

ABSTRACT

A SAFEGUARD AGAINST ANARCHY? EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE LIAISON MECHANISM IN THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM: SOME LESSONS FOR RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY MAKERS

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There are three main *research objectives* with this project: *First*, to examine how the executive-legislative liaison machinery is organised in Western democracies. *Second*, to analyse the role that the said apparatus plays in foreign policy making both in the West and Russia. *Third*, to find out what could be borrowed from the West and implemented in the Russian political system.

As far as the Western experience is concerned, three models of government have been examined—presidential (the United States), semi-presidential (France) and parliamentary. It has been concluded that the American and French experiences are particularly relevant for building a new Russian executive-legislative liaison mechanism. At the same time, some methods that executive lobbyists use to influence legislature (especially party leadership and caucuses) in the parliamentary models are worthy of attention as well.

It is argued that under the current circumstances the need for an effective executive-legislative liaison mechanism in Russia is compelling. Without such a mechanism neither parliamentary support for Russian foreign policy nor democratic control over the executive power are possible.

The Russian post-Communist leadership managed to create some elements of the liaison mechanism both at the formal (presidential and prime ministerial representatives in the Federal Assembly) and informal ('Big Four' mechanism, informal contacts and consultations with party factions and individual deputies) levels.

However, the Russian liaison machinery's efficiency is doubtful and numerous deficiencies are identifiable. It is reactive rather than active and often simply follows the course of events rather than anticipates or manages them. The presidential and Cabinet liaison structures often duplicate each other. There is also the lack of co-ordination between different executive agencies. More generally, the President and Cabinet underestimate the significance of the liaison machinery and pay a relatively little attention to creation of a stable and efficient executive-legislative liaison mechanism.

A number of concrete recommendations is made. These are proposals to create liaison structures at the ministerial level; re-organise the Russian liaison mechanism in an American-like way and adopt a more aggressive lobbying strategy; introduce a new division of labour between presidential, governmental and ministerial lobbyists to avoid duplication and inconsistencies; provide presidential and prime ministerial representatives in the Federal Assembly with staff of their own; pay more attention to indirect methods of lobbying (including mobilisation of interest groups, mass media and the electorate); to further institutionalise the 'Big Four' arrangement; train a new generation of specialists for the liaison apparatus; and change presidential perceptions of Parliament, its role in the decision-making process and the status of the liaison mechanism.

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INTRODUCTION

Executive-legislative relations is a key element of the policy-making process in a democratic society in terms of both effectiveness of decision-making and prevention of anarchy and autocracy. Co-operation between the two branches creates a favourable atmosphere for further development of healthy procedures and thus strengthens democratic norms and standards. On the other hand, confrontation between the executive and the legislature is detrimental to the normal functioning of the government and prevents its further improvement. One can find numerous historical evidences how executive-legislative conflicts led particular countries to failures both on the domestic and international arenas—e.g., the Watergate (1972-74), the non-ratification of the Versailles Peace Treaty (1920) and the SALT II Treaty (1979), the Turkish arms embargo (1974), the ban on the US intelligence operations in Angola (1976), the Iran-contras-gate (1986-89), the Monicagate (1998) and so on.

While in the well-established democracies executive-legislative controversies are exceptional and the two branches prefer co-operation rather than confrontation, in post-Communist Russia, conflicts between the President and the parliamentary body became a part of a day-to-day political reality. The lack of a proper legal basis and of an efficient executive-legislative liaison mechanism, the fierce struggle between different party and oligarchic groups in the Russian government resulted in a number of disastrous conflicts between the two branches of government (especially in 1992-93). This led to inability of the Russian leadership to implement duly some key democratic doctrines, such as separation of powers, checks and balances, accountability of elected officials, etc. Partly for this reason, the President, Cabinet and Parliament failed to develop a common and coherent foreign policy course.

Many Russian and foreign analysts wonder whether the Western experience could be helpful in creating of a more efficient and democratic executive-legislative system in Russia? If yes, how to adapt it to the Russian reality in accordance with Russian national traditions and values?

There were three main *research objectives* with this project: *First*, to examine how the executive-legislative liaison machinery is organised in the Western democracies (presidential republic, parliamentary republic, mixed forms of government). *Second*, to analyse the role that the said apparatus plays in foreign policy making both in the West and Russia. *Third*, to assess what could be borrowed from the West and implemented in the Russian political system.

I believe that at least several audiences could benefit from my study—decision-makers (copies of finished documents were and will be submitted to the legislative liaison and public relations offices of the Administration of the President, Cabinet and the Russian Foreign Ministry as well to the Security Council, Foreign Affairs and National Security committees of the State Duma); the academic community (through my publications and participation in various fora), students (through my teaching activities) and journalists.

PAST RESEARCH

The problem of executive-legislative relations in democratic states is thoroughly examined in the Western scholarship. Historical and political science literature is replete with studies in the liaison

apparatus's history, current organisation and role in foreign policy making (*Abshire, 1979; Baylis, 1989; Berman, 1964; Bulmer and Paterson, 1987; Campbell and Wyszomirski, 1991; Clausen, 1973; Crabb and Holt, 1980; Dahl, 1964; Davis and Rinqvist, 1975; Edwards, 1980, 1983, 1989; Edwards and Wayne, 1989; Elgie, 1993; Fisher, 1978; Gordon, 1989; Gutjahr, 1994; Hagan, 1993; Harmel, 1984; Hart, 1985; Holtzman, 1970; Hoxie, 1984; Hughes, 1974; Kavanagh, 1990; King, 1985; Koenig, 1967, 1986; Laver and Shepsle, 1994; MacNeil, 1963, 1970; Mansfield, 1975; Mezey, 1979; Nelson, 1989; Neustadt, 1980; Oleszek, 1978; Ollson, 1982; Padgett, 1994; Polsby, 1965; Rhodes and Dunleavy, 1995; Robinson, 1967; Rose, 1974; Rosolowsky, 1987; Smith et al., 1988; Spitzer, 1993; Suleiman and Rose, 1980; Sundquist, 1981; Thurber, 1991; De Vree et al., 1987; Ward, 1993; Wayne, 1978*). Unfortunately, in the Russian scholarship the subject was not given a due attention.

Some Russian scholars have contributed to the study of the problem through their analysis of its theoretical and methodological aspects (*Gantman, 1981; Kolobov et al., 1991, 1992*). Few works examined how the liaison machinery functioned in the United States and West European countries (*Boldyrev, 1973; Kolobov et al., 1991, 1992; Krutogolov, 1980; Krylova, 1965; Leibo, 1984; Maklakov, 1977; Nyporko, 1979; Savelyev, 1989; Sergounin, 1984, 1985, 1987, 1989a, 1989b, 1990a, 1990b, 1991; Shvedkov, 1972; Uryas, 1988; Zyablyuk, 1976*). Some authors studied how the Russian/Soviet legislature contributed to foreign policy making (*Borisov, 1995; Gusev et al., 1996; Kozhokin, 1992; Rybkin, 1995; Savelyev and Huber, 1993; Sergounin, 1991, 1997b, 1998a*]. There are some works on the legal dimensions of executive-legislative relations in post-Communist Russia (*Okunkov, 1996: 60-76; Shokhin, 1997*). In the course of my work on the project I've published an article on comparative analysis of the US and Russian executive-legislative mechanisms (*Sergounin, 1998b*).

However, there is no Russian scholarly work that provides a comprehensive analysis of the problem. Many works are oriented to case study (country or functional) rather than comprehensive analysis. None of them propose concrete ways how to implement the Western experience to the Russian political system. Some works published in the Soviet period simply lack academic objectivity and often bellicose towards the democratic system of government as a such.

It was the ambition of this project both to fill the lacunae in the past research and contribute to the complex analysis of the subject. The purpose of this research was not only empirical (to study data relating to concrete country, region and period) but also theoretical, methodological and practical. Theoretically, I wanted to demonstrate the complexity and richness of interaction between executive and legislative powers in the democratic system. However, I also wanted to illustrate how such complexity could be captured with contemporary research methods. Moreover, I was interested in discussion how the results of my research could be used practically by decision-makers, NGOs, and academics.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

There are several competing theories explaining the nature and major characteristics of the executive-legislative liaison mechanism.

Since this mechanism is an institution the so-called 'new' institutionalism is the most popular school among the students of executive-legislative relations (*March and Olsen, 1984*). There is a number of versions of or sub-schools within the 'new' institutionalism. The so-called 'strategic analysis of institutions' was developed by French political scientists (*Parodi, 1985*). There are also historical institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism (*Thelen and Steinmo, 1992*).

Some analysts suggest that as far as the study of political institutions is concerned, emphasis should be placed on what has been called 'polity-centred institutionalism', or, more simply, political institutionalism (*Pontusson, 1995: 122-123*). This means that the object of study includes 'such features of the institutional context as the rules of electoral competition, the structure of party systems, the relations among various branches of government, and the structure and organisation of economic actors like trade unions' (*Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 2*). For the purposes of my research, this approach will be given priority. Whatever the interpretation and whatever the institutions under consideration, this approach makes the assumption that institutions are independent variables and that the aspects of political life which they affect, such as the conduct of executive politics, are dependent variables.

Institutions matter because they can be a source of both systemic stability and systemic change. First of all, institutions can create the conditions for a relatively stable hierarchy of authority. By distributing power resources unequally and by creating constitutional, legal and behavioural incentives to ensure that any such distribution of power is relatively enduring, institutions may affect decision-making system, thus encouraging a particular pattern of power relations to emerge and then freezing the pattern that does emerge. In this respect, institutionalism helps to explain why certain disparities of executive and legislative powers may occur in the first place and why they may endure over time. It helps to explain why a particular model of politics, or a particular system of government, may predominate in a particular country over a considerable period of time.

Nonetheless, although institutions can cause a particular model of executive-legislative politics to predominate, this does not imply that institutions always sustain a form of systemic stasis, or that they are fixed and not open to variation. On the contrary, along with institutions producing regularities in politics, some kinds of institutional configurations may be systematically biased in favour of change—the feature that may be termed 'institutional dynamism' (*Hall, 1992: 107*).

As Elgie notes, along with other sources of institutional dynamism, the configuration of executive-legislative relations also creates an institutional potential for change (*Elgie, 1997: 229*). The nature of executive-legislative politics is likely to vary depending on whether there is a single-party or coalition government. All things being equal, single-party governments will foster more personalised forms of executive decision making and more straightforward style of executive leadership in the legislature than coalition governments. The pattern of executive-legislative relations is likely to be organised more hierarchically in the case of the former than the latter. As a single-party government is replaced in power by a coalition government, so there is likely to be change in the context of executive-legislative relations and a move from one model of politics to another.

Despite the obvious advantages of political institutionalism this approach has often been criticised by other schools ranged from realism to political economy. They believed that the institutionalist approach is too formalistic and ignores the role of the environment in which institutions operate. The sources of institutional changes can be often found outside institutions rather inside them. For example, according to the *theory of exogenous events*, the context of political power is also affected by the impact of events which are exogenous to a country's institutional structure. In this respect, both international and domestic events are relevant. For instance, in many European countries executive-legislative relations will vary greatly according to economic conditions, the success of policies, the degree of popular support and events in the outside world such as the EU, GATT or local conflicts (*Smith, 1994: 348*). The proponents of this theory assert that by contrast with the relatively straightforward effects of institutional structures, it is more difficult to predict the impact of exogenous events on the political system. This is because the same type of situation may make executive-legislative relations either more friendly or tense. For example, by contrast with the war in Bosnia that

provoked clashes between the Russian Cabinet and the State Duma in 1994-95, the Kosovo crisis of 1999 united the two branches on the basis of an anti-NATO platform.

Some analysts identify *leadership styles* as one more source of change (Kavanagh, 1990; Elgie, 1997: 230-231). For them, it would be wrong to believe that institutions or exogenous events totally determine the behaviour of political actors. Institutions may provide very strong incentives for people to behave in particular ways, but they still leave room for the impact of human agency. Institutional rules have to be learnt, compliance procedures have to be complied with and standard operating practices have to be followed. In other words, the impact of personality should not be treated as being either liberated from or imprisoned by institutions and events, but as being relatively autonomous of them. There are limitations to ways in which individuals can behave, but there is still some scope for personality differences to impact on the decision-making process. Moreover, a change in leaders and leadership styles may be a source of change and may induce a move from one model of executive-legislative relationship to another.

