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Polish Media in the Light of the Conflicts and Controversies between NATO Members after the Year 1989 (on the Example of the Greek and Turkish Conflicts of Cyprus).

INTRODUCTION

Cyprus - an island inhabited mainly by the population of Greek origin and partly by that of Turkish origin – came into existence in 1878 under the British administration, and in 1925 it became formally a British colony.

In the 1930s a liberation movement, which aimed at gaining the independence, started to grow there. After the World War II it grew stronger and stronger.

The AKEL party (Progress Party of Working People) fought against the British and then the EOKA organization (National Organization of Cyprian Liberation) started to fight as well. The latter was a radically national organization, led by Colonel Grivas, which concentrated the Cypriotes of Greek origin and endeavored after annexation of Cyprus to Greece. The Cyprian Turkish, who belonged to the organizations which, on one hand, conducted the terrorist activity against the English colonizers and, on the other hand, against the Cypriotes of Greek origin demanding the union with Greece, were for the independence but against the *enosis* with Greece.

As a result of growing tendencies towards liberation from the British power, the Greek Catholic Church put forward a proposal of arranging a plebiscite. In January 1950 a voting took place in which participated the population of Greek origin only. The majority of this population supported *enosis*. However, neither Great Britain nor Cyprian Turkish accepted the results of the plebiscite.

In the same year, a personage of Archbishop Makarios appeared in the arena of politics. This bishop became a leader of Greek opposition against Great Britain. The case of Cyprus stopped to be only a question between the population of the Island and England. Greece and Turkey were also considerably involved in this problem, each on the side of that population with which they had ethnic and religious relationships. In 1954 the Greek government proclaimed that Cyprus should get a right of self-determination. However, Great Britain, which after retreating from Egypt made Cyprus another, apart from Malta, military bastion at the Mediterranean Sea, by no means treated this postulate in a friendly manner. Also the Turk, who put in a right for the island, did not accept such a solution. Different standpoints of Greece, Turkey and England to the question and intensification of the partisan warfare within the Island made the ministers of foreign affairs of these three countries sit at the conference table in London. This conference, however, did not bring any constructive solutions. Further increase of tension was a reason that this question was in the agenda of UNO debates several times. The problem of Cyprus had a decisive influence on the Greek and Turk relations, introducing the element of hostility towards each other. These countries were the members of NATO, so they were urged by this Organization, and mainly by the USA, to stop quarrels.

With continuation of the conflict, the Turk, who initially had thought that extending the British Administration would be the most favourable solution, changed their standpoint for the fear of consolidation of the Greek position. The Cyprian Turks felt to be threatened with a possibility of potential persecutions and deportations. The Turkish government, in solidarity with them, demanded annexation of the part of Cyprus inhabited by Turks to Turkey. Thus, the plan of division of the Island into two parts, so called *taksim*, occurred. But Greece did not accept this proposal. Both countries started to conduct organized informative campaigns in the Island. Things arrived at such a point, that open fights and rioting between the Greek and Turkish populations took place.

The second conference regarding Cyprus took place in Zurich in February 1959 and then Greece and Turkey arrived at an agreement as to the future status of the Island. It was decided that the meeting with share of England and representatives of both nations inhabiting the Island would be arranged. This meeting took place in London in the end of 1959. As a result of the negotiations made in Zurich and London, it was decided that in a course of a year Cyprus would gain independence provided it would make certain concessions. England, Greece and Turkey agreed to create the independent Cyprian Republic and all the three parties assumed a role of a guarantor of the Island's political system. Greece and Turkey made an agreement regarding the mutual defense, which gave them a privilege to keep their military garrisons within the Island. Great Britain was allowed for further maintaining its military bases on the Island as well. Besides, it gained a right for free flights of the fighter planes, for the use of ports and airports and the right for conducting the maneuvers in the territory of the Island.

The agreement expressed in such a way had serious consequences. The right of the third countries to interfere in internal affairs of Cyprus was repeatedly used and it was a reason of permanent conflicts.

The constitution determined in details a complicated system of administration of the country; in this constitution a distinct division into the citizens of Greek and Turkish origins was made and administrative functions were divided between these nations in proportion of 70:30. The function of the president was to be performed by a politician of Greek origin while the function of vice president was to be performed by a politician of Turkish origin. The legislative power was awarded to the House of Representatives excluding the strictly national affairs. Each nation could elect its own Municipal Chamber, which had the legislative rights exclusively with respect of religion, education, culture etc.

Archbishop Makarios was the first president. He entered upon his office on 16 August 1960, which was the day when Cyprus was proclaimed an independent republic. Soon after that a new State was admitted to UNO.

Cyprian Turks treated the internal policy of Makarios as successive restriction of their rights. On the other hand, the EOKA extremist organization, under the leadership of General J. Grivas, kept consolidating within the Greek organization. This organization demanded prompt *enosis* and accused the president of conducting the policy of postponing and even of betrayal of the idea of union. Besides, such feelings were fanned by the standpoint of the guarantors who perceived in the policy of non-involvement, conducted by Makarios, a basic difficulty in realization of the plan of incorporating Cyprus in NATO.

However, the antagonism between the two national groups kept increasing. Both Cypriotes of Greek and Turkish origins entered many reservations with respect to the provisions of the constitution and also accused each other of creating additional difficulties when realizing it in practice.

In the end of the year 1963, encounters between the Turkish extremists, demanding the division of the Island, and the police occurred in the streets of the capital city of Cyprus – Nicosia. As these encounters did not cease, England introduced its tanks into the streets of the city.

In the meantime, the encounters between Greek and Turkish populations grew in number in other cities as well. In Ankara it was announced that the situation required intervention of foreign armies, and at the coasts of Cyprus Turkish warships appeared. In response, Greece kept its forces in action stations.

On 26 December 1963 the representative of Cyprus in UNO delivered a protest against interference of Turkey in the internal affairs of his country to Secretary General and demanded Security Council to be convened. England and the United States objected consideration of the matter in UNO maintaining that it should be decided between the countries concerned within NATO. By virtue of UNO Security Council's resolution of March 1964 there came the troops of UNO Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP).

The conflict was temporarily averted but the Greek government assumed the slogan *enosis* once again. In the meantime, the Turkish government demanded a division of the Island, or – in the case of maintaining the sovereignty – establishing a federation. At the same time, the Turkish government brought about, like in 1955, expulsion of the next Greek group of several dozen thousand people. In the end of 1967 the Administrative Council of Cyprian Turks was formed, exercising the power in the regions occupied by the Turkish community. In the same year a considerable sharpening of the conflict in Cyprus took place which could provoke an armed intervention of Turkey. However, the signed agreements concerning the withdrawal of the Greek troops, which came illegally, mitigated the situation. Since 1968 a gradual normalization of the relations between the both communities of Cyprus has taken place. The representatives of Greek community – Klevidis and Turkish community – R. Denktasz, took up direct negotiations, aiming at settlement of the problems through establishment of political and social forms of coexistence of both communities. Since July 1972 the negotiations have been continued with participation of UNO, Turkey and Greece representatives.

As time went on, President Makarios became transformed from an advocate of *enosis* into a protector of Cyprus's independence and, after military coup d'état in Greece in 1967, the conflict between Cyprus and Athens rapidly sharpened. In that period, the Makarios's government was under the double pressure resulting from intersection of the international policy and internal atmosphere in Cyprus.

On one hand, the policy of the Greek dictator J. Papadopoulos, distinctly steered by the major NATO states, mainly by the USA, tended to improvement of relations with Turkey by means of certain concessions in the problem of Cyprus. But on the other hand, the Greek-Cyprian organization EOKA-2 tended, through intensification of terrorist actions, towards demonstration that Makarios gave up the idea of *enosis*, and they tried to deprive him of power. The Greek government who advocated the activity of EOKA-2, withdrew formally their support for the leader of this organization – J. Grivas only in the mid of the year 1973,

not giving up, however, their non-official support for extremist solutions proposed by EOKA-2.

On 15 July 1974 the Greek nationalists, trending towards *enosis* and supported by Athens, overturned the Makarios's government. Turkey did not remain insensible to the events in Cyprus. Five days later Ankara, referring to the treaties of 1959, raided the north of the Island. Greece gave dispositions for general mobilization and gathered the army at the border in Tracja. Approximately 1500 people were killed in the fights. The Turks, occupying 38 per cent of the territory of Cyprus, made a brutal ethnic purge of Greeks. Some 180 thousand Greeks escaped to the south. Several dozen thousand Turks from the non-occupied territory took refuge in the north. In this way, a division of the Island into two parts: Greek and Turkish took place. The basic economic potential of Cyprus was in the Turkish region. In 1975 Turks proclaimed in the north the Turkish Federal Republic. They asked Greeks to do the same in the rest of the Island. In 1983 Turks proclaimed, one-sidedly, formation of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus. Only Ankara accepted this new republic

I. Comments on methodology

A rapid, characteristic for transformations occurring in Poland after 1898, development in electronic media - commercial broadcasting and TV stations - brought about essential changes in the methods of influence of information and propaganda broadcasters on listeners and TV viewers.

Many broadcasters started to operate in this country and the commercial broadcasting and TV stations, connected with powerful capital groups and often with the foreign medial consortia, changed the electronic media market irreversibly. Due to commercialization of media, their informative function was weakened. In a struggle for a listener or a TV viewer, the information on political events or commentaries on them lose with music programs or other forms of entertainment. The information services both in the broadcasting stations and TV stations (commercial and public) have become shorter and shorter and more trivial. More and more pronounced is a tendency towards amazement of the viewer or listener. In a view of a just principle of separating the information from journalist or author's commentary, the latter is generally abandoned. Nattily expressed, concise sentence connecting different as to importance and consequences information on the events in the world more and more frequently replaces the commentary.

The mechanism of influence of television (each television) – domination of picture and sound which provides a substitute of participation – promotes building of emotional and not intellectual attitude to an event. This facilitates a TV viewer identification with acting subjects but does not allow for understanding their arguments.

Another equally important reason of such an influence of television is its transitoriness and homogeneity. The TV information, i. e. the picture and associated sound live very short, sometimes during their emission only. That, what can remain after them, is exclusively a general impression and stimulated emotions. The knowledge of facts is replaced in the viewer's mind by the subsequent news that is often very exciting. From the homogeneity of the TV transmission it appears clearly that the proportions have been lost. This, what really matters and this, which is only an entertainment, a peculiar ornament facilitating reception, are presented in the same way. This is also received in similar way and, thus has the same influence on a viewer, builds his or her attitude, emotions and knowledge of the world.

