NATO's Global Mission in the 21st Century

Strategic Study

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Abstract

The present study aims at bringing up most fundamental components that take part in constituting a comprehensive vision for NATO’s long-term policy, especially enlargement.

The analysis starts by a backward reflection upon the enlargement debate over the entire decade of the 1990s. That reflection does not reveal that the arguments proponed have been wrong. It rather discloses that at most of its stages the enlargement debate has focused on abstract issues, on important but isolated aspects of the enlargement process. In particular, it has not made a decisive attempt at making explicit the fundamental presuppositions that underly the idea of enlargement in the long run.

A summary reflection on this review of major arguments shows that the fundamental factors of the enlargement could be reduced to three: the paradigmatic change in understanding security after the collapse of the Cold War security environment, the role of Russia in terms of the scenarios for its own future as a political body, and the historical dynamic of the Alliance’s own involvement over the last ten or so years. These are the topics the paper concentrates on in the main part of its analysis. The assumption is that these factors constitute a comprehensive enough framework for articulating the problems of both enlargement and future overall strategic vision of NATO’s.

The first factor mentioned has a conceptual character. It touches upon the fundamental change in how security had been understood till the collapse of the bi-polar system, as well as the transformation this understanding underwent thereafter. The change, our argument runs, concerns the irrelevance of the the entire conceptual apparatus of the threat-oriented security policy and its replacement by a more untraditional risk-oriented policy. The former makes it possible to advance a universal security policy whereas the latter renders a reasonable security policy dependent on specific contexts. Herein lies the challenge for NATO and any future strategic vision should account for the profound change this shift from threat to risk entails.

The second factor is the new geo-political factor of Russia and its post-soviet yet quasi-imperial policy. The analysis of Russia
is an analysis of a highly untransparent object, a political body whose behavior is impossible to predict in the long run. This premise has been somewhat overlooked by analysis, critics as well, of enlargement, who have used the name Russia in a way that implies predictability and a clear foreign policy agenda. This however is not the case as Russia herself experiences acute problems with her own identity and political unity wherein foreign policy originates. Two scenarios are advanced: the preservation of Russia’s unity and her disintegration. The paper makes an assessment of the probability for each of them to become actual, and makes recommendations, as well as predictions, on the basis of these imaginative yet clear developments.

The third factor analyzed is the decade-long history of NATO’s own involvement in operations that were not part of its traditional defense-oriented strategy. This is especially the case with the entire Yugo-crisis. The basic argument of this part is that most international institutions, such as the UN, the EU, the WEU, the OSCE, etc, have failed to resolve the crises. What they lacked have been exactly the resources NATO had. That is why it became somewhat inevitable that NATO was the international agency called upon to intervene and provide temporary solutions of the Balkan crises. At the same time, NATO was somewhat forced to accomplish missions that have brought the Alliance out of the scope of its traditional activities. A new and more comprehensive vision for how NATO is to develop in the future should account for the fact that such interventions are more and more probable; hence, the Alliance should be better prepared for them and include them in its overall strategic concepts.

In conclusion we summarize our observations in three major points. Here is what they read:

- NATO’s mission has acquired a global dimension which will have to be accounted for and reflected in all fundamental strategic documents.

- NATO has proved unique in combining extraordinary efficiency with enduring democratic values and will have to base its further strategic concepts on this unity.

- NATO of the beginning of the 21st century should develop a policy of diversification with regard to both its territorial and its functional scope while preserving its basic definition of 1949.

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Once upon the time, namely in 1990, a group of Bulgarian Members of Parliament visited NATO Headquarters, and put forward the idea that the Alliance should inevitably expand eastwards. The reaction was one of profound skepticism and dismissal, with Secretary General Manfred Wörner being among the very few exceptions. Ten years later there is no doubt as to who was right then, yet one may wonder if that lesson has been duly taken. Indeed, President Menem of Argentina and Russia's Putin alike have recently suggested they see their countries in NATO, only to meet the same misplaced reaction.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
INTRODUCTION

At the time of creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization the first NATO’s SACEUR, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, general Dwight Eisenhower wrote: “If in ten years all American troops stationed in Europe have not been returned to the United States, then the whole NATO project will have failed”.

History did not listen to this. Instead, the Alliance endured the whole Cold War period, a whole epoch in contemporary history. Much more than that, these words, as wise and definitive as they could be at the time, turn out not to hold true for the historical epoch succeeding the Cold War. Somewhat surprisingly, especially if assessed against the early Cold War warnings and predictions, today the idea of total withdrawal looks even more incredible. Not only that: today we witness, again much to the surprise of the founding fathers, new ambitious projects for NATO, for its new role, new mission, new members, and new, long-term strategic plans. Instead of thinking of reductions and withdrawals, today’s NATO strategists involve themselves in an intensive debate about these new moments constitutive of the essential definition of NATO. The future of NATO has become one of the most important topics in Western security policy in the last decade of the 20th century and, to be sure, beyond that time limit.

With this paper we attempt to place ourselves in the center of this debate. In is our intention to attempt to develop a consistent and comprehensive position on the topic, the role of NATO in the 21st century. A central concern of the working group and the author has been to formulate this position within a very broad horizon. To this effect we have made significant reductions with regard to important details, events, arguments, etc.
More specifically, we believe that, although the debate on the future of NATO will continue, it has already produced whole theories. Most important arguments have been advanced and discussed. It would be somewhat naïve if we did our research under the assumption that we would be first in the business. We rather take a different stance and recognize we enter the scene of the debate at a later stage finding numerous positions exchanging actively arguments in various directions. We recognize this fact and accept it as a condition for our work.

This recognition of the fact of the debate over NATO’s future imposes on us certain requirements regarding research methods. Our methodological paradigm is quite special due to this initial assumption. In the first place, we take as our immediate object of inquiry not events, developments, facts, and other objects belonging to the actual environment. Rather, the first object we concentrate on is the very debate on enlargement, on NATO’s future role, etc. It is, in other words, not objective reality but its reflection in the argumentative discourse, in the security policy rhetoric, our immediate research reality. We try to present some major arguments and accomplish a critical reconstruction of the main positions in the debate.

Further, in this reconstruction we identify some, presumably the basic, deficiencies of the argumentative discourse on NATO’s future role. These in our view are:

- first, the lack of enough clarity concerning the paradigmatic change in the very way one could and should conceptualize security after the collapse of the bi-polar world;

- second, the absence of a more decisive reflection on the lessons that have been taught in practice by the most acute crisis after the end of the Cold War, namely, the series of the Yugoslav wars;

- third, a tremendous analytic hesitation and indeterminacy with respect of Russia and, more specifically, her own political
condition, her historical alternatives and the consequences of each of them.

These three aspects have become the major topics of this study. We deal with them in three separate chapters and assess them in view of the central subject of our research. Upon further reflection on our observations at the end of this essay we advance a concise outline of NATO’s role in the long run as we see it. An important aspect of this view is that it skips numerous details which, though important, do not belong to this level of analysis. In other words, we unfold a position which has strategic dimensions but can hardly serve as a basis for making immediate operational conclusions. The reader should keep this limitation in mind, or so we advise her/him.

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THE ENLARGEMENT DEBATE IN THE 1990s

Historical Context: Setting the Stage

The debate on NATO’s enlargement, on its future military and political activities, on its very reason to exist, on possible organizational reforms, etc., began in a specific context. It was characteristic for the period 1989-1991 that the change had taken by surprise even the most imaginative visionaries in the West. It was unexpected for politicians and analysts alike. As a consequence of this historical rupture, a huge conceptual vacuum opened up. It was under such circumstances that the debate on NATO’s role started. Hence, the debate was to inevitably suffer major deficiencies. A basic one was that the chain of events developed much more rapidly than the debate on NATO’s future. It was very often the case that strategists of the Alliance were not doing strategic planning but rather responding to the dynamics which dominated on the international arena. In geo-political terms that was especially true as regards NATO’s ambitious enlargement project and NATO’s relations with the Soviet Union and, after 1991, with Russia.

This description is not totally uncontestable. NATO major strategists may take it as too critical and respond that despite all the political upheavals they succeeded to frame an Alliance Strategic Concept in 1991. Or, that they met Russia’s concerns or paranoid perceptions with due care and exactitude, one of the examples of this being the NATO-Russia 1997 Founding Act. There might be some answer and it might be more or less correct. Yet, the problem we are raising here does not implicate that administrative structures and strategic planning were overlooking something. We rather bring up a different problem and propose a slightly different perspective. In our view the dynamic of events was so extraordinary, the diversity of developments was so
enormous that even the most talented prophets of international life could not but fail to live up to them.

Hence, it was inevitable that the debate would, for quite a period of time, be implicitly re-active. Projects for the future of NATO would thus more often than not reflect particular features in the context. These, for their part, might well turn out to have no long-term significance. This, in our view, was a controversy arising from the epochal change itself not from particular positions involved in it. Let us attempt to briefly explain this in an exemplary fashion.

One example we take here relates to how the European continent was seen back in 1989-1991. Presumably, the immediate post-Cold War settlement was based on three major factors: (a) the reunification of Germany, (b) the reduction and limitation of strategic armaments and conventional forces in Europe and, (c) the expected revision of NATO's military doctrine to reflect the collapse of the bi-polar world. By the end of the 1990s these circumstances did no longer play such an important role. The overall strategic perception was thus to experience a series of changes in this respect.

Another example relates more specifically to Germany and the arrangement with Russia in this connection. One of the major debates after the end of the Cold War was whether a unified Germany would remain neutral or integrated in NATO. The Bush administration insisted that Germany should be part of NATO, provided that Soviet troops would remain in Eastern Germany for a five-year interim period. Bowing to what was considered at that time “legitimate Soviet security concerns,” the U.S. administration implicitly recognized that NATO’s advance was threatening the Soviet Union. There are different versions about how Washington convinced Moscow. Still, the bottom line is that Russian troops withdrawal and, consequently, Germany’s reunification were made possible by assuring the Soviets that
NATO would not expand beyond Eastern Germany. Such factors of international security bargaining were soon to disappear. True, they were not allowed to dominate the 1991 Strategic Concept; yet, at the time they were seen as most important. It was soon to be revealed, by history itself, that NATO’s future role would not depend on these temporary geo-political considerations.

Here is another example with Germany. Under Gorbachev’s leadership the Soviet Union undertook unilateral steps in favor of the West. The most important were the acceptance of Germany’s reunification and its NATO membership. At the beginning the Soviets favored a united but neutral Germany. This vision was shared also by then-West German foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher. It was broadly understood that German unification would be the final step in a transformation period during which both NATO and the Warsaw Pact would shift their orientation, namely, from a predominantly military to a more political profile. Later on they were to be dissolved by mutual agreement. Apparently Gorbachev gave up the idea of a neutral Germany following assurances from top American officials that should unified Germany join NATO, NATO would not move eastward. As of today, upon a backward reflection, the idea of neutral Germany looks totally absurd. At the time it was among the crucial factors and the debate on NATO could hardly avoid it.

Yet another example points to what the late Soviet Union expected as a gesture of the West in response to its own friendly policy. When the Soviet Union collapsed, instead of entering a new strategic partnership with the United States, Russia was disgraced to the role of a junior partner and subjected to American diminutive attitudes; this was the perception among Russian leaders. She had to put up with economic, as well as political humiliations. Immediately after the Soviet collapse, the U.S. and Western Europe introduced economic quotas on aluminum, uranium and aero space technology in which Russia could
have had some competitive advantage. She was also excluded from meaningful participation in the Oslo peace accord in the framework of the Middle East peace process.

These, and other, examples, demonstrate that the debate on the future of NATO started in a context that was to undergo quick and significant changes. The debate was thus to remain for a while somewhat narrow and restricted by factors of long-term significance. It was only after 1991 and especially after 1993 that the discussions of politicians and political analysts set out to focus on factors of long-term political value. At this second stage, the debate gained a new portion of rationality. Its arguments were to develop at a higher strategic level and thus come closer to the core issues, such as enlargement, the division of Europe, the danger of an emergence of a gray zone, the out-of-area operations, the new European security identity, the distribution of labor and funding, etc.

In the chapter that follows we are going to discuss arguments that develop at this level and have a long-term value.

**Critical Position Toward the Debate**

Upon its creation NATO's mission was defined through a famous metaphor: “to keep the Germans down, the Americans in and the Russians out”. This clear-cut definition was intended for public usage, to be sure; it was not a formula of "statutory" activities. Yet it surely reflected true motives for the formation of what today politicians widely call "the most successful military alliance in history."

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War attempts to conceptualize NATO’s new role have produced a truly intensive debate. This debate, however, has not yet led to formulating a definition as brief and clear as the one that
accompanied the founding act. Instead, for ten years now it has often produced murky, sometimes even confusing arguments.

Why such a difference in the very structure of the debate, the results, the duration? Let us take two examples that indicate the direction in which answers should be sought for. We present first the more abstract, then the more specific and complex one:

One argument may go like this: The post-World War II international order was stable and predictable. In carving out their spheres of influence the two superpowers kept each other in check. The Soviet Union was portrayed as an ever expanding, seeking global dominance, totalitarian in essence, evil empire. This image gathered a wide public approval rather quickly and easily. Therefrom political backing for investing in an organization providing for collective defense was even easier to ensure.

Even with the apparent oversimplification this argument does not provide ground for answering the question of enlargement today, let alone of the globalization of NATO's role. It is negative in nature and only indicates what is absent at present, namely, this whole clarity and simplicity on the global security scene; but not what, more precisely, has replaced it. So, the question why maintain and even expand a military organization designed primarily to confront the Russian threat still remains unanswered.

A more specific argument may go like this: In President Clinton’s view, enlargement was meant “to construct a balance of power that both restrains and empowers all people who came within the framework of the agreement,” meaning military restraint of unified Germany and Russia, and empowerment of Russia to participate in the economic and political evolution of Europe.

Though apparently different, such an argument could hardly explain the rationale behind the enlargement policy. On the one hand, at present Germany is a leading player in the European
Union. There are no signs whatsoever that it may undermine this position by resorting to adventurous militarism. Russia, on the other hand, is too weak and dependent on Western aid to risk decisive confrontation. And, ensuring Russia’s participation in the evolution of Europe by other means would be more attractive to herself; NATO enlargement rather exacerbates relations with an already humiliated and irritated Russia. Further, by using the expression “balance of power” the argument belongs in the realist language of conceptualizing international affairs; however, it remains unclear whether this theoretical view is relevant to the enlargement strategy.

The diversity of arguments opposing enlargement is even greater than is the class of the pro-enlargement ones. This diversity may grow on and on, especially upon reflection on new events on the international arena. Thus a study on NATO's future, as is the current one, faces the dilemma whether to add another argument, or a set of arguments, to the debate, hoping it would hit the mark. That belief is somewhat naïve and we discard it. Being destined to drag feet behind the course of events it could hardly lead to laying the ground for unfolding a broad strategic view.

The conceptual-analytic approach we adopt here is fundamentally different. We assume that the debate searching for straight answers may, and should, go on. It would, however, not produce a decisive final word in the way it has been structured and has developed. Thus instead of jumping on the train of arguments and adding the next one in the series, provided this is possible at all, we advance a different approach and conceptual technique:

In the first place we recognize, in principle though, the legitimacy of the totality of arguments and see them as constituting a whole, namely, a whole and dynamic debate involving an international public. We grant most of the arguments
the credit of being important against the framework they operate in.

In the second place, we take a critical stance with regard to the whole debate. Thus, at the beginning, it is not the reality "out there" that is the object of our analysis. We rather take as a starting point the very debate on enlargement.

In the third place, our intention is to give an outline of the debate by presenting a number of major arguments, mostly against enlargement as they are more informative and challenging. We present them in a simplified way, namely, as more or less summarized typical positions, and reflect critically on them severally.

Finally, we attempt to reconstruct and render explicit the major deficiencies implicit in them all. These deficiencies have to do with the way various arguments articulate basic conditions that should be accounted for as they have a crucial significance for the producing most rational policy arguments. These same conditions will afterwards become the central subject of this analysis.

To state it in a preliminary fashion, the conditions that appear fundamental yet are in need of receiving a considerably greater conceptual clarification are (a) the overall change in the very paradigm of understanding security after the end of the Cold War, (b) the emergence of a new geopolitical factor, namely Russia, and the alternatives its own development presents, (c) the dynamic change on the international arena that has been taking place for the last decade.

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Europe: Divided or United?

According to President Clinton the reason for expanding NATO eastward is fourfold:
1. To strengthen the alliance’s capabilities in meeting the security challenges of the 21 century;
2. To promote freedom, democracy and prosperity in Eastern Europe, much as it did for Western Europe at the wake of World War II;
3. To encourage prospective members to resolve their dispute peacefully;
4. To erase the artificial line in Europe that the Cold War has drown and to bring Europe together again.

This strategic outline has received as much approval as it has harsh criticism. The claim that expanding NATO will unite Europe, critics respond, is ill founded. For without an intention of universal NATO membership expanding NATO simply moves the division between NATO and non-NATO countries eastward. Even a proponent of expansion as is Henry Kissinger warns that NATO expansion has to do with division, not union. Countries seek membership not for the sake of erasing dividing lines but to position themselves inside a guaranteed territory. Thus it appears that NATO boundaries only make a move to the east.

Therefore, a basic problem of NATO enlargement is that admitting some countries and excluding others, especially Russia, creates new dividing lines in Europe. On the other hand, opening NATO for universal membership provides no solution to that problem at all. As Dr. Kissinger pointed out in an Economist essay earlier in the past decade a universally inclusive structure is a redundant one.

The argument of unification vs. division has not received its proper answer yet. It has only had the effect of bringing into relief the difficult dilemma which, as we shall see in the next chapter, has to do with the character of the alliance, indeed with the very core nature of its historic mission. To just indicate it in a negative and preliminary fashion, a continuous expansion may not go hand in hand with the fundamental definition
of NATO as a defense organization; a change in its basic identity is inevitable.

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Extended Deterrence vs. Diminished Credibility

The idea of "extended deterrence" presents yet another point of disagreement. The controversy surrounding the unification idea has implications that go beyond this regional aspect and relate directly to the nature of the military, as opposed to security, organization. Critics of enlargement draw attention to this difference.

One, NATO is first and foremost a military alliance designed to protect its members from armed attack. "Extension" of its mission so as to include a political dimension only highlights the difference between Western European and Eastern European visions of enlargement. Western proponents see NATO membership as a political exercise designed to promote overall European stability. Eastern Europeans, however, see it as a tool for enhancing their security and independence from potential adversaries. This difference indicates a conceptual muddle in the entire enlargement idea.

Two, proponents of enlargement act as though there are no serious prospects for a situation where Article 5 must come into play. Efficiency of the military alliance, however, requires that it ensure credible security shield and not run a policy based on assumptions that are always secondary to its core mission. Shying away from this obligation would undermine NATO's and US's credibility not only in military but in other fields as well. In this case "extended deterrence" may be questioned as to whether it may uphold the deterrence mechanism at all.

Three, even if "extended," deterrence still implies balance of power between the challenger and the guarantor. This balance depends on what the stakes are for both parties involved.
Historically, Eastern Europe has not had major economic or security importance for the United States. During the Cold War the United States did not prevent the Soviet Union from restoring order in its imperial periphery: it suffices to recall the cases with East Germany, 1953, Hungary, 1953, and Czechoslovakia, 1968. Similarly, given the high importance vested in Western Europe, the Russians did never dare to challenge US’s readiness to go to war if its Western allies were attacked.

Four, proponents of expansion assume it is not threat-driven. It is rather a part of an overall strategy toward protecting stability and democracy and unifying Europe. The latter would not require deploying a large number of NATO combat forces around the region. Critics of this argument point out that this is inconsistent with fundamentals of deterrence theory. With extended deterrence, too, the presence of the defender’s ground forces remains the most powerful factor for success. During the Cold War it was ensured by the presence of large number of American conventional forces in Europe. The allied governments wanted such a presence as a guarantee that American government would not enjoy the luxury of choice. However, such grave risks should not be incurred unless there is a vital threat to America’s security interests.

