During the 1990s the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has faced a fundamental crisis of purpose. The Soviet Union had collapsed, Germany had been reunified, and the nations of the West, especially the alliance’s leader, the United States, were now turning their attention toward their unresolved internal problems. The inevitable question arose: should NATO should remain in existence, or follow the Cold War into oblivion? Although the full impact of the war in Kosovo is still uncertain, it seems reasonably clear that although NATO might be considered a child of the Cold War, it does not intend to follow its parent into the dust bin of history. Indeed, through the decision in favor of enlargement as well as the redefining of the alliance’s original purposes, the countries of NATO have reinvigorated the alliance for the 21st century.

What does this have to with the 1960s? Although the dimensions of the crisis have been obscured by subsequent history, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization faced a remarkably similar challenge during the 1960s. After the Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises, the general fear of a nuclear war between the two superpowers faded quite rapidly. The Partial Test Ban Treaty, signed in August 1963, was the first major agreement between the superpowers, and seemed to hold out the general promise of detente. Indeed, although it may seem
surprising from a later perspective, in the mid-1960s there was a pervasive sense that the Cold War was, if not over, certainly cooled down considerably from the successive hot crises of the 1950s and early 1960s. (CBS News devoted one of its radio talk shows in early 1967 to the question, «Is the Cold War Over?»)¹ The easing of tensions in Europe, coupled with French President Charles de Gaulle’s defiance of American leadership, seemed to augur a new period of uncertainty about the Western alliance. As the United States turned its attention toward tackling its own social and racial problems, and became increasingly committed to a war in Southeast Asia, Europe’s importance as a field of American-Soviet confrontation seemed to diminish. With European countries also intent on devoting their resources to domestic needs, and with signs of some thawing in Eastern Europe, many Western observers feared that the absence of a sense of threat would undermine the solidarity of the alliance. Some European apostles of NATO, like the influential German politician Kurt Birrenbach, professed to see the real danger of the «disintegration of the alliance.»² When in 1966 de Gaulle pulled France out of NATO’s integrated command, and when it appeared that both the United States and Britain were contemplating large reductions in their forces in Europe, Birrenbach’s fears were not unreasonable. NATO faced its most serious crisis in, at that time, its only seventeen year history.

This project, which will eventually become a full scale book, examines this crisis through the perspective of the much-maligned 36th President of the United States, Lyndon Baines Johnson, whose reputation will always be considered in the shadow of the American failure in Vietnam. It will examine the general state of the literature on the Johnson Administration’s policies in Europe, discuss the challenges to writing a balanced historical account of the period, suggest a new and revisionist approach, and examine some of the most important
issues faced during this critical time in alliance history.

1.) The Literature on the Johnson Era

The historian H.W. Brands, in his *Wages of Globalism*, one of the recent studies of the Johnson era foreign policy, argues that "it was Lyndon Johnson's peculiar bad luck to preside over American foreign policy at the moment the scales of world power were tipping away from the United States." Most historical treatments of the Johnson era emphasize the debilitating effect of the war in Vietnam on America's international standing, seeing it as both a cause and a harbinger of America's overall political and economic decline. As one recent book put it, "Lyndon Johnson's presidency, his plans for a Great Society, and his quest for national unity and universal adulation all sank and rotted in the rain forests and rice paddies of Southeast Asia."

The overall verdict on the Johnson foreign policy, including his policy toward Europe, remains a negative one. Lyndon Johnson himself usually shoulders much of the blame. The perception that Johnson was a stumbling leader in foreign policy was an early element of criticism of his administration, and has become a fixed image of the 36th president. In late January 1964, after a crisis in Panama, Douglas Kiker in the *New York Herald Tribune* depicted Johnson "disorganized and disengaged in foreign affairs." A satirical folk song written early in 1964, was entitled «Luci Baines,» after the President's younger daughter, and it contained the refrain, «Luci Baines, she is no Jackie but then who complains; she may tacky but she is the brains behind our foreign policy, Who else but Luci could it be?» On a more serious note, in one of the first studies of Johnson's foreign policy, the journalist Philip Geyelin argued that Johnson
"had no taste and scant preparation for the deep waters of foreign policy..."

Princeton historian Eric Goldman, who had hoped to play the role of Arthur Schlesinger Jr. for the Johnson Administration, wrote in his memoir that "Lyndon Johnson entered the White House not only little concerned with the outer world but leery of it. 'Foreigners are not like the folks I am used to,' he remarked, and he was only half-joking."

Critics have stressed Johnson's provincialism, ignorance, and crude American nationalism as central to his foreign policy failures. Historian Waldo Heinrichs argued that Johnson was "culture-bound and vulnerable to clichés and stereotypes about world affairs." Henry Kissinger observed that "President Johnson did not take naturally to international relations. One never had the impression that he would think about the topic spontaneously - while shaving, for example." Some longtime friends of Johnson came to share this view. Oxford-educated J. William Fulbright, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who had known Johnson for years and even supported him for President in 1960, came to think of him - before the escalation of the war in Vietnam - as "an unlettered Texan desperately in need of enlightened guidance in matters of foreign policy." Doris Kearns Goodwin, an early and influential biographer, portrayed LBJ's hesitancy in foreign affairs and disdainfully wrote that "Johnson's belief in the universal applicability of American values ... was the source of his greatest weakness as president."

The contrast with his martyred predecessor has also affected perceptions of Johnson's foreign policy. Many contemporaries could not help but make an unfavorable comparison between the Northeastern, Harvard-educated, urbane, cosmopolitan John Kennedy, whose administration was absorbed with apocalyptic foreign policy crises such as Berlin and Cuba, and his Western, earthy, Southwest
A Washington Post writer referred to Johnson as "the antithesis of John F. Kennedy...the cowboy who had rented the Taj Mahal with a rebel yell...a caricature out of an American Western, with an uncultivated accent and an often unintelligent turn of phrase." The contrast seemed especially sharp on Europe and European issues. Henry Brandon, the Washington columnist for the London Times, wrote about Kennedy that "No other president spoke for Europe, with such understanding as he did," and that he enjoyed such popularity in Europe because of the "impression he created of being a living fusion of the American and European cultures." By contrast Lyndon Johnson was, as Tom Wicker noted, "a middle-aged man of small town America, both a Westerner and a Southerner," ... whose internationalism was "based on a self-righteous sense of American superiority," and whose style, as even his most loyal subordinate Jack Valenti acknowledged, "repelled Europeans."

This negative perception has continued to influence the relatively few extended treatments of Johnson's policy toward Europe. Frank Costigliola concludes that Johnson and his advisors "remained imprisoned by the Cold War discourse that restricted even their most innovative policies." David Kaiser of the Naval War College has argued that the "years 1965-1969 [were] generally unproductive ones in East-West relations." In an essay reviewing recent literature on the Johnson period, Boston University political scientist David Fromkin argued that Johnson did not have a foreign policy, «only a set of unoriginal opinions that he articulated with great force and conviction and was unwilling to question even in the face of failure.» Brands, although more generous to LBJ, still concluded that Johnson suffered from a "dogged lack of imagination," which led him to "stick to the traditional verities of the Cold War."
Johnson's own determination, early in his Presidency, to focus on enacting Kennedy's stalled legislative program, also contributed to the impression that he was less interested and knowledgeable in foreign affairs. Almost all writers make the contrast between Johnson's great success in passing domestic legislation - such landmark legislation as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and Medicare - and his foreign policy failures, most notably Vietnam. Kissinger notes that the "very qualities of compromise and consultation on which his domestic political successes were based proved disastrous in foreign policy." This view of Johnson, that he was a master of domestic politics but out of his element in foreign relations, was underlined recently in the Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. survey of historians, which ranks American Presidents. Schlesinger commented on Lyndon Johnson's ranking by historians as an "above average" President, noting that it came about because [Johnson's] "domestic and foreign record [is] so discordant."

