Abstract of the Final Report

on “Democratization and Foreign Policy of Russia”

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This report reviews the applicability in the Russian case of the recently advanced theory that regime change in a democratizing direction is likely to increase a country’s proneness to war. The international behavior of post-Communist Russia is extremely consequential for regional and global security. By implication, investigating the impact of democratization on Russia’s Foreign Policy (FP) and identifying those domestic factors which contribute to the country’s aggressiveness is a critical policy imperative. Indeed, Russia’s proneness to war even being “proven” just theoretically gives one more argument to the proponents of the further expansion of NATO eastward.

I evaluate the emergence, pronouncement and conduct of Russian FP since the break-up of the Soviet Union in the light of the country’s moves towards a democratic political system. Examining the effect on Russia’s FP of democratization, I conclude that the impact of it is both mixed and limited. Methodologically, the study is conducted according to the longitudinal version of the “most similar systems” research design in which otherwise similar cases differ with respect to some characteristics (i.e. process of democratization) the impact of which is being studied. Thus, the foreign policy decision-making process of liberalizing, yet still authoritarian, elite under Mikhail Gorbachev is compared to foreign policy formulation during the process of democratization under Boris Yeltsin.

The analysis is divided into several parts. The first part is devoted to the theoretical issues of democratization as well as the relationship between democracy and peace. The second part briefly explores the relatively large degree of domestic control that Gorbachev had over the implementation of in Yeltsin’s foreign policy. The fifth part emphasizes the rise of nationalism as a result of popular reaction to the process of reforms. The last part examines the current stage of democratization in Russia. In sum, democratization lead to politicization of FP and the growth of nationalism, fragmentation among executive branch of power, paralysis in FP decision-making.

Terms: democracy; partial democracy; transition to democracy; regime change; democratization, democratic peace.

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3 Kozhemiakin, p.59
Introduction.

This report reviews the applicability in the Russian case of the recently advanced theory that regime change in a democratizing direction is likely to increase a country’s proneness to war. The international behavior of post-Communist Russia is extremely consequential for regional and global security. By implication, investigating the impact of democratization on Russia’s foreign policy (FP) and identifying those domestic factors which contribute to the country’s aggressiveness is a critical policy imperative. Indeed, Russia’s proneness to war even being “proven” just theoretically gives one more argument to the proponents of the further expansion of NATO eastward.

I evaluate the emergence, articulation and conduct of Russian FP since the break-up of the Soviet Union in the light of the country’s moves towards a democratic political system. The war behavior of newly or partly democratizing states is too important to be relegated to the category of cases that are defined out of the sample of peaceful democracies. It should be a major research in its own right, in part because of its policy implications.

Is it prudent to promote new democracies, or will such states destabilize the international order? Are some pathways to democracy more benign that others, and how can they be promoted?

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6 Kozhemiakin, p.59
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1. Theoretical issues of democratization

Foreign policy is usually defined as “the actions of a state toward the external environment and the conditions under which these actions are formulated”. The state ultimately has to adopt to its environment. According to Holsti, governments need to balance domestic institutional tensions with external demands and priorities or risk failure which in fragile countries could lead to political and socio-economic collapse. Russia as well as other NIS of the former Soviet Union behaved according to tenets of Holsti’s argument.

1.1. Two bodies of theory

Since the mid-1980s, scholars of international politics have debated whether democratic states are strongly inclined to keep peace with one another. Apart from its academic interest, the “democratic.
peace” thesis has the greatest possible policy relevance. If democracies are in fact hardwired to treat each other benignly and if we can devise nonviolent means of encouraging democratic rule, we may have finally discovered a recipe for lasting peace.¹⁰

The idea that democracies are inherently disposed to peace can be traced back at least to Immanuel Kant, an 18th-century German philosopher, who made a similar argument for republics in an essay called “Perpetual Peace”. Kant though that an absolute ruler could plunge his country into war on a whim and expect to be largely insulated from its effects in his everyday life; whereas the citizens of a republican state, if they went to war, would be choosing to bring death and hardship upon themselves. Kant came to the conclusion: “If the consent of the citizenry is required in order to determine whether or not there will be war, it is natural that they consider all its calamities before committing themselves to so risky game”.¹¹

The idea that democracies do not fight one another is undeniably attractive for those who happen to live in them. But the number of democratic states is quite limited.¹² The increase in the legion of democracy means the period of time when some non-democratic states undertake pave their way to democracy. One of the leading experts in the filed, Jack Snyder, looks at the importance of regime type and questions the commonly held presumption that post-Communist regimes will produce more pacific FP. He argues that although many of the post-Soviet states, including Russia, have abandoned

¹⁰ Bill Clinton in his 1994 “state of the union” address said: “Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don’t attack each other”. Other leading American politicians (Anthony Lake James Baker) repeated this thesis on many occasions.

¹¹ Critique of the “new” Kantians focuses on the assumption that if there has been correlation between democracy and peace in the past, it does not mean that it will endure into the future. First, democratic states whose people have nothing much to lose may even quite like the idea of a fight, particularly if encouraged by government propaganda. Second, the Gulf war and NATO operation against Yugoslavia pointed out the way how modern democracies can avoid suffrage of its own people by using last word weaponry. Since some countries in transition to democracy (including Russia) possess such sophisticated weapons, the Kantian reason of not fighting is faded.

¹² The author of “Democracies and War” published by The Economist (April 1st-7th, 1995, pp.19-20) pointed out that if liberal democratic governments continue to proliferate around the world, then democracy as such will count for less and less in one country’s evaluation of another. Some democracies may get on well, like France and Germany; some dreadfully, like India and Pakistan/
authoritarian political institutions and centralized command economies and replaced them with free elections and democratic institutions, these states are at best merely *partial democracies*. They lack the established and stable democratic and liberal political orders that can produce the ‘democratic peace’, and the process of incomplete democratization may produce even more aggressive and unstable foreign policies than did the authoritarian political regimes of the late Soviet era. In particular, he argues, that the institutions of partial democracy and the dynamics of democratization enhance the power and role of ethnonationalist movements, which tend to produce belligerent and expansionist foreign policies.\(^{13}\)

As Mansfield and Snyder have argued, “democratizing states – those that have recently undergone regime change in a democratic direction – are much more war-prone than states which have undergone no regime change, and are somewhat more war-prone than those that underwent a change in an autocratic direction”.\(^{14}\)

Most current disagreement about Russian FP among scholars in the West and policymakers arises not from varying access to information, which is generally available to any researcher, but on *interpretation of events and explanation* of the sources of behavior. For instance, the *Foreign Affairs* has published many articles since 1991 in which authors disagree substantially on what Russia is up to in its foreign relations and on whether the U.S. should adopt a cooperative, competitive, or even hostile position toward the country.

According to Celeste A. Wallander, ‘Faced with the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the task of understanding and explaining Russian foreign policies, scholars can pursue one of two broad options. The first option – and the focus of most discussion and publication since December 1991 – is description and documentation of Russian policy. The second option is explicitly and self-consciously theoretical and is less well represented in recent work. It begins with theoretical constructs rather than substantive policy concerns….Researchers following this approach are less focused upon the policy itself and more intent on the dynamic processes of policy formation, evolution, and change. The advantage of the first approach lies in its concrete and fine-tuned exploration of the substantive context of Russian policy. Its weakness is twofold: It can become easily dated, and it cannot produce generalizable insights on Russian foreign policy. Their weakness of the more theory-based approach is that it is unlikely to be useful as a direct guide to the content of policy. However, if done well, it will provide a more substantial basis for long-term and more general explanation’.\(^{15}\)

We also adopt a theory-focused approach to the Russian FP and will examine a theoretical model that focuses on the impact of democratization on Russian FP.

\(^{13}\) Celeste A. Wallander, “The Sources of Russian Conduct: Theories, Frameworks, and Approaches”. In: *The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War* (ed. by Celeste A. Wallander), West view Press, 1996, p.13

Partially changed and democratizing character of Russian domestic political institutions is crucial for understanding Russian FP interests and the policymaking. The idea that democracy has an important pacifying impact on relations among states is an old one. In recent years, nevertheless, it has resurfaced as if it were a new idea. Why? What are its origins? How persuasive is the evidence in favor of the proposition that democratic states have not, and are not likely to, engage in international wars against each other?