To sum up this line of the debate: the "extended deterrence" concept does not give a satisfactory answer to the basic concerns regarding enlargement. The reason for this is that, however modified, the concept remains part and parcel of the bi-polar paradigm. A preliminary inference would be that a more radical approach is needed to solve these questions. If a paradigm shift has occurred in the state of the object under consideration, and if consensus about this is in place, a paradigm change is also needed in how we describe this change.
Military Doctrine vs. Military Spending

One of the central questions discussed in connection with enlargement has been the question of costs. In addition to having significance of its own, it has been evaluated in relation to the character of the military doctrine underlying NATO's very existence in the closing days of, as well as right after the Cold War era. Critics have observed that NATO members are assuming very large new commitments at a time when all of them are making substantial cuts in their defense budgets.

First, the costs. According to Pentagon's calculation NATO's enlargement would cost $27 to $35 billion over a period of 10 years, Washington’s share amounting to $200 million a year. The RAND corporation has estimated probable costs at $30 to $52 billion. The Congressional Budget Office has predicted that the cost would range as high as $125 billion. At a time when both the administration and the Republican-led Congress are seeking a balanced budget, costs of NATO expansion would have to be balanced by further cuts in the public sector. Both raising taxes or cuts in education and health care are unattractive options for each administration. This raises the question of the seriousness of such commitments.

Second, the military doctrine. The creation of a new military balance in Europe was codified in the Conventional Forces in Europe Agreement. It constitutes a new military regime of limited armaments and thus precludes the notion of two blocs. Further, it reduces the potential for a surprise attack with conventional forces. As a result, NATO military doctrine and strategy shifted dramatically. In an effort to reassure the Russians NATO radically altered the two pillars of its military doctrine, “forward defense” and “flexible response”, modifying them as “reduced forward presence” and “reduced reliance on nuclear weapons as a weapons of last resort.” This political-military strategic doctrine imply recognition of the collapse of
the bi-polar opposition and a significant reduction of the threat perception.

Third, the contrast between costs and doctrine. In 1990 former Warsaw Pact countries were invited to set up liaison missions at NATO's headquarters. The Bush administration created the North Atlantic Consultative Council. The Clinton administration invented the Partnership for Peace. NATO's inclusive drive was reasonably narrowed and led to admitting Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Nevertheless new members cannot be credibly defended without NATO mounting up conventional forces in Europe or go back to its doctrine of first use of nuclear weapons. Otherwise it will create a second class membership and will become a paper promise. In order to avoid this scenario NATO members would have to swallow the above given estimates.

To critics of enlargement this dilemma has not received a credible solution. On the contrary, the discrepancies between military doctrine and military spending could have most undesirable effects on NATO’s new members. Without serious financial commitments they should have to rely on NATO paper guarantees. But the symbolic inclusion, be it association, partnership or membership, does not provide them with the security environment they are striving toward.

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Expanding NATO, Expanded Security Risks?

NATO enlargement proponents argue that merely extending NATO security umbrella will lower the risk of outright conflicts and neutralize the possibility of the region recessing to its turbulent past. They point out to two sets of examples, the improved relations between France and Germany, and between Greece and Turkey.

Both examples are fairly misleading, critics reply.
After the end of the war Germany was divided into four zones of occupation one of which was under French control. It was impossible therefore for Germany to commit any act of aggression. Both France and Germany were concerned about the rising Soviet threat. As for Greece and Turkey their relations were steadily deteriorating during the Cold Ward notwithstanding their adherence to the same club.

This critical remark extends toward the three new members of 1999. The admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in NATO entails dangerous security obligations for the alliance. Here are some observations to this effect.

Hungary, in particular the Hungarian diaspora, could present a somewhat unexpected challenge NATO. Hungarian officials have stressed on many occasions that they might take advantage of NATO membership to strengthen Hungary's role as protector of Hungarians outside its borders. There are compact groups of ethnic Hungarians living in Romania, Slovakia and Vojvodina. True, after the signing of 1996 bilateral Treaty of Understanding, Cooperation and Good Neighborliness between the two countries there are no signs of outright hostilities and tensions but it is not clear weather that could last forever. There is suspicion that Hungary-Romania rapprochement was primarily driven by the two countries' desire to enter NATO and therefore would not represent a steady trend in their state policies. With 700,000 Hungarians living in Slovakia the relations between the two countries have been always strained due to the treatment of the Hungarian minority. The situation is even worse in Vojvodina where Milosevic government has consented to the persecution of Hungarians there.

Poland's admission to NATO also poses potential threats to the alliance because of the common border with Belarus. This country has a wrecked economy and an oppressive government, and is a perpetual source of instability for all its neighbors. In
case of civil war in Belarus devastating spillover effects may spread to and destabilize Poland. Even though some argue that NATO expansion will prevent other Bosnias to come, given the risks Hungary and Poland bring to NATO the opposite seems equally probable.

The Clinton administration often portrays an expanded NATO as a means to ensuring that countries within the alliance remain free-market democracies. Neither Turkey nor Greece were models of democracy at the time of their admission, and Portugal remained a dictatorship up to the 70s. NATO membership did not prevent the rise of the junta in Greece, nor has NATO had any impact on Turkey’s poor democracy record.

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Russia: Friend or Foe?

The main problem in formulation NATO’s mission and strategy lies in its inability to answer a fundamental question, namely, whether Russia should be considered friend or foe, a potential threat. Arguments in both directions, pro or against expansion, fall short of giving a straightforward answer to this question. Usually, they adopt, or implicitly presuppose, some kind of middle ground position. Thus, arguments referring to Russia seem to be sending contradictory messages.

One, if we consider Russia as a conceivable threat in the near future it is an apparent contradiction that Russia has been given a special status through the Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council. The Founding Act grants Russia a “voice but not veto” power in NATO affairs, and thus a vague right to participate in the alliance’s military planning.

Two, if NATO expansion does not go fast but delayed for years ahead, a number of vulnerable countries will be left in a gray area while Russia enjoys a privileged position as NATO consultant. This circumstance constitutes another serious
ambiguity, which does not disappear with the admission of three new members from Central Eastern Europe; the "gray zone" problem becomes even more disturbing.

Three, upon signing the Founding Act President Clinton officially proclaimed that Russia-NATO relations will no longer be a zero-sum game, where Russia's weakness is NATO gain and vice versa. Still, he finally appeared very firm stating that Russia should be left out of the new NATO. This uncertainty is not specific for the U.S. president, it reflects a dilemma of the entire Euro-Atlantic community.

Four, it looks like the alliance experiences difficulties framing a coherent strategy of providing credible security assurances to its new members. On the one hand, it admits there is no reason for stationing substantial forces on the new member countries territory; apparently implying threat from Russia is not likely. On the other hand, NATO does not rule out embarking upon “enlargement” in the Baltic states. Russia views such a move very negatively warning the West it would react accordingly. So, we witness in this that enlargement may go parallel with absence of clarity regarding what specific security and defense guarantees it necessitates.

To sum up: the debate, which concentrates on Russia seems to be missing a major point. What is missing, in our view, is a comprehensive vision of what Russia of today is like, where it is heading to, what the most likely scenarios for its future are. That question requires special attention and we shall return to it in a separate chapter as this analysis progresses.

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America’s “Manifest Destiny”

NATO enlargement becomes subject of critique from a broader perspective, too. It has to do with the observation that this type of involvement does by no means represent a new course in
American foreign policy. This agenda has always had its critics, though.

The enlargement policy is consistent with the underlying aims of a NATO-American global strategy after the end of World War II. The United States’ Cold War fierce stance had a global dimension and a purpose transcending the concrete. The U.S. Cold War policy was directed not toward fighting communism, the typical argument goes, and triumphing over the Soviet Union but toward imposing the American vision of a new world order. Although the continuity of America’s drive for global leadership was obscured by anti-Communist rhetoric, it becomes evident when one examines how the US contained its allies. By providing security umbrella for Germany and Japan the United States prevented them from carrying out independent foreign and military policies thus reassuring their neighbors. Freed from the fears and competition West European and East Asian were able to cooperate economically and military.

American policymakers have always considered the danger of “renationalization” as two sets of challenges to American leadership:

- “renationalization” of regional politics in which scenario states will shrink into nationalist rivalries, leading to economic autarchy, and,

- “renationalization” of world politics in which case independent regional economic blocs would be formed thus threatening the interdependent international world order.

Even though there has been much talk about the need to formulate new foreign policy and to forge a new role for the United States in a post-Cold War era, in fact there is a widespread consensus that America should maintain its prominent role in the world through its leadership in its European and Asian alliances.
Therefore, the argument that NATO security umbrella should be extended as to include Eastern and Central Europe is merely an extension of the argument that America will be the leader in European affairs. Some proponents argue that US and NATO have to go out of area because “there can be no lasting security at the center without security at the periphery.” True, there are still many places in the world where America’s military might makes difference. But following this logic, the American commitments will be endless, and America’s security obligations will go forever expanding.

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Summary Reflection on the Enlargement Debate

The debate on NATO’s enlargement, which has all kinds of implications concerning the overall future of the Alliance, has been intensive and, at times, has heated up significantly. In respect to its style, content, argumentative structure, etc., we propose some critical remarks and draw inferences from them.

First and foremost, as it often happens in serious and intensive discussions, most of the arguments suggest important points yet, at the same time, have a natural inclination to go one-sided and somewhat extreme. The above presented parts of the NATO debate in the 1990s show this clearly. This deficiency may also be defined as an unjustified taking of abstract position and losing the sense of the whole. It is this picture of the whole that is absent in many, if not all, of the arguments. And, it is the idea of the whole that needs to be recovered, assessed and brought in the background of any definitive statements regarding NATO’s future.

At the same time, we register different points belonging to different arguments but somewhat conflated in the debate. Arguments about Russia and the Baltics and the gray zone notion,
etc., could hardly be efficient if not first distinguished and, only after that, rationally combined with each other.

Further, Russia appears as a central concern in most anti-enlargement positions. The arguments about Russia’s reaction, however, usually presuppose a view of Russia which is more suitable for the Soviet Union. The Russia problem does exist; but it is too serious and should be tackled separately. Few of the arguments about Russia are based on a preparatory analytic work on Russia herself; and that is something, which is needed in the first place.

Still further, it is characteristic of the debate on NATO that it hardly takes into account the high dynamics of change with regard to the context, the international arena in general. Many arguments tend to completely lose sense of history and ongoing change. This is a very tangible deficiency because, as we all have seen, the debate may go on and on yet NATO, at the same time, may get involved in operations such as those in Yugoslavia. So, the debate sometimes follows the course of events or develops as if history has stopped.

Other critical remarks may also be proposed. We reduce them to three basic ones:

One, before jumping to conclusions, the arguments need to be based on a preliminary clarification about the epochal change in our ways of understanding security and the methods strategists should apply when discussing NATO’s future.

Two, the historical practice of 1990s speaks for itself, it contains enough material the reflection on which would prevent advancing abstract arguments; the Yugo-crisis, in particular, is by and of itself a synthetic argument about NATO’s future.

Three, Russia is a crucial factor indeed. However, precisely because she is, and should be recognized as such, she should become a subject of a separate discussion, not a denomination of a vague power ghost applied at random.
In what follows we deal with each of these aspects individually. We believe that they are representative enough for the overall constitution of the security environment wherein NATO’s new mission should be assessed.

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FROM COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TO COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Ideal Types in International Affairs.

The transformation which NATO experiences after the end of the Cold War can be described as a movement from “collective defense” toward “collective security”. In effect, the strategic focus of the Alliance turns from “direct threat” to “risk factors”. Also, the attention gets turned from subject-origin of threat to multiplicity of time-bound factors characterizing situations as risky. And, the static organizational structure is getting transformed into a more open process. It is against this background that the policy of enlargement should be seen and assessed. However, due to a variety of factors, such a proposition is not obvious at all.

In 1993 President Clinton announced for the first time after the end of the Cold War that as regards NATO the United States would follow a firm and consistent policy of enlargement. A central component of this policy agenda was NATO membership for the Central European countries. The policy of “open doors” came next. A series of untraditional steps such as the initiative Partnership for Peace stemmed from this new orientation. Out-of-area operations in the Balkans were soon to follow. In other words, the idea of eastward enlargement was gaining momentum rather quickly in the mid 1990s. The debate among experts was going to get hot and last several years, right to NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, a point in time when the enlargement debate took a different course. Experts aside, the wider public, however, was and is still divided.

As to the countries in Central and Eastern Europe the public has not attained a sufficient degree of clarity with regard to the reasons for joining and enlarging NATO. The very expression “expansion” has residual negative connotations inherited from the
past. Politicians, on the other hand, are not always persuasive enough when they attempt to clarify this situation. For quite a long time, the Kosovo war being the mark of a new, yet even more complex development, NATO membership just went together with membership in the EU and other European structures. It was advanced as a kind of natural development and as a self-evident proposition. Thus, the specific question of why we should join a “military, though defensive, alliance” remained open. Kosovo has made things more complicated. The countries whose public at large was on the way to being persuaded about the package of benefits accompanying NATO membership were to face the other side of the coin, namely, the package of responsibilities such a membership would involve. It is this dividing line, the Kosovo war, where the debate reached two extreme points, the point of losing its initial naivete, as well as the point of sensing the circumstance that the membership equation involved numerous parameters and variables. It is also the second boundary point where the debate about straightforward membership has shown signs of new maturity: in the first place, the naive enthusiasm has been overcome by the public, in the second place the public has appeared somewhat ready to swallow new arguments, new and more adequate pros and cons, in the third place, it has turned out that the fundamental dimensions of a mature and reasonable debate have not been quite at work. This brute fact has to be recognized. And, the first consequence of its recognition would be that a prerequisite for any clarification is the endeavor to come back to the conceptual fundamentals that stand behind any argument, be it for or against, concerning the expansion process and its long-terms perspectives.

I shall formulate here a series of theses relevant to the reason why NATO of the period after the Cold War launched a policy of enlargement. Also, why this process is not about membership but about an overall security policy in the
international arena. Further, that this policy has inevitable
global implications, that is, the policy under consideration has
to do with security conditions in various contexts and region.

The assumption of this conceptual analysis is that the
answer to “Why should NATO expand in the East?” is not ready at
hand. As the expert debate, not the large public one, in the West
has shown, the question is rather complex and, in many respects,
even controversial. Apparently, a more clear answer could be
reached against a more clear background. However, having a clear
conceptual background is not a simple condition, though on the
face of it sounds like a banality of kind, but a special new task
requiring also special endeavor at conceptual level. More
specifically, we need to develop this answer under certain
simplifications. Here are some of them:

(a) The fundamental one, which is at work throughout this paper,
relates to the assumption of the full dominance of the bi-polar
model of the Cold War period from 45-50 to 89-90. Assuming this,
we disregard other “poles” such as the conflict area of the
Middle East, the oil embargo of 1973 imposed by the OPEC member
states, a number of regional conflict areas, etc.

(a) This reduction of the entire complexity of the international
arena after World War II provides the condition for constructing
what Max Weber calls “ideal types.” The ideal types, in our view
and for the purposes of this study, are general notions,
perceptions, representations. They do not correspond to any
specific, empirical data and their significance and rationale is
not to be such. Rather, they are conceptual constructs which
refer to realities that dominate over others and function as
conditions for the latter. The idea types we are going to present
thus constitute the central axis around which other developments
occur.

(c) The method thus described has direct consequences with
regard to the paradigmatic dimensions of how we understand the
field of international affairs. The ideal type of conceptual work in this concrete case refers to a reality which is dominant on the international scene, that is to say, which dominates over other developments. So, by assuming a simplified and unitary conceptual ground, the ideal type technique provides the condition for unfolding the whole paradigm of the historical period we are interested in. As we shall see, this has to do with such central notions of the Cold War era as are containment, domino effect, bi-polarity, deterrence, detente, etc. Conversely, if we make an attempt to account for the whole complexity of the world affairs after World War II, we can never see this dominant paradigm.

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A Concise Definition of an Epochal Change

Under such an assumption the major change which occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall can be described in the following formula: **The subject-origin of direct threat was replaced by a variety of risky situations.**

NATO’s expansion comes as a response to this transformation of the vast field of international relations. The expansion is, to be sure, only one aspect of Alliance’s search for a new role and a new identity. Before we explore the constructive, positive aspect of this proposition, let us turn toward possible assumptions concerning the enlargement policy and advance some critical observations to this effect.

In the first place, it would be totally wrong to think that the expansion of the Alliance stems from the internal character of the organization, that is to say, that an “expansionist appetite” is somehow embedded in it from its inception. This idea characterized the debate about enlargement in the beginning of the 1990s. The argument was widely used by left-wing parties in Central and Eastern Europe that opposed the enlargement for
reasons mostly related to their party propaganda, as well as for the sake of saving part of their pre-1989 identity.

In the second place, the same argument gained some more solid ground, for a short period of time though, when its proponents related it to the Warsaw Pact dissolution: it would have been apparently reasonable for NATO to follow suit, the argument went, but it did not. For the nature of the Atlantic Alliance is based on an aggressive hidden agenda. Along this line it is first and foremost the United States that was seen as the primordial evil, the driving force of the new imperialist thrust. This primitive reference enjoyed some endurance due to the large public ignorance regarding strong opposition, which the idea of enlargement met in the West itself. It was popular around former Soviet bloc territories, much less in the countries of Central Eastern Europe, a little more in the South Eastern Europe, and has a lasting presence in countries of the former Soviet Union. It even formed the core of the argument against enlargement in some cases as was, and still is, for example, the case with notables of the Russian State Duma.

In the third place, the enlargement was perceived in some political circles in Eastern Europe and countries of the former Soviet Union as inherent in NATO itself, in its organizational design and essential constitution. This assumption is wrong as well and a simple reference to facts shows it. NATO of the period 49-89 and after 89 is not very different in terms of its inner structure, mechanism of decision-making, membership criteria. In this respect NATO has not changed considerably. For instance, the Czech Republic of 1997 meets the membership requirements better than Germany of 1950-1955. Not to speak about internal political upheavals in Greece and Turkey, already members, in which the civic-military relationship was not the most desirable from a Western point of view.
It is possible to enumerate various other arguments which try to hit the mark by expounding either apparently wrong or even contradictory arguments. They all ignore the fundamental level underlying the enlargement policy. This fundamental layer in the sphere of international relations does not relate to either a unitary position, as was allegedly that of the United States, nor to a new wave of imperial expansion the door for which was open with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, nor in the organizational design of NATO.

The difference between the two periods relates first and foremost to the radical change in the state of the international environment. Therefrom changes have followed, and will follow, in the identity of the Alliance, in its functions and activities internationally, as well as in the direction of its future evolution.

Let us now turn to the ideal types that constitute this fundamental difference. Our method, as well as procedure, of dealing with this difference is divided into three basic steps.

The first one was explained above in the remark about the ideal types in the sphere of international affairs. It has to do with the simplifications needed for expounding a picture of the international arena after the World War II, which could give us the dominant trends, positions, perceptions, and policy agendas respectively. We do not try to disentangle the whole complexity of the international field. Rather, we disregard this empirical diversity and attempt to disclose the ideal conceptual grounds which constitute the two states of the international relations after World War II, the Cold War era and the still-short period after its demise.

The second step has to do with constructing the two ideal types of situations we distinguish in this essay. They are claimed to dominate the scene and, even more, to provide the fundamental constituents of two different epochs in international
life. These two types of situations, or of constructions of the realm of the international relations, correspond to two different historical epochs.