The "above average" ranking which Johnson enjoys among professional historians is in sharp contrast with his extraordinarily low standing with the American public. In polls taken in the late 1980s and early 1990s measuring public opinion of Presidents from Roosevelt to Reagan, Johnson was near or at the bottom in 11 categories, even placing below Richard Nixon in moral standards.

The general public has a stronger distaste for "big government" and the domestic programs of the "Great Society" than that of academic historians, and this further contributes to Johnson's low standing. In addition, Oliver Stone's movie "JFK," placed Johnson at the center of the conspiracy to kill John Kennedy, and one of Martin Luther King's sons has recently charged that LBJ was behind that assassination as well. In reviewing Robert Caro's negative biography of Johnson, Gary Wills wrote "Lyndon Johnson was clearly a monster of ambition, greed, and
cruelty. What's not to loathe?" On a much lighter note, New York Times columnist Russell Baker joked about the presidential candidacies of Texas Governor George Bush Jr. by remarking, "Does anybody seriously believe this country will be ready for more Texas in the White House while millions still live who remember Lyndon Johnson?"

2.) Challenges in Interpreting the Johnson Era

Usually when history and the conventional wisdom tilt as far in one direction, there is room for some revisionism. In their lopsided and overly negative character, these judgments and assumptions about Lyndon Johnson, the Johnson Presidency, and by extension its policy toward Europe are open to serious reservations. First, though, one must concede that in many respects Johnson was his own worst enemy. Inordinately sensitive to mildest criticism, and plagued by deep personal insecurities, Johnson poses many difficult questions of interpretation. Possessed of a passion for secrecy and concealing his motivations - William Manchester once wrote that for Lyndon Johnson, "the shortest distance between two points was a tunnel" - it is often difficult to determine Johnson's thinking on many foreign policy questions. In his typically folksy manner, Johnson told Senator Russell Long, «Now I'm just an old Johnson City boy, but when I'm playing bridge and I show the other fellow my whole hand, I can't make a very good deal with him.» Johnson was also, as many politicians are, something of an actor, and he often played different roles for different audiences. Nevertheless, historians have been far too willing to accept a static caricature of Lyndon Johnson rather than look at the full complexity of the man or his development and learning while in office. They have
tended to ignore evidence of the more serious and thoughtful Johnson, the Johnson who, as a Treasury department official put it, had an "innate high intelligence that you sort of wish every president would have." Histories are far more likely to include the anecdotes of the vulgar Johnson - such as Johnson talking policy with an aide while sitting on the toilet - than include such observations as that of America's ambassador to Britain, the aristocratic David Bruce, who remarked that "LBJ was one of the most courteous human beings I've ever met." Former High Commissioner to Germany, John McCloy, a frequent advisor to Presidents, commented that Johnson was "much more exacting and penetrating in the questions he put to you than his predecessor (Kennedy)." Johnson was a mass of contradictions, or as his aide Bill Moyers remarked, "LBJ was thirteen of the most interesting and difficult men I've ever met." Joseph Califano, another Johnson assistant and later Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, echoed this when he wrote: "The Lyndon Johnson I worked with was brave and brutal, compassionate and cruel, incredibly intelligent and infuriatingly insensitive, with a shrewd and uncanny instinct for the jugular of his allies and adversaries."

In my view there are four challenges to interpreting Johnson and his times. The first is one recently presented by his biographer Robert Dalleck, and requires recognizing that Johnson's career and ideas can tell us a great deal about America in the middle years of the 20th century, both in the domestic and foreign arenas. Johnson was quite representative of the America of mid-20th century - in his view of the expansive role of government in correcting social wrongs, his assumptions about America’s world leadership, in his belief about the need to promote economic growth and development, both in his native South and throughout the world. On a more psychological and personal level, there were
ways that Lyndon Johnson, a man of newly acquired wealth without a sophisticated or cosmopolitan background was very American, in an almost embarrassing fashion, so much so that a recent biographer wrote that Lyndon Johnson is the "one modern President most Americans refuse to look in the eye, to consider in all his vulgarity, passion, weakness, and greatness."  

Secondly, the impact of the Vietnam War, although powerful and pervasive, should not simply be assumed, but needs to be assessed and analyzed. Because the war slowly "escalated," and Johnson did not declare a national emergency to fight it, the conflict existed in an uneasy coexistence with the ongoing activities and policies of the American government. It is open to question whether the war "fundamentally" altered every other element of U.S. foreign policy as some have argued, or whether its impact accelerated certain trends, and inhibited others.  

Dean Rusk may not have been exaggerating when he told German Foreign Minister Willy Brandt in February 1967, that it was a "false impression that Viet-Nam pre-occupies us to the exclusion of everything else." The war's impact came in ebbs and flows did not bring to a halt all other Johnson foreign policy initiatives, nor did it paralyze the Administration. No one denies that Vietnam cast a very long shadow over the Administration's policy toward Europe, but we still need to understand what the Johnson Administration accomplished and failed to accomplish despite the war as well as because of it.

Thirdly, U.S. historians should no longer insist on the "decline of American power" as the principle model or paradigm for understanding any and all developments during this period. Certainly there was a relative decline in U.S. power, but this approach to the events of this time is too simplistic and far too sweeping, both because it greatly exaggerates America's ability to control events abroad in the 1950s and it underestimates America's continuing relative power in
the 1970s and 1980s. American «decline,» after all, was engineered purposefully by American leadership after World War II, with such programs as the Marshall Plan and assistance to Japan. The American position after World War II was artificially high, and the signs of a change in the U.S. economic position were already apparent at the end of the Eisenhower Administration. President Kennedy’s own obsession with the balance of payments had its roots in these worries as well. Managing the adjustment in alliance relationships that relative decline would bring became one of the tasks of the Johnson Administration, accelerated as it was because of Vietnam but already apparent in 1964. Johnson was as aware of this as anyone. For example, he recognized that the recovery of Europe had allowed "monetary strength" to be "spread more widely over the world than in the early postwar years, when the dollar dominated affairs," but unlike his successor, Johnson sought to make this adjustment through international negotiation, rather than unilateral American action.

Fourthly, historians assessing and evaluating America’s policy toward Western Europe during this period need to recognize some of the limits of alliance politics, with a clear sense of what the Europe of the mid-1960s was like. Both Western and Eastern Europe were in political transition, both freed in very different ways as the bitter confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union was slowly and cautiously giving way to a fragile detente. The alliance was easier to hold together when the Europeans feared Moscow’s intentions, and when they were too poor to worry about America’s economic dominance. The mid-1960s were different, and the strongest leader in Western Europe was also the one most hostile to American political and economic policies, France’s President Charles de Gaulle. Indeed de Gaulle’s challenge to U.S. policy in Europe and around the world should not be underestimated. Not only did
the General attack U.S. policy in Southeast Asia and recognize the People’s Republic of China, he sought his own détente with the Soviet Union in Europe, challenged the integrating functions of NATO, and attacked the Bretton Woods system by converting his country’s reserve currency holdings into gold. At the same time his veto of British membership in the European Economic Community and his resistance to any measures that moved Europe toward a greater federalism had effectively halted the momentum toward further European integration. The other two major European allies of the United States faced different challenges that limited their political effectiveness. In 1964, Britain was in the midst of a political transition, with a weakened conservative government followed by a Labor Government with a tiny majority. Her successive financial troubles and concern over the value of the pound paralyzed British leaders. By the time Harold Wilson secured a large political mandate in 1966, Britain’s economic weakness was leading to a reassessment of her worldwide role and decisions to cut back her involvements. In 1964 West Germany was strong economically, but Ludwig Erhard presided over a divided government, with significant factions favoring a policy oriented more toward Gaullist France. Even former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, a supporter of Erhard, referred to the Chancellor as the “Herbert Hoover of German politics — a technician with popular appeal, and that’s all.”