TV transmission (in a lower degree – broadcasting), by facilitating of emotional identification, falsifies and simplifies the knowledge of the world and events occurring in it. It does not mean that the other classic media, for instance, press are free of such ailments. The press can also exert an influence, first of all, on reader's emotions, falsify or knowingly forge image of the world, events or persons. However, considering a mechanism of the influence, due to the fact that the receiver is involved in the transmission process to a considerably higher extent – one should want to read. And before reading, one should buy a paper. The fact of buying just this and not the other title of a newspaper is a selection of contents, with respect to ideology, politics as well as intellectual, cultural and moral forms, made by a potential buyer. This means that a degree of fortuity of the relations between the addresser and addressee, so characteristic for the TV transmission, is considerably minimized. The addresser, in this case – an editor of a given newspaper and an editorial office, know to whom they address their publications, what they publish and in which form. In sum, they know more about their potential addressee – a reader and his needs. So effectiveness of their influence

increases. On the other hand, a buyer of a paper generally knows what he can expect and which of his needs can be met. This means contraction of a number of readers (edition) but, on the other hand, it exempts the editorial office and authors from necessity of care for meeting various needs of all the possible addressees. In turn, this has a good influence on (but is not a reason) preservation of the intellectual and substantial level of a paper, scrupulousness in selection of arguments and their quality, reliability and authenticity of information, expertise and competence of journalism and commentaries. However, it is a feature of so called serious political journals. Such papers make it their business to present the views of a specified group in terms of ideas and politics, to verbalize its interests, to shape, or at least to exert an influence on the outlooks and opinions of their readers.

Beside, the press has such superiority over the electronic media that the information or opinion contained in it does not vanish without any trace. After listening or watching news or a radio / TV broadcast, only impressions remain in the mind of a listener or a viewer. It is not possible to check, if he or she understood the transmission well. Only the printed word, recorded in a material way, allows a reader – addressee to come back to single pieces of information and their sequences. This gives a possibility of verification of both factographic side and impressions received.

From the point of view of a researcher dealing, for instance, with a history of political thoughts and international relations i. e. a historian or a political historian, a material form (record) facilitates excellently an analysis of mechanism of developing the views of the addresser - disposer. This concerns both detailed and general questions and allows for investigating how, with the use of which techniques and with what result the addresser exerts an influence on the addressee. The analysis of the contents and form of transmission allows for answering not only detailed questions concerning a specified event or process and for estimating its course and results from the addresser's point of view but also for reconstruction and systematization of the principal for the addresser values. This facilitates, thereby, determination of the outlook of the addresser and his social, political or economical orientations and -in the consequence of the goals, to which he is tending - methods and ways which he is going to use.

The value of this form of transmission is also the fact that it allows for exact differentiation of subjects – addressers and for indication and supplying documentary evidence for the existing ideological, political, social and cultural as well as programmatic differences. This, in turn, allows reconstructing, rather exactly, a level of public awareness and changes occurring in it.

The above comments on methodology explain the reasons, for which a query of press presenting different political options became a basic method of recognizing the attitude of the Polish political centers towards Greek-Turkish relations, especially in respect of Cyprus.

In the investigations it has been assumed that ideological and political differences, dividing Polish subjects, are reflected in the way of presenting the Cyprian question, the more so because it is an important element determining and shaping the Greek-Turkish relationships. And both these countries appear to be an essential component of the NATO's flank in political and military categories.

The questionnaire with questions, to which the answers were searched by analysis of different titles of press, included the following problems:

1. In what circumstances, when and for what reasons was the Cyprian problem presented to a reader?
2. How was the Cyprian problem defined? What, at estimation of the newspaper, constituted its essence and what its aspects? How was the genesis of this problem explained? To what elements was a special attention paid?
3. Was the conflict placed in a wider political context? (especially, in the context of Greek-Turkish relations, duration of the internal conflict within NATO, political changes in the Balkan Peninsula).
4. How were the activity and effectiveness of the international institutions and organizations, trying to solve the problem, perceived and estimated?
5. Was the lack of such solutions commented on and, if so, how was it done?
6. Was an attendance in the conflict of both countries concerned i. e. Greece and Turkey shown and, if so, how was it done? How was this attendance interpreted?
7. Was the attention paid to historical conditions of the problem, and if so, how far in the past were the roots of the quarrel found?
8. Were the consequences of duration of the quarrel presented? If so, to which elements a special attention was paid?
9. Was any forecast made? Were any possibilities of solution of this problem given? If so, what possibilities?

A separate group constituted the questions concerning the technique of presentation of the Cyprian problems used by individual titles on their columns. What journalistic forms were used? What was the relation between information and journalism? From what sources did the information come? Was it so called own information or agency news? From which agencies?

The press materials occurring in the columns of the major Polish political papers in 1991-1998 have been subjected to the analysis. It should be mentioned that this category includes both opinion creating daily newspapers of considerable edition such as "Rzeczpospolita" and "Gazeta Wyborcza", along with its weekly supplements, and those of much lower edition but with the same range of influence such as "Trybuna" – a daily paper connected with Social Democratic Party of the Republic of Poland and "Życie" representing the views of the centroright wing.

A common feature of all analyzed press titles is the fact that none of them is an official organ of a political party or a social organization. However, all of them have very univocal political lines allowing identification of the press titles with adequate environments but - it should be stressed - not with any organizations. In each case, the editors constitute journalist partnerships and co-operatives.

The weekly magazines such as "Wprost", "Polityka", Tygodnik Powszechny and "Tygodnik Solidarność" are reckoned among the major Polish political papers. However, it should be stated that generally these weekly magazines, irrespective of their political orientation, did not undertake widely understood Cyprian question. In the period under analysis only one publication concerned this subject [Andrzej Szostakiewicz – "Wyspa niepewności" (The Island of Uncertainty) – "Wprost", 1998-12-06]. The other titles only placed news agency information on current events in their weekly reviews of the events. This indicates that, from the point of view of publishers and editorial offices, the Cyprian question, along with its all contexts, was not considered to be essential. This is amazing, bearing in mind such international contexts.

The lack of publications, concerning a widely understood Cyprian question, in the columns of the Polish confession papers connected with the Polish organizational structures of the Catholic Church, can be explained by their nature and by the fact that they concentrated on the internal problems.

Generally, in the period from 1991 to 1998, 77 articles on the problems connected with the question concerned were discovered in the Polish political papers. Out of these, 50 articles provided more or less developed information and 22 – wider opinions which can be classified as political publications representing the views of the editorial staff and thus the opinions of political circles connected with them.

The quantity analysis of the press materials published allows for statement that “Rzeczpospolita” gave the most attention to the Cyprian question - 36 pieces of information and 12 publications. In the same time, 13 pieces of information and 9 journalist opinions (including one correspondence and one newspaper report from Cyprus) appeared in the columns of “Gazeta Wyborcza”. One publication occurred in “-ycie” and one in “Wprost”. Lower Silesian local press published 4 articles including 3 items of news agency information.

Part II “Rzeczpospolita”

A daily newspaper commonly regarded as the nearest to central state administration, which is considered to be a non-official organ of the government as its editor is a company in which the State Treasury has its shares. This financial connection was a reason that during the total period under analysis, i. e. from 1991 to 1998, regardless the composition of the governing coalition and efforts of the editorial staff, the opinion on this paper has not been changed.

The formula of the paper – informative daily newspaper - is a reason that the presence of individual threads and problems in its columns is decided by a course of the events in the world. Such a rule was also confirmed with respect to the Cyprian question. It was the events on the Island and around it that decided about the fact if and what information or commentary will be published. The frequency of occurrence of the widely understood Cyprian threads in the columns of this paper is as follows:

In 1991 there appeared 3 items of information in two subsequent issues dated 21 and 22 July, all of them being directly connected with the visit of the President of USA – George Bush in Athens and Ankara. Only one of them contained, apart from the news agency information about the visit, a specific catalogue of problems connected with Cyprus. The quarrel of Cyprus and assumption by the role of a mediator by the President (provided he does not want and cannot impose the parties any settlement) were mentioned in it as the most important issues. In the account signed as own information, the paper, emphasising the military role of Turkey both as a participant of the war with Kuwait and the place where American forces of quick response were stationed, gives one to understand, however does not state this directly, that Turkey is a more important partner to the USA than Greece. This suggestion is included in the statement that Ankara will purchase 160 fighters F-16, including 80 fighters for American credits. However, the division of Cyprus, indicated as the main reason of tensions between Greece and Turkey, was not discussed at all. [“Jak pogodziæ zwaœenionych”, Rzeczpospolita No 169, 1991-07-22].

In the next year i. e. 1992, “Rzeczpospolita” gave only one information about the Cyprian question. The text was published on June 21 along with extended information signed by a

journalist of the paper. It concerns, commencing in New York, direct Greek-Turkish negotiations under the auspices of Secretary General of UNO – Butros Ghal. This time the circumstances of division of the Island were touched: invasion of the Turkish army in 1974 and its consequences: the question of refugees, presence of the UNO army. The proposal of a solution of the problem – the federal state of Cyprian Greeks and Turks, prepared by UNO and initially accepted by both parties, was also indicated. However, the author of the information distinctly doubts in the success of peaceful negotiations. He puts emphasis on the fact that initial agreement of the parties is not sufficient to level the principal differences in the detailed questions: the division of the territory of the Island, principles of home-coming of the refugees, retreating the Turkish army [“Najwyższy czas na prześm”, “Rzeczpospolita” No 144, 1992-06-21].

