

**THE ENLARGEMENT OF NATO:
CULTURAL LESSONS AND PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES**

— AN ESSAY IN GEOCULTURAL PHILOSOPHY —

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„If NATO did not exist today,
would we have to invent it?
The answer is, emphatically, yes.”¹

¹ Talbott 1999.

1. Introduction

Political philosophy has always been one of the main fields of general philosophy. There are two basic senses of political philosophy. The one is concerned with traditional politico-moral questions, such as the problem of 'dirty hands' or the more general relationship between ethics and political action. The other consists in applied philosophy, that is in a systematic employment of philosophical means in political, cultural and historical analysis with the explicit purpose of arriving at important lessons for the future.² In what follows I offer a consideration of the second kind of political philosophy. My methodology is based on philosophical considerations of historical events and their structures, an approach sometimes termed 'geopolitics'.³ Yet, the present paper would be geopolitical if and only if it remained on the level of a strategic analysis of geography, history and politics; but it goes beyond them, and in the final sections my paper becomes an analysis of the relationship between politics and culture as well as culture and general philosophy. Hence I term the category of my paper 'geocultural philosophy'.⁴

In view of some past experiences and possible future developments I shall argue for the reconsideration of the framework in which the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been considered. While NATO came into being as a military organization, already the Preamble of the Washington Treaty points out that

The Parties of the Treaty... are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.⁵

² With reference to some perspicuous failure of historical prediction, such as the Marxist ideas, some philosophers argued for the impossibility of any sort of substantive anticipation of historical events. The best one can reach is the probabilistic prediction of historical trends. See Popper 1979.

³ Blair 1995; Brzezinski 1997; Hillen and Noonan 1998.

⁴ An alternative term would be cultural philosophy or philosophy of culture. But cultural philosophy is concerned with the comparative description and analysis of particular human cultures, sometimes — as for instance in the phenomenology of religion — with the tacit presupposition that there is an abstract realm of being, 'culture', which can be typically described. Cultural philosophy is concerned however with political and strategic thinking too, that is with problems present in geopolitics. Geocultural philosophy is thus designed to connect these various fields. In the present paper it is not my purpose to work out the systematic basis of my approach; I only point out that geocultural philosophy has a metaphysical, and more particularly an ethical foundation which possesses an immediate relevance to political philosophy in the sense of political ethics.

⁵ Brzezinski 1997.

Freedom, civilization, the principle of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law are clearly cultural values. By accepting the eminent role of these values in the Treaty, the possibility of a political or, more widely, cultural approach to the role of NATO is clearly admitted. The legitimacy of this approach is reinforced by the words of the New Strategic Conception (NSC) of 1999:

The Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, which recognizes the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defense dimension. This broad approach forms the basis for the Alliance to accomplish its fundamental security tasks effectively, and its increasing effort to develop effective cooperation with other European and Euro-Atlantic organizations as well as the United Nations.⁶

The stronger emphasis on the broad understanding of security is an answer to the new strategic situation in Europe. After the Cold War period NATO has found itself in a situation in which the redefinition of its strategic identity is clearly one of its most important tasks. NATO intends, on the one hand, to maintain its traditional role concerning the 'indivisible security' of North America and Europe.⁷ On the other hand, the collapse of the 'designated enemy' in Europe — that is the Soviet Union — is obviously modifying NATO's emphasis from the traditional standpoint of deterrence and defense to the more complex approach of partnership and crisis management.⁸ With this change, political factors come into the fore in the policy of NATO; and together with the political factors cultural considerations concerning the future of NATO become more relevant.

In this paper I say that not only the new strategic situation in Europe necessitates a more complex approach to the status and the future of NATO, but also some global strategic interests of North America and especially the United States of America. I introduce the technical term 'enrooting' and mean thereby the process of political and cultural establishing of a military power in a given region of the world.⁹ I argue that in spite of modern military

⁶ NSC, 25.

⁷ NSC 27.

⁸ NSC 10.

⁹ The word 'enroot' is quite a rare one. It reappeared in the English language in the Renaissance (see Baugh, A. C. and Cable, Th. 1993, paragraph 168). It is considered to be the direct translation of the French 's'enraciner'. Thus its basic meaning is 'to establish or insert firmly by or as if by roots; implant.' On a more general level it means 'establish'. I use the term in the general sense with the technical definition I give in the text. Accordingly, 'enrooting' means 'inculturation' in the special sense I describe.

In common American usage it is understood in the sense of 'en rout'. Another meaning is something like 'dwell in'. Thus William Blake writes:

technologies, the US as 'the first global power'¹⁰ needs enrooting; it needs to have a much closer political and cultural connection with some territories of the world in order to maintain global power for a long time. I shall argue too that the unification processes in Europe offer the possibility of enrooting. A high level coordination of the various European unification developments, such as the enlargement of NATO and the expansion of the European Union needs to be understood as the necessary means of keeping the balance of power in Europe. A complex approach to the question of the European balance of power makes it inevitable, however, to realize the process of enrooting in some of the European regions. Inasmuch as the security of the US is closely connected to the balance of power in Europe, enrooting is important in the global perspective.

The discussion of the enrooting problem needs to be based on an analysis of the traditional cultural regions of Europe. So I shall argue that the process of enrooting should be realized in that cultural region of Europe where we find rich political and cultural traditions which have been most dramatically mutilated during the 20th century. The region in question is what used to constitute the territories of the Habsburg Monarchy together with its immediate peripheries. Enrooting in this region presupposes unification of some important elements of the local traditions which can in principle lead to a political reinforcement of the region in Europe in which most of the European wars of the past hundred years were directly or indirectly originated. The cultural approach to the balance of Europe offers the possibility of reaching some more general conclusions as to the future of Europe. I shall argue that the European cultural synthesis must be able to handle all the significant traditions in Europe and has to be skeptical about apartheid attempts, visible or concealed. Such a synthetic approach can provide the framework necessary for a balanced European future, which is in its turn important for Euro-Atlantic security. I shall finally point out that philosophy, in the sense I define the term, is an important component in realizing the process of Europe's cultural synthesis.

As to the particular development of my paper,

I shall first have a look at the US as 'the first global power' (2).

I then briefly investigate the nature of NATO and the problem of the

As when the thunderbolt down falleth on the appointed place
 Fell down down rushing ruining thundering shuddering
 Into the Caverns of the Grave & places of Human Seed
 Where the impressions of Despair & Hope enroot forever

(A World of Darkness. THE FOUR ZOAS. The torments of Love & Jealousy in The Death and Judgement of Albion the Ancient Man).

¹⁰ See Brzezinski 1997. The Soviet Union was rather the largest continental power, since it lacked the necessary means of rapid military transport

enlargement (3).

I consider the relationship between the European Union and NATO (4)
and explain what I call the enrooting problem (5).

Next, I shall consider Europe's traditional regions with reference to the important fact of the emergence of a new state in Eastern-Europe, Ukraine (6).

In (7) I discuss the enrooting problem in Central Europe and raise the idea of a new form of cooperation among South-Eastern European Countries (SEEC).

In (8) I clarify the relationship between politico-cultural regions and philosophical traditions and distinguish between the various philosophical traditions in Europe. I conclude that the most promising area for enrooting is the SEEC region in Europe.

In (9) I point out that, parallel to the various European regions, we can speak of various concepts of European philosophy. I briefly characterize these concepts and offer a longer discussion of what I call ECAT philosophy.

In (10) I relate the cultural needs of the SEEC region to ECAT philosophy and conclude that the enrooting problem can be solved on various levels, but — from the geocultural point of view — most importantly on the philosophical one. Such a solution, as I try to show, can lead to a renaissance of European politics and culture.

I then offer in (11) a list of the most important notions of my paper. I argue that the US and NATO need Europe for their well established global purposes; but Europe too needs the US and NATO in order to reach a new synthesis in its history.

2. The United States of America as the 'first global power'

Historically, the US has acquired the status of the 'first global power' in three phases. The first phase lasted from the American Civil War to the end of World War (WW) I. The second lasted from the end of WW I to the end of WW II. And the third phase consisted in the Cold War years between the end of WW II and the downfall of the Soviet Union in 1991. As a result of the first period, the US became capable of playing the role of a military power of international significance.¹¹ The US's participation in WW I was a logical consequence of two factors: on the one hand, the rapid growth of its economic, technical, political and military potential; and on the other hand the historically and culturally based interest of the US in European matters. The US was not only one of the victorious states in WW I, but it was the

¹¹ The American-Spanish War (in which the US expanded its protectorate to Cuba in 1898) was the first important step of the US as a military world power.

most important such power — at that time, a kind of *primus inter pares*.¹² During the years between the two world wars, the Soviet Union, Germany, Japan and the US emerged as the most powerful candidates for exercising world wide influence. The victory of the Allied Powers in WW 2 and the end of National Socialist Germany and imperial Japan led to a completely new situation in modern history. For some decades only two military ‘superpowers’, the US and the Soviet Union were able to exercise global influence.

It is important to note that just after WW 2 the US seemed to be dominating rather the seas around the world, while the Soviet Union was acknowledged to be the number one continental power.¹³ The Cold War period was differently used by the US and the Soviet Union. While the Soviet Union was quite successful in acquiring new political and strategic positions in China, Korea, Vietnam, Africa and Cuba, the United States concentrated not so much on political and military expansion as on the rapid development of technology and strengthening links with its traditional and newly acquired allies especially in Europe, but also in Asia (Japan, Korea, Australia). The fact that the Soviet Union led the politics of military expansion to the detriment of supporting technological and economic growth, rooted perhaps in the very nature of the Soviet system. The organization of power of the Soviets had always been characterized by the parasitic mechanism of exploiting existing economical and political systems for their own purposes. For the first two decades, the system exhausted was the old Russian one with all the remaining political and cultural structures and economic potentialities. In two decades, just by the time these sources were essentially worn out, the new situation in international politics seemed to be able to satisfy the new economic needs of the country. First Nazi Germany and then the Western powers provided the Soviet Union with a variety of economic means, most importantly — after the invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany in 1941 — military supplies. The victory in WW 2 brought new and rich sources for the Soviet Union which was able to maintain the system for some more decades. But because of the structural problems of the state, and most emphatically because of the totalitarian character of its oppressive political

¹² The US was moreover considered sometimes as the ‘common enemy’ of the European states. Thus Max Scheler, one of the leading German philosophers of his age, in a paper written in 1917 still hopes that the destruction of Germany can be avoided by the cooperation of France and Germany *against* the US. See Scheler 1933.

¹³ By the end of WW II the Soviet Union had a military force of more than five millions of soldiers; its tanks and airplanes outnumbered any other country’s capacities, including the US. For tactical reasons and especially because of the US’s nuclear bombs, Stalin did not risk any serious military confrontation in Europe. Instead, he rapidly changed the field of battle to China and then to Korea. Soviet support in both countries secured convincing military dominance; and this success created a tradition for the coming decades when the Soviet Union cleverly avoided face-to-face military confrontation with the US, but at the same time expanded its power either to background territories (such as Africa) or

ideology, the Soviet Union was doomed to collapse after a while, a perspective recognized by many already in the late 1940s.¹⁴

The disintegration of the Soviet Union marked the end of the third phase in the development of the United States on its way to be the single world power by the beginning of the new millennium. The US has succeeded, first, to get foothold on the European continent already by the end of the 1940s, the most important event of this having been the organizing of NATO. Second, the US succeeded not only in preventing the Soviets from expanding its influence to many areas (with the spectacular exceptions of Cuba and Vietnam), but also in organizing a world economy based on the rapid unification of markets and the astonishing development of new technologies. The emergence of the computer-based new industrial revolution — the basis of today's 'new economy' — has then definitively decided the struggle. The Soviet Union was not capable of maintaining its expansionist politics and rival the economic and technological development of the Western powers at the same time. And while China was able to withdraw from one of the fields of confrontation by the end of the 1970s — when China's new economic politics began —, the Soviet Union existed in a situation in which it was impossible to get off the rails either in politics or in economy.¹⁵ Thus it was no surprise — at least for observers who intimately knew the system — that the radical political and economic reforms at the end of the 1980s were not able to control the explosion-like disintegration of the Soviet Empire. Consequently, there has remained only one world power on the global stage, the US with all the challenges and tasks of a radically new situation in the history of mankind.