Along with Weber's classical categorisation of political leadership (traditional, charismatic and legitimate), there is a number of other ways in which to classify leadership styles—formal and informal, responsible and populist, authoritarian and democratic, monocratic and collective (collegial), mobilising and expressive, etc. (Blondel, 1984; Baylis, 1989; Campbell and Wyszomirski, 1991; Kavanagh, 1990: 246-271). Depending on a leadership style's type the executive-legislative liaison mechanism will operate in one way or another. For example, by contrast with Nixon and Reagan who preferred more personalised forms of leadership in Congress, Carter tended to a collegial style. The same leader can change his or her style over time. For instance, President Yeltsin initially demonstrated its democratic style in his relations with the Supreme Soviet, but with time it was replaced by the authoritarian one.

It should be noted that all the above approaches are complimentary rather than mutually exclusive. They are really helpful in understanding how the executive-legislative liaison mechanism works in various countries. However, to operationalise these approaches one should move from the level of 'grand theories' to the level of 'middle range' theories and concrete models. Particularly, *models of government* should be constructed because they determine the very shape of the liaison machinery and the ways in which it works.

Traditionally, political scientists single out three major types of government—presidential, parliamentary and mixed. However, present-day political thought offers much more sophisticated systems of categorisation. In their path-breaking article on the British system of government, Dunleavy and Rhodes suggest five models—prime ministerial government, cabinet government, ministerial government, segmented decision-making and bureaucratic co-ordination (Dunleavy and Rhodes, 1990: 5-16). They argued that each of these models was separate and distinct from the rest in that each assigned different roles to the principal political actors within the British system of government. Two of these models designated key decision-making responsibilities to the prime minister and the cabinet respectively; one suggested that individual ministers were the motive force within the executive; another proposed that power was shared between the major protagonists in the system; and a final model indicated that bureaucrats were dominant.

O'Leary argued that these five models might also be applicable to Ireland (O'Leary, 1991: 154-155). In the French case, Elgie identifies a slightly different set of models in which one of the models (cabinet government) is absent, another has two variants (segmented decision making), and two additional models are also present (presidential government and executive co-operation) (Elgie, 1993: 21-37). In the Austrian case, Müller singles out only three of the models (prime minister government,

cabinet government and ministerial government), although yet another model has also been distinguished (party government) (*Müller, 1994: 15-34*).

On the basis of a comparative study, Laver and Shepsle has considered six models of government (prime ministerial, cabinet, ministerial, bureaucratic, party and legislative) (*Laver and Shepsle, 1994: 6*). Party and legislative governments exist in so far as the actions of office-holders are influenced by values and policies derived from the institutions of party and legislature (*Rose, 1974: 379; Laver and Shepsle, 1994: 7; Müller, 1994: 23*). However, these two models remain hypothetical as no country present a solid evidence that political parties and legislature are stronger than executive power which usually shapes the form of government. In Japan, some political parties (for example, the Liberal Democratic party) were rather successful in controlling the governmental decision-making process. There were some periods in early American and British history (Continental Congress and the Puritan revolution of the 17th century respectively) during which the legislature was stronger than the executive bodies or simply assumed the powers of all the three branches of the government. In 1991-93, the Congress of People's Deputies also attempted to dominate the Russian government. However, this still is not enough to prove that the party and legislative models really exist.

Since the above models were mostly based on comparative analysis of various types of the parliamentary regime, Elgie suggests a more general classification designed for presidential and mixed regimes as well. He distinguishes six main models—monocratic government (this includes presidential and prime ministerial models), collective (cabinet) government, ministerial government, bureaucratic government, shared government (where two or three top-ranking individuals have joint and equal decision-making responsibilities) and segmented government (in his view, it is different from the shared government model in that in this model there is a functional, or sectoral distribution of power, whereas in the previous model there was a general sharing of power across all areas) (*Elgie, 1997: 222-225*).

However, the above classifications are not designed for description of purely presidential regimes (the United States) or superpresidential regimes (such as the Russian Federation). Moreover, one should remember that, generally speaking, it is difficult to construct universal models and apply them to particular cases. For example, according to the above classifications, the American government may be categorised as both monocratic (in its presidential variant) and legislative (because US Congress is more powerful than the European legislatures). The Yeltsin regime combines a number of characteristics attributed to superpresidential, oligarchic, bureaucratic and segmented governments.

It seems that diversity of classifications and difference of opinion among scholars are basically caused by the lack of common terminology and accuracy of concepts. Authors often do not delineate or use interchangeably the terms such as 'regime', 'system of government', 'model of government', etc. Criteria which serve as a basis for distinguishing different models often remain unclear. Some of the above classifications single out models of government on the basis of leading political actors, other are focused on the form of government or style of executive leadership in the legislature.

For the purposes of this study, I suggest the following hierarchy of terms. The term 'system of government' is the most universal notion that includes all the major characteristics of a country's polity such as form of government, constitution, the nature of state and civil society, type of power relations, regime, political leadership, administrative and party systems, elites, civil service, electoral system, political participation, etc. The term 'form of government'¹ is narrower than the term 'system of

¹ Elgie prefers to use the term 'regime' as an equivalent to the term 'form of government' (*Elgie, 1997: 218*). However, in political science literature, the term 'regime' used to describe the actual functioning of either political system (democratic, authoritarian or totalitarian regimes) or a concrete government, leader, political party, etc. (the Pinochet regime, the Tory regime, the Communist regime, the Nazi regime and so on.).

government' and characterises the type of constitutional system (formal organisation). Presently, there are two forms of government—monarchy and republic which have different variants. Monarchy has its absolute and constitutional (parliamentary) forms; republic includes three main variants—presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary. Due to the differences in constitutional systems presidential republic may have two variants—'regular' (the United States) and superpresidential (the Russian Federation). There are also some 'irregular' republican forms of government such as the Soviet system, Islamic republics or 'revolutionary republic' on Cuba, but they should be excluded from the framework of this analysis because only democracies are in focus of this study. For this reason, absolute monarchies are out focus of my analysis as well.

The style of political leadership and decision making determine further differentiation between the models of government. Depending on situation presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary republics as well parliamentary monarchies may have prime ministerial, cabinet, ministerial, bureaucratic, shared or segmented forms (of course, presidential and semi-presidential models include presidential variant of leadership).

For the purposes of this project, emphasis will be placed on presidential and semi-presidential forms of government because they have much in common with the Russian system of government although the experience of parliamentary models deserves some attention as well.

Bearing in mind that reality is richer than the analytical schemes applied in describing it, I'll try to use the above theories and models in this study. Despite their shortcomings and limitations they do provide me with useful research tools for analysing various types of executive-legislative liaison mechanisms.

DATA AND METHOD

The data for the project were drawn primarily from nine main categories of sources:

- *Constitutions* of the Russian Federation and some Western countries representing various models of government assist in the study of powers of executive and legislative bodies. First of all, these documents shed light on legal resources which both the executive and legislative branches have in their disposal and how they use these resources in power struggle. These sources are equally important in terms of understanding a legal environment in which the liaison machinery operates. It should be noted, however, that constitutions say nothing about the liaison mechanism as such. The latter used to exist on the extra-constitutional (de facto) basis albeit within the general legal framework provided by the fundamental law.

- *Executive branch's documents* regulating the liaison mechanism's activities.

There are two main categories of such materials:

- (a) Presidential and prime ministerial decrees, executive orders, governmental instructions, bulletins, messages to legislatures and other documents which define legal status, powers, structure and staff of the liaison apparatus. This sub-group of sources is crucial for studying a top level of the decision-making process but provides a student of executive-legislative relations with little information on the behind-the-scene activities. These documents are published in editions such as *Collection of Legislative Acts of the President and Government of the Russian Federation*, a state-owned newspaper *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, etc.

- (b) Publications of particular ministries and government agencies involved in foreign policy making such as ministries of foreign affairs, ministries of defence, national security councils and so on. They help in understanding how the ministerial liaison machinery works and what roles different executive

agencies play in decision taking. They also shed light on interdepartmental differences and competition. One can find these materials, for instance, in *Diplomaticheskii Vestnik* (Russian Foreign Ministry), *Foreign Relations of the United States, Current Policy, Special Reports and Department of State Bulletin* (all published by the State Department), U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency annual reports, US Defence Department's bulletins and British Foreign Office's press releases.

- *Parliamentary publications and documents*. There are several categories of these sources as well. The first category is legislation produced by parliaments (bills, resolutions, laws). Similar to constitutions, parliamentary documents provide a scholar with knowledge of laws and legal procedures which define both ground rules for the liaison mechanism and foreign policy strategies. Regulations on the executive branch lobbying in the legislature are of particular importance (for example, Statute No. 1913 of 1919, the Hatch Act of 1939 and the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946 which regulate some indirect forms of the US presidential lobbying in Congress). This type of documents is published in official governmental organs (periodicals, bulletins, collections, series, newspapers) such as *Collection of Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation*, *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, *US Code*, *US Congressional Record*, *Legislation on Foreign Relations*, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, *The Official Journal of Debates of the French National Assembly* and so on.

It should be noted that not only the 'end-product' (legislation) but also drafts are important for the study of my subject. They are helpful in a sense that a student of executive-legislative politics can realise how the legislature and liaison apparatus work and how decisions are taken. For example, the draft of the Russian Law on the National Security of 1995 demonstrates how the joint work of governmental officials and legislators on the bill has been organised (*State Duma, 1995*).

The second category of parliamentary materials is represented by records of plenary meetings (e.g., *Proceedings of the State Duma of the Russian Federation*, *US Congressional Record*, *The Official Journal of Debates of the French National Assembly*). They contain information on the crux of issues being under consideration as well as on position of different factions and interest groups within and beyond the legislature (records often include not only speeches and declarations of legislators but also reprints of articles, research papers, political pamphlets and memoranda and other background materials). Moreover, given the fact that a plenary session used to conclude parliamentary debates on a bill one can judge how efficient the efforts of executive branch lobbyists were on different phases of the legislative process. In case of Russia where by contrast with some other countries (e.g. the United States) presidential and prime ministerial representatives can present and intervene plenary discussions one also can examine what types of strategies and tactics are used by executive branch lobbyists.

The third group of parliamentary sources is committee (subcommittee) hearings and executive sessions where bills used to be discussed, amended and recommended to the floor (or rejected). A lot of empirical material can be found in these documents because executive branch lobbyists are especially active at this level. However, the problem is that few countries make public this category of documents. Only short notes about the most important committee decisions are published. The only exception is US Congress where almost all hearings are available for academics, journalists and the broad public.

The fourth category is formed by analytical and documentary publications of parliamentary committees, commissions, ad hoc groups and research services. US congressional publications are especially diverse—*Congress and Foreign Policy*, *Chronologies of Major Developments in Selected Areas of Foreign Affairs*, *Executive-Legislative Consultations on Foreign Policy* series,

committee staff reports and background papers, Congressional Research Service, General Accounting Office, Office of Technological Assessment and Congressional Budget Office reports, etc. These sources are of great interest for my study because they both reflect exogenous events that affect the executive-legislative liaison mechanism and reaction of legislative bodies to the executive power's lobbying.

Documents of party factions and interviews with leaders of the legislature (speakers, committee chairpersons, party leaders, prominent foreign policy experts, etc.), the fifth group of sources, are also of significant interest because the parliamentary leadership used to be a key element of the liaison mechanism and decision-making system. For example, late in 1995 an authoritative Russian journal *International Affairs* (semi-official organ of the Foreign Ministry) published a rather interesting interview with Ivan Rybkin, then Speaker of the State Duma, where he evaluated the 5th State Duma's foreign policy activities (*Rybkin, 1995*).

It should be noted that since the legislature is more open than the executive branch in terms of information it is easier to investigate the behind-the-scene activities of the liaison machinery on the basis of parliamentary rather than executive sources.

- Publications of *political parties, interest groups and non-governmental organisations*. Since these are important political actors and integral part of the legislative process their documents should be paid some attention as well. Parties used to publish their foreign policy platforms on the eve of either parliamentary or presidential elections. Occasionally, some professional journals publish documentary collections or review party platforms (see, for example, a collection of documents on Russian parties' foreign policy views in one of the issues of *International Affairs: Election 1995: 7-13, 18-22*). The party leaders used to publish books or pamphlets where they elaborate their views on topical foreign policy issues (see, for instance, *Zhirinovskiy, 1993; Zyuganov, 1995*). Parties also encourage publishing of expert assessments and analytical papers on various issues (*Zyuganov, 1997*). In Russia, almost each party has a newspaper or journal of its own. For example, Russia is Our Home sponsored a bi-weekly edition *Nash Dom i Otechestvo* (Our Home and Fatherland). Communists published *Pravda* and *Den* (Day). Social Democrats were grouping around the journal *Svobodnaya Mysl* (Free Thought) while the Slavophiles favoured to *Nash Sovremennik* (Our Contemporary) and *Molodaya Gvardiya* (Young Guard). The Liberal Democratic Party printed up a huge number of its publications - *Liberal* (The Liberal), *Pravda Zhirinovskogo* (Zhirinovskiy's Truth), *Sokol Zhirinovskogo* (Zhirinovskiy's Falcon) and so on.

