At the turn of the ‘80s and ‘90s the communist system fell down in most of Central and Eastern European countries which enabled to build new democracies, as well as to form a new system of international relations in the whole Europe. The profound political and social transformations and their effects on the international relations forced to seek new, original solutions corresponding with the challenges of the time. These solutions concern not only the necessity of getting rid of communistic burdens and building new democratic states but also building new international order on the basis of commonly accepted democratic rules. The chances of new democracies left in solitude would not be certain without regulating international relations and seeking new forms of co-operation.

This elaboration is innovative undertaking in the scope of political and sociological sciences in Poland. It presents visions of the new democratic order in Europe propagated by political parties. Up till now, many initiatives of different kind were undertaken in different sciences centres for instance in the International Relationship Center (“Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych”) co-operating with Conrad Adenauer and German Marshall Fund. Unfortunately very few publications on the above mentioned topic were issued. The only one book that was published in the
last few years, i.e. “Polska Kaczka – europejski staw”¹ was written by Klaus
Bachman. This book deals with visions of European Union and prejudices and myths
of politicians that concern the European Union integration. Among more current texts
a monthly magazine “Central European Review” edited by Ryszard Bobrowski² and
devoted to the European integration and security can be found. The other texts
usually discuss the above issues separately and sometimes bring up conceptions on
that topic that are propagated by political parties. The following can be included: a
bulletin „Kulturowe aspekty tożsamości europejskiej”³, monthly magazine „Studia
Polityczne”,⁴ some books: „Ład międzynarodowy – doświadczenie i przyszłość”⁵
„Wizje bezpieczeństwa europejskiego.”⁶

My work is a sociological and political science analysis and concentrates on
issues of widely considered new democratic order built in Europe. The analysis
concerns contemporary not to say the most important current threads in national and
international policies. The main problems are how Polish parties perceive changes
occurring in Europe, what the most probable scenarios of near future of the continent
are, and how the parties imagine the opportunities of building the newly arising
democratic order. The various kinds of political life documents, which include
comments stated by particular parties’ representatives in public places, were the
subjects of the analysis. The following can be found among them, i.e. stenographic
records from parliamentary proceedings, interviews with politicians in media, election
programs, press articles, etc. Though, I am most interested in official statements of
politicians given in the last two years (January 1998 – April 21⁶th 1999), I will
sometimes recall their words said earlier.

The thesis that can be supposed at the beginning concerns a claim that the
main Polish political parties are not interested in the discussed matter as much as
they should and that they treat it manipulatively as an instrument in ruthless political
fight. True that for instance Unia Wolności (Union of Freedom) has been busy in
practice with foreign policy since a long time ago but it does not mean it offers more

¹ CSM, Warsaw 1999
² Ryszard Bobrowski, Central European Review, Warsaw 1999
³ Elżbieta Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, Warszawa 1995 (“Cultural aspects of European identity”)
⁴ ISP PAN, Warszawa (“Political Studies”)
⁵ Janusz Stefanowicz ISP PAN, Warszawa 1996 (“International order – experience and future”)
⁶ Wojciech Multan, Elipsa, Warszawa 1997 (“Visions of the European security”)

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specific conceptions or visions of newly built democratic order in Europe. There are also parties that do not bother to think more deeply about it and they hardly rise to speak about that matter. Matters concerning carrying on the Polish foreign policy, ideas concerning future European order and the assessment of things going on in Europe are usually put off with general slogans and wishful thinking.

Additional explanations should be made for the purpose of this work. This elaboration is not to present opinions of the whole political world in Poland but to present only the most significant trends and groups of this world. Assuming that the line-up of Polish parliament appointed in elections in 1997 reflects opinions and ideas of vast majority of Poles, I limited my analysis to parties represented there. At the same time I did not include non-parliamentary groups as the most of them is rather not stable and has little support of the society.

I also need to explain the used categories: the Right, the Left, and the Center. The traditional West European division of the Right and the Left is not always helpful in explaining the situation in Poland. The political divisions does not depend on the attitudes towards economic policy but political past (post-Solidarity and post-communist camps) and towards role of the Church and religion in the society. The categories of the Left and the Right in Poland mean something different than this what it means in the West European policy. I do not intend to make any moral assessments or to discredit anybody and by using terms like “post-communist” I only describe particular political environments.

This elaboration is to bring closer the visions of new democratic order in Europe which are built and propagated by particular parties but it does not mean that these conceptions are drew up precisely or are internally coherent. It is rather a picture full of contradictions, though some its elements are stable and supra party to some extent.

The Polish largest and most important political parties, representatives of which sit on the Parliament, are presented below.

Akcja Wyborcza Solidarności – (“Solidarity Election Campaign”) both the solid origin of activists and jointly assented Christian and conservative and national system of values are categories uniting various ideological and political trends. Among the most important associated groups in AWS are: NSZZ Solidarności at the same time Chrześcijańsko-Narodowy (Christian and National Union), Porozumienie Centrum
(Center Agreement), Rodzina Polska (Polish Family), Ruch Stu (Movement of Hundred), Konfederacja Polski Niepodleg³ej – OP (Independent Poland Confederation), Stronnictwo Konserwatwono Ludowe (Conservative and Peasant Party), Koalicja Konserwatwyna (Conservative Coalition). AWS gained the vast majority of seats in both houses during parliamentary elections in autumn 1997 (202 seats in the Lower House of Parliament and 360 seats in Senate) and formed together with Unia Wolnoœci a coalition that appointed the government with Jerzy Buzek as its prime minister.

The Right is represented in Lower House of Parliament also by radical Ruch Odbudowy Polski (Poland Reconstruction Movement) (5 seats), as well as by Rodzina Polska (Polish Family) formed out of AWS (4 seats).

**Unia Wolnoœci** (Union of Freedom) was formed in the result of joining two parties out of solidarity movement, i.e. Unia Demokratyczna (Democratic Union) and Kongres Liberalno – Demokratyczny (Liberal and Democratic Congress). UW is the centre party of moderate liberal and democratic vision of society order. It propagates such values like civic society, market economy, and rule of law, tolerance and dialogue. At present, UW has its 60 deputies in the Lower House of Parliament.

**Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej** (Left Democratic Alliance) is a group consisting of social democratic and socialist parties including the most powerful, i.e. Socjaldemokracja Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej (Social Democracy of Polish Republic) and other: PPS, OPZZ, ZNP, Demokratyczna Unia Kobiet (Democratic Women Union), ZSMP, etc. All those parties derive from former PZPR party but some of the new members were never members of any communist party. At present, SLD occupies 164 seats in the Lower House of Parliament and forms together with PSL a coalition opposition towards solidarity majority.

**Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe** (Polish Peasant Party) was formed on 5th Mai 1990 and its members came from both former ZSL and newly formed peasant parties. In the result of parliamentary elections in September 1993 PSL gained more than 1/3 seats in the Lower House of Parliament and 1/3 in Senate. It enabled to form together with SLD parliamentary coalition a majority government exercising power (while many changes in its line-up) till the end of its tenure. PSL refers in its programs
to the tradition of peasant movement and its values, i.e. to peasant ethos, national identity, struggles for independence, as well as to Church social science. It also sharply criticizes the liberal economical policy. Currently, PSL has not many seats in the Parliament (only 27 seats in the Lower House), and its power of influencing political decisions is slight.

DEMOCRATIC EUROPEAN ORDER

At the beginning of my considerations I would like to define the term “democratic order”. It seems like it has many meanings, as it covers both procedural aspect and valuable one. Mentioning “democratic order” I mean not only democratic institutions and ways of their functioning but also accepted system of values and putting it into effect. I would not like to focus in my analysis only on postulate declarations of particular parties because it will not be helpful in understanding their real opinions. That is why, I will concentrate my attention on analyzing what they think, what their real standpoints towards the most important current events in Europe are.

The list of the most significant references towards which Polish political parties stand is quite long, as far as issues of new democratic order in Europe are concerned. The most important issues that arouse the greatest emotions, problems for today’s Europe including Poland are as follows:

- European integration and importance of the European Union in building new political, social and economical order on the continent – institutional and financial reforms and reforms of a few common policies, the functioning of common currency policy and common currency, matter of preparation for further enlargement

- new structure of powers in security sphere – the role of NATO in the European security, projects of new Alliance doctrine, how the European defensive identity should look like; the meaning of the Independent Nations Community and the former republics of ZSRR for instance: Ukraine, Belorussia, Baltic states in that field,

- Threats and conflicts in today’s European for instance: lack of stability in Russian national and foreign policy, ethnic and military conflicts in the territory of
Yugoslavia and especially the war in Kosovo and political and military trials to solve the conflict.

As you can see, issues connected with building the new European democratic order include many issues that concern the sphere of international security. It probably results from the current situation full of great transformations in the international relations, shaping new divisions of influence of existing superpowers, building political identities of new independent nations, appearing phenomena hardly known so far for example supranational integration. It affects the rise of many difficult problems even armed ones, which are very difficult to solve. Thus, what is going on in the whole Europe cannot be left out for the purpose of presentation of topics and threads mostly discussed by Polish parties.