The third step in this line of analysis developing consists in the attempt to explore possibilities for going beyond the conceptual dichotomy of threat vs. risk as unfolded below. The idea of the attempt is to identify a level which underlies it and is thus more fundamental than they are. The consequence of this analytic finding is that it opens a horizon for a new visionary thinking. To put it in a slightly different way, if a conceptual dichotomy turns out irreducible, the inevitable conclusion is that we, our communities, nations, the whole international life is fundamentally divided and occurs in two different worlds. This situation makes any vision for the future divided as well, hence based on uncertainty and thus hard to uphold. Our view, however, is that this conceptual division is not fundamental but rather founded. There is a global trend that stands deeper and its ground has conceptual dimensions, too.

Let us now turn to the basic dichotomy which, we believe, was characteristic of the overall constitution of this historical era, the second half of the 20th century and beyond.

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Subject-Origin of Threat

The central concept of the bi-polar system, and thus of the entire Cold War era, is not the concept of risk but the concept of threat. The expression risk has always referred in this period to risk of massive attack, risk of domino effect, risk of first nuclear attack, risk of having a situation necessitating massive retaliation, etc. To put it in a somewhat different way, risk was subjected to threat and thought of as secondary to the fundamental threat. It was in the horizon of threat and, correspondingly, in the horizon of expectations connected with
direct threat, that the idea of risk was articulated. It was thus used as a situational feature under the arch of the fundamental threat.

The two poles, which were formed from 45 till 50, presented not risk factors but direct threats to each other. Following are some typological characteristics of the notion of threat.

(a) First, threat implies positioning of clearly identifiable enemies both on objective and on perceptual level. Although at a different level, this implication has a projection on the plane of Carl Schmitt’s famous, or infamous if you wish, friend-enemy bi-polar opposition, which he and his followers take as fundamental to the idea of the political as such. In our case, which is limited to interactions in the field of international affairs and does not spread over the very idea of the political, it is important to emphasize this double meaning, the objective side and the perceptual play. As we know from such dramatic events as was the case with the thirteen days of October 1962, the Cuban missile crisis, the war of perceptions could be as important as the objective positioning of power centers; and, could determine objective developments as far as actions follow from those perceptions. The play of perceptions and misperceptions aside, as a rule the enemy is immediate and clearly defined for either side - each one lives with the conviction that the other intends to destroy it.

To be sure, a proliferation of enemy poles is possible and easily imaginable. Our construction, however, is both simplified for technical reasons and adjusted to the historical epoch we are concerned with. Therefore, we assume two poles. In principle, however, we do not rule out, nor do we overlook other historical contexts where poles may be more than two and quite diverse: such are situations with a variety of imperial powers or, another example, at stages of nation-state formation.
Thus a basic and simple structure is formed: two axes, hostile relations between them, and spheres of dominance or influence toward which each of them directs its expansion. Here is where the famous “Truman Doctrine” originates inevitably. According to it the United States and its allies are to be aiding “free peoples” everywhere. True, President Truman had in mind Greece and Turkey in particular and not so much a global strategy; he was more pragmatic than visionary. Still, this policy has vast, universal indeed, implications with regard to dividing the world into two spheres of influence. The division was, to be sure, part of a policy agenda and, in actuality did not lead to complete worldwide bi-polarity. It is important, however, that all trends that remained outside this project were perceived as, and in a sense really were, exceptions to the rule.

The concept, which is probably the most central one within the paradigm of the bi-polar system is the concept of “containment.” Although this invention of George Kennan’s is of a more special character, with a more sophisticated conceptual essence, it also arises from the bi-polar, friend-enemy distinction and its subsequent universal significance. The policy recommendation that comes out from the idea of “containment” as first expounded by Kennan in 1947 pronounces the need for “patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”

Kennan had such an extraordinary visionary power that was urgently needed at the time. It was also quite suitable against the state of conceptual limbo wherein politicians found themselves to be after the War. His ideas about the essence of the Soviet Union, about the origin and character of what he called “Soviet conduct,” were based on observations on Russia’s imperial appetite throughout Russia’s own history and on its somewhat natural, as would be the case with any imperial power, inclination toward expansion.
This view of Kennan’s, despite its speculative and intellectual background, turned out to be a groundbreaking insight, both after the War and for decades to come. The containment idea was to pre-determine policy decisions within a vast range of diverse concrete situations. True, it changed significantly depending on events and cases where applied at. The empirical enrichment however did not transform the essence of this fundamental category.

The famous metaphor of the domino also has its roots in this simple structure, the bi-polar direct enemy positioning. It was first advanced publicly, may be invented too, by President Eisenhower. He, and other policy makers after him described the importance of Vietnam to U.S. in 1954, by referring to the domino image. Its paradigmatic significance in the field of international affairs during the Cold War consists in the assumption that a retreat in some region is highly probable to produce a wave of retreats back to the center.

The strategies of the Soviets were similar though ideologically decorated. Their apparent agenda was more expansionist because of the ideological prejudice of the epidemic character of the communist revolution. So, it was openly not a deterrence policy but rather an expansionist version of the domino; hence, instead of prevention, their Utopia prescribed a kind of pro-active policy practiced mainly through “export of revolutions.” However, in its deeper essence the structural arrangement of the interaction of nations was the same seen from either of the two poles.

(b) Second, the interpretation of reasons and causes, which each side ascribes to the other, does not influence the existence of threat. Nor does it have, curiously enough, a significant impact on the perceptions of threat themselves.
The significance of the entire causal principle as regards relations between the two poles is restricted and rather narrow. It has to do only with the way each of the parties represents to itself, and to the public, the deep roots and origin of threat. For Kennan, it is rooted “in Kremlin’s neurotic picture of world affairs” and in the imperial appetite hidden behind the Marxist ideology. The idea of roots, causes, origins, etc., however, has significant impact neither on the existence of threat nor on the way of managing it.

For the Soviet leaders the threat’s origin is rooted in the innate defects of the capitalist system and in the prolonged agony before its inevitable destruction. These explanations can change over time regarding specifics but they hardly affect the grounds of the bi-polar structure at any time of its existence. Their own history is a history of ideology, or even of propaganda, which, for its part, is intended for internal usage in the first place. In the second place it may have transnational usage and cover spheres of influence, as well as spheres over which influence is being sought.

The proper meaning of this observation relates to the previous one, to the positioning of enemies presenting immediate threat to each other, and grants it additional strength and gravity.

The idea is that once formed, the bi-polar structure cannot be changed, let alone transformed or dissolved, by means of interpretation of causes, reasons, and grounds. Even more, it is safe to say that the bi-polar structure has no history of its own. The paradox of this statement is only apparent. History, to be sure, underlies this special arrangement and its worldwide implications. The structure itself however either exists or does not exist: it has no historical life. The first consequence of this feature is that as long as the bi-polar structure exists whatever variety of palliative remedies are applied,
tranquilizing actions are taken, structural reforms are attempted, etc., the basic threat factor is at work. All such measures are temporary and not radical. The only radical measure comes from the hidden historical process, which leads to inevitable disintegration.

Another significance of this observation consists in the circumstance that although perceptions have enormous role in this bi-polar game, this role is being played not by ideological but by threat perceptions. Ideology may only cover up those perceptions which have policy-making implications. This fact has two major consequences.

On the one hand, this is the paradox that despite its global dimensions, the bi-polar system precludes the possibility of an indefinitely open public debate with its own internal dynamic. The two poles constitute two totally different public spheres, which means that a major globalization dimension is prevented from unfolding. The paradox, more specifically, is that the global bi-polar system of the Cold War sets conditions for a limited and thus ideologically biased debate.

On the other hand, the decision-making process develops beyond, or independently of the public debate. All crucial problems in the field of foreign policy tend to receive clandestine solutions. Thus, instead of having national, international and global debate on major problems within an expanding public space, there is a tendency of unlimited strengthening of the power centers. This way of managing the threat factor directly from a unitary position of power is inevitable. Yet, it increases the dangers and risks insofar as it grants enormous might to the either of the poles. Thus the apparently well structured, simple and predictable bi-polar system turns out to involve an extreme voluntaristic moment. It is in this sense that the perception game, which is played by the leaders, becomes so important. It is also from this origin that
game theories and security dilemmas, as is the metaphor with the prisoners’ dilemma, become standards of rational thinking about international affairs.

(c) The strategy of the two enemies is determined by the simplicity of the structure and the immediacy of the threat which leads to inevitable and radical militarization of all security problems. The rest of the pool of resources the two sides have at their disposal, economic, intellectual, cultural, etc., have a secondary significance in the context of such a structure. In terms of deterrence, the basic means for providing security is in the hands of military strategists and military-intelligence services.

The threat from the enemy is avoided temporarily by showing him that his action would be responded by a more destructive counteraction. This strategy of preventing the enemy from taking actions, known widely as deterrence, becomes central in the Cold War era. According to B. Brodie, 1946, instead of winning wars, the military’s main purpose is to “avert them.” Or, to take a word from another high authority of the Cold War Western policy, John F. Dulles, the policy of nuclear deterrence as he defines it in 1954, should be carried out by means of a threat of massive retaliation. This threat has the effect of deterring the enemy from taking hostile actions.

In this shuttle of directed impressions another paradoxical development finds its condition. The mounting up of instruments for blocking the threat escalates indefinitely. The cause of this is the deterrence policy in its hard version as described above. The reason is highly doubtful despite the inevitability stemming from the cause. Finally, it is only the objective finitude of the historical period that imposes limits to the competition. Had the end of the Cold War been delayed by several years, the new-generation technology of this rivalry would have been installed
in the space. At least this was intended by Ronald Reagan who advanced the idea of a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

(d) Finally, **the relations between the two sides can well be described in a realist paradigm**. It is impossible to construct, for instance, an institutional regime picture of the bi-polar world. Taking specific decisions is based on the attempt of each party to penetrate the sphere of representations of the other. This state leads to transforming diplomacy into a game of mind-reading and, sometimes, an anticipation of the reaction of the other which is close to a game of hazard, as was the case with the Cuban missile crisis. Attempts at improving relations between the two poles – for instance, the policy of the superpower détente, and the “era of negotiations”, which President Nixon announced in his 1969 inaugural address – have a temporary impact and are limited in scope. Hence, the suggestion to distinguish first and second periods within the Cold War era.

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**Risky Factors and Situations**

After 89-91, dominant in the international affairs is not the concept of threat but the concept of risk. Here are some features of this change.

(a) **Risk does not imply a clearly defined enemy** “out there”: it is a threat without an enemy and without a unitary point of origin. One of the most significant consequences of the replacement of threat by risk is the dissolution of the subject of threat into a multitude of factors which increase or decrease the risk. Risk is not a characteristic of a given position, it is not a property-like attribute to be attached to the latter, but is rather a characteristic of a situation, context, environment.
To take an example, the worldwide drug traffic does not pose a direct destructive threat in political as well as military terms. Still, its rise over the last couple of decades constitutes an environment which is increasingly risky for governments and, much more, for society at large. In order to handle successfully this risk, state or inter-state institutions, which bear primary responsibility for its reduction, can hardly succeed by mounting up weapons, throwing their power shadow over prospective spheres of influence, or deterring the enemy. There is no unitary enemy to be deterred here. There is a network of international criminal activity which poses great risks. The way of dealing with it differs dramatically from the way of playing the international power game under the realist paradigm. In this particular case, it is necessary to have concorded efforts, reliable international institutions, flexible operative policies, intensive exchange between parties involved in fighting the traffic, etc. Which is to say, it is necessary to develop a decisive preventive policy with a global perspective embedded in it.

(b) This replacement of position (or subject) by situation (or context) makes it almost impossible to build a comprehensive structural picture of the field of international affairs. Attempts to concoct a structural model of this field would lead one nowhere (unless one calls upon the ghost of Yalta to assist). The factors which render a situation risky are subject to significant change in number and character. Hardly any observer assessed the notorious pyramids as a risky factor that could effectively lead to temporal disintegration of statehood of Albania.

(c) In the absence of a clear structural model of the field of international affairs the significance of the idea of spheres of
influence or domination weakens. The highly risky region of the countries of former Yugoslavia experienced influence from different, often mutually exclusive, directions. Sometimes this de-centering leads to paradoxes: for instance, as a member of the EU Germany should presumably follow the unitary policy of the Union (no matter that it is highly controversial to claim that such a policy was formulated at the time the crisis began). However, as an independent sovereign state, Germany preferred to recognize unconditionally two of the former Yugoslav states, which speeded up the crisis.

(d) As risk is not connected with a clear origin-carrier but with degrees of indeterminacy, with variations and play of factors, the means for decreasing risks could not be defined clearly and in any universal way. In particular, the growth of military potential loses the relevance it used to have in the bi-polar world. The mass-precision military machine of the Persian Gulf war would be inefficient facing the primitive Bosnian partisans, state-of-the-art equipped U.S. marines get frustrated in Somalia, for it turns out they can do no better than start acting as one clan among others.

(e) Due to the dispersal of risk into multitude of factors - an open multitude at that - the risk assessment of a situation is, in principle, a multi-disciplinary work. It requires expertise from spheres which in the simple bi-polar model remain unexplored - demographic, cultural, ethnic, social-psychological, etc. Thus a team consisting of one psychologist and one Wall Street financial speculator may become more competent on the sustainability of the Albanian state institutions than a whole faculty of sophisticated constitutional theorists.
(f) Whereas threat can be partially managed, or controlled, by policy of deterrence, for instance, a risky environment requires a much more flexible policy, which would account for the degrees of indeterminacy and of unexpected emergence or contingent play of factors. As a result, the role and significance of the policy of prevention is growing. So, today in Bosnia the international policeman protecting the social order replaces the figure of the military who carries out an attack on the enemy or is entrenched in defense.

(g) As a basis of the bi-polar structure the phenomenon of threat makes this structure possible and even requires long-run strategic planning with stable, unitary system of co-ordinates and reference points. On the contrary, objects of preventive policy for decreasing risk are not placed a stable system of measuring. They require much more an individualized approach. The origin of threat can even be pointed to by a hand, directing the index east or west. Risk assessment, for its part, is a result of balancing heterogeneous factors, chances and probabilities, which are a function of time; a major risk factor today gets an unlikely successor tomorrow.

One could go on to less conspicuous differences; but let us sum up the above given typological characteristics:

The technology for avoiding threat is connected with keeping the enemy at a distance, with a constant postponement of collision, with drawing boundaries and with their defense. It requires setting up organizations for “collective defense”.

The technology of avoiding risk implies involvement of the parties concerned, participation, crossing boundaries and more active presence in the risky situations. It requires developing systems of “collective security”.
NATO’s Fundamental Identity Dilemma

The fundamental dilemma is easy to utter and difficult to solve: Without the defining term “collective defense” NATO may lose the ground for its existence; and, either stop existing or transform itself into quite a new proposition. However, remaining within the restrictions of “collective defense” as a defining term, NATO would distance itself from the reality and become a self-sufficient bureaucratic body.

How does NATO attempt to resolve this dilemma?

On the one hand, the defining expression “collective defense” and Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, have not been changed. Both fundamental provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty originated from the US’s perception and experience of direct threat from the USSR after World War II. Still, it is not realistic to expect that such a change will be accepted in the near future.

On the other hand, in its real practice NATO develops more and more an attitude and a behavior of an organization for “collective security”. The idea of collective security does not imply direct threat of massive attack on the territory of the member states. It is much broader and relates to the notion of risk, risky factors, variety of risky regions and situations, etc., and with risk prevention, respectively.

Here is a series of differences characterizing the two strategic orientations, “collective defense” and “collective security” which, according to this interpretation, correspond to the notions of “direct threat” and “risk factors”.

(a) In principle, “collective defense” introduces difference and exclusion, particularly, between the two pole of the Cold War. In this way it defines the conditions for setting up its organizational structure.
“Collective security” has a universal dimension, at least potentially. It does not introduce difference and is inclusive. If, however, the central concept of an organization is universally inclusive, the reasons for the very existence of this structure become somewhat ambiguous: as a rule, questions on which there is universal agreement, full consensus, may make redundant the creation of special structures. Hence, despite the fact that the policy of enlargement has been widely accepted in the West, it provoked debate over whether NATO should continue to exist as a special organization.

(b) “Collective defense” implies separation and boundaries. In this way it provides a solution to the identity problem: the structure acquires its identity through its relation to the adversary’s force.

“Collective security” does not imply separation and boundaries. In this way it poses an identity problem: without initially given boundaries it is not clear how the structure would obtain reliable identity characteristics. This is the root of the intense discussions since 1989 about new strategic concepts and changes in the Alliance’s political profile.

(c) “Collective defense” provides conditions for designing a stable, even static structure, in which there is enough clarity concerning which parameters are constant. This feature gives the condition for solving the institutional problem.

“Collective security” makes it more difficult to set up a stable structure because the origin of insecurity is not constant but a variable. Hence, the difficulties in solving the institutional problem. So, it is not to be ruled out that NATO may start deliberations on changes in its institutional design.
(d) “Collective defense” introduces clear dimensions for the very feeling of insecurity. The states of insecurity are predictable as they are connected with a threat from a determinable origin.

“Collective security” does not introduce clear parameters for the feeling of insecurity. Feeling of insecurity cannot be reliably predicted and can originate from factors that have not been accounted for. It is very likely that NATO’s preventive policy will become increasingly broader including scenarios of seemingly more improbable developments.

(e) With “collective defense” it is much easier to determine the position authorized to decide which action, fact, or event - in a sector of the socio-political life, in the field of international affairs, in a certain geo-political zone - presents a threat. The decision-making process is centralized and becomes thus more efficient.

With “collective security” determining this position may become more difficult, exercising its functions may be undermined, or closer to parliamentary practices. Decision-making gets decentralized and more complicated. Therefore, the enlargement process may lead NATO to discussing possible changes in the decision-making mechanism.

Remark on a Negative Perception of Enlargement

In the light of the above given considerations, the territorial expansion of the Alliance is only one of the consequences of the changes in the environment described above. As this picture of the context does not imply building new boundaries and walls, the expansion will continue - by accepting new members, with initiatives as is the PfP, with out-of-area operations, conflict management, peace-keeping missions, co-
operation with other organizations, such as the WEU, the OSCE, etc. In particular, admission of new members is a logical and inevitable part of this process.

The idea of “collective security” seems to be welcomed by most countries of the former Soviet bloc. Yet, it is not universally accepted. Whether the movement from “collective defense” to “collective security” would be successful depends also on one major world factor, and that is no doubt Russia. Messages so far are ambiguous and occasionally contradictory. For instance, the Russian State Duma has set up an “Anti-NATO” committee chaired by the Duma’s Speaker. This committee refuses to accept that the enlargement of NATO could and should be seen from the perspective of a large, inclusive security policy in which Russia can become an active participant. It insists that the enlargement is a continuation of the same old expansionist policy of the West. In some of its memoranda that committee has explicitly stated that the enlargement process poses the most serious threat to Russia since 1945. This position indicates that there are influential circles in Russia that perceive the enlargement in terms of the bi-polar model of the Cold War and as a successful political and military, at any rate imperialist, move made by the United States.

This is a refusal to see the enlargement as rooted in the major change in the character of international affairs and in the replacement of the notion of “direct threat” by the concept of “risky situations”. In reality, it amounts to a refusal to get rid of the paradigm of “collective defense” and accept the paradigm of “collective security”. If important circles in Russia continue to contend that such a replacement is not invented for ideological purposes but characterizes the international environment, this may produce serious complications regarding the ongoing evolution of NATO. Or, as G. Kennan warned in the International Herald Tribune of February 6, 1997, the enlargement
would “restore the atmosphere of the Cold War”. In order to prevent the restoration of the “collective defense” paradigm, decisive measures should be taken to affect the Russian perception. It is crucial that Russia begins to perceive the process from the perspective of the global change and the need for a large scale policy of “collective security”.