- *Monographs and articles* on the executive-legislative liaison apparatus in Austria, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Russia and the United States. This is one of the most important categories of my sources because the book-size work provides a researcher with a rather complete and systematised information both on the subject itself and views of an author and school which he/her represents. Since the book format allows it, an author has sufficient space to develop his/her argumentation and describe his/her theory in length. Along with theoretical underpinnings, the author's way of reasoning, research methods and technique, system of arguments, intellectual precursors and empirical basis can be examined.

- *Research papers* on the subject produced by the Russian, West European, and American research institutes and think tanks. These sources are valuable because they mainly aimed at applied rather than theoretical research. They used to contain practical recommendations how to improve the liaison apparatus, what problems should be addressed and how solutions could be found. This is helpful in terms of understanding both the internal organisation of the liaison mechanism and sources of institutional change.

- Newspapers (*Le Figaro, The Guardian, International Herald Tribune, Izvestiya, Le Mond, Moscow News, New York Times, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, Novaya Gazeta, Pravda, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, The Times, Washington Post*) and journal publications (*American Political Science Review; Atlantic News, Comparative Political Studies, Co-operation and Conflict, Current History, The Economist, European Journal of International Relations, European Security, Europe-Asia Studies, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, International Affairs(London), International Organization, International Relations, International Security, The International Spectator, Journal of Peace Research, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn (and its English version International Affairs), Military Review, Millennium, Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya (World Economy and International Relations), Nato's Sixteen Nations, Orbis, Perspectives, Polis (Polity), Political Science Quarterly, Political Studies, Presidential Studies Quarterly, Pro et Contra, Public Administration, Review of International Affairs, RUSI Journal, Security Dialogue, Sotsialno-Politicheskiy Zhurnal (Social-Political Journal), Survival, Svobodnaya Mysl (Free Thought), USA - Economics, Politics, Ideology, Vlast (Power), West European Politics, World Affairs, etc.*) related to the subject;

- Interviews with officials, legislators and experts in the field. Despite the subjectivity of these sources they are particularly helpful in understanding of motivation of Russian and Western policy makers as well as of nuts and bolts of the executive-legislative liaison mechanism in various countries. During my work on the project I interviewed numerous experts from different countries:

Russia:

- Administration of the President: Prof. Leonid Smirnyagin, Head of Division;
- Council on Foreign and Defence Policy: Andrei Fyodorov, Executive Director, and Igor Urgens, expert;
- Diplomatic Academy, Russian Foreign Ministry: Prof. Grigory Khozin and Artem Rudnitsky, Head of Department;
- Fund "Politics": Vyacheslav Nikonov, Director;
- Institute of Europe: Dr. Arkady Moyses, Project Leader, and Dr. Irina Busygina, Senior Research Fellow;
- Institute of USA & Canada Studies: Dr. Sergey M. Rogov, Director, Manana Guseinova, Senior Research Fellow, and Tatyana A. Shakleina, Senior Research Fellow;
- Institute of World Economy and International Relations: Dr. Vladimir G. Baranovsky, Deputy Director, and Dr. Nikolay Kosolapov, Senior Research Fellow;
- Institute of Information on Social Sciences: Dr. Vera M. Solomatina;
- Izvestiya (newspaper): Konstantin Eggert, Diplomatic Correspondent;
- Moscow Carnegie Center: Dr. Dmitry Trenin, Deputy Director, Dr. Alexander Pikaev, Project Leader, Nikolay Petrov, Project Leader, and Dr. Ekaterina Stepanova, Research Fellow;
- Moscow Institute of International Relations: Prof. Ivan G. Tyulin, Vice-Rector; Prof. Marina Lebedeva, Head of Department, Prof. Andrei Melville, Dean of the Faculty of Political Science; Dr. Andrei Yemelyanov, Assistant Rector R & D;
- PIR Centre (Centre for Russian Political Studies): Dr. Vladimir Orlov, Director, and Ivan Saffronchuk, Research Fellow;
- State Duma: MPs Vladimir Averichev, Konstantin Borovoy, Galina Starovoitova, and Alla Yaroshenko;

- *St. Petersburg University*: Prof. Konstantin Khudoley, Dean, Department of International Relations, Prof. Vladimir Baryshnikov, Prof. Boris A. Shiryayev, Dr. Valery Konyshev, and Dr. Yury S. Kuzmin;

- *St. Petersburg Pedagogical University*: Prof. Vladimir Noskov, Head of Department, and Prof. Yuri Yegorov;

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- *Nizhny Novgorod Regional Administration*: Dr. Boris Dukhan, Vice-Governor, Ivan Konovalov, Head of Department of International Relations, and Prof. Olga Savinova, Head of Public Relations Department;

- *Nizhny Novgorod Research Foundation*: Dr. Sergei Borisov, Director, and Dr. Mikhail Kazakov, Research Fellow.

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- *Roskilde University*: Prof. Poul Wolfssen;

- *Danish Human Rights Society*: Dr. Eric Andre Andersen, Deputy Director.

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- *SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute)*: Prof. Adam Rotfeld, Director, and Dr. Ian Anthony, Project Leader;

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- *United States Institute of Peace*: Prof. Terrence Hopmann.

It should be noted that it is very difficult to deal with such a fragmented and often subjective and contradictory data-base. Numerous problems, such as comparability, reliability, systematisation, classification and interpretation of sources, inevitably emerge at some point. To solve these problems a scholar must examine different accounts, carefully compare them with each other, verify their authenticity and information value. Methods such as classification and systematisation, which are based on identification of homogenous groups of sources as well as similarities and dissimilarities between them, bring an analytical order into research efforts and help to organise sources for comparative procedures.

It is also important to select sources to compile a data-base. Several criteria should be implemented. First, sources should properly represent a body of evidence (in other words, they should reflect exemplary, typical phenomena). Second, identity of a source should be examined. An author, historical and ideological (if any) background should be identified. Third, sources should be original and informative in a sense that they should provide a scholar with new information about, vision of and approaches to the subject. Finally, preference should be given to primary rather than secondary sources in order to reduce the risk of error and create an adequate image of the object.

These research tools can serve as more or less reliable safeguards against misinterpretations; they help to overcome the limitations of the sources and compile substantial and sufficient data for the study.

EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE LIAISON MECHANISM: THE WESTERN EXPERIENCE

As mentioned, the study of executive-legislative liaison mechanism in presidential and semi-presidential republics is of particular importance for this project. The United States and France can exemplify these two models.

1. Presidential form of government (the United States)

The rise of the executive-legislative mechanism in the United States was necessitated by three factors at least.² First, the US constitutional system dictates the need for a liaison machinery. On the one hand, the separation of powers doctrine has an extreme form in this country. The American Constitution of 1787 distributed powers between the chief magistrate and the legislature in such a way that they became virtually independent (separated) from each other. For example, by contrast with the semi-presidential and parliamentary forms of government, the US President does not need a congressional confidence vote to form the Cabinet. He also can bypass the legislature by issuing executive orders and regulations albeit their effect is limited only to the executive agencies. On the other hand, according to the Founding Fathers' design, the American government is able to take most important decisions only by joint efforts of the two branches of government. For instance, the President needs congressional approval of his nominees. Senate ratifies international treaties prepared and concluded by the administration. While the President can veto bills, Congress can overcome a presidential veto by two-thirds vote. It is clear that to make this system workable and efficient a special mediator between the President and Congress is needed. The liaison mechanism plays the role of such a mediator.

Second, by contrast with the early period of American statehood when the executive and legislative powers were equal partners (in some cases, the Capitol Hill was even more influential than the White House), in the 20th century, presidential leadership became unchallenged. The congressional liaison apparatus became one of the most important channels of presidential influence on the Hill. As Holtzman and Mosher note, it is not incidentally that the rise of the first lobbyist structures within the executive branch coincided with the shift of the budget initiative from Congress to the President (*Holtzman, 1970: 5-6; Mosher, 1984: 1-2, 46*). The Budget Office (created in 1921) embodies these two tendencies. Under FDR two other areas—foreign and defence policies—fell into the presidential sphere of influence, and congressional relations offices were immediately created in the State Department and Department of War (*Pious, 1979: 187*).

Finally, in the post-World War II period, the legislative process became extremely complex—quantitatively and qualitatively—to the extent where a special co-ordinating mechanism was needed. For example, upon his inauguration JFK had to deal only with 35 domestic legislative programmes. When Lyndon Johnson left the White House his lobbyists were monitoring 435 bills on the Capitol Hill (*Zyablyuk, 1976: 121*). In late 1970s, the State Department received from Congress 1,500 requests a month; the Defence Department got from the Hill 110,000 letters and 220,000 phone calls a year (*The Washington Lobby, 1979: 32*). In qualitative terms, the post-war legislation itself became much more complex than in, say, the Wilsonian or FDR era. For instance, the Versailles Treaty or New Deal legislation seem very simple in comparison with the SALT II Treaty or bills on exploration of the outer space. The increasing complexity of the legislative process made the liaison apparatus a crucial element of the decision-making system responsible for a number of important functions such as exchange of information and reaching the compromise between the two powers.

² On the origins of the US executive-legislative liaison apparatus see in detail *Sergounin, 1987 and 1990a*.


In other words, the evolution of the American decision-making system resulted in creation of a special executive-legislative liaison mechanism that helps the two-century-old US constitutional system to adapt to the present-day realities and function in a proper way.

The contemporary US liaison apparatus has a number of important functions such as drafting legislation and monitoring the legislative process in Congress, consulting and lobbying legislators, serving their political and even personal needs, exchange of information, providing the executive branch with a feedback from the Hill, clearing governmental officials' statements on relations with the legislature and co-ordination of their contacts with members of Congress, mobilisation of public support (including pressure groups), contacts with mass media, etc. (*Holtzman, 1970: 21-30; Sergounin, 1990a*) This makes the liaison apparatus not only a consultative or advisory but also policy-making body. It should be noted that the liaison mechanism is both an instrument of presidential leadership in Congress and a way to establish partnership and co-operation between the two branches of government. It aims at establishing of working and co-operative relations between them rather than confrontation.

There are formal and informal structures of the liaison mechanism (see figure 1). The formal structure consists of a professional lobbyist apparatus of the executive power (a network of congressional relations offices and bureaux). While the White House Congressional Relations Office (CRO) is on the top of a lobbyist pyramid, departmental congressional liaison bureaux form a basis of this construction. There is a division of labour between the CRO and the departmental lobbying machinery. The latter is responsible for routine business (day-to-day contacts with members of Congress, monitoring the legislative process at the subcommittee and committee levels, information-gathering, etc.); the former used to be in charge with most important bills and help the departmental lobbyists in most difficult cases. According to some accounts, there were 26 officers in the CRO and 675 departmental lobbyists under Carter with the \$11-15 million annual budget (*National Journal, 1979 (2): 55; Current American Government, 1978: 116*).

The informal structure of the liaison mechanism may include a number of executive branch units such as public relations, communications and personnel offices as well as individual executive officials (including the President and heads of departments) who take part from time to time in lobbying Congress; the so-called 'built-in lobby' (administration's supporters on the Hill); party leadership; interest groups; mass-media; influential persons (on the national and local arenas); relatives and personal friends of a legislator, and congressman's

Figure 1. Organisation of the US Executive-Legislative Mechanism



constituency. The informal structure is broader, more flexible and fluid than the formal structure and may be quickly changed depending on the situation.

Depending on the style of executive leadership several models of the liaison mechanism can be distinguished. While the presidential model predominated over the entire post-war period, there was some room for the cabinet and ministerial models. For example, Carter and Clinton preferred a collegial (cabinet) style of decision-making on the early stages of their administrations. The congressional liaison machinery under Carter had also some characteristics of the ministerial model and departmental lobbyists were quite independent from the White House (*Current American Government, 1978: 120*). However, in 1978 Carter tightened its control over the departmental liaison apparatus to make the work of presidential lobbyists more co-ordinated (*Current American Government, 1978: 116*).