More precise and detailed handling of those topics seem to be indispensable for better understanding and clear-sighted presentation of attitudes of particular parties towards above defined problems. That is why, I will try to describe them with greater accuracy. I will pay my attention on the analysis of opinions and attitudes of mentioned political parties towards the following issues:

1/ The European Union and its role in building the new order in Europe. How the EU and its evolution are perceived, what the attitudes towards the most significant current events are for instance towards: crisis and industrial and budgetary reforms, achievements of common currency and agricultural policy, lack of successful common foreign policy and security, etc. Should and how should the process of integration of Poland with EU take place? What profits and possible expenditures are expected? What are the most important Polish interests and how they should be accomplished?

2/ The importance of NATO in building the new model of security and stability in Europe and in particular in its Midwest part. How proposals of changing the defensive doctrine of the Alliance are perceived. What role are the other international organizations to play in building the new order in our part of Europe? What position should Poland take in NATO and who could be its possible ally?
3/ The current situation in Midwest and in particular in Russia, Belorussia, Ukraine, Baltic states – how is that situation perceived by Polish political parties and what strategy should Poland choose towards it.

4/ Democratic values – how are they defined and what is their meaning for particular parties? What is the hierarchy of them and when are they realized? What examples of implementing them in specific actions are given?

**European integration**

The process of crystallizing democracy and new security in Europe is complex and long and its fundamental elements depend on many factors. The political, economical, and social integration in Europe is probably the most important factor. Its deepening process is also significant as it forms new quality structures strengthening democratic order, as well as its enlargement process because it covers new territories and strengthens newly formed democratic systems.

One could have an expression while observing Polish public debates that there is a broad consensus concerning the integration of Poland with Europe both in society and among politicians. Most of political parties are for joining by Poland to the united Europe, so it can be said that it is pro-European. Unfortunately, analyzing comments of particular representatives of political élite it occurs that their opinions are much different. This diversity concerns not only dichotomy between pro-European and anti-European but also the level of escalation of those features.

**AWS**, deriving from post-solidarity camp without which activity it would not be possible to apply for a membership in the European structures, presents the most diversified attitude towards the united Europe and the integration of Poland with Europe. AWS politicians’ main slogans are “Europe of homelands”, “Europe of nations” referring to Gaulle’s and Thatcher’s vision of Europe as a zone of free trade with some of political connections and ruled by agreements concluded by national states governments. But it is impossible to be more precise about this conception. The representatives usually say “Europe of nations” meaning Europe that should not threat “Polish identity”, but their statements are limited to few catchy slogans not
explaining what “Europe of nations” would really mean. It can be only a conjecture how such Europe would look like.

It seems to be a mix of concepts to some extent. Instead of talking about the European Union or specific community, its institutions and integration with them, enigmatic terms are used for instance “Europe of homelands” or “the community of nations”.

Much of consideration is taken in relation to possible threats and costs that are connected with the integration process and Europe is defined on their basis. Thus, it is understood as a source of threats of for example “the purchase of Polish lands”, “fill in the Polish market with foreign products”, “the loss of sovereignty in favour of Brussels”, “affluence of adverse phenomena like: secularity, mass culture, and homosexuality”. The European social card also arouses many emotions. On one side Polish conservatives are very critical about it. On the other one NSZZ Solidarność (the most powerful structure in AWS) is in its favour and demands signing and ratifying the card by Poland as quickly as it is possible.

Marian Krzaklewski, the leader of AWS shows its irritation when asked in one of interviews about his conception of further integration of Europe and an idea of “the United States of Europe”. He also considers that idea a complete and going too far absurd7, Jerzy Buzek, the Prime Minister says: “If it is even possible, it is very distant future that it exceeds even the most far-reaching continent plans.”8

AWS emphasises the necessity of maintaining sovereignty of national states in the integrating Europe that from traditional point of view means as follows:
- the existence of state borders inside the community that divide one’s own and foreign military, economical and legal areas,
- the primacy of national state in determining internal and foreign policies over arrangements of the community.

So, are the representatives of AWS aware while defining the united Europe in such way that their doubts and possible ideas are out-of-date? The debate on federal and confederate model of integration carried on in the European Union was finished long time ago. As a matter of fact, the internal borders do not exist, common policies are

successful in many economical and political areas, and the European politicians think over what should be done in order common policy could be more effective.

One of varieties of AWS’ attitudes towards the European integration is Mission one. Joining Europe Poland will also carry a large contribution in the European identity, i.e. special morality, Christian values and eagerness to participate in new evangelisation recognized as the European heathen.

Reluctant and critical attitude of vast majority of AWS towards what is going on in Europe results mostly from fears of protection of the whole country interests as well as their ignorance of what is going on in the Union. AWS does not determine precisely its attitude towards the European issues, which can be explained by the politicians’ fear of the possibility of reaching an understanding inside the party. Well, some politicians avoid revealing their opinions on the European matters on purpose as they realize that the consensus on that topic reached inside AWS is very uncertain and can be strained in the open discussion. The slogan “Europe of nations” is of general nature and very receptive at the same time. Thus, during any Parliamentary voting on membership of Poland in the EU in the future, it could unite both followers of fast and deep integration as well as followers of confederate model of the united Europe. This thesis is proved by the achievements of Jerzy Buzek government. Although, the explanations of how politicians perceive Europe are not detailed, their opinions and actions prove their good intentions as to the fastest joining the really existing European Union by Poland. Starting difficult in realization economical, social and institutional reforms (reform of public administration, insurance, education, health care, heavy industry, etc.), efficient negotiations concerning membership in EU, fast membership in NATO are the actions that prove not only an intention of integration of Poland with the united EU but also definitely faster getting the rightful membership. What a peculiar paradox that AWS is more pro-European in its actions than in its public verbal declarations. And, as it seems, being silent about the own visions of the European Union is indispensable in order to continue the pro-European policy.

According to public opinion and media Unia Wolności was recognised the most pro-European party. It declares for joining the union structures as quickly as possible because such joining may have the largest impact on accelerating the processes of modernization in Poland and make up for the backwardness of

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civilization inherited from communist system. The European Union is perceived both as economic and political community that guarantee internal and external protection against non-democratic solutions.

The quickest integration of Poland with the EU is the main postulate of UW. As far as deepening processes and institutional reforms are concerned they are in its favour because they improve the decision making process inside the Union. Unfortunately, the comments of parties’ representatives include no details of how the EU would look like, how the Currency Union and Political Union are imagined, what future role of Poland would be like in the community. Like in case of AWS, UW also uses rather general and unclear slogans. The traditional understanding of sovereignty still remains the fundamental category – an integration model that “will increase the sovereignty” is postulated here. As it seems the dispute in Poland is not carried on about whether this traditional sovereignty is something good or bad, whether this term can be redefine in such way it could correspond with the present time. The dispute is carried on about whether it is possible to relinquish part of sovereignty in favour of supranational institutions or whether it is unacceptable. In the opinion of UW and SLD the transfer of some of the competence to the European institutions gives them a chance to co-decide about what is going on inside them. On contrary, PSL and ROP – claims that it denies sovereignty. In case of AWS, it thinks that joining the EU does not have to be connected with the necessity of give up its sovereignty, as the United Europe should constitute kind of confederation meaning the union of loosely connected countries. All parties consider the European Union as a chance to strengthen a sovereignty of particular member states, which functions through the national states. None of parties considers the necessity of strengthening sovereignty of the Union itself at the expense of member states. Nobody accepts the thesis of West European political scientists that concern the dusk of a national state in the face of supranational integration.