In 1993 the daily undertook a widely understood Cyprian thread three times and this time these were exclusively own materials of the editorial staff. In connection with unrealised negotiations in New York, the paper published on June 17, an interview with the ambassador of Cyprian Republic – Andros A. Nicolaidis [“Podzielona wyspa”, “Rzeczpospolita No 139, 1993-06-17]. The point of view and evaluations of Cyprian Greeks were presented in it. The ambassador indicated the realised policy of ethnic purges as well as social and political consequences of the division of the Island, which becomes fixed. For the first time, a religious thread also appeared. The ambassador emphasised a religious motivation of actions of the Turkish party. When defining the Cyprian question, he perceived it not only as “unification of the country and getting off the foreign occupation but also as protection of the oldest in Europe Christian traditions.” However, it should be stated that the editorial staff did not undertake such an interpretation of the genesis of the conflict. In the same issue of the daily, its publicist – Teresa Stylińska – represents the view of the Turkish party. [Teresa Stylińska, “Denktasz nie wyklucza ustępstw, ale stawia warunki”, “Rzeczpospolita No 139, 1993-06-17]. The text, maintained in an objective tone, shows a basic inequality of the parties to the quarrel. It results from differences in a formal status. The leader of Cyprian Greeks is the president of the State recognised by the international community whereas the State of Cyprian Turks, officially recognised only by Ankara, is not capable to self-dependent existence both in economic and military aspects (the Turkish garrison of 35 thousand people is stationed here). This State is systematically subsidised or even maintained by the Turkish party. The commentary shows the function of the Cyprian question in the internal political contests in Turkey. Here, the attitude towards the Turkish community in the Island became a criterion of the patriotic attitude. Any concessions in favour of Cyprian Greeks are treated as a betrayal of the lively national interests of the Turkish Republic. So the author only presents the most important elements, determining the view of the Turkish party.

The reason, for which two major publications on the Cyprian question were placed in one issue, was the fact that the peaceful negotiations anticipated on June were not realised, despite verbal assurances of both parties. The editorial staff thought that a reader should be given some explanation why it was like that. The attention should be paid to the fact that both texts occurred in the same column under the characteristic title: “Dwugłos w sprawie Cypru” (Double voice about Cyprus). In the form, in which the problem was presented, you can see a care of editorial staff for keeping balance, at least, a formal one. As the official representative of law - the ambassador Nicolaidis presents the arguments of Cyprian Greeks, so it is a direct transmission. The view of another party, i. e. Cyprian Turks and Ankara was presented in a form of author’s account, so we deal with an indirect transmission where a form of the account is a specific commentary as well. This paradoxically confirms a journalist thesis of essential, procedural inequality of Cyprian parties to the quarrel, instrumental function of so

called North Cyprus and, more extensively, the Cyprian question in the Greek-Turkish relations.

In the analysis published two months later, the same author [Teresa Stylińska, "Dwie osie na Ba³kanach", "Rzeczpospolita No 191, 1993-08-17] mentions the Cyprian question as one of many elements determining the arrangement of political forces in Balkans. The division of the Island was regarded, at par with the quarrel of the Aegean Sea and the problem of ethnic minority, as an evident symptom of the Greek-Turkish conflict, which were something more than a quarrel of a land itself. In the interpretation made by the paper, an essence of the conflict is a generally different concept of the roles played by antagonists in the east part of the Aegean Sea and in Balkans. For Greeks, the question of major importance is their north border and relationships with the States formed after disintegration of Yugoslavia. The problem of Macedonia is of special importance; in that case both a territory and various traditions are concerned (Greeks lay a considerable stress on this). This is proved by unhesitating objection both to the name - Macedonia and the emblem – "Stars of Vergina" used by the north neighbour. The price that Greece paid for non-admittance to the official recognition of Macedonia by European Community (isolation in Community, cooling in the relations with Russia) testifies to the importance that Greeks attach to the traditions and symbols. In the author's opinion, very real fears of possible putting forward the territorial claims by the north neighbours are behind Greeks' inflexibility with respect to the symbols. This concerns not only Macedonia but also Albania (the quarrel of Epir) and Bulgaria. Such elements are to decide about the attitude of Greece toward Serbia, which is perceived as a traditional anti-Turkish ally, constituting religious community with Greece. According to the author of the analysis, the religious solidarity occurring in the Balkan politics of Turkey does not play such a substantial role. The basic goal of Ankara is gaining a position of the main partner of the West in the region. Both the activity of Turkey (fully supported by the USA) in the Muslim States formed after disintegration of the Soviet Union and mitigation of the quarrel with Bulgaria, concerning ethnic problems, are to serve this purpose.

The rivalry for the position of the number one regional partner between Turkey and Greece can lead to crystallising a permanent division in Balkans. Each of the parties, by using also historical arguments, organises its own political base. The author is reckoning Serbia and, if necessary, Romania among the Greek camp, whereas Bulgaria, Albania and Macedonia – among the Turkish camp. Possible consolidation and formalisation of the division can lead to extension of the ethnic and religious conflicts on the whole peninsula and to weakening the south NATO flank.

It should be emphasised that in the analysis presented, A Cyprian thread was mentioned as one of many areas of the quarrel. The author made a specific classification of the problems according to hierarchy, placing them in a wider context. From this context it appears univocally that both parties consider the division of the Island to be an instrument of exerting pressure, in a selected period, on their rivals and on the most important ally – the USA.

According to the author and thereby - editorial staff, a basic problem present the questions concerning possible changes in the arrangement of forces in Balkans, extension of the ethnic conflicts and potential influence of such events on the political and military structure and effectiveness of NATO.

The editorial staff of "Rzeczpospolita" put off the 20th anniversary of Turkish invasion on Cyprus, which falls to 20 July 1994, with two texts only. A short occasional report from

Nicosia [Joanna Majewska, “Œwiat zapomnia³ o Cyprze”, “Rzeczpospolita” No 239, 1994-12.18.] presents the life of the divided Island from the point of view of old people – refugees from the north. Their statements, full of apathy and doubts as to the possibility of repeated unification of the Island, are a background for presentation of different proposals of solving the problem. An informative function of the text is excellently reflected by the title: “Kto za, a kto przeciw podzia³owi?” (who is for and who against the division?) [“Rzeczpospolita No 293, 1994-12.18].

The attention should be paid to the fact that it is the first text in “Rzeczpospolita” connecting clearly the Turkish invasion of 20 July 1974 with the coup d’etat of 15 July 1974. At that time the supporters of *enosis* overturned the President Makarios, in full co-operation with and support of the Greek authorities. Both occasional texts treat the Cyprian question as Greek-Turkish contest about the Island and its inhabitants. The title question is considered just from this point of view.

The Cyprian question occurred in the text reporting a successive stage of tensions as one of many elements determining the Greek-Turkish relations. This time, the reason of sharpening was a possibility of extending, by states-signatories, the zone of territorial waters from 6 to 12 sea miles, which was foreseen by the Convention of Sea Law signed in Caracas in 1982. Greece signed the Convention, which came into force on 16 November 1994, but Turkey did not do this. “Rzeczpospolita”, with a pen of its journalist [Teresa Stylińska, “GroŸba wojny na osiem szpalt”, “Rzeczpospolita” No 222, 1994-09-23] explains the reasons and motives of the decisions of both parties. The author shows an international context, especially the problems of tensions that led to a direct threat of employing armed forces, in full, between the allies of NATO. The basic reason of such a situation is generally different treatment of the Aegean Sea by both parties. For Greeks, it is a normal sea area, so the Convention of Caracas can apply here. According to the Turkish party, it is a closed area, so the Convention cannot apply and the division should be made through bilateral agreements. In the case of applying the signed rules, 71.5% of the sea area would belong to Greece; in practice, it would be the internal Greek sea, bearing in mind that only 8.8% of its area would belong to Turkey. In detail, location of the Greek islands nearly at the Turkish coasts could be the reason that Turkish shipping would lose freedom of movement. The author concentrates on the current events and lays stress on the long duration of the conflict and lack of prospects of the solution.

The Cyprian question has been mentioned here only as one of several permanent reasons, which serve the parties to provoke the tensions. This, in turn, serves for exerting the pressure on the protagonist and allies, especially on the USA.

The situation changed at the beginning of 1996 when impetuous quarrel of a small (some 400 m²), deserted and rocky island named by Greeks – Imia and Kardak by Turks, situated in the archipelago of Dodokanes, took place. This little island of no economic or strategic importance became, for both parties, a pretext for manifestation of uncompromising attitude towards territorial claims of the neighbour. Both parties mobilised not only public opinion but also armed forces. In the statements of the ministers of both governments, a very sharp rhetoric occurred. In parallel to the mobilisation of the forces, the parties demonstrated their rights to the island. Each of them referred to the treaty with Italy. Athens referred to the treaty of 1947 and Ankara to that of 1932. The activities undertaken by the parties and determination, not only in a verbal sphere, threatened even with the outbreak of the open armed conflict within NATO. Such a situation forced the diplomatic service of the USA to undertake mediations. Deputy Secretary of State – Richard Holbroke after all-night phone

consultations, brought about the withdrawal of their naval forces from the disputable land. "Rzeczpospolita" informed its readers about these events in 4 texts. Two of them were terse dispatches and the other two – own editorial statements with a commentary. Considering the merits of the US diplomatic service, especially those of Holbroke's, "a man who managed to achieve a peace in Bosnia" [T. T. S "Dyplomatyczny sukces USA," "Rzeczpospolita" No 27, 1996-02-27], the author suggests that he should undertake an attempt of solving the Cyprian question.

However, it should be clearly stated that Holbroke's actions, undertaken within so called "Aegean mission", were evaluated negatively by the Greek authorities. This is why Athens undertook an extensive diplomatic campaign. In consequence, Holbroke's visit to Ankara was recalled. Another tool of exerting the pressure on Turkey was announcing the blockade of the EU financial aid for Ankara. Large sums were at stake – some USD 500 million.