Frustrated with the lack of progress toward reunification, and with progress toward European unity stymied by de Gaulle, the direction of German politics was unclear. Eastern Europe showed signs of greater independence with countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary interested in expanding the range of their trade and economic contacts. Within such a setting Johnson faced the very real danger of the slow unravelling of the alliance, as countries focussed on internal questions, or as in the case of the U.S., it became committed in Southeast Asia.
The true test of alliance leadership in the Johnson period came in its ability to solve problems and prevent disputes from escalating, not in extolling "grand designs" or proclaiming "the year of Europe."

3.) The Role of Domestic Politics in Johnson’s Foreign Policy

Along with the challenges of re-thinking Lyndon Johnson’s era, we need to approach this period with something of a 1990s understanding of the role of domestic politics. Secretary of State Madeline Albright has stressed the importance of domestic politics in her vision of American foreign policy, and Cold War taboos about the connection between foreign affairs and domestic questions have begun to break down. To this extent, Lyndon Johnson was ahead of his time, as his foreign policy was inextricably linked to his domestic agenda. Geyelin recognized this at the time, noting that "Not since Roosevelt, or perhaps ever, have foreign politics been integrated so inextricably into the processes of domestic politics." One can understand this in three specific ways. The first is that Johnson recognized that the domestic situation of the United States would affect foreign perceptions of America and contribute to American prestige and influence. Foreign policy was also connected to what he sought to accomplish at home, and it should reinforce those objectives and, in its own turn, be strengthened by them. Johnson sought, as Joseph Califano has noted, "to mount a social revolution" in civil rights and the extension of the welfare state. He wanted a foreign policy that would help sustain and reinforce those changes. To this extent, Johnson hoped that his attention to America's civil rights questions would play a role in America's world leadership. Dean Rusk stressed this fact as well, arguing that tackling such issues as civil
rights was a "fundamental prerequisite" to strengthening the American voice abroad. Despite his opposition to civil rights legislation, even Fulbright came to support much the Great Society reform program from a conviction that "If his country were ever to pursue a policy of reason, restraint, and understanding abroad, it must do so at home as well." To this extent, the relative neglect of European issues during the first two years of the Johnson Administration, as the President struggled with the profound issues of civil rights and poverty, did ultimately serve the larger purposes of American foreign policy.

Secondly, Johnson recognized the critical dimension of domestic politics in affecting American policies and options abroad, especially on such issues as the maintenance of troops in Europe. As Goldmann recognized at the time, "No modern president has shown so intense a concern with maintaining broad approval for his foreign policies in the House and Senate." Johnson was haunted by his understanding of his boyhood hero, Woodrow Wilson, who failed to maintain Congressional support for his foreign policy. Johnson continually cultivated such support, calling Senators and Congressmen to lobby for his policies, and insisting that his aides recognize the importance of Congressional concerns. However, this does not mean that Johnson assessed foreign policy questions only in terms of the benefit they might bring him in domestic politics. Indeed Johnson often rejected foreign policy positions that might have brought him short-term popular approval but which he believed would be damaging to long term American interests. Such was the case clearly with the confrontation with de Gaulle, which Johnson might have handled in a demagogic fashion, but decided to follow a path of restraint.

Thirdly, Johnson recognized that European reactions to his initiatives would be conditioned by their domestic politics, and this consideration played
an extremely important role in his decisions. He would often ask European leaders, as he did Erhard after their December 1965 meeting, «what he could do for him, what he would like to take home with him for his people.» Although Vietnam complicated his relationship with Harold Wilson, both men discussed their internal political situations with great frankness, and Johnson showed considerable reluctance to press Wilson on matters when his political majority was thin. Johnson understood that the US and Britain did have similar interests on a number of issues, telling him that «When you have headaches, we have headaches too.»

James Callaghan, Chancellor of the Exchequer and one of Wilson’s top advisors, referred to Johnson as a «politician’s politician,» a man who understood the game of electoral politics no matter where it was played. To a certain extent Johnson even understood de Gaulle’s anti-American posturing in terms of the needs of a nationalistic politician to pull together his domestic support. He didn’t approve of it, but on one level he understood it better than his foreign policy advisers.

4.) Johnson and Europe - a Revisionist View

Overall, the argument presented in this essay is revisionist: the Johnson Administration’s conduct of policy toward Europe, both Western and Eastern deserves consideration as among the most important achievements of his presidency. Despite the impact of the Vietnam War, the Johnson record on European questions is an impressive one. The Administration held the Atlantic alliance together during what truly constituted its most severe internal crisis, the withdrawal of France from the unified military command of NATO. Defusing the challenge posed in the U.S. Senate from the Mansfield Resolution - a
resolution which called for the unilateral withdrawal of half of all U.S. forces from Europe — Johnson initiated negotiations — the Trilateral Discussions — which lead to the readjustment of the financial and military burdens of the alliance with West Germany, and at the same time assisted Great Britain in keeping the British Army of the Rhine in Germany. Although historians stress Johnson’s failure to gain a British commitment in Vietnam — an unlikely possibility from the beginning — they neglect the way in which U.S. financial assistance maintained the value of the pound sterling and kept a British commitment East of Suez three years longer than would have been the case otherwise. Johnson's instincts and understanding of the importance of domestic politics, a characteristic frequently criticized by scholars of international affairs, largely served him well in dealing with European policy questions. They led him to recognize the problems inherent to the proposed Multilateral Nuclear Force, and move away from it and toward agreement on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Despite the escalating war in Southeast Asia, the Administration was determined to "grow out of the Cold War" and followed a policy of "bridge-building" toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. It had a partial success in opening some avenues of trade and cultural exchange, as well as in lowering the rhetorical temperature of the Cold War. The Administration sponsored initiatives such as the creation of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), that were designed to create "non-political" links between Western and Eastern Europe, fostering changes within the Eastern bloc that helped undermine communist rule. Johnson's October 1966 speech, which laid out a vision of a Europe «whole and free» — a phrase which George Bush would resurrect in 1989 — encouraged detente in Europe as a way of overcoming the division of the continent. The speech was an important encouragement to an
already visible movement in German politics toward the development of Ostpolitik. The Administration fully supported the Harmel Report, which provided the reconstructed NATO with a direction toward both deterrence and detente. By 1968, as one study concluded at the time, «NATO was in a better state of health than the pessimists predicted a few years ago.»

Neglected in most historical treatments, foreign economic policy is an area in which the Johnson Administration had significant achievements. Despite intense domestic opposition, Johnson made a series of important decisions that allowed for the success of the Kennedy Round of tariff reductions with the EEC, continuing the movement toward freer international trade and preventing a slide back toward protectionism. As one recent study concluded, "the Kennedy Round contributed to the substantial rise in the value of world exports in the early 1970s as the tariff cuts were phased in." Johnson’s decision to approve the Kennedy Round came despite the relative lack of gain for American agriculture in the face of strong EEC resistance to anything that might affect the laboriously negotiated Common Agricultural Policy. This required him to defy the wishes of the politically influential Agriculture Department and upset a number of significant domestic constituencies. (Edward Fried, one of Johnson’s NSC deputies, argued that LBJ was the «strongest advocate of free trade we have ever had in the White House.») Johnson also acted on the international monetary front to counter the French challenge and attempt to stabilize the Bretton Woods system. He sponsored negotiations that sought to create a new international money through international organization. These led directly to the breakthrough agreements at the Group of Ten’s September 1967 meeting and to the creation of SDRs, Special Drawing Rights on the International Monetary Fund. Although the role of SDRs has been limited, this important reform "planted a new permanent
feature of international monetary organization that has the potential for further
development over the long term." Both the Kennedy Round and the international
monetary negotiations required careful attention to the domestic politics of key
allies, particularly West Germany and Great Britain, as well as a recognition of
the connection between security issues and questions of political economy. De
Gaulle's rejection of American leadership in NATO had a counterpart in the French
attempt to derail the Kennedy Round, SDR negotiations and undermine the Bretton
Woods system. In all of these questions - alliance politics, managing the
international economy, creating a basis for detente - Lyndon Johnson's Presidency
emerges as significantly more creative and skilful than the picture presented in
the standard historiography. At an important time of transition in the Atlantic
relationship, with the Gaullist challenge, the need to readjust the burdens of
the alliance and to ease tensions with the Russians, Johnson worked successfully
to solve concrete problems with the allies, as his NSC deputy put it, "without
overloading each other's politics, and thereby risk a splintering of the
structure we had together built since 1945."