The basis feature of post-communist picture built by SLD is its pro-European one which means the recognition of European values, e.g. rules of law, justice, rationalism, tolerance, freedom, etc., opting for the fastest joining the European structures by Poland, adducing the European social democratic ideas. The discussions carried on publicly among others in the papers like “Trybuna” and “Dziś”

are to strengthen this picture but they are rather poor as far as their content is concerned. The most important value for SLD is pragmatism and it is the main determinant of the party’s actions at the same time. The described ideas and conceptions are as much important for post-communists as they are useful in a particular situation. SLD beliefs and opinions are irreversible because the reality changes also the time and pragmatism orders to be effective in the actions. It can be thought that today’s pro-European is not a value in itself for SLD but it can be only useful in winning the social support, can be kind of etiquette. Pragmatism may induce post-communist élite to leave pro-West orientation as it was done in early ‘90s with pro-Russian option. An argument for the thesis of only rhetorical character of pro-European of the Left is the anti-European character of this party’s actions. The anti-European character is proved by: undertaking actions that make negotiations with the European Union difficult for instance giving Korean company Hyundai a permission for industrial assembly of cars, which in fact violates the association treaty; establishing 15 special economic zones that violate the rules of common competition policy; concluding an agreement with Russia on the non-visa traffic; desisting from the reforms of insurance and telecommunication sectors.\(^\text{13}\) Moreover, lobbies of clearly anti-European orientation, e.g. claiming trade unions of OPZZ and business groups support SLD. It is very difficult to present a vision of future form of the European Union suggested by post-communist élite because they programs and official comments do not include any deeper considerations on that topic. Probably, the Left does not intend to carry on any content-related debate on this matter or to form any clear conceptions on how the future united Europe should look like. The Left wants rather to convince the society of its pro-European character. The only element of the European Union picture that is the most firmly outlined by post-communists is the political or rather social democratic character of the Union. According to Piotr Ikonowicz the European Union is an attempt at building supranational socialist system, Europe of socialists, an integration of protective states and an antidote against economic liberalism allegedly raging in Poland.\(^\text{14}\) In the opinion of SLD Europe is of socialist character as vast majority of countries is governed by the Left parties. Besides, the European Parliament is dominated by social democrats and passing the social card was the greatest success of the


\(^{14}\) K.Bachmann, “Polska kaczka...”, p.153
European Union. Moreover, post-communist élite has no reservations about the processes of deepening integration that cause revaluation and redefinition of the concept of state sovereignty. Therefore, the ideological issues gives to SLD more problems than the program discrepancy between the interests of own pressure groups and the fact that the pro-European character of SLD is based on shallow and without any reflections consensus referring to political pragmatism.

As far as PSL attitude is concerned, it is rather ambiguous. On the one hand, PSL avoids opposing the membership of Poland in the European Union openly. But on the other hand, it imposes so many and usually contradictory conditions of taking part in the integration that it becomes completely impossible. PSL attitude has a distinct claiming character demanding the fulfillment of that party’s conditions by others. PSL treats the integration as a necessary evil that we cannot avoid because most of the society and political élite support the fastest membership in the EU. So, if it were happened, it would be the best for Poland to have a strong position in the Union following firm negotiations. If some specified conditions are fulfilled, then the integration may be allowed. Those conditions include many various and usually contradictory requirements imposed mainly towards the union side. This is a main claiming element of the attitude. Another is waiting mostly for financial benefits coming from the union budget. Let’s give an example. Janusz Dobrosz, a member of Parliament, call in one of his statements on the Prime Minister, J. Buzek to assure Polish farmers of an opportunity to use the union agricultural policy fully. PSL assumes in advance that Polish national interest identified with Polish farmers interest cannot rely on the membership in the European integration. PSL argue differently then the rest of parties. It claims that Poland may become an equal partner towards other member states not thanks to the reform of the country and fast transformation but thanks to firm negotiations and gaining many allowances, exceptions and adjustment periods. PSL perceives integration process not as negotiations for reasonable compromise but as a struggle with an enemy (in form of Brussels negotiators) in which Polish national interest, the interest of others or the European powers will win. That dichotomy between Poland and the European Union is constant element usually used in statements of PSL representatives, while the union side is always perceived as threatening everybody (even the European farmers), ominous-minded and trying to use everyone for its particular interests. At
the same time, there are no traces of considerations concerning internal reforms within the EU and changes introduced to common agricultural policy in the appearances of this party. The vision of future role of Poland in the union structures is, though, very clear. Poland is to use its position to win as greatest benefits for Polish farmers as possible. PSL treats the UE not as an area of co-ordination, co-operation and of protection of community’s interest against its surroundings but as a forum of protection of Polish agricultural interests against threats of the diabolic European Union.

None of parties do not adduce the argumentation that played the significant role in uniting Europe during post-war period. It was considered at that time that bringing Germany in the supranational community is the only way to control Germany and to limit its superpower tendency. Besides, being up to economic and political competition at the side of the United States and the then ZSRR supported the necessity of forming community’s structures. In Poland it is beyond any discussions. Nobody sees any necessities to make any efforts in favour of keeping by the European Union its position in highly competitive international trade and of preventing any political and military conflicts. All parties perceive the European Union mostly as an economic community and free trade zone. Unia Wolności, as the only one, notices the EU’s political character and that the membership of Poland and other Central-East European countries will finish Yalta division of Europe and build the new democratic order and security. Many Polish enthusiasts coming mostly from UW think that the integration with the European Union is a chance of ensuring external security and also of opportunity of preventing from a menace to democracy (populism, nationalism, totalitarian trends) inside a country. The only feature linking all political parties is lack of consent as to carry the European integration at cost of NATO. There is a major consensus in Poland as for the membership of Poland in NATO and active presence in Europe. Even Euro-skeptics reluctant towards the integration of the European Union are ardent followers of membership of Poland in NATO. They (ZChN, PSL, ROP) consider the integration with NATO a guarantee of anchoring and controlling Germany, and assurance of the security in case of any possible threat from Russia or other countries. Politicians who opt for including the West European Union in the European Union do not do that because of anti-

American motives but because of fear that the United States could slowly withdraw from Europe.\textsuperscript{16}

Summing up, it can be said that Polish debates on the European integration include rather no clear concepts of further lots of the European Union. Moreover, the role of Poland in the European structures is not discussed as far as the content is concerned and there are also no questions concerning the form and meaning of the future united Europe in the international relations.

**The meaning of NATO and other organizations in forming the European democratic order.**

Porozumienie Centrum, the center-right party co-governing in years 1991-1992, announced the postulate of the membership of Poland in NATO for the first time, but it has no influence on Polish foreign policy. During the I Congress of PC in March 1991 it was stated “NATO is together with American troops on the continent the only power guarding Europe. We think that in this situation the closer cooperation with NATO and starting the process of joining this organization are necessary...”. On the initiative of people of the Right and its sympathizers for example Z. Najder, the first Polish pro-NATO organization, i.e. the Atlantic Club was established in 1991. This club’s delegation presented the postulate of complete membership of Poland in the Alliance in January 1992 in the headquarter of NATO and received confidential assurance of the General Secretary, M. Werner that it will really happen before the end of his tenure\textsuperscript{17}. R. Bobrowski, the chairman of the club said in the interview for “Nowy Świat” (“New world”) in January 1992: “We have presented explicitly our conception of share of Poland in the proved security structures of NATO. We also presented clear issues concerning our complete membership in this organization in course of a process that should take place.”\textsuperscript{18} This postulate was introduced in the official Polish policy by the government of Jan Olszewski.

\textsuperscript{16} S. Parzymiński, in “Polska w Europie”, 21/1996, Warsaw
\textsuperscript{17} R. Bobrowski “The center-right party towards challenges of foreign policy and external security of Poland in 1999. Przegląd Central-Europejski (Central-European Survey), Warsaw, No 24/1999, p.17
\textsuperscript{18} R. Bobrowski, “Nowy Świat”, 3 Feb. 1992
At the beginning of ‘90s the most of the then politicians including Prime Minister and ministers of the government, and at present UW élite, i.e. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, W. Osiatyński, K. Skubiszewski, did not stop thinking in categories of former system, i.e. soviet domination in Mid-Eastern Europe. They presented officially their clear opinions: “We revise the Warsaw Treaty, but we will never withdraw from it”\textsuperscript{19}, “Entering the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is out of the question because of regional balance”\textsuperscript{20}. Later, the President Lech Wałęsa propagated an idea of forming NATO-bis. Janusz Onyszkiewicz, the minister of defense in solidarity government, stated: “Poland did not and does not want to enter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its military structures”\textsuperscript{21}, “...demanding entering NATO is against our foreign policy towards Eastern neighbors, as we would have to manifest fears that a major state conflict threatened us”\textsuperscript{22}. At the same time post-communist opposition, among others L. Pastusiak, won Parliamentary elections a year later and governed and pushed its vision called \textit{Trójkąt Warszawski (Warsaw Triangle)}.\textsuperscript{23} The present president of the Republic of Poland, and the then chairman of post-communist SdRP in 1993 stated “Forming a system of collective security in Europe should insure our interest within OBWE. I think NATO is historical formation like the Warsaw Treaty that was signed in specific conditions of the Cold War. In my opinion the Treaty should be transformed or disappear”.\textsuperscript{24} It seems that if Polish politicians talked about ambitions of entering NATO with great caution, it resulted from fear of Russian reaction. Only formal liquidation of the Warsaw Treaty, the withdrawal of stationing Russian troops and the end of troops and equipment transit from the territory of former NRD enabled official declaration of joining the Alliance. Till 1995 the most of political parties and public persons were presenting officially their ideas of insuring the security in Poland and stability in Europe, including the conception of building “międzymorze” (“isthmus”) or “Danubian confederation”, the program “Partnership for development” submitted by W. Pawlak, the Prime Minister deriving from PSL in Brussels in February 1994. Already in 1997 SLD tried to avoid the necessity of determining its attitude towards the membership of Poland in NATO, 