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Summary Reflection on Conceptualizing Security

As developed above, the security problematic looks fundamentally divided: the two basic types of situations indicate two different worlds, as it were. In a sense, this is the task of any serious ideal type study as we know this technique ever since max Weber. As said already, however, in our analysis we differ from the paradigm of the classic political sociology. We develop the ideal types of security situations only as a second step in the course of this investigation. The third step, forbidden in classic methodology, consists in raising a simple and straightforward question. It may be framed as follows: Is this dichotomy of threat vs. risk a real and fundamental one? In other words: Is it not possible to find a way of representing one of the ideal types as more primary than the other? And, as a consequence of this, to reduce the dichotomy to the common ground, to a unitary origin wherefrom the two types, the two world if you wish, spring forth?

Let us propose a view concerning the common ground and origin of the two types of security situations, that of direct threat and the one whose central concept is the concept of risk factors.

The common ground and origin does not lie outside the two security paradigms. It is rather one of the two poles that has a more primordial existence and significance than the other. This is certainly the idea of risk and risk factors. The reduction as
a result of which the apparent dichotomy appears overcome produces the following definition: the threat of direct massive attack is a particular constellation of risk factors to the effect that they constitute a stable position aimed at destroying an enemy. The fact of the matter is that this constellation did not arise right after the World War II. It took a couple of years until it became clear that the world was heading toward such a state of affairs. Therefore, it would be wiser for policy analysts, historians and politicians alike to study carefully, and in more detail, how this specific synthesis of risk factors had led to the formation of such an peculiar system of world power distribution.

In view of this definition it becomes clear that the Cold War structural arrangement, the bi-polarity, is a particular combination of risk factors, or a specific, indeed quite unique in history, concatenation of risk factors. It is especially characteristic of the bi-polar system that it seemingly excludes all contextual parameters. It is somewhat non-historical in the sense that nowhere in this arrangement itself could one recognize signs of historical dynamic: if observed as it stands on its own, this structure, as if, lives outside historical time in the way objects of natural science do. This is one of the explanations why its destruction and total collapse came as a surprise. From its own structural characteristics one cannot infer, let alone exactly predict, the point of its historical exhaustion.

Once this positioning has acquired a stable form it becomes possible to speak about risks under the condition of enduring threat. Such are the risks of the domino effect worldwide, an acceleration of acute crisis, as with the 1962 one, the loss of a sphere of influence, as with the notorious cases around central Eastern Europe in 1953, 1956, 1968, the nuclear advantages of either side for some period of time, etc. These developments present risks but on the basis of a stabilized bi-polar system of
global opposition and potentially unlimited threat. The structure with the two poles however is already in place and the problem of risk is thus reduced to the possibility of some of the poles to activate its direct destructive potentials, or, which is the lesser evil, to act indirectly with the end of gaining advantages in the peripheral zones.

After having advanced this view let us make a remark concerning its significance as regards our core topic, the 21st century global security perspective and NATO’s central role in it.

The question concerning common origin of the two types has crucial consequences for any attempt at developing a global security agenda. Such attempt may only be made meaningfully under the condition that basic global dimensions are in place. Before and independently of such a presupposition it is simply unthinkable to have any kind of global vision. In this sense until we have two types, two pole, two visions, two fundamental positions, we also have two global agendas, two global projects for the future, two universal ideologies, etc. This amounts to having no true global perspective at all: a global vision can only be one, by definition at that.

Two competing global visions is a characteristic of the bi-polar world but they are only seemingly global. In fact, as well as conceptually, they are exclusive to each other and thus contain hidden limits. Hence, their universality is, as with most ideologies, an illusion shared by a limited communication community, to use K.-O. Apel’s expression. To take a point from this reference and develop it still further, the exclusive global agendas of the bi-polar system have specific moral implications. They are easily visible from the perspective of the foundational political philosophy of the late Modernity, namely, the discourse ethics. To put it briefly, the formation of two public spaces, two public worlds, each one excluding the other, implies a
strongly restrictive notion of the public space in general. This limitation and exclusion makes it impossible to rely on the kind of open public debate, as well as argumentative discourse, which constitute the basic moral condition of today’s political action. Such a moral condition cannot be upheld if the public realm is initially divided. This, of course, holds true for the moral conditions of a global politics, not of a regional or local political life.

From these reflections there follows a certain strategic paradigm for NATO’s role in the new security conditions. That one has to do more and more with risk management and less with threats, defense, containment, etc. This new strategic perspective will be briefly discussed in the final chapter of this essay.

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HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS: THE YUGOSLAV WARS

THE EARLY YUGOSLAV CRISIS: A NEW INSTITUTIONAL CHAOS

The tragic case with Yugoslavia’s disintegration and civil wars is a landmark even of the 1990s and, sadly enough, beyond this time limit. The Yugoslav series of crises has shown to the international public a number of essential characteristics of the post-Cold War security environment that will constitute a whole new space of debates for years, may be decades to come.

On the face of it, the Yugoslav crisis does not appear as an epochal event, a were the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, the 1989 revolutions, etc. The whole of the Balkans, one might argue, could be defined by Western strategist as a region that would better be contained rather than integrated; and that that could reduce the threat for Western Europe without much ado. We leave this perspicuously wrong proposition aside and take a different direction for discussing the Yugo-crisis. We take the Yugoslav case as a test, a laboratory, however small it may look to a more conservative type of, say, U.S. national interest strategist. What happened in Yugoslavia, and this is our rationale for focussing on Yugoslavia, showed major deficiencies in the entire institutional system of the post-World War II era, the dangerous inefficiency of the same system when facing untraditional challenges, the lack of preparedness and flexibility to respond to them, it inability or, to say the least, resistance and difficulties to adjust to the post-Cold War context, etc.

In what follows we are proposing a critical overview of these aspects, mainly two of them, the institutional capacities of the West to handle crises like the Yugoslav one, as well the challenge of Kosovo, which was a crucial test for NATO. From these observations we attempt to draw inference with regard to the new mission of NATO in the next century.
Let us begin with a critical comment of the way in which international organizations acted on the occasion of the crisis in Yugoslavia.

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(a) Confusion Regarding Fundamentals

Even though the breakup of Yugoslavia has been easy to predict, there was little or not at all preventive diplomacy. This was *post factum* explained with caution toward avoiding this becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. For this reason at the beginning European leaders championed the idea of keeping Yugoslavia together. Indeed Slovenia’s and Croatia’s will for secession confronted the international community with the need to address and reconsider founding international law principles - the principle of sovereignty and the right of self-determination.

From the outset the conflicting parties, Milosevic’s Yugoslavia and the federal republics seeking secession, played territorial integrity against the right of self-determination. The republics insisted upon their right to self-determination as territorial entities. However, Serbs on the one hand and Slovenians and Croats on the other understood differently these concepts. According to the Serbs the rights of self-determination belonged to peoples and not to geographic entities; they conceived the collective right to secession to be well above the principle of sanctity of borders. This provided the rationale for the ensuing ethnic cleansing and the conceptual framework for the Greater Serbia Utopia.

The EC/EU responded to this challenge in a tremendously ambiguous way. From the very beginning EC/EU members’ divergences were highlighted by their splitting over the issue of recognition. Germany and Italy favored prompt recognition in the spirit of people’s right for self-determination. The Dutch, the French and the British opposed such a move as threatening the
region’s stability and wanted to preserve the federal structure of Yugoslavia. From the outset Germany took the most anti-Serbian stance. Domestic politics played an important role given the fact that most of the Yugoslav workers in Germany were Croats and the Croatian lobby was influential enough. But the strong German stand was counterproductive in two ways: first, it increased the Serbs’ paranoia over Germany’s sympathy for the Croat “fascists” and, second, its desire for hegemony on the Balkans produced tensions within the EC between France and Britain and Germany.

However, under Germany’s pressure came the EC prompt recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 and the European-American agreement in 1992 that Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina should all be recognized. Some analysts still argue that the German conduct during the crises was highly irresponsible. Germany constantly pressed standing up to the Serbs, though given its constitutional restraints the responsibilities of doing so would fall to others. Even when European states agreed upon granting recognition to Slovenia and Croatia they did not pursue a consistent policy. At the beginning the Europeans insisted that a constitutional commitment to the treatment of Serb minority should be endorsed before granting recognition. Notwithstanding that, as the special committee assigned to collect evidence and write an evaluation of this problem made it crystal clear, in the case of Croatia this condition was not been met, recognition was granted. In this particular and telling case Germany literally blackmailed the EC. It just threatened other EC members that should they decide to postpone recognition for whatever reason, Germany would go ahead herself with a bi-lateral recognition of the seceding republics. This pressure was real and carried much gravity because at that time the EC was preparing itself for entering a new stage of integration. It would have certainly been seriously undermined had Germany proceeded with her own foreign policy decision as to
matters of such importance. So, EC members had no choice but to accept Germany’s position as an EC one. For the sake of face saving the EC established a toothless committee to assess the human rights conditions in these countries: Macedonia was ranked rather highly but got no attention, let alone recognition, Croatia’s record was unacceptable yet Croatia was to receive fast recognition. This was one of the most clear demonstrations of institutional confusion, weakness and helplessness as regards the EC. The entire impressive institutional network of the EC was totally incapable to prevent geo-political, voluntarism, highly biased, nationalist agendas to come to the fore and play a role similar to the one they played at the Berlin Congress more than a century ago.

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(b) European Institutions: Taken by Surprise

The European Union was ill equipped institutionally to deal with such a challenge as the Yugoslav crisis. First and foremost, foreign policy cooperation and coordination was not yet a Community function carried out under the treaty of Rome and the Single European Act. Except for external trade policy the supranational Commission is not the legislative body of the EC (the Council of Ministers fulfill this function) but is rather both initiator and enforcer of policy. Thus, it could not speak on behalf of all its members. Foreign policy is entirely an ad hoc intergovernmental exercise done by and among the foreign ministers of the member states. Called “European Political Cooperation” it started in the 70s rarely going beyond joint declarations of approval and disapproval. Even after the Maastricht Treaty went into effect the EC was handicapped by the rule of unanimity.

In theory the extension of new Union’s functions to diplomacy and security makes it possible for the Commission to
act in these areas. Yet, it can act only insofar as they are linked to the areas in which the Commission represents the EC/EU abroad, namely, foreign trade. But at this earlier stage many governments, including Britain’s and France’s, were (and still are) unwilling to let the Commission exploit this narrow opening. The Commission was thus not yet equipped to do so. It played an important role in shaping the common economic policies of the EC but this was due to its having strong expertise in the field. This expertise is lacking in domains such as security and diplomacy.

Developing a common foreign and security policy depends to a large extent on the transformation of the main European institutions on a more federal fashion. Still, this is a very thorny issue. For, the individual states regard such transformations as interfering with their sovereignty and independence. Also, during the first half of 1991 EC members were focused on the Maastricht Treaty negotiations that dealt with such vital issues as the planned monetary union and the reshaping the EU institutions. Being so much focused on these vital yet somewhat internal issues, they and apparently underestimated the potential magnitude of the upcoming crisis.

When in early 1990 the United States suggested that NATO discuss the problem France rejected the idea for two reasons, basically: first, because of sheer negligence, which was anyway at work all around the Union states, and, second, because of its opposition to NATO’s continuing dominance in post Cold War European security design. Conversely, the French reluctance to use NATO from the outset was linked to the EU presumed ambition to forge the new European defense identity. Thus the Yugoslav crisis led France, and other states as well, to view the case as a testing ground for the viability of the EU’s own security institutions namely the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Western European Union. Let us reflect on these
alternatives for a moment and see how the own institutional test failed:

The one asset of the WEU was that unlike NATO it was not bound to reject out-of-area operations. Yet, here again, a European security and defense organization, the WEU, appeared to have a basic deficiency built into it. Its actions, too, were handicapped first and foremost by the principle of unanimity which, as we have seen, was not present among its members. They mainly split over the issue of using forces of interposition. On the other hand, the WEU lacked logistical autonomy, an integrated command and control, and readily available forces besides the Franco-German corps. This, however, was not usable because of Germany’s constitutional restriction on military actions abroad, which was abolished later.

As for the CSCE, after the 1990 Paris conference it was still in the process of establishing its new institutions. For this reason mainly no one tried to activate its new conflict prevention machinery until after the Slovenian and Croats declaration of independence. The Yugoslav crisis confirmed once again that an organization can be either effective diplomatic agent or a force for collective security but not both of them. It was, too, handicapped by the principle of unanimity, which made move against Yugoslavia impossible. When, at last, it adopted the “consensus-minus-one” notion the process of decision-making was not speeded up either: in an organization with more than 50 members, many of whom faced, or could have faced in the future, ethnic tensions as in Yugoslavia this did not work; they were not eager to take easy decisions setting probably harmful for them precedents in the future.

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(c) UN and the Others

The failure of regional organizations to make a difference corroborated the belief that regional organizations were better positioned to confront such a challenge. Presumably, they had their vested interests and their superior, compared with international organizations, local knowledge. However, as we have seen in the Yugoslavia case, local proximity was more an impediment than an asset. For regional actors got split in their perceptions and conflicting national interests. Still, what turned out to be a real problem was rather the insufficient coordination between regional and global agencies.

Thus, during the Croatian crisis Milosevic successfully played the United Nations against the EU hoping to benefit from the sympathy of the Soviet Union to overturn German and Italian hostilities. For France and Britain UN’s involvement was considered a necessity given the absence of common foreign policy and defense system. Also, UN was considered useful in the aim of preserving EC’s cohesion despite disagreement among its members as to moving all the coercive aspects of the campaign under UN authority. However, the experiences of both the UN and the European institutions shows that a concert between key players, operating as a leaders in the Security Council, as was the case with the Gulf War, renders collective actions successful. Where such an agreement is lacking collective action fails thus demonstrating that strong leadership is a prerequisite for successful the collective action and not an alternative to it.

From the beginning of Yugoslavia’s wars the international community repeatedly weighted the costs and benefits of deploying military force. Even when the international community switched to Chapter VII of the UN’s Charter, which mandates the use of force, it did so without the will to commit the necessary military means. Its opposition to use military force had disastrous consequences as we all know today. Instead of stopping the
civilians’ suffering its appeasement allowed grave suffering to continue. It seriously undermined the credibility of the UN in general and of its peacekeeping operation in particular. UN forces became trapped somewhere in the middle ground between peacekeeping and coercion. They also suffered a tremendous humiliation in the hands of the Serbs.

It is quite ironic, though, that UN humanitarian efforts became a substitute for an overall strategy to bring the war in Yugoslavia to an end. The price of this in economic terms as well was high enough and higher than planned. The UN committed substantive forces, approximately 50,000 troops plus 3,000 civilian personnel at an annual cost of some $ 2 billion. This made UN intervention to be dubbed the most expensive failure in the history of the organization. By giving them a very narrow mandate UN personnel acted as if their essential task was the delivery of relief goods. They downplayed such undertakings as protecting fundamental rights, gathering information about war crimes and investigating alleged abuses.

During the months that followed the ill-fated London conference in 1992 the Serbs ignored every accord and commitment made by their officials there. This did not trigger any response from the West or the Security Council. The lack of retaliation clearly showed that the Western community of states was lacking an efficient instrument for coercion and was thus institutionally unprepared to take actions, to intervene and make the Serbs abide by their promise. Moreover, some analysts are argue that Westerners repeatedly voiced concern over the safety of UNPROFOR contingent which had an inverse effect. It invited the Serbs to deliberately threaten UN personnel as a means to derail Western attempt to interfere with the ethnic cleansing of the Bosnian Muslims.

Arguably, had the Western democracies shown that harming UN personnel would be adequately punished, the Serbs would have been
consequently deterred. It is not until Serbs overrode the safe areas of Srebrenitza and Zepa, firing a Mortar shell in the main Sarajevo market and executing thousands of Muslim that a consensus finally was reached and NATO bombing campaign followed.

The Europeans were also against lifting the arms embargo, which finally appeared favorable to the Serbs. Even though the Americans favored this option, the fact that at the time they did not participate in UNPROFOR forces made them bowing to European pressure. Therefore after the London conference the Serbs rightfully got the message that the West had no intention to intervene in the conflict, is not going to allow the Bosnian to arm themselves and not going to use all necessary forces to deliver humanitarian assistance. As a result the Serbs abrogated UN directives, taking UN soldiers as hostages and even humiliating them as human shells. From 1992 until 1994 and throughout Bosnia in 1995 the Serbs deliberately pursued their policy of ethnic cleansing and despite the widespread public outrage the international institutions were unable to develop an adequate mechanism to counter and deter their aggression.

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(d) Diagnosis: Institutional Paralysis

Let us summarize the above given observations on the institutional reactions and strategy, or absence of strategy, of the major international institutions, regional, as are the EU, the CSCE/OCSE, the WEU, as well as global, as is the UN and its Security Council.

Almost ten years of warfare that has ravaged former Yugoslavia demonstrated the limitations the European institutions as the have been structured and existed for decades. The first important condition to be jeopardized was the very credibility of the nascent European defense identity. Since the beginning, the European leaders dubbed the Yugoslav crisis as the “hour of
Europe” meaning an opportunity to act as a key player in European and international affairs for the first time after the end of the Cold War. Instead, the disaster that followed was a clear case demonstrating that national interests are hard to overcome. In no instance European players acted as a “community of nations” but in the old-fashioned way, going back to the Concert of Europe, like nation states pursuing divergent and sometimes conflicting agendas. The lack of coordinated political will was translated into succeeding failures of European institutions to address adequately the crisis.

The crisis in former Yugoslavia clearly elucidates two points in the theory and practice of international relations: First, in the absence of strong leadership multilateral actions are bound to fail and effective multilateralism became a mere conceptual theoretical concept;

Second, the reluctance to use military force not only undermines the credibility of deterrence but also reduce the room for diplomatic maneuvering.

More precisely, the incredible prolongation of the Yugoslav crisis could be blamed upon two factors:

One is the inability of the European Community/Union actors to transcend their national interests and to formulate a coherent common policy. By the end of 1991 particular European nations succumbed to the temptation to let their old nationalist policy agendas surface, divide them and influence their individual behavior. This was being reinforced by the inefficiency of European security institutions such as the OSCE and the WEU. Another is that by sticking to only providing humanitarian relief the Europeans sent a clear message that they did not intend to commit strong military forces. Consequently, their deterrence strategy was not credible and, as we all know, constantly ignored by the Serbs. They opted for limited actions directed toward
bringing humanitarian relief to the victims and not toward defeating the aggressors.

The absence of strategic choices, the chaotic behavior, the inability to act decisively, etc., all these tragic factors that constituted the specific Yugo-profile of the so-called international community are telling. They demonstrate an institutional paralysis of great scale and depth. They also prove, however, one point of most crucial significance for the global, not only regional, security environment:

Institutional regimes, even if reasonably arranged, possess the capacity to meet challenges in accordance with their initial design primarily. Institutional networks, of whatever complex structure, degree of internal differentiation and historical duration, act on the basis of their innate institutional inertia. What they lack is not just flexibility and sense of adaptation to new circumstances. The Yugoslav case shows that it is much more than that and much more essential. It is the combination between the "just cause" and the ability to act that has been missing. Further, it is this combination that made NATO the primary player in the decisive attempt at resolving the Kosovo crisis.

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KOSOVO: A NEW KIND OF WAR

To be sure, Kosovo of 1990 presented a culmination of the Yugoslav crises of the last decade. Yet, Kosovo is much more than that. As was shown above, all the large international institutions failed to solve the crises in Yugoslavia at their earlier stages. With Kosovo, this incapacity as well reached a peak. It became unbearable yet there was no security institution available that could advance some plausible alternative to the past failures. The alternative to previous appeasement came this time from the only organization that could provide any such worldwide, namely, from NATO.
We shall draw some conclusions from this development afterwards, in our concluding chapter. Now, we are going to discuss another aspect of the Kosovo case, namely, the character of this conflict, that is, the whole new set of challenges that it presented to the international community, to international law, to international organizations, etc.