As James Lee Ray stated, “academic research on the democratic peace idea may be said to have established itself as a full-fledged, undeniably important phenomenon with the appearance of an article devoted to the topic in the American Political Science Review in 1993, and a book published in the same year entitled Grasping the Democratic Peace.” For the most part, however, the authors agree on the basic facts: that the Yeltsin government is beset by economic and political problems of enormous dimensions and complexity and that Russian FP has become more assertive and confrontational. Different policy prescriptions arise not from implicit explanatory models that try to make sense of what the available information means. These questions can be answered only by an understanding of how Russian government operates, what are its bases of support, the relationship of society and interest groups to Russian political authority, and the relationship of Russian domestic politics to its FP.

Democratization as a phenomenon is just one of many sources to explain Russian FP. But before starting analysis of the relationship between the Russian FP and democratization one have to define key terms in use such as democracy, partial democracy, transition to democracy and democratization.

1.2. Democracy as a “final destination of democratization”

15 Celeste A. Wallander, “The Sources of Russian Conduct: Theories, Frameworks, and Approaches”. In: The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War (ed. by Celeste A. Wallander), Westview Press 1996, p.1
17 See, for instance, James Lee Ray, «The Democratic Path to Peace», Journal of Democracy, Volume 8, Number 2, April 1997, pp.49-64
Transitions to democracy are dated by the time of the inauguration of the newly elected government.

Our definition of democracy is a minimalist one. We follow Robert A. Dahl’s 1971 classic *Polyarchy* in treating as democratic all regimes that hold elections in which the opposition has some chance of winning and taking the office. We define democracy as a regime in which governmental offices are filled as a consequence of contested elections. Only if the opposition is allowed to compete, win, and assume the office is a regime democratic. To the extent to which it focuses on elections, this is obviously a minimalist definition. This definition has two parts: “offices” and “contestation”. In no regime are all governmental offices filled as a consequence of elections. What is essential to consider a regime as democratic is that two kinds of offices are filled by elections: the chief executive office (in Russia – office of the President) and the seats in the effective legislative body (the State Duma and the Council of the Federation). Contestation occurs when there exists an opposition that has some chance of winning office as a consequence of elections (as Przeworski stated, “Democracy is a system in which parties lose elections”). Alternation in office constitutes prima facie evidence of contestation. Contestation, in turn, entails three features:

1) *ex ante* uncertainty,

2) *ex post* irreversibility, and

3) repeatability.

By “*ex ante* uncertainty” we mean that is some positive probability that at least one member of the incumbent coalition can lose office in a particular round of elections. Uncertainty is not synonymous with unpredictability: the probability distribution of electoral chances is typically known. All that is necessary for outcomes to be uncertain is that incumbent party could lose.

By “*ex post* irreversibility” we mean the assurance that whoever wins elections will be allowed to assume office. The outcome of elections must be irreversible under democracy even if the opposition wins. The practical consequence of this feature is to exclude sham elections as well as periods of liberalization. Liberalization is typically intended by dictatoral regimes to be a controlled opening of the political space.
The final feature of contestation is that elections must be expected to be repeated. Democracy, as Juan Linz once said, is government *pro temprore*. All political outcomes must be temporary: losers do not forfeit the right to compete in the future, to negotiate again, to influence legislature, to pressure bureaucracy, or to seek recourse to courts. Even constitutional provisions are not immutable, rules, too, can be changed according to rules.

When in doubt, we err in the direction of calling a regime dictatorial. There are classifications which are not idiosyncratic, but closely related to several alternative scales of democracy. 19

Studies of the democratic peace also define democracy according to a number of criteria. Minimal definitions of democracy advanced by J. Schumpeter and most recently S. Huntington require periodic elections between candidates who compete fairly for the votes of a substantial portion of the adult population and whose outcome determines who makes state policy, including foreign and military policy. 20

Some stricter definitions require in addition that democracy must respect individuals’ civil rights or that a government must have surrendered office following an electoral defeat. As further indicators of democracy, though not necessarily part of the core definition, some studies also measure whether the executive branch of government is checked in policymaking by the legislature or the judiciary, whether political parties are well institutionalized, and whether individuals’ economic rights are respected. 21

Some studies pointed out that states exhibit democratic characteristics in varying degrees. Elections may be sporadic, some people may be barred from voting or running for office, access to the press may be skewed, or elections outcomes may not directly determine who governs the country. Quantitative studies have devised schemes for measuring gradations of democracy. J. Snyder uses the term partial democracy to refer to intermediate cases where the prospect of having to compete in elections, no matter how sporadic or unfair, has a substantial effect on the calculations of political elite. He calls a

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19 Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub & Fernando Limongi, p.39
state democratizing if it is a partial democracy that is becoming more democratic on one or more of the above mentioned criteria. 22

Operationally, a regime may be classified as a democracy if it does not fail under any of the following rules below:

1) “executive selection”. The chief executive is not elected.
2) “legislative selection”. The legislature is not elected.
3) “party”. There is no more than one party.

In sustaining democracy the importance of economic factors is vital. Once established in a wealthy country, democracy is more likely to endure. Przeworski and his colleagues have found that once a country is sufficiently wealthy, with per-capita income of more than $ 6,000 a year, democracy is certain to survive, come hell or high water. And while international factors as well as political institutions are important for the durability of democracy in less affluent countries, economic performance does matter: indeed, democracy is more likely to survive in a growing economy with less than $ 1,000 per-capita income than in a country where per-capita income is between $ 1,000 and $ 4,000, but which is declining economically. Democracies can survive even in the poorest nations if they manage to generate development, if they reduce inequality, if the international climate is propitious, and if they have parliamentary institutions. 23

1.3. Democratization and War

In order to identify and explain the impact of democratization on international security it is necessary to analyze first the nature of the transitional process itself. The least controversial way of defining democratization is by listing its three consecutive stages:

1) the end of a non-democratic regime,
2) the inauguration of a democratic regime, and
3) the consolidation of a democratic system. 24

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22 J. Snyder, Democratization, War, and Nationalism. In: The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy, p.23
23 Przeworski, p.49
24 Alexander Kozhemiakin, p.50. As to the above mentioned three criteria, we can add that there is another subjective factor have to be taken into account. As John Owen argues, the all-important
Democratization can be reversed at any point during the transitional period. Moreover, the very process of democratic transition can last for a long time and its success is not assured. Authoritarian regimes can come to an end in a variety of ways: through decolonization, foreign intervention, or primarily indigenous process. It is the latter – domestic attempts at reform – that have signaled the end of most authoritarian regimes encompassed by the third wave of democratization. A non-democratic regime is believed to have finally collapsed when the first free and fair elections are held. Such an electoral test separates the process of democratization from that of liberalization during which some political freedoms are introduced but competitive elections for top offices are not allowed.

As we have already noted a democratic political system requires fulfillment of a certain minimum of procedural criteria.

Finally, if the process is successful, a democratizing state reaches the third stage of transition – democratic consolidation – when democratic institutions and norms become an integral part of politics. In other words, the notion of democratic consolidation refers primarily to the fact that a democracy has been accepted by elite groups and the general public as the only legitimate political regime. Indeed, first and foremost a consolidated democracy is a regime in which there is a procedural democracy and democratic actors no longer have as one of their central concerns the avoidance of an authoritarian regression.25

Unlike the first two stages of democratization, the successful completion of democratic consolidation requires not only political but also societal changes.26 Democratic consolidation is impossible unless specific changes occur in the society’s culture, with norms of tolerance, cooperation and trust sinking deep and lasting roots.27 As argued by a number of scholars, it would be correct to characterize consolidated democracy as society that has attained a high level of “civic culture”. But as rightly pointed out Alexander Kozhemiakin, “it is not entirely clear,...whether it is democracy that promotes “civic culture” or the other way round... Indeed, the principles of tolerance, moderation,
mutual respect, fair play, and readiness to compromise are often thought of not only as a producer but also as a product of consolidated democracy.”