Obviously no historical revisionism can neglect the failure of Johnson's
Vietnam decisions. The war exacted a heavy price, and limited the
Administration's achievements, both foreign and domestic. In European policy,
it led Johnson to pressure the German government of Ludwig Erhard to keep to its
schedule for offset payments, pressure which certainly contributed to Erhard's
demise. Although Johnson kept the British Army in Germany, the administration
was ultimately unsuccessful in preventing the devaluation of the pound. The
balance of payments deficits aggravated by the war contributed to the gold crisis
of March 1968. The policy of bridge-building reached its own end with the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia. The bombing of North Vietnam also damaged America's
image in Western Europe and burdened relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

A balanced look at the Johnson years needs to consider such issues, the accomplishments and failures of the era. But along with taking a new look at Johnson, I would also argue that historians looking at US policy toward Europe need to examine the interrelationship of foreign policy and domestic politics. I contend that within the institutions and decision-making forums of the western alliance - both its security structure of NATO and its assortment of economic groupings, including the European Community, the IMF, and the Group of Ten - foreign policy issues were increasingly "domesticated," with transnational political coalitions and networks playing decisive roles. The intellectual awareness that the behavior of the western countries deviated from the "realist" view of how nation states interact developed early in the postwar period. In 1957, the political scientist Karl Deutsch, schooled in Immanuel Kant's certainty that liberal democracies were inclined toward peaceful cooperation, used the term "pluralistic security communities" to refer to Atlantic alliance. Deutsch described a process whereby the nations within the alliance were developing a network of security relationships which made the resort to force between them unthinkable. This understanding of the importance of integration and interdependence permeated the intellectual atmosphere of the 1960s, leading analysts to look at the functioning of the alliance. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye focussed on the networks of "transnational relations, ... contacts, coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of government." More recently Thomas Risse-Kappen has argued that the transatlantic alliance gradually came to constitute a community of liberal democracies, which deeply affected the collective identity
of all its members, including the United States. Within such an alliance community, norms committed its members to timely consultation and consistently influenced the decision-making process. With military power or threats considered inappropriate among democratic allies, domestic pressures were often used as a way to increase one's leverage in transatlantic interactions. Finally, within such a community, neither the Europeans nor the United States can be treated as unitary actors. Rather, transnational and transgovernmental coalitions among societal and bureaucratic actors frequently tipped the balance in tightly fought and difficult decisions.  

Louise Richardson's recent work dealing with Anglo-American relations during the Suez and Falklands crisis also demonstrates the "centrality of transnational groups to policy outcomes." In earlier research, I found this to be true in the course of trying to explain some of America's policies toward Germany, and finding that one could not explain these without reference to the transnational political coalitions which supported certain approaches and worked within the institutional framework of the alliance to achieve the adoption of such policies.

Within the Western alliance community, with the concerns about answering to the electorate, the timing of elections, appeasing particular bureaucracies and economic interest groups, and arranging coalitions in support of proposals — the environment was becoming similar to the environment of American domestic politics. In such a political context, Lyndon Johnson excelled, bringing with him the skills that he had honed as Senate majority leader. Johnson recognized the need to build political coalitions, understood the constraints created by the domestic political situation of his allies, and forged the consensus necessary to implement solutions. Johnson believed these leaders were influenced "by the same grammar of power; whatever their countries' sizes or shapes, they shared a
common concern with questions of rulership: which groups to rely on, which
advisers to rely on, and how to conduct themselves amid the complex intrigues of
politics." Johnson thought, as Richard Barnet wrote, that the "the global
political elite constituted a club like the Senate, not even as big." Whatever
one might think of such a comparison, within the Western alliance Johnson's
belief was not off the mark.

Certainly Johnson did not always have the type of detailed and intimate
knowledge of his allies and adversaries that had contributed to his success in
the Senate. He did often have to use his experts, but Johnson was, as Califano
and others have pointed out, very good at exploiting the talents and skills of
others in pursuit of his objectives. One of those experts was Francis Bator,
Johnson's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Bator went to
the White House in late April 1964 to handle international economic policy
matters for McGeorge Bundy, and in the summer of 1965 he received the portfolio
for European policy. A native of Hungary, Bator's family had come to the United
States before World War II. Trained at M.I.T., Bator joined the faculty there
after receiving his Ph.D. He gained national prominence when the arguments of
his book, The Question of Government Spending, were used by the Democrats to
justify increased Federal expenditures after their victory in 1960. Possessed
of a sharp sense of European history as well as economics, Bator was particularly
sensitive to the connections between security, political, and economic questions.

He also possessed a number of "transnational" connections with his counterparts
in allied governments, especially the British, which frequently smoothed the way
toward agreement on contentious issues. Johnson, in fact, always sensitive to
the particular perspective or bias of his advisors, dubbed him Britain's second
ambassador in Washington. Indeed, upon his retirement from the Johnson
Administration, The Economist, whose coverage of the Administration was generally friendly, called Bator "Europe's assistant," and noted that on a succession of matters relating to America's European policy, "a thread of lucidity, consistency, and balance has been traceable in the Administration's handling and Mr. Bator has had a lot to do with it." As holder of the portfolio for European policy from 1965-1967, Bator was one of Johnson's "strong right arms" who helped the President make his judgments, frequently balancing political, economic, and security issues. Bator also reflected - and to an extent absorbed - Johnson's own acute sense of the importance of domestic politics, not only the politics of the United States, but the politics of each of the chief allies. Neglected in most historical accounts, Bator played a significant role in advising Johnson on European policy. His activity offers an insight into a different Lyndon Johnson, one capable of mastering the essentials of foreign policy as effectively as he had domestic affairs.

5.) The Demise of the MLF and the Move Toward Detente

This essay will look at three areas to illuminate Johnson's approach to Europe. The first is the Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF), which was the chief issue before NATO and the allies when Johnson became President. The second will be the Johnson response to the challenge presented by French president Charles de Gaulle, a challenge that cut to the heart of American leadership in Europe. And the third will be the Johnson Administration's handling of the Trilateral talks, which readjusted the financial and military burdens within the NATO alliance.

Designed to head off German interest in national nuclear forces, and to
give Germany a role in the decision to use nuclear weapons, the MLF proposal had changed considerably since it first emerged late in the Eisenhower Administration. As part of his "Grand Design," Kennedy had supported the concept and allowed planning to proceed. Indeed, only two weeks before the assassination, Vice President Johnson publicly endorsed the idea, calling it "a first step toward a greater European voice in nuclear matters." By early 1964, the MLF proposal involved the creation of a "fleet of surface warships, armed with Polaris missiles, owned, controlled, and manned jointly by a number of NATO nations." After Kennedy's death, State Department supporters of the MLF, many of whom hoped to use the MLF to push their goal of a politically unified Europe, wanted Johnson to renew his earlier commitment and put pressure on the Europeans to act. At a meeting with the President on April 10, 1964, George Ball argued that the MLF would "give Germans a legitimate role in the defense of the Alliance, but on a leash." Thomas Finletter, the US Ambassador to NATO, reported that the Europeans had the impression Johnson wasn't interested in the project. He argued that the "U.S. had to stop being diffident about the MLF." The only major reservations about the MLF came from William Foster, head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, who worried that the MLF would damage the chance for a disarmament or non-proliferation treaty.