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(a) A New Concept of Security Implied

All that has been already said in the previous chapter about the paradigm change concerning conceptual aspects of security applies to the Kosovo war. Kosovo is first and foremost interesting as a security policy case as regards the basic, deep, structures involved in constituting it. There was no threat available in the first place. This was an internal conflict which has been growing for years until its final explosion in 1998-1999. Since there was no threat to any outside position, state, constellation of powers, it would be easy for the conflict to be contained and fully encapsulated in its own boundaries, geographical, social, political and military. This type of reaction would have been in line with the long tradition of several decades of Cold War. It had been practiced numerous times and could have been applied to Kosovo as well.

Further, the debate surrounding this special case did not focus too much on fundamentals. There was no time for this. Action was needed and all parties involved in debating publicly the fourth Yugoslav war coming up focused immediately on this vital aspect, act or abstain. The debate in the U.S. in particular revolved around, understandably and in accordance with the established standards, the basic U.S. concept used when security issues are subject to open discussion: national interest. In this respect, too, the idea national interest as applied by opponents reflected paradigms of thinking about
security which were valid for decades. Nothing specifically new emerged in terms of “national interest.”

These two conditions, absence of external threat and reflections on the national interest showing there was none in the conflict, could have constituted quite a different story only a decade ago; not to speak about all the years of Cold War in its apex. Instead, the international community, meaning those states supporting NATO intervention and a pro-active policy, took a decisive action, first in the history of the Alliance. This involvement had many circumstantial explanations at the time it was undertaken: Secretary Albright, it was claimed, persuaded the “small circle” of the Oval Office that Milosevic would give up the first day after NATO’s forces enter Yugoslav territory; this proved to be wrong. Another story goes like this: The U.S. threatened Milosevic in an escalating manner so that when he launched his deadly campaign, they discover, much to their own surprise, they could not avoid acting as they claimed they would; so the U.S. got trapped in their own hasty words.

Other descriptions of a similar kind can also be quoted as there were plenty of them. All of them miss the point. The question here is neither one of the “small circle”’s personal inclinations nor of words going ahead of actions and producing them in an undesirable way. This whole style of explaining the intervention holds true as much as the apple’s falling on Newton’s head does for explaining the nature of gravitation. Whatever circumstantial evidence available, the problem of the essence of this action remains open.

This decisive question has to do with one rather simple thing. It is that no matter what was explicitly said or claimed, the action itself is unique in the recent history and implies a new understanding of security matters. Whether this was explained at the time or later or is expected to be elucidated in the future, that is a different question. The response the Kosovo
conflict received by the very practice, by the deeds of the Alliance’s members, by the actual involvement, that is where all the study of the security aspect should begin from. The action, for its part, implies a whole new understanding of security. This understanding is fully in accordance with the ideas we proposed above, namely, while distinguishing the two paradigms and draw the difference between threat and risk factors. There was no threat in Kosovo to any NATO member; there was rather a multiplicity of risk factors for the security environment in South Eastern Europe. There was no immediate danger for any of them; there was rather the perception of risk, namely, the prospects of having this region sink down into continuing chaos was seen as a risk for the security balance in Europe. There was no military danger to outsiders; there was rather a very broad horizon of articulating long-terms risks for the entire Euro-space. To mention one more observation, there was no immediate and vital security interests involved, which would necessitate defense activities; there was rather the recognition that decisive preventive policy was needed in order to prevent further degradation of one of the corners of the European security environment.

Thus, to sum it up, the entire concept of security implicitly present in the very action of intervening in Kosovo was different from the Cold War one. As far as NATO itself is concerned, the security idea implied was surely crucially different from the one present in the Washington treaty of 1949, though, these untraditional aspects were already defined in the Strategic Concept of 1991.

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(b) Human Rights vs. State Sovereignty

A remarkable feature of the Kosovo war is the undisputed fact that it was a war about human rights. Even more, that one of
the sacred postulates of the post-World War II dogmas, the sovereignty of the individual states, was sacrificed for the sake of protecting the rights of a particular ethnic community.

Here, as with the previous observation, one may contest the statement referring to circumstantial evidence of various kinds. This, too, would be missing the point. Our reconstruction of the character of this war does not concentrate on the facts as they appeared to us in this period; nor to statement of politicians, media, or participants on the ground. It is based on a different premise, namely, that the action itself carried this implication and no further evidence is needed to prove it. In short, this is not a statement of fact but one of implicit conditions, concepts, attitudes, etc.

This proposition has been contested, time and again, by reference to the discrepancy between what was, presumably, intended and what was not but still actually occurred. There is the famous claim of most critics of the war that instead of preventing Milosevic’s driving a whole ethnic community out of their land it did exactly the opposite. The intervention opened new possibilities to the prospective war criminal. It is true that Milosevic turned up the heat of his campaign and continued sending troops and supporting the paramilitary in Kosovo. Yet, this does not change our positions and is even irrelevant to what we claim to be a fundamental characteristic of the war. We may even give cautious credit to such a grave criticism of the war as was Michael Mandelbaum’s, one of the major opponents of enlargement, that the war was failure as far as its planned short-time goals are concerned. It speeded up the ethnic cleansing, untied Milosevic’s hands, made the paramilitaries go crazy brutal, etc. This may be the case, indeed, although the bottom line of what actually happened is that almost all refugees returned home as quickly as none of the other communities forced
out of their place, Bosnia being the primary example. This aspect, however, is not of interest to us here.

What is of true interest is that in the very motivation of the western democracies there was implied a strong, indeed without precedent in recent history, moral component. There was no petrol or gas, there was no raw material of any kind to constitute sufficient reason for action. The war had a moral ground and, at the same time, place NATO’s credibility on a decisive test. This combination was really unique: the defense Alliance felt, or that is the implicit truth, that if it had closed its eyes for the grave atrocities in Kosovo, its own international, broadly public, credibility would have suffered a major blow, to some proponents of intervention a deadly one. Thus what we have here is a deep change of what may constitute a sufficient reason for action of the Atlantic Alliance. It is not necessarily defense of one of the members, but human rights violations, in a non-member state at that. This is truly unprecedented and may have enormous consequences for the entire international order for decades to come.

One of the most fundamental consequences of this newly discovered reason for out-of-area operation is the fact that it produced a real clash between the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration for Human Rights. This problem itself will have tremendous repercussions on the entire international order and, especially, on what events, developments and campaigns on the international arena can claim legitimacy. The very idea of legitimate actions was dramatically shaken by NATO’s intervention. According to the UN Charter the only sanctity, hence source of legitimacy, is the sovereignty of the state. According the Universal declaration there is one supreme value and that is unquestionably the individual human being. For several decades they had lived peacefully together, so to say. Now, the intervention in Kosovo burred the former in the name of
the latter. It showed that there was something that stands above the sovereignty of the state, the rights of the humans, and that the restrictions implied by the state sovereignty may not apply if human rights are violated.

This clash of paradigms occurs for the first time, its initiators are the Western democracies, its implementing agents is NATO. Now, from this event a painful state of schizophrenia might well follow. For what we have as an ultimate ground of international law has suddenly become an uncertain and even questionable presumption. The intervention is in this sense a groundbreaking action whereby morality and human rights take precedence over state formations. The debate in the future will be revolving around this problem and will attempt to either reconcile the two opposite poles or find a new basis for this section of international law or take a whole new direction of development.

Our view, the justification of which goes beyond the proper topic of this paper, is that this is not a clash of two incommensurable paradigms. They may have been perceived in this way once a specific event turns them against each other. The deeper question however remains and will remain open for quite a while. It is not about sovereignty vs. human rights and about which one is more fundamental. It is rather about who the true carrier of sovereignty is, the state or the individual human being. The intervention of NATO in Kosovo answered this question in favor of the human being thus introducing a new moral dimension in areas which have traditionally been seen as political and morally irrelevant.

(c) Adopting a Comprehensive Approach

The experience of the ten years of Yugoslav wars has made it clear that case-by-case solutions in the Balkans only reproduce
the balkanization, that is, fragmentation that is anyway there on the ground. NATO’s intervention differs significantly in this respect from most of the attempts by regional international organizations, individual Western states, and the United Nations to provide efficient formula for resolving the conflicts. These attempts were summarized in the first chapter of this essay where we showed how appeasement and inefficiency, institutional inertial and surfacing nationalist projects contribute to sustaining the crisis production in the region. That was the case with the 1991 war in Croatia, later on in Bosnia, still later the Dayton agreement, as well as with particular actions as were the economic sanctions, today questioned by many, or the acceptance of Milosevic on the basis of the belief that he pulls the strings anyhow. All these actions present not an approach but rather disconnected individual projects, which later turn out to be counterproductive in the long run.

In this respect the Kosovo war presents a different campaign. We are, to be sure, far from the intention to claim it aimed at inventing a formula for the region; that would be a kind of magic and would go contrary to common sense. However, we register a number of signals that NATO’s intervention was based on a different view.

In the first place, the approach to Kosovo was comprehensive and not limited to a specific and narrow end; even if it had not been such by initial design it inevitably became such and very quickly at that. The intervention aimed at solving a whole array of problems ranging from preventing ethnic cleansing to pressing Milosevic to withdraw his 40,000 troops from the province to making him accept the Rambouillet accords to bringing war criminals to justice at the Hague Tribunal for the Crimes in former Yugoslavia. Thus, the Kosovo campaign pursued a whole package of goals and, correspondingly, was to unfold a spectrum of functions toward their achievement.
In the second place, the comprehensive approach applied had to do with the relations of all the countries involved, be they NATO members, neighboring states, other Eastern European states, and, of course, account was taken of Russia’s ambiguous but generally critical position. The endeavor to unite all presumably democratic countries of the Euro-Atlantic community as well as eastern Europe and Turkey and even beyond is a remarkable feature of this campaign. It certainly has moral overtone, it does contain an explicit appeal to the international public, it attempted to gain legitimacy through such channels. This ad hoc promotion of the campaign, and especially the dramatic search for legitimacy, was not present in previous involvements in the region. NATO’s campaign in Kosovo was based on a wide and open, in principle universal, inclusion. NATO countries did not have time for that and yet they tried their best to gain as wide an approval as possible. Here we see another interesting aspect of this: consensus building of this type is assumed to be characteristic for the UN and, in such special cases, for the Security Council. The action was not and could not be approved by the latter and NATO’s coalition ignored this highest international decision-making body. Yet it attempted to replace it by building consensus among those most directly related with the Balkan crisis (China is not among them and would not approve any action of the kind, Russia too, both for well known reasons). Thus an ad hoc broad and inclusive community of participants and supporters got formed, which is another aspect of the integral approach adopted.

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(d) A Province within the Euro-Atlantic Space

Much has been said about other cases of grave atrocities where Western powers have not intervened or have acted not as decisively as in Kosovo: Rwanda, a genocide case, Haiti, Somalia,
etc. And the question has been asked about what moral grounds this distinction has, the implicit assumption being that it has none. Here again we have to stress the argument is missing the point and is ill framed.

First of all, this challenge may be met by a reverse question such as: provided that NATO does not possess capabilities to act as a global policemen, does that mean it should not act anywhere, at least not until it has built up capabilities to act everywhere? This assumption of acting everywhere or nowhere is implied in the question of morality and demonstrates that it is absurd.

Our view concerning this peculiar matter is not based on refusal to accept this distinction; on the contrary, we do accept it and insist it is at work inevitably and for good reason: an attempt to take actions wherever and whenever crises break out is useless, impossible, and utopian. Somalia showed clearly the limits of such actions where the entire campaign may turn out to be in limbo because there are no clear goals, strategic parameters, etc. So, this limitation should be recognized in the first place on the level involving not values but resources. That however is only the negative side of it.

The truly moral response to the demand for universal action vs. complete abstention would be to recognize that the Western community experienced the Kosovo crisis as its own, occurring in its own space, developing within its own boundaries, political in the first place, but also societal in general. This is not necessarily a statement to be interpreted as expressing a geopolitical vision. We are not claiming that the Balkans were important just because of their geographical belonging to Eastern Europe. Although a good argument to this effect may well be made be, the point we are stressing here is rather different: that the Western democracies experienced the Kosovo culmination of the Balkan crisis as its own, occurring within their community,
implies that the dynamic and expanding European space had already included this region. This point may wrongly be interpreted as a resurgence of the Berlin Congress type of geo-political calculations and projects; but it is not.

The idea we are propounding is that (a) the Euro-Atlantic societal space is internally, inherently dynamic, (b) an important aspect of the dynamics is the expansion of the space, (c) the expansion has an inclusionary character founded on democratic values. This definition of spatial dynamics, expansion and inclusion is essentially different from the one we see in the old geo-political projects, in the Berlin Congress, as well as in later versions of geo-political thinking. It is also very different from the imperial type of expansion, which is not democratic and has its origin in a unitary center of power, that of the imperial center (we shall analyze this case in the chapter on Russia).

Thus, what we can infer from this observation and the character of the Euro-Atlantic expansion is that the Kosovo intervention carried an important historical implication: the Euro-Atlantic community implicitly recognized the Balkans as belonging to it, that is, as being included as a member in this community regardless legal membership in any organization, especially NATO. This implicit recognition has also plenty of consequences, some of them unexpected and far reaching. Let us only mention one of them, which has to do with the idea of the so-called out-of-area operations: If the Balkan crisis was perceived as a crisis on the periphery yet within the Euro-Atlantic space, then the idea of out-of-area operations changes considerably its meaning. Formally, it means all operations beyond territories of member states. However, in practice, as well as in terms of the strategic scheme and vision now in force, the expression has a broader semantic field.
The important thing here is not so much the Balkans, of course. It is rather the global perspective implied in this extended understanding. The Balkan crisis, especially the Kosovo case, is an indication that the expansion of the community of democratic states leads to the emergence of a new perception of belonging, inclusion and, correspondingly, of responsibility. It may be thus argued that the expansion of the Euro-Atlantic space leads to a de facto enlargement of the community of democracies which share common values and have similar attitude with regard to most fundamental questions of the life on the international arena. This circumstance, for its part, may well lead to reconsidering the entire out-of-area concept: It may well become redundant in cases like Kosovo if actions are based on assessment of this type of inclusion. Whether this global perspective will come into life and practice soon is a question we abstain from speculating on. The important thing is that in an implicit and somewhat unreflected way it was present in the Kosovo intervention and there is no reason to assume Kosovo would remain, as some try to argue, an exception.

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Summary Reflection on the Yugoslav Crisis

There are a number of other features that make the Kosovo war unique in recent history. They are worth analyzing, elsewhere though.

Our fundamental thesis as regards Kosovo is that the tiny little province of Yugoslavia served somewhat unexpectedly as a laboratory of a whole new understanding of security policy at the very end of the 20th century. What happened in Kosovo is thus a very strong indication of how the international, from a certain perspective the global, security environment is getting structured after the Cold War; what developments can be considered typical and may be expected to recur; what missions
NATO most probably will have to perform in the future; what new morality as foundation of politics should be reflected upon, made explicit and accounted for; what the proper meaning of the out-of-area operations is and what it is not; how the idea of national interests within the Euro-Atlantic community has acquired an essential international communal dimension; how the capacity to enforce justice on the international stage goes over and above the traditional concept of sovereignty; what new legitimacy military-political actions may hope to achieve and where its source is, and so on and so forth.

These, and many other implications of the “Connecticut-size” Yugoslav province have a truly global significance. For, the meaning of the Kosovo war does not have its roots in territorial size. Kosovo is a landmark event of the very end of the 20th century because of all the visible as well as hidden dimensions concerning how we understand security matters today, and for years and decades to come. It is in this respect that Kosovo is and should be carefully studied by strategists of NATO. For, Kosovo is the very practice of the new conceptual paradigm of security we distinguished in the previous chapter.

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GEOPOLITICAL DIMENSIONS: RUSSIA’s NEW GEOPOLITICS

We in Central Europe
live under the eyes
of the Russians.
Carl Scmitt, 1929.

Russia: Indeterminacy of Analysis

Let us take a point from this dictum of Carl Schmitt’s: As of today, not only Central Europe does live under the eyes of the Russians. It is much more than that and much more dramatic: Russia itself lives today under its own eyes. The eyes of Russia do not know where to look at. They are painfully turned backwards, toward the heart of the Russia’s political personality. These eyes stare at themselves and seem to find no answers to the fundamental question: What do we see where we look at? To what kind of epochal position do we belong? Who are we that look at our own fundamentals and feel painfully the uncertainty of our own foundation?

These somewhat metaphysical questions belong to the language of metaphors great thinkers like Carl Schmitt allow themselves to use. We are not going to advance further speculations at this metaphoric level. Rather, we shall concentrate on questions of security policy which, though basic in international affairs, have a more pragmatic orientation. The ultimate horizon of our thinking, however, remains similar to the one implied in Carl Schmitt’s words, as simple as they are alarming.

The end of the Cold War marked a resurgence of an old geopolitical factor of world significance, namely, Russia. All around the continent two eras of European history seem to be over, irreversibly at that: these are the era of the multinational empires and the era of the initial formation of
nation-states. Nationalism springs forth at various places and, as with former Yugoslavia, may contaminate whole regions. But the rise of the nation state is not a historical process that may yet to develop. This observation is even more valid as imperialist policy is concerned, both on the continent and in the form of expansion outside its boundaries. Russia is the prominent exception in this regard. Its behavior on the international scene cannot be truly imperialist as it has not the resources needed to support it, nor does it have space for exercising real imperial and expansionist activities and spread its central power over territories surrounding her. This double restriction, the stability of the current boundaries and the lack of resources are basic conditions. One could add to them a couple of other factors, such as the collapse of the Soviet empire, which has demonstrated that an imperial utopia and the totally discredited policy of export of revolutions, presenting partly a Soviet version of practicing a pro-active containment policy. Despite these reasons and easily identifiable factors showing that an old-new imperial policy is simply inconceivable, Russia still acts as if it is a superpower, has relevant claims, may be imagined responsibilities, too.

Today’s Russia acts in a geo-political way for many reasons which ultimately belong to its internal character of an unreformed old imperial power; apparently the collapse of the Soviet empire does not naturally lead to a quick transformation of Russia’s own imperial worldview. These reasons and causes, however, are not subject of this study. We only have interest in the re-emergence of an international player that acts on the older, 18th and 19th century geopolitical pattern. This attitude entails strong emphasis, indeed often overstatements concerning the role of the political geography, horizontal territorial vision of political affairs and security, the entire realist paradigm of international politics, the balance of powers in
particular, defensive rather than preventive security agendas, isolationist rather than communal orientation, a view of the world affairs based on power bargaining, strong sense of sovereignty dominating over international law commitments, involvement in international institutional networks on the basis of a recognized own strength and ranks of power, etc.

These and other features of Russia’s foreign policy constitute the condition of the new geopolitics that came out after the end of the Cold War. One may claim that geopolitics is in principle an old idea which is impracticable at the beginning of the 21st century. Granting credit to such a claim in more general terms, we still have much reason to think that Russia’s residual imperial attitude goes hand in hand with, or results in practice in adopting a geopolitical framework for articulating, understanding and acting on the international scene. The same factors constitute Russia’s understanding of NATO’s enlargement for most of the past decade.

As emphasized throughout this essay, as regards the variety of the out-of-area activities, that is, in its real practice NATO develops a profile of an organization for “collective security.” In its real practice, NATO leaves aside, as it were, its fundamental definition from the North Atlantic Treaty’s preamble of an organization for “collective defense”. Despite the fact that this change occupies a time span of about ten years, is accompanied by a sometimes tense debate about the strategic rationale of this functional expansion and diversification, receives enormous public and media coverage, Russia remains utterly suspicious, indeed sometimes paranoid, regarding this change.

In the first place, Russia’s official position toward NATO’s enlargement is generally negative. In the second place, Russia does not actively oppose the enlargement process and restricts itself to notes and announcements; it seemed to have swallowed
easily the eastward enlargement with three new members, which is already a fact. Further, however, as the Kosovo war and the case with the Pristina airport demonstrated, Russia has the inclination, as old as it is surprising sometimes, to take sporadic actions as if to show off some superpower ambitions. The fact of today’s however remains undoubtful: Russia has experienced a devolution from a state of world power to a state of tremendous confusion. This circumstance may seem strange for a state which could exercise such an influence on the global political process as to determine the historical development for a whole century. It is mainly due to the fact that the Russian foreign policy is not based on any strategic vision. One can distinguish in it no clear parameters – be they pragmatic or ideological. Hence, the fact that it is either contradictory or re-active and without significant own initiatives.