Some traits of the party model are also identifiable in the functioning of the liaison mechanism under Nixon, Reagan and Clinton. Since other channels were unavailable both Nixon and Clinton had to rely upon Republican and Democratic leadership, respectively, in their efforts to resist impeachment procedures on the Hill (*Public Papers of Presidents of the United States, 1974: B11; and 1975: 2-6, 21-25; Nixon, 1978: 708, 899, 1001-1003, 1041, 1047, 1058, 1066-1067; Wayne, 1978: 155-156*). As far as the Reagan lobbyist tactics is concerned, he tried to establish close relations with the Republican leaders in Congress even before the election (*Koenig, 1978: 160-161*). In the transitional period, Reagan co-ordinated all key appointments in the administration with them (*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 1981 (4): 175; Business Week, 1981, November 2: 89*). Due to good relations with the Republican party leadership the Reagan's quite controversial legislative package successfully passed the Capitol Hill in 1981.

Finally, it is safe to assume that some elements of the bureaucratic model are also present in the US executive-legislative liaison mechanism at least since the 1950s. Many experts note that in the post-war period a sort of an 'iron triangle' emerged at the level of executive bureau, congressional subcommittee and interest group (*Freeman, 1965*). These 'triangles' which embraced the entire governmental system resulted from a long-standing relationship between the executive and legislative bureaucracies as well as from regular contacts with private lobbyists. These 'triangles' exist regardless of changing political regimes and form a primary basis of the liaison mechanism. Presidential administrations can change the top of iceberg at most but the rest remains intact.

There are two main groups of methods used by presidential lobbyists—direct and indirect (*Holtzman, 1970: 172-229*). Direct methods include personal presentation of arguments; localisation of arguments (linking a certain bill to a legislator's constituency or district); providing members of Congress with useful information; party motivation (when lobbyists remind a congressman or senator about the need to be loyal to the party and President); serving legislators' political and personal needs (assistance in re-electing, fund-raising campaigns, covering travel costs, providing an access to sensitive information and mass media and even entertaining them); twisting-arms tactics and black-mailing in case of resistance or non-compliance.

Indirect methods aim at mobilisation of the informal structure of the liaison apparatus. For example, public relations offices used to build interest group coalitions to put a pressure on Congress. Communications offices are responsible for influencing public opinion via mass media. Personnel offices are in charge with patronage. The 'built-in lobby' helps presidential lobbyists from inside. The so-called 'grass-rooting' (exerting pressure on a member of Congress from his/her district) is seen as one of the most effective lobbying techniques. Along with mobilisation of the local interest groups and influential individuals, 'grass-rooting' includes the organising of a 'write to your Congressmen' cam-

paigned by which executive lobbyists try to demonstrate to legislators public attitudes to a particular bill (on lobbying techniques see in detail *Sergounin, 1990a*).

Given the nature of lobbying methods a question about their legal status is inevitable. There could also be a more general question: what is a legal framework of the executive-legislative liaison apparatus?

Presidential lobbyists and some lawyers believe that executive leadership in Congress is justified by one of the provisions of the Article 2 of the US Constitution which postulates that the President shall from time to time appeal to Congress with messages on the state of the Union and make suggestions for the legislature's consideration. Although this justification is disputable, Congress did not challenge this argumentation. Moreover, according to the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946, the executive branch does not fall into the category of a 'lobbyist organisation' and presidential officials involved in lobbying are considered as official representatives of the government rather than lobbyists (*The Washington Lobby, 1971: 116*). In 1919 and 1939, Congress adopted Statute No. 1913 and Hatch Act which limited some indirect lobbying methods (particularly, the use of federal money for organising of 'write to your Congressman' campaigns) (*US Congress, 1950: 61; Graves, 1964: 138*). However, these laws have numerous loopholes and, for this reason, are not taken seriously by presidential lobbyists. The main reason why Congress does not want to adopt more strict regulations is that legislators themselves need the liaison mechanism. They merely want to restrict most odious methods and make presidential lobbying a 'more civilised' instrument of public politics.

To sum up, the United States managed to create a rather efficient executive-legislative mechanism with a well-developed structure, skilful personnel and sophisticated techniques. With some minor exceptions, this machinery proved to be helpful both in improving the decision-making procedures and, more generally, adapting the American system of government to change.

2. Semi-presidential form of government (France)

By contrast with the United States, the French constitutional system does not draw a dividing line between the executive and legislative powers. Borders between them are transparent and penetrable. In France, the executive power consists of the President and Cabinet which have different sources of political authority. The President is elected by direct popular ballot; the Cabinet is formed by the parliamentary majority. For this reason, the Cabinet has a double loyalty: on the one hand, it is accountable to the President, on the other, it is dependent on the confidence vote in the National Assembly (*Suleiman and Rose, 1980; Elgie, 1993*). Again, by contrast with the United States, the situation of a 'divided rule' is possible not only in relations between the executive and legislative powers but also inside the executive branch (the President and Prime Minister may belong to different political parties).

Such a constitutional system has at least three implications for the executive-legislative liaison mechanism. First, there are two—presidential and cabinet—autonomous or semi-autonomous liaison systems which can act together (when the President's and Cabinet's party affiliation or concrete goals are alike), in parallel (when they have different but not conflicting interests) or even against each other (when they have conflicting interests).

Second, the role of the party machinery is significant. In fact, this machinery is a core of a liaison mechanism. The Cabinet (and the President if they belong to the same party) uses the party leadership for persuading legislators, coalition-building, reaching compromises, bargaining, introducing new legislation, information-gathering and disciplining members of party factions. It should be noted that

by contrast with the United States, in France and other European countries party discipline is relatively strong, and this provokes an intensive use of party instruments for ensuring executive leadership in Parliament. In case of the 'divided rule', the President may also use 'his' party faction to forward his legislative agenda or block initiatives of his opponents in Parliament.

Finally, as follows from the above analysis, there is a serious problem of co-ordination of presidential and cabinet liaison activities. Even if the President and Cabinet have the same party affiliation some problems with duplication of liaison machinery may arise. In case of the 'divided rule', situation becomes even more complicated because the President and Cabinet may compete for control over the liaison apparatus.

There are some constitutional procedures aimed at preventing of conflict between the President and Cabinet and facilitating their co-operation. For example, the Prime Minister needs presidential consent for appointing members of the Cabinet and used to discuss with the head of state a Cabinet's legislative agenda. On the other hand, the President needs a Prime Minister's or one of the responsible ministers' counter-signature on most important decrees and other documents. The degree of co-operation or contention between the President and Cabinet used to depend on the area of politics. In economic sphere, where the Cabinet and Parliament have rather broad powers, the President feels obliged to be more flexible and tolerant. However, the President behaves much more aggressive in the so-called 'reserved domain' (foreign and national security policy) which is traditionally seen as a sphere of presidential authority (*Maklakov, 1977; Krutogolov, 1980*).

Unlike in the United States, there is no a professional lobbying apparatus in France. There are some President's and Prime Minister's assistants responsible for contacts with MPs and monitoring the situation in Parliament but they can be compared with American 'colleagues' neither by their functions nor status. As mentioned, the party mechanism plays a central role in a liaison system. In addition, there is a number of formal and informal instruments such as presidential messages to the legislature, regular meetings with key MPs, briefings for legislators, receptions, participation of governmental officials in committee hearings and meetings, joint work on drafting bills, etc.

At the first glance, the French experience is most relevant for Russia because the constitutional systems of the two countries have much in common (particularly, the President-Cabinet-Parliament 'fateful triangle'). However, there is a big difference between France and Russia because the Russian president has more powers than the French one and the Russian cabinet is formed by the President, not by the parliamentary majority (like in France).

3. Parliamentary model

In parliamentary republics and monarchies, the problem of the president-prime minister rivalry is irrelevant because of the lack of the institution of presidency. The executive-legislative mechanism is more centralised and co-ordinated than in presidential and semi-presidential republics. There are some minor clashes between the prime ministerial and cabinet models of decision-making but their implications are important only for the executive branch and almost unidentifiable in case of the liaison mechanism (*King, 1985; Campbell, Wyszomirski, 1991; Rhodes and Dunleavy, 1995; Elgie, 1997: 219, 222*).

Similar to semi-presidential republics, the party apparatus plays a crucial role in functioning of the liaison system in parliamentary regimes (Britain, Canada, Japan, some Scandinavian countries, etc.). Some experts single out three main types of executive-legislative relationships in the parliamentary systems: (1) government-opposition; (2) government-small groups of MPs, both formal and informal;

and (3) government-private members, or MPs acting as individual representatives (*Whittington and Williams, 1990: 347*).

The government-opposition relationship used to be characterised by adversary style. There are three important activities that take place on the floor of a lower house and have these combative and partisan qualities. The first is Question Period in which opposition has an opportunity to criticise government and propose an alternative course and, in turn, government can defend and explain its policies. A second occasion on which opposition and government traditionally confront one another is the second reading stage of government-sponsored legislation. It is here that the minister appears in the chamber to defend the legislation and the opposition spokesperson mounts a challenge. The government prefers to believe that once the second reading stage has been successfully completed, Parliament is obliged to concentrate on the details of the bill, the main battle over principles having been fought. A similar quality of partisanship is found in the special debates that are scattered throughout the parliamentary year.

However, it would be a distortion to think of executive-legislative relations in the parliamentary model simply in terms of government-opposition confrontation. Some of the most important political activity in Parliament takes place away from the floor of the house in the caucuses of the governing and opposition parties and committees. It is in forums such as these that conflicts over policy are refined or redefined, that agreement is often achieved, and that truly controversial matters are subject to a measure of conciliation.

The second type of executive-legislative relationships—government vs. formal and informal groups of MPs—is also important in terms of power relations. For the government, one of the most important sources of criticism is the government backbench. Normally quiescent and polite in public, in private the backbench supporters of the government frequently clash with Cabinet on matters of policy. Open rebellion, though rare, can take the form of abstentions on important votes, minor media campaigns, and cross-voting. The governmental arsenal is rather traditional and range from threats to inducements or appeals to party loyalty.

The government often tries to use the caucus system to assure backbenchers that they have some say in the legislative process. For example, in the Canadian Parliament, government members, ministers included, meet in caucus every week when the legislature is in session (*Whittington and Williams, 1990: 350*). Although caucus is not a decision-making body and the party leadership almost always has the last word, backbenchers have an opportunity both to express their views and even affect the decision-making process.

Like the meeting of caucus, parliamentary committees are means by which smaller groups of MPs acting in concert can influence the direction of government policy. The potential of committees in this regard lies primarily in their ability to study specific topics in depth and offer detached, and sometimes non-partisan, assessments. Unlike caucus, however, committees are comprised of representatives from all parties, and with some exceptions they conduct their hearings in public. It should be noted that with the growth of government activity and an increase in annual government spending, the government in countries such as Britain, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Sweden, etc., has found it expedient to transfer some of its own business to parliamentary committees (*Boldyrev, 1973; Rhodes and Dunleavy, 1995*).

Governments are ambivalent toward the activities of committees. On the one hand, public inquires give the appearance of action without substance. They ascertain the reactions of interest groups to governmental proposals without requiring that a formal commitment be made to introduce changes. MPs, particularly government backbenchers, are kept busy and given an opportunity to prove themselves. On the other hand, committee members are usually eager to have their proposals discussed.

Moreover, committee reports are not always what the government wants to see. If reports are tabled with the unanimous approval of committee members, the government will be facing a small body of informed opinion, usually supported by interest groups, which it might find difficult to ignore. Critics of an expanded committee system have warned that once committees cease behaving as little replicas of Parliament's houses, a decline of parliamentary traditions can happen and a weakening of party ties can only culminate in congressionalism. In other words, the classical model of parliamentarism will ultimately be undermined. Other analysts, however, note that caucuses and committees can help to properly use backbenchers' potential, encourage opposition to a constructive dialogue with government and increase legislators' general skill and expertise (*Whittington and Williams, 1990: 353*).

The third pattern of executive-legislative relationship is the government-private MPs relations. There is a wide-spread opinion that Parliament is about political parties, not private members (*Krylova, 1965; Rose, 1974*). Nonetheless, MPs frequently feel the need to make manifest their legislative aspirations, sometimes to fulfil a personal mission, sometimes to demonstrate their political talents. Moreover, the task of private members, like that of the opposition and groups of MPs, is to prod, encourage and question the government with the intention of forcing it to justify in public its actions or inactions. For a certain range of matters the private member is in an excellent position to do that. The government usually is unhappy with this type of political actors and would prefer to deal with the party leadership but has to adapt to a new reality and study lobbying techniques that are used by American congressional relations officers.

