive capabilities; geographic proximity; and perceived intentions. (Walt 1987, p.5.)

[22] Aron 1967, 44.

[23] Waltz 1979, 126.

[24] Waltz 1979, 105.

[25] Grieco 1988, 498, emphasis in original. See too idem 1990.

[26] Jervis 1997, 133-34. The source of the diplomat's remark is Gulick 1967, 72.

During the apogee of balance of power politics, the goal was characterized by statesmen and writers in many ways, including "reciprocal compensation," "proportional aggrandizement," "proportional mutual aggrandizement," and "reciprocal reduction." Examples of successful reciprocal compensation may appear to be rare, but they are not nonexistent : e.g., the compensations of the Westphalia settlement; the partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793, and 1795; agreements among the colonial powers over the division of Africa and Asia; and the division of Germany and Austria into French, British, Russian and American zones after the second world war. See Gulick 1967, 72-77; Morgenthau 1978, 199-200; Gifford and Louis 1967; Schroeder 1994b, especially chapters 1-3; and Davis 2000.

[27] Grieco 1988, 499. Reinhard Wolf presents the argument as a hypothesis deduced from neorealist theory and thus subject to empirical testing. See Wolf 1996, 14.

[28] Riker 1962, 67-68.

[29] Important older works include Liska 1962; and Rothstein 1968.

[30] See for example Rosen 1970, 215-237. The logical and methodological problems posed by strong functionalist arguments are well known. For a good discussion of the most important of these, see Turner and Maryanski 1979, 118-126.

[31] For the full exposition of the institutionalist position, see Wallander and Keohane 1996, 1999.

[32] For a statistical examination of the connection between war and regime change, see Bueno de Mesquita et. al. 1992.

[33] See Liska 1962, 103.

[34] See, for example, Walt 1987, especially chapter 2; Liska 1967, especially chapter 1; Wolfers 1968, 270; Waltz 1979, 166. Morgenthau recognized the existence of alliances built upon shared values, but argued these are most often subsidiary to common material interests. See Morgenthau 1978, 204.

[35] Frankel 1979, 130; Dawson and Rosecrance 1966, 21-51, quote at 51. See too Holsti 1970, 93-103.

[36] Specifically, the assumptions that wars are seen as legitimate tools of statecraft, and that all states are regarded as possible alliance partners. See Jervis 1986.

[37] For an argument that collective security systems are preferable to alliances, see Kupchan and Kupchan 1991; also Kupchan and Kupchan 1995. For a less optimistic view, see Betts 1992.

[38] Riker 1962, chapter three.

[39] For the conditions which gave rise to the final coalition and a discussion of the tensions which were present from the start, see Schroeder 1994b, chapters 10 and 11. For discussions of Concert diplomacy, see Elrod 1976; Lauren 1983; and Schroeder 1986.

[40] For a discussion of the Treaty of Chaumont, see Gulick 1967, 151-160.

[41] Schroeder 1976, 231.

[42] For a discussion of the negotiations leading to the treaty and the various understandings of its meaning, see Kissinger 1957, chapter 12.

[43] Gulick 1967, 270-276.

[44] See Gulick 1967, 272-279; and Schroeder 1994b, 555-558.

[45] See Schroeder 1994, chapter 10, and pp. 555-556; and Kissinger 1994, 80-82.

[46] Kissinger 1957, 172-190, quote at 182, emphasis in original.

[47] Holsti 1991, 138-143.

[48] Holsti 1991, 155.

[49] For discussions of the causes and conduct of the Crimean War, see Saab 1977; Schroeder 1972; Rich 1985. For its effects on the Holy Alliance, see Taylor 1954, 60; and Mosse 1969, 50 ff.

[50] The best work on Austria's Crimean War diplomacy is Schroeder 1972a.

[51] These comprised: 1) a collective, rather than Russian, guarantee for the Danubean Principalities--Moldavia and Wallachia; 2) a collective, rather than Russian, guarantee of the rights of Christians in the Ottoman Empire; 3) free navigation of the mouths of the Danube; and 4) the demilitarization of the Black Sea.

[52] Mosse 1963, chapter 2.

[53] Schroeder 1972a, 356-363; 380-385. The Austrians eventually agreed to evacuate the principalities upon the conclusion of a Russo-Turkish peace, and carried out their obligation in March 1857.

[54] Schroeder 1972a, 418-420.

[55] See Schroeder 1972a, 360; and Rich 1985, 201.

[56] See Taylor 1954, 88-98.

[57] Of course Napoleon III was at war with Austria in Italy in 1859.

[58] Walt 1987, 31-32.