\textsuperscript{19} K. Skubiszewski, “Contra”, Warsaw , No 4/1990
\textsuperscript{20} Parliamentary debate on foreign policy, 14 Feb. 1992
\textsuperscript{21} “Polska Zbrojna”, July 1991
\textsuperscript{22} interview for “Wprost”, according to “£ad”, 30 Aug. 1992
\textsuperscript{23} R. Bobrowski, “The center-right party towards challenges of foreign policy and external security of Poland in 1999, Przegląd Euroweuropejski (Central-European Survey), Warsaw, No 24/1999, p.17
\textsuperscript{24} “Polska Zbrojna”, 23 Aug. 1993
and when SLD was asked about it, it stated that the society should decide in the nation-wide referendum on possible membership. Post-communists politicians and their experts proved that a trial of entering NATO in defiance of Russia will fail because the West will never take a risk of conflict with Moscow in that field. More radical fractions of AWS – members of Parliament from ZChN and Rodzina Polska (for instance J. Łopuszański, J. M. Jackowski) still question the need of entering not only the EU but also the membership of Poland in NATO. They criticize armed intervention of the Alliance in Kosovo and the purpose of this organization existence claiming that Poland should itself mould its security policy. According to PSL the geopolitical situation is a trump and chance to achieve and maintain by Poland the strong position in the international relationships. Poland is situated in the center of Europe on routes leading from east to west and from north to south. The co-operation of Poland with Western and Easter Europe countries is needed and should be carried on in the interest of our country. Yet the statements of particular representatives of PSL as for NATO role in the process of shaping security zone in Europe are so general and unclear that it is difficult to draw any conclusions from it.

The conflict in Kosovo and ways of solving it arouse the greatest emotions and involvement during the discussions on NATO role in shaping the security in Europe. The debate about NATO military intervention in Yugoslavia is like litmus showing opinions of politicians on the role of the Alliance in building the new democratic order and security on the continent.

In the opinion of UW, the international community cannot show powerlessness towards drama in Kosovo. NATO military actions are an expression of belief that Belgrade’s policy directly threats fundamental values, which organize the international order. The Alliance’s actions were in the name of protection of human rights and of the most significant values.”

According to the foreign affairs minister, there is consent in Poland as to the way of carrying on a foreign and security policy, but not all parties share this opinion. Even inside the UW more skeptical and critical opinions can be heard on action taken by NATO. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the former Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland and an independent OBWE observer in

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25 Bronisław Geremek, foreign affairs minister, the expose given in the Lower House of Parliament, 8 April 1999
Yugoslavia in recent years, claims that NATO started military operations violating the international law, sovereignty of a country, though it was done for the protection of the national minorities’ rights. Therefore, Poland stands for the necessity of explaining that the intervention of NATO is not directed against Serbs but against the policy of ethnic purge promoted by Slobodan Miloszviæ. Polish foreign policy cannot also exceed a chance of peaceful ending of the conflict.

As far as the assessment of NATO-Russia Card is concerned, and in which the Alliance obliged itself to distribute neither nuclear weapon nor NATO military basis in the territory of Poland, UW has not a positive opinion about the Card, though approves its officially. UW claims that after some time of functioning of the new commanding structure of NATO its verification will be necessary. “We would like so called sub-regional command of air operations to be set up in the territory of Poland and next international units to be formed with the participation of Poland. The Northwest German-Danish-Polish corpus with the seat in Szczecin is such an unit.”

PSL presents critical stance. An attack on Serbia shows the character of NATO that is subject to changes. It is not only the defense alliance any more, which protect rights of Albanians turned adrift from Kosovo in Yugoslavia. It is now an instrument of building the New World order. “NATO became an instrument mostly of the United States politicians. The role of UNO was resolved to zero. It means that this decision was taken without nuclear superpowers, i.e. China and Russia.” What happened in Kosovo is “illegal Alliance’s aggression against Yugoslavia. [...] PSL calls on to stop unfounded bombings in Yugoslavia. Those events caused the major misery of civil population in Kosovo and Serbia.”

The fact of selective treatment of national rights to own nationalities and autonomy is most dubious. At present, human rights and national rights to self-determination are not abided in many places. Kurds can be an example. Fortunately, there is no military intervention, at least now. That is why, PSL does not agree on using Polish arm forces in case of escalation of conflict. In addition, the extreme right present in the Lower House of Parliament (Nasze Koœo and Koœo KPN - Ojczyzna) judges NATO actions. Jan £opuszañski assumes that if the Alliance has the alleged right to judge nations, this alleged right may be directed against every other nation today even against Poland. “The rule of states

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26 Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Państwo z innej półki, Gazeta Wyborcza, 13 April 1999
27 Janusz Dobrosz, a speech in parliamentary debate on foreign policy of the Republic of Poland, 8 April 1999.
28 Jacek Soska, a press speech of PSL press spokesman, 1 April 1999.
independence and nations sovereignty is being crossed out before our very eyes. NATO intervention is justified by humanitarian considerations, but it did not help as far as protection of Albanian population goes. On the contrary, NATO attack initiated the misery of Albanians.²⁹

However, the representatives of SLD support generally NATO action in the defense of Kosovo, because “in today’s Europe and the world no power is allowed to do ethnic purges and repression.”³⁰ Polish membership in the Alliance became the trial of allied credibility. We became not only a witness but also participant in those dramatic events. On the other hand, the international society is obliged to form such law that will be helpful in solving conflicts in the way that nobody will have any doubts that protection of human rights is legally valid. Poland should take part in those works.³¹ But here are also more sceptical opinions. Let’s take Longin Pastusiak, the vice-chairman of parliamentary commission of foreign affairs, claims that reaching the political compromise after attacks of the Alliance is absolutely impossible. Moreover, NATO intervention violated basic interests of Russia and its sudden reaction should be expected.³² Post-communist editorial staff of “Trybuna” claims that preventing humanitarian catastrophe is not the purpose of NATO attack. The opportunity of testing new weapon or aspiration of the U.S. president for diverting American society’s attention from internal problems in the country is that purpose in question. “NATO is the only military policeman of the world and does what it wants.”³³

So, how is the position of Poland in NATO perceived, and how is the role of the Alliance in building the new order in Europe seen?

All parties agree on the necessity of assuring within allied states the role enabling actual co-shaping strategy and policy of the Alliance in accordance with Polish interests. This postulate concerns mostly possibilities of influencing decisions about Central-Eastern Europe. That is why, active joining the co-operation within standing NATO-Russia Council and NATO-Ukraine Commission is according to most of politicians necessary. Besides, the matter of further enlargement of the Alliance is significant for Poland. The minister for foreign affairs, Bronis³aw Geremek (UW) claims: “we will participate actively in discussions about specifying the rule of open

²⁹ Jan Łopuszañski, speech in the parliamentary debate on foreign policy of the Republic of Poland, 8 April 1999
³⁰ Leszek Miller, speech in the parliamentary debate on foreign policy of the Republic of Poland, 8 April 1999
³¹ T. Iwiñski, “Clubs support the fundamentals of foreign policy of the government”, Rzeczpospolita 8 April 1999
doors to NATO supporting countries of our region and especially our neighbors in realizing their aspirations and in determining rules of NATO enlargement and a calendar.”

There are no fundamental differences in the presently governing in Poland party coalition (UW and AWS) as for determining how future strategy of NATO should look like. As a matter of fact, it is rather hardly and rarely discussed issue by parties’ circles. Politicians are usually busy with other things but if any votes on that topic appear they do not differ in principle. The United States support a new definition of NATO, according to which there is an opportunity of taking various actions by the Alliance, including military ones outside the member states, without an UNO mandate. Poland may accept such a definition of NATO. The carried on discussions on a new NATO strategy show that the coalition politicians agree with the American stance. They accept among others an American vision of the Alliance’s actions outside the territory of its members because of fears of instability in former ZSRR. But the post-solidarity politicians would rather relevant regulations of the international law that allow such actions and are unquestionable to be formed firstly. For now, it would be better if the Alliance’s actions were taken on the basis of UNO and OBWE mandate, but such a mandate should not limit actions of the Alliance in emergency states. This, what happened in Kosovo is a precedence and it should remain so. “We see in it an unusual decision dictated by a peculiar situation.”

An intervention in Kosovo shows how much carrying on an international policy by NATO is changing. The issues connected with geographical reach of the Alliance’s mission and also the source of mandate for future Alliance’s actions outside the member states are of course very important. But the fact that the character of the purpose of undertaking armed intervention changes is more significant. This conflict called “the first war of XXI century” is not a question of strategic considerations, territory, natural resources or even ideology. It is a question of rules, “values of higher range than the national sovereignty question, of the meaning of ethical standards in relations among states.”

This is completely new. In their opinion the crisis in Kosovo shows that the democracy cannot be built in Europe now and in the future only basing on declared values. The specific actions need to be taken in order to oppose sudden crises and instability and the Washington Treaty obliged signatories to “keep joint heritage of

35 A. Smolar, Próba ognia i wody, Gazeta Wyborcza, 10 April 1999.
36 A. Smolar, Próba ognia i wojny, Gazeta Wyborcza, 10 April 1999.
nations which is freedom based on democracy, individual and law rules.” Thus, NATO is not only a military organization but also a form of protecting common values.