As a brief characterization of today's situation it is important to recall the following facts. The United States as the first global power is still in a peculiar situation. Although it exists on a large island so to say — on the 'American Island' — its military power is based on three crucial

to countries where it was able to organize revolts and ensure political dominance (as in Cuba).

¹⁴ Thus the Hungarian writer, Sándor Márai, who left the country in 1948 and moved to the US, writes in his *Diary of 1949*: „It is most possible that Russian Bolshevism just suffered a deadly strike: It has won in China.” See Márai 1999, p. 91.

¹⁵ As to the history of the Chinese-Russian relations it is interesting to note that China's economic opening at the end of the 1970s had been indirectly catalyzed by the earlier rigorous Maoist orthodoxy. It was Mao-tze-Tung who refused the Soviet policy of *détente* at the beginning of the 1960s. This conflict became expressed in military confrontations between China and the Soviets which, after Mao's death, has led to China's attempts to find a new identity by the 1970s. As a reaction, China's spectacular success in industrial and technological modernization has led to the deepening crisis of the Soviet leadership which, after the military failure in Afghanistan, was desperately seeking the point of outbreak. 'Perestroika' and 'Glasnost' came however too late: there was no organic way to modernize the Soviet system by the end of the 1980s.

factors. First on the existence of the huge reserve of sophisticated nuclear weapons. This is what eminently makes the US a global power. Second, on the military presence of the US in almost every important corner of the world from Australia to Japan, and from South-Africa to Alaska. Military presence is secured by the necessary military means, by military bases in various countries, and by the capacity of rapid military transfer. Third, the US is a leading member of various alliances, most importantly NATO and ASEAN. Below I shall concentrate on the third factor of the military politics of US and on its specific problems especially in Europe. These factors however would not be sufficient to maintain the US as the single world power. It is the country's unique technological and economic achievements which provide it with the principal role.

In view of my below discussion of NATO it is useful to call attention to a common misunderstanding which is popular in books analyzing the strategic situation of the US in the world. It is often alleged that there are many parallels between the classical Roman Empire and today's United States, such as for instance the cultural role of the Romans in the Hellenic world; or the legally based rule of the Romans over various nations which lacked the necessary traditions or potential to organize entire states with all its human and natural resources and functions.¹⁶ But as opposed to these views it is important to note that the Roman Empire was basically a continental power. Although it controlled the Mediterranean Sea as well, but was not the kind of power based especially on its rule of the seas.¹⁷ Second, the Romans wanted to build a rigorously centralized empire all around the Mediterranean Sea. Third, the Romans acknowledged the superiority of the Hellenic culture and were ready to embrace it in many ways and forms.¹⁸ These features, however summarily we conceive of them, are not characteristic of today's US. The US is not a continental power in relation to the rest of the world; its power is importantly based on the capacity of rapid military transfer to any part of the world. Second, the US does not for the time being seem to be willing to build an empire

¹⁶ Huntington 1998; Brzezinski 1997.

¹⁷ This type of power were the various states of the Phoenicians who founded, among other cities, Carthage too. The wars between Rome and Carthage were precisely between a continental and a marine power.

¹⁸ There is a third parallel present in the literature. It is often said that the collapse of the Western part of the Roman Empire was due — among economic factors such as high inflation rate — to moral weakness which became expressed in the fast increase of a hedonistic outlook among the Romans. While this thesis may be true — together with the additional notion to the effect that Christianity came too late to stop the trend — it is important to have a look at what led to the collapse of the Delian Confederacy (for its importance in my analysis, see below). Some historians seem to agree that one of the important factors was the Athenians' unjust behavior in economical and political matters with their allies which became more and more alienated from Athens and became closer to the Spartans during the Peloponnesian War.

comparable to what the Soviet Union attempted to do. The US wants to have allies of various degrees, but not an empire in the classical sense of the word; not even in the sense of the British Empire. Third, there is no culture in the world today regarded as superior by most of the citizens of the US. European culture would be in principle in that position, but many theorists seem to feel that the US is the historical fulfillment of the European cultural traditions, and it is thus superior — both scientifically and in matters of general culture — to Europe.¹⁹ Thus the historical parallel between the Roman Empire and the United States is not plausible.

It would be however interesting to try another parallel: the one between the US and the Delian Confederacy of a number of Greek cities lead by Athens in the 5th century BC. This confederacy was organized originally against a puissant continental power, Persia. After the defeat of Persia the confederacy existed under the rule of the Athenians for some decades. The structure of the confederacy was based on two pillars: intense commerce among the partaking cities; and the military capacities of the Athenians based on their then unique naval technology. While the *raison d'être* of the confederacy was originally the fight against the Persians, later on — when the relations between the Greeks and the Persians became more stable — the Athenian rule took more and more excessive forms. And while the Athenians considered themselves to be the most cultured ones among the Greeks, their superiority was not acknowledged by many of the traditional Greek states, such as Sparta.

The lessons to be drawn from historical examples are often misleading. But there is a structure in history in which a certain combination of fractals become visible. Thus for instance one important lesson of the history of the Delian Confederacy, and especially of the history of Athens, is that a global power needs to have stable continental pillars which cannot be substituted by means of rapid transportation, either by traditional ships or by the most advanced airplanes. Not even the most sophisticated 'Star War' system seems to be capable of securing more than the role of a suppressive power with no cultural establishment. In the long run however, a military power seems to be dependent on its political and cultural basis; and the building of such bases needs what I call enrooting: long range political and cultural

¹⁹ The feeling of cultural superiority is visible in many fields, thus in academic philosophy. While at the beginning of the 20th century American philosophers felt impressed by the results of the then contemporary European philosophy, after the rise of Neo-Positivism and parallel to the military clash between the US and Germany, Continental philosophy has become synonymous with a kind of thinking inferior to Anglo-Saxon style analytical philosophy. This picture is valid even today, in spite of the fact that there are minor changes, such as the ones mirrored in the work such philosophers as Richard Rorty. But Rorty does not really see the genuine values of European philosophy, and his relativism is not able to conceive of them. Most probably there will be a period in US philosophy in which American philosophers will rediscover the values of European culture and use them as their most important resource.

establishment of the power in question. This seems to be the way not only to the preservation of global power, but also to creating and upholding cultural supremacy. NATO has been founded just in the light of this recognition. But for a long time it was interpreted as a merely military power which coordinates and organizes the military matters of its allies. The existence of a designated enemy and the imminent danger of the nuclear war concealed the need for some 'broad approach to security'. Today's strategic situation however makes it necessary not only to recognize the importance of the broad approach to security, but also the urgent formulation of its detailed conception.

3. NATO and Its Enlargement

If the US is the first global power in the history of mankind, then it has two powerful arms, ASEAN in Asia and NATO in Europe. ASEAN is supported by the specific US-Japan and US-Korean relations, somewhat similar to the specific US-British relations supporting the presence of NATO in Europe. For historical and cultural reasons NATO is the closer sort of organization than ASEAN, for Europe is the cultural and political origin of the US and during the last half a century the most important military and political decisions have been made with respect to Europe. The emergence of China and the collapse of the Soviet Union mark an important shift in this matter. While Asia and especially China becomes more and more important, Europe seems to struggle for escaping the imminent political and economic decline.²⁰ Yet NATO will remain for some more decades the most important military organization in which the US plays the central role. As the US's National Security Strategy for a New Century (NSS) writes,

European stability is vital to our own security. The United States has two strategic goals in Europe. The first is to build a Europe that is truly integrated, democratic, prosperous and at peace -- a realization of the vision the United States launched 50 years ago with the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Our second goal is to work with our allies and partners across the Atlantic to meet the global challenges no nation can meet

²⁰ The technological gap between the US and the EU, and between Japan and the EU, does not seem to diminish. The population of Europe is shrinking; and the economic growth has been slower than that of the US. The ECU has shown a spectacular fall of value since its introduction in 1999. It is clearly the East European regions which show a much stronger impulse of economic growth. In the first half of 2000 the growth of GDP in Hungary has been almost 7 percent; in Poland, 4,5, and in the Czech Republic about 4 percent. The average European growth has been in the same period 2,5 percent.

alone.²¹

The goals of the US can especially be carried out by NATO's gradual enlargement to more new members in Eastern Europe, and by developing an even more specific relations with Ukraine and Russia. Such a NATO will inevitably be important for the US in the Asian matters too, since Russia is a European as well as an Asian power.

It is significant to note here that the image of NATO as an „arm” of the US is in many ways misleading. First, the US is the leading member of NATO,²² but is not obliged to maintain its role for an unlimited period of time. Second, some European powers, France most importantly, aspires to play an important role in the integration of Europe. At the same time, the friction between NATO and France, and between the US and France, become from time to time visible.²³ Third, the US may consider some of its other interests, say, in Asia to be more important than the European ones, and thus may leave Europe to the Europeans. But in spite of these considerations a deeper look at the situation leads us to a different view. Although NATO is an organization of powers politically independent from one another, it is the vital interest of the US to maintain this alliance.²⁴ In spite of all the possibility of high-tech weapons capable of defending the US from almost all kinds of attack, the existence of the US has by today become closely integrated with its role as a world power. No doubt, if the US withdrew from the military bases and gave up its military dominance, new powers would step into its place, powers which may become in the end capable of dominating even the US itself. Thus the US is interested in maintaining both NATO and ASEAN as long as possible, even if the adaptation of their military and political structures to the changing circumstances becomes from time to time necessary.²⁵

The 1999 enlargement of NATO and then the war against Serbia has created a fait accompli with respect to the role of NATO. NATO will be maintained as an important or even decisive factor in the politics of the US; and will be kept under US leadership. And while the US will seek to have bilateral agreements with important powers in the world (such as Russia,

²¹ NSS, Ch. III.

²² As to the distinction between the role of the US as a 'leader' and as a 'dominator', see Hulsman 2000.

²³ „The French, in their insistence on the primacy of the nation and the nation-state, are sometimes frustrating for American policy, but the French desire to "exist" is a healthy factor in the international system as a whole, one which, among other things, serves to keep Americans awake to the fact that American perceptions and interests are not necessarily those of the world.”, McNair Paper 43.

²⁴ See 'the indivisible security' of North America and Europe, in accordance with the NSC.

²⁵ Hulsman 2000.

India or Iran), its global policy cannot be securely carried out without the means offered by NATO. Thus the enlargement of NATO is an organic part of the world policy of the US. The 1999 enlargement will possibly followed by further steps, such as the joining of some more states in Eastern Europe (some of the Baltic states, Slovakia, Slovenia, and perhaps Croatia and Austria). By the process of its enlargement NATO will be able to reach a clear cut situation in Europe: most of the European countries are integrated into NATO, while Russia will enjoy a specific status possessing bilateral agreements with the US and NATO. NATO has thus a role in the US world policy, without all the organizational complexities characteristic of the cooperation between NATO and the EU (the Western European Union and the European Security and Defence Identity), and between NATO and the rest of the European countries (OSCE).

The further steps in the process of enlargement of NATO seem to be important for some other reasons too. The political situation of many countries in Eastern Europe is far from being stable. Although there are less security problems today than were some years ago before the war against Serbia, the situation especially in Belarus, Ukraine, Moldavia, Rumania and Bulgaria is not especially comforting. Among the main factors of insecurity the following are to be especially mentioned. 1. Economic problems with mass poverty especially in Belarus, Moldavia and Ukraine. 2. Conflicting military and political interests especially between the Baltic states and Russia, Belarus and Poland, Moldavia and Ukraine, Rumania and Ukraine, Rumania and Bulgaria.²⁶ 3. Serious minority problems in the Baltic states, Moldavia, and Rumania. All these problems may lead to violent conflicts inside, and between, the countries mentioned, conflicts which may even take the form of armed maneuvers of some more or less limited scope. But any conflict in Eastern Europe may lead to unforeseeable consequences as seen during the disintegration of Yugoslavia. To prevent such conflicts and their consequences is an important task; and though the enlargement of NATO cannot depend solely on the aim of prevention, prevention may be one important factor among many others contributing to the further enlargement of NATO.