Whether democratization exerts a qualified pacifying influence or impedes cooperation and promotes conflict ultimately depends upon the success of the transitional process.

On the one hand, it appears that successful democratization is a useful tool for expanding the “pacific union”. This pacifying influence, however, is most likely to develop only those foreign policy areas which concern the relations with other peace-loving nations.

On the other hand, when the transition to democracy is problematic, it may result in an increase in international conflict. It is important to stress that problematic democratization is likely to lead to international violence not merely because of the democratic procedures introduced, but also because of the political (i.e. strength of illiberal elites), socio-economic (i.e. domestic crisis), and cultural (i.e. weakness of liberal norms) attributes typical of the society experiencing the problematic process of transition.

While democracy inhibits conflict with other democracies, the problematic process of democratization augments the overall conflict propensity of the state. It is most likely, however, that a failing nascent democracy will direct its aggressiveness against its regional neighbors, since the opportunity for conflict with this group of states is usually much larger than the potential for confrontation with distant nations.

It is also important to point out that while

the “nature of the impact of democratization on international society is dependent on the character of domestic foreign policy preferences (which...are shaped by the transitional process itself), the intensity with which the process of democratization affects international security is dependent on the strength of such preference. Thus, in an unlikely situation of all major domestic groups and lobbies being completely inward-looking and having no specific foreign policy preferences, the process of democratization will have no substantial effect on the country’s foreign policy. In contrast, when foreign policy issues are of paramount importance domestically, the impact of the process of democratization on international security will much more profound. Most cases of transitional regimes, however, are likely to fall somewhere in between these two extremes”.

The experience of the post-Communist states confirms the proposition that democratizing states are at risk for militant nationalism and war, even among each other. Two states engaged in military conflict, Serbia and Croatia, are arguably democracies by minimal Schumpeterian criteria. Armenia, also a Schumpeterian democracy, has supported the Karabakh Armenians in their war with

28 Kozhemiakin, p.52
Azerbaijan, which chose the ethnonationalist Abulfaz Elchibey as its president in free elections until he was overthrown following military defeats. In addition, incipient post-Communist cold wars between Russia and its Ukrainian, Estonian, and Latvian neighbors involve nationalistic democratizing states on both sides. But J. Snyder pointed out that “wars are not caused only by democratization!”.

The greater theoretical problem is that the democratization hypothesis seems to overpredict war among the post-Communist states.

Perhaps more revealing than gross correlation between degrees of democratization and belligerence are the more specific hypothesis about how democratization leads to international conflict. The hypothesis derived from the literature on the democratic peace get mixed results. The argument that legislative checks keep democracies peaceful fares quite poorly. In Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Azerbaijan under Ayaz Mutalibov parliament were consistently more belligerent than the chief executives. The argument about the free marketplace of ideas fares better: the press in the Balkans and Caucasus is notoriously myth-ridden and skewed by nationalist content.

The argument about norms of dispute resolution is harder to assess. It is true that almost all of the post-Soviet states faced difficulties in resolving political disputes both at home and abroad. But little insight is to be gained attributing Yeltsin’s high-handedness toward the parliament and toward the near abroad to a weakness of Russia’s democratic norms. Then Russian Foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev spent 1992 and 1993 touting the value of democratic norms in domestic and international affairs, yet by the beginning of 1994 he was forced to jump aboard the nationalist, pro-Serb, neo-imperialist bandwagon like virtually everyone else in Russian politics. Hence, more concrete causal explanations can be found by studying political tides and coalitions that lie behind the norms.

In Russia the election of substantial number of nationalist politicians was in part the unintended consequence of a protest vote based primarily on the poor economic performance of the Yeltsin regime. Surveys suggests that on most policy dimensions the general public is less nationalist and less oriented toward the use of force abroad than are Russian elites. According to a study of W. Zimmerman, 56 percent of a sample of Russia’s FP elite were inclined to “send military aid if asked to aid a country of the former Soviet Union” whereas only 34 percent of the general public held that opinion. According to 77 percent of the elite sample, the “national” interests of Russia extend beyond

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30 Kozhemiakin, p.59
31 Przeworski, p.35
32 Ibid.
its current territory”, but only 57 percent of the general public agree. The public was more nationalist than the elite (81 percent to 69 percent) only on the use of unspecified means to “defend the interest of Russians abroad”. Other polls show that the mass public has a low level of interest in foreign policy and is often unwilling to express any opinion on foreign issues. In contrast, the elite expresses elaborate views on foreign affairs.33 As J. Snyder has pointed out, the rise of nationalism in Russia has more to do with the forging legitimization of elite coalitions than with a groundswell of mass sentiment. Nationalism is a useful component of a counterliberal ideology binding together an emerging coalition of neo-Communist elites, industrialists, and the military. Nationalism substitutes for communism as an ideology stressing the role of the strong state in defending the Russian national interest against economic and security threats, real or imagined, domestic and foreign.

2. Political liberalization under Mikhail Gorbachev

The first post-communist Russian FP actually began in the Soviet period. It was an innovation of the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, the product of his “new political thinking”. It was developed in opposition to the precepts that had guided relations between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world from the time of the Bolshevik revolution. Lenin and his successors considered the “international class struggle” between the communist and non-communist camps to be the defining feature of international politics. Gorbachev rejected this staple of communist thinking and replaced it with the common interests that unite all peoples, foremost among them peace. He thereby changed the fundamental presumption of Soviet FP from conflict to solidarity. Gorbachev concluded that in the nuclear age national security had to be mutual: neither the USA nor the USSR could hope to gain a decisive military advantage over the other. This central conclusion which Western leaders had publicly embraced earlier in the nuclear age, paved the way for agreements that dramatically reduced the arms that the United States and the Soviet Union had accumulated for decades.34

The main goal of this part is to examine a very important aspect of the process of Soviet FP decision-making during the last General Secretary, namely, Gorbachev’s scope as chief executive to play a crucial role in making Soviet FP and his powers to cope with domestic opposition on FP issues.

33 J. Snyder, p.36
Almost a half of century ago, George Kennan predicted the possibility of the nonmilitary demise of the Communist regime in the USSR. He suggested that under conditions of containment designed to demonstrate the non-aggressive intentions of the West the Soviet Union would gradually decay as its ideology proved inferior both domestically and internationally to Western liberal ideas.  

Such an emphasis on the role of ideas in contributing to the downfall of the Soviet regime and improvement Moscow’s relations with the West has turned out to be quite insightful. Today, a number of analyses trying to identify the sources of Soviet change *ex post facto* emphasize that although by the mid-1980s most of the Soviet people remained isolated from Western cultural influence, a relatively small but influential stratum of the population occupying high-ranking positions in the state became intensively exposed to pro-liberal ideas coming from the West.  

Increasing pro-liberal orientation was especially strong in those state institutions whose activities were exposing them to the outside world. Some of the major Soviet think-tanks, such as the Academy of Sciences Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), were unofficially promoting the ideas of non-class-based FP for nearly twenty years before Gorbachev’s “new political thinking”. In other words, the period of Gorbachev’s political liberalization was characterized by domestic conditions favorable for the integration of the Soviet Union into the international community dominated by the West. Most importantly, however, an increasingly powerful but still not prevalent pro-liberal orientation was combined with the essentially authoritarian style of Gorbachev’s leadership that enabled him to fend off the conservative interests of those who were still loyal to communist dogma. Indeed, Communist liberalization, was “clearly not democratization”.  

Glasnost did not mean freedom of speech as much as “the right to criticize whatever got in the way of Gorbachev’s reforms”. Thus, during his first years, Gorbachev’s immediate aim was to strengthen his personal control – as General Secretary of the Communist Party – over foreign policy and over the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs so that he could achieve his foreign policy goals.  

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37 Jeff Checkel, «Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution», *World Politics*, 45:1, 1993, pp.271-300  
39 Kozhemiakin, p.61  
40 Ibid
Three important features that distinguished the Soviet policy-making system remained the same:

1) it enforced greater centralization (concentration of decision-making power),
2) it maintained deeper differentiation (role specialization of institutions and individuals),
3) it allowed much less participation (access to the decision-making process).