This information was repeated in the commentary of the editorial staff, published on 24 February 1996, [Teresa Stylińska, "Cierń u boku sojuszników", "Rzeczpospolita" no 29. 1996-02-04]. The whole text devoted to Holbroke's "Aegean mission", which failed, shows numerous reasons of hostility between the allies. For the first time, a historical argument was defined accurately and referred to the overthrow of Byzantium and nearly 400 years of Turkish reign. In addition, the Cyprian thread was determined as a historical argument. However, the author considered contemporary events, mutual accusations of breaking by Greece the embargo imposed on Serbia, participation of the Turkish volunteers in the military actions on the side of the Bosnian. Quite a new element, extending a sphere of conflict and hindering a possible solution of the question, is an attitude of Greece to the Kurdish problem. The visit in the headquarters of the Kurdish Workers' Party conducting the fight with the central government in Turkey, paid by a group of Greek deputies in summer 1995, embittered the situation. All this brings about a very serious threat for stability of the whole region. Just in such categories, the editorial staff perceived it. Their thesis on key importance of the relationships between Ankara and Athens for the region was supported by a statement of Holbroke himself: "As long as normalisation of the relations between Greece and Turkey does not occur the whole region will nor be stable"[*ibidem*]

A specific confirmation of fatigue of the international opinion with Cyprus is a way, in which the editorial office treated the information about shooting Cyprian Greek by the Turkish soldiers. The information is not complete; only the name of the victim and circumstances of the case were given, which were, as usual, different in the reports of the parties.[*"Rzeczpospolita" No 240, 1996-10-14.* In the text, a statement can be found that it was not the only accident in that year. In August, two people were killed in a similar way and, from that time, in the Island, which has been divided since 1974, there has remained a state of tension. Both the informative contents of a paragraph, its size (so called size one), place in the column of the review of daily events and the used words hackneyed the tragedy. This diminished the death of human being to a measure, which in the basic question, i. e. with respect to the extending tension between Ankara and Athens, lasting for several dozen years, is only of statistic importance.

The picture of widely understood Greek-Turkish relations, presented to readers in 1997, was a little modified. In accordance with the so far scheme, the Cyprian thread is perceived as the most spectacular element of such relations, but a course of events introduced new elements to the columns. Firstly, a decision of Cyprian authorities to purchase 20 Russian anti-aircraft missiles S-300 may change the arrangement of forces in the Island itself, and enable Cyprian

Greeks to achieve their goals in Turkey; all these will complicate substantially a difficult peaceful process. Such an opinion was expressed not only by the daily but also by observers. Secondly, the transaction which, at least, will be accepted by Athens means indirect involvement of the next partner -Russia into the conflict; this seems to be even more important. This transaction is a clear signal of possible Greek-Russian rapprochement. From the NATO's point of view, it is a very threatening signal as it substantially changes measure of tensions between the allies. According to the paper, military consolidation of Cyprus – its Greek part - has to cause the reaction both from the side of the Turkish community on the Island itself and in Ankara. This means initiation of armaments race together with all its consequences. [“Rzeczpospolita” No 6, 1997-01-08]. Although the Greek party declared intention to mitigate the tension, it emphasised, at the same time, that the decision on purchasing the Russian missiles had been made by authorities of sovereign country.

Apart from a procedural argument, there will appear information that Greece accuses Turkey of conducting military preparations since 1995, aiming at modification of the sea borders at the Aegean Sea. In Greeks' opinion, the aggressive attitude of Ankara is confirmed both by official announcement of damaging the stands of missiles and maintenance the military expenditures at the regular level of 5% whereas Greece reduced such expenditures from 6% in 1980 to 4.8 % in 1997 [ibidem].

In the commentary bearing a very trivial headline, the editorial staff, as usually with a pen of Teresa Stylińska [Teresa Stylińska, “Ma³a Kuba” (Small Cuba), “Rzeczpospolita”No 11, 1997-01-11], determines the decision on purchase of the missiles as threatening one. However, according to the author, there is not any danger in military aspects – the outbreak of the open war is rather impossible – but in political aspects. The only party, which gains material benefits and, above all political advantages, is Russia. In this text, the author, securing herself with a world “probably”, informs that Russia is going to come back to the “forgotten idea” about international conference on Cyprus, with its share. This means that Russia is going to participate actively in the Mediterranean policy and to return to a role of world-power, without which no problems can be solved.

In the analysed commentary, another very important thesis is included. The quantity of gun collected on both sides of the demarcation line, along with considerable ethnic tensions, can initiate a chain reaction, which can become uncontrolled. There is a danger that in a certain moment after the subsequent sharpening, despite a good will it can be impossible to prevent from avalanche of events and outbreak of bloody conflict. The pessimistic scenario may happen as no chances for solution of the Cyprian question are seen and many years' efforts of diplomatic services of the allies from NATO, UNO or European Union did not bring any effects. “Because it is difficult to assent the achievement of partial solutions, such as postponing installation of the missiles in Cyprus by 16 months, as the success”.

The military demonstrations, carefully prepared and precisely dosed to the international community, military demonstrations, purchases of weapon and joint manoeuvres under cryptonyms provoking the other party and actions of air forces in disputable zones appear to be permanent elements associating the subsequent attempts of undertaking direct or indirect negotiations. They always aim at consolidation of their own position and weakening the tendering position of the partner. The scheme of such activity is as follows: we are ready to undertake the peaceful negotiations but the other party does not want to do this. The basic problem in the case of Cyprus is a formula of possible unification of the Island. Both parties agree for a federal formula, however, for each of them this means something different. The

principle of equality of the parties is interpreted differently. Both Cyprian communities understand their security in different way and look for different political and military solutions. North Cyprus is integrated with Turkey, the south- with Greece. As a result of the division , which kept consolidating for many years, the chances of the success of the next peaceful negotiations grow smaller. The more so because the both Cyprian parties are only an instrument of interests of their principals and protectors, for whom, first of all, Cyprus is, a field of prestige quarrel. From obvious reasons, none of the parties can suffer a defeat such as, for instance, concession in favour of their neighbours. The attitude of both parties of possible dialogue is the reason, for which successive attempts, slowly but regularly, become a ritual in the international relations. However, nothing results from this ritual.

Such theses can be found in the commentaries and analyses presented in the columns of “Rzeczpospolita” in connection with the negotiations between the two leaders of Cyprian communes – Kleridis and Denktasz in July [Teresa Stylińska, “Nikt nie bawi siê w prorocstwa”, “Rzeczpospolita” No 158, 1997-07-09].

Even more expressively, helplessness of not only international community but also of the most important ally of both sides – the USA was emphasised in the commentary of October. Its last sentences provide an excellent recapitulation of the situation. “Greeks and Turks do not wage war. But nobody, even the biggest world-power, has a recipe for that how to force them to arrive at agreement [Teresa Stylińska, “Wojna na manewry”, “Rzeczpospolita” No 244, 1997-10-18].

Another area of the quarrel, but also a tool for exerting pressure on the other party and allies, become the question of admitting Cyprus (formally uniform state structure) to European Union. The decision of Union on invitation of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia and Slovenia to negotiations, at simultaneous extension of UE by Turkey, complicated this not easy situation. In practice, a Turkish thesis on basic inequality of the parties was confirmed. Turkey with its military potential is a major military partner of NATO – “ a front-line country” and a barrier separating the West from the world of Islamic fundamentalists. In this role, appreciate it both its European partners and, what is very important for this country - USA. But, on the other hand, European Union does not want and cannot accept the behaviour of Ankara towards ethnic minorities (Kurdish question), breaking the human rights, no acceptance for the rules of free market and regular restricting the freedom of press. The commissioner for extension of EU – Hans van den Broeke, during his stay in Ankara in November 1997, presented the Turkish authorities a decision of “15,” which was accepted by Turkey very coldly. The latter perceived it, especially the motives indicated by the administration of Union, as an evidence of discriminating Turkey - not only in relation to its “age-long rival” – Greece. Invitation of the Cyprian Republic for access negotiations, with omission of the political structures of Cyprian Turks, was perceived as expression of univocal support of Union for Greece. It was acknowledged that the invitation directed to the post-communist countries of Central Europe with refusal of undertaking negotiations with Turkey – a NATO member at the same time, requires a strong-minded action. Among the measures possible to be applied by the Turkish part, the correspondent of the daily mentioned: 1. First , refusal of ratifying the decision concerning admittance of new members to NATO, i.e. Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. 2. Annexation of the north part of Cyprus occupied for 22 years. Such a move is to be a reaction for actual annexing the Island to Greece; Ankara interprets possible admission of Cyprus to Union with omission of Turkey like that [Jêdrzej Bielecki, “Szantażowanie Cyprem”, “Rzeczpospolita” No 257, 1997-11-04]. 3. Commence of a diplomatic offensive via the USA. A visit of the leader of Turkish government in

Washington that, contrary to Union, appreciates “significance of Turkey for security of the West and freezing the relationships between Turkey and Union at the same time aim at intensifying the pressure on “15” so that it reckons Turkey among the candidates to European Union [M. W. “Wzajemne groŹby”, “Rzeczpospolita” No 293, 1997-12-17].

For both parties a question of presence of Cyprus and absence of Turkey in the group of potential members of “15” have, apart from economical aspects, a considerable political and prestige significance. Since this determines an attitude of the institutional international community towards the fact of division of the Island and ways as well as circumstances under which this came about. For the two parties, it is an instrument for exerting pressure both on the allies and rival.

The problem of installing the missiles of medium range S-300 bought in Russia, which appeared again in 1998 after 16 months of “freezing”, served such actions. This caused firm objection of Ankara and concern of the other members of NATO. In this case, the argument was the fact that installation of the system gives a possibility of radar control of the allied forces by the states from outside the treaty. In this contest, a possible change of the missile system into a weaker one, became a tendering element of Greece and its Cyprian collaborates.

In sum, the controversies ended with prestige defeat of Greeks; under the pressure of their American allies they have to resign installation of the system in Cyprus [S. G. “Cypr bez rosyjskiej broni”, “Rzeczpospolita” No 305, 1998-12-31]. To some extent in the shade of the quarrel concerning the missiles, the parties celebrated 24th anniversary of the invasion.

The problem of participation of Cyprus in Union appeared to be another cause of a quarrel. Cyprian Turks declared readiness to peaceful negotiations for withdrawal of the objection and gaining “certain rights” for Turkey. They aimed at forming a state in Cyprus with a formula of confederation. According to Greeks, this will mean procedural acceptance of the division for which they cannot agree [T. T. S. “Dzielenie czy 31czenie”, “Rzeczpospolita” No 204, 1998-09-01].