The enlargement of NATO may be regarded as one process among some others leading to the integration of Europe. Before I analyze briefly the relationship between NATO and the EU, I point out that the military structure provided by NATO is perhaps the most important network which is able to help the process of European integration. This is not altered by the fact that there are further military or quasi-military organizations in Europe possessing more or

²⁶ I do not mention the tensions between Rumania and Hungary, since the latter is already member of NATO.

less well defined relationship with NATO, such as the WEU and the ESDI. As compared with the WEU, NATO has a number of advantages which cannot be substituted by further developing the WEU.²⁷ In general, military security is of the greatest importance in view of the architecture of a political unity. For instance, in Hungary's economy, the official announcement of the country's joining NATO led to a spectacular increase of the volume of foreign investments in 1997. No wonder; especially because of the wars in Yugoslavia there had been only a slow economic increase before 1997. This example clearly shows that political and military balance is considered by most economic actors as one of the important factors in a country's general situation. So the enlargement of NATO has a wider significance than just the systematic expansion of military cooperation. And the possible further enlargement of NATO to some Baltic states, Slovakia, and Slovenia etc. will contribute to the integration of Europe in a complex fashion. It is obviously in the interest of the US to have a quite strong and unified Europe; a 'truly integrated' Europe in which military, political and economic structures are harmonized. Such a Europe will be capable of having some part of the financial burden of NATO much more as is the case now. And such a Europe will in principle be able to develop its economy and technology in order to contribute to the ever higher level technology of the Western military powers.

4. The European Union and NATO

In spite of the above comments on the general effects of the enlargement, NATO remains a basically military organization. But as mentioned above, the preamble of the Washington Treaty and some sentences in the NSC clearly signal NATO's more general, political and cultural commitments. In view of these it may seem that there are two parallel processes in Europe, the integration in NATO and in the EU. Even though there are formal platforms of coordination and a variety of informal ways of tackling common problems of the two organization, still their exact relationship are far from being clear. Obviously, the EU is based on a close French-German cooperation in economic, political and cultural matters; but even in the EU real political relations are somehow inextricable. This was evident for instance in the question of enlarging the EU. Just after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Hungary in

²⁷ Talbott: „We're in favor of ESDI. But while our support for the concept is sincere, it is not unqualified. ESDI is, in one respect, like EMU -- to work, it must reconcile the goal of European identity and integration on the one hand with the imperative of transatlantic solidarity on the other; it must reinforce, not duplicate or dilute the role of the Alliance as a whole; and it certainly must not attenuate the bonds between our defense and your own.”

1990, one leading European politician announced in Budapest that the enlargement of the EU would be realized in two years.²⁸ Nine years have passed since that time, a sufficient amount of time, according to Horace, even for a poem to turn out to be good or bad. But even now the closest possible year of the EU enlargement is 2005 or 2006. If it happens in 2005, fifteen years will have passed until the materialization of the plan of actual membership of some countries of the 'new democracies'. But such a span of time is enough for anything historical; and the obvious lack of a clearly defined schedule of the enlargement of the EU cannot be credibly explained either by the need of the 'internal reforms' of the EU or by the supposedly unprepared status of the possible members. An old law in political philosophy is that there is vacuum of power in a region if and only if there is no neighboring political power capable of carrying out some form of control. In Central Europe, many countries — such as the ones besides the new NATO members — still exist in a political vacuum, which explains their often chaotic circumstances in economic and political matters.²⁹ Since clearly there are neighboring and puissant powers in the region, their hesitation must be attributed to their indecision to expand influence. Political hesitation may have two basic reasons: either political weakness, or some other factors hindering determinate action. Since NATO has already enlarged the number of its members, it cannot be charged with inability. The EU however has not been able to act in a similar fashion which may be the sign of some kind of political impotence deriving either from tactical considerations or from the lack of strategic thinking. I do not say that the EU should have in any case been enlarged; but there should have been given a clear and convincing explanation of the hesitation of the EU with respect to the new members; or at least there should have been a clear and public narrative of what would happen to an Europe with no 'designated enemy'.

The hesitation is however quite understandable. If we have a look at the Balladur Plan and find such expressions as 'the variable geometry' of a 'Big Europe', or if we try to understand such expressions as the 'hard core' of a 'stratified Europe', then we may be able to have the right conclusion. The European Union is thinking of the general reform of its structures with the possible consequence that 'Big Europe' will consist of countries with a variety of rights and obligations; that is with a minimum of general rules equally valid to every

²⁸ The person was Dr. Otto von Habsburg, member of the European Parliament, in an interview given to the Hungarian television channel 'Duna'.

²⁹ A good example is Rumania; see the actual process of its regional elections in June, 2000. For many days after the elections there was no end result because of the lack of a well organized system of vote counting, and other kind of infrastructure to handle problems of legal appeals.

member of the EU. The new EU seems to become a strongly centralized organization with the 'hard core' in the middle (France, Germany and the Benelux states). Even if the centralization will bear the nice name of 'Europe of concentric circles', the fact still remains that the necessary institutions to govern such a Europe are still missing. The idea of the centralized Europe is an ideal with no concrete shape, and the real processes do not suggest quick materialization. Thus the conclusion of an observer seems to be plausible:

The European Union has little chance of ever becoming a super-state, notwithstanding whatever federal aspects it may ultimately have. French policy has never taken up the idealistic federalist idea that the Commission should become the Union's government, with the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers (the latter as a sort of European Bundesrat) sharing the tasks of democratic and parliamentary control of this government. The European nation-states will survive, and EU policymaking will remain centered in the Council rather than the Commission.³⁰

A further consequence not mentioned by the analyst is that the EU in the form of an 'institutional framework' will inevitably cause the reemergence of old cultural and political traditions. The now stronger position of the nation states is a sign of this development. Little wonder that French politics tries to emphasize the concept of the 'hard core' in the EU; and that, as an observer notes,

from the French point of view the risk in enlargement is that the French-German axis will weaken and that France will find itself in some ways cut off from its special German partner, isolated with the southern and western countries it has to an extent represented or embodied in European negotiations — Spain, Italy and Portugal.³¹

But the hesitation of the EU with respect to its enlargement does not give a good answer to the fears of French politics. It does not seem that irresolution is capable of solving historical political problems. There are natural developments in history which cannot successfully be manipulated by not taking part in them or by attempting to avert their course with bureaucratic means. Bureaucratic means taken in themselves, such as institutional settlements of political questions, do not seem capable of solving important tasks such as the 'true integration' of the European countries. There is much more needed here than only bureaucrats with a conscientious style of carrying out certain political orders. Grand style conceptions and a planetary understanding of the relationship of local and global perspectives are needed. But

³⁰ McNair Paper 43. Ch 2.

³¹ Ibid.

even though we have this, I do not believe that the reemergence of the regionalization of Europe can be stopped. The right attitude would be to cleverly make use of this process; an attitude still missing, as far as I see, in EU politics.

5. The Process of Regionalization

The developments of the past ten years have shown that the rapid economic growth of the Eastern European regions will inevitably lead to a new order of emphases in European politics. The swift expansion of economies, the mere fact of the number of the population, the slow but clear economic and political consolidation of such states as Ukraine, Belarus or Rumania show that the significance of these countries will become ever stronger. With their emergence, traditional regions of culture become more vigorous too. Thus for instance the presence of the Hungarian minority in Rumania or in Slovakia catalyze economical processes among these countries. Even if such processes are slowed down in many ways, a clear awareness of the common cultural region emerges. Similar processes are observable between the Scandinavian and the Baltic countries; between Poland and Ukraine; between Rumania and Moldavia, and so on.

This process can be called regionalization. Since German economy is the strongest among the ones on the border of the new democracies, the influence of German economy can hardly be totally suppressed. It is to be expected, then, that the present processes will lead to a situation close to the hypothetical one sketched above: with the emergence of the new economies, French influence cannot be secured to the desired extent. One solution of the problem is offered by Z. Brzezinski: the EU should enlarge its 'hard core' to Poland and to Ukraine.³² While the notion is plausible, it has several problems. First, Polish economy may become strongly dependent on German economy in the long run; and even if this will not happen and the political and economic structures of Poland can be kept under control, the same may not be done in Ukraine. Ukraine has a different position; its territory, the number of its population will make the country more significant than Poland. And the enlargement of the European 'hard core' to Ukraine may equally lead to a shift of emphasis, and perhaps to the so much feared 'isolation' of France. Here it must be emphasized the role of cultural traditions again. Ukraine has a traditional relation to Central Europe, a relation which most probably will become even more articulate in the future.

It may be said that a clear EU policy showing unhesitant resolution would have been able

to avoid the emergence of regionalization — most conspicuously perhaps in the case of Yugoslavia. But since it was hesitation which characterized the EU in important matters (from the Bosnian war to the recent sanctions against Austria), the process of regionalization will probably be very difficult to stop. The enlargement of NATO to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic has clearly encouraged such processes; and NATO has appeared in these countries as an organization able to act, and thus free of the ‘cunctator’ policy of the EU.³³ It must be noted too that even without NATO, on the natural grounds of the political processes, regionalization is spreading. Not only Kosovo offers an example of this, but — to mention another region with some inherent dangers — there are clear signs of the revival of ‘Transylvanianism’, a movement seeking a politically independent status for Transylvania in the Western territories of Rumania.

There is an even more serious aspect of the relationship between the EU and NATO. NATO obviously encourages European integration in a form which is favorable to the global purposes of NATO. But the question arises whether a strongly centralized Europe, based exclusively on the French-German partnership, can protect NATO’s interests in Europe. While NATO emphasizes the priority of the Euro-Atlantic stability, French preferences are not always quite clear in this matter.³⁴ It often seems that the French, besides the minute fulfillment of their duties in NATO and in other common organizations, do not wish to give up their independent conception of the European integration as was shown by the French behavior during the war against Serbia in 1999 or by the traditionally very close connections between Rumania and France. A centralized Europe may thus become critical from the point of view of NATO; and only by emphasizing the importance of the Euro-Atlantic security or the ‘indivisible security’ of North America and Europe, will NATO be able to control actual and possible historical processes now and in the future. The WEU is a good example here: as an organization hibernated for some decades, it has been awakened as an answer to the independent military needs of the European Union. This autonomy has however been successfully harmonized with the general purposes of NATO. As the NSC explains,

The European Union has taken important decisions and given a further impetus

³² Brzezinski 1997.

³³ Fabius Maximus Quintus, Roman dictator, was given the additional name ‘Cunctator’ or ‘the Delayer’ in 217 BC, because he was keeping to avoid the face-to-face military engagement with the army of Hannibal and thus contributed to Hannibal’s long military and strategic success in Italy.

³⁴ See the present conflict concerning the US’s plan to realize its own defense system, without involving its European partners.

to its efforts to strengthen its security and defence dimension. This process will have implications for the entire Alliance, and all European Allies should be involved in it, building on arrangements developed by NATO and the WEU. The development of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) includes the progressive framing of a common defence policy. Such a policy, as called for in the Amsterdam Treaty, would be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within the framework of the Washington Treaty.³⁵

The emphasis of the CFSP as a connecting link between NATO and the WEU — underpinned by NATO's resolution to make available its assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations — can be considered as an example of successful solution of problems raised by diverging interests. There are however some other similar problems, such as the differing evaluation of the political and cultural role of NATO in Europe by the French and the Americans.³⁶ A strongly centralized EU may have the tendency to emphasize objectives which are in conflict with the original principle of NATO as to 'keeping the Americans inside, and the Russians outside Europe'. But a strong centralization seems to inevitably provoke what I called regionalization. It is however interesting to note that regionalization has two sides: on the one hand it shows possible dissolution, the possible outburst of nationalism, political chaos, sometimes even actual war. On the other hand, it is a possibility of engineering new identities, controlling political and cultural processes, and — last but not least — realizing what I call enrooting. It is the latter aspect of regionalization on which NATO should concentrate its activity. NATO needs Europe for its strategic goals; and Europe too needs NATO in order to exist in the Euro-Atlantic security system and in a Europe which is 'truly integrated'.