The article V of the Washington Treaty arouses the greatest anxiety of coalition politicians as far the NATO status. This article says about security guarantees in cases when it is threatened in any member state of the Alliance. Having bad memories from the past and being situated in the Central Europe, which is not safe, Poland counts on political and military solidarity of the whole NATO.

SLD representatives think also about what role Poland should have in the Alliance and what shape of political and military doctrine of NATO should be like. In their opinions we are facing, while entering NATO structures, very important and difficult tasks to carried out. First, we should demonstrate from the very beginning the readiness for fulfilling allied obligations absolutely as we expect such a readiness from others. Second, the conceptions pursuant to our national interests and conceptions strengthening the Atlantic community as a whole should be suggested during discussions on NATO’s future because enlarging and not limiting the scope of tasks will strengthen the power and cohesion of the Alliance. That is why, one should strive for the constant and active presence of the USA in Europe. At last, Poland should actively shape eastern policy of NATO towards Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, and rest of countries in Mid-Eastern Europe. “Door to NATO must remain open and the perspective of enlargement by next states must be determined with precision. [...] Poland bears responsibility for imparting a new dynamism to relations with Russia which should be based on the co-operation and strategic partnership.”

Poland may contribute to a large extent to form the unique character of the Alliance as an organization, main purposes of which is not only the protection of the integrity and sovereignty of member states but most of all the protection of democratic values. The Alliance is not directed against anybody and is not to constitute any threat to anybody. It is to assure stability and security.

As you can see, many politicians have irrespective of their party membership difficulties in identifying with the new NATO. Some of them keep the distance towards the Alliance’s action. Poland wanted, similarly to the other countries, new members of NATO, i.e. the Czech Republic, Hungary to enter NATO structures as soon as possible in order to protect itself against Eastern threats, against Russia.
aggressiveness and also new forms of regional destabilization and domination. It is already two weeks after solemn admitting new members to the NATO when it occurred that the Alliance strays from its classic purposes and actions. Reflections concern also the changing model of security in Europe. SLD and especially its more conservative representatives have fond memories in public of former “clear and stable order”. In their opinion, the fall of former Soviet Union did not bring about the more peaceful and more stabilized world. “Borys Jelcyn himself caused the fall of ZSRR violating at the same time the stability of world-wide situation. [...] And national and religious and other prejudices in Yugoslavia that were smothered and kept in a tight rein by Tito’s wise policy prevailed over common sense.” According to SLD the military attack of NATO developed such situation in which the common international organization that was originally supposed to be a guard of peace and security was completely pushed aside giving way to the North Atlantic Treaty. Not involving UNO in the process of decision making as to war and peace becomes a norm. In consequence of such behaviours the role and purpose of this organization existence are undermined and “all wisdom and gifts for making correct decisions are attributed to only that group of states.” It would appear that after “cold war” UNO got another chance, but was differently. The new powers structure formed within last ten years showed that these kinds of organizations became only “a set in non-existing theatre.”

Almost all parties accept officially the formal opinion of Poland as to support of NATO operation, but individual politicians keep distance towards it. This situation is not unusual in comparison with states newly admitted to the Alliance. Similar situation is in the Czech Republic and Hungary, but skepticism and criticism to NATO decisions is even greater in those two countries.

The entering NATO by Poland has a major support of the society. Two third of Poles is for our membership in the Alliance. About 80% of Poles think that it will assure a “security for many years” to our country. At the same time the half of respondents is afraid of worsening relations with Russia and drawing Poland into

40 Z. S³omkowski, Dekoracje w nie istniej¹cym teatrze, Trybuna, 29 March 1999.
41 survey results of OBOP of 22 March 1999
others conflicts. Moreover, not all what is said by politicians is consistent with what the majority of the society thinks.

There are also some ideas and expectations concerning the further lots of NATO in Europe after period of “acquiring new strength by new members”. Only a few politicians (mostly from governing coalition) reach to distant future. They claim that the appearance of a problem of membership of states from former communist camp will force the Alliance to determine necessarily a new identity, maybe not only as a “hard core” of arising design of security, but also as an European-wide organization that “consume” OBWE tasks in the field of military security.  

Russia towards searching a new identity in Europe

Beside the European and Atlantic Union also position and priorities of Russia actions are of great importance for the process of building the new democratic order and security policy. One of after-affects of great transformations and revaluations period in the international arena is less than transparency and predictability of policies of particular states. The Russian policy is still the most questionable which results from many changes occurring inside the country and in the external relations. New Russia still looks for a new place in the world. It is still perceived, though it made a great progress within last few years, as a country that is politically unsure, socially divided and being in permanent economic crises. The situation is more complex and unpredictable because of no deep democratic traditions and connected with them institutions in the history. However, it seems that the country has the most difficult period behind which decided about its existence. It does not mean, of course, that Russia solved the most significant political, economic and social matters. The great ethnic problems, economic and institutional transformations, developed corruption, number of mobs and crimes accumulate still in Russia. Besides, it constantly looses its superpower in the international arena.

After the fall of bipolar system in security area the states of Central Europe applied officially for the membership in NATO, which made Russia to attempt at

42 M. W¹growska, Polska w roli adwokata, Rzeczpospolita, 28 April 1998.
interfering with the enlargement of the Alliance. NATO was eager to get permission not the veto from Russia, which led to appointing the NATO-Russia Council. It was to prevent the Russia’s impression that it was turned down from the group of decision-makers on the form of the European security. The process of the integration of a few Mid-Eastern Europe states evokes less intensive reactions from Russia. It can be presumed that Russia perceives the enlargement of the EU to the borders of Russia as in its favour and interest.

According to SLD politicians the attitude of Poland towards Russia should not be built re-sentiments even when Russian mistakes, for example lack of unambiguous condemn of harm inflicted to Poland in the past, as Germany did it, are conductive to surviving those feelings. It is in the interest of Poland to have good relations with Russia. It is of greater importance when our country became a member of NATO. Poland should within the Alliance assure good relations with its neighbours especially when Polish-Russian border constitutes the eastern border of NATO. The position of Poland would be bad in the situation in which Poland would be the source of tensions of relations between NATO and Russia. The enlargement of NATO in the Central Europe will prevent from rebuilding Russian influences in the territory of the Russian Empire extended before 1990. “The Polish policy cannot take the liberty of any ambiguity on that issue. Good relations with Russia have a significant meaning for Poland. However, they loose such an importance in case when, in exchange for avoiding worsening those relations, Poland would have to give up basing its security on the membership in NATO.”

The Left claims that so called “managed democracy” in Russia has many authoritative features which is proved by strengthened influences of orthodox communists and extreme Russian nationalists. In this case the Polish policy should be more connected with Russian democracy and avoid anything what could threaten this democracy. “At the same time, one should be aware that the perspectives of democracy in Russia remain uncertain and in consequence there is a feasible opportunity of recurring hegemonic policy which could be a potential threat to the new order in Europe. Poland entering the NATO reduces this threat to the extent of being assured of the future even in authoritative and hegemonic Russian policy.”

The Russia has less meaning in building democratic order and security because “the USA shattered brutally Russian ambitions to play a specific role on the Balkans and

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44 J. J. Wiatr, W poszukiwaniu nowej tożsamości narodu, Myśl Socjaldemokratyczna No 4/1998, p.27
45 J. J. Wiatr, W poszukiwaniu ..., p.28.
in Europe at the same time. No hard confrontation is expected. Russia needs both the USA and Western Europe to overcome economic crises. On the other hand the United States of America also need Russia as an important partner in the face of increasing political and economical competition with the European Union and China.

According to UW the greatest threat we should expect from Russia is its weakness, “threat of chaos, perspective of unpredictable nuclear explosion, the next Czarnobyl or theft of mass destruction weapon.” Fears of Russia, its traditional aggressiveness and also new forms of regional destabilisation and domination guided Poland while entering NATO. On the other hand, it is no act against Russia at all. Russia is still a strategic partner for Poland and “it is wished to have the development of co-operation with Russia needed from the point of both countries’ views. We do believe that the enlargement of NATO will serve peace and stabilization on the whole continent.” The membership in NATO itself gives us a chance to shape up well with Russia. Germany can be an example. The normalization of relations between Germany and Russia was possible only after strengthening the membership of Germany in NATO. Moreover, Poland may be a spokesman of Russia in NATO. We, as a “border” country, should care about Russia’s successes. The more stable Russia the greater market. Only at present, it is possible to build Polish-Russian reconciliation. Poland became reconciled with Germany, Polish-Ukraine reconciliation is going on, and time of Polish-Russian reconciliation comes. Russia, though very weak and though last failures of Russian diplomacy for instance on an issue of NATO enlargement, is still able to play a significant role in the international matters. “The failure of a trial with the mediation between NATO and Belgrade may, the paradox is only apparent, prove this. The West seems to be satisfied. It could never disregard the position of Moscow so much. Such a standpoint is comprehensible to some extent but it is neither prudent nor far-sighted.”