An experience of the Western parliamentarism is also useful for Russia because a number of political principles has been borrowed from this model. For example, the half of members of the State Duma is elected via the party-ticket system and, for this reason, many deputies are dependent on the party machine. The Russian government is also familiar with the problem of backbenchers and unpredictable private members. Similar to Western governments, Russian executive lobbyists are usually focused on the second reading stage of government-sponsored bill. However, there are many differences between the two models. Among these are the institution of presidency, combination of territorial and party-ticket election systems, an important role of committees in the State Duma and so on.

EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS IN POST-COMMUNIST RUSSIA

Contrary to the Western countries, Russia is still in the process of nation-building and its political system is in transition. Along with other political institutions each branch of the state power aims at asserting its positions in and control over various areas of politics. Making of Moscow's foreign policy is one of the relatively sensitive political issues in Russia.

To understand the nature of executive-legislative relations and the role of the liaison mechanism in shaping Russia's post-Communist foreign policy it is advisable to examine a number of research questions such as foreign policy powers of the President and Parliament, major sources and areas of tension in executive-legislative relationship, methods of presidential leadership in Parliament, structure and activities of the liaison machinery, the impact of party factions in Parliament, as well as of interest groups and regional elites on decision-making and so on.

Three periods in executive-legislative relationship in the post-Communist Russia can be identified:

- Relations between the President and the Congress of People's Deputies/Supreme Soviet (1991-93);

- President-Parliament relations under the new Russian Constitution, the 5th State Duma (1993-95); and
- Executive-legislative relations after the 1995 parliamentary and 1996 presidential elections, the 6th State Duma (1995 - to date).

It is advisable to start from the analysis of the constitutional powers of the President and Parliament in the field of foreign policy because it is helpful in understanding of the legal framework of policy making.

1. Constitutional powers

In 1991-93, executive-legislative relations have been regulated by the Constitution of the RSFSR adopted on 12 April 1978 and amended in the post-Communist period (more than 300 amendments and additions have been introduced in 1991-93) (*Savelyev and Huber, 1993: 43*). A contradiction has been embodied in this document: the preservation of the previous system of Soviets as representative structures and the existence *de facto* of a new system of executive and judiciary bodies of power which were in the process of making. There was also a lack of the real separation of powers in the Russian system of government because the Soviets united the functions of the representative and executive powers. That is why although Articles 1 and 3 of the Constitution proclaimed the separation of powers, at the same time Article 104 said that the Congress of People's Deputies was the supreme body of state power in the Russian Federation. While the Parliament was given the right to lay down the main lines of foreign policy, the President and the government were responsible for implementing it.

However, it has been unclear how an assembly of 1068 people's deputies which has regularly been convened not less than twice a year and lacked a professional staff could make decisions. For this reason a routine control over foreign policy has been transferred to the Supreme Soviet, a permanent organ of the Congress. Formally, the Constitution gave the Supreme Soviet quite extensive foreign policy powers. Along with the Congress, the Supreme Soviet should help in shaping the general direction of Russia's international strategy. It drafted major legislation on national security matters. The Supreme Council regulated the budget of the foreign policy, defence and (nominally) intelligence agencies. It had the right to approve ambassadorial appointments and in early 1993 the appointment of Foreign and Defence ministers. The dispatch of armed forces abroad had to have parliamentary sanction. Most importantly, all international treaties required parliamentary ratification or could be denounced by the legislature. The legislature had a *de facto* right to develop inter-parliamentary co-operation and include its members into official Russian delegations conducting negotiations with foreign powers.

Contrary to the Congress, the Supreme Council had specialised and standing bodies to deal with foreign policy issues: the Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations, the Committee for Defence (including the Subcommittee on International Security and Intelligence), the Committee for Inter-republican Relations, Regional Policy and Co-operation (dealt with the CIS affairs), and the Subcommittee for Relations with Foreign Religious Organisations. A Commission for Relations with Compatriots Abroad has been set up under the Supreme Soviet Presidium. The Parliamentary Group, an affiliate of the Inter-parliamentary Union, was quite important in establishing co-operation between the Supreme Soviet and foreign parliaments.

Despite the fact that the Supreme Soviet possessed of broad powers the effectiveness of these formal rights was doubtful. Exact procedures remained undefined. Fixing procedures and making them work was made more difficult by the general lack of parliamentary experience and expertise. The few deputies with some experience and knowledge of international issues tended to dominate debate. Proceedings were often confused, debates were frequently rushed and resolutions hurriedly put together. Legislative overload also was not conducive for taking good decisions. For these reasons, many Russian and foreign experts assess the Supreme Soviet's foreign policy activities as inefficient, secondary, reactive and mostly critical and negative as regards the executive branch (*Kozhokin, 1992: 33, 38; Malcolm et al., 1996: 204-207, 296; Savelyev and Huber, 1993: 43*). Some analysts believe that, in practice, Russian foreign policy was essentially 'presidential' from the start and the Parliament had relatively little impact on the executive (*Malcolm et al., 1996: 107, 296*). However, it took some time to embody the presidential leadership in the Russia's fundamental law.

With adoption of the Russian Constitution in December 1993, the President became a key figure in foreign policy making. The President "directs the foreign policy of the Russian Federation", within the framework set by the Constitution and laws of the country (Articles 80 and 86). He no longer needs Parliament's approval of ministerial appointments, or of the composition of the Security Council (Article 83).

Bicameral Parliament (the Federal Assembly) has got quite limited powers in the field of foreign policy. It is able, however, to influence the executive power in some ways. The President needs the legislature's approval of his ambassadorial appointees (Art. 83 (m)). The lower house, the State Duma and the Council of the Federation ('Senate') ratify and denounce international treaties (Art. 106 (g)). Parliament drafts legislation related to foreign and national security policies (foreign trade, defence, conversion, national security, etc.). However, its power of legislation is less effective because of the extensive use of executive decrees, and the President's rights of veto. The legislature can also adopt non-binding resolutions which have limited impact on the executive but cannot be fully ignored by the President and the government. It has some voice in the budgeting process and may cut or increase appropriations for particular foreign policy agencies. The legislature may undertake investigations. The Council of the Federation exercises the sole parliamentary say on the sending of armed forces abroad. Finally, the legislators can appeal to public opinion's support to block some executive's initiatives. However, neither of these prerogatives affords Parliament much leverage over policy and even the legislators themselves acknowledge this (*Rybkin, 1995: 28*). The Russian Parliament's powers and impact on foreign policy cannot be compared to those ones of, let say, US Congress.

The Parliament has got some institutional framework for making and even conducting foreign policy. The State Duma has five committees which deal with international affairs: the Committee for International Affairs, the Committee for CIS Affairs and Links with Compatriots, the Committee for Defence, and the Committee on Geopolitics. The Council of the Federation has three specialised bodies: the Committee for International Affairs, the Committee for Security and Defence, the Committee for CIS Affairs. Compared to the Supreme Soviet this structure is designed better and more efficient.

Many experts believe that with the adjustment of the balance of power in favour of the executive branch relations between the two powers have become less confrontational (*Malcolm et al., 1996: 128; Rybkin, 1995: 28*). However, the way in which Parliament exercises its main foreign policy functions - promoting scrutiny and accountability - still remains far from the democratic ideal.

2. Sources of conflict

There are numerous causes of tension between the executive and legislature in post-Communist Russia - legal, historical, institutional, psychological and so on.

1. *Legal.* To begin with, as follows from the above analysis the lack of clarity with constitutional powers of the two branches could serve and served as one of the sources of conflict. In the Supreme Soviet period, for example, the mixture of the representative and executive functions in the Soviet system and the lack of the real separation of powers invited the parties to the conflict. The Constitution of 1993 which provided the President with vast foreign policy powers, in fact, lacks any real parliamentary check on the executive. It is also very difficult for the legislature to exercise its existing rights because there are few regulations and procedures describing how to implement them.

2. *Historical.* The setting of a proper framework for executive-legislative relations is a rather new problem for Russia. Under the Soviet regime, the legislature has been the solely representative or symbolic (if not "rubber-stamp") rather than policy-making body. The Communist Party machinery and the governmental agencies have been in charge with both making and implementing foreign policies. The lack of democratic and parliamentary traditions affected executive-legislative relations in the post-Communist period as well.

Increasing a foreign policy role for Parliament has been an integral part of the whole attempt to democratise the Russian political system both during the Gorbachev *perestroika* and "early Yeltsin". There were hopes that a Western-like parliament could be established in Russia. Such a legislature could be a partner and guarantor of democracy rather than rival and destructive opponent of the executive power. Both the Supreme Soviet and Yeltsin to whom the Parliament has helped in its struggle for the Russia's independence, initially aspired to an even constitutional power-sharing and co-operation.

However, the difference of opinion on the nature and tempo of reforms as well as the lack of democratic culture, mutual tolerance and proper procedures have quickly led to the confrontation between the President and the legislature. Political realignment both inside and outside Parliament has also been unfavourable for establishing of friendly executive-legislative relationship. The market-oriented (so-called "democratic") forces have mostly been represented in the presidential apparatus while their political opponents—nationalists and Communists—prevailed both in the Supreme Soviet and Duma. Moreover, economic decline, the shortage of resources, virulent nationalism and separatism, social conflicts added kerosene into the inter-branch conflict.

3. *Institutional.* The lack of thoroughly designed institutions and procedures as well as of a proper liaison mechanism also often prevented President and Parliament from effective co-operation. It should be noted that more or less efficient liaison apparatus has been established as late as in 1994. As mentioned above, few deputies and staff members had expertise in international affairs. Foreign policy activities of the legislative bodies have frequently been uncoordinated and sent wrong messages to the foreign partners. Despite the relatively short duration of the overt conflict between the President and Parliament (spring-autumn 1993) many legislators, even in the State Duma, have got a rather strong "institutional memory" coloured by confrontational thinking. Even now some deputies believe that they should oppose any presidential or governmental initiative simply because it comes from the rival institution.

4. *Interest groups and regional elites.* Given the weakness of political parties in Russia interest groups and regional elites found themselves in the centre of political process. In fact, they fulfil some functions which used to belong to other political institutions—parties, NGOs, mass media, leaders. Some political organisations, election coalitions and parliamentary factions are just a camouflage for various national and regional pressure groups. For example, Russia Is Our Home is a political in-

strument of gas and oil lobbies, and the Agrarian Party is a representative of the agrarian lobby, etc. (Pappe, 1996: 65; Temirkhanov, 1994: 40-41). The upper house of the Russian Parliament, the Council of the Federation, is seen by many analysts basically as a forum for representation of regional interests (Skokhin, 1997: 39-57) because regional executives which sit there actively lobby the federal centre to get governmental subsidies, state orders or other kind of federal assistance. Given the role which interest groups play in the Russian political system it is safe to assume that they can influence both the balance of power in and the nature of executive-legislative relations.

However, in comparison with other political priorities, Russia's foreign policy is not a subject of really strong competition between the different lobbies. To put it more precisely, with a rare exception, different pressure groups usually have parallel, not conflicting interests in this area. This gives the Russian foreign policy machinery a relatively free hand in shaping and conducting foreign policy. A number of informal political actors, however, could be identified.

For example, the gas-oil lobby which is a key supplier of energy to the Baltic states and Kaliningrad, opposed to economic sanctions against the Baltic states and pressed the Russian government to normalise its political and economic relations with these countries. Under the gas-oil lobby's pressure, Moscow, for example, insisted on including a special provision on purchases of energy in a larger package into a proposed Russian-Lithuanian agreement in 1995-96 (Joenniemi, 1996: 14). Russian export-import firms put a pressure on both the State Duma and the government to enhance Moscow's co-operation with the EU under the 1994 Partnership Agreement and with East European countries which have always been Russia's traditional trade partners.