I have so far argued that the relationship between the EU and NATO must be a balanced one; and Europe in the process of unification needs NATO's positive involvement. On the other hand, it is the interest of NATO too to be present in Europe for the following reasons:

1. The cooperation between the US and NATO provides the most important means against the still possible revival of Russian expansionism.
2. NATO's presence in the Mediterranean region is indispensable for the stability of the Middle and the Near East.
3. NATO is needed in what used to be Soviet Central Europe (from the Czech Republic to Ukraine, from Estonia to Bosnia) in order to safeguard security and to keep an eye on what is going on in Russia.

³⁵ „Important steps taken in this context include the incorporation of the WEU's Petersberg tasks into the Treaty on European Union and the development of closer institutional relations with the WEU.” NSC 17.

³⁶ McNair Paper 43.

4. NATO expresses the global interests of the US also in the sense that NATO's presence can preserve the balance of power in Europe, which does not only concern the relationship between the EU and its periphery, but also the EU's internal relations.

6. NATO in Europe: The Enrooting Problem

So far we have seen that there are well established US interests prohibiting either NATO's withdrawal from Europe (for instance leaving Europe to some combination of a French-Russian cooperation) or NATO's renouncing its political and cultural role in Europe. And even if one can argue that the main US interest is not a strong EU but an EU which is only moderately able to have a say in global political and military matters, NATO is still to find an organic pattern of its European presence. Here we meet the enrooting problem. As I mentioned above, the term 'enrooting' designates those political processes by which a state or an organization becomes capable of developing complex conditions of its long term presence in a natural and/or political region.

It can be argued that a military organization does not need any kind of enrooting. What it needs is military basis with all the necessary internal and external supplies, material and logistic structures, but there is no need of any kind of a more complex, say political connections between the region and the military organization. And in fact we have had several occasions to see that Soviet or American bases could or can even now exist in areas where there is almost no connection between the political and cultural structures of the region on the one hand, and the mere fact of the existence of the military basis on the other hand. But this kind of military presence is rather rare; it is more typical that the military presence is closely connected to the political system of the region and thus have a relation to the cultural circumstances as well. No doubt, the main reason why the Soviet Union did not keep the Jalta Agreement after 1948 in Central Europe, and the reason why it introduced in these countries some variation of Soviet totalitarianism, was the plan to establish its permanent presence in the region. The Soviet Union thus changed the political systems in the relevant countries and even attempted to completely reorganize the political and cultural life.³⁷ Where resistance emerged, such as in Berlin (1954), in Budapest (1956) or in Prague (1968), the Soviets enforced their interests by applying ruthless military means.³⁸

³⁷ Most excessively this happened in East Germany; more mildly perhaps in Poland. But in each country there was some characteristic form of the Soviet system totally dominating the political, economic and cultural life.

³⁸ In 1956 Budapest was damaged to a horrifying extent; and if the question as to whether there was a regular

I do not intend to suggest that there is anything acceptable in the way the Soviet Union exercised its kind of enrooting policy. Nor do I find it acceptable that, in the Baltic states, Soviet immigrants gradually took over all the important positions in society, state and culture, so much so that, at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, almost the half of the populations in these countries were already Russian or russified, and the rest had the articulate feeling of having been brutally suppressed. What I wish to emphasize is that a military power always needs a kind of enrooting if it has long term purposes in a region, and enrooting may take much more positive forms than it was the case with the Soviets in Central Europe. In general we may say that enrooting is an important factor in developing a common military and political structure and it always mirrors the political characteristics of the system seeking enrooting. Thus the Soviet enrooting was unfavorable not because of the fact of enrooting, but because of the despotic nature of the Soviet system. The enrooting of a power with high level civilization should be evaluated on the basis of the nature of its political system and cultural features.

The enrooting problem in our case has the following significance. The US is the first global power, but it exists in a natural isolation. According to some views,³⁹ the struggle for world power will most probably take new forms after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the power which has a stable continental background — such as China or Russia — has more chance to become victorious in the end. The truth of this view may be challenged by pointing out the nature of modern military machinery with ‘Star War’ systems, intercontinental missiles and the means of rapid transfer. True, by means of modern weapons a war can be won; but in order to win the peace too, one needs enrooting.

Enrooting, then, is to create,

1. a political system favorable to the military and political aims of a given power controlling the region.
2. It is a linguistic task in the sense that there must be a common language between the representatives of the local traditions and those of the world power seeking enrooting.
3. Enrooting means cultural synthesis too between the representatives of the military power and those of the local traditions.

In each point, enrooting may take various forms; but it remains what it is inasmuch as it

war in Hungary in 1956 should be answered on the basis of material destruction, the answer is clearly yes. (The question is important in the legal processes today against some key figures taking part in salvos against peaceful demonstrators).

³⁹ Brzezinski 1997.

provides a complex kind of political, economic and cultural synthesis. This synthesis can be termed 'moral' in the sense that human morality is precisely the field in which various needs, capacities and activities of the human being is coordinated. Therefore I believe the analyst who has asserted that

NATO has evolved into a moral instrument from a strategic instrument

is absolutely right.⁴⁰ Enrooting, in the last analysis, is to create the moral circumstances and conditions of a military power to be present in a region with long range purposes. This moral dimension is what I think enrooting should realize in a complex fashion. It seems to me that if there is no moral synthesis, neither there is enrooting; and if there is no enrooting, neither there is long term political and military presence; and if there is no such effort, neither there is the possibility of maintaining political influence and military control.

I have already mentioned the fact that, in spite of the impressive rhetoric of some politicians, there are actually two organizations trying to realize European unity: the EU and NATO. And even if there is a complex machinery of cooperation in political, economic and military terms, there are also diverging tendencies. The main reason of the divergence may be seen in the differing geographical and political status of the EU and NATO. The EU is rather a loosely organized political federation which has started to develop its more effective legal and institutional structures only recently. NATO is however a highly effective, rigorously organized military structure which has by now become aware of its political and cultural — we may even say, moral — tasks. But does not enrooting mean a kind of obligation of the US to NATO and especially to Europe, an obligation not acceptable from the point of view of the global interests of the United States? Could not we say that what is normally called 'Americanization' is already some form of enrooting, without however mixing up military matters with political and cultural ones? Is not the US able to intervene and change political processes whenever they become unfavorable to its interests?

As to the first question I say — as argued above — that the global interests of the US need not only military bases, not only systems of missiles, not only rapid transportation, but enrooting too. It seems to me that the United States — together with NATO — has two possibilities: either it develops a new form of empire building with all the necessary conditions to be realized; or it remains an isolated power with an in reality limited scope of influence. As

⁴⁰ Talbott 1999.

to the first option, a new style of empire building should change the present character of the US and NATO, a character more comparable to the Delian Confederacy than to the Roman Empire. *The name of the change is enrooting.* By enrooting, the US may be able to become a kind of 'Roman Empire' for the coming centuries, an empire realizing the synthesis of the European legacy and the American spirit.

As to the second option, the fact of the island-like position of the US suggests the possibility of repeating in some form the history of the British Empire. While the Empire could realize enrooting in many areas — especially in Australia and Canada —, it was not able to develop a lasting and effective political and cultural framework of cooperation in its territories. Characteristically, wherever the Empire was successful in realizing enrooting, its influence has proved to be lasting; and wherever it failed to have enrooting, its influence declined, as for instance in its territories in Africa. As an additional element it should be mentioned that, as a small island in Europe, Great Britain was not designed to control countries with strikingly different dimensions of territorial extension and population.

As to the second question, Americanization is a natural process present everywhere and it helps indeed the realization of what may become enrooting in certain regions. But enrooting and Americanization are two different things. Americanization is the spread of American popular culture and language; but enrooting means a conscious effort to develop political and institutional structures favoring the emergence of societal groups or elites supporting the global politics of the US in important points. And to the third question the answer is that the US is certainly capable of intervening militarily in many regions of the world; but the point after the collapse of the Soviet Union is not the capacity of military intervention (which would make the US 'the policemen of the world'), but rather to develop political, economic and cultural structures which guarantee the global interests of the US and NATO.

7. Europe's Regions and the Role of Ukraine

NATO is obviously not interested in reviving the traditional conflicts in Europe. But the downfall of the Soviet Union has inevitably lead to the revival of old rivalries not only between the Serbs and the Croats, the Czechs and the Slovaks, the Hungarians and the Rumanians and so on, but even between the French and the German. A cover picture of the Time magazine in 1991, which showed a Gulliver-Germany discovering its gigantic strength in a Europe of Lilliputian figures, reflected at least the fears of the reappearance of traditional conflicts in Western-Europe. The French-German conflict seems to have been solved by determinate

diplomatic efforts leading to the Maastricht Agreement, the European Monetary Union and the Petersberg Declaration of the WEU; but the emerging European Union with its somehow overcomplicated political structures does not seem to be able to offer a fast solution of all the traditional problems and tensions. The EU as the most important political partner of NATO shows then a heterogeneous political map which is to be taken into account when investigating the relationship between the EU and NATO.

There are four main historical regions of today's Europe:

The first contains countries in Western-Europe bounded to one another not only by geography but a close historical relationship too; this region can be termed 'Euro-Atlantic' (EA) containing France, Spain, Portugal, the Benelux countries, Great-Britain and Scandinavia.

The second region can be termed 'Euro-Continental' (ECON) covering the northern parts of continental Europe from Germany to Poland, the Baltic states and Belarus; Switzerland is to be counted to this area; but Austria, the Czech Republic or Hungary are certainly not.

The third region can be termed 'Euro-Catholic' (ECAT) containing Austria, the Czech Republic, Italy, Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia, Slovakia. Their unity is historical and cultural, based especially on their Latin (Roman Catholic) cultures. There is fact a close cultural relationship, even a similarity in attitude, between a Czech, a Bavarian, a Hungarian or a Croat.

And the fourth region is 'Euro-Orthodox' (EO) comprising Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece. This region is delimited, again, culturally; by the actual presence of cultural traditions originating in the Greek Orthodox Church. This region seems to enter in our days the Western territories of Rumania which for centuries belonged to the ECAT region. But today not only the spread of the Rumanian Orthodox population, but a boom in building gigantic Byzantine style Orthodox churches in the smallest Hungarian village, create the impression that the borders of traditional regions can be changed to a certain extent.

Let me note that Spain and Portugal are Catholic countries, but now they are politically quite far from the rest of Europe's traditionally Catholic states such as Austria. Located in the Atlantic region, they are much closer to France both geographically and culturally. Germany belongs politically just as strongly to the EA region as to the Continental one. Its Atlantic position is however something new, as its history connects the country to its eastern neighbors, such as Poland or the Czech Republic. Scandinavia, especially for cultural reasons, are located in the Atlantic region; but the Baltic states, even if showing the effects of an ever stronger Scandinavian influence, traditionally belong to what I term the ECON region. The unity of the orthodox countries is obvious; yet there are strong ECON influences in Ukraine, Rumania and

Serbia; and the presence of Moslem minorities is also important in Bulgaria, Serbia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

One may raise the problem to the effect that the above division of the regions of Europe presupposes a scheme of mixed categories. The classification contains obviously religious aspects, such as in the cases of the ECAT or the EO regions. On the other hand, the EA and ECON parts are defined rather on geographical grounds. The answer is that geography is important but is often overwritten by cultural elements. Thus Germany belongs to what I call the ECON region, although South-Western Germany (Bavaria) is strongly Catholic and culturally belongs to what I term the ECAT region. And similarly Rumania asserts itself to belong to the EO region both geographically and culturally, yet its political orientation has often been Euro-Atlantic during the past eighty years. Thus neither geography nor religious traditions are exclusively decisive in my classification; and the fringes of the divisional parts always show interesting mixtures political and cultural traditions and trends.