This state of affairs could continue for quite a long period of time. Yet, any strategic study, as is the current one, should attempt to define the spectrum of possibilities and the relevant parameters of Russia’s security and foreign policy. This is needed at any time of the Western, and European in general, foreign policy planning. The task we set for ourselves in this chapter is to develop a framework that could provide us with basic co-ordinates for articulating Russia’s position, its options for the future development, the choices partners and opponents of Russia’s may face when running their own security policy.

In essence, such a task presupposes interest in having a description of Russia which gives basic, however abstract they may be, parameters for predictions and prognoses. Those asking question in this direction have this fundamental interest in knowing what happens “out there” in this vast imperial space. Questions of this kind involve a considerable difficulty. The desire to know more about today’s Russia has no apparent and easy
solution. This is not a question that has possible straight answers. The difficulty involved is also not due to lack of enough information or of solid factual ground; in a sense it is quite the contrary, there is too much diversity of facts that apparently contradict one another and complicate the Russia puzzle even further.

So, the difficulty, and that is the proposition we take as a starting point here, is much more serious and deeply embedded in the character of the very object, that is, of Russia itself. It is this peculiar socio-political body that produces the indeterminacy with regard to its own portrait and makes the outside observer get perplexed. If that is the case, as we think it is, it becomes necessary to account for this indeterminacy in the very analysis we propound. This is the reason why in this study we propose a schizophrenic view of a kind: we develop two pictures of Russia and, correspondingly, two series of developments related to the overall security policy with respect to Russia, two policies of the West to Russia as regards NATO enlargement and future transformation, two different positions and attitudes toward Russia.

The theoretical way in which we develop this double view is based on the idea and the method of scenario building. We propose two scenarios for Russia’s future and draw conclusions, predictions and recommendations which have to be taken into account by Western policy decision-makers and, especially, by long-term strategists. Both of the scenarios have simple and condensed description as far as the basic development is concerned. They carry, however, vast implications with regard to this particular body politic and to the way interactions with it may proceed.

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The Status Quo Scenario: Probability Assessment

Here is the brief picture of the first possible development.

Russia remains a unitary federal state. The powerful center exercises partial control over politics, society and economy. It reproduces itself, a small elitist group, and a constant crisis at all levels of social life. Russia, in other words, continues to exist as a unitary yet weak state.

There is one term in this scenario which needs to be clarified from the start, “weak state.” We take a “weak state” to be one where the legitimately elected government experiences increasing difficulty to exercise its executive functions and implement its policy projects. It is characteristic for the “weak state” that its legitimation crisis could not be resolved by simply resorting to early elections. The true problem is that it suffers from a deficit of political and governmental alternatives. Thus the “weak state” is not necessarily involved in a governmental crisis. It is rather involved in a crisis of governmentality (to use the English for Foucault’s much celebrated expression). In the public realm there is no candidate capable of gaining true political recognition and so legitimacy, and in effect take over the functions of the central government. So, a “state” becomes “weak” when the surface-level governmental or parliamentary crisis is rooted in an overall inability to govern, and not in conflicting power claims from rival political subjects. In our case this “weakness” refers to the Russian federal state institutions.

The first question we should attempt to answer is the probability question, that is, what factors constitute the
condition for this development. The question has relevance to scenario thinking in general, since the development presented in italics is taken to be one possible development, not a prediction or prognosis.

In this first case of preserving the federal unity the probability assessment refers mainly to factors of conservative kind, such that are at work in the status quo. Shortly, it is in the first place the status quo and the historical inertia that increase this development’s probability. In order to show that this statement has implications that are not as trivial as they might seem to be we may approach the proposition of the federal unity in the reverse way and ask the question somehow in the negative as follows: If, for a moment, we imagine that instead of the federal state of Russia to the east of Ural there were a couple of other states, how probable would it be that they would at once unite in a federation of the kind we know? We have much reason to doubt that a great excitement would push the regional governors in their capacity of heads of state, the relevant political institutions, and the public at large to go ahead with implementing that idea. Such a development would be highly improbable, at least as improbable as it is regarding the states of the former Soviet Union (could one imagine a federal contract between Estonia and Belarus or Ukraine?).

To be sure the status quo factor can be broken down into numerous specific conditions: the constitutional design of the federal state, the role of the military and the military industrial complex, the central control over them, the nuclear arsenals and the control on them, the fact that Russia receives foreign aid as a unitary state, the privatization process which is heavily dependent on the positions of the old nomenclature and on the new power constellations, even the personal role of the President as well as all kinds of personifications in Russia’s politics, etc.
Most of these concrete references to internal factors however would be doubtful in terms of important, indeed fundamental, aspects of the federal state political constitution and functioning: the legitimacy of the federal power center, the efficiency of the economy and of the federal state institutions in general, the prospects for socio-economic prosperity of the entire federation, the reasonable management of this vast imperial body politic, etc. The inertia factors play however a significant role if we take into consideration the circumstance that they support, and are being in turn supported by, the current political elite. This elite, for its part, does not suffer legitimacy crisis mainly because large parts of the population do not question legitimacy in Russia. So, once this question is put into brackets the political scene appears to be dominated by power elites, and the dynamic, both visible and hidden, on this stage comes from the power-game these elites play.

To be sure, there are numerous external factors that play a crucial role in the life-support campaign regarding Russia’s federal unity.

First, the collapse of the Soviet Union was an event of epochal significance which overshadowed the very question of a next wave of imperial disintegration. The international public debate on the issue was focused exclusively on the republics severally, on relations between them, and on Russia’s new role on the world stage. To be sure, the very idea of a continuous disintegration looks in principle very doubtful in the eyes of the Western observer. This is another expression of inertia, this time characterizing the outside positions.

Second, the United States and the world financial community seem to have been overenthusiastic for quite a while regarding Russia’s future and the prospects for it to join the community of democratic states. This idea was the leading motif of
international politics and relations with Russia. It led to this endless series of financial aid packages and institutional arrangements aimed at bringing Russia closer to the Western democracies.

Third, the nuclear proliferation risks turned out to function as a replacement of Russia’s position of first-rank nuclear power posing direct threat to the West. The new Russia was granted the credit to handle successfully the nuclear arsenals both on its own territory and, due to its authoritative position in the former Soviet Union, in the new independent republics. This international legitimacy Russia still enjoys is based primarily on the assumption that only a unitary political power center may exercise control over the nuclear warheads. No reliable alternative to this is even thinkable. As a consequence of this Russia gained a somewhat paradoxical new legitimacy worldwide: it was no longer seen as a direct threat but as a guardian against export of its own nuclear capabilities.

There are numerous other factors in the international arena, shared by the major Western players in the field of security policy. Some of them have a peculiar character as is the long-lasting overstatement concerning Yeltzin’s true commitments to the democratic tradition of the West, as well as the conviction of the mid 1990s that he was a kind of overran and as such a supreme guarantor of the reform process.

If Russia preserves its federal unity and continues to exist as it has over the entire decade of the 1990s, the same old picture would most probably unfold itself before the Western observer. The basic state institutions would suffer constant crisis of various kinds. The President of the federation would, in constitutional terms mainly, remain one of the strongest political position in the world. The President and the State Duma would be in a state of power struggle on a permanent basis. The Council of Ministers would represent a weak executive branch,
which could hardly carry out significant reforms. Economy would depend on the same huge amounts of foreign aid, which would be channeled through temporary constellations of the political power. Some temporary improvements should not be ruled out, to be sure. But the crucial factor are not those possible economic ups and downs. The basic factor is the overall societal infrastructure, which includes the social cohesion factor, the constitutional arrangement, the normative power of the political institutions, the capacity of the federal institutions to exercise control over all federal units. The state of society at large, the level of poverty, etc., present a significant factor but not a crucial one if they remain within the limits of the present state.

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Policy Options

All these factors and quasi-causal explanations aside, the status quo, the preservation of the Russian federal state has a spectrum of consequences as to the global security environment, to the overall security policy of the West and the United States in particular, and to the policy of NATO enlargement.

Under this scenario it may be expected that Russia’s foreign policy will live in cycles, each lasting a couple of years, depending on internal circumstances. An improvement of the economic situation may make Russia feel stronger; any election campaign coming up would make some nationalist or neo-imperial agenda surface again; a sudden new urgent need of financial aid may press down Russian self-confidence or neo-communist arrogance. The syndrome of the weak state would hardly disappear, however, and, if coupled with nostalgia to the old great times of world dominance, it may produce any kind of compulsive behavior on the international scene.
Having said that, however, we have to also assume that the next couple of years a unitary Russian federal state would have a unitary Russian foreign policy, one organized around a more unitary axis. For NATO it would be of crucial importance how this new line would perceive the process of the territorial expansion of the Alliance.

Our assumption, to recall this, is that an isolationist attitude combined with lack of solid self-confidence regarding real role in the world affairs, and still further combined with residual imperial appetite constitutes a position which is heavily dependent on its own subjective perceptions, feeling, suspicions, and other states of mind in which psychological and political things are not divided.

Russia’s perception is thus a problem the solution of which could greatly influence both the stability of the international environment at a global scale and the policy of the Atlantic Alliance. The question whether, how, under what conditions, through what acceptable bargaining, etc., Russia would accept the enlargement or would decisively oppose it remains an open question for now. If, in the final account, NATO’s enlargement appeared totally unacceptable to Russia, one of the most ambitious projects regarding international security in the 21st century could be considerably embarrassed.

For this reason, assuming endurance of a unified Russian federal state, in what follows we explore various options of dealing with this problem. These options represent the major Western policy patterns regarding Russia’s perception of NATO expansion. We present them in a specific order, starting with more straightforward and simple yet questionable policy standards and go on to discussing the more promising ones.
(a) Ignore Russia

One option is Russia’s opposition to be simply ignored. As Grigorii Yavlinski expressed it in a forum sponsored by the Bohemia Foundation, “You [meaning countries aspiring for membership in NATO, though the message may extend to the entire policy of expansion] would be right if you would say: “We do not care about your internal politics!”.” It is highly improbable, one may argue, that Russia’s official opposition to NATO enlargement would lead to any truly decisive action. Experience from the past several years shows that multitude of Russian warning notes, which declare that Russian leaders would not allow NATO’s enlargement, remain without significant consequences. Russia, one could argue, has neither foreign policy vision nor conscious positive interests, and its position is ambiguous, hesitant and circumstantial. Therefore she would accept the change in the status quo despite its seemingly firm attitude expressed in all kinds of official announcements.

Such a relation to Russia enjoys little, if any, popularity among Western politicians and political analysts. And, rightly so, because of two reasons, at least. First, it would contradict the policy of co-operation with the reform-oriented wings in Russian political life for whom it would be greatly unfavorable to get internationally isolated. Second, it would make a big favor to the imperial-nationalist circles, especially in the State Duma, by providing them with a new reason and a new argument for their hostility.

(b) The “Non-Exclusion” Rhetoric

A second option has been intensely explored in Western political and diplomatic circles, especially after 1993 when President Clinton voiced the US administration’s intention to support the Alliance’s enlargement. I would like to name it here “rhetoric of non-exclusion”. According to it NATO’s enlargement
is not directed to, nor does it imply, isolation and exclusion of Russia. On the contrary. At present, but especially in the long run, a membership of a democratic Russia will be seriously considered, Russia is welcomed to the club, though not yet, and so forth.

This language became a diplomatic institution before the Madrid meeting of 1997, and much more so after the membership invitation for the first three countries of Central Europe. To be sure, it is more reasonable than the language of ignoring and exclusion. However, its real political significance does not reach beyond the limits of the diplomatic protocol. And, possibly, it provides a minimum dose of tranquilizing compensation against more neurotic reactions on the occasion of the first wave of expansion. More than that cannot be expected from it.

As the main memoranda of the committee “Anti-NATO” at the State Duma show the hard line in Russian policy perceives in the protocol language of “non-exclusion” only hypocrisy and lies. It is either disinterested in it or, which seems more probably to be the case, once easily blamed as lie this language supports the committee’s cause.

(c) Institutional Regimes

During the last several years intensive attempts have been made to involve Russia in various international regimes. This tendency will continue, though it is not clear what unexplored possibilities remain after it reached an apex with the signing of the Founding Act between Russia and NATO in Paris, 1997. The tendency presents a higher and more responsible stage in the relation to the Russian side. Building institutional connections has a multiplicity of aims – from information exchange through consultations to a joint participation in decision-making.
Including Russia in international regimes and institutions is inevitable, if Russia position should be taken into account. Such projects also contain an essential symbolic side. It demonstrates that the relation to the Russian statesmen is a relation to representatives of a great power. With regard to the hard-line position of the imperial nationalists the active participation of Russia in international forums demonstrates respect, and not “humiliation” as the enlargement has been interpreted by representatives of the State Duma. Although undoubtedly useful, this activation of Western politicians has a limited impact and significance. We can welcome it with a restrained skepticism.

First, due to the high degree of indeterminacy in Russia’s domestic policy and the dispersal of the centers of power and influence, the questions “Who?”, “Which Russia?” participates in a given international regime has no reliable long-term answer. Hence, the risk to rely on a sustainable engagement of Russia in international institutions. These forms presuppose, and build upon, stability and continuity of the positions that participate in them, a requirement which Russia cannot be claimed to meet sufficiently.

Second, building international institutions at high pace is always in danger of lapsing into a formalistic extreme. Especially if Russia capacity to be participant in such networks gets overestimated. Or, if at a time institution-building gets ahead of Russia’s ability to undertake engaging herself, even if she has the intention to. Such a development could produce a loss of meaning of signed agreements and, correspondingly, loss of confidence in their function and efficiency.

Signing all kinds of agreements with Russia may have undesirable effects. It is necessary to set a measure and to dose more carefully institutional initiatives.
(d) Practices of Involvement in NATO Initiatives

Roughly, all Russian arguments against NATO expansion come down to the statement that the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact should have been followed by a dissolution of NATO. Instead of this, the Alliance started expanding to the East. A more serious part of the argument goes like this: the enlargement goes in parallel yet in clear contradiction with the general agreement among NATO member-states that direct threat of a massive military attack on their territory no longer exists. The positive alternative of Russia’s is that the OSCE should take over NATO’s functions in the sphere of security, a suggestion which sounds neither serious nor realistic. It is this kind of argument that the strategists of the enlargement should, first, find an answer to, and, second, present it successfully to the Russian side.

In respect to the concrete case of the Alliance’s enlargement, tranquilizing the “neurotic Kremlin’s view of the world affairs” (G. Kennan, 1946) is a non-traditional strategic task. Briefly, it consists in the following: It is necessary that the West and, in particular, the U.S. and the other member-states of the NATO club, make a decisive attempt to influence the formation of the future sustainable Russian foreign policy, especially in the direction of Russia’s security concerns. That is to say, to explore all possibilities for decomposing the paradoxical synthesis of imperial appetites, painful paranoid suspicion, and deep feeling of insecurity. And this to the effect that Russia gets involved in formulating her foreign policy objectives in a more open environment, that is, as an active participant in the international community.

For achieving this end the above-mentioned forms of relating to Russia do not look sufficient at all. What is essential here is to develop a package of measures for involving Russia in the real practices of NATO and in the overall security policy of the
West. To this effect the following suggestions could be considered:

First, even without previous general agreements, that is, independently of the institutional framework, Russia should increasingly take part in practical initiatives such as international peace-keeping and security missions, preventive activities, ad hoc coalitions, international police operations, humanitarian actions with political-military support, etc. All possibilities should be explored for inviting Russia to participate in out-of-area military operations.

Second, Russia’s role in the PfP should become a basis for new preventive policy initiatives (at present the State Duma insists that the PfP is a masque hiding NATO’s expansive policy). Russia may be given special status within the PfP, or, the PfP may develop at two levels one being the bi-lateral co-operation between NATO and Russia. Such initiatives may also lead to a more stable institutionalization of Russia’s involvement on the pattern of the IFOR and SFOR, namely, by transforming this precedent of co-operation into a basis for a permanent body for joint military activities.

Third, possibilities should be explored for involving Russia in the decision-making process regarding NATO’s activities that go beyond the founding definition of the North Atlantic Treaty and its Articles 5 and 10. For an effective policy of integration it is not sufficient that Russia is a member of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council and, respectively, takes part in activities which it regulates, such as the existing PfP formula, the “16+1” consultations, the Bosnia initiative.

The guiding idea, which stands behind these and similar suggestions, is that a policy of Russia’s inclusion should develop along all dimensions that have to do with NATO’s security policy; exceptions should be restricted to policies relating to the “collective defense” dimension and to Articles 5 and 10.
With this conclusion we come naturally to the following question: Granted such policies of inclusion and involvement on a case-by-case basis become a more common practice, would this provide a strong enough guarantee that Russia would be integrated in international systems of security, accept NATO’s enlargement as preventive and security policy, co-operate in this process trying to constitute its new identity and find a corresponding position?

This question presents a dilemma.

The first answer is easy to state: no, there is no such guarantee. As the entire Russian policy toward the Yugoslav crisis has shown, Russia has not find its proper place in these wide interactions of coalitions of states seeking improvement of the security environment. Russia, as was best demonstrated by the sudden appearance of its troops at Pristina Airport by the end of the Kosovo war, insists on being individually recognized as a world power, cannot be fully trusted just because she is herself full of distrust, is not a reliable partner for longer terms, etc.

The second answer, however, is that despite all these reservations there is no other way of resolving the Russia problem. Even if it receives no secure solution in the ways enlisted above, any other policy, be it of ignoring Russia or containing and isolating her, would do more harm. So, involving Russia in the everyday political-military practices of the Alliance and seeking agreements on a more pragmatic basis seems to be inevitable, no matter what the guarantees are. For NATO such an involvement strategy is not new at all.

The neutralization of Russia’s imperial-nationalist impulses through a policy of integrating Russia herself has a successful precedent in the decision to admit Germany in NATO from 1950 to 1955. Generally, balancing the West-European arena after 1945
indicates unambiguously that the efficient policy is that of integration, not the one of isolation and exclusion.

If a policy with such an orientation develops properly, the most that can be hoped for is the context in which the future Russian security policy is getting formed would change in a direction favorable for stabilizing international security environment. With Germany of 1945-1955, however, resolving this issues was in great part, first, a matter of a western common understanding that Germany should not be isolated, punished and treated on the failed pattern of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, and, secondly, a question of designing appropriate institutional regimes.

With Russia the case is different due to the absence of strong institutional tradition in the country and, correspondingly, the lack of sufficient confidence in the western type of institution-building. It is this essential difference which requires that the policy of institutional inclusion of Russia be accompanied by initiatives for her involvement in the NATO day-to-day political-military practices and in the decision-making process.

Disintegration Scenario: Probability Assessment

The second scenario we propose and are going to discuss looks as follows:

Some regions of the Russian Federation become increasingly stronger. Secessionist forces gain momentum. The central political institutions lose control over them. The federal umbrella starts negotiating a loose confederal contract with the regions. The Russian Federation disintegrates.
As with the previous scenario we first ask the question of factors that increase or decrease the probability for this imaginary development to become actual. A disintegration of the Russian Federation seems as improbable at first glance as the collapse of the Soviet Union looked until right before it occurred. Yet let us proceed, as above, with a probability assessment presenting factors that render this development more probable. Due to the character of this scenario we are going to present the set of factors without giving priority to some over the others.