On another occasion, Russia Is Our Home lobbied the government hard in favour of Sino-Russian joint projects. For example, during his March 1997 visit to Beijing Alexander Shokhin, one of the leaders of Russia Is Our Home and First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma, put pressure on his Chinese counterparts to proceed with construction of a nuclear power station in Jiangsu (worth \$2.5 billion) and to sign contracts on the construction of a thermoelectric power station in Beijing and a system of hydroelectric power stations on the Yangtse River (the Three Gorges project) (*Dom i Otechestvo*, 6-14 March 1997: 1). Rem Vyakhirev, Chairman of Gazprom and another key figure in Russia Is Our Home, told participants at the Gas Congress in Copenhagen in June 1997 that his company expects growth in Asian demand for gas to offer the biggest potential for exports. While big buyers such as Japan are a long way from some Gazprom fields in Siberia, much of Asia is not too far away, he said (*International Herald Tribune*, 12 June 1997: 17). In particular, China and Russia are constructing a pipeline connecting the Irkutsk gas fields with the Chinese industrial centres (with prospects for potential extending to other countries). The presidents of the two countries have discussed this issue, among others, at the Sino-Russian summit meetings in Beijing (April 1996) and in Moscow (April 1997) (Fanlin, 1997).

The Russian Orthodox Church and human rights organisations were very active in protecting the Russian national minorities in the FSU countries. Along with some other political groups they forced the Yeltsin government to pay more attention to this issue (Petlyuchenko, 1993: 65).

The environmentalists have also become rather influential in Russia's domestic politics and security debate in the post-Communist period. It was the environmentalists who first started to re-define the concept of security. Under their pressure nearly all leading schools of foreign policy thought included ecological dimension in their concepts of security. A special section on ecological security was put into the draft of the Russian Law on National Security in 1995 (*State Duma*, 1995). The Russian "Greens" were particularly active in the Russian North-West. Apart from monitoring the environment in St. Petersburg, on Kola Peninsula and in the Baltic Sea, the environmentalists initiated some inter-

national projects to highlight the most compelling ecological issues in the area (*Van Buren, 1995: 133-134*).

Regional elites were rather influential actors as well. For example, the leaders of the three "most European" Russian regions (both due to their geographical location and economic orientation) -- Kaliningrad, Karelia and St. Petersburg -- were interested in opening up the regions to economic, political and humanitarian co-operation with the countries of the Baltic Sea rim space (*Vozgrin, 1992: 107-119; Matochkin, 1995: 8-14*). They pushed Moscow to grant them special privileges, including creating free economic zones (FEZs). Some of them succeeded in cultivating contacts with top federal officials who defended regional interests in the centre. For example, Vladimir Shumeiko, ex-Chairman of the Federation Council, Federal Assembly of Russia, was a deputy from the Kaliningrad Region. He assisted the local government in promoting of the FEZ idea and obtaining other privileges.

On the other hand, a number of Russian regional leaders pushed both the Parliament and the government to be more assertive with regards to territorial disputes between Russia and the FSU countries. For example, on a number of occasions the Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov who is seen as one of the promising presidential candidates in the year 2000 made some confusing statements on the Russo-Ukrainian dispute on the Crimea peninsula. The Pskov and Novgorod governors also made several tough statements on Russo-Estonian and Russo-Latvian territorial disputes which entailed the reaction of and clashes between the Russian executive and legislature (*Moskovskie Novosti, 29 September - 6 October 1996*).

5. *Ideological.* Although ideological factors were of less importance in foreign policy domain than in the domestic one they also affected executive-legislative relations in this field. Atlanticism vs. Eurasianism, liberal institutionalism vs. political realism, liberal democracy vs. Communism, nationalism vs. cosmopolitanism exemplify some of these ideological conflicts. In 1991-93, Atlanticism dominated the government while Eurasianist and Marxist paradigms prevailed in the Parliament.

Interestingly, since the mid-1990s the realist/geopolitical school became dominant both in the executive and legislative bodies. Political realism served as a basis for the foreign policy consensus among the Russian elites. This development reflects relative economic and political stabilisation in the country. In addition, the discussions of 1991-93 resulted in defining some common principles on which the major schools have agreed upon (such as the priority of Russia's national interests; the secondary role of 'all-human' or cosmopolitan values; vision of Russia as a great power with a major voice in the international community; moderate anti-Westernism, etc.) (*Sergounin, 1997a*). At the same time, the emergence of a realist-based consensus led to the relative decrease of ideological factors.

6. *Inter-personal relations.* Executive-legislative relations have been also affected by personal sympathies and antipathies of political leaders. It is well-known that the personal enmity between President Yeltsin and the Speaker of the Supreme Council Ruslan Khazbulatov has contributed to the confrontation between the two powers. At the same time, good personal relations between Mr. Yeltsin and the Speaker of the State Duma Ivan Rybkin were conducive to co-operation between the executive and legislature.

The personal antipathy between the country's "main experts on world affairs" Andrei Kozyrev (the former Foreign Minister) and Vladimir Lukin (Chairman of the Duma's Committee on Foreign Affairs) is the most exemplary story. Lukin was discontent not only with the Kozyrev's pro-Western political philosophy but also with his reluctance to provide the legislature with information and consult it on major foreign policy issues (*Brillov, 1994: 2*). This enmity led to a number of clashes between the Foreign Ministry and the State Duma in areas such as the Yugoslav conflict, Russia's joining the

PfP programme, Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic states and so on. However, Yevgeny Primakov, who has succeeded Kozyrev in early 1996, managed to establish good personal relations with the parliamentary leaders and this facilitated understanding between the two governmental bodies.

It is difficult to identify a most important source of conflict or establish some hierarchy of the above factors. Depending on a concrete situation a particular factor played significant or relatively unimportant role. However, it should be noted that in reality a combination of several causes rather than one factor initiated the power struggle.

3. Areas of contention

A number of 'conflict zones' in executive-legislative relations can be singled out:

Conflict resolution and peace-keeping. Parliament often was unable to find accord with the government on the approaches to managing and resolving conflicts in the post-Soviet space. For example, the legislature was dissatisfied with the agreement between Moldova and the Trans-Dniester Republic by which the rights and security of the Russian-speaking population have not been guaranteed enough. In April 1992, having received the report of the mixed governmental-parliamentary commission headed by Vice-President Alexander Rutskoi, Parliament passed a resolution recommending to use the former Soviet 14th army stationed in Moldova as a peace-keeping force. The resolution also requested the Russian government to assist talks on the legal status of the Trans-Dniester region as part of Moldova "in keeping with the principles and norms of the UN Charter" (*The Congress of People's Deputies, 1992: no. 2680-1*). This meant indirect support for self-determination of the Trans-Dniester region if Moldova opted to join Romania. Finally, with some reservations, the government accepted this resolution. This paved a way to an agreement between Russia and Moldova on settling the conflict in the Trans-Dniester region (21 July 1992). It should be noted that in case of this conflict the legislators not only sent its colleagues on fact-finding missions to the field but also took part in the official negotiations with the conflicting parties.

The Abkhazia-Georgia conflict was another area of contention between the executive and the legislature. Parliament criticised the President and the government for the lack of coherent approach to this problem. According to some legislators, Yeltsin's pro-Georgian position made possible Tbilisi's military intervention in Abkhazia in August 1992. On the other hand, when the Russian military supported the Abkhazians in order to stop the Georgian offensive and prevent the genocide and ethnic cleansing in this breakaway republic, some liberals in the Supreme Soviet and later on in the State Duma blamed Yeltsin for his support of Muslim terrorists and separatists. Many legislators believed that the old imperialist principle "divide and rule" which Moscow often implemented in the "near abroad" did not serve Russia's national interests. They successfully insisted on creation of the CIS peace-keeping forces which brought some reconciliation to the region.

Among the "far abroad" issues the Yugoslav conflict has got more parliamentary attention than other European disputes. As Pravda put it there were several reasons for such a focus (*Malcolm et al., 1996: 215-216*). Many deputies regarded this crisis as analogous to that in the former USSR and the Russian Federation. The Balkans has been a traditional sphere of Russian influence, Serbia an historical ally. Western involvement has been seen as encroachment on Moscow geopolitical positions in the region as well as a testing ground for the viability of Moscow's post-Communist foreign policy.

In 1992-93, the Supreme Soviet heavily criticised the Foreign Ministry for its inability to produce a clear strategy towards the international economic sanctions against Belgrade. Many deputies were concerned at the haste of Moscow's acquiescence to Western-sponsored economic sanction against Serbia in May 1992, without any consultation of the legislature. In June, the Parliament passed a resolution calling for a moratorium on sanctions. In December 1992, another resolution which stressed the need for the extension of sanctions to all three warring parties has been adopted. Simultaneously, the Supreme Soviet paid much attention on the need to prevent military intervention, demanding in December 1992 that the Foreign Minister be instructed to use Russia's Security Council veto to achieve this end if other means failed. The legislature also urged the government to prevent lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia. Parliament insisted that the military force should be used only for peace-keeping and sanctioned by the UN. The Russian government could not ignore these parliamentary actions and the tone of Russian diplomats become tougher in 1993 (in particular with regard to the military intervention). However, the government did not give way to parliamentary insistence on the use of the veto on sanctions or the arms embargo.

Similar tactics has been used by the government in its relations with the State Duma. A number of radical initiatives, often sponsored by Liberal Democrats, were produced. For example, the Committee on Geopolitics, where such extreme views frequently prevailed, called for vetoing NATO strikes and unilaterally suspending sanctions against Belgrade. In May 1994 and July 1995, the Duma passed a resolution calling for the end of Russian participation in UN sanctions (*Gusev et al., 1996: 8, 12*). However, the centrists (like Lukin) managed to exercise a moderating influence on further legislative activities. Even Dayton agreements which evoked much discussion in the Parliament finally have been accepted by the vast majority of the deputies.

During the Kosovo crisis of 1999, a number of deputies from the LDPR and CPRF called for immediate military-technical assistance to Serbia and creation of a trilateral union Russia-Belarus-Serbia (*Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 30 March 1999: 1; Nezavisinaya Gazeta, 1 April 1999: 3*). However, the vast majority of both the State Duma and the Council of the Federation was against Russia's direct involvement into the Balkan war. Moreover, although the Council of the Federation approved funds for sending Russian peace-keepers to Kosovo, many senators expressed their concerns about financial and security implications of peace-keeping operation for Russia.

It should be noted that in case of the Yugoslav conflict the government and parliament often played the famous game of "good and bad cops" where the executive "had to" use a tougher tone with the West because of the legislature's pressure.

CIS integration. From the very beginning the legislature became a bulwark of the integrationist forces led by the Communists. In the Supreme Soviet period, it focused on the need of economic and military-technical co-operation between the CIS member-states as well as on the establishing of an institutional framework for the Commonwealth. However, neither in the Supreme Soviet nor in the 5th Duma the integrationists had sufficient majority and resources to challenge the executive.

With the Communists' victory on the parliamentary elections in December 1995 situation has changed. In March 1996, the State Duma passed a Communist-drafted resolution that annulled the 1991 Belovezhskaya Pusha agreements on the dissolution of the USSR and creation of the CIS. Despite its political rather than legal significance (it was not mandatory for the President) this Duma's move accelerated the timetable for the signing of the quadripartite agreement between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and the union treaty between Russia and Belarus. At the same time, this action increased the Russian neighbours' concerns on ability of the Russian leadership to counter the neo-imperialist forces in the country.

Arms control. Division of the former Soviet arsenals under the ceilings of the CFE treaty was one more area of tension between the executive and the legislature. For example, parliamentary critics attempted to force the government to take a tougher stand on Kiev's attempts to make the naval personnel of the Black Sea Fleet swear allegiance to the Ukrainian authorities. Several deputies led by Lukin demanded to exert a strong diplomatic pressure in order to avert what they called Ukraine's "one-sided" approach to problems of the Black Sea Fleet. As a means ensuring negotiations within the CIS framework, an idea rejected by Ukraine, the adherents of the tough line managed to pull through a parliamentary resolution requesting the President to put back the Black Sea Fleet under Russia's control. In order to avoid confrontation, Mr Yeltsin consented to issue such a decree.

Some of the Russian legislators criticised their government for an "inadmissible tolerance" to the inadequate interpretation by Ukraine of the CIS agreement on the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons on her territory, as well as to Ukraine's stand on the ratification of the Soviet-US START Treaty. In the first case the Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk in March 1992 suspended the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine because he was not convinced that warheads were destroyed in Russia. Although the destruction of nuclear warheads was eventually resumed, many Russian deputies requested consistency from Kiev and accused Mr Kravchuk of putting off the solution of the problem in order to wring additional aid from the United States.

In the second case Russian deputies insisted that only Russia should ratify the START Treaty since, by proclaiming herself a successor state, Russia assumed the entire burden of the contractual obligations of the USSR. Ukraine rejected that position saying that the strategic offensive weapons that are the subject of the Treaty should remain on the territory of Ukraine. Later on the problem was settled by the Lisbon Protocol.