The stance of AWS assumes the improvement of relations between Poland and Russia. There were very difficult moments in the history about which anybody should not forget, “but should draw some conclusions from it that problems can be

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47 A. Smolar, Próba ognia i wojny, Gazeta Wyborcza, 10 April 1999.
49 L. Unger, Nie skreœlaæ Rosji, Gazeta Wyborcza, 2 April 1999.
solved only by a dialogue.”\textsuperscript{50} This is much better than keeping tension and standing in distrust. Poland has now its historical chance to break a bad tradition in mutual contacts: “The neighbourhood with Russia does not have to be treated as potential or real threats. This is also our strategic investment in the future of this area. It is in the interest of Poland to transform the country into the easternmost watch-tower separated from the neighbour by the wall of prejudice and dislikes but to form the space of dialogue and co-operation, experience exchange and meetings.”\textsuperscript{51}

\textbf{Other states of Central-Eastern Europe – platform, buffer or emptiness?}

The question included in the title of this chapter concerns what roles the states, successors of ZSRR should play in building the new political and economical order in the Mid-Eastern Europe. The states, which regained its independence only several years ago, are still forced to large extent to take not always independent decisions. Thus, their position and abilities not always depend on effective transformation of its economy and political system. They depend also on the development of relations with Russia and attitudes of the international community. All parties claim that the ability to use favourable geopolitical changes by former soviet republics and becoming sovereign and independent of Russian influences states in the region mentioned below is in the interest of Poland and other states of the Central Europe. This issue is connected with the more open question about what kind of geopolitical scenario will replace cold war plan in the Mid-Eastern Europe and what the proportions between stabilising and destabilising powers will be in this region. The question of pro-Soviet Russia’ role and the situation of former ZSRR republics are the most important matters in those considerations.

\textbf{Ukraine}

It is interesting how Ukraine is at present after the enlargement of NATO to the Central Europe perceived in building the new system of security in that region. Will it

\textsuperscript{50} Jerzy Buzek, Prime Minister’s speech in the Headquarter of NATO in Brussels, 16 April 1999
\textsuperscript{51} Marian Krzaklewski, W NATO-wskiej rodzinie, Tygodnik Solidarnoc 12 (548) 1999
lead to forming the new “iron curtain” along the eastern border of Poland? Will it be helpful first, in strengthening pressure of the West to play role of anti-Russian “bulwark”, second in attempts of Russia at regaining influences in Ukraine? Starting from 1991 the west politicians expect Ukraine to accept fundamentals of “platform” linking the East and the West. Krawczuk, the former president of Ukraine, determined Poland as a “gateway to the west of Ukraine” in one of his speeches. Looking at it from the wider perspective one could ask a question: what role of the Central Europe would be in shaping relations between the West European states and Ukraine? Could Poland contribute in any way to faster economic development of Ukraine or support Ukrainian political independence in the international relations? Did Polish initiative of forming the Carpathians Euro-region, the aim of which was to help in border co-operation among local societies, bring any expected effects? Could Poland alternatively involve Ukraine in activities run by the European institutions for instance OSCE or the European Council?

Poland was the first country that recognized the independence of the new democratic Ukraine and acted in its favour very actively on the international forum. However, it was only a political gesture, which had no support of specific actions in bilateral relations. Not only leading politicians but also the most of political parties demonstrated their will to support an intensive co-operation with Ukraine but they also gave no specific solutions or ideas of its realization.

Ukraine has two alternatives. First, it will become a strong, independent and economically efficient state that would be a strong link in the new security order in Europe. Second, it will become weak and susceptible to and a titbit for the Russian expansionism. Strong and self-assured but not chauvinistic Russia could play the role of not “an obstacle” in the way of Russia’s possible expansion trends. It could play the role of “support for Russia in redefining the positive meaning of its nationality, in giving up imperial ambitious and in changing historical feeling of isolation and lack of security.” All Polish politicians agree that the current period of Russian power weakness is a unique opportunity for Ukraine to join Europe. The stronger Russia is as far as its economical and military issues are concerned the less chances Ukraine will have as to placing itself among sovereign and independent countries.

52 Ian Brzezinski, Polish-Ukrainian Relations: Europe’s Neglected Strategic Axis, „Survival” 1993, vol.35, no.3
53 M. M. Balmaceda, Państwa byrego ZSRR a stosunki rosyjsko-Óœrodkowoeuropejskie, Studia Polityczne, No 6/1996, ISPPAN.
Unfortunately, the West is not ready, though the declarations on strategic meaning of Ukraine in the international security, to declare officially the guarantees of future joining the west security structures by Ukraine. The most favourable, from the point of view of Russia, is keeping the real economical and political influences in former sphere of influences, the important part of which Ukraine constitutes, even at cost of giving up institutional multilateral guarantees, i.e. the Community of Independent States. “Moscow aims at tightening bonds with Kiev mostly because of political reasons (Russia may do smoothly without Ukraine). However, the Ukrainian interests are the opposite. Ukraine would like, mostly for political reasons, to be completely independent of Russia.”\textsuperscript{54} but for the economical reasons it has to be dependent to some extent. Ukraine will probably remain under the influences of Moscow, if it does not get any significant economic aid from the West. Russia will still play a leading role in not yet reformed Ukraine because of its unquestionable domination and considerable dependence of Ukraine on Russian supply sources. It is not out of question that if a privatisation were carried out in Ukraine, it would become “the ownership of Russian banks, through the contracted part of important enterprises mostly from energy sector, as a compensation of debts incurred for the energy supply.”\textsuperscript{55}

On the other hand, an independent and democratic Ukraine is a very significant element of stable security system in the whole Europe. It is also a proof of peaceful intentions of Russia and a guarantee of continuing democratic transformations in both countries. Thanks to such an approving attitude Russia becomes a more credible partner in the international relations.

There are no fundamental differences among Polish political groups as for images and opinions on the relations between Poland and republics of former ZSRR and their role and position in a newly arising European order. Maybe, only SLD presents here more specific attitude. According social democrats Poland should develop relations with Ukraine mostly political, economic, cultural and social relations. The conceptions of social democrats are still dominated by thinking in geopolitical categories, i.e. geographical conditions and so called high politics not dependent on will of citizens of a country. The Poland significance depends on those factors and in the situation in which for instance Russia were reunited with Ukraine

\textsuperscript{55} Stanisław Bień, Ukraina a Rosja, w Polityka Wschodnia, UW 1/1998
and Belorussia, the position of our country would worsen. But it does not mean that Ukraine independence is necessary for Poland independence because Poland as a NATO’s member does not have to worry about its borders and sovereignty. However, it would become “a front” state, to the east of which the rebuilding Russia empire extends. According to the Left, the so far poor effects of bilateral co-operation between Ukraine and Poland do not result from the Polish side’s fear of what Moscow could perceive as a trial of creating “anti-Russian alliance”, but rather from “the lack of clear and expressive visions as to the future of our and this part of Europe.” The closer co-operation of both countries may be threatened by political parties that embitter anti-Ukrainian feelings. The actions against Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation taken by the extreme Right may only strengthen Russia’s superpower aspirations. “Unfortunately, it coincides with strengthening the position of communists in Ukraine who were elected during Parliamentary elections in 1998 and who evidently try to tight relations with Russia.” Ukraine should not and as for now, it has no such an opportunity to apply for joining the Alliance. That is why, Poland should build bilateral political and military co-operation, as well as support economic co-operation of both countries. According to SLD Ukraine is standing at “the political crossroads”, now. On the one hand, it results from its economic difficulties and on the other hand from superpower aspirations of Russia. Russia cannot dominate Poland without Ukraine. Thus, Kiev is “a key for Russian expansion in Europe.” Polish-Ukrainian relations should be in favour of stabilisation in that region and should not be against anybody. The West should be very sensitive as for supporting “geopolitical pluralism” in former sphere of soviet influences in order not to cause any radical reactions from Russian nationalists. Any support of the West for pro-Russian states, except of course Russia, is usually perceived as an action against it. Every trial with including Ukraine in the west structures should be preceded by relevant negotiations and insurance in relation to Russia.

In the opinion of part of right politicians the Central European states, especially Poland are to play the important role of barristers of Ukrainian case on the international forum as for the security and support and investment actions.