Correlation between the presence of Poland in the Euro-Atlantic structures and the Cyprian question has been discussed in the commentaries of editorial staff, connected with visits of the Polish president in Athens in April 1998. During this visit, the Greek party formed non-officially *iunctim* between admission of Poland and Cyprus to Union [M. W. “Obietnice z Cyprem w tle”, “Rzeczpospolita”, No 82 1998-07-82]

The same thesis, enriched with argumentation connected with internal relations and international conditions of the Greek policy, was brought forward in the commentary on the visit of Prime Minister – Kostas Simitasits in Poland. [Teresa Stylińska” , “Strach przed drug¹ kategori¹”, “Rzeczpospolita”, No 263, 1998-11-09]. The author indicated instrumental treatment of the Cyprian thread by Greek authorities, almost in all aspects. For the use of a Polish reader, there was exposed an opinion that doubts and fears, presented sometimes by Greek authorities, as to admission of Poland and other post-communist countries to European Union, resulted exclusively from the realised by Greeks conception of consolidating its own position in Union. The attempts aiming at activation of commencing pre-access negotiations with Cyprus and simultaneous blockade or hindering further co-operation between Union and Turkey were to serve in gaining this goal.

Generally, it should be stated that the formula of the paper – informative daily newspaper – had a basic influence on frequency of occurrence of the Cyprian subject matter in the columns of the paper. Current events, successive sharpens of the situation on the Island itself, possible chances of peace negotiations, diplomatic visits etc. are the reasons for which the editorial staff published the information and, from time to time, at very important moments,- their own commentaries and analyses.

The query performed entitles to the following statements. The editorial staff, with a pen of its leading expert – Teresa Stylińska, defines the Cyprian question as follows. The division of the historically developed, multiethnic and many-religious Cyprian community took place under the influence of quite contemporary political ambitions of the local leaders (Cyprian ones) correlated with pending, for many dozens of years or even hundreds of years, Greek and Turkish rivalry. During a discussion with the ambassador of Cyprus, the arguments of religious nature were also presented [“Podzielona wyspa”, “Rzeczpospolita No 139, 1993-06-17]. It should be emphasised that the editorial staff did not accept interpreting the conflict in terms of religious differences, proposed by the ambassador. In practice, a historical context of the quarrel has been limited to 20th century and, in detail, to the early 1950s. However, we can find single sentences informing about specified events such as international treaties, conferences etc. in the 1930s. A reader gains as much information as the editorial staff (author) thinks it is necessary for understanding the current events. According to the editorial staff, a course of such events is as follows. Cyprus delivered from the English became a sovereign State with the guaranties of Great Britain, Turkey and Greece. In practice, considering the ethnic composition, Cyprian Greeks dominated the State. The weaker, also in economic aspects, Turkish community was looking for a support from Ankara, with success. In this point the editorial staff puts stress not on historical but on strategic motives of actions of the Turkish party. The principal question is domination at the Aegean Sea, number and location of the Greek islands directly at the Turkish coasts, which, in practice, would give the Greek party a control of the sea. From the Ankara’s point of view, this means a blockade of its west coasts. Cyprus, dominated by Greeks, provides such a blockade from the south. The editorial staff in the background presents the essential reason of the quarrel. These are not historical questions but tending of both states i. e. Greece and Turkey to attain a position of the main partner of NATO, in fact – the USA, in this important region as far as the military strategy is concerned. Existence and political activity of the Soviet Union limited a significance of the south flank of NATO. In this period, for the demographic and geographic reasons, Turkey was considered by the USA to be a more important partner. In its eagerness for changing this situation, the Greek party, during the reign of so called “Black colonels” supported the existing on the Island movement aiming at formal union of the Island with Greece. This was also dictated by a need of autocratic authorities to make an external success. The goal of possible union was to satisfy national ambitions of Greeks and , in a distant plan – to make the public opinion on the military government change. A measure leading to the goal was to be a coup d’etat in Cyprus – overthrow of presidency of Archbishop Makarios. The actions undertaken by the supporters of *enosis* encountered immediate reaction of the Turkish party. Although the invasion on north Cyprus, made by this party in 1974, was provoked, what was distinctly stated by the editorial staff [T. Stylińska, “Denktasz nie wyklucza ustępstw”, “Rzeczpospolita” No 139, 1993-06-17], it created a new quality and complicated difficult Greek-Turkish relationships. It is enough to mention that Turkey, with a population of 60 million people, has an army of 800 thousand soldiers at its disposal, whereas Greece, with its 10 million inhabitants, raises 250 thousand soldiers. According to Turkey, the invasion on Cyprus was justified by necessity of protecting the Turkish minorities, threatened with the plans of annexation made by Cyprian Greeks and Athens [Teresa Stylińska, “Daleko od

antyku”, „Rzeczpospolita” No 150, 1996-06-30]. All the arguments of the parties, quoted by the paper, allow reducing the essence of the quarrel to confrontation of the military arguments. In this sphere, supremacy of the Turkish party is obvious, and not the size of the military potential is important, but its significance to the main partner i. e. for the USA. This means, in practice, that a Turkish position in confrontation with Greece is determined, first of all, by special relations connecting Turkey with the USA. These, in turn, are determined by the strategic goals of the USA and NATO. According to the daily, the Greek party is aware of Turkish predominance and so, it undertook an attempt of strengthening its position by playing an active role in Balkans. This became possible after disintegration of the communist system, especially after the changes in Yugoslavia. According to „Rzeczpospolita”, Greece has all particulars to become the regional leader in Balkans. This country is a member of NATO and European Union, has a stabilised internal situation. After overthrow of the government of “black colonels”, a stable, democratic system was formed. Along with the elements of Orthodox and anti-Turkish traditions, such values may be the reason that Greece can become an important partner for the countries in region, organiser of their co-operation and possible mediator in a process of pacification of so numerous quarrels. On the other hand, obtaining by Greece such a position in Balkan means that its position in relation to NATO and USA will be consolidated. Greeks hope that in such a way they will become for the USA at least as important partner in a field of regional policy as Turkey is in a military sphere. The paper explains rapprochement with Serbia, the attitude of Greece towards Bosnian question, the attitude towards Miloszewicz etc. by this fact. The opinions and evaluations, expressed by the paper, are made in a context of the Mediterranean Sea or globally, if this concerns efficiency and effectiveness of the allied system – NATO. Such prospects is a reason that the Cyprian problem is treated as an element of much wider political game. All these what happens in Cyprus was perceived and evaluated in instrumental categories. The basic question asked by the daily is, how the Cyprian problem, understood very widely and comprising all these what happens on the Island itself and around it, will influence on the integrity of NATO.

Such a prospect should not be surprising since Poland declared a desire to join NATO. In a context of such Poland’s efforts, it does not matter who, in a specified situation, is right and which arguments are used etc. The fundamental thing is only the fact that NATO, to which we aspire, is not able to solve its internal problems. From this observations the daily concludes that both at description and analysis of the quarrel, there is no reason to refer to historical arguments of the parties. All the more, to assume a univocal attitude, to pass evaluations or to take sides with somebody, if the essence of the whole matter is necessity of selecting, by the USA, the main major partner in the region. To begin from the early 1990s, the Cyprian question and the Greek-Turk quarrel were of concern of the Polish political elites for one reason only. If and possibly how this will influence the process of Poland’s entering into the NATO structures. From this point of view, the fact if the individual incidents will be explained to a reader or if a genesis of conflict will be presented, is of little importance. Will the reader be informed about the truth? From the Polish point of view, in accordance with a thesis of the newspaper, it does not matter who in the quarrel is right.

As long as nothing will directly threaten Polish presence in NATO, the fact that international communities are not able to solve this problem does matter, too. This means that, from the point of view of Polish interests, readiness for accepting each solution is acceptable, if it does not cause disintegration or weakening of NATO.

The analyses and commentaries published were based on earlier information and repetition of its content was to be confirmed. The authenticated, in this way, simple items of information,

due to their repeating in the commentary, provided the basis for drawing conclusions. As it was mentioned, the editorial staff is really interested only in one question: Will the Cyprian problem, especially its consequences, influence the process of Poland's entering into the NATO structures? This means that, in fact, the Cyprian question is not of concern of the editorial staff. The latter even does not try to define their attitude towards individual aspects, which form the widely understood Cyprian question. It only confines itself to relating the events after press agencies. The descriptions are general and they are presented at random.

A characteristic feature of the opinion on the Cyprian question, presented in "Rzeczpospolita", is perceiving this problem only in terms of a political or diplomatic game. The game of Greece or Turkey for support from the USA, the final goal of which is a desire of both parties to reach the position of the main partner of the USA in the region. Treating the quarrel of Cyprus as a game is a reason that the picture of the conflict in the columns of the paper was dehumanised. Although the information may include some news about people, the sufferings of individual people and the whole communities are not of concern of the editorial staff or parties to the quarrel, unless they can be used as arguments. Therefore in the columns of "Rzeczpospolita", there are not accounts on Cyprus, Greece or Turkey which would present the problem from the point of view of human being involved in history. There are no refugees or social problems. The convention, obligatory to the editorial staff, of perceiving the occurrences exclusively in terms of a political game is a reason that there are no threads regarding observation of widely understood human rights. There are no broader, apart from strictly informative, references towards the sphere of culture, custom or religion. It is only a game, the elements of which are also the efforts of international organisations such as UNO, European Union or NATO to find a solution of the Cyprian question. The editorial staff of "Rzeczpospolita" noticed such efforts. In the opinion of the daily, although this thesis has not been articulated directly, they will not lead to any solution, unless this is the complex solution restructuring the whole region. Whereas, from the logic of the political game it appears univocally that the parties involved in the quarrel are not interested in such a solution. This means that unless the external factor occurs, influencing the whole defensive system of the West (in the past the Soviet Union, along with its satellite states, performed such a role), no quarrel including the Cyprian question will be solved. From the picture presented by "Rzeczpospolita" it appears that all the parties to the Cyprian conflict, both states and ethnic groups, take care for keeping control of the quarrel. It is important not to go beyond narrow limits of making use of the conflict in the political game.

III. "Gazeta Wyborcza".

The paper with the biggest edition in all Poland has a non-questioned position of the most opinion-creating daily. The paper is connected with the political environment of Unia Wolności (one of Polish political parties). However, it is not an official organ of any political organisation. When "Gazeta Wyborcza" occurred in the Polish readers' market, it was the innovating formula of the political journalism. One of the basic elements of this formula was a clear, also with respect to graphics, separation of the author's commentary from the information. The editorial staff generally tries to follow this principle.