Given the possibility of NATO enlargement in mid-1990s the State Duma returned to arms control issues again. A number of parliamentary factions (mostly the Communists) undertook some measures to put pressure on both the Yeltsin government and NATO itself. These factions proposed to revise the CFE Treaty in accordance with the 'new realities' and voiced their negative attitude to the ratification of the START II Treaty until the US and NATO changed their position on the Alliance's extension. According to experts close to the Communist Party, the Treaty is detrimental to Russia's security because it is grounded on Moscow's unilateral concessions and undermines the country's deterrent potential (*Podberezkin, 1996: 95-97*). These anti-Western forces have effectively blocked the ratification of the START II Treaty so far. In addition to the above initiatives, the Communists again threatened to return to the discussion of Russia's participation in the Partnership for Peace programme. As a result of the Balkan war, almost all Russia-NATO joint programmes have been frozen in 1999.

Territorial disputes. The Parliament used to take more assertive position on these disputes than the executive power. For example, in the context of some plans to transform Kaliningrad into either the Baltic Hong-Kong or the "fourth Baltic republic" the legislature tried to tighten control over this region. Along with some centralists in the executive branch the State Duma was reluctant to grant the region extended powers. In 1994, the President proposed the law 'On the special status of the Kaliningrad region'. However, instead of approving the law, the State Duma renamed it to read 'On safeguarding the Russian Federation's sovereignty on the territory of the Kaliningrad region' and placed it on a waiting list (*Wellman, 1996: 176*).

Rather serious difference between the Supreme Soviet and the government bore on the legal status of the Crimea. The Russian-Ukrainian disagreements over the Black Sea Fleet, the destruction of nuclear weapons, etc., were used as an excuse for raising once again the issue of the Crimea

status. President Yeltsin tried - albeit without much success - to calm down the legislators. Nevertheless, on 6 Feb. 1992 Parliament passed a resolution requesting "to examine the constitutionality" of the 1954 Khrushchev's decision to hand over the Crimea to the Ukrainian Republic. The 7th Congress of People's Deputies once again raised the Crimean issue, that time in package with the status of Sevastopol, the main base for the Black Sea Fleet.

Hearing on these issues were held in the Supreme Soviet on 18 January 1993 (*Savelyev & Huber, 1993: 37*). The State Duma also raised this question from time to time until the Russian-Ukrainian accords on the division of the Baltic Sea Fleet were reached in 1997.

National minorities rights. It was Parliament who along with some political parties and interest groups forced the President to turn his attention to the Russian minorities in the FSU countries. For example, the legislature successfully opposed to the unconditional Russian troop withdrawal from the Baltic states unless they would guarantee the civil rights of the military pensioners and ethnic Russians in these countries. The Parliament fully supported Kozyrev's 'linkage tactics' (*Sergounin, 1998a: 58*).

Access to information. The legislature's discontent with the government's information policy also caused some conflicts between the two powers. Deputies complained that the executive often provided them with incomplete and outdated information while governmental officials blamed legislators for the lack of secrecy, organising leaks and using confidential information in parochial interests. As mentioned above, Kozyrev-Lukin animosity has been caused—among other factors—by their discords over the access to information.

In a hope to become more independent from the government Parliament tried to develop a system of gathering and evaluation of information of its own. In mid-1990s, the State Duma invited American experts to create an analytical unit which should be analogous to the US Congressional Research Service. Duma's committees dealing with foreign and national security policies employed (full- and part-time) a number of famous experts from the Russian Academy of Science (RAS)—Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Institute of Europe, Institute of the USA and Canada (ISKRAN), university research centres—Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO) and Moscow State University—and research institutes working on defence and intelligence agencies.

The State Duma also co-operated with some independent and state-funded think tanks. For example, the Supreme Soviet helped to establish a Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISS) which proved to be the most authoritative organisation among the state-run research institutes dealing with international studies. Since its creation in 1992 the RISS is led by Yevgeny M. Kozhokin, a former member of the Supreme Soviet and chairman of the sub-committee on defence and security. However, after the dismissal of the Supreme Soviet the executive branch decided to put the RISS under its command. In accordance with the presidential decree, the RISS is a state research organisation which should provide the governmental bodies with analytical information and recommendations related to national security. The RISS maintains a staff of over 70 research fellows. It is mainly financed from the state budget but it also managed to get grants from NATO and some other foreign foundations. The Institute maintains close relationships with the Presidential Administration, Foreign and Defence Ministries, security services and the Parliament (State Duma and Council of Federation). The priority areas of research for the RISS include: national security and Russia's strategic interests in different regions of the world; developments in the CIS countries; security system in Europe; Russia-NATO and Russia-EU relations; disarmament and global stability; non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and peacekeeping operations (*Antonenko, 1996: 42-44*).

The State Duma also established some links to the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy (CFDP), the biggest and most influential independent think tank. The Council was established in February 1992 as an independent non-governmental organisation. Although the Council is basically oriented to the executive agencies, the CFDP also provides the Duma committees with its research papers. The CFDP does not conduct projects at the request of the government structures but chooses the topic of research on its own initiative and based on the decisions of the Assembly and the Board which direct the Council. However, since a number of authoritative legislators (such as Deputy Chairman of the Duma Defence Committee Alexei Arbatov and Chairman of the Duma Foreign Affairs Committee Vladimir Lukin) are members of the Assembly, the Council usually takes into account Duma's information priorities and needs.

It should be noted that regardless of Parliament's efforts to build an information system of its own, the latter is not comparable with the executive one in terms of quantity and quality. This means that, in principle, the grounds for potential conflict are still there.

4. Executive-legislative liaison mechanism

Frequent conflicts between the executive and legislative branches of the government, which sometimes can lead to the constitutional crisis or even—as the October 1993 events demonstrated—to a civil war, emphasised the need for a special liaison mechanism. As the Western countries demonstrated (particularly, the United States and France, the states with similar to Russia—presidential and semi-presidential—forms of government), such a mechanism could fulfil a number of important functions. It could be a proper channel for consultations, exchange of information, receiving "early warning signals", initiating new legislation, bargaining and providing feedback. However, it took some time for the two parties to realise the need for a liaison machinery.

There were some sporadic attempts to create some elements of such a mechanism in the Supreme Soviet period. The administrations of both the President and government set up small units in their public relations offices to monitor the situation in Parliament (*Collection of Legislative Acts of the President and Government of the Russian Federation, 1993 (9): art. 735*). The Foreign Ministry also established a Department of Parliamentary Liaison, Political Parties and NGOs. It has initially been headed by Dr. Vladimir Savelyev, a famous Russian expert on US Congress and a former senior research fellow at ISKRAN. Some presidential political advisers had expertise in this field as well (for example, Sergei Stankevich who was an expert on American Congress during his affiliation with Institute of General History, RAS). However, these small and non-influential structures could not substitute a real liaison mechanism. They functioned as monitoring rather than policy-making bodies.

With coming of a new constitutional system the President and Prime Minister reorganised the entire liaison mechanism (see Figure 2). Special units on relations with the State Duma and the Council of Federation have been established within the presidential and Cabinet apparatus. Experts in public relations and law have been invited to work as staff members. For example, Georgy Satarov, a former senior research fellow at the RAS who studied voting behaviour in US Congress together with Stankevich, headed a directorate on relations with the State Duma in the Administration of the President (AoP).

The posts of the presidential representatives in the State Duma and the Council of Federation have been created. These officials not only monitor the situation in both houses but also take an active part in committee hearings and plenary sessions, draft legislation, consult deputies, present president-sponsored legislation, invite experts, make a legal assessment of bills pending in Parliament, in-

introduce presidential nominees and deliver presidential messages to Parliament (*Okunkov, 1996: 75-77*). The presidential representatives got a secretarial support from the special unit of the AoP which had 25 employees in 1998 (*Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 14 February 1998: 2*).

A post of the representative of the Russian government in the Federal Assembly and Constitutional Court has been established. One of the high-ranking members of the Cabinet used to assume this position *ex officio*. For example, in June 1999 Pavel Krasheninnikov, the Minister of Justice, was appointed the representative of the government in Parliament and the Constitutional Court (*Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 11 June 1999: 26*).

The legal directorates of both the presidential and Cabinet administrations are responsible for co-operation with Parliament in areas such as drafting legislation, defining a legislative agenda and legal assessment of legislation adopted by the State Duma. By a special presidential decree (7 March 1996) the Main Directorate on Domestic and Foreign Policies of the AoP has been charged with gathering information on deputies' attitude to president-sponsored legislation (*Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 16 March 1996*).


Interestingly, liaison offices not only participated in the legislative process but also organised training programmes for governmental officials. For example, in March 1998 the Department on Relations with the State Duma of the Cabinet sponsored four workshops on drafting laws (*Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 7 April 1998: 2*).


Along with micro- and mezo-levels some liaison mechanism has been created at the macro-level. Regular meetings of the "Big Four" (the President, Prime Minister, Speaker of the Duma and the Chairman of the Council of Federation) have been institutionalised. This institution, however, is mostly designed for solving domestic problems and rarely serves as a forum for discussion of the foreign policy issues. Because of the Yeltsin's health problems these meetings were quite rare in 1998-99, but in March 1999 the President suggested to resume regular meetings (*Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 31 March 1999: 1*).

To stop the impeachment procedure in the State Duma and consolidate his political base in view of the Balkan war, in April 1999, Yeltsin decided to include Gennady Seleznev, the Speaker of the Duma, and Yegor Stroev, the Chairman of the Council of the Federation, into the Security Council of the Russian Federation. By contrast with the 'Big Four' format, this gesture has contributed to developing executive-legislative liaison mechanism in foreign policy and national security spheres.

Some informal liaison structure emerged as well. The Foreign and Defence ministries often sponsor conferences, seminars and round-tables where experts from Parliament are invited. The above think tanks are also used for informal co-operation between the governmental agencies and parliamentary committees. These informal channels of communication have been rather helpful in reaching of an executive-legislative consensus on issues such as NATO enlargement, START II Treaty, Russia's policies in the Baltic Sea region, etc.

Figure 2. The Russian executive-legislative liaison mechanism, as of May 1998.





However, the existing liaison mechanism is far from perfection. It is reactive rather than active. It often simply follows events and processes rather than anticipates or manages them. The presidential and Cabinet liaison structures often duplicate each other. There is also the lack of co-ordination between different executive agencies: this frequently thwarts government's schemes and undermines presidential leadership in Parliament. There is also an impression that the liaison mechanism sometimes looks like an individual (executive) business rather than a joint executive/legislative venture: while presidential officials are rather persistent in pursuing their interests, the legislature remains passive and indifferent.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The entire story of executive-legislative relations in the post-Communist period is about how the two powers tried to assert their control over Russia's foreign policy. The point of departure was that the legislature formally had more powers but has been unable to exercise them, while the executive *de facto* made and implemented foreign policy. The Constitution of 1993 finally legitimised presidential leadership in this field.

The Parliament's role has been limited to promoting scrutiny and accountability. The legislature, however, is dissatisfied with this role and continues efforts to assert its control over Russian international strategy. As for the efficiency of these efforts, Malcolm and Pravda correctly note that the parliamentary actions have usually affected the timing of policy moves and the overall climate of policy rather than determining its strategic direction (*Malcolm and Pravda, 1996: 544*).

Despite the seeming predominance of executive power in foreign policy-making at least two challenges to the President's omnipotence emerged. First, there was growing inefficiency of the presidential decision-making system which often resembled a Byzantine-like politics. Second, presidential foreign policy prerogatives were gradually eroded under the pressure of various interest groups and regions represented in the State Duma and Council of the Federation. This made Russian decision-taking process a real puzzle for both practitioners and scholars. An outcome of this power struggle remains unclear.

Under the current circumstances the need for an effective executive-legislative liaison mechanism is compelling. Without such a mechanism neither parliamentary support for Russian foreign policy will be provided nor democratic control over the executive power is possible. The Russian post-Communist leadership managed to create some elements of the liaison mechanism both at the level of

governmental bureaucracy and leadership of the two branches. However, as a political institution, the Russian liaison apparatus has a long way to go before it can play a meaningful role in decision making.

A number of suggestions on improving the existing executive-legislative mechanism could be made on the basis of the study of the Western experience and current Russian legislation:

1. Liaison structures should be created not only in the administrations of the President and government but also at the ministerial level.

2. The liaison mechanism should become an American-like lobbying machinery with both formal and informal structures. Presently, executive officials dealing with the Duma and the Council of the Federation focus too much on paper-work (drafting legislation, secretarial functions, etc.). They have no time and skill to lobby legislators.