Thus the right to have an overall view about FP issues was in essence restricted to the Politburo – the job of other participants was to provide specialized information and to carry out specialized tasks of implementation. Such compartmentalization fostered a powerful version of bureaucratic parochialism. Information, as a rule, was distributed on a “need-to-know” basis, and opinions were sought only as and when those in power thought appropriate. Of course there were informal channels of access and privileged information sources for a slightly wider elite, and policy could be argued about specialists in oblique terms; but in general it would have been misleading to talk about a “foreign policy debate” or about an “informed public”. The Communist Party was at the core of the FP making. Decisions were taken by the Politburo or by the key groups drawn from its members; the Secretariat acted as the main channel, sifter, and organizer of the information the Politburo needed to make its decisions. Party spokesmen and publications articulated the doctrinal framework of policy. Party officials watched over the implementation of policy, and maintained discipline among those responsible. However, it would be wrong to exaggerate the scope or the efficiency of party control. The powers of institutions fluctuated. The General Secretary who did not have the advantage of endorsement by popular vote and who was no longer able to use terror against his rivals had to maneuver and build coalitions among powerful groups in the apparatus. The Politburo itself had become a more representative body by the 1970s: the minister of defense, the minister of foreign affairs, and the head of the KGB seemed to attend virtually ex officio. The USSR was clearly by no means immune to the effects of bureaucratic politics in the FP field. Roles were distributed in an untidy, ad hoc fashion; there were frequent demarcation battles between the party International Department, the military, and the foreign ministry.

Gorbachev succeeded in opening up discussion of FP issues and in breaking down some of the barriers of specialization. The overall effect of the first phase of reforms in this area was to shift the

42 Ibid, 25
balance of influence somewhat in favor of the foreign ministry. The party International Department
grew less involved in implementing policy and became more of an information and analysis center.

Also, he wasted no time using his power to make sweeping personnel changes in order to undermine
any potential opposition to his policies in the party and state apparatus. A year after Gorbachev took
office he appointed a new minister of defense and a new chief of the General Staff, and installed men

In general, sweeping personal changes were a prerequisite for Gorbachev’s FP initiatives. For
instance, the decision to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan was announced only after
Gorbachev had changed the top of the military.\footnote{Kozhemiaikin, p.62}

In the last two years of the Soviet Union’s existence, Gorbachev’s political power,
undermined by his own policy of perestroika, was gradually weakening. During this period the
domestic debate on Soviet FP became extremely vocal and heated. Gorbachev and Shevarnadze were
accused of having abandoned the security interests of the USSR in Eastern Europe and the Third

By that time, however, most of Gorbachev’s FP initiatives were a \textit{fait accompli}. As
A.Kozhemiaikin pointed out, “it was exactly Gorbachev’s authoritarian power base that safeguarded
more or less effectively the policy of “New Political Thinking, which stressed non-class,
interdependent nature of the international system, from the assaults of hard-line Communists. In other
words, Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking was the policy of a liberalized, but still authoritarian, elite,
that, for a variety of reasons, was willing to make concessions in the international arena in order to
achieve a more complete integration of the Soviet Union into the “civilized international community”
and that was ready to the use of authoritarian power to get around all domestic obstacles in pursuit of
this policy”.\footnote{Kozhemiaikin, p.63}
Yet even in 1991, despite the institutional associated with the setting up of an executive presidency changes (for instance, the downgrading of the Politburo), there were still strong continuities with the past. Gorbachev was able to draw on the authority of a party General Secretary of five years standing. The presidential apparatus employed numerous former senior party officials and cooperated with party bodies. The Central Committee departments continued to function. There was still widespread deference to the symbols and values of the Soviet period.

Insofar as central control had been relaxed, moreover, the consequences were not encouraging. In a system that had been held together by strict central control and where debate had been discouraged, there was no underlying agreement on national goals to soften the rivalry between the different agencies. During the winter of 1990-91 the KGB, the armed forces, and the International Department appeared at times to be forwarding their own FP, jarringly at odds with the “new political thinking” of Gorbachev. This led to uncomfortable complications in relations with the West and with the former Soviet-block states.48

3. Politics and democracy.

Among the most robust elements of democratization in Russia had been freedom of expression and political opposition.

President Yeltsin found greatest support for his reforms among the Democratic Russia movement (with former mayors of Moscow and St.Petersburg as its leaders) which had helped his rise to power by organizing large demonstrations during Gorbachev’s period in office. Opposition to Yeltsin came from two main groups. The fiercest criticism emanated from a loose coalition of neo-Communists and Russian nationalists. This group claimed that Yeltsin was capitulating to the West or the “Zionists”, allowing economic policy to be dictated by the IMF and the World Bank. They accused the government of humiliating Russia in every way: in losing its empire, in abandoning 25 million Russians to live in “near abroad” which was once part of the USSR; and in betraying ordinary citizens by promising them prosperity and turning them, instead, into poverty. These critics demanded that Russia rely on its own resources and return to the social guarantees and state planning of the Soviet period. Such views were shared by a variety of groups, many of whom were part of a

coordination body, the National Salvation Front, set up in October of 1992. A more moderate centrist group was supported by a general move towards a market economy but demanded a shift in tactics and a significant slowing down of the reforms. A leading role here was played by Civic Union, a coordinating body which included centrist political parties such as influential Union of Industrialists called the “Red Directors”. Civic Union described itself as a “constructive opposition” to Yeltsin’s government.

The turning point in relations between the president in opposition was the eighth Congress of People’s Deputies (the highest authority in Russia at that time). The Congress cancelled Yeltsin’s emergency powers, and rejected almost all of his proposals, including one designed to overcome the paralysis of power by holding a referendum on whether parliament of president should rule Russia. On 20 March president Yeltsin inflicted a crisis on the country by introducing emergency rule, effectively bypassing parliament, in an attempt to end the political stalemate. One week later an emergency session of the Congress of People’s Deputies attempted to impeach Yeltsin for violating the constitution. His opponents narrowly failed to achieve the required two-thirds majority, but a national vote of confidence in Yeltsin was arranged. The referendum held on 25 April included four questions: on confidence in Yeltsin as president; on support for his economic reforms; and whether to hold early presidential and early parliamentary elections. The result confounded the President’s enemies. Not only did he win 57.4% in the personal vote of confidence, but a majority even endorsed his economic policies. There was less support, however, for new elections, which meant Yeltsin would have to continue working with a hostile legislature.

With the opposition’s case against Yeltsin’s economic reforms weakened by his victory in the referendum, the key political issue became the question of what kind of democratic system Russia should have: essentially, whether it should be a presidential or a parliamentary republic. The existing constitution was based on the old Soviet one but incorporated hundreds of amendments to annul the Communist Party’s leading role and introduce the quasi-democratic parliamentary structures invented by Gorbachev: namely, the Congress of People’s Deputies which met for short sessions about twice a year; and the smaller permanent body, the Supreme Soviet, elected by the Congress. It was the failure of this constitution to define properly the powers of the legislature and the executive that resulted in the constant political impasse between president Yeltsin and the Congress. A totally new constitution was needed to redefine Russia’s basic law. Yeltsin’s own team and parliamentary committee each drew
up rival drafts of new constitution. However, little progress was made towards actually adopting one until Yeltsin forced the issue calling a Constitutional Convention with some 760 representatives from the main political and social organizations and from 88 regions and republics of the Russian Federation (the 89th territory, Chechnya, had declared independence in November and boycotted the conference).

Although Yeltsin has insisted that only his draft for a constitution be taken as a basis for discussion, the delegates in fact discussed the parliamentary version too, formulated a compromise draft which was approved on July 1993. The draft provided for a presidential republic some ways similar to the French model. The legislature (the Federal assembly) would consist of directly elected 400-member lower house, the State Duma, an upper house (the Federation Council) would consist of two members from each territory (178 members in total). The directly elected president would have the right to dissolve the Duma in certain cases and to arrange declare new elections. The Federation Council would have the right to impeach the President in the event of treason or some grave crimes. The government would report to both president and parliament.