Johnson took up the challenge that Finletter presented. The President was most interested in the argument that Germany would have to be treated as an equal with regard to nuclear weapons. In characteristic language, Johnson told his advisers, "the Germans have gone off the reservation twice in our lifetimes, and we've got to make sure that doesn't happen again, that they don't go berserk." Rostow reinforced Johnson's fears when he told him, "if the multilateral solution is shot down now, as it was in 1932, the swing to the Right is all too
likely to repeat itself."\textsuperscript{74} But although Johnson thought the MLF could "satisfy the pride and self-respect of the Europeans," he "warned against trying to shove the project down the throats of potential participants."\textsuperscript{75} Johnson did set a year-end deadline for signing a treaty, and in a speech to newspaper editors later that month announced, "We support the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force composed of those nations that wish to participate."\textsuperscript{76}

Johnson's deadline brought the MLF to the center of American diplomacy toward Europe, with ambassadors urged to press their host countries for approval, and the USIA seeking the dispel the impression that the MLF was a bilateral US-German arrangement.\textsuperscript{77} (Thus it proved highly embarrassing to the Administration when German Ambassador Wilhelm Grewe arrived in October 1964 with a proposal from Chancellor Ludwig Erhard to proceed with MLF on a bilateral basis.)\textsuperscript{78} But while the US pressure elicited more support for the proposal, it also served to motivate the opposition. As the deadline approach, French attacks on the "two horned and apparently powerless body" of MLF increased, with the prediction of a "very serious situation" if the MLF was approved.\textsuperscript{79} The Russians also stepped up their criticism, repeating their attack on giving the German "revanchists" nuclear weapons and contending that the MLF would doom a nuclear non-proliferation treaty.\textsuperscript{80} The U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, Foy Kohler, believed they were "genuinely concerned that MLF will only hasten the day when the FRG becomes a nuclear power."\textsuperscript{81}

After President Johnson's landslide victory, a conference was arranged with the new British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, whose Labour Party held only a two-seat margin in the House of Commons. Although he had moderated his opposition to an independent British nuclear deterrent, Wilson remained sceptical of the MLF. In the weeks before Wilson's visit, Bundy established a special
committee, composed of himself, Ball, Rusk, and McNamara, to work out a negotiating position. Bundy was particularly interested in evaluating the European prospects for MLF, and suspected that the picture being presented by MLF advocates - "who are determined to make the Europeans do what is good for them" - was seriously flawed. As new information came in, Johnson's own doubts about the project grew. The President had just won an election against Barry Goldwater in which the nuclear question was the central issue, and though he had maintained his support for the MLF, he had also warned against "the fearful possibility of nuclear spread." Now he was struck by the assessment that German support for the MLF was lukewarm and that one of the reasons Germany supported it was "it also believes that we want it very badly." Henry Kissinger told Bundy that "it is simply wrong to allege that the future orientation of the Federal Republic depends on pushing through the MLF." Even George Ball, an MLF supporter, reported that Erhard's CDU was badly divided over the MLF, with its Gaullist wing bitterly attacking the idea.

True to his understanding of all politics, domestic and foreign, Johnson now began to canvas the Senate, where he found little support for the MLF proposal. Conservatives disliked any sharing of the nuclear trigger, while liberals believed the MLF "would further imperil the prospects for arms control and divide the NATO alliance, all without adding to the security of the United States." The need to conduct a "great effort of political education" in order to secure passage of the MLF sobered Johnson to the dangers the MLF posed to his political power. With historical analogies in mind, LBJ decided he neither wanted to be a Woodrow Wilson, trying to push a League of Nations on a hostile Senate, nor a Franklin Roosevelt, squandering his electoral landslide in a Supreme Court packing plan.
Prime Minister Wilson arrived in the United States with a compromise proposal - an Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF), which replaced the mixed-manned ships with various national components, thereby preserving British ownership of its V-Bomber and Polaris fleets. The Prime Minister might have been prepared to deal on the MLF, but Johnson decided that there was no good reason to press a fragile Labor government with an unpopular idea. Bundy convinced him that President Kennedy had the same doubts about the MLF.\textsuperscript{90} "If Europe isn't for it, LBJ told a small group of advisers, "then the hell with it." Reminded of the argument that American prestige was already committed to the MLF, and that the U.S. had to save face, Johnson dismissed the concern with one of his favorite sayings: "While you're trying to save face, you'll lose your ass."\textsuperscript{91} American pressure for the MLF came to an end, and although Johnson told the British and Germans that they were welcome to devise their own solution, the MLF lost its centrality in America's NATO policy.\textsuperscript{92}

When the dust settled, Bundy praised LBJ telling him that "this was without doubt the most productive and useful two days that we have had in foreign affairs since President Kennedy went to Berlin."\textsuperscript{93} The demise of the MLF reinforced Johnson's own desire to pursue an easing of tensions with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Fears about the effects of the MLF on nuclear proliferation and arms control negotiations were important to the opposition in the United States. From his first days in office, Johnson was determined to pursue the possibility of agreements with the Soviet Union, as well as encourage the West Germans, the ally most sceptical about detente, to take their own initiatives. During his first meeting with Erhard in December 1963, Johnson told him that the United States was "going down the road to peace, with or without others," and asked the chancellor to be more flexible toward the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{94} Johnson told Erhard
that he believed that a policy of detente was the best approach to German reunification and progress with the Soviets. In February 1964, Johnson used the surplus of fissionable material possessed by the U.S. to persuade the Soviets of the wisdom of a mutual cutback in the production of uranium for atomic weapons. That April he gave an interview to a German magazine in which he told the Germans that they needed to consider the Russian point of view on a question like German reunification. In May Johnson spoke of the need to "build bridges across the gulf which has divided us from Eastern Europe." He emphasized to his advisors that while they "work on the Atlantic nuclear problem, we keep Soviet interests in mind."

Johnson's interest in detente had important consequences. First, for the issue of nuclear sharing within the alliance, it necessitated finding an alternative to the "hardware" solution of the MLF, ANF, or whatever acronym was used. Recognizing the likelihood that MLF would fail, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara provided this "software solution" with his Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which he proposed in May 1965. Designed to give the allies, especially the Germans, a greater insight and input into allied discussions of military strategy and nuclear weapons, the NPG proved extraordinarily successful at satisfying Allied concerns. As Lawrence Kaplan has noted, Johnson accorded the NPG "a status it might not have had otherwise," recognizing its value in attempting to "tie in Germany with the U.S. and U.K." Ultimately the NPG would prove the key ingredient in what Bundy called "a real Johnson breakthrough" by opening the way "toward a non proliferation treaty and toward a new collective arrangement for command control and consultation in NATO."

Secondly, Johnson's interest in detente meant an acceptance of the division of Germany for the foreseeable future, while helping Germany to recognize that
reunification could only come about at the end of a long term process of change. As part of that change, Germany needed to develop a "more active Eastern policy." Bator added his own perspective, dismissing the idea of some Germans that an official renunciation of the MLF would be a bargaining chip for reunification. He argued that the "only tolerably safe path to unification is one which involves lessening fear of Germany in Eastern Europe and the USSR." Bator urged the President to steer Erhard and the Germans toward a recognition that they should make a virtue out of their non-nuclear status, using it to ease fears in Eastern Europe and hold open the long run hope for reunification.

Despite the escalating war in Vietnam, the Administration pushed ahead toward detente. On October 7, 1966, Johnson told a conference of editorial writers that "we must improve the East-West environment in order to achieve the unification of Germany in the context of a larger, peaceful, and prosperous Europe." The speech was an important signal, and expressed "a doctrine congenial in Europe, different from de Gaulle's, without quarrelling." Johnson also affirmed that the United States respected "the integrity of a nation's boundary lines," and encouraged the removal of territorial and border disputes, a none-too-subtle reference to Germany's refusal to recognize the Oder-Neisse line and the loss of its eastern territories. The Bonn Embassy had sought a last minute change that would have softened the reference, but the State Department insisted it remain, to provide "gentle support to those people in Germany who want slowly to back away from a self-defeating position." In effect, the Johnson Administration was lending its support to a transnational coalition in support of detente. Among those who were encouraged by this was Willy Brandt, who became Foreign Minister in late 1966 and initiated his policy of Ostpolitik. The Administration's new priorities were the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was
signed in 1968, and a strategic arms control agreement with the Soviets, which Johnson discussed with Soviet Premier Kosygin in June 1967 in Glassboro, New Jersey, and might have been achieved had not the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia. By December 1967 NATO adopted the Harmel Report on the future of the alliance and affirmed that "military security and a policy of detente are not contradictory but complementary." The Johnson Administration had created a firm basis upon which Nixon and Kissinger could build.