3. There should be a division of labour between presidential, governmental and ministerial lobbyists; duplication should be avoided. While ministerial lobbyists may take care of routine business, presidential and Cabinet-level liaison structures should be concentrated on most important issues.

4. Representatives of the President and government in the Federal Assembly must have their own staff rather than borrow secretaries from other structures. The Cabinet should have two representatives in Parliament (one in the upper house and another in the Duma) and they should not be burdened by other duties.

5. Public relations offices within the central executive bodies should pay attention not only to contacts with media but also with pressure groups in order to mobilise their resources in favour of presidency and government.

6. The 'Big Four' format should be further institutionalised and the scope of discussions should be extended.

7. A new generation of specialists should come to the liaison apparatus. There is a demand not only for lawyers (who is a dominant group now) but also for PR-experts, political and social scientists, former legislative assistants, party activists and so on.

8. Finally, the President should change his perceptions of Parliament, its role in the decision-making process and the status of the liaison mechanism. He should get rid of a stereotype of the legislature as an adversary and irrelevant institution. Rather, he should perceive Parliament as an equal partner and the liaison mechanism as an efficient instrument of problem-solving. It is unlikely that such a fundamental paradigmatic change will occur under the current President. Perhaps the next President will be able to understand this and reform the executive-legislative liaison mechanism.

MAJOR ACTIVITIES DURING THE WORK ON THE PROJECT

(a) Study trips and work in the libraries

To collect data for the project and interview experts I've visited some Russian and foreign research institutes, universities and libraries:

- *Russia*: (i) Nizhny Novgorod: University of Nizhny Novgorod, Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic University (American Centre and French Library), Nizhny Novgorod Regional Library (1997-99); (ii) Moscow: Russian State Library, Russian Library of Foreign Literature, Moscow State University, Institute of Information on Social Sciences, Moscow State University of International Relations, Institute of the USA and Canada, Institute of Europe, Institute of World Economy and International Relations (1997-99); (iii) St. Petersburg: Library of the Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg University (1997-99).

- *Australia*: La Trobe University and University of Melbourne (July-September 1998).
- *Belgium*: Free University Brussels (October 1997); NATO headquarters (November 1998).
- *Denmark*: Royal Library, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI), Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI), University of Copenhagen (June-August 1997, February and June 1998, February 1999).
- *France*: IFRI, CERI and Political Science Foundation (Paris); Council of Europe, Strasbourg (June 1998).
- *Germany*: Aspen Institute Berlin (October 1997).
- *Hungary*: Central European University and Alba Kor (November 1997).
- *Norway*: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) (April 1998).
- *United Kingdom*: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London School of Economics and Royal Institute of International Affairs (December 1998).
- *United States*: Library of Congress (December 1998), George Washington University (December 1998), Harvard University (May 1999), University of Minnesota (March 1998), San Diego State University (January 1999).

(b) Conferences and symposia in 1997-99

1997

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| 4 June | Research seminar of Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (Paper: "Russian views on NATO enlargement: academic schools and political parties"). |
| 7 August | Lecture, the Danish Military Academy, Copenhagen ("Conflict resolution in the CIS framework"). |
| 26 September | International conference "Comparative regionalism: Russia-CIS-the West", EU INTAS Programme/ University of Nizhny Novgorod (paper: "External factors of Russia's regionalisation"). |
| 3-4 October | International seminar "EU Common Foreign and Security Policy", Institute of European Studies, Free University Brussels (Paper: "Russian security policy in the context of NATO and EU enlargement"). |
| 5-7 October | International seminar "Russia and NATO: prospects for co-operation", Aspen Institute Berlin (discussant). |
| 10-11 October | Nikolay P. Sokolov Memorial Conference, University of Nizhny Novgorod (paper: "Operational models of international security: debates in the Western political science"). |
| 27-29 October | International seminar "Civil society in the post-Communist Countries", Pushkin, Russia, St. Petersburg Centre for Humanities and Political Science "Strategy" (paper: "Postmodernism and civil society in the post-Communist countries"). |
| 31 October-
2 November | International seminar "World without NATO", Alba Kor, Budapest (paper: "Russian security policy in the context of NATO enlargement"). |

1998

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| 13 January | Seminar "Prospects for comparative regionalism", University of Nizhny |
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- Novgorod (paper: “Regionalism and security: a future research agenda”).
- 19 February Research seminar of Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (paper: “The new national security concept of the Russian Federation”).
- 21-22 February International seminar “The arms economy”, Institute for East-West Studies/Finnish Institute for International Affairs, Kiev (Paper: “Regional export control arrangements: a Russian perspective”).
- 17-23 March The 39th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA (paper: “Studies of diplomacy in post-Communist Russia: changing paradigms”).
- 27-28 April International conference “The Barents Euro-Arctic region”, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo (paper: “The Barents regional co-operation and the security dimension—a Russian perspective”).
- 15-16 May International conference “Society—young people—army”, University of Nizhny Novgorod (paper: “The national security concept of the Russian Federation: the role and functions of the armed forces”).
- 26-28 May The annual seminar of the Association of Russian and American Historians, St. Petersburg University (paper: “Executive-legislative relations and foreign policy making in the United States and Russia: comparative analysis”).
- 29-31 May European Peace Congress Osnabruck’ 98, Osnabruck, Germany (paper: “European security model in the context of NATO enlargement: a Russian perspective”).
- 22 June Expert meeting on the prospects of integration in the Baltic Sea region, Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI), Nyborg, Denmark (discussant).
- 25 June Hearing “Drawing a European Code of Conduct on Arms Sales”, Political Affairs Committee, Council of Europe, Strasbourg (expert, discussant).
- 26 June International seminar on American studies, USIS/University of Nizhny Novgorod (paper: “Executive-legislative liaison mechanism in the United States and Russia: comparative analysis”).
- 16-19 July International Conference of the 350th Anniversary of the Peace of Westphalia, The European Peace Research Association, Enschede, the Netherlands (paper: “Sovereignty games: presidential leadership in the legislature and Russia’s post-Communist security policies in Europe”).
- 13 September Seminar “Russian crisis and its international implications”, The Centre for Russian Studies, University of Melbourne (discussant).
- 24-27 September The 2nd Baltic-Nordic Conference “Regionalism and conflict resolution” (chair of panel; paper: “The new Russian national security concept and prospects for building a co-operative security system in the Baltic Sea region”).
- 2 October International conference “NGOs and global security in the 21st century”, UN Danish Association, Copenhagen (paper: “Russia and the 3rd Hague Peace Conference 1999”).
- 9-10 October Think Tank Seminar “The European North - Hard, Soft and Civic

- Security", Calotte Academy 1998, The Arctic Centre, University of Lapland, Rovaniemi, Finland (paper: "Russian policy towards the BEAR: from 'hard' to 'soft' security").
- 3-5 November Workshop at NATO headquarters (discussant).
- 3-6 December Conference "Russia after crisis", Programme on New Approaches to Russian Security, The Davis Centre for Russian Studies, Harvard University, Washington, DC (discussant).
- 10-11 December The board meeting and workshop, Central and East European International Studies Association, Warsaw University.
- 12-13 December Workshop "Sub-regionalism in Central and Eastern Europe", East-West Institute, Kiev (paper: "Sub-regional cooperation in Russia").
- 14-15 December British International Studies Association Annual Conference, Brighton, UK (paper: "The role of the Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council in creating a cooperative security system in Europe").

1999

- 9-15 January International conference "Transborder cooperation and sustainable development in a comparative context", Institute for Regional Studies of the Californias, San Diego State University (paper: "Russia's regionalisation in the context of the financial/political crisis").
- 25 February Copenhagen Peace Research Institute public seminar (paper: "The process of regionalization and the future of the Russian Federation").
- 18-19 March International conference "Russia's regionalisation: new perspectives", Moscow Carnegie Centre, Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan (chair of panel; paper: "Russia's regionalisation in the context of crisis").
- 6 May Discussion of Russian views on the Kosovo crisis, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA (paper: "Russian foreign policy schools on Kosovo").
- 14 May International seminar "Subregional relations in and around the CIS space", East-West Institute, Moscow (paper: "Subregional co-operation in Northwest Russia: challenges and promises").
- 23-27 May Central and East European International Studies Association Annual Convention, Prague (chair of panel; paper: "The Russian post-Communist IR at the cross-roads: changing paradigms").
- 18-19 June International conference "Nuclear policy and security on the eve of the 21st century", International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, St. Petersburg (chair of panel; paper: "Russian security policy in the Baltic Sea Region").
- 21-23 June International conference "Political science and International Relations in post-Communist Russia", University of Nizhny Novgorod (paper: "International Relations Theory in post-Communist Russia").
- 8 July 14th Danish Atlantic Youth Seminar, The Danish Atlantic Treaty Association, Ålborg, Denmark (lecture: "Russia's Security Policy in the 21st Century") (forthcoming).

(c) Teaching:

The results of my research were used in my teaching at the University of Nizhny Novgorod (UNN) and Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic University (NNLU):

(i) The revised courses 'International Relations Theory', 'Political Science', 'Political Culture' and 'History of Western Political Thought' oriented to the students of Department of Political Science, Department of International Relations and Department of Sociology, UNN, and Department of American Studies, NNLU;

(ii) A syllabus of the International Relations Theory course published by the UNN Press (1997);

(iii) A textbook "*Contemporary Western Political Thought: A "Postpositivist Revolution"*" (NNLU Press, 1999).

(d) Publications resulted from the project:

Contemporary Western Political Thought: A 'Post-positivist Revolution' (Nizhny Novgorod: Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic University, 1999), 88 p. (co-author: Andrei S. Makarychev) (in Russian)..

'The US and Russian executive-legislative liaison mechanisms and foreign policy: comparative analysis', in Oleg A. Kolobov (ed.), *Topical Issues of American Studies* (Nizhny Novgorod: University of Nizhny Novgorod Press, 1998), pp. 161-168 (in Russian).

'In search of a new paradigm: the Russian national security doctrine of 1997', *Peace and Security* (Vienna), Vol. XXX (September 1998), pp. 21-32 (in English).

'European security model in the context of NATO enlargement: Russian perspective', in Mohssen Massarat (ed.), *European Peace Congress'98: Papers, Statements, Reports, Resolutions of the Congress. 29-31 May 1998* (Osnabruck: Tragerkreis Europaischer Friedens-u. KDV-Kongress Osnabruck, 1998), pp. 127-138 (in English).

'Russian domestic discussions concerning NATO enlargement', in Oleg A. Kolobov and Andrei S. Makarychev (eds.), *Russia, NATO and a New European Security Architecture* (Nizhny Novgorod: University of Nizhny Novgorod Press, 1998), pp. 31-50 (in Russian).

Russia: A long way to the national security doctrine (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 1998) (COPRI Working Papers; No. 20, 1998), 27 pp. (in English).

'The Russia dimension', in Hans Mouritzen (ed.), *Bordering Russia: theory and prospects for Europe's Baltic Rim* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), pp. 15-71 (in English).

'Russian domestic debate on NATO enlargement: from phobia to damage limitation', *European Security*, vol. 6, no. 4 (Winter 1997), pp. 55-71 (in English).

'In search of national identity: foreign policy schools of thought in post-communist Russia', *International Problems* (Belgrade), vol. XLIX, no. 2-3, 1997, pp. 297-336 (in English).

'External factors of Russia's regionalisation', in Andrei S. Makarychev (ed.), *Comparative regionalism: Russia - CIS - the West* (Nizhny Novgorod: University of Nizhny Novgorod Press, 1997), pp. 130-149 (in Russian).

(e) Forthcoming publications:

Executive-Legislative Liaison Mechanism in Russia and the West: Comparative Analysis (Nizhny Novgorod: Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic University, 1999), ca. 50 pp. (in English).

'Russian security policy in the context of NATO and EU enlargement', in Eric Remacle (ed.), *EU Common Foreign and Security Policy* (Brussels: Institute of European Studies, Free University Brussels, 1999) (in English).

'The Russian post-Communist IR at the cross-roads: changing paradigms', *Mezinarodni Vztahy* (Prague), 1999 (in Czech).

'Sovereignty games: presidential leadership in the legislature and Russia's post-Communist security policies in Europe', in Lev Voronkov and Wojciech Kosteci, *Globalization of the Westphalian System: Sovereignty-related Conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe* (Vienna: International Institute of Peace, 2000) (in English).

In Search of a New Security Identity: Russian Domestic Debate on European Security (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), ca. 200 pp. (in English).

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