Large problems, remained, however. First, the existing People’s Deputies insisted that only they had the right to adopt a new constitution. A majority of them, including the chairman of the Supreme Soviet Khasbulatov, were opposed to the Conference’s draft which would inevitably abolish the Congress of People’s Deputies. Second, the draft did not have satisfactory balance between the federal government of Russia’s regions and ethnically based republics. Many of the 68 non-national regions wanted similar economic and political rights as national republics. While no agreement could be reached with the Supreme Soviet on either the new constitution or on holding parliamentary elections, Yeltsin continued with political games. In August 1993 he persuaded the leaders of 88 territories of Russia to create a consultative body along the lines of the Federation Council. Despite the political conflicts, by August 1993 it appeared that Russia had made steady progress from Communism to democracy. Apart from some trouble in the Caucasus area, it had generally avoided the bloody ethnic conflicts that affected many other former Soviet republics. There have been no major social conflicts either. In general, politics tended to be dominated by 10 or so personalities rather than by political parties which became too numerous and too small to be a major influence on the country’s democratic development. However, a return to the past seemed unlikely, even if institutions such as television and the press still saw their role as propagandists rather than informants. President Yeltsin himself was trusted by most Western governments as the guarantor of both political and economic
reform in Russia. Despite his sometimes erratic decision-making (his sudden declaration of emergency rule in March 1993 and frequent reversals of policy), he did not seem to evince the dictatorial ambitions attributed to him by his enemies. He stated on several occasions that he would not stand again for president when his current term expired, although he seemed likely to ignore his pledge if forced to call elections before the end of his term. In short, Yeltsin gave the impression that he would be happy to see his place in history as the man who helped destroy Soviet Communism and put a democratic system in place in Russia.  

In September 1993 the tension between the legislative and the executive branches of power turned into serious confrontation. Frustrated with attempts by the legislature to hinder his reforms, Yeltsin dissolved parliament and announced that elections would be held to the Federal Assembly. The Supreme Soviet responded by summoning an emergency session of the Congress of People’s Deputies. Despite shutting down the parliament building’s power supply, some 180 deputies remained inside the parliament. Attempts by the Constitutional Court and the Orhtodox Church to mediate in the conflict proved useless. On October 3-4 armed hostilities occurred between supporters of the defiant deputies and the army and the interior ministry troops. On October 4 government troops bombarded the White house and overcame the resistance. Over 100 people were reported to have died in the conflict. 

Having suppressed the rebellion by opponents to his reforms, Yeltsin sought to finalize a draft constitution. On November 10, 1993, the Constitutional Convention agreed upon a version which was put to a nation-wide vote in a plebiscite on 12 December. According to the final results issued by the Central Electoral Commission, a total of 58,187,755 citizens (comprising 54.8% of registered voters in Russia) participated in the plebiscite. The new constitution was endorsed by 58.4% of participants (some 32,937,630 voters) and rejected by 41.6% (23,431,333). The constitution provided for a strong presidency with few legislative checks on its power and differed in some respects from the draft worked out by the Constitutional Convention in May. According to the constitution, the country would be a presidential republic with a bicameral legislature and an independent judiciary. 

For some Russian observers, suspicions that the West was more committed to Yeltsin than to democracy appeared confirmed when Western leaders failed to protest Yeltsin’s dissolution of the Russian Supreme Soviet on Sept.21, 1993. Such indiscriminate Western support fostered “legal nihilism” in Russia. The result of backing Yeltsin in the October 3-4 the shelling of the parliament

49 Notes of the President (in Russian), Moscow, 1994
was a vote of no-confidence in Western-style reforms and of the Yeltsin governments’ relations with the West.\textsuperscript{50}

Since then, the clash between the President and the legislature has continued. In the spring of 1999 Duma was very close to reaching its final political goal - to impeach Yeltsin and clean the way to the Kremlin. And the Upper House has been opposing Yeltsin’s wish to dismiss the General Prosecutor from his office. This undoubtedly proves the thesis that at least partial democracy is in Russia and the rights of the various branches of power not just declared in the constitution (as it used to be under Communists) but are the main legal foundations for political activities of them. The most important thing is that the second attempt of opposition to take the Kremlin did not result in the bloodshed as in 1993, though the situation in 1999 was much better for Yeltsin than in 1993. The peaceful and legally correct solution of the process of impeachment was quite remarkable in terms of building democracy in Russia.

4. The New Russian Foreign Policy

As N. Malcolm stated, the legacy inherited from the Soviet Union made it particularly difficult to establish effective FP-making in post-Communist Russia:

1) the effective operation of the previous ultra-centralized system had depended on the party apparatus. When it vanished at a stroke at the end of August 1991, an enormous overload was placed on the information-processing and political-control capacity of the presidency and the foreign ministry,

2) earlier differentiation of roles, and exclusion from access to policy debate of senior officials in relevant institutions, meant it would be difficult to build a more collegial, cooperative approach to FP even at top level. Blinkered bureaucratic perspectives were likely to dominate.

\textsuperscript{50} The facts cited by the Western press are absolutely obvious. Beginning in November 1992, Yeltsin constantly discussed with his Western partners the possibility of his taking steps to impose presidential rule in Russia. After securing his “friends” support, he deliberately set about efforts to exacerbate the political situation once more. For details, see: "Rossiskaia gazeta", 1993, April 21 (“In the Mirror of the World Press: Having Secured the West’s Support, Boris Yeltsin is Prepared to Become a Dictator” by A. Berdnikov; Nezavisimiaia gazeta, 1993, 28 September (“The West and Yeltsin. - So Democracy Isn’t for Russia” by V. Belotserkovsky)
3) the entire political and administrative system had to be reconstructed in a country where formal institutional hierarchies and predictable procedures in policy-making had never been given a chance to take root and where organizational changes had always tended to be linked to top-level power struggles. The scope for conflict and disorder was very great,

4) the breakup of the Soviet Union created a whole new sphere of foreign relations fraught with the problems generated by deep economic interdependence and contested borders. The specialized knowledge needed to deal with these problems was difficult to find,

5) the new politically active elite had in most cases little experience of FP matters. They were therefore more likely to be willing to support unrealistic and destabilizing policies,

6) political views were sharply polarized, and FP issues soon began to be used by the opposition in an increasingly bitter struggle for power. There was resentment in army and defense-industrial circles about the material implications for them of the demilitarized FP line preferred by the foreign ministry. Old conceptions of Russia’s role in the world had been challenged and there was no agreement on what was to replace them. Wounded national feeling was further offended by foreign minister Kozyrev’s conciliatory approach to the West. The prospect for a broad consensus on international matters emerging looked poor.\(^{51}\)

Also, the absence of democratic traditions impeded the consolidation of new democratic institutions. Political learning itself is a very important factor.

Among the most important elements of democratization in Russia has been freedom of expression. It has made possible a fundamental debate on national interest and FP. But the tone and content of this debate owes less to democratization than to Russian political culture and the demise of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, from the outset of Russian sovereignty\(^ {52}\) its leaders declared their firm belief in democratic values. Not only were they ready to support the “new political thinking” and the reduction of the level of confrontation with the West, but they also made known their intention to go much further. They intended to end the confrontation altogether and subsequently to join the

\(^{51}\) Neil Malcolm, Russian Foreign Policy Decision-making, pp.25-6

\(^{52}\) On 12 June 1990 the Supreme Soviet (parliament) of the Russian Soviet Federative Republic proclaimed the sovereignty of Russia which, however, continued to be a part of the USSR. State sovereignty implies a foreign policy exempt from external control but the central Soviet power structure did not, at that time, relinquish its authority over these matters. This resulted in marked ambiguities in the FP and diplomacy of the newly born state.- See: Vladimir Matveyev, “The New Russian Diplomacy: The First Months”, International Relations, Vol. XI, Number 2, April 1992, p.77
community of nations of the Free World. The new leaders of Russia set out to act in accordance with these principles and aims, notably by recognizing the full independence of the new Baltic states, demonstrating their solidarity with Anglo-American operations in the Kuwait War and condemning violations of human rights in Castro’s Cuba. On all these matters, and on others, the position of the central power structure and diplomatic establishment was somewhat equivocal and on occasion contrary.