(a) The very principle of the internal constitution of the contemporary Russian federal state is an outdated imperial one, no matter what its international behavior may be; the fact that internationally it does not act as an expansionist imperial power presents a different question. We will refer here to the new Russian Constitution of 1993 not to directly prove this in legal terms, which may even be irrelevant, but as a an example, a metaphor characterizing Russia’s post-Soviet fundamental political vision. In short, it is not radically different from the one inscribed in the Constitution of the USSR of 1977. The federation is built up from the center to the periphery. Its political authority branches out into a complicated federal system of divisions which is well brought into relief in Articles 3 to 5. As provided by Article 4 (1) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, it consists of “republics, territories, regions, federal cities, an autonomous region and autonomous areas.” The federation is “based on its state integrity, the uniform system of state power…” (Article 4 (3)). The fundamental idea is thus different from, if not opposite to such classic cases of democratic federal designs as is the United States, Canada, or, say, Germany; not even former Yugoslavia. The difference, as simple as it is basic is that the federal units
have no power to question the central authority: As has been demonstrated by the two Chechen wars, such attempts may receive drastic response from the center. In this way all the federal units appear to be seen from the center as if they are sheer administrative divisions, not true federal entities; whether this is realistic and practicable is a different question. To make this story short, the very fundamental political-institutional design of the Russian state defines Russia neither as a “normal” nation state nor as a modern federation. The intrinsic imperial features, however, constitute a political entity which has questionable sustainability and belongs to a different historical epoch.

(b) Russia’s federal construction does not account for secessionist attitudes but creates conditions for their further flourishing instead. Russia’s constitution was in a process of preparation for about four years, from 1990 to 1993. The federal construction was being thoroughly discussed by Russian constitutional lawyers and consulted with prominent American and European specialists. This discussion indeed underwent an evolution, which started with open preference of the United States Constitution and, later on, going on to accepting a more European type of presidential republicanism. All this debate did not prevent the new founding fathers from a lack of deep constitutional wisdom. The major controversy at the time was the division of power at the federal level, not the relations between the federal center and the autonomous entities of various kinds. In 1993 President Yeltsin intervened in the drafting process and his team of loyal experts designed a machinery of power which vests enormous power in the President. The vertical relation of federal vs. regional levels did not receive due attention. This story not only shows absence of broad political perspective. It also demonstrates absence of a more ordinary empirical
The basic deficiency in this process lies in the fact that all those strong secessionist attitudes in the regions were overlooked. Federal entities are not conceived of by the Constitution as truly constitutive of the federal state. The Constitution itself is not a contract, be it explicit or implicit, between political subject that transfer portions of power to a common body. Rather, they are somewhat conceived of as parts of an aggregate, which exists over and above them. We view this circumstance, to repeat, as a mirror of a political vision and an example of constitutional policy, not as a legal fact. But it clearly shows that no account has been taken of the true existential-political autonomy of the constituent parts. This increases the probability of a chain reaction of disintegration because the tension between federal union and constituent parts is built into the overall institutional design.

(c) If looked at from the federal center, the regions of today’s Russia seem increasingly difficult to encompass in a uniform network of socio-economic and political institutions. Russia consists of 89 federal units having different degrees of autonomy from the center. Whatever the concrete unit, be it region or republic, or whatever, the management of the unity is a task of highly improbable straight solution. This fundamental difficulty surfaced somewhat suddenly and became clear to the outside world after the economic crash of August 1998. In particular, it became apparent that running a uniform federal policy from the center meets strong opposition from regional leaders. Their responsibility is to take care of their regions, not of the federation. Whatever the specific agenda they have at certain moments, be it survival or prosperity, it is a regional one and in times of crisis may dramatically contradict the expectations, or ambitions, of the federal center. The difference of the
federal and regional political agendas is, however, fundamental, not contingent, and originates from the specific Russian federal arrangement. It may remain hidden for the outside observer for a while but at times of crisis it comes to the fore. So, in principle, the efficiency of the federal institutions in the regions is low and has further diminished during the acute depression of 1998. At such times of crisis the basic functions of the federal center and its administrative branches in the regions may get suspended: there is no reliable instrument that can enforce federal decisions that are unfavorable for a region. So, enforcing federal law, collecting federal taxes, mobilizing regional resources for enacting federal policies, etc., becomes harder. As Thomas Graham testified before U.S. Congress in 1998, the crumbling of the political center is of such a scale that it leads to a true devolution of this center’s power to control the diverse regional policies.

(d) If seen from the regions, this development, the degradation of the federal authority, leads to a rise of the power of the regional centers vis-a-vis the federal umbrella. This tendency and its inevitability have been felt in a timely fashion by the stronger political leaders in Russia. Some of them have rightly understood, and acted in a corresponding manner, that the direct power struggle in the imperial center is a risky business of questionable value. Instead, the project of running a successful regional policy is much more feasible, more promising, and more sustainable. So, there are plenty of examples about regional leaders beginning to run their independent policy and care little about the federal center and its grand yet utopian enterprises. Some of them have been truly successful. In Veliki Novgorod governor Mikhail Prusak won a reputation of economic success, similarly in Nizhni Novgorod with Boris Nemtsov, with Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, etc. Here are some other examples of the last
couple of years, which are telling: Tatarstan introduced import tax on some goods, Saratov quite openly considered introducing its own currency, Yakuta resolved to limit the amount of gold it sells to the federal government. Or, a case of a different character, with a stronger political motivation: A hard-line contender for the presidential position, Alexander Lebed has established a power base in a specific region and started running a policy from this more reliable and safe position. Of all the 89 federal entities only few have enjoyed success and may hope to step on a prosperous track. Most are in a very bad economic condition and would hardly overcome the state of recurrent depression. Whatever the case, however, the regions are gaining power momentum and are most probably going to pursue a more and more independent policy. Such policies are in open contradiction with the federal constitutional design. In any case, a process of regional feudalization is underway in today’s Russia.

(e) Russia’s federal arrangement is endangered by the absence of democratic government at federal level and rule of law over the federal state. In Russian history the power of the state has been in essence coextensive with the executive branch. The legislative one has basically had functions of consulting or accompanying executive actions, or providing them with the normative mantle needed for public consumption or for propaganda. The history of the judiciary is indicative, too. In the transit from one form of empire to another one Russia had neither the time nor the resources of establishing a real and strong judiciary. Thus, the executive remained the strongest power position essentially experiencing no restrictions from other branches within a modern division of power. In this context it is highly improbable to have a long lasting co-existence of two sets of factors. On the one hand these are the modernization of economy, the privatization process, the internationalization of social and
economic life, the rise of modern information and communication technologies, the expansion of all kinds of international regimes, etc. On the other hand, these are the factors of political type whereby the powerful and unrestricted federal executive exercises the old imperial constitutive, decision-making and controlling functions over the regions. These two conditions do not constitute a vital body politic in principle. On the contrary, at the beginning of the 21st century this type of domination of the executive seems by and of itself irrational, subjectivist, voluntaristic, as well as, in the final account, inefficient. An executive leaning toward the tzarist era is destined to underperform and its apparent strength turns out to be a true weakness. The remarkable political elite’s power autonomy is in fact a condition for arbitrary decisions, chaotic shifts, political instability, constant power struggle, a rise of personalistic and psychological determinants in policy; absence of institutional continuity, in short. This state of affairs, which is inherent to Russian politics, is going to be increasingly unbearable for the regions. The regions have all kinds of reasons to be extremely suspicious of this federal executive. The prospects for confidence building are thus seriously undermined. Absence of rule of law, which is only another and more specific way of expressing the same, amounts to an absence of a basic condition for establishing a uniform context of societal unity, nationwide exchange and communication, or, a common language of political understanding, as it were. Absence of rule of law, for its part, makes it impossible to establish the institutional framework of a functioning market economy.

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Open Multiplicity of Risk Factors

In this review of factors increasing the probability of a federal disintegration we have focused primarily on relations between the federal units and the federal umbrella. There are, to be sure, numerous other factors that are relevant to a probability assessment regarding the second scenario. We are not going to discuss them in detail but only point out some of the most significant ones. Such are the oligarchic structure of Russian societal life whereby political and economic elites overlap; the organized crime, which has developed on a vast scale; the structure of societal reality in which clans and groups reminding one of the Soviet nomenclature replace the institutions of the modern western state; the manifest incapacity, or rather unwillingness, of the central authority to prevent abuse of the huge foreign aid, and so on and so forth.

Finally, a risk factor of a deeper level is the apparent impossibility to formulate a preventive policy framework aimed at diminishing the significance of all the factors enlisted, and others as well. This means that, in a sense, the overall situation is risky, that the synthetic picture of the Russian statehood of today provokes doubts as far as its vitality is concerned. There seems to be no reliable base that could unite forces opposing disintegration. Such bases have mainly been either loaded with negative meaning, as is the Chechen campaigns, or related to some kind of political manipulation and thus bound to disappear with, say, releasing the election results. The Chechen war, for instance, is only seemingly a nationalist campaign with massive public involvement. Had it been a real one, despite all the bloody developments and breaches of international human rights law, it may have functioned as an instrument of national unification. Chechnya, true, is a tiny little space, which may not be representative for the entire multi-national state of Russia. But it sets an indicative example and shows what
may be expected in other wars of the kind. The Chechen war, in both of its phases but especially in the last one, presents an example of what can be expected from the federal executive at times of crisis and destabilization. Instead of searching for some reasonable and acceptable solution, the executive wages the bloody war as part of its upcoming election campaign. Such a perverse understanding of politics may pay off in the short run; it may do the magic of installing a previously unknown person in the position of the powerful super-president. But it could hardly provide a solution to the question of how the federal center and the federal entities could relate to one another in a constructive way thus preserving the federal state.

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Policy Options

It is characteristic for the second scenario that it is doubtful that policy options, as specific as were the ones formulated in relation with the first scenario, are possible and make much sense at the present. They would depend to a great extent on the specific rearrangement that would follow a disintegration development. We even better speak of levels of restructuring since it is not only the state entities that we are interested in but also such aspects as possible contracts between them, emergence of new federal states out of Russia itself, etc. It is also tremendously important what kind of large socio-political spaces would be formed, or are just thinkable or more probable, following such a development. And, it is very probable as well that these socio-cultural and socio-political spaces may give rise to new state structures. That aspect, however, is a topic for another set of scenarios and goes beyond the task of the present study. Still, let us give an example of imaginary, yet not improbable development along these lines.
A disintegration chain reaction could spread over all the 89 federal entities and even further. Most of those units differ significantly from one another, some of them have incommensurable characteristics of social, cultural, political constitution. Yet, a disintegration wave could hardly produce so many and so diverse independent states, nation-states in particular. It would be more reasonable to assume that such atomistic decomposition would not occur or, at least, would not last long. It is more probable that a possible federal disintegration would lead to forming new constellations of smaller units. The extreme version of independence would neither be feasible nor desirable for the regions; nor would it create political bodies of viable statehood.

It is much more reasonable to suppose that a dissolution of the federal state would rather open room for a more natural and genuine, at the same time dynamic, development. What we mean by natural in this context is the tendency that once ceded from the federal union the former federal entities would combine on the basis of some common features and interests, such that are not imposed by the federal power center but are inherent in them. In this respect, it is quite plausible to expect that at least three new socio-cultural and geo-political spaces would get organized around common axes. One would be the European part of Russia; another would be Siberia, the central part of today’s federal state; the third would be a concatenation of large communities that belong, more or less, to the Pacific basin.

We emphasize again that this development is imaginary and, as such, belongs to the method of scenario building. It is not a prediction based on measuring facts and circumstances. Further, we do not propose probability assessment concerning this specific development. The intention is rather different, namely, to give an imaginary picture of future restructuring, which would follow after a dissolution of the federal state. There might be various
such scenarios; their presentation is not of main interest here. What is of interest, however, is what major political changes are likely to occur granted such a scenario becomes actual, as well as what policies the West and NATO may have to run under such conditions.

We shall delimit our considerations to the more basic aspects and consequences.

One, a dissolution of the federation would interrupt immediately the intrinsic imperial inclinations of the federal center, which expand over the regions. The very center of power, which is so unpredictable and dangerous as of now, would stop exercising imperial pressure. This would set the basic condition for a more free and, may be genuine, federal associations between most of them. That would be a democratic process at inter-state level.

Two, once having collapsed the imperial power of the center would be transmitted to several such centers. The major consequence of this would be that they would stop thinking in the old-fashioned imperial way and would step on a more pragmatic platforms in their relations with the West. This would be especially relevant as regards the European parts because they would turn their political and strategic look at the West in a very natural manner. Negotiations with them may become at least as easy as they are with other countries of the former Soviet Union.

Three, the applications of East European states for NATO membership would not be felt as insults to Russian superpower’s ambitions. In particular the problem with membership of the Baltic states would lose its dramatic overtone of today.

Four, the United States, the EU and its future security and defense structures and, in the first place, NATO itself would have plenty of opportunities for launching security initiatives of new kinds. This would be especially promising with regard to
in institutional regimes the validity of which Russia question today on a perpetual basis. With smaller political entities of manageable scale international security institution building would be much easier. Initiatives such as the current Partnership for Peace could flourish.

Five, having escaped the imperial umbrella and thus the having neutralized its inclination to impose a federal super-agenda, the regions and their new associations would be given the chance, for the first time in history may be, to develop their own identity, if we resort to this very abstract term. To make it more concrete, instead of cheating or opposing the federal center, they would be given the chance to freely built up their policies reflecting exclusively on their interests and thus thinking within pragmatic horizons.

Six, the entire dilemma, as artificial as it is painful today, pro or against NATO enlargement would get overcome. It is rooted at present exclusively in the Russian prejudice that it is necessary for Russia to play a real superpower on the world scene. Such an ambition belong in the imperial power center but would immediately diminish once it disintegrates and divides itself into a couple of regional centers.

Seven, Russia of today could not form a long term strategic perspective with regard to foreign and security policy. As mentioned time and again, its policies are contradictory and reactive, it attempt to assert its superpower position on a case-by-case basis, as was the Pristina Airport action. Today, the imperial center could not go beyond this manner of thinking and acting. The new entities emerging from a federal dissolution would place their own foreign and security policy agendas on a much more rational and closer to the common sense platform. They would develop political agendas of their own and would not be regional reproductions of an imperial utopia. In this respect, it might be expected that they would turn their strategic looks
toward in different directions, to Europe, to the Middle East, to China and India, to Japan, etc., without attempting the impossible, namely, to embrace these policies in a uniform framework.

There are plenty of other consequences that are of fundamental significance to both the federal entities and to the global security environment. In this list, which may continue, we present only positive result. Needless to say, we are well aware that there are numerous uncertainties and risks involved in having this scenario become actual.

The most popular and, at the same time, most alarming one as regards global security is the fate of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. We cannot give an outright solution or reliable recommendation aimed at solving this issue. However, we could state for certain that the only avenue for reasonable solutions involves the United States, the European Union and NATO. A promising example in this respect is the Ukraine-type of nuclear-free state arrangements; it could be extended to Siberia and the Russian far east alike. At different levels all the three could act toward resolving this security puzzle. Still, there is no easy alternative to the central presidential power with regard to the nuclear capabilities.

Another indeterminacy originates from the huge accumulation of foreign debt, which is today a burden to the federal state; it is not clear what restructuring would satisfy them and the international creditors. However, precedents to this effect are readily available and could be practiced.

There are, to be sure, numerous other uncertainties and risk factors, which we cannot discuss at length here. The basic consequences of such a transformation would however improve the global security environment. To put it briefly: a formidable imperial power, as dangerous to the outside world as it is unmanageable internally would give way to what in the history of
the West has proved to be a model of normal, democratic, efficient, and internationally co-operative community of political entities. Whatever concrete difficulties this process involves, an internal dismantling of the empire would give birth to democratic opportunities.

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Summary Reflection on Russia’s Condition

There is one last point which we would like to bring into relief. It concerns a more empirical matter, namely, the question about what state of affairs one observes in today’s Russia if one makes observations against the background of the above presented scenarios. The answer to this question is: the state of today’s Russia is, in this respect primarily, a schizophrenic one. By saying this we mean something serious and quite painful for Russia itself, namely, that Russia is a body politic that lives at two levels, which contradict each other, or, within two co-ordinates, which do not constitute a uniform system, or, further, in two worlds, which tend to be in exclusive relations to each other.

Each of the two lives of this political entity corresponds to a scenario which, in its part, contradicts or simply excludes the other. This dilemma is fundamental and could hardly last for good. Such is the case because Russia of today has preserved its imperial viewpoint of world affairs but the world affairs do not constitute a context wherein this same viewpoint is sustainable.

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TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURY: THREE CONCLUSIVE PROPOSITIONS

In this concise conclusive part we are going to advance some propositions, which we believe follow from what has been discussed up to this point, in a way summarize the major arguments of the discussion, and have a long-term significance as well. Before we proceed to our conclusive remarks, however, let us reflect back upon the stages of analysis we have gone through.

In the first place we did not jump to a direct observation of reality as such, “out there,” so to speak, but concentrated on the argumentative discourse about NATO, its role after the Cold War, the enlargement debate, etc. The analysis of this debate showed that it contains a number of discrepancies. Most of all, the arguments appear one-sided, focusing on one aspect of the problem or another. What the overview of some of the major points in the debate shows is that a thrust toward embracing the whole complexity of the problematic is absent. Thus, abstract moments, such as costs, division of Europe, America’s liberal tradition, Russia’s reaction, etc., though valid turn out overstated; synergy of the argumentative discourse is lacking as a rule. Hence, conclusions from such arguments do not answer the fundamental question concerning the mission of NATO in the new century. The answer to this question requires that we go beyond particular aspects and attempt to see the problem in its entirety and thus the solution in a somewhat synthetic way. Whether our synthetic picture is good enough or has some flaws is a question, which we cannot discuss, to be sure. Our point rather is that it is necessary that we, and whoever else takes up this road, make an attempt to think in parameters that may provide a kind of synthetic picture.

Our critical analysis dealt with three such parameters, the underlying claim being that they should have to be taken as
forming a unity. The first was the conceptual change, the change in our very paradigm of understanding security issues; our observation was that this paradigm change was not properly and adequately reflected in the NATO debate. The second is the Russia factor; it bothers politicians and analysts alike yet has not been analyzed in its most authentic and essential context, namely, “Russia as such,” its own drama and its own alternatives. The third parameters we distinguish is the course of history after the end of the Cold War, which did not come to an end, as Fukuyama’s neo-Hegelian position informs us, but rather began following the collapse of the somewhat a historical bi-polar system; in a sense the ten-year history of the Yugoslav wars has demonstrated that the question of NATO’s role has immediate practical answers that make the debate look like missing the point sometimes.

These three parameters, we believe, constitute a three-dimensional theoretical space, a co-ordinate system where most, if not all, of the questions discussed otherwise in abstracto can find their proper answer and still be related to one another. This is to say, our claim is that if these parameters are clarified and, also, taken from the perspective of their complimentarity, they can certainly bring us closer to the right answers and to a more clear vision for the future. The claim, to put it still differently, is that when working within these parameters we can be more secure that we preserve a sense of the the complexity of the problem and do not go one-sided losing sense of the whole.

Now, against this backward reflection, let us advance some propositions concerning NATO’s role in the future, for decades to come in the 21st century. As was the case with the entire discussion up till now, we are not going to discuss details but only define directions of development, in highly abstract terms at that.
In the first place, our discussion of the paradigmatic change concerning security politics after the end of the Cold War era indicates that, no matter whether actually practiced, **NATO’s mission has acquired a global dimension which will have to be accounted for and reflected in all fundamental strategic documents.** Let us discuss briefly this proposition and attempt to bring into relief the essential point it makes.

The idea of a global mission is hardly new and we do not claim to have invented anything extraordinary in this respect. We rather claim that the paradigmatic conceptual change that has occurred regarding the very idea of security, the very core essence of the concept of security, leads to the idea of globalization inevitably. To put it in a different way, the new conceptual paradigm that has replaced the bi-polar one and is now in force has as its consequence the opening up of a global dimension of articulating all problems of security as far as NATO is concerned.