Paradox of "Gazeta Wyborcza" resolves itself into the fact that a volume of edition is not in line with the electoral decisions of its readers. The paper is supplemented, in a weekly cycle, with numerous additions assigned for different groups of the readers. The biggest of them – "Magazyn Gazety" is in fact an independent, illustrated weekly magazine. This wide range of editorial forms allows for better influencing the reader. The information, transmitted to a

reader in the cable service, can be repeated in a bit changed form either in special addition or as one of elements of the journalistic texts in the Magazine". In each case, we deal with intensification of the propagandist transmission. However, "Gazeta Wyborcza" proves that formal, quantity range of influence need not be directly in line with a range of political influence, measured by electoral decisions of the readers. To be familiar with the mechanism of this phenomenon, further specialist investigations are required.

The picture of the Cyprian question drawn by "Gazeta Wyborcza" is composed of several basic elements: 1. The situation on the Island and genesis of partitions. 2. Cyprus as an element of the Greek-Turkish quarrel. 3. Cyprus presented as an instrument of the parties, both in their internal and foreign policies. According to the editorial staff, the parties are not Cyprian ethnic communities but the states formally recognised by the international community, first of all, Greece and Turkey as well as the Cyprian Republic, although the latter is not perceived as an independent subject.

In 1933 the Cyprian question occurred in the columns of "Gazeta Wyborcza" only once as a fragment of the analysis of expose of the new Greece's Prime Minister- Andreas Papandreu. The author reports in short the latest history of Cyprus, to begin with 1960 i. e. since the Island gained independence. This article appeared under the characteristic subtitle "Jak to z Cyprem by³o" (How it was with Cyprus") [Miros³aw Banasik, "Emieszy, tumani przestrasza...", "Gazeta Wyborcza" No 250, 1993-10-25]. The basic thesis of the report is a statement that Turkey has not any business in annexing other parts of Cyprus, except for those, which have been already possessed by this country. So, loud prognostications of Papandreu, threatening Turkey with a war, are assigned, first of all, for the internal use. In the author's opinion, they are to "consolidate popularity" of this politician (ibidem), to shade an obvious necessity (motivated by the condition of economy) of withdrawing most election promises. Although genesis and chronology of the events, leading to the present division of the Island, have been presented, the Cyprian question, as such, is not substantial for the editorial staff; the important thing is instrumental treating this problem by Greek socialists.

The editorial staff paid attention to international contexts of the widely understood Cyprian question in the subsequent years. In the correspondence from Brussels [Ma³gorzata Alterman, "Z Cyprem wejœæ do Unii", "Gazeta Wyborcza", No 32, 1995-02-07], the stress was put on the tendering nature of negotiations on accession of Cyprus to Union. For the promise of commencing negotiations, Greece was to agree for signing the customs union of "15" with Turkey. The Greek demands regarding the retreat of the Turkish armed forces from Cyprus and partitions within Union are of the correspondent's concern only to the extent, which may influence the success of Poland's efforts. The important question is if the attitude of Greece will cause a delay in negotiations with Poland concerning the access. In this case, the authors treated the division of Cyprus as an obvious element, too. They remembered a reader the circumstances and genesis of the division, but the latter itself was not of their concern. The influence of the partitions within Union, generated by the Cyprian conflict, in a course of negotiations with Poland is also important.

A specific supplement to the picture of the Cyprian question, drawing the reader's attention to a particular role of the Island in the international financial turnover was, quoted after "International Herald Tribune", the information about the presence of Serbian and Russian assets in the Cyprian, very liberal banking system. According to American sources, out of 2 thousand Russian firms, a considerable number belongs to mafia and serve for laundering "dirty" money. According to the same sources, out of 500 Serbian firms, about 30 is

connected with the government and participates actively in breaking the economic isolation of Serbia. That is why "Gazeta" published this information. Here, not Cyprus and its problems were important, however, if occasion arises, the reader receives some additional information about the role that the Island performs in the events in former Yugoslavia. The main information, quoted after the American press, was accusation of depositing the Serbian war-funds in Cyprus ["Cyrlic¹ na Cyprze", "Gazeta Wyborcza" No 144,1995-06-23]. Although the editorial staff did not formulate this thesis directly, it suggested that a reason of the uncompromising standpoint of Cyprian authorities was actual acceptance of the Island's division by the USA and NATO and its role as an instrument in the Greek-Turkish quarrel.

A peculiar confirmation of perceiving, by the paper, the Cyprian question as one of many items in the catalogue of reasons of tensions between these two states was a manner of presentation of sea border problems and circumstances of ratification of the UNO Convention of Sea Law. At the same time, the paper presented peculiar records of divergences, the list of unsolved problems, which cannot be solved. A characteristic thing is that the editorial staff places the division of Cyprus at the same level as the question of sea borders at the Aegean Sea. However, these two problems were only illustrations or arguments, confirming the basic quarrel concerning admission of Turkey to European Union ["Krok od wojny egejskiej", "Gazeta Wyborcza" No 127, 1995-06-02]. Agency cables provided a basic material for presentations. "Gazeta" supplements the picture of complex relations between quarrelled states and nations with the correspondence from Tracja, touching a subject of Turkish minority in Greece [Andreas Liani, "Inna Europa", "Gazeta Wyborcza", No 14, 1996-01-17]. This material does not directly refer to the Cyprian question, even in a wider context. A substantial goal of its publications seems to be presentation of the references, very important for the editorial office and generally for the political circle connected with "Gazeta". These concern the rights of individuals as well as ethnic and religious minorities, and the standards binding in European Union, which the editorial staff regards as their own. The correspondence illustrates a thesis that restriction of the freedom of individuals and groups is both the effect and the reason of social, economical and, first of all, political tensions and influences international relations. The thesis itself is not specially revealing, however, in this case the important thing is what factographic material illustrates and confirms this thesis and from which disputable area it comes. By occasion, a reader gains additional information supplementing a register of reasons and indications of the Greek-Turkish conflict. The conflict of the rock (Imia/Kardak), reported on the turn of January and February 1996, became an opportunity to show the essential goals of the actions of the parties. In the commentaries of David Warszawski, added to agency cables to be selected, a stress was laid on internal mobilising functions of the quarrel, on one hand, and their international connotations, on the other hand. In this plan, the conflict is perceived as a test determining the attitude of the USA towards the parties to the quarrel. According to Warszawski, the USA declared for Turcja. As a consequence, anti-American public feelings will occur in Greece and stiffening of the Athen's attitude towards the European ambitions of Ankara will take place. ["Spór o ska³ę", "Gazeta Wyborcza, 1996-01-31; "Odwrót ze sztandarem", "Gazeta Wyborcza", 1996-02-01]. In this place, a manner, in which the editorial office made use of agency cables, should be indicated. A characteristic feature of "Gazeta" was aggregation of cables, provided with a joint title, in which basic information was contained. A signature was characteristic as it included the names of all the agencies the cables of which were used, as well as the initials of the journalist of "Gazeta", who made the selection. As a matter of fact, we dealt with journalist's – author's report of the content of cables and not with the content of cables itself. A collective signature is a reason that no information can be attributed to a specified agency. The author's commentary, is signed individually. So, the requirement of

distinct separation of information from a commentary was formally fulfilled, however in practice, we dealt with manipulation. It is like that because the author of the commentary not only selected the cables-information but also reported them instead of quoting. The collective signature disables one univocally from indicating the origin of a specified piece of information, its source and from separation of the facts from opinions. With respect to widely understood Balkan problems, including the Cyprian question as an element of Greek-Turkish relations (Dawid Warszawski – *ibidem*), we do not know and, due to the techniques used by the editorial staff, we will not know which fragment of the text is a commentary - the opinion of a given agency, and which part comes from a journalist of “Gazeta”.

The texts, which have been mentioned so far, touched a subject of the Cyprian question in the limited range only. They served for sketching a background rather than for presentation of the international and internal contexts of the problem or indication of general goals of action of the parties. In 1996, only two texts directly refer to the Cyprian question. On February 29, “Gazeta” published a discussion of Dawid Warszawski with Rauf Dentasz. An opportunity for presentation of the opinion of Cyprian Turks on genesis, course and consequences of the conflict on the Island was the private visit of their leader in Poland [“Niech Grecy nie myœl¹, ¿e ujdzie im na sucho”, “Gazeta Wyborcza, No 51, 1996-02-29]. Uncompromising standpoint of the Cyprian Turkish party, emphasised in the discussion, the arguments brought forward by Dentasz, both procedural ones and those taken from a practice of every day life, are to confirm univocally inability to return to the situation from before 1974, i. e. to the formula of the joint State of both ethnic groups. According to Turks, Cyprian Greeks are to blame for all this; from the beginning i.e. since the moment of origin of independent Cyprus in 1960 they have been tending towards dominating the Turkish community and annexation of Cyprus to Greece. They were going to reach this goal through military operations but they lost a direct encounter. From the times of the Turkish military intervention in 1974, all the actions undertaken by Athens are to lead to reversal of the situation. However, an actual division of the Island, in all possible planes including political sphere, has already been done. More important still is the fact that, in the international relations, this is a *de facto* state although not *de jure* accepted. The social, ethnographic and political arguments, named in the discussion by Dentasz, served a journalist of “Gazeta” as a general indication of the general source of conflict rather than for presenting the standpoint and opinions of the interlocutor (however, this is made, too).

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The thesis of Warszawski, formulated in the commentary to the discussion, links the conflict on the Island, and generally the Cypriot question, with the fundamental inconsistency between the 19th century tradition of perceiving national questions and the standard of European Union which all the parties to the conflict want to join.

“The Cypriot question” pictured by “Gazeta” , generally with a pen of Dawid Warszawski, is a quarrel fought in 19th century, justified by the nationalism of both parties. The quarrel, the stake of which, apart from outdated prestige satisfactions, are very measurable benefits which may result from affiliation of the states of the parties to modern political and economic European structures.