The regional division of Europe has a political component which seems to be more strongly stressed today than earlier. One of the main objectives of the EU has precisely been the disintegration of some of the regional divisions in Europe, most importantly the dissolution of the cultural, political and economic frontiers between France and Germany. As I pointed out above, the main fear from a unified Germany has been that France, parallel to Germany's growing influence in Eastern-Central Europe, may become isolated and thus gets close to the position characteristic before WW 2. It is however important to point out that the collapse of the Soviet Union has dramatically changed the situation. The existence of the Soviet Union with its zone of influence in Central Europe can be conceived of as the historical enlargement of the EO region (even if Marxist-Leninist ideology makes the term 'Euro-Orthodox' not fully appropriate). It was nevertheless the Soviet rule in Central Europe which made possible the dissolution of most of the frontiers in Western Europe and the economic, cultural, and political unification of the countries there.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union has led to the reappearance of at least two regions which did not seem to exist for several decades: the ECON and the ECAT regions. These have reemerged as soon as new states came into existence in their territories, such as the Baltic states, Ukraine, Slovenia, Slovakia and Croatia. These countries have been seeking some appropriate form of their cooperation, that is a form which resembles previous historical formations. For instance the Visegrad Cooperation comprising Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland has some reminiscence of the political cooperation between these countries in earlier centuries; and it raises the memory of the existence of earlier cultural and

political units. Austria's new interest in the Visegrad Cooperation is the clear sign of awakened memories; and Hungary's efforts to have a distinguished foreign policy as to Austria, Croatia, Slovakia and Slovenia reveals the same kind of interest.

Even if refused to be taken into account, the reappearance of the earlier cultural regions in Europe is a process which cannot easily be altered. There are however plans as to use this processes in a way contributing to the security of Europe.⁴¹ There is the plan, for instance, to base the main structure of the European Union — also the main structure of the US's European policy — on the enlargement of the French-German cooperation to Poland and Ukraine. It could be then formed an axis from France to Ukraine in which the most powerful and most populated European countries closely cooperate. But the question is whether such countries as Spain or Italy can accept such a shift of political — and possibly economic — emphasis in the EU. And the other question is whether the involvement of Ukraine into the French-German-Polish axis does not jeopardize the post WW 2 balance between France and Germany, given the fact of Ukraine's traditional Central European orientation? One possible answer is that such an alteration of balance of power can be equalized by strengthening the role of NATO in this region (which also means Ukraine's joining NATO). But such a step would not count as a 'European' solution; NATO is considered by some of the countries in the region not as a military organization of the EU alone, but as that of the US. Thus Russia surely would interpret Ukraine's joining NATO as a step against its interests. So Ukraine's entering NATO may not lead to the reinforcement of the balance of power in Europe, but rather to some new form of political and military tensions between Russia and the US.

Obviously, the rise of a new state in Eastern Europe, Ukraine, has an unparalleled importance for the future of the continent. No wonder that Ukraine has a special role in the NSC. As is written in Paragraph 37,

Ukraine occupies a special place in the Euro-Atlantic security environment and is an important and valuable partner in promoting stability and common democratic values. NATO is committed to further strengthening its distinctive partnership with Ukraine on the basis of NATO-Ukraine Charter, including political consultations on issues of common concern and a broad range of practical cooperation activities. The Alliance continues to support Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, economic prosperity and its status as a non-nuclear weapons state as key factors of stability and security in central and eastern Europe and in Europe as a whole.

Obviously, Ukraine's 'independence and territorial integrity' is an important factor in

⁴¹ Brzezinski 1997.

refashioning old Europe. But the emergence of an independent and strong Ukraine raises several questions.

First, will the EU allow Ukraine to join it in the near future?

Second, will Ukraine soon enter NATO?

Third, which is the European region to which Ukraine most intimately belongs?

Fourth, what are the political consequences of country's traditional cultural commitments?

As to the first question, it seems that Ukraine's joining the EU will inevitably reshape the traditional structures of the EU. Ukraine has a territory bigger than that of France; and has a population roughly as much as that of France. Even if it has no actual nuclear force, its traditional army may still be among the strongest ones in Europe. To let Ukraine join the EU would then obviously alter the present balance and make Ukraine one of the most important members of the EU. But due to Ukraine's economical problems, and especially to the structural difficulties of the EU, it is not probable that Ukraine will join the EU very soon. As to the second question, the answer should in principle be yes; NATO has no such structural problems and would be able to cooperate with Ukraine. But because of Russia, NATO has to show some attention. Russia has a world-wide strategic significance, and if Ukraine's joining NATO may hurt Russia's political and strategic sensitivity, it is better to have only high level relations with Ukraine, without letting it enter NATO. Yet Ukraine will attempt to maximally utilize the country's special political importance and try to find informal ways of getting closer to NATO and the EU.

As to the third and forth questions, Ukraine's present borders encompass territories which used to belong to German-speaking parts of Europe. There are minorities in the country which pertain to Central-European nations, such as Poles, Slovaks and Hungarians.⁴² Ukraine is thus closely connected to traditional territories of Central Europe; and it is highly probable that its relationship with the neighboring countries will be gradually more intimate in the future. The mere existence and the natural development of the country will then be profitable to these countries: Ukraine constitutes a kind of a buffer-zone between Russia and Central-Europe, and its natural resources and large population offer good economic possibilities. By these factors, the mere existence of Ukraine is a contribution to the strengthening of the ECAT and ECON regions.

⁴² Ukraine has today territories which belonged for a long time to the sphere of German-speaking Central Europe (Galicia), especially to the Austrian Monarchy; and other districts in which there is mixture of Hungarian, Slovak, Rumanian and Ruthenian minorities (The Lower Carpathian Mountains).

Of these two regions it is the ECAT one which is much more formless and chaotic than the others. The ECON region with Germany and Poland is quite easy to survey and control; but the ECAT region is more complex, with a number of fragmentary countries which used to belong to the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy. It is especially this region which is in need of some systematic kind of structural reshaping in order to prevent the eruption of dangerous developments. The Hungarian minority in Rumania, for instance, finds itself in an ever more miserable status of oppression; and even if there are efforts to improve the situation, the Rumanian majority uses almost every means either to suppress the Hungarians or to expel them of the country. Hungary's joining NATO has to some extent cooled down the political passions; but without a long range solution of the problem there will be no stability in the region. Ukraine's expectable natural growth in economic and political influence may lead to the rise of a additional element of uncertainty.⁴³

Thus it is the ECAT region in Europe which needs to be stabilized first of all. If the disintegration of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy had led to the emergence of one larger formation, say a larger Austria or a larger Hungary after WW 1, the problem would have become clearly different; the regional problems would then be similar to those of the ECON region in which a strong and large Poland makes it much easier to handle the political, economic and cultural difficulties.⁴⁴ But in the place of the Habsburg Monarchy we have today only fragment states with a disproportionately large surface of actual and possible conflicts in matter of politics, economics and culture. Hungary's membership in NATO is indeed an important fact which has a positive effect; but the membership will not be able to offer a good solution for many of the problems mentioned.

In sum I can say that the emergence of Ukraine is a factor in Europe which effects first of all Central Europe; and therein most intensely the region termed ECAT. The reason is not that the existence of Ukraine be insignificant for Poland, Germany or France; but that the enlargement of the French-German axis to Poland and Ukraine raises unwelcome problems

⁴³ For instance, Ukraine has a traditionally problematic relationship to Rumania.

⁴⁴ The Viennese Decisions in 1939 and 1940, in which some territories of historical Hungary were reconnected to the then existing Hungarian Kingdom, wished to realize precisely the kind of solution in order to create a balance of power in the Carpathian Basin and on its periphery. Bigger Hungary remained still a small country with a population of about 14 millions and with a territory of about the half of present-day Germany. But its natural resources and economic power made the country significant enough to represent a factor in the region and to contribute to the balance of power there. Interestingly, the Soviet Union and even Great Britain showed some willingness to keep bigger Hungary in existence after WW 2; but since the country was not able to step out of the war in time and became occupied by the Germans in 1944, there was no real diplomatic possibility to keep its old-new borders.

both for Russia and for the French-German cooperation.⁴⁵ Thus the political and cultural effects of the mere existence of Ukraine are more or less blocked with respect to Poland and Germany; but the way is open for them with respect to the ECAT region. That is to say, it is the Carpathian Basin and its peripheries which are most susceptible to the political, economic, and cultural consequences of the historical reemergence of the Ukrainian state.⁴⁶

8. Enrooting in Central Europe and The Idea of SEEC

If NATO is to carry out what I call enrooting, the best area to begin with is precisely the ECAT region, and especially its eastern segments. This region is the most vulnerable one in Europe: it is on the brink of the Balkan, the only active theater of war in post WW 2 European history. On the Balkan we find today the only European country in which liberal democracy has not gained foothold⁴⁷; and the only European country whose military forces means a real threat to neighboring countries, such as for instance Montenegro or Albania. It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that the present situation on the Balkan is closely connected to the French politics after WW 1. While dissolving the Habsburg Monarchy, the Allies did not consider it important to help the formation of natural — culturally and politically traditional — states, such as the Hungarian Kingdom was for many centuries. Instead, French politics preferred creating quite arbitrary states with artificial mixtures of populations, traditions and cultures, such as Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia. While the latter has dissolved in a peaceful way, the history of Yugoslavia turned into a series of catastrophic events ending with the 1999 bombing of Serbia. Although Hungary's membership in NATO, and NATO's presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo is a kind of solution to the architectonic problems of the Balkan, they represent no long term political solution to the problems of the region.

The instability on the Balkan and in the ECAT region affects the stability of the Mediterranean region as well. The problems of the Balkan are closely connected to the traditional problems between Turkey and Greece, a fact which became evident again during the

⁴⁵ It is to be mentioned that the strongly centralized political system of Belarus has a lot to do with the fear of a closer kind of Polish-Ukrainian cooperation.

⁴⁶ Obviously, the president of Ukraine, Mr. Kutsma is well aware of all these aspects of the existence of its country. Thus he sees well that Ukraine's position is a great political means in his hands. He sees well too that Ukraine is capable of influencing both the Northern and the Southern wings of Central Europe; and clearly presumes that the country's influence may be stronger in the latter direction. His sometimes dictatorship-like behavior is of course the only way to make use of the country's new political and economic possibilities.

⁴⁷ One could mention Belarus too; but because of its close connection to Russia, Belarus is a special case.

NATO's bombing of Serbia. The Greek government carried out a diplomatic policy which was rather pro-Serbian than pro-NATO; and the Greek population showed indeed many signs of its hatred of NATO's war against Serbia. The sentiments of the Greek is obviously based on their traditional friendship with the Serbs in matters of religion, culture, and especially in the common enmity with Turkey. With Greece and Turkey we are at the Mediterranean Sea; and it is a vital interest of NATO to secure peace in the Northern-Eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea in order to safeguard the political balance between the Arabic states and Israel. Thus the political stability in the ECAT region is indeed an important factor in NATO's strategic policy.

We can thus clearly recognize the importance of the development of stable and reliable political structures in the ECAT region in Europe. How can this be secured? I answer that by way of enrooting. This has the following steps:

1. It is important to encourage the development of common political, economic and cultural structures in the ECAT region.
2. Concretely it is important to promote the development of closer political, economic and cultural relations between the traditionally related countries of the ECAT region (at least Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Croatia).
3. It is equally important to offer NATO membership to all these countries (that is to Austria, Slovakia, Slovenia and Croatia), or at least to involve them into common military projects with special emphasis on their common structures.⁴⁸
4. The ECAT countries are to develop common political, cultural and economic institutions in so far as they are compatible with NATO's interests in the region.
5. The ECAT countries are to advance the factual knowledge of English; and just as the French encourage special partnership with the francophone countries, the US should consider various forms of special relationship with the ECAT states. This can take the form of a more intensive cultural cooperation between these countries and the US.
6. There should be institutes promoting the project of cultural cooperation; institutes which are connected to universities and academic centers in all the relevant countries.
7. The cultural cooperation should take the form of official cooperation on various political levels of the states involved.
8. NATO is to function as the frame organization of these developments with reference to the possible enlargement of NATO to the countries involved, and to the military and political circumstances on the Balkan.

⁴⁸ Croatia has recently joined the NATO's Partnership for Peace, a step ahead on the right way.