First and foremost, this global perspective stems from the fact that the very constitution of the new security environment rules out mighty centers—origins of threat which could have required drawing demarcation lines on the international arena, defining boundaries that cannot be crossed, excluding whole societies as totally different and placing threats on the community of states united under NATO’s umbrella. This is no longer the case. Instead, the world of international relations has become tremendously diverse, some would say multi-polar, with a variety of contexts dominated by no specific world power center. In such an environment the very idea of a direct threat and potential destruction loses its gravity. It gets replaced by a highly indeterminate play of factors constituting the security equations for specific contexts. These, for their part, are the proper subject of probability assessments case-by-case, not at all once and for all. In such a context the security politics
involves untraditional actors, not necessarily aggressive nation-states or empires with global agendas. International terrorism of any kind, drug trafficking, ethnic violence, crises of statehood, social crises, secessionist movements, international organized crime, natural or ecological disasters of massive scale, etc., bring themselves in the security function as its variables. Numerous others may get activated yet can hardly be enlisted as the list is open and not known in advance.

If the constitution of the international security environment is such, then it follows one has no sufficient reason to restrict NATO’s role to collective defense of a closed number of members-states. Its role knows no territorial limits, in principle, theoretically. Potentially, its political interest may spread out globally and its strategic schemes not only may but should involve a global perspective. Even if not accounted for it is implicitly there and cannot be reduced. Thus, paradoxically though it might seem, the end of the bi-polar global arrangement and the emergence of a variety of relatively closed contexts appears to entail a stronger global demand for NATO.

That NATO, however, cannot remain the same rigid defense alliance. Its strategic focus as well as its ongoing practice will get more and more oriented toward dealing with risk factors and applying preventive policy measures. With changes in this direction NATO will preserve its utmost importance in security matters worldwide; conversely, remaining a narrowly defined defense alliance, it will certainly freeze its fresh relation to the ongoing historical process.

At the same time, we see that the two parameters involved here are closely related to each other: absence of territorial boundaries or loosening their previous rigid significance is a process going parallel with the process of widening the functional definitions of NATO. Thus territorial expansion and functional expansion turn out to presuppose each other. Further,
however, territorial expansion itself may adopt new forms, which have not been practiced in NATO’s history, except for the Partnership for Peace initiative (though a good idea, the Russia-NATO Joint Permanent Council is dysfunctional). The point here is that new forms of association, quasi-membership, partnership, cooperation, ad hoc coalition building, etc., are needed to reflect this kind of territorial enlargement. For instance, Latin America has, for some time now, raised its voice about security issues worldwide and its major states have expressed interest in joining the US and the other Western powers in dealing with global security issues. If that tendency gets stronger, as it seems to be the case, there is no reason at all for NATO to set a limit and start running a policy of exclusion. On the contrary, this would contradict the entire conceptual basis on which NATO develops its mission statements of today. Along this line of reasoning it is even necessary for NATO strategists to develop a variety of schemes to the effect of a potential inclusion of states like Argentina, for instance, in a NATO-run security policy and eventually in NATO itself.

In the second place, the above stated global mission of NATO’s is founded in condition of crucial importance, which has not proved valid for any other alliance in modern history: NATO has proved unique in combining extraordinary efficiency with enduring democratic values and will have to base its further strategic concepts on this unity. It is important, we believe, for anyone interested in the future of the alliance, to see and understand the proper meaning and the enormous scope of this combination. NATO was established to deter, or in case of action, to fight an enemy. The entire design of the organization was subjected to this end and articulated for decades in terms such as massive retaliation. Thus NATO was granted for all these decades a mission and a task of utmost significance: to prevent or retaliate to an attack aiming at the ultimate destruction of
its members. This mission implies an enormous concentration of power beyond national borders. Yet, not even for a moment the organization was to become anything more than an instrument toward achieving its primary goals. Not for a moment was there any sign of international power abuse. To put it otherwise, NATO remained truthful to the democratic values that had brought it to existence and never crossed the limits of what is an acceptable framework of functions and activities for an alliance of democratic states.

With the sudden collapse of the origin of threat, the Soviet Union, it might have been expected, as was indeed by some, that NATO could lose one of the sides of this combination, either its efficiency or the values promoted by the European Modernity. One could imagine NATO taking advantage of the dissolution of the enemy and beginning an outright expansion in directions that could be considered profitable in global political terms. Despite arguments in this regard coming from Russia mainly, it did not. On the contrary, instead of diminishing its democratic foundation and become an instrument for running an aggressive expansionist policy, NATO itself became a hot topic of a re-assessment debate the member states and beyond. This wide public debate is the best demonstration that the alliance’s mission and the very rationale of its existence share the same institutional condition as all other institutions in a democratic society. It is not different in this respect and is not immune to continuous re-evaluation, which by definition takes place in the public realm.

On the other hand, doubts could be cast concerning the side of efficiency. More specifically, they could relate to the assumption that after having lost its basic point of reference, the pole of the enemy, NATO may turn out to have lost basic orientation as far as its strategic vision is concerned; hence, it may either freeze its functional definitions letting them die away in the course of time or act without living up to its core
mission thus creating an impression of fundamental disorientation. Such skepticism would be unfounded as our chapter on the Yugoslav wars showed clearly. For, in the Yugoslav crisis, which presents a laboratory where the new security politics is being practiced, the international public witnessed a failure, sometimes embarrassing indeed, of numerous institutional branches of the so-called international community; except for NATO.

There were plenty of organizations involved in attempts to solve or alleviate the Yugoslav crisis: The United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations High Commission for Refugees UNHCR, as well as some that were established *ad hoc*, namely, the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the United Nations Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP), the Implementation Force (IFOR), the Stabilization Force (SFOR), etc. Some had larger success in the Yugoslav crisis (SFOR), some had little (UNHCR), some failed completely (UNPROFOR). A reflection on this indicative story reveals that NATO was the only international organization capable of handling aspects of the crisis. Both in 1995, before the Dayton Accord, and in 1999, when it engaged in a massive attack on Yugoslavia, NATO made a perspicuous demonstration of how it could adapt to circumstances unknown before and take action in situations that have hardly anything in common with the Cold War standards of military planning.

Thus, we can state for certain that the combination of democratic values that stand behind NATO’s existence and the efficiency of the organization, for which it is anyway most famous, is at work today as well. The end of the Cold War not only did not change this essential balance but showed that it could live successfully in epochs as different as the two successive ones in the second half of the century.
This unity of democratic essence and operational efficiency, as well as its tested endurance, have tremendous consequences for the future role of NATO. Both in territorial and in functional terms NATO has potentials for expansion that have no determinable limits on the ground, with respect of empirical circumstances.

From the perspective of the balance just discussed, we may advance the third proposition of this conclusion. It concerns more specifically the state of the international arena after the end of the Cold War. It also has a more specific relevance to strategic and political planning concerning NATO’s future development: NATO of the beginning of the 21st century should develop a policy of diversification with regard to both its territorial and its functional scope while preserving its basic definition of 1949. Once again, although this proposition constitutes a basic policy axiom, it is closely related to the previous one.

Territorially, NATO may, and should, expand in various directions and, generally, develop a policy of inclusion. The timetable of this policy should certainly take into account a great number of factors. It may be prolonged, rather cautious, adaptive to circumstances, etc. The essential point however is that in its fundamental definition, in its core mission statement NATO of today, and of years to come, is to be inclusive. In this sense the acceptance of the three new members in 1999 marks a kind of beginning only. The very standards on which these invitations were made were rather in accordance with the tradition of considering membership applications. Over the next several years NATO most probably will reconsider these standards, make them more liberal and flexible, as well as attempt to introduce a variety of forms of partnership relations. This development looks inevitable in view of all the three parameters we proposed above.
In more functional terms, we have witnessed in the 1990s an expansion of NATO’s role, particularly in the Yugoslav crises. With the absence of direct threat, the emergence of what one calls today non-state actors, the explosive societal state in numerous regions, collapse of statehood in various points of the international field, etc., preventive action acquires greater importance. This leads inevitable to an increasing role of the police functions vis-à-vis the military-defensive ones. Risk management broadly taken is becoming thus a functional dimension that NATO should unfold and adapt to a variety of situations.

The question here comes up naturally about the core definition of NATO as a defense alliance. The answer to it comes also somewhat naturally in the course of our inquiry. NATO will not, and should not, let this essential definition die away while developing a more flexible policy along territorial and functional lines. This is neither realistic to assume nor recommendable. The defense character of the alliance is going to constitute its core mission for decades ahead even if becoming practically less and less relevant. Yet, this nuclear part of the mission only defines a kind of central axis. Around this axis concentrated circles spread out to more and more untraditional activities as is the idea of policing and preventive action.

The balance between the core defense definition and the diversification of untraditional functions may also provide clues to such an ambivalent relationship as is the one with Russia. Against what has been just said it appears that the necessary conditions are in place for handling the Russia problem. In short, NATO, as we see it here, has the capacity to develop reliable strategies for responding to either of the two developments of Russia given above. Having preserved the defense core function it may act pretty effectively within the paradigm which is relevant to the older type of international geo-politics. This one involves all the concepts of the bi-polar
system, most notably the deterrence effect. At the same time NATO will naturally prepare itself for a variety of problems stemming from a dissolution of the federal state and the formation of a new type of democratic federal unity, or rather unities. In either case NATO as defined in the last proposition of this conclusion will certainly live up to the challenges history will place before it in years and decades to come.

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Stefan Popov holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from The New School for Social Research in New York City. He was a University Prize Fellow at the same university with specializations in philosophy and political science 1991-1995. He specialized constitutional policy at the Vienna-based Institute for Human Sciences in 1994, and international security policy at the Atlantic Council of the United States in Washington, DC, 1999. He is currently a senior research fellow with the Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia.


Dr. Solomon Passy is the founding President of the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria, established in 1990 as the first pro-NATO think tank in Central and Eastern Europe and the then Warsaw Pact. He was also Vice-Chairman of the Paris-based Atlantic Treaty Association. As a member of the Bulgarian Parliament in 1990, he was the co-drafter of bills on Bulgaria's participation in the US-led coalition against Saddam, on Bulgaria's membership in NATO and in the EU. He is the author of a number of strategic studies and political analyses on the Euro-Atlantic area, the Balkans and Russia. (Including ones on the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, USSR and former Yugoslavia, as well as on NATO enlargement eastwards.) Dr. Passy is active in several non-governmental and research think-thanks. He has a Ph.D. in Mathematical Logic and Computer Science.

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The Atlantic Club of Bulgaria is a non-governmental, non-partisan organization dedicated to fostering the common values of the Euro-Atlantic community. Originally formed in 1990 around the pro-NATO lobby in the first post-Cold War Bulgarian Parliament, the Atlantic Club has grown to include members from all walks of life: government officials, member of the academias, military officers, businessmen and journalists. The Club works to promote Bulgaria's integration with NATO and with the Euro-Atlantic political, security and economic structures. Within Bulgaria, the Atlantic Club serves the broader purpose of supporting democracy, human rights, free market economy and the rule of law.

The Atlantic Club’s activities focus largely on raising public awareness about security and international affairs. The Atlantic Club sponsors visits and speeches by distinguished speakers, and by domestic and foreign experts in this area. The Club has hosted President Peter Stoyanov and Prime Minister Ivan Kostov, as well as other leading Bulgarian politicians and statesmen from different parts of the political spectrum. The list of international guest speakers includes the Nobel Peace Prize Laureates Lech Walesa, Shimon Peres and the XIV Dalai Lama of Tibet. Several Heads of States and Governments addressed the Atlantic Club, among them being: Tony Blair of Britain, Romano Prodi of Italy, Mesut Yilmaz of Turkey, Jose-Maria Aznar of Spain, Lyubcho Georgievski of Macedonia, Mikulas Dzurinda of Slovakia, as well as Mircea Snegur of Moldova and Mario Soares of Portugal. NATO Secretaries General Dr. Manfred Wörner, Dr. Javier Solana and Lord George Robertson, as well as Lord Carrington, the Chairman of NATO Military Committee Gen. Klaus Naumann, SACEURs Gen. George Joulwan and Gen. Wesley Clark also addressed the Atlantic Club. His Holiness Pope John Paul II gave an Audience to the Atlantic Club in 1994. The Atlantic Club was also host of the mass rally for President Bill Clinton who visited Sofia in 1999.

Other distinguished guest speakers of the Atlantic Club are US Secretaries of Defence William Perry and William Cohen, UK Defence Secretary Michael Portillo, Emilio Colombo, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Secretaries General of WEU Willem van Eekelen and Jose Cutileiro, Secretary General of the Council of Europe Daniel Tarschys, Deputy UN Secretary General Vladimir Petrovsky, and Director of CIA William Colby.
The Atlantic Club was the first Atlantic NGO to be formed on a non-NATO territory, even before the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. This fact has contributed to the Atlantic Club's international reputation, and has allowed it to remain at the forefront of change in East-West relations. The Atlantic Club is the first non-NATO member (since 1992) of the Atlantic Treaty Association, (ATA). ATA is a non-governmental network affiliated with NATO, with branches in thirty-two NATO member and partner states. The President of the Atlantic Club, Dr. Solomon Passy, was the first Vice-Chairman of ATA (1996-1999) originating from a partner country. In 1997 ATA held its 43rd Annual Assembly in Sofia, hosted by the Atlantic Club. The Atlantic Club maintains an active network of counterparts in North America and Israel and has assisted in the establishment of Atlantic associations in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The United States counterparts of the Club include the German Marshal Fund of the United States, the American Jewish Committee, the Atlantic Council of the United States, the New Atlantic Initiative and RAND Corporation.

In 1998 the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria was awarded the Annual Manfred Wörner Fellowship by NATO HQ for its strategic study on "NATO’s Global Mission in the 21st Century" completed in the spring of 2000.

In keeping with its role as a NATO Information Center, the Atlantic Club is responsible for the publication of information about the activities of NATO and other international organizations, including information on scholarships, seminars and research opportunities. The NATO Information Center in Sofia, the Manfred Wörner Foundation and the Euro-Atlantic Youth Club, all of them co-founded by the Atlantic Club, play an important role in the Club's outreach program.

In its capacity of a think-thank the Atlantic Club sponsors seminars and conferences as part of on-going Atlantic Club programs in a variety of fields such, as sustainable development, aerospace and Antarctic research, and market economy studies, respectively as a co-founder of the Bulgarian Aerospace Agency, the Bulgarian Antarctic Institute and the Economic Policy Institute.

During the Kosovo crisis the Atlantic Club acted as a pillar of the public support for NATO's actions against the dictatorship of Milosevic.

The Atlantic Club enjoys the highest public recognition in Bulgaria, and leads the public opinion polls for popularity among think-thanks and NGOs. It is, therefore, able to lend its
expertise and support to other local initiatives, by acting as a sponsor and/or providing important contacts through its network of members and associates.

An important part of this network is the Atlantic Club's International Board of Directors, whose members are prominent individuals from Bulgaria, Europe and North America working for Atlanticism or humanism in general.

The Founding President and CEO (since 1991) of the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria is the Honorable Dr. Solomon Passy (43).
ABOUT THE ATLANTIC CLUB OF BULGARIA

Dr. Manfred Wörner, NATO Secretary General, in his cable for the 1st Anniversary of the Atlantic Club on March 26, 1992, said:

"Today we celebrate the first anniversary of the Bulgarian Atlantic Club. This is an event of substantive and symbolic significance, substantive, because the Bulgarian Club has accomplished much in forging relations between the people of Bulgaria and the Euro-Atlantic Community. Symbolic, because as the first of its kind Central and Eastern Europe, its foundation represented the beginning of a new era. I warmly congratulate the Bulgarian Atlantic Club on its contribution and look forward to its future accomplishments."

Dr. Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO, on July 8, 1999 in his address to the Bulgarian Parliament, said:

"Your Atlantic Club is one of the most active organizations supporting the Alliance."

Lord George Robertson, Secretary General of NATO on February 10, 2000 in his address to the Bulgarian Parliament, said:

"Allow me to single out the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria. For many years, this group has been among the most active of all Partner countries in marshalling public support for the Alliance. They have done the work of pioneers. And their work is paying off. Today, NATO-Bulgaria relations are better than ever. And Bulgaria's road into European structures and institutions is irreversible."

Ambassador Robert Hunter, US Permanent Representative to NATO, on October 20, 1997 in his address to the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria, said:

"May I say a special word to my friend, the head of the Atlantic Club, Solomon Passy, for his perseverance for the efforts that he has made on behalf of your country and in your country's relationship with NATO. I know all of us at NATO are deeply grateful to him for what he has done here, and I think the people of Bulgaria owe him a great debt of gratitude, since he has done so much to ensure that you are able to take your rightful place with the nations of the West."
US President Bill Clinton, in his greetings to the participants of the 43rd General Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association in Sofia (2-8 October 1997), said:

"I am very pleased to extend greetings and best wishes to the participants of the 43rd Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association. This meeting is particularly significant because it is the Assembly's first after the NATO Summit in Madrid and because it is the first held in a non-NATO country. The holding of this meeting in Bulgaria today is a tribute to President Stoyanov, Prime Minister Kostov, Mayor Sofianski, Solomon Passy, and the Bulgarian people as a whole. You should all feel very proud of your commitment to and success in bringing Bulgaria into the European family of the democratic nations."

Bulgarian President Petar Stoyanov on April 6, 1998, on the occasion of the 7th Anniversary of the Atlantic Club, said:

"It is not a sign of good manners to praise the host at a birthday party, because the occasion may make this appear somewhat insincere. Moreover, when the host is only seven years old, this may seem wrong from a pedagogical point of view. However, it will be unfair not to mention that over these seven years the Atlantic Club brought about a significant change in the way of thinking in Bulgaria, and in my opinion, this is its major contribution.

Since your birth you know what you want to say and you say it with courage, wit and originality. It gives me, indeed, great pleasure to congratulate today the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria on the occasion of its seventh anniversary, to urge it to continue to work with the same boldness, the same courage and intellect for the new thinking, which has emerged in the Bulgarian society, which has gained momentum and which, I am convinced, will bear genuine fruit in the foreseeable future. Thank you from the bottom of my heart. I am certain that the Atlantic Club will have a really bright future."

Bulgarian President Petar Stoyanov on April 4, 2000, on the occasion of the 9th Anniversary of the Atlantic Club, said:

"Let me first of all congratulate the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria, its members and followers with the 9th
Anniversary of the Club. I would like to wish all the members of the Club to continue disseminating the ideas of Atlanticism in Bulgaria in the forthcoming years, so that they and we all may welcome the successes we deserve.

Therefore, today I would like to wish all of you, the members and supporters of the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria, to continue developing your activities as persevering as you have been working by now, to keep on preparing the Bulgarian society for that long waiting event by all of us, Bulgaria’s membership in NATO and I want to wish it happens as soon as possible.

I wish it happens before not to long for the success of Bulgaria, for the success of all of us, for the success of our children, which I believe, will live in a new world. A world in which freedom and democracy, supremacy of law and principles of market economy will predominate. A world in which talent, professionalism, honesty will be of utmost importance for prosperity of all people. Waiting for the new world to come, I wish you Mr. President, dear ladies and gentlemen to go on working as hard as you do now.”

His Holiness Pope John II, on November 14, 1994, in his address to the Atlantic Club’s Delegation, said:

“"It is a pleasure for me to be able to welcome the Delegation of the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria which brings together distinguished representatives of religion, cultural, political and labour interests in you country. Your Organization has set itself the goal of advancing your country along the path of new relationships in the wider context of Europe and the West in general. Among your concerns you number the environment, solidarity with the weaker sectors of society, the fostering of justice, peace and development. Undoubtedly benefit from you concerted efforts to promote observance of the rule of law and unfailing respect for those fundamental human rights without which no society can prosper.

I invoke God’s abundant blessings upon you and upon all the people of Bulgaria.”