The introductory phase of Russian FP, i.e. the declaration and presentation of its intentions in official and unofficial talks with almost all its neighbors and its main partners as well as in international organizations, was all but completed by the end of spring 1992. Despite all its difficulties, in a short period of time Russian diplomacy managed to formulate its priorities which include respect for basic human rights and values, to define its main political interests and regional preferences, to declare its intention to join the international community of civilized nations and, in particular, its desire to apply sometime in the future for membership in the European Communities and NATO.\(^{53}\)

The first months of Boris Yeltsin’s presidency were characterized by conditions that were highly conducive to the liberalization of Russian FP. Democratic euphoria and expectations of a better life under the new regime were still strong among the masses, and the conservative political elements were still in shock after the defeat in August of 1991. Encouraged by these favorable circumstances and motivated by the desire to convince the West that Russia was even more liberal, more market-oriented, and more European than Gorbachev’s Soviet Union, the Russian foreign ministry based its initial policy on the statement that Russia “has no enemies and wants to be friends with all countries”.\(^{54}\)

The objectives of creating an effectively functioning domestic civil society and constructing the international society of states capable of resolving its problems peacefully were seen by Russia’s democratic forces as intricately related. For the newly emerging democrats, liberal norms could not be observed domestically while disregarded internationally. To then acting prime minister Yegor Gaidar, “if the goal of our policy is to preserve the democratic freedoms and to increase the population’s standard of living, then war (including victorious war) is a war against this policy”.\(^{55}\) For Gaidar and other Russian democrats war meant, “a) convulsive of political democracy, b) convulsive expansion of...

\(^{53}\) Matveyev, p.93  
\(^{54}\) Alexei Arbatov, “Russian Foreign Policy for the 1990s”. In: Teresea Johnson and Steven Miller (eds.), Russian Security After the Cold War, Washington, DC 1994, p.35  
\(^{55}\) Kozhemoakin, p.63
command economy”.56 Before nationalist pressures started mounting, most of Russia’s democratically oriented officials had tried to solve the problems of the alleged abuse of ethnic Russians living in the “near abroad” through political and diplomatic means, without resorting to military force or other coercive measures. It was democratic political forces that pushed for the conclusion of treaties with Latvia and Estonia on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of these former Soviet republics despite nationalist hysteria with respect to human rights violations by authorities of the both Baltic states.57 Finally, it was uncompromising democrats who criticized most vigorously the Russian government’s inability and unwillingness to find political solutions to the war in the secessionist republic of Chechnya. The most telling story of Russian FP in the initial period was Yeltsin’s decision to support sanctions sponsored by the UN against the rump Yugoslavia. This decision was especially remarkable, given Russia’s self-proclaimed status as historical protector of Serbia. The Russian position on that problem is largely explained by desire to preserve the rough consensus existing at that time between the US, Great Britain, France, and Germany on how to cope with the crisis in the Balkans. Indeed, the Russian media later published what purported to be a classified memorandum from Russian UN representative Vorontsov in which he appealed to Moscow not to oppose the West on this issue.58

5. The rise of nationalism

Shortly after the collapse of the USSR the domestic situation that was quite supportive for promoting democracy in Russia started to change rapidly bringing about a dramatic shift in FP. With the intensifying socio-economic crisis, the Russian public exposed an increasingly negative view of the process of democratization and its by-product in the post-Soviet context – transition to some form of market-oriented economy. It became quite common for Russians to argue that the government’s policy of economic liberalization had had a more ruinous effect on the country’s

56 Ibid
58 Kozhemiakin, p.64
economy than had four years of war against Nazi Germany. Indeed, according to the official and rather conservative estimate, the total decline in Russia’s GDP from 1991 to 1994 amounted to 38%.59

This rapid economic decline was one of the main reasons of the fact that for the first time since WW II the death rate in Russia exceeded the birth rate.60 According to the pools of 1992, there was a change in public preferences from the initial democratic euphoria to support for more authoritarian forms of government. 78% of respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the political situation in Russia.61 Thus, already in the very beginning of democratization a majority of Russia’s population were dissatisfied with the process and consequences of political reforms. This is proved to be fertile ground for the growth anti-reform views expressed by both Communists and nationalists. During elections to Duma in 1993 it resulted in a victory of the so-called Liberal-Democratic Party led by Zhirinovsky. Thus, severe political struggle between Yeltsin and Supreme Soviet as well as intense socio-economic problems has created a situation in which the huge part of population moved from a democratic extreme to a nationalistic one.

Painful experiences of national decline and humiliation created hypersensitivity to issues of international status. In this way Russian FP resembles to some experts French policy during the presidency of Charles de Gaulle. For Russia, the equivalent of the French defeat in 1940 was the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.62 Some have even compared the situation in Russia with that in the Weimar republic where a deep socio-economic crisis and the psychological humiliation of losing WW I led to the soaring rise of right-wing forces. In the Russian case (as well in Chinese and French under de Gaulle) a nationalist FP was and continues to be useful as a source of domestic legitimacy. The fledging democracy that has succeeded the Soviet regime in Russia needs nationalism as the one cause that seems capable of uniting the country and rallying support for its rulers.63

So, the collapse of the USSR was treated by many Russians as disaster. Also, more than 25 million Russians lived outside the Russian Federation. In this respect, the Russian government has been forced to respond to three basic categories of problems:

1) those of Russian-speaking civilians demanding integration into new societies,

2) those of Russian-speaking civilians demanding some level of autonomy from new states,

59 Kozhemiakin, p.65

60 Izvestia, 1992, March 30

61 RFE/RL Research Report, 2:3, January 1993


63 Ibid
3) those of Russian servicemen stationed abroad.

In the first category were the Russian-speaking populations of Estonia and Latvia, which were the only new states that did not grant automatic citizenship to residents on their territory. Both governments imposed a series of requirements for potential citizens who were not residents or who were descendents of residents of the interwar independent republics, including a language competency examination and a minimum period of residence. The second group included segments of the Russian-speaking populations of Ukraine and Moldova as well as some groups with ethnic or potential ties to minorities in the Russian Federation. These included Ossetians in Georgia and the Abkhaz in Georgia. These Russians and non-Russians fearing discrimination at the hands of new national governments have attempted to remove themselves from administrative control by establishing autonomous or independent regions, sometimes requesting incorporation into the Russian Federation in the process. Russians of the Crimean peninsula in Ukraine who make up the majority of the population of the territory have argued that their region’s transfer from Russian to Ukrainian jurisdiction in 1954 by the USSR legislature was invalid and have repeatedly declared autonomy or separation from Ukraine. Russians living to the east of the Dnestr river in Moldova went a step further and took up arms in 1991 to carve out an independent Trans-Dnestr Republic despite the fact that they make up only 25% of the self-styled republic’s population. Abkhazians and Ossetians have come under prolonged attack by Georgian forces for attempting to remove their existing autonomous units from Georgian control. These conflicts have made refugees or hostages of several thousand local ethnic Russians. In all of these cases the presence in the region of servicemen under Russian command but still stationed at former Soviet military installations has been a complicated factor. Russian involvement and the rise of nationalism on the level of the government stemmed from a number of concerns. The first was a desire to secure the physical safety of both civilians and military personnel. This desire was not purely humanitarian one – the Russian economy could not absorb a huge flow of refugees and the abrupt return of large numbers of servicemen due to a lack of housing and in the case of civilians high unemployment. Second, the right of Russians and Russian speakers and of the Russian military to remain unmolested in the territory of the former Union was a key emotional issue for those Russians who questioned whether the collapse of the USSR was necessary.