Nature and obstinacy of the conflict is confirmed by the information, published by "Gazeta", saying that Denktasz admitted that Greeks, lost after the Turkish invasion on Cyprus in 1974, do not live ["Zaginienu nie żyj!", "Gazeta Wyborcza No 54, 1996-03-04]. However, this information, based on the agency cable, selected and reported by the author according to the technique typical for "Gazeta", was not given in other Polish newspapers. From the point of view of "Gazeta", the important thing (important because it confirms the nature of the conflict) is the fact that the reason of crime, indicated by Denktasz, was the desire and need of revenge for the harms incurred previously by Cypriot Turks. For "Gazeta, the anachronism of such justification of the crime, perceived as an attempt of its exculpation, was obvious and not acceptable. The more so as in the discussion, which has been already analysed, Denktasz stated that he did not know anything about the fate of the lost. According to "Gazeta", this was a confirmation of the fact that in the occupied territories, the Turkish party had been using consequently the technique of "ethnic purges" for along time [ibidem]. In October 1997, in "Magazyn Gazety" there appeared a report from Cyprus provided with a very characteristic title: "Pięć flag na Cyprze" (Five Flags in Cyprus) [Robert Stefanickim "Pięć flag na Cyprze", "Magazyn Gazety", 1997-10-30]. Here, it should be emphasised that it was the largest text in "Gazeta", devoted to the Cypriot question – the only article which tried to present Cyprus and its problems not as a subject of the international or interstate quarrel but as an active subject. Robert Stefanicki showed not only a present day of "the endmost divided capital" but also described the genesis of the conflict. According to this author, a reason of sharpness of the ethnic conflict was a policy conducted in the past by the succeeding superiors of Cyprus. In the list of the responsible, were not only Phoenicians, Persians, Romans, Frenchmen and Venetian but also, maybe first of all, Turks ruling the Island from 1571. Their rules, extremely inhuman, left behind the Turkish minority of 18% on the Island. . Inheritance of this past - distant but constantly living - is a conviction, prevailing among the Cypriot Greeks, that they cannot live together with Turks or even near them. The policy of the British authorities, ruling Cyprus since 1878, resolved itself into making use of the ethnic differences for keeping the peace. In a consequence, anti-British feelings kept increasing; they were connected with the nationalism directed against the neighbours. So, after withdrawal of the British, the Greek majority promoted the slogan "enosis" whereas Turks propagated the program "taksim". After 1960, in the already independent republic, both parties undertook terrorist actions aiming at realisation of general goals, using the method of accomplished facts. An element of such actions, to which mother countries were incorporated, was both coup d'etat of the Greek National Guards of 15 July 1974 and consequent Turkish invasion on the Island with all its after-effects.

The author, very relevantly, defines the essence of the Cypriot question as "a long-continued inability of arriving at agreement" [ibidem]. Such inability is a consequence of the past as well as of divergence of contemporary business of the parties. When characterising the political activities, undertaken by the parties, the author shows differences in methods and fields of activity, resulting from differences in goals. The Greek party – military weaker – played its game, first of all, in the diplomatic sphere in order to work out such a formula of the Cypriot State that will ensure them domination. The goal of Turks was consolidation and formal confirmation of the division of the Island. The expression and evidence of formal acceptance of the facts by the international community was to be acknowledgement of separateness of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. An alternative formula was a Greek-Turkish federation, with very weak, simply symbolic competence of central authorities. In the author's opinion, it was a stalemate situation. Both parties having different kinds of arguments, including military reasons, at their disposal, did not resolve on confrontation, as they were aware of possible losses. Cypriot Turks were afraid of deprivation of their own

State, which was not formally acknowledged, whereas Greeks were afraid of losing their economical position. The state of the controlled tension allowed the parties to influence their allies from NATO and European Union.

A characteristic feature is that the author, when writing the report on the Cypriot question, mentioned only such elements, which determined a role of Cyprus in the international game. Cyprus constitutes a problem for UNO, which only managed to “freeze” the situation of 1974, but it does not perform a duty in the context of NATO or Union. The author tried to present the problem from the point of view of people - members of ethnic communities, inhabitants of the divided island - rather than institutions. This humanitarian view is a reason that in the text, attempts of rapprochement of both communities, undertaken by UNO, were presented. Stefanicki is the only Polish author who showed this thread. Concerts, meetings and sports events, arranged in the buffer zone, allowed to make the acquaintance with one another. However, the author states expressly that compatriots as traitors of the national affair perceived their participants. Such a state confirmed univocally that a chance for the permanent solution could occur only in the next generations. For the people living today, such divisions are natural and self-evident heritage of ancient history and the difficult past of their own.

The formula of “Magazyn” allows changing the convention and prospect of the text. Its task is to transmit a reader impression rather than to inform him about the events. By describing people and their issues, it tries to bring nearer a problem, to generalise and to provoke the reader for deeper thought on the essence of the occurrence, its reasons and consequences.

However, it is worth of indicating that publication of the text, which represents the “human” view of the Cypriot question, was preceded by a political analysis [Dawid Warszawski, “Turcja w przedpokoju Europy”, “Gazeta Wyborcza” No 253, 1997-10-29]. The author placed the Cypriot question in a wider context of the Greek-Turkish quarrel. In this analysis, Cyprus was perceived as an element of the game for position in the military alliance and in the economic structure of Europe. From the point of view of “Gazeta”, the latter was more important. It is like that because military and political structures of NATO control a conflict and, in the real issues, pacify it. The position of the USA played a fundamental role here, however, the need of guaranteed security felt by both states, set at variance, was an important element, too. It is quite differently in the European plan. Here, the Greek party predominated. Considering its affiliation to Union it could shape a policy of “15” in relation to Ankara. By touching upon a question of breaking human rights by the Turkish authorities, Athens blocked the possibility of rapprochement between Union and Turkey. Turkey responded for such moves with menaces: annexation of northern Cyprus, abandoning Europe. According to Warszawski, breaking the bonds between Ankara and Europe would be a very severe signal for the Islamic world. Erasure, thanks to Greece, of European aspirations of Turkey may have far-reaching consequences, also for the military alliance. In this context, Cyprus, by making decisions, for instance, on purchase of the Russian missile system S-300, evoking Greek-Russian military rapprochement, may play a role of the exploder, which defeats the southern flank of NATO. We can find the confirmation of this opinion in the cable service presented by “Gazeta”. In January 1997, it informed about the threats of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, caused by the delivery of the Russian armament to Cyprus [“Ankara grozi”, “Gazeta Wyborcza” No 9, 1997-01-12]. In October, there were reports concerning joint Greek-Cypriot manoeuvres and consequent successive sharpening of relations and the next peace mission of Richard Holbrooke [“Gry powietrzne”, “Gazeta Wyborcza” No 241, 1997-10-15].

Another form -own correspondences - undertook a thread of relations between Turkey and European Union. The leaders of "15", debating in Luxemburg, rejected again the application of Turkey which is a candidate to membership. The list of blames justifying refusal to commence negotiations, quoted in the correspondence, included both breaking the human rights – Kurdish question and division of Cyprus [Bartosz Wêglarczyk, "Europa nie dla Turków", "Gazeta Wyborcza" No 290, 1997-12-14]. In the next correspondence, the same author informed about reactions of Ankara to the formula of participation proposed by Union. Turkey rejected the formula (established specially for it) of the European Conference which brings together the countries of "15" and 12 countries aspiring to the membership.

The correspondent, tracing the Warszawski's analyses, perceived in this exceptional behaviour a veiled threat of reversion of that country towards the Islamic fundamentalism. From the point of view of the alliance, especially, of the USA, this would be extremely dangerous trend. In this affair, Cyprus played a substantial, although passive, role, too; rejection of Turkish aspirations took place exactly at the same time as invitation of the Central Europe countries to initial negotiations, this invitation being supported by Greece?. According to Ankara, simultaneity of both decisions constitutes the evidence of anti-Turkish attitude of Europe and, of course, is the effect of actions of Greece [Bartosz Wêglarczyk, "Turcja obrażona", "Gazeta Wyborcza", 1997-12-15]. One of possible reprisals of Turkey could be the formal annexation of northern Cyprus. This could mean escalation of the tensions in the region, dangerous for all parties. By presenting the opinions, worked out in the group of "15", "Gazeta shows that the only way of meeting European aspirations of Ankara is observation of the standards of human rights and a peaceful, without threats of using armed forces, solution of the territorial questions – division of Cyprus, zones of territorial waters. In this sphere, the best solution would be submission to the procedure of Hague Tribunal ["Cypryjski szantaż", "Gazeta Wyborcza", No 239, 1997-12-17]. In the commentary, placed beside the cables, the editorial office, with a pen of D. Warszawski, stated directly: this is Turkey to blame itself; this country does not observe human rights and thus, gives an excellent pretext and reason to those who simply do not want to have it in Union, as it is too poor, and this means expenses from the joint budget. The commentator did not believe in the threat of annexation of part of Cyprus. In his opinion, this act would mean a closing break of bonds with the western world, and the Turkish authorities cannot afford this irrespective of the rhetoric used [Dawid Warszawski, "Na z³oœæ pani matce", "Gazeta Wyborcza" No 239, 1997-12-17]. On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine how more, in practice, northern Cyprus can be integrated with Turkey, without breaking the principles of allied loyalty.

Both these threads, i. e. the problem of arrangement of the Russian missiles on the Island and commencement of the pre-accessing negotiations with Cyprus, will return in the cable service of "Gazeta", although in the limited range. Out of 5 pieces of information, this time univocally provided with the names of agencies, 3 items are connected with the problem of the Russian missiles. One of them presents the opinions of the British press on commenced pre-accessing negotiations with six candidates to Union, and one informs about the efforts of the Cypriot ecologists to save a natural reserve.

In January 1988, "Gazeta" informs, after Press Agency, about the resignation lodged by two ministers of the Cypriot government, as a sign of the protest against the decision of President Clerides on non-arrangement of the missiles S-300. Both ministers, of defence and education, regarded this decision as inadmissible and unjustified concession in favour of Turkey ["Do dymisji", "Gazeta Wyborcza" No 3, 1998-01-05]. Approaching final November date of

installing the missile system brought about sharpening of the situation. "Gazeta" informed about the moves of the parties. Greeks proposed to form a zone of a ban on flights over Cyprus. In a revenge, they were ready to resign, in accordance with a suggestion of the USA, installation of the system in Cyprus, or to purchase the missiles with less range ["Strefa zakazu lotów", "Gazeta Wyborcza" No 160, 1998-07-10]. Reuters, after which "Gazeta" gives information, stated that the Greek offer was recognised in Washington as a step in a proper direction, for it allowed avoiding an open armed conflict, which the Turkish party threatened with. Reuters reports that Turkish bombing fighters F-16 started, on the Israelite testing ground, drills of the operation of liquidating the Russian missile launchers ["Æwicz¹ wojnê", "Gazeta Wyborcza" No 163, 1988-07-14]. The quoted cable includes the information testifying to instrumental treatment of the missile problem both by Russia and Cypriot authorities, as the routine assurances about a defensive nature of the system hold together with readiness, declared by both parties, to cancel the contract, unless "the peace process is unblocked". It seems, however, that both parties are aware of the fact that this is of little probability, so the price of probable concessions will be a subject matter of the successive round of negotiations.