6.) The French Withdrawal from NATO’s Military Command

French President Charles de Gaulle posed the most critical challenge to the Johnson Administration and its alliance policy. Although he had supported the United States in the Berlin and Cuba crises, De Gaulle's insisted on demonstrating his independence from the United States in such moves as his veto on British entry into the Common Market, recognition of the People's Republic of China, and attacks on America's Vietnam policy. These were relatively insignificant compared with his March 1966 decision to notify NATO that he was officially withdrawing French forces from the integrated military command. Johnson, whose relationship with de Gaulle never recovered from a misunderstanding they had at Kennedy's funeral, was stung by the attacks on his Vietnam policy but avoided personal criticism of the General. When the demand for withdrawal of American forces from France came, Johnson stifled the urge of his advisers to hit back sharply, fearing this would only confirm de Gaulle's claim of American domination. Johnson insisted that he saw "no benefit to ourselves or to our allies in debating the position of the French government." George Ball noted that Johnson "incessantly restrained me from making critical
In one of his most famous remarks, the President told his aides, "When a man asks you to leave his house, you don't argue; you get your hat and go." Historians have generally not given Johnson credit for resisting the temptation to exploit the French action for his own short term political gains. Polls at the time demonstrated that an overwhelming majority of Americans disapproved of de Gaulle's action, and Johnson, in the midst of the Vietnam conflict, could have chosen to exploit this issue as a diversion. To arouse American anger, he need only have used Dean Rusk's question after de Gaulle told him that every American soldier must leave France: "Does that include the dead Americans in military cemeteries as well?" (Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson told Johnson that he had said this to de Gaulle.) Johnson chose not to arouse passions, and stressed instead the last sentence of his response to de Gaulle's letter that "As our old friend and ally her place will await France whenever she decides to resume her leading role."

Although Johnson favored a judicious and measured response to De Gaulle's withdrawal from NATO, many of his top advisors, including men like Dean Acheson and George Ball, wanted a much tougher approach. One opportunity to press their case came over the issue of French troops stationed in Germany. Consisting of air and army units comprising approximately 76,000 personnel, these forces posed less of a military question than a political one. The French government made it clear that although these forces would no longer come under NATO command, they would leave the forces in Germany if the German Government wanted them. The German Government faced a dilemma: if it insisted that French troops could remain only if they remained committed to NATO, it would precipitate a French withdrawal and cause a major setback in Franco-German relations, with important domestic
political consequences. The Gaullists in the Christian Democratic Party, led by such figures as Franz Josef Strauss and having the support of the former Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, would vigorously protest such a move, and would have significant public support. In a note of significant understatement, the American ambassador in Bonn, George McGhee reported that "If the present confrontation results in a withdrawal of French forces...German public opinion will not react with exhilaration." Indeed McGhee suggested that such a clear failure in the attempt to "build Europe" would lead the Germans to a renewed focus on "the other elusive goal of German foreign policy-reunification," a game in which, McGhee commented the "key cards are held by the other side." On the other hand, if Germany agreed to seek a new arrangements with the French, that would seem to reward De Gaulle's nationalism, and it raised questions about a special status for France that would be particularly irritating to Washington. In effect, de Gaulle's policy was forcing the Germans to choose between Paris and Washington, a choice no German political leader could afford.

On this issue most of Johnson's advisers wanted to take a very firm stand. At a meeting on April 4, with Rusk, McNamara, Ball and Acheson present, they decided that the United States "should fully support" the Germans if they took a hard line toward the French and their troops in Germany, "and do nothing to dissuade them." If the Germans decided to try to negotiate an agreement with de Gaulle about the troops, the "US should urge them to incorporate in these new arrangements effective safeguards assuring their use in accordance with NATO requirements and an adequate quid pro quo giving to other allies in Germany facilities in France such as transit and overflight rights." These conditions were designed to be unacceptable to the French and call their bluff. They were the basis of the instructions given to John J. McCloy, the President's special
envoy, as he prepared for talks with Chancellor Erhard a week later.

Johnson was at his ranch when the State Department finished drafting the instructions for McCloy. George Ball sent them to the President, with the note that this "will constitute Mr. McCloy's instructions." When Bator saw Ball's message, he objected to what he perceived as pressure on the Germans to take a hard line. He believed that such pressure would both complicate Erhard's position in German politics as well as go against Johnson's own clear preference for a muted response to De Gaulle's challenge. He feared that "if under U.S. pressure, German-French negotiations fail, and French Divisions withdraw, Germans will join other Europeans in blaming us for resulting grave damage to German-French relations." The desire to avoid choosing between Paris and Washington, Bator warned, is "still at the center of German politics." Bator immediately cabled LBJ at his ranch asking him to change McCloy's instructions. Bator urged a less conditional American approach, offering the Germans support for whatever they decided to do about the French troops. Johnson, who was on vacation and "wanted to focus on his cows," did not look at Bator's message until later in the week, after McCloy had already met with Gerhard Schröder, the German Foreign Minister, and delivered the tougher message. However, when Johnson read Bator's message, he immediately told Dean Rusk that he agreed with Bator, and that the Secretary should change McCloy's instructions. Johnson wanted the Germans to know, as McCloy subsequently told Chancellor Erhard, that the "United States should support any position taken by the FRG that recognized the seriousness of the situation and provided an adequate response to the French. The FRG must itself decide the position it wishes to occupy in Europe. We are not thinking of forcing the FRG toward any policy or decision." The Germans ultimately decided that the political importance of the French troops outweighed any other
considerations. France was allowed to keep its troops in Germany on its own terms, free, as Lawrence Kaplan noted, "from alliance obligations and free, for that matter to leave whether or not the Germans or Americans wished them to go."\textsuperscript{127}

Johnson's "soft" treatment of de Gaulle aroused the fury of his advisers, notably Dean Acheson, who told Bator at a Washington dinner party that "You made the greatest imperial power the world has ever seen kiss de Gaulle's arse."\textsuperscript{128}

But the wisdom of Johnson's approach was that it recognized that for the US to force the Germans to choose, as tempting an option as that might be, was unnecessary to preserve the alliance's vitality. Recognizing the extent of his differences with de Gaulle, Johnson kept them from damaging U.S. foreign policy, "not an insignificant achievement," as Lloyd Gardner concluded.\textsuperscript{129} To a very large extent, Johnson's reading of the European political situation and the French challenge was far more acute and incisive than some of the most experienced American diplomats and foreign policy "Wise Men."

7.) The Trilateral Negotiations

By 1966 the escalation of the war in Vietnam had increased the American balance of payments deficit and aggravated further the crisis over NATO's future that de Gaulle's withdrawal had precipitated.\textsuperscript{130} In August the Mansfield Resolution calling for the reduction of American forces in Europe garnered 44 votes in the Senate. Weakness in the British economy kept the pound sterling under severe pressure, culminating in a run on the pound in July 1966. British austerity measures pledged savings of £100 million in overseas defense expenditures, and the British Army on the Rhine looked like a prime candidate for
cutbacks. In early 1966, the German economy faced its first severe recession of the postwar period, and the Erhard government faced a large budget deficit. Under pressure to curb government spending, especially the expensive — and questionable — purchases of American military equipment, Germany was badly lagging in fulfilling its offset orders. Erhard told Washington that he needed significant relief from the current offset payments, as well as a change in the future arrangements. In July elections in North Rhine Westphalia, West Germany’s largest state, dealt a strong blow to the Erhard coalition. Recognizing Erhard was in political trouble, and that the British were determined to cut as well, Bator suggested to Johnson the creation of some type of "mixed commission" of the US, UK, and Germany which might "protect our balance of payments" and hammer out a consensus "on an allied defense posture in Europe which will provide deterrence and the insurance of a reasonable conventional option."