The total effect of such a development may be what I call enrooting. Among the population of the countries involved, the knowledge of the English language will perspicuously increase; in culture, education, academia and state organizations there will be common structures which facilitate communication in these countries, and they especially promote the appearance of institutes which, officially supported by all the relevant governments, will contribute to a widespread knowledge of the common political, cultural, and strategic interests. Thus NATO can in principle gain a large territory of various countries in which English is spoken on a high level, institutes and cultural structures develop a deeply rooted pro-US and pro-NATO attitude. Thus enrooting becomes a fact: these countries, organized into a whole in the form of international partnership, can serve as a solid basis of NATO interests in the region, supported by the governments and populations involved.

Let me call this organization the South-Eastern European Cooperation (SEEC). I have chosen this name in view of the possibility of involving more countries into the cooperation in the long run, countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina or Rumania. Most of SEEC countries will possibly be members of NATO;⁴⁹ they will develop a common network of political, economic and military organization; they will have a common language practiced by most members of the population; they will have a strongly pro-US and pro-NATO attitude, since it is NATO which realized their political and economic integration by eliminating all the bitterness of political, national, cultural and military discord. SEEC will be able, then, to take part in the process of the European unification as a strong party. SEEC will be capable of solving the problem of an emerging Ukraine on the borderline of the EU; it will be able to offer a unity so much lacking today in the region. It will be able to reshape the EU in the sense that, as an effect of the existence of SEEC, it is no longer the French-German-Polish axis only which is decisive in matters of European balance, but the French-Italian-SEEC axis too. Thus it will be possible that an ever stronger Russia cannot manipulate the EU by trying to play out either the Russian-German or the Russian-French cards. SEEC will be a politically and militarily stable region which is able to counterbalance any attempt to divide the EU. Thus SEEC may become a

⁴⁹ „The point we are making here is that using a military alliance for a moral project becomes very dangerous if a strategic threat reemerges. Since we see the reemergence of a strategic threat from Russia, we are arguing that the current shape of NATO since its expansion is militarily insupportable. It might have been better not to expand NATO, but having expanded, NATO's eastern frontiers are no longer defensible. It has become absolutely indispensable that Slovakia and Slovenia be admitted to NATO if NATO is to be able to defend its frontiers. Now, this poses a challenge to NATO's vision of a moral project. NATO has been cautious about Slovakia because of certain anti-democratic tendencies of its former Prime Minister. Whatever the moral character of the regime, its location in the Carpathian Mountains makes its inclusion essential.” Talbott 1999.

strong factor in the 'indivisible security' of the Euro-Atlantic domain. Moreover, the stability of SEEC can clearly contribute to the stability of the northern Mediterranean region and thus both the controlling the Greek-Turkish and the Arab-Israeli conflict. By this however SEEC is able to contribute to the promoting of the global interests of NATO and therefore to that of the US too.

The core countries of SEEC are Hungary and Austria. Austria has a highly developed economy, and Hungary's economy has shown the highest growth rates in Europe during the years 1999-2000. The intellectual potential of both countries are extremely high, which should be used in a way sketched above. A closer cooperation between Austria and Hungary should take first of all the strategic form: Hungary as an actual, and Austria as a potential member of NATO should cooperate as closely as possible. This cooperation should be realized on the political, economic and cultural levels as well. It is very probable that such a coordination would produce a staggering flush of economic growth; and the involvement of other countries in the economic processes — such as Slovenia and Slovakia, — would further accelerate the progress. Economic growth leads to stable political circumstances and a kind of magnetic force attracting further countries to join the cooperation.

9. Philosophical Traditions and Cultural Backgrounds

Philosophy clearly belongs to culture, and the cultural traditions in Europe are expressed in philosophical traditions as well. But what is the importance of philosophy in contemporary culture? To give a brief answer, philosophy is the discipline in which special scientific disciplines and general culture meet. Special scientific disciplines, such as mathematics, physics, genetics or brain-research are important fields the questions of which are intensely evaluated in philosophical literature. The results of such evaluations are scientifically relevant;⁵⁰ and philosophy is in a position to discuss general scientific questions. On the other hand, philosophy is a discipline which is accessible for many people lacking special knowledge of the sciences but interested in their essential problems. Since philosophy deals with general epistemological and methodological questions, its insights offer a good springboard for those who wish to have an overarching view of scientific problems. Philosophy is moreover capable of reflecting on the developments of everyday culture too, such as the literature and the arts, which are regularly assessed philosophically and are thus involved in a discourse in which they are considered in the same context as the results of other cultural and scientific achievements.

Philosophy consequently has a central cultural role at least in Western societies, a role which is to be kept alive and cultivated.⁵¹

Cultural traditions can be considered as culminating in philosophical traditions. And the above division of Europe into various cultural regions can be considered in terms of philosophical units too. That is to say, there are philosophical traditions in these regions which express the characteristic outlook of the culture of the region in a complex way. In accordance with the above division into cultural regions of Europe, we can offer a division of philosophical traditions as well. Thus we can distinguish among the following areas in terms of philosophical traditions:

1. Euro-Atlantic (EA) philosophy;
2. Euro-Continental (ECON) philosophy;
3. Euro-Orthodox (EO) philosophy;
4. Euro-Catholic (ECAT) philosophy;

Let me explain. EA philosophy consists in the traditions prevailing especially in Great-Britain and France. Its origin can be traced back to the empiricist interpretation of Cartesian rationalism. Its British branch is more empiricist, represented by such authors as Locke, Hume or later on Russell, Moore and the school of Neopositivism which is alive today in various forms of physicalism, naturalism or materialism in Britain as well as in the US. The French branch of EA philosophy is not so much empiricist than pragmatically idealistic as was shown by the work of 'les philosophes', the group of French philosophers working especially on scientific and societal ideas, such as Pierre Bayle, Voltaire, or Rousseau. French philosophy has shown an ambiguous character during the later centuries when they received influences both from EA and from ECON philosophies. In our century, for instance, until the emergence of French phenomenology and existentialism, empiricist and scientific trends were the most influential ones among French philosophers. In our days, the typical irrationalism of French philosophy is a special phenomenon which betrays the influence of ECON philosophy — especially the thought of Heidegger.⁵² But, interestingly, behind seemingly irrational attitudes,

⁵⁰ Popper and Eccles 1977.

⁵¹ The main problem with teaching philosophy at contemporary universities is that its relevance concerning the logic, the methodology and sometimes the results of the natural sciences is not widely acknowledged. There are signs, however, that ethics may be recognized at least with respect to some crucial fields of science, such as biotechnology.

⁵² Let me note however that the major part of the French reception of Heidegger's philosophy remains on the level of epigonism. Thus it seems to me that neither Merleau-Ponty nor Emmanuel Levinas are original enough as compared to Husserl and Heidegger. The most original figure is most probably Sartre.

contemporary French philosophy remains surprisingly naturalistic and materialistic.⁵³ EA philosophy can thus be characterized as basically empiricist, materialistic, naturalist and pragmatic, with the tendency of leading its conclusions ad absurdum.⁵⁴ EA philosophy is the origin of today's largest philosophical school, often called 'Anglo-Saxon' or 'analytical'. It is Anglo-Saxon, since it is the accepted philosophy in most English language universities; and it is analytical, because its original empiricist preferences have become applied to the empirically describable realm of the human language. Analytical philosophy is often defined in terms of its opposition to ECON philosophy. This opposition is conceived of as 'antagonism' — as Richard Rorty puts it⁵⁵ — between 'scientific' and 'humanistic', 'hard' and 'soft' philosophies.

ECON philosophy originates in the idealist or intellectual interpretation of Cartesianism represented by such authors as for instance Leibniz, Wolff and Kant. This interpretation, encouraged by the systematic achievement of Spinoza, led to the outburst of one of the most fruitful periods in the history of Western philosophy, German idealism, in which a series of important thinkers emerged and discussed similar ideas with strikingly dissimilar results. Fichte, Schelling and Hegel are the most important names, but even less known thinkers, such as Schleiermacher, Feuerbach, or Schopenhauer have proved to be influential in a number of ways. Their philosophies, if they can be characterized summarily at all, may be described as rational, immanentistic, idealistic, rather poetical than scientific. Interestingly, the most successful pragmatic and societal theory of modern European philosophy was born as an interpretation of German idealism: Marx's thought. But even later developments of German philosophy, such as the work of Nietzsche or Dilthey, show a similar, idealistic tendency, even if moderated either by bitter skepticism or 'hard' scientific ambitions. It is important to note that ECON philosophy has influenced decisively Italian philosophy (B. Croce), and to some extent British and American thinking (James and Bradley). In the 20th century, the main sources of the renewal of German philosophy arrived from a foreign source: Edmund Husserl's phenomenology which originated in ECAT philosophy.

EO philosophy emerged in many respects as a reaction to German idealism. The Platonic spirit of the Orthodox cultures refused to accept the immanentist feature of German idealism

⁵³ As is seen for instance in the criticisms of 'idealism' by Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur. For the typical trends in US philosophy, see for instance Rescher 1995.

⁵⁴ The history of Neopositivism is clearly a history of defeaters of defeaters of defeaters (verificationism, falsificationism, paradigm paradigm). This kind of absurdity is expressed in French philosophy in more simple, less ambitious and more rhetoric form.

⁵⁵ In a recent talk given in May, 2000 at Budapest University.

and developed its own interpretation of Orthodox Platonism. 19th and 20th century developments of EO philosophy have led to the merging of EA and ECON thought in terms of strongly Platonistic tendencies. The works of N. Berdjajev or W. Solovjev are to be considered as authentic syntheses of Orthodox Platonism and German Idealism. EO philosophy is inherently theistic, religious and even mystical; it has no recognizable scientific aspirations, no clear methodology, but a kind of idealism which attempts to maintain the difference between the flesh and the spirit, world and transcendence, man and God. In some examples, EO philosophy becomes outspokenly enthusiastic and Gnostic.⁵⁶ Even Soviet philosophy, especially in its fantastic features, reflects the Gnostic character of EO philosophy. Soviet philosophy however was also strongly influenced by Marxist scientism (as applied to societal questions) and by Leninist political thought, the most machiavellian in the history of European political thinking. Further European influences, such as that of phenomenology, have been received in EO philosophy mainly through the filter of Orthodox Platonism.⁵⁷

ECAT philosophy is indeed determined by its Catholic roots.⁵⁸ Even if there had been Catholic philosophy in the European thinking, such as Aristotelian Scholasticism in its various forms, much earlier too, yet ECAT philosophy originated in a deliberate effort to resist both Enlightenment Gnosticism and German Idealism. Thus ECAT philosophy attempted to be scientific and rigorously methodological, but in a complex fashion which insisted on the crucial importance of theistic views — even if in terms of rational thinking, as is seen by the ‘reform Catholic’ views of the first important figure of ECAT philosophy, Bernard Bolzano. The result was an interesting synthesis of scientific thinking and theistic thought with a high level methodology especially in the works of Bolzano and Brentano. The leitmotif of this tradition was a return to Aristotle as opposed to the role of Plato in rationalism and German idealism. And to cultivate Aristotle meant to cultivate logic; and ECAT philosophy was for a long time logically and mathematically interested, as in for instance the logically and mathematically so much significant work of Bolzano. The most important follower of the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition was, after Trendelenburg, F. Brentano. Brentano may be considered to be the central representative of ECAT philosophy, whose disciples made his name internationally known and contributed to new philosophical developments in the Habsburg countries, especially in Poland, but also in Prague, in Maribor (Slovenia) and in Budapest. Through the notion of

⁵⁶ As for instance Lev Shestov’s writings.

⁵⁷ See S. L. Frank’s reception of Husserlian phenomenology (Frank 1995).

⁵⁸ ECAT philosophy is often called ‘Austrian philosophy’. But for historical and cultural reasons I prefer the term Euro-Catholic. See Smith 1994.

'intentionality', Brentano became crucially important for Anglo-Saxon philosophy too. ECAT philosophy produced interesting developments in the works of two important thinkers, Edmund Husserl and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Husserl initiated his phenomenological philosophy which has acquired world-wide influence, leading to new perspectives in 20th century French and German philosophical cultures.