64 All NIS except for those of Estonia and Latvia had granted automatic citizenship to anyone residing on their territory on the day the citizenship law came into effect.
The surge of Russian nationalism has also been intensified by international forces. Despite expectations of Russian liberals, the West was quite reluctant to extend assistance to Russian reforms. Moreover, the way the West conducted negotiations with Russia over debt restructuring and providing assistance via the IMF and IBRD was treated as a national humiliation. Finally, expansion of NATO and bombing Yugoslavia seriously undermined remaining trust in the West.

6. Current stage of democratization in Russia and FP

6.1. Constitutional grounds of Russian FP

According to the Russian constitution in force at the moment of independence in 1991, it was the prerogative of the parliament to lay down the main lines of FP and the duty of the president and the government to implement it. According to the constitution in force in 1992 and 1993. The legislature as “the supreme organ of the state power”, had the right to pass resolutions binding on the foreign ministry. Its committees for international affairs and foreign economic relations, and for defense and security could make recommendations that had to be “considered” by relevant government agencies, which were required to deliver a report to parliament within a fixed period of time.

In the early months of 1992 the leaders of the Supreme Soviet (then Russian parliament) kept a low profile on international issues, describing their role in this area as primarily consultative. For instance, Ruslan Khasbulatov stated that “the foreign policy of the country is determined primarily by the president. We support the FP of our president. However, the Supreme Soviet has the duty of making a significant contribution to the state’s FP and of exercising effective democratic control over the activity of those agencies responsible for carrying out that policy, where necessary introducing

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66 Such resolution was passed on December 1992, obliging the foreign minister to vote against any UN Security Council decision to undertake an armed intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina. See: Nezavisimaya gazeta, December 19, 1992
adjustments, and expressing an opinion about particular diplomatic actions or the absence of such actions.\textsuperscript{67}

The new constitution introduced at the end of 1993 reflected a real shift in the balance of power in favor of the executive arm. The current constitution simply states that the president “directs the foreign policy of the Russian Federation” within the framework set by the constitution and the laws of the country (articles 86 and 80). As before, the president has the right to appoint members of the government, proposed by the prime minister but without any longer having to seek parliamentary approval of his appointments. He forms and presides over the Security Council and conducts international negotiations (article 83). Also, the president is commander-in-chief of the military forces of the Russian Federation. For its part, parliament still enjoys the right to ratify and denounce major treaties and international agreements (article 106). Ambassadors are appointed by the president “in consultation with the appropriate committees” of parliament (article 83).

The Russian legislature has been vocal on FP matters but its involvement in FP-making has been of a different order than of the executive agencies. Like other parliaments, it has been obliged to operate mainly in public with only a small professional staff and with expertise of foreign affairs relatively thinly spread among its members. Deputies’ primarily interests relate to domestic politics. The legislature has provided a forum in which disgruntled members of the executive can indirectly express their dissatisfaction with existing policy and mobilize opposition to it. When the political temperature rose, FP issues were exploited in order to belabor Yeltsin and to try to displace Kozyrev from the government. In calmer moments the parliament has been used by FP officials as a sounding board of elite opposition.

Though the parliament has always had a fairly peripheral part to play on FP issues (formulation of national interest, drawing up goals and strategies have been the work of government agencies, research institutes, and the mass media rather than of the legislature), the Russian Parliament has enough power to balance president and his apparatus in foreign policy making. According to constitution (article 106) and Federal Law on International Agreements of the Russian Federation (article 15), practically all international treaties of Russia are subject of ratification. The international agreement is the subject of ratification if:

\textsuperscript{67} Diplomatichesky Vestnik, N.6, 1992, p.32
1) its implementation requires making amendments in existing or adoption of new federal laws,
2) it touches on basic rights and freedoms guaranteed by the constitution,
3) it deals with territorial delimitation of Russia including issues of state border as well as of exclusive economic zone and of continental shelf,
4) its content is the basis of interstate relation;
5) intervenes in the sphere of national and international security, disarmament and international arms control,
6) it is a peace treaty or an agreement on collective security,
7) it deals with Russia’s membership in international unions or organizations,
8) all sides agreed on further ratification.\(^{68}\)

Since Russia inherited some difficult diplomatic problems (for instance, with Japan), obligations in disarmament and arms control, and seeks its place in “international community of civilized nations”, the parliament, in fact, is a key institution in Russian FP making. Indeed, SALT-2 treaty, peace treaty with Tokyo, membership in international organization (whether it will be WTO or alliance with Belarus and Yugoslavia) will be subject of decision not only of the president but also of the parliament.

Though the relations among the institutions involved in FP, and the balance of influence among them, have varied markedly over time\(^ {69}\), in reality, under Russian presidentialism when the legislature is controlled by a majority that is hostile to the president but not large enough to override presidential vetoes routinely, presidential democracy in Russia constantly generates legislative paralysis in general and in FP making in particular.

Also, the president needs the approval of the Upper house of Russian parliament (Council of Federation) to deploy Russian military and civil personnel abroad for peacekeeping or peacemaking (it is necessary, for instance, in case with peacekeeping operation in Kosovo).\(^ {70}\)

6.2. Polarization and fragmentation of Russian FP and the way to elite consensus in FP

\(^ {69}\) Neil Malcolm, pp.27-45
With regard to the FP executive, regime change and democratization initially had a double effect. First, the changes in 1991-1992 shook up the distribution of power among the main players – the Foreign Ministry (FM), the KGB and the Ministry of Defense. Second, by destroying the Communist Party apparatus, they deprived the FP system of its central information-processing, decision-making and monitoring agency. Indeed, in the early months of 1992 the military and the former KGB were at a political and organizational disadvantage. Senior figures in both agencies had been implicated in the August 1991 coup attempt. The security services had been reorganized, and separate Russian armed forces did not come into existence until May 1992. Though the FM was granted the wide-range rights to oversee and coordinate FP, at that time there were at least three competing institutions within the president’s office, namely, office of vice-president, Yeltsin’s state secretary who took “responsibility for control over all international cooperation of Russia”, and Security Council which was very active in the situations in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Trans-Dnestr, with Baltic troops withdrawal, and relations with Japan.

In the first constitution the Council of Ministers was supposed to coordinate the work of different agencies of government. Whereas in the new one the emphasis is placed on the prime minister, who determines the main policies of the government “in accordance with the constitution, federal legislation and the decrees of the president” and “organizes its work” (article 113). In reality the role of the government as a body has consistently been negligible, the prime minister (except Primakov) has played as subsidiary, albeit increasing role, and the parliament has always had peripheral part to play on issues of initiating and conducting FP. The presidential apparatus and government ministries have occupied the center of the stage. The president and his officials have made the important decisions and have fulfilled the task of coordinating and harmonizing policy more or less successfully.

By the middle of 1992, however, the ministries of defense and security were regrouping and with the assistance of the Supreme Soviet questioning the foreign ministry’s role. In November of 1992 after a series of failures of coordination, the key position of the FM was again confirmed by presidential decree. “The Russian Foreign Ministry will be entrusted the function of coordinating and monitoring work by other Russian ministries, committees and departments to ensure a unified political

line by the Russian Federation in relations with foreign states…71 However, in the following two month period the foreign minister was showing greater deference to other institutions, including his critics in parliament, and the policy continued to evolve in a “centrist” direction over the year of 1993. Throughout 1993 and 1994 relations between the various agencies continued to be dominated by the internal political struggle and the Russian FP badly suffered from its fragmentation.

It is arguable that much of responsibility for fragmentation lay with the top level of the executive arm. At first the major source of confusion appeared to be the activities of the vice-president Alexander Rutskoi who employed his own group of experts and supported a line often at odds with that of the FM, especially with regard to the former Soviet republics. In 1992 he attracted attention by making provocative remarks about Crimea being part of Russia and implying a partisan, pro-Russian mission for the ostensibly peacekeeping forces in Moldova. He became the front-man of powerful groups in the military, complicating the FM’s task at every turn. It was not until after the constitutional crisis of March and April 1993 that Rutskoi was formally disowned by Yeltsin.