In late August 1966 the United States suggested a form of "Trilateral Negotiations" between the US, Britain, and Germany to resolve the offset problem. Through Bator and other channels, the Americans sought to convince the Germans that although they would insist on the current offset being met, changes in the manner of future payments were negotiable. However, Erhard refused to agree to the arrangement, stubbornly insisting on seeing Johnson personally before he agreed to the talks. With Erhard’s political position in Germany now precarious, Bator told LBJ that "for us it is important — even more than Erhard’s survival — that we not appear the culprit if he falls." Press reports made it clear that Erhard "badly needs a success at the White House," but Johnson, backed strongly by McNamara and the Treasury Department, would not allow a "stretching out" of the current offset payments. In a long and painful meeting, Erhard pleaded that a potential successor might "not show the same loyalty and determination to
cultivate close ties to the United States." However, in the end Erhard remained true to form and put up little resistance. When he returned to Germany without a success given by his American friends, his government collapsed. The new government consisted of a "Grand Coalition" between the Christian Democrats and the Social Democratic Party. Kurt Kiesinger from the Gaullist faction of the CDU became Chancellor, with SPD leader Willy Brandt taking over as Foreign Minister.

The collapse of Erhard's government might have proven a disaster for Johnson's European policy. Erhard had been the most loyal of allies, and Johnson felt a genuine warmth toward him. However, Erhard was increasingly ineffective as a political leader, and his weakness had shown at the polls in Länder elections. In the weeks preceding the trip, his top aide had resigned and his Defense Minister only barely survived a vote of confidence. One recent analysis notes that "in Germany the prevailing opinion was that Erhard's fate was sealed anyway and the visit to Washington was just the last straw." With his resignation and the coming of the Grand Coalition, Johnson now had a stronger, if more independent-minded, German government to deal with, one more capable of taking risks and far more interested in moving forward on detente. Most importantly, however, Johnson and his advisers recovered rapidly, using the crisis to push for a solution that dealt with both the security and economic issues underlying NATO.

To handle the Trilateral negotiations, Johnson appointed John J. McCloy, the former American High Commissioner in Germany. McCloy strongly opposed significant troop reductions, and argued against the idea that the level of forces should depend on the offset payments. Opposing him was McNamara, who advocated a reduction of two divisions, and personally favored even a more
drastic cutback. In presenting the options to the president, Bator stressed that this "decision will cast a very long shadow on our relations with Germany and Europe, with consequences for domestic politics." Johnson now took command.

Through a series of meetings with the Congressional leadership and his negotiators, Johnson laid down the path he wanted to follow. With the Congressmen Johnson "managed" a breakfast, taking a hard line "more arbitrary than I like, which made it difficult for them to disagree with the President of the United States." With McCloy, Johnson insisted that the former High Commissioner pressure his German friends "that they have to be realistic." Noting that the Fredericksburg Germans with whom he grew up were "great people; but by God they are as stingy as Hell," Johnson told McCloy that "they have got to put in some money." They would have to help the British as well, as a BAOR withdrawal would encourage demands for a similar American action. Johnson feared that without a German offer, he would have to cut two divisions. When McCloy warned "you are on the verge of the collapse of the Alliance," Johnson replied, "Jack, I know that; I'll try to hold this Alliance together longer than anybody else will, longer than the British will, and longer than the Germans. But they have got to put something in the family pot." The Germans did. They agreed to purchase and hold some $500 million in US Government medium-term securities, and even more importantly, agreed to make public their intention to refrain from buying gold. The so-called "Blessing Brief" was a significant German concession, one which would be extremely helpful in managing the balance of payments deficit. In effect, as Bator told the President, the U.S. had also scored a victory against the French, "negotiating the world onto a dollar standard," and to "recognition of the fact that, for the time being, the U.S. must necessarily play banker of the world and that the
continuing threat to convert gold is simply unacceptable." Bator expected that America's concessions to the Germans in the Trilateral talks would contribute to gaining German support in the ongoing negotiations dealing with international money. The U.S withdrew one division and 96 aircraft, although for appearance's sake, these forces remained committed to NATO. The British proved more difficult, and the Americans had to increase their own spending in Britain to help the Germans reach a 90 percent offset of the exchange costs of the BAOR. McCloy wrote Johnson that "although from time to time the trading instincts of your Fredericksburg Germans cropped out in the F.R.G. representatives, I am not certain that the subtler but still acquisitive instincts of the British are any less formidable."  

The Trilateral Agreements of May 1967 were in part a stopgap measure. They temporarily secured the Alliance's financial basis - and protected the dollar - giving Johnson the weapon he needed to fend off Congressional challenges. More importantly, they were one of the first examples of genuine burden sharing within the Alliance. A German analyst recently noted the "greatest success of the trilateral talks" was that the offset question, rather than becoming an "explosive issue" within the Alliance, "paved the way for the its consolidation."

1968 was a troubled year for Europe and the United States, with domestic disturbances in the United States, France, and Germany. To a certain extent the upheaval of that year has obscured the real achievements of the Johnson Administration earlier in the decade. This essay suggests the need for a more intensive examination of the foreign policy of the Johnson years, both in pursuit of a balanced historical assessment and a better understanding of the dilemmas of that troubled decade. The war in Vietnam always overshadows this era, and
there is no escaping its impact. But there was more to Johnson's foreign policy than Vietnam. Lyndon Johnson set the United States on a course that balanced the solidarity of the Western Alliance with the need to begin "growing out of the Cold War." His Administration began a process of treating Western and Eastern Europe as a whole, recognizing that the division of the continent - and division of Germany - could be overcome only by a patient and sustained effort that sought a reduction of tensions and the building of bridges between East and West. These were important achievements, and should be recognized as among the Administration's most significant and long term successes. Charles de Gaulle once compared Lyndon Johnson with his martyred predecessor by saying, "This man Kennedy is America's mask. But this man Johnson, he is the country's real face." De Gaulle did not mean to flatter Americans with this comparison, but for once, the General may have been unintentionally ironic.
Endnotes


1. Lyndon Baines Johnson Library (LBJL), Papers of Francis Bator, Chronological File, Box, Memo, Bator to LBJ, March 24, 1967. Bator was asking the President for permission to appear on the program. Johnson was notoriously sensitive to presidential aides who talked too freely to the media.


15. Richard Barnet, *The Alliance* (New York, 1983), p. 235. No one was more aware of this than Johnson, who once told Hugh Sidey that "I don't believe that I'll ever get credit for anything in foreign affairs, no matter how successful it is, because I didn't go to Harvard."


19. Valenti, quoted in Brandon, p. 209.


23. Kissinger, p. 18


31. In his oral history at the Johnson Library, Douglas Dillon included a letter he sent the library denying that he was the source of a story about such an encounter in David Halberstam's The Best and the Brightest (New York, 1972).

32. David Bruce, Oral history, LBJ Library, p. 12.


34. Bill Moyers, Oral History, LBJ Library, p. 3.

35. Califano, p. 10.


37. Schulman, p. 165.


39. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, 13, p. 531. Indeed, Lloyd Gardner reminds us that the military strategy of slow and deliberate escalation, so often criticized today, was an example of "trying not to allow Vietnam to undermine policy in the rest of the world." Lloyd Gardner, Paying Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam (Chicago, 1995), p. 158.

40. To a certain extent, this concept reminds me of other historical cliches that are less than helpful in analyzing particular periods, such as the endlessly rising bourgeoisie of pre-revolutionary France and the perpetually declining Ottoman Empire. They simply don't take you very far.