The role of Wittgenstein is to be mentioned separately. Originally he belonged to ECAT philosophy with a typical interest in logic and scientific thinking, and with an articulate rejection of any sort of idealism. His metaphysical concern, which he refused to express philosophically in accordance with the Viennese Positivists, has led him however to an ever more articulate relativistic and skeptical view of reality. He moved to Britain and became the most influential Continental thinker after Hegel in Anglo-Saxon thinking. His work interestingly connects EA and ECAT philosophies. While he shared the logical-empiricist views of Russell in his early career, he did not give up the idea of a positivistic — later on: religious and mystical — kind of metaphysics. He thus imported into 20th century EA philosophy the need for some kind of metaphysical view of the world, and became a connecting figure between ECAT and EA philosophies.

I claim that these philosophies, briefly summarized above, are representatives of cultural regions in Europe. EA philosophy is characteristic especially of France, Britain and Scandinavia, that is on what I have termed the EA region. ECON philosophy is characteristic first of all of Germany, Italy and their peripheries: the ECON region. EO philosophy has emerged, and is highly popular, in the countries of the EO region; and ECAT philosophy, rooted in Aristotelian Scholasticism, appeared in the Habsburg Empire and spread to its territories.⁵⁹ I have claimed that philosophies are comprehensive representatives of cultural features; and that the cultivation of philosophy mean, in the optimal case, the cultivation of the given culture in its central field. Thus it is important to call attention to the following facts:

1. Perhaps the most influential philosophical culture in our age is ECAT philosophy: It has produced two names, Husserl and Wittgenstein, whose work are the most important ones in our contemporary Western culture.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ An important philosophical culture, that of Spain, has not been mentioned. The reason is that Spanish philosophy has not proved so deeply influential in modern and contemporary philosophical thought as for instance Austrian philosophy. And while there are strong Scholastic and Existentialist traditions in Spanish philosophy, their significance is mainly confined to the country and does not essentially effect other philosophical cultures.

⁶⁰ It is often claimed that the two greatest philosophers in the 20th century have been Martin Heidegger and Wittgenstein. I agree that Heidegger is indeed a mysteriously important thinker; but for the time being his influence is more limited than that of Husserl or Wittgenstein. In the long run he may prove to be the most influential philosopher

2. ECAT philosophy has thus realized a synthesis unusual either in contemporary philosophy or in contemporary culture. First, it has achieved a synthesis of Aristotelian Scholasticism and modern logical and scientific thinking; then of scientism and metaphysical thought; and later on of religious claims and philosophical thinking.

3. ECAT philosophy is thus a sign of the global importance of ECAT culture.

4. The importance ECAT culture stands in an ambivalent relation with the politically fragmented nature of the ECAT region.

5. Since the ECAT region is to be restored along the lines of political preferences, as I argued above, there is a role of ECAT philosophy to play in this process.

6. ECAT philosophy is the intellectual potential of the cultural and political reintegration of the ECAT region in terms of what I explained above.

ECAT philosophy has a renaissance in our days. The renaissance has begun in Austria where the Graz School of philosophy developed an elaborated concept of Austrian philosophy. Scholars of the project, however, understood Austrian philosophy mainly in terms of Viennese Positivism and Wittgensteinianism. While clearly pointing out the Aristotelian roots of Austrian philosophy, they have not emphasized its religious character — given that for instance Bolzano and Brentano were Catholic priests and showed a strong interest for the philosophy of religion which both considered as the highest form of philosophy. During the 1980s and 90s, researches as to the importance of Austrian philosophy in the ex-Habsburg countries have been virulent and led to important results. It is significant that the direct effects of Austrian philosophy can be felt in cities throughout the old Monarchy, from Vienna to Clausenburg, from Zagreb to Novi Sad, from Graz to Prague, to Krakow and to Lublin and Lvov (now in Ukraine). Hungarian philosophy has also strong Austrian roots as is shown by the excellent and influential works of such authors as Akos von Pauler, or Bela von Brandenstein.

It is important to point out that I emphatically changed the name of Austrian philosophy into Euro-Catholic philosophy. Thereby I want to suggest the more general grounds of Austrian philosophy leading to a common tradition in Catholic countries. I also wish to emphasize the very important relationship between Catholic culture and the geocultural and geopolitical region involved.

10. SEEC Philosophy and European Integration

of our age; but now he is mainly refused and harshly criticized. And the aim of my paper is not to argue for the greatness of this or that philosopher, but for the important relationship between culture, philosophy, and political thinking with respect to the role of NATO.

I argued above that the region of SEEC countries pertains to the realm of more or less common cultural traditions. I have pointed out too that there is a common denominator in these cultural traditions, namely ECAT philosophy which embodies a synthetic character. The synthesis has two sides: the one is internal, the other is external. As to the internal side, the common culture of the SEEC countries is obviously something like Catholic. I do not wish to understand the term 'Catholic' in a strongly denominational sense. Catholic cultures, especially in the region in question, show common elements which are related to, but not exclusively dependent on, denominational Catholicism. Such an element is for instance the emphasis on societal subsidiarity. This means that there is a high level unity and a similarly developed complexity in the culture involved, a complexity composed of various traditions and languages which are nevertheless synthesized in the overarching structure of the culture itself. The synthetic character favors a universalistic attitude in a variety of realms: ethically it promotes tolerance, in ideological orientation openness, in matters of language multilingual attitudes, politically pluralism yet a striving for architectonic unity.

I think that a philosophy which has a similar character can genuinely be termed 'Catholic' in a general sense of the word.⁶¹ Catholic philosophy strives to realize the above principle of subsidiarity: it acknowledges the plurality of various ontological regions together with their autonomous natures which demand the right method of investigation and description of each region. By acknowledging plurality in the form of subsidiarity, Catholic philosophy does not fall into the mistake of monistic philosophies. Monism mistakenly interprets reality in terms of a substantive structure which it defines either as 'matter' or 'spirit', 'history', 'economy', 'class struggle', 'communication', 'context', and so on. According to Catholic philosophy, reality has no monistic nature; and the reason of it is that reality is grounded on a principle which is infinite in the most general sense of the word.⁶² Infinity as the first principle makes possible both *de jure* and *de re* pluralism: that is a plurality of substances in every realm of reality. Yet there is some kind of unity in plurality which can be conceived of in terms of a tendency approaching infinitely an ideal unity, that is a *harmonia praestabilita* in Leibniz's sense of the expression. This ideal can however never be fully grasped in itself; it is infinite in a general sense of the world. The right understanding of infinity, moreover, leads to the conclusion that it comprises two basic poles: one immanent, and one transcendent. A certain dynamic relation between the two is what makes reality at the same time united and pluralistic; this is what

⁶¹ As is known, the meaning of the Greek word 'katholikosz' is 'universal'.

⁶² In the sense in which Thomas defines God's infinity as 'infinitem simplex'.

makes reality on all of its levels complexly integrated. This is how Catholic philosophical standpoint turns out to be valid not only as a systematic principle, but also as a real moment of the entire scale of phenomena, natural, intellectual, or societal.

The idea of SEEC as explained above consists in reestablishing the political and cultural homogeneity of the ECAT region in South-Eastern Europe and on its periphery in some form of a unity. The process of reestablishing needs a cultural basis which is still there in the form of a tradition in outlook, attitude, behavior and ideas in many countries of the region. Catholic culture is most eminently expressed in what is often called 'multiculturalism', a notion quite close to the ideas of the Catholic culture. 'SEEC philosophy' means thus principally two things:

1. It is the notion of the need of reestablishing the political and cultural identity of the ECAT region with respect to the needs of NATO by means of what I call enrooting.
2. It is the notion of the need of an institutional framework to promote cultural integration in the region. In such a culture philosophy, in accordance with what I have explained above, plays a centrally organic role.

As to the second point it is important to call attention to the importance of SEEC philosophy in the process of European integration. I have discussed above the difficulties of the integration processes in the framework of the EU; I pointed out that there are good reasons why NATO should take part in the integration process. The best form of NATO's role is not to establish an institutionally independent form of integration, but rather to promote a pluralistic notion of integration — the 'true integration', as the NSS formulates it — in the framework of the EU.

I now go a step further and claim that the genuine unity of Europe is strongly dependent on the successful political and cultural integration of its regions and their traditions on the basis of equal importance. 'Equal importance' is the expression emphasizing the rejection of an the legitimacy of an apartheid approach to the problem of European integration, an approach which for instance accepts the importance of the EA and ECON regions but denies that of the ECAT region. If one or two of the European regions and regional traditions are neglected or eliminated in the process of integration, the result will not be a 'true integration' of Europe but rather a new form of cultural and/or political segregation. But any policy of segregation needs an ideology; and political apartheid needs a political ideology. If European integration is carried out in terms of segregating some of the important traditions of European history, then it will be inevitable to justify this way of action in terms of a new system of artificial beliefs, similar to the ideology of Communism. But the end of the story of any political ideology has already been quite spectacularly demonstrated both by the fall of National Socialist Germany and Marxist-

Leninist Soviet Union. Ideologies do not offer long range solutions of political and cultural problems; only well established philosophies are able to do so. 'Philosophy' is used here, again, in the sense of geocultural philosophy, that is as strategic thinking using the morals of general philosophy, history, politics, ethics and religious teachings in a synthetic way. Catholic philosophy can be understood in this sense of geocultural philosophy: a Catholic political philosophy, based on the principles of ECAT philosophy, is long range strategic thinking able to point out the most useful means of promoting just, democratic, stable and prosperous political units, such a that of an integrated Europe.

SEEC philosophy is geocultural philosophy teaching that the political, cultural and economic integration of Europe must be built on the acknowledgment of the rights of the existing European traditions. It points out too that a narrowly nationalistic approach to the European integration will either dramatically fail, or inevitably leads to disintegration. Fortunately, we are informed about the most important principle of the European integration, a principle which cannot be swept aside without quite unfortunate consequences. The principle is the 'indivisible security' of North America and Europe; that is, the importance of the role of NATO in the process of European unification. The role of NATO is to be conceived of in terms of the need for enrooting; and, as I pointed out, enrooting is to be based on a kind of thinking which is expressed in the principles of geocultural philosophy.

The need for enrooting thus leads to the need of a cultural structure which is centrally expressed in ECAT philosophy. Inasmuch as ECAT philosophy is both general and political philosophy, the enrooting problem has a double solution. On the most general level it has a metaphysical layer in which questions are raised such as 'Why should there be a political unity at all?' or 'Why is it worth striving for the right kind of power?'. The answers to these questions can be formulated metaphysically, in concert with the general principles of ECAT philosophy. Accordingly, it is due to the pluralistic unity of reality that human societies tend to create similar — pluralistically united — systems. Such systems embody the possibility of the human being both to realize and to infinitely transcend himself or herself. The merely pragmatic aims of a political system are secondary or functional with respect to this overarching principle. Further, the just kind of domination, that is the right form and the right application of political and military power can be discussed with reference to the above principle. It can be said that the maintenance of any kind of political power in the form of a state or a system of various states is to realize indeed 'l'unité dans pluralism', as the new motto of the EU goes. The right structure of a political system is what secures its long range preservation; it is precisely the principle of 'true integration' which points out the deepest metaphysical dimensions of political

existence.

On a lower level the problem of enrooting arises as the problem of the general and institutional unity of a culture. I have already pointed out that the political importance of enrooting is something like inculturation: the establishing of the true cultural basis of some political power. I have pointed out too that enrooting can be lasting if and only if it is the enrooting of a political system refusing the drastic forms of ideological, political, cultural or economic coercion. An example for extreme ideological coercion was offered by the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the Soviet Union. And there are plenty of other examples of political, cultural or economic violence enforced in an extremist fashion by a stronger system on the weaker one. Now it is rational to think that no hegemony can be realized without some form of coercion, just as no political power is realistic without possessing the necessary coercive means and the capacity of their application. But coercion can be used and abused; and the characteristic of long range solutions in political and cultural matters is the right use of coercion with respect to the acceptable common interests of the systems in question. Enrooting is the right use of political, economic and cultural power; it is the way of taking into consideration the complexity of the interests of all sides, with an articulate preference for the more general interests, such as the global interests of a political system. But no global interest needs to be defended by way of suppressing second and third order interests, such as ones of a traditional cultural region. Enrooting is precisely the method of harmonizing the various levels of interests, political, cultural and economic, in an overarching system which is capable of maintain itself not as an oppressive power but as a historical entity called civilization.