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56 J. J. Wiatr, W poszukiwaniu nowej tożsamości narodu, Myśl Socjaldemokratyczna No. 4/1998, KKF, Warsaw, p.29
57 J. J. Wiatr, W poszukiwaniu...”, p.25
58 J. Rolicki, Czas Ukrainy, Trybuna, 16 Jan. 1999
59 see Stanisław Bięń, Ukraina a Rosja – niezależność i dominacja, w Polityka Wschodnia, UW 1/1998, p.29
Multilateral meetings are demanded on the model of the meeting of 27\textsuperscript{th} Mai, 1997 in Tallin where Poland supported jointly and severally an ambition of joining NATO by Baltic states and Ukraine in the future. Poland should promote the co-operation with the Central Europe, especially within CEFTA, for the reason of enabling Ukraine, as a future member of this group, the adjustment of internal legislation to European law. On the other hand, there are more and more critical votes towards incompetence and incapability of Polish leaders who did not suggest any initiatives and missed a chance to influence the situation before “a window on opportunities closed.”\textsuperscript{60} This Polish “inactivity” can be justified by uncertainty of our politicians as to opportunities of keeping full independence of Ukraine. As for now, Ukraine concluded no trade agreements, is not a member of the World Trade Organization, does not have an agreement on association with the European Union, does not even meet any membership criteria in CEFTA. So, it could seem that Poland, which is mostly interested in developing pro-European feature of Ukraine, could and should do more for that purpose. There should be no more void declarations supporting independence and sovereignty of Ukraine and specific undertakings should be initiated.

**BELORUSSIA**

Treaties signed in Mai 1995 between Russia and Belorussia have significant consequences on policies of the Mid-East Europe. Poland and other countries of that region have to redefine their visions of security in this part of Europe in the face of coming the superpower trends of Russia back to life. The treaties in question include not only building custom union, free trade, military co-operation and stationing of Russian soldiers in the territory of Belorussia but also official opening the borders of those two countries. A question comes to mind: where the border truly ends – should 900 km Polish-Belorussian border be treated as an extension of border with Russia? The specific character of Ukrainian-Russian border arouses similar doubts. The another significant matter is coming bad historical precedents back to life which embitter discussions on the security of Poland for instance an experience that every time when the sovereignty of Belorussia was threatened, the independence and

\textsuperscript{60} J. deWeydental, Poland’s Eastern Policy, RFE/RL Research Report, 19 Feb. 1994
democracy of Poland also suffered damage.\textsuperscript{61} Putting forward a matter of Ukrainian-Polish relations was an indirect effect of Moscow-Minsk treaties. If Moscow pays its attention on elimination of sovereignty of Ukraine after incepting Belorussia, then the relations with Ukraine including pressures on entering NATO by Ukraine will become priority. In such a situation coming back to Polish-Ukrainian partnership became a priority for the purpose of avoiding next negative, self-fulfilling predictions connected with Polish hesitations as to Belorussia. A kind of “friendly relations” among Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine was the first effect of treaties. Lithuania and Ukraine turned to Poland again in order to form the common peaceful sections.

According to SLD Poland should carry on the prudent policy in relations with Belorussia. “Demonstrating towards Belorussian discontents concerning the fact that their country approaches Russia must adversely affect only the relation of Belorussia towards Poland giving no advantages in return. The involvement of Polish Right on the side of Belorussian opposition embitters only suspicions that Poland tries to establish its own hegemony.”\textsuperscript{62} The Russian-Belorussian relations will surely tighten next years and “Poland is not entitled and has no opportunity to counteract this process.”\textsuperscript{63} Both UW and AWS worry about the situation in Belorussia and especially about abandoning democracy by Belorussian authorities. They sharply criticise the behaviour of Aleksander Łukaszenko, the President who introduced totalitarian rule and renewed former relations and links with Russia. At present, Belorussia is in the sphere of strong geopolitical influences of Russia, probably because the former superpower prefers having pro-Russian territory as its neighbour instead of normal, democratic and sovereign state. But for the sake of the security of Poland and the whole Europe, the neutral Belorussia is needed between NATO and Russia. Besides, it will be better for Belorussian citizens, if their fundamental rights are respected and executed. The Highest Belorussian Council, which was dissolved by Łukaszenko several years ago, was officially accepted by Polish Parliament to prove its support of country’s democratization.

\textsuperscript{61} M. M. Balmaceda, Państwa byłe ZSRR a stosunki rosyjsko- décordkowo-europejskie, Studia Polityczne, No 6/1996, ISP PAN.
\textsuperscript{62} J. J. Wiatr, W poszukiwaniu........, p.31
\textsuperscript{63} J. J. Wiatr, W poszukiwaniu..., p.31
BALTIC STATES AND OTHERS

Since regaining the independence by Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia many initiatives and ideas appeared that concerned tightening co-operation of these countries with Poland and involving them in building the new European political and economic order. Proposals of former Lithuanian president Brazauskas concerning forming the free trade zone between the two countries, bringing a common peace battalion into being, joint control of air space and sea borders can be included. However, Polish side did not accept those proposals. Polish politicians are rather sceptical which results from the awareness of complexity of matters connected with the integration of former republics of ZSRR with economic and political area of the Central and West Europe and not from past re-sentiments or fears of Russia.

The most intense anxiety arouses the Kaliningrad region that after the fall of soviet superpower became a meaningful tender card in Russian policy towards Baltic countries. The strong Russian military presence in Kaliningrad constitutes the potential threat for Poland and other states of this region.

In the opinion of Marian Krzaklewski, the AWS leader, our east policy demands an increased activity in the face of entering NATO: “Today, we will promote fast admittance of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to the North Atlantic Alliance in the name of our vital national interests.”

At present, the Polish relations with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are successful and they should be in the nearest future a significant factor in the enlargement of NATO to the east and of the European Union because “those countries are not burdened by Russia, though Russia might try to exert an influence on them.” That is why, the main task of democratic states of the Western Europe and our country is to help Baltic republics in stabilising democratic system, strengthening independence and free market economy. Such a stance is supported also by UW, which claims that “now, after years of constraints, Poland should as a rightful member of NATO find its historical chance in the new eastern policy. The policy towards Baltic States, Russia and Ukraine becomes the central issue. [...] It should accept the role of a platform between the East and the West.”

According to SLD matter of joining the Alliance by democratic Lithuania is only a matter of time, though the events in Kosovo should not influence the enlargement of

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64 Marian Krzaklewski, speech on the 44th session in the Lower House of Parliament, 17 Feb. 1999
65 as above
66 Adam Michnik, Toast za Polskê, Gazeta Wyborcza, 13 March 1999
NATO. Thanks to the activity of the president Aleksander Kwaœniewski Polish-Lithuanian battalion LITPOLBAT was established. On NATO summit on 9 July 1997 in Madrid the president Aleksander Kwaœniewski supported officially candidacies of Baltic Republics: “We want the whole Central Europe including Baltic Republics to be found in the European structures.” As far as other Baltic States and States of the Central Europe are concerned, the representatives of most parties would like NATO to start negotiations on admitting new members from this region as soon as possible. Poland will still support Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Ukraine and other countries in applying for membership in NATO, though Poland failed to push any obligations from the side of the Alliance and the record on “continuity of open doors policy” is still current. Both Polish Prime Minister and the President assure that our country will be their “barrister” in the Alliance.

**DEMOCRATIC VALUES**

In the opinion of UW the current situation in Kosovo put us in front of a dilemma, i.e. what costs one has to bear in the activities leading to the protection of democratic values. Universal values, we adhere to and which order to protect human rights, bring freedom, fight dictators, collide with the natural fear and anxiety of paying the high price that may be entailed by our moral aspirations. “The decency and history do not allow to turn back on Kosovo but fear of expenditures induce to choosing half-measures. This tragic dilemma is one of sources of NATO weaknesses and serious question mark as for the effectiveness of new orientation of the Alliance that look for raison d’être after the Cold War.” According to UW the soviet threat has assured recently strong stimuli for defense and readiness for paying high price. Can one count on that in the world of more spread, often abstractive threats or potential and usually geographically distant ones? This is a very important question for NATO. Probably the future of democracy and the whole Europe depends on the answer to that question.

What happens in Europe at present represents a major change in the way of thinking about human and citizen’s rights. For the first time NATO came out in

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67 Aleksander Kwaœniewski, Zwyciêzcy znad Ba³tyku, Gazeta Wyborcza, 10 July 1997
68 Aleksander Smolar, Próba ognia i wojny, Gazeta Wyborcza, 10 April 1999
support of values deemed that time as values of higher level than the national sovereignty, i.e. in support of human rights, people’s rights to life, security, freedom and dignity. What’s characteristic is that NATO started the war against Serbia on the same date in which the British House of Lords decided for extradition of Pinochet to Spain, though Chile questioned the right of foreign countries to judge the general. In that case, the international law speaking about punishing for crimes against humanity was recognised as superiority over the rule of national sovereignty. Both cases illustrate according to UW politicians the rising acceptance of humane and democratic imperative which excuses punishing by the international community all genocide crimes and tortures.