[59] See Davis 2000, 54-74.

[60] Mosse 1969, 81.

[61] The first attempt to wrest the duchies from the Danish crown came in 1848. Russian opposition also proved critical to deterring the Prussian annexation of Hesse-Kassel in 1850 leading to the humiliating "Punctuation of Olmütz."

[62] Hinsley 1967, 244; Mosse 1969, 7; Taylor 1954, 73.

[63] The Schleswig-Holstein question had a long and complicated history. Palmerston's statement on the question is well known, but worth repeating: "Only three men have understood it. One was the Prince consort, and he is dead. The second was a German professor, and he went mad over it. I am the third, and I have forgotten all about it." Associated with each other since the Middle ages, the danish king was made Duke by charter in 1460 by election rather than hereditary right. Only male heirs

would be eligible for election as duke. Holstein was a member of the German Confederation established and guaranteed by the signatory powers represented at Vienna on 8 June 1815, but Schleswig was not. And in the negotiations leading to the settlement of the first crisis over the duchies (1848), the Danish crown promised Austria and Prussia never to incorporate Schleswig into Denmark or take any steps toward that end in the London Treaty of 1852.

[64] For the history of the unity movement and the two visions for Germany, see Pflanze 1979; Clark 1934; Austensen 1980; and Mosse 1969.

[65] Schroeder 1972b, 320.

[66] See Walt 1987, 31-32.

[67] Even in Great Britain, the traditional defender of the European balance, Wilsonian principles took root in influential political circles. See Wolfers 1963, 6 and 196-197; and Kissinger 1994, 248-249.

[68] On French War Aims, see McDougall 1978, chapter one.

[69] On reparations discussions at Versailles, see Burnett 1940.

[70] See Schuker 1976, 171-172.

[71] Albrecht-Carrié 1958, 390-391.

[72] See Albrecht-Carrié 1958, 392-393.

[73] See Kissinger 1994, 252.

[74] The best studies of the period are Wolfers 1940; Trachtenberg 1980; Schuker 1976; and McDougall 1978.

[75] Albrecht-Carrié 1958, 395.

[76] Jacobson 1972, 383.

[77] Jacobson 1972, 385.

[78] A major shortcoming of Locarno was the failure to legitimate Germany's eastern frontier or come to terms with Bolshevik Russia. See Kissinger 1994, 274-277.

[79] For fuller treatments of the case, see Gaddis 1972; Kuniholm 1980; Leffler 1993; Jones and Woods 1993.

[80] For a somewhat simplified account, see Kissinger 1994, 394-422.

[81] For Roosevelt's view of post-war international politics, see Kimball 1991, especially chapters 5 and 6. The idealistic current was still present at the start of the Truman Administration. See Miscamble 1977, 268-283.

[82] Churchill's radical about face, moving from a policy of close cooperation with the Soviets as demonstrated in the percentages agreements reached with Stalin in October 1944, to one of promoting an Anglo-American confrontation with the Soviets over developments in Hungary, Rumania and Poland in March of 1945, remains an historical puzzle. For a discussion of Churchill's change of course and the hypothesis that the explanation is to be found in British domestic politics, see Kimball 1991, chapter 8.

[83] See Louis 1978.

[84] See Evangelista 1982/83, 110-138. From a balance of power standpoint, Roosevelt's apparent lack of concern for the recovery of French power is even more difficult to explain.

[85] The fateful decisions were made at Potsdam and concerned the issue of reparations. See McAllister 1996, chapter three.

[86] Leffler 1986, 101.

[87] See Leffler 1986, 88-123.

[88] But see Leffler 1992.

[89] On the use of counterfactuals in the study of international relations, see Fearon 1991; and Tetlock and Belkin 1996.

[90] Wallander and Keohane 1999.

[91] A useful analogy might be a Mississippi delta community before, during, and after a flood. Beforehand, neighbors might not even know one another. During the flood, neighbor helps neighbor in a common effort to minimize damage and loss of life. Once the waters recede, neighbors again return to normal patters, yet no one would argue that the social fabric has disintegrated.

[92] This finding is not unique. See Lebow 1984; Reiter 1995; Schroeder 1994.

[93] For a similar characterization, see Kratochwil 1982, 29.

[94] See Baldwin 1989, 10-44.

[95] Waltz 1979; Kaplan 1964.

[96] In this sense, the argument in "From Balance to Concert" is constructivist.

[97] Mearsheimer 1990, 47.

[98] A similar point is made in Schroeder 1994a, 127. For a discussion of the inadequacy of standard notions of "security," see Baldwin 1995.