Successful enrooting has a double positive effect. On the one hand it promotes global security in the sense discussed above. On the other hand it contributes to the long range reinforcement of the European balance of power. Thereby enrooting advances the renovation of European civilization first in political and economic, second in general cultural terms. This 'Europa renovata' may mark the beginning of a new renaissance of European culture. And just as in the Italian Renaissance in the 14th century, philosophy can have a leading role too in the new renaissance of Europe in our age. It is a logical consequence of what I discussed above that the new renaissance of European philosophy should be based on what I call ECAT philosophy.⁶³ But in order to avoid misunderstanding I say that such a renaissance be grounded

⁶³ 'Should' has the following meaning in the above sentence: appropriate philosophical considerations lead to the insight that only a metaphysical philosophy, based on the tradition of European metaphysical thinking, seems to be capable of offering grand style philosophies. Such philosophies are culturally relevant, inasmuch as they contribute to the emergence of a philosophical culture which leads in its turn to a variety of subordinate forms of culture, such as ethics,

on philosophy first of all in general terms. On the general level, philosophy must be distinguished from ideology into which much of the important philosophies of the 19th and 20th century — such as Marxism, Liberalism, Conservatism — has been turned. Ideology in the sense I use the term is political ideology with the explicit purpose to represent and rhetorically administer the central ideas of a political power which attempts to rule human societies in totalitarian terms. Since the consequence of any totalitarian ideology is the collapse of high level human culture and civilization, ideologies must be fought. First of all, they must be refuted on the philosophical level. That is why philosophy can be understood as a struggle against ideologies; quite similarly to that philosophy has originally emerged as a kind of spiritual fight against sophism and pseudo-religiousness at the beginning of its history.⁶⁴ On the other hand, philosophy is to become metaphysics, since it is only on the most general level of ‘first philosophy’ where principal questions may be genuinely decided. Nevertheless we find almost everywhere naturalism and materialism in the various philosophical cultures in contemporary European philosophy; cultures which not only refuse the dialogue with other philosophical traditions but reinterpret their own traditions in a naturalistic way. In my view, the flourishing of naturalistic philosophies, together with a sophisticated rhetoric as a kind of Ersatz-philosophy in certain philosophical cultures, are the clear signs of philosophical, and consequently, of cultural decline. This decline is both historically and logically bound to the destruction of certain traditions in European philosophy and culture — thus above all the elimination of the principles which are present in ECAT philosophy.

Thus the emphasis on the importance of ECAT philosophy means first of all an appeal for a dialogue among the various European philosophical and cultural traditions. Second, it expresses an emphasis on the kind of philosophy which is able to become culturally relevant in our age not in spite, but rather because of, its metaphysical engagement. Hence I say that the idea of an *Europa renovata* — so important for both political and cultural reasons – should be based not only on philosophy in the vague sense of the term, but rather on the more precise concept of a metaphysical philosophy which is able to give back the original strength and cultural mission of European philosophical scholarship.

morality, a kind of general psychological attitude, that is factors highly effective in the life of a society. Such effects are capable of historical transformation: the transformation of Europe into a new phase of its history. I have however argued above that such a transformation minimally presupposes the recognition of the merits of all articulate European cultural traditions; and it presupposes the recognition of the cultural traditions in particular of the ECAT region. ECAT philosophy is the tradition in European culture which is very close to the idea of philosophy which is able to contribute to cultural transformation.

⁶⁴ As is clear from many of Plato's dialogues.

The close relationship between philosophy and culture on the one hand, and between culture and politics on the other hand, is not a new idea. Already such representatives of the ECAT philosophy as Bolzano and Brentano saw the general importance of an appropriate philosophical culture. They supposed that an appropriate philosophical culture is the key factor in scientific progress; and more generally, in cultural progress too. These philosophers, however, did not see the importance of an institutional framework promoting the cultivation and reception of an appropriate philosophical culture. In our days the need is much more visible for a well organized institutional framework for a philosophy which is capable of promoting the dialogue among the various philosophical cultures, and among the cultures in themselves. The name of 'geocultural philosophy' does not want to suggest that a merely speculative approach to philosophy in general has no importance in what a philosophical culture has to carry out. It wants to stress however that such a philosophical culture has been existing in the form of ECAT philosophy, that is in a form clearly bound to certain cultural traditions in European history. A general approach to the historically and culturally determined existence of such a philosophy may thus be rightly termed 'geocultural philosophy'. The conclusions of geocultural philosophy are however quite close to the general conclusions of ECAT philosophy. These conclusions concern the importance of a metaphysical philosophy in the philosophical and scientific culture; the importance of such a philosophy in a flourishing civilization; the importance of a philosophically based civilization for the mankind as such.

We are able to add some further conclusions to the list. In present day Europe, European integration must be carried out on the basis of the equal importance of all the significant European traditions. The past fifty years has shown a cultural and philosophical disintegration, especially due to an apartheid attitude against some European cultural traditions. European integration should lead to a reintegration of the segregated traditions; and to the reintegration, on the philosophical level, of ECAT philosophy. The revitalization of ECAT philosophy has a special importance for the cultural integration of the SEEC region in Europe; thus SEEC philosophy can be conceived of as the possibility of a genuine revival of ECAT philosophy.

11. Conclusion

As a conclusion I list the following points which summarize what I have attempted to say so far:

1. It is the global interest of the US to have a strong and unified Europe.
2. Europe cannot be genuinely integrated on the basis of segregating some of its

most valuable traditions.

3. In order to prevent European disintegration, and in order to maintain global interests, NATO should carry out what I term enrooting.

4. The best region of Europe for enrooting is the ECAT region.

5. Enrooting presupposes the reestablishing of the political identity of the ECAT region in the form of the SEEC.

6. The successful functioning of the SEEC is a decisive factor both of the 'true integration' of Europe and the global perspective of the US.

7. The successful functioning of the SEEC can be grounded, among other factors, on cultural integration; and the best means of cultural integration is what I termed SEEC philosophy.

8. By way of rehabilitation of segregated cultural traditions, Europe can reach a new and flourishing period of its history.

9. The leading idea of SEEC philosophy is an 'Europa renovata'. A culturally and politically renewed Europe is an important condition of the realization of the global interests of the Western world.

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⁶⁵ There are two sorts of item in my Bibliography. The one begins with a name and goes on with the number of year (e. g. Smith 1994:); this refers to footnotes in the text. The other sort gives just the name or names and the title, etc.: these items are not directly referred to, but I have used them in my work.

Attachment

Balint Vazsonyi's article in *The Washington Times*

June 4, 2000

Bad treaty that won't go away

Today marks the 80th anniversary of the Treaty of Trianon, named for the palace in Versailles where it was concluded in 1920. Few Americans know it ever happened, yet thousands of them are having to risk their lives right this minute in consequence of it. Here the story begins: After long periods of Austrian occupation, Hungary achieved limited independence in 1867, embodied in the so-called dual monarchy, Austria-Hungary. (There never was an Austro-Hungarian Empire.) Thus, despite little interest or stake in World War I, Hungary found itself involved, and on the losing side. France declared itself the winner, and sole arbiter of a new Europe. President Woodrow Wilson watched his 14 Points, a source of hope for lasting peace, brushed off the table by French fury. For reasons yet to be explained, Hungary was singled out for punitive treatment, unique in the annals of modern history. After a thousand years as a nation-state, and looking like a perfect geographic entity on the map, the country was dismembered and carved up as if on a butcher's board. Two-thirds of Hungary's territory and 60 percent of its population were simply detached, making it a torso of insufficient resources, creating international borders of village streets. Overnight, parents, grandparents or cousins needed passports if they wanted to visit. Millions woke up as subjects of new, hostile governments that literally did not exist the night before. The proceeds of Trianon appeared on the map as Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Greater Romania. A final quirk: Even Austria got a chunk of Western Hungary. Can anyone figure that one?

Now it is certainly true that, for example, Slovaks had lived in the northern counties of Hungary for a thousand years, and their only path to social advancement was to become Hungarianized. Also, Hungary missed a great opportunity during its own revolution of 1848 to respond to the aspirations of ethnic minorities. But the answer surely was not to place millions of Hungarians under Slovak, Serbian, Romanian rule the latter through the wholesale gift of Transylvania to Romania.

Distributing the material and human resources of Hungary was presumably the only way to endow the new entities with a measure of economic viability. Northern Hungary was rich in minerals, Southern Hungary was famous for its wheat fields and in the East, Transylvania simply had everything, including enormous historic importance to Hungary. Historic importance also attaches to what is now known as Bratislava, capital of Slovakia. Under its original name, Pozsony (Pressburg for the German-speaking), it had been the coronation town of Hungarian kings for 900 years, seat of the first Hungarian Parliament, and the cultural center where child prodigies like Mozart and Liszt performed within days of being heard in Vienna.

Of Hungary's four greatest composers, all born in Hungary of course, only Zoltan Kodaly's birthplace remains. On today's maps, it appears as if Franz Liszt had been born in Austria, Erno Dohnanyi in Slovakia, and Bela Bartok in Romania. On Bartok's 100th birthday, the Hungarian delegation, wishing to lay a wreath, was turned back at the Romanian border. The 19th century was a hotbed of nationalistic aspirations. But knowing how to be a country takes more than a flag and a few leaders. Among other things, cities must be built, an infrastructure produced and operated. At the time of Trianon, Slovaks had zero years of experience of it. Romanians had 61 years of running two provinces combined into a political entity. Serbs and Croats had made various attempts between periods of Turkish, Austrian and Hungarian rule. In the region, Hungary alone could look back upon 1,024 years of genuine nationhood.

Thus, the towns, the great centers in Slovakia, in Transylvania, in Vojvodina were not built by Slovaks, Romanians or Serbs. The distinguished teaching institutions, the book publishers, indeed all carriers of "culture," passed to their control through the Treaty of Trianon along with the territories. The new owners could have chosen to learn and benefit by them, as once Romans did from the Greeks. They could have looked upon the people, the cities, the institutions as precious capital, gifts of history, assets to nurture and multiply. They could have invited, encouraged the participation and loyalty of their new subjects. Instead, their policy became to usurp what they could and do away with the rest.

Initially, promises of plebiscites were made to enable entire communities to choose sides. They never happened. What has happened is a horror story of systematic destruction of cultures, involving millions of Hungarians still the largest oppressed minorities in Europe. If at least the outcome had been a success story for everyone else, one might propose that sacrificing Hungary, an alien among European nations for a thousand years, was worth the happiness of others. But, as always, history

teaches us that destruction can never provide foundations for construction. We learn this when we compare the "Great French Revolution" with the American Revolution; we learn it again when we look to the dissolution of Czechoslovakia at the first opportunity and, of course, the tragedy that Yugoslavia has been, day in day out.

There is nothing to show for the untold suffering of millions of Hungarians. Indeed, many believe that a wiser disposition of World War I might have forestalled the tragedies of World War II. Certainly, many of Hungary's leaders between the wars had a distaste for Adolf Hitler's reign, but the national pain about Trianon was a button Hitler was always able to push. And make no mistake: what socialists denounce as "irredentism" has been shared by most, and found its lasting artistic expression in Zoltan Kodaly's oratorio "Psalmus Hungaricus."

Unlike its neighbors, Hungary has not hired public relations firms in Washington. There has neither been a Hungarian lobby nor a Hungarian vote to court in America. Hungarians have been coming here simply to avail themselves of the opportunities of this great land and ask for nothing else. But something is not right about the manner in which the plight and cultural destruction of the Hungarian millions in Slovakia, Romania and Serbia has been ignored. An inspired initiative for the Danube region is long overdue. Then, perhaps, Americans who now have to keep the peace in the Balkans, will come home for good.

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