More serious in its effects in the long term was the style of action favored by the president himself. It appears that he repeatedly failed to consult with the FM, for example over the recognition of Macedonia, the suspension of troop withdrawal from the Baltic states in October 1992, sanctioning of NATO expansion into Central-Eastern Europe during his visit to Warsaw and Prague in August 199372, and more recently deployment of Russian rangers in the military airport in Pristina. In general, Yeltsin seemed rather too ready to go along with defense ministry initiatives (peacekeeping missions in FSU which sometime were regarded by observers as interventions, bargaining over troop withdrawal from the Baltics, etc), and to call off international meetings and visits at the last minute. Most damaging have been the lack of collegiality inside the presidential administration, Yeltsin’s method of maneuvering between rival factions, and his refusal to allow a stable framework of institutions and procedures to crystallize. Even quite lucky for Russia the appointment of Chernomyrdin to be a special envoy of the President in negotiations over Kosovo can be treated as a part of intrigue against then prime minister Primakov.

As to the extreme activism of the defense ministry, the following statement of Kozyrev is quite remarkable: “The party of war, the party of neobolshevism, is rearing its head in our

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71 Rossiiskaja gazeta, November 18, 1992. Almost four years later Yeltsin issued another decree on the “Coordinating role” of the Foreign Ministry in conducting IR which again proved the mere fact that the anarchy in Russian FP-making had been understood even by the President himself.
country...Wholesale transfers of arms are taking place in the Transcaucasus and Moldova... Under what agreement is this effected, I would like to ask...? Why are the military deciding the most important political issues?73 Such protests, however, appeared to have little effect74.

Nevertheless, a number of events occurred over the first two years of Russian FP:

1) during this period a lengthy debate continued among FP specialists concerning the nature of the new Russia’s national interests. This helped to build wider agreement on the country’s place in the world and the appropriate hierarchy of priorities in its FP based on a much more “realist” view of international relations than prevailed during the dominance of “new political thinking”;

2) the passage of time played an important role in overcoming the initial euphoria about “joining the West”. The international community had accepted that “democratic” Russia had broken with its Soviet past. It was time to turn to practical matters in particular to decreasing the damage caused by the dissolution of the USSR. It was also possible to bargain harder with the West;

3) important changes occurred in internal politics. Yeltsin was being forced to seek an accommodation with the political “center” and the military. Both favored a much more active policy in the CIS, that was designed to preserve or recreate as much as possible of the preexisting single economic and strategic space.

The role of the military in both internal and external policy enhanced radically after its active support of Yeltsin’s October 1993 action against the Supreme Soviet and is still high in comparison to other FP institutions. Its recent activism in Kosovo again proved the military to be quite effective institution in Russia’s FP-making. That’s why a consensus on FP issues which took shape in 1994 and is still in existence in Moscow has been its basis in the views backed by the army and leftists in the Duma rather than by liberals. Moreover, during the crisis over Kosovo in 1999 the FM alongside with the Duma became the most anti-Western institution in Russian FP-making. But the path to the present situation was paved by Kozyrev and Yeltsin just after the failure of democrats in the December 1993 elections in the parliament. At that time they wanted to satisfy by demands to recognize of

72 Neil Malcolm, p.31
73 Izvestia, 1992, June 30
74 For details see Neil Malcolm, p.37-38
Russia’s special security role in the FSU as a condition for adhering to NATO’s Partnership for Peace and by resistance to military intervention by NATO in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a result of this policy, Kozyrev began to attract criticism from liberals. Despite the consensus on FP-issues (on Yugoslavia, on the “near abroad” seen as a “sphere of Russia’s vital interests”, the “need” to protect “compatriots” leaving abroad, and “No” to NATO expansion) and redistribution of power as a result of adoption of the new constitution, Russian experts evaluated the President’s FP as being very bad shaped: “The president has so far paid insufficient attention to FP and security issues; he evidently lacks the administrative capability to supervise effectively, even in a broad sense, the formation and implementation of coherent FP strategy”. Until now the situation has not changed for better. There are the same constant complains about lack of cooperation and coherence. Declarations that the FM must play a more active coordinating role have again been made by the President in 1995 and 1996, virtually identical to those made in 1992 and 1993 and with equally little effect.

Partly because of Yeltsin’s leadership style, decision-making has tended to be concentrated in an even smaller circle than before. Recent publications in the Russian press focused on analogies of his “family” cabinet with last years of the Old regime. Decisions have looked impulsive, ill-informed and erratic. All of them nothing have in common with true democratic procedure (except for deployment of the second group of Russian peacekeepers in Kosovo in the late June of 1999).

Conclusion.

The relationship among democratization, nationalism and war is complex and contingent. A great deal more research is needed to prescribe policies knowledgeably. **At this stage only a few broad conclusions can be drawn.**

Although mature democracies have never fought each other, the road from a society’s authoritarian past toward a stable, democratic future is likely to be bloody. Promoting democratization

in large, nuclear-armed states like Russia and China is at best like spinning a roulette wheel. Often, however, history will set this wheel to spinning whether the West gives it a nudge or not. When it is a case, they are strong reasons to take a hand in the process, trying to minimize the carnage that sometimes accompanies a democratic transition.

To ease the international security consequences of democratic transition, the West should seek to strengthen institutions of democratic accountability, remove imperfections from the free marketplace of ideas, aggressively use its influence to promote civic-territorial rather than ethnic forms of national identity, invest in social safety nets to buffer the victims of economic change, buy off or dismantle elite groups with imperial interests, and focus its efforts on the great powers, where the temptations of aggressive nationalism may be greatest and where the resulting wreckage would be more serious.77

If social scientists begin to study democratization and war with as much care as they have democracy and war, perhaps future presidential speeches will temper their calls for the promotion of democracy with reminders of the dangers of a halfhearted policy that gets countries only halfway to that goal.

The specific role of democratization in Russia has several important elements:

1) Russia started its way to democracy quite recently and is far from the end of the process of democratization though the constitution provides real distribution of power among various its branches. In short, there is no body in Russia which can solely plan and conduct FP. There is a system of checks and balances in FP making.

2) The logic of the “democratic peace” thesis is applicable for Russia. It means that the process of democratization, if successful, can eventually bring the Russian Federation into the “pacific union”. At the same time there is no evidence that democratizing states always war-prone. It depends on many factors, and among those internal development being the key element in FP making is not the only one. On the other hand, today’s democratizing Russia is characterized by a substantial degree of political instability and severe economic problems.

76 See, for instance, Moscow News, 1995, no.13 and 46; Kommersant-Daily, 1995, March 16
77 J. Snyder, p.37
3) democratization as such paved the way to political competition. At a time of social turmoil and economic disruption it encouraged the use of nationalist and other emotional slogans which has indeed turned to be the only reliable routes to political success. Thus, electoral factors have catalysed the evolution of policy rhetoric in a nationalist direction. Debate and the parliamentary forum have amplified differences and boosted nationalist critiques which have encouraged Yeltsin to move to take opposition ground.

4) political polarization (especially in 1992-1993) compounded the volatility and ambiguity of Russian FP stemmed from fragmentation of then FP executive. The consensus over the FP was reached by the Russian elite not on the basis of democratic values but nationalistic “realist” approach.

5) partly because the leadership has been ready to adopt its policies to sentiment among the elite, and has been successful in maintaining an adequate political base within it, a powerful and coherent opposition grouping determined and able to impose an aggressive FP does not seem to have emerged.

6) President Yeltsin and his close circle have been dependent on the West in many ways (money, political and moral support), and because of this the Kremlin could not afford to behave aggressively against its rivals elsewhere but in Russia (Chechnya). Also, by calculating the proneness to war of any country, there is a need to take into account of first- or second-hand memory of what war can mean. Not all countries have that knowledge but Russia has. Thus, Russian threat of aggression was and is no more than just rhetoric for “internal use only”.

7) while the future of democracy in Russia experiencing the process of democratization is primarily dependent on its own inner strength and resolve, the West can greatly facilitate the transition process, and thus ultimately promote international security by offering various forms of aid to the reforming societies. As Alexander Kozemiakian rightly stated, “after all the cost of expanding the “pacific union” of democratic states appears to be much less than the cost of a broken peace”.78

78 Kozhemiakin, p.74