42. Diane B. Kunz, Butter and Guns (New York, 1997), p. 192,
contains an insightful portrait of Nixon's determination to "do what was best for the domestic economy and his own political future and let the international economic system adapt to the United States."

43. Acheson to Rostow, December 6, 1963, Acheson Papers, Box 32, Truman Library.

44. Geyelin, p. 13.

45. Joseph A. Califano, Jr., The Triumph and Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson (New York, 1991), p. 10. In considering this connection between Johnson's foreign and domestic policies, Lloyd Gardner has argued that there was an "ideological weld between the cold war vision of the world and American beliefs about the capacities of their society," and that "Johnson faced losing the Great Society without going forward in Vietnam." Gardner, Pay Any Price, p. 95.

46. Geyelin, p. 147

47. Woods, p. 323.


51. Helga Haftendorn recently noted that "The NATO crisis of 1966-7 was viewed at the time as a situation in which the survival and future course of the Alliance were in jeopardy." Helga Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), p. 1.

52. Anatoly Dobrynin's memoirs make it clear that the Soviets appreciated Johnson's efforts despite their loyalty to their Vietnamese ally. Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (New York: Random House, 1995), pp. 188-189.

53. Mania concludes, "No other president had done as much since the end of the Second World War." Andrzej Mania, Bridge Building: Polityka USA wobec Europy Wschodniej w latach 1961-


55. Lawrence S. Kaplan, «The United States and NATO in the Johnson Years,» in Divine, p. 143.


59. This phrase is used by Francis Bator, in a note to Johnson on October 4, 1970. Bator was providing Johnson with his own assessment of the planned treatment of European issues in Johnson's memoirs. My thanks to Francis Bator for providing me a copy of his note.


64. This was the case with measures to bring about greater European economic integration — namely the Schuman Plan for placing European coal and steel industries under a central authority — and the less successful European Defense Community, which sought to create a unified European Army. See also François Duchêne, Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence (New York, 1994).


68. Bator also recognized that the very transnational governmental relationships, which were changing the nature of US policy toward Europe, also posed numerous challenges of coordination to the alliance leader. Policies can be advocated by specific groups within the bureaucracy — the best example are the theologians in the MLF case — that may seek to create transnational coalitions and restrict the choices of the President. As the White House staffer responsible for European questions, Bator sought to manage these transnational bureaucratic connections in a way that maintained the President's options and remained consistent with his policy decisions. Interview with Francis Bator, December 16, 1995.


71. LBJL, NSF Subject File, Box 23, Memo, Discussion of MLF, April 11, 1964.

73. LBJL, Gerard Smith, Oral History, p. 7.

74. LBJL, NSF-SF, Box 23, Rostow to LBJ, December 5, 1963.

75. *FRUS 1964-1968*, 13, p. 36. See also Geyelin, p. 159.

76. Barnet, p. 240.

77. LBJL, NSF-SF, Box 23, USIA Circular, "MLF Information Activities," June 1, 1964.

78. *FRUS 1964-1968*, 13, pp. 78-83. Haftendorn notes that this may have been one of the events that caused McGeorge Bundy to take an even more critical look at the MLF. Haftendorn, p. 132.


80. LBJL, Gerard Smith, Oral History, p. 10.


84. LBJL, NSF-SF, Box 23, Martin Hillenbrand to Klein, November 25, 1964.

85. LBJL, NSF, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Box 15, Kissinger to Bundy, November 27, 1964.


89. Ibid., p. 133.

90. Ibid., pp.134-137.
91. Richard Neustadt, Memo of Conversation, "Wilson Visit and the MLF," December 6, 1964. I want to thank Prof. Ernest R. May for making this available to me.

92. To make sure that MLF supporters got the message, Johnson deliberately leaked his decision to James Reston of the New York Times. Geyelin, pp. 171-177.

93. FRUS 1964-1968, 13, p. 158.


106. LBJL, NSF Speech File, Box 5, Speech to Editorial Writers, October 7, 1966. Zbigniew Brzezinski, later to be Jimmy Carter's National Security Advisor, took full credit as author of the speech in his oral history at the LBJ Library. He modestly believed that it "fundamentally reversed the priorities of the United States in Western Europe." In truth, the idea of a major speech on European policy was one of the contributions of the Acheson group, and had a number of contributors. The first drafts were written by Bator. FRUS 1964-1968, 13, p. 385, and Interview with Francis Bator, Cambridge, Mass., December 16, 1995.

107. LBJL, NSF Speech File, Box 5, Rostow to LBJ, October 6, 1966.

108. LBJL, NSF Speech File, Box 5, Bator to LBJ, October 13, 1966.

109. I am not arguing that the U.S. deserves the credit for Ostpolitik, only that at this time it was ahead of the Germans on the issue and capable of lending considerable political support to those in Germany who wanted to move in that direction. For the signs of interest in Germany for such a policy, see Roger Morgan, The United States and West Germany, 1945-1973 (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1974), pp. 155-158.


111. Philip H. Gordon, A Certain Idea of France (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1993), pp. 3-22, has one of the most succinct and clear expositions of de Gaulle's ideas.

112. LBJL, David Bruce, Oral History, p. 7.

113. Johnson later said of de Gaulle, "I always had trouble with people like him, who let high rhetoric and big issues take the place of accomplishments." Kearns, p.195. There is a parallel here to Johnson's unwillingness to arouse American passions about Vietnam, for fear that it would compel him to escalate the war.


117. Brands is a noteworthy exception to this tendency. Brands, *Wages of Globalism*, p. 102.


125. LBJL, Bator Papers, Chronological File, Box 3, Telegram, Bator to LBJ, April 11, 1966.


128. Interview with Francis Bator, Cambridge, Mass., December 16, 1995. Acheson had other reasons for his anger, including Johnson's use of the press to paint him, Ball, and McCloy, as "anti-de Gaulle extremists." This led to an extraordinarily heated confrontation between Acheson and the President at a White House meeting on May 19, 1966. For Acheson's account, and their subsequent rapprochement, see his letter to Anthony Eden, June 29, 1966, in *Among Friends: Personal Letters of Dean Acheson*, eds. Davis S. McLellan and David C. Acheson (New


132. Some of these purchases, like the F-104 Starfighter planes, had already had an alarming run of 66 accidents. Gregory F. Treverton, The Dollar Drain and American Forces in Germany (Athens, Ohio, 1978), p. 65.

133. Wightman, p. 46. By September 1, 1966 Germany had placed less than half the orders due by the end of 1966, and made less than 25 percent of the payments due by the end of the agreement in June 1967.


137. To meet an estimated yearly gap of $500 million between what the Germans would pay and what the costs were, McNamara advocated reducing American spending in Europe by $200 million, and considering the withdrawal of a significant number of American combat personnel, which he acknowledged would have a "traumatic" effect on NATO. LBJL, NSF, NSC History, TNN, Box 50, McNamara to LBJ, September 19, 1966.


Although Bark and Gress repeat the argument that American obstinacy caused Erhard's downfall, the evidence they present suggests otherwise.


142. Rusk was particularly impressed with Brandt's appearance at NATO, noting that he demonstrated that the new German government "will not be bound by the rigid theology of the Adenauer period..." FRUS 1964-1968, 13, p. 517.


146. LBJL, NSF, NSC History, TNN, Box 50, McCloy to LBJ, May 17, 1967.

147. LBJL, Bator Papers, Chronological File, Box 4, Memorandum for the President, March 8, 1967.

148. LBJL, Bator Papers, Box 4, Memo to the President, February 23, 1967.

149. LBJL, Bator Papers, Chronological File, Box 4, Memorandum for the President, April 21, 1967.

150. LBJL, NSF, NSC History, TNN, Box 50, McCloy to LBJ, March 22, 1967.

151. Haftendorn, p. 397. Kaplan ends his study by noting that John Leddy's 1968 conclusion that "NATO is in a better state of health than the pessimists predicted a few years ago," may have understated Johnson's achievement. Kaplan, "US and NATO, " in Divine, p. 143.