PSL keeps long distance towards intervention of NATO in the Balkans claiming that it violates both the rule of states’ sovereignty and human and citizens’ rights. PSL excuses its attitudes saying that it is “the most sensitive party to aggression and human pain. It results from a large attachment of village citizens to the Church. Moreover, people know that the situation in Kosovo will not be improved at all after the NATO intervention.”69

UW politicians sharply criticise the thesis that human rights are the European idea and that attempts at executing them in other parts of the world constitute an act of cultural imperialism. According to those politicians “there are no such a culture which would deny a confidence that all people are born free and equal as to their dignity and rights.”70 Violation of human rights can be the most easily noticed in dictatorships, but democratic states themselves are not free of them. Let’s just recall the still existing problems of some of national, religious and ethnic minorities in countries of the whole Europe or the North America. A fight for human rights does not end along with democracy coming. “Poland should also export an idea of human rights and democracy both in our neighbourhood and distant parts of the world.”71

Democratic values mean for the majority of Polish Left mostly rules of law guaranteed by relevant institutions, obeying human rights, respecting rights of national and religious minorities. Democracy standard is to guarantee rights to every unit, especially units belonging to different minorities. However, categories of social equality and justice are put in the first place in accordance with the social democrats

69 Alfred Domagalski, Poglady na naloty, Gazeta Wyborcza, 3 April 1999
70 B. Geremek, „adne państwo nie jest wyspą, Gazeta Wyborcza, 24 April 1999.
71 Program wyborczy UW, September 1997
ideas. Some of the Leftist emphasises also the significance of building civil society defined as “a community realising tolerance, equality, limiting and controlling power, pluralism, political consensus, etc.” SdRP writes in his ideological program: “Our main purpose is to prevent unemployment, misery, homelessness, excessive incomes differential, to assure common access to public education, to basic health care, good dignified living, work and care conditions. We fight for equal rights for women and men, oppose to discrimination of any minorities as to their origin, outlook, financial status, political beliefs, nationality, sex orientation.” However, similarly to the declared pro-European is with democratic ideas propagated by the Left. Opting for democratic institutions and procedures results probably from the real beliefs of the Left politicians. Thanks to the built democratic system the post-communists had an opportunity at the turn of ‘80s and ‘90s to change their identity and image and to participate on equal rights together with other parties in political life. The introduction of that identity protected post-communists from decommunization and revenge of political opponents from former anticommunist opposition. The influence of former nomenclature on functioning democratic institutions is paradoxically a guarantee of democratic attitude of this political group. Propagating social democratic values and slogans seems to be not only a propaganda procedure because SLD did in practice execute no postulate during its four-year ruling, though having in the coalition together with PSL the significant political power in the Parliament.

CONCLUSIONS

The above-shortened presentation of conceptions and ideas of Polish political parties concerning opportunities of building the new democratic order in Europe does not describe the subject entirely. It touches only on the most essential at present issues. Nevertheless, several conclusions can be drawn from that brief analysis.

Firstly, analysed political parties do not show their special interest in so general and probably too abstract issues like a vision of democratic order in the whole Europe. Political reflection on that topic is characterized by passiveness,

72 Antonii Szuciński, Przyszłość Europy i socjaldemokracja, Myśl Socjaldemokratyczna, 1/1998

73 SdRP program accepted on III Congress in days 6-7 Dec. 1997
responding only to current events and lack of honest and wider creative view and not by dynamism and far-reaching attitude. It seems sometimes that like Polish politicians were missing imagination and their possible projects or conceptions were so modest and arising from the existing state of affairs that they do not encompass the most current matters. What is important, they include no comparisons either to opposite conceptions or to that what appears on this issue in other political circles or states. Every arisen project or idea concerning for instance the further lots of the European integration never refers to the existing projects. We do not think enough about matters that are not strictly connected with us and which will be of great significance from our point of view in the nearest future. The question of choosing a new strategy of NATO activity, an American version of which is supported by the most of Polish politicians, can be included. However, this support was disclosed after the NATO intervention in Kosovo meaning during its realisation. As a matter of fact, no party brought up this topic earlier, no party talked in public about plans of changes in NATO functioning, though our membership in the Alliance has been planned since many years. No discussions on new purposes and strategies of the Alliance, on the European defence identity or on displays of reflections about it are taken up in Poland. Some politicians sometimes stresses that such topics do not exist at all but it can be said that some of them (for example from PSL) do not even know what the West European Union is confusing it with the European Union. The European integration is another sphere of lack of far-reaching thinking. I do not mean the process of adjusting our economy and law to union standards, but political discussions about the further lots of the European Union. The membership in the EU is a total guarantee of further democratisation of our social and political life and the acceptance and approval of all the thinks that were done in the EU are necessary to receive that membership. Even if we do not have an access to formal discussions about the form of future community and an opportunity of deciding in the Union institutions, we are obliged to acquaint and think over the plans, which were executed, are being realised and those remaining in the sphere of ideas, and the future shape of the Union. Such ignorance effects the lack of knowledge about the simplest mechanisms of functioning of the EU and creating conceptions inappropriate to the real circumstances. As an example, let us take ideas and prejudices of both opposition PSL and ruling AWS. The ignorance affects also the rhetoric and mentorial tones of voices of some politicians or complete escapism from the
international issues. Yet, it is necessary to take a trial for answering questions concerning the EU evolution in two contexts. The first context concerns loosing dynamism of development of so far Union conceptions realised by the Christian Democratic Party’s rule and conceptions of conservative and liberal parties (Maastricht 1991, Amsterdam 1997) and the second concerns dominating role of socialists in Europe and return of their protective state.

Secondly, most of politicians treat matters of democracy and security in Europe manipulatively and use them as useful propaganda tool in competitive political fight. The European issues are touched on for giving credence to and legitimisation of own opinions, as well as for creating positive media image of own party. Politicians may keep out of critics for their opinions thanks to using very rhetoric, general and very receptive at the same time slogans like “Europe of homelands”, “common values”, “partnerships” and without the necessity of being precise and detailed in their opinions. The manipulative character is also proved by the way of publicising. The European issues are referred to when the current situation requires it. Actually, there is no constant debate on the European matters. They are usually brought up depending on the context. In addition, particular parties stipulate systems of values for the purposes of propaganda. Images of democratic principals are fundamentally different for particular parties, but the execution of those values is differentiated. There are parties trying to implement them to a specific extent but there are also ones recognising them as empty slogans, which proves shallow taking roots. SLD is the best example. It did not execute even one of its postulates during its four-year ruling, though it declared strict social democratic ideas.

The analysis presented here does not probably touch on many significant matters or describe them insufficiently for instance opinions on the role of the West European Union in shaping the model of the European defence identity, the meaning of the European organisations in building the new democratic order, issues concerning threats to democracy (nationalism, totalitarianism, racism, discrimination, etc.), globalisation processes, but it was my wilful action. As the most of parties do not express their opinions on them or use only general slogans and non-specified postulates, I decided not to touch on those subjects. I just did not want to present or interpret something that probably does not exist.
Dear Mr. PHILIPPAS,

I have finished my Final Report in compliance with the regulations of the Fellowship Agreement. I send the report in specified time. I hope it meets all the requirements made by you as regards content and form. I must admit that the preparation of my research work gave me a lot satisfaction and enriched my knowledge and interests in this domain. The presentation of the report in the Political Studies Department aroused the great interest and initiated stormy discussions among political scientists and sociologists at my University.

As I have doubts about differentiating the Final Report and the end-product I ask for some explanations as to the following matters:
- has the Final Report to be a short version of my end-product?
- in what form and when should I provide the end-product to you and how many copies?
- how long should be the end-product?

I also ask for confirming the approval of my Final Report and any remarks to it.

Yours sincerely,

Urszula KURCZEWSKA
ABSTRACT

In this text, I present the analysis of visions and conceptions of Polish political parties on the arising new European democratic order. I try to present opinions and attitudes of particular parties on the most important trends of political, economic and social transformations in the whole Europe. The most significant problems the European countries stand for at present are as follows: processes of the supranational integration, the meaning of international organizations acting in favour of Europe democratization, new strategic conceptions of the North Atlantic Organization and processes of this organization enlargement, security and democracy guarantees in the Central-Eastern Europe countries, etc.

The main thesis of this elaboration concerns the statement that no Polish party present coherent and transparent conceptions on the above mentioned problems. If they bring a conception up, they usually do that in form of very general slogan or treat it as an instrument of political fight. This thesis is proved by first, lack of foreign issues in parties’ programs and politicians’ speeches, these issues are treated marginally, they usually present several general meaningless sentences and from the existing state of affairs point of view politicians touch on that subject only in special occasions. Second, if they refer to the European issues, they only serve the purpose of presenting the positive image of own group in the political competition with other parties. Third, expressions such as “Europe of homelands”, “partnerships”, policy towards Russia” used by politicians remain on the level of useful slogans without any precise and detailed explanations.

The confidence that Polish politicians are not interested and that they do not even appreciate the meaning of problems, which are discussed nowadays mostly in the West Europe and which are of the great importance for the future of the whole continent, is the final conclusion.