A basic material that serves "Gazeta" for presentation of the widely understood "Cypriot question", along with all its after-effects, constitute agency cables. They provide decided majority of the material, which is a basis for the successive operations. The manner of making use of the agency cables is very characteristic. When the role of the cables resolved itself only to informing about the facts, then the editorial staff provides, even single cables, with signature – name of an agency. However, if the information was to be used for presentation of opinions and evaluations, then the editorial staff provided the contents of several cables with one attractive title. However, they were not quoted but reported by the journalist who selects the information and, in practice, decides on their sequence, uniformity and informative force of the whole. His initials (signature) are placed under the text, beside the names of all the agencies whose materials were used. In consequence, a reader does not know which agency published a given piece of information and thus, is responsible for it and which is expression of the reporting journalist, i.e. his opinion. As a rule, "Gazeta" placed its own commentary beside such a set of reported cables. It was always graphically separated and undersigned with full first name and surname (pen name) of a journalist. Such a text aimed at direct expression of all this, which was left unsaid in the commented selection but only suggested. So it was a specific guide book which was to facilitate the reader acceptance of interpretations and opinions of "Gazeta". The propagandist influence strengthened journalist texts, generally own correspondences, that present evaluations and opinions formulated by the centres and institutions, which are important from a point of view of "Gazeta". With respect to the Cypriot question, these were opinions and evaluations worked out in the managing circles of European Union. The reports appeared only occasionally. In the analysed period, over the years 1991-1998, only one such a text occurred in the columns of the paper.

The lack of large journalist forms can be only partly explained by a nature of the newspaper. However, it seems that, generally, the number of journalist opinions and frequency of their occurrence in the columns confirmed the fact, that from the point of view of "Gazeta", the Cypriot question was a marginal issue (this is proved by the fact that "Gazeta" has some troubles with spelling the names, for instance, the name of President of Cyprus appears in two versions as Cleridis and Kleridis and that of the leader of Cypriot Turks is spelled as Denktasz and Denktas). The Cypriot question occurred only then, when something was happening and this was realisation of the informative tasks of the paper, and even then the editorial staff was

interested, first of all, in the influence of the reported events on the Polish-European Union relationships.

III. Other papers

The query of the press performed entitles for a statement that the widely understood Cypriot question was not the subject matter often touched. It occurs almost exclusively on the dispatch pages of the newspapers and in the weekly magazines in different reviews of events. So the basic form constituted agency dispatches without any commentaries or interpretations. This means that, from the point of view of the Polish press, Cyprus is a distant question of little importance. Only in the moments of culmination of the successive tensions, to which the world and also a Polish reader got used, the press undertakes the attempts of explaining the question. All these sporadic texts have one common feature. Irrespective of the political option, they present and explain the problem from the point of view of Polish aspirations. When reporting the Cypriot question, they perceive it in a very limited range regarding chronology. An opening turning point is the year 1969 – origin of the independent Republic of Cyprus.

The problem was presented in this way by the daily – “Gazeta” , with univocally rightist orientation [Zbigniew Ćwikowski, “Trójkąt cypryjski”, “Gazeta”, 1997-22-18]. In the analysed period, only one larger text reported the events connected with Cyprus. In this case, the opportunity and reason of this was increased tension between Greece and Turkey concerning the purchase of Russian missiles by the Cypriot authorities. The author of the report concentrated on possible consequences of this crisis for uniformity of NATO. The historical retrospective view was limited to 20th century; only the dates of the successive crises were mentioned and the concern of the editorial staff concentrates on the description of the military and diplomatic actions undertaken by the parties. From the description presented, there appears univocally a threat of transforming the tension into an open military conflict. This could mean that the southern flank of NATO would cease existing. Then, Russia could occur again in the region of the Mediterranean Sea, in terms of political and military affairs. This almost strategic point of view of the editorial staff was a reason that it perceived Turkish efforts of admission to European Union as less important. The author, however, stated clearly that the lack of success in this sphere increased frustrations of the Turkish party and had a substantial influence on its attitude towards new members of NATO.

The weekly magazine “Wprost” represents another point of view and here, a historical retrospective view of the conflict is limited, too. The initial turning point is the year 1960 – origin of the independent State and the successive significant date is the year 1974 – Turkish invasion and real division of the Island. According to the weekly, the essence of the conflict lies in economical differences dividing the Island as well as in the policy of Greece and Turkey. The latter, both by direct actions and through its ethnic group and also by blockade of admission of Cyprus to European Union, wanted to reach a formal acceptance of the State of Cypriot Turks, which, in practise, already existed. The fact that the editorial staff presented a diplomatic game and successive rounds of the accessing negotiations proved that “Wprost” is interested, first of all, in the influence of the Cypriot question on realisation of the Polish efforts regarding admission of Poland to Union. The threat is perceived not in terms of admission of Poland but in terms of the date of this admission. The question is, if divided Cyprus, which provides the arsenal of not top modern but efficient weapon, treated by both parties as a tendering element and, at the same time, as a pretext and an object, will not hinder the Polish way to Union. In the analysed text, although the successive military

incidents are mentioned, there are not any references to NATO, to possible consequences of escalation of the conflict for uniformity of the alliance. The only area of the quarrel is a n economical and diplomatic rivalry of the presence of Union and its consequences.

An attention should be paid to the fact that “Wprost”, when indicating the reasons of the reserved attitude of Brussels towards Turkish aspirations, does not mention the question of human rights. The paper perceives the reason only in differentiated economical potentials, which, in consequence, mean considerable expenses from the joint budget in the case of commencement of accession procedures in relation to Turkey. On the other hand, when interpreting the attitude of Cypriot Turks towards commenced Union-Cyprus negotiations, the paper indicates a fear of economical domination of Greeks as the reason of their objections. From the point of view of Turks, the Union standards meant liquidation of their political and economic achievements in the Island. The right of free settling, acquisition of property and conduction of economic activity means for Cypriot Turks the return of Greek refugees to the northern part of the Island. In this way, the foundations of the Turkish policy and sense of existing of the independent State, unable to live individually, would be impaired [Andrzej Szoszkiewicz, “Wyspa niepewności”, “Wprost” No 49, 1998-12-06].

IV. Summary

The analysis of the press materials, presented above, allows drawing general conclusions concerning the presence and functioning of the widely understood “Cypriot question”. It shows univocally that only two papers – “Rzeczpospolita” and “Gazeta Wyborcza” dealt with the Cypriot question, and only in the limited range.

The analysis of the materials, in terms of quantity, shows that the problems connected with the issue occurred in the columns of the Polish press very rarely, irrespective of their political aspects. Daily newspapers informed, first of all, about current events through agency dispatches or their commentaries. From time to time, generally during the visits of the diplomats or special sharpening of the situation, commentaries and analyses have been published. As a rule, they were based on the same dispatches, so their informative value was the same, and editorial staffs realised educational goals by building the sequences (sets) of information. Thus, such a situation was reached that individual pieces of information were complementary to one another and constituted the context supplementing and explaining one another. In this sphere, some differences between “Rzeczpospolita” and “Gazeta Wyborcza” can be found. The latter expresses the culminating points to the end. It seems, however, that this is not a result of political or ideological differences but only of the techniques of influence.

With respect to the whole Polish press, a characteristic feature was a hardly perceptible presence of the “Cypriot” question” and only on occasion. This means that from the point of view of editorial staffs and thus, political groups that support them, it is not the problem of great importance, if not say of very little importance. The only things that really interests the Polish media are international circumstances and consequences of the problem.

The manner of defining the “Cypriot question” results from adoption of such a view. The problem was considered in two planes. Internal - concerning the Island, its ethnic and political division, circumstances and mechanisms of its consolidation. Here, it should be stated that in general, the Polish press acknowledges the division of Cyprus (ethnic, cultural and political)

and considers it to be irreversible. When presenting the internal situation of Cyprus, the papers tried to keep a position of a neutral observer who is reporting and evaluating the events, but who does not declare himself in favour of any party. However, it should be stated that the Polish press devoted to the internal problems of the Island's community some 10% of texts touching the Cypriot question. Some differences between the main daily newspapers, concerning the way of presentations are to be found. "Gazeta Wyborcza" pays more attention to observation of human rights. It also uses more frequently the historical arguments which serve for more complete explanation of the today's problems.

The external plane – international circumstances of the Cypriot question, its functioning in the Greek-Turkish relationships, influence on the form and actions of the international organisations, including NATO and European Union - interested the Polish authors to much higher extent. This thread is included in more than 90% texts. Such proportions appeared to be an obvious consequence of perceiving the question from the point of view of the Polish business.

"Rzeczpospolita" focused its concern, first of all, on the influence of the Cypriot question on integrity of NATO, of course, in a context of Polish efforts of admission to the alliance. The basic question is, if the internal quarrel will not be a reason that any party will treat the Polish efforts in the instrumental way and will not block the accessing processes. The actions of the diplomats were reported and evaluated from this point of view.

"Gazeta Wyborcza" is interested, first of all, in functioning of the Cypriot question in the game as to the presence of Poland in European Union. According to the editorial staff, it seemed that the problem of admission to NATO was settled due to the standpoint of the USA. The conflict of Cyprus, its European aspirations may bring about a diplomatic game. The editorial staff is afraid that, in a consequence of such a game, a delay or even a blockade of Poland's admission to Union can take place. The basic question, occurring in all correspondences, and in imply meanings in all the authors' statements, was if simultaneous commence the pre-accessing negotiations with Poland and the Republic of Cyprus will not subject the admission of Poland to Union to the solution of the "Cypriot question". In the opinion of the editorial staff, such a fear is justified because there is a little chance to solve the Cypriot loop. The diplomatic initiatives are evaluated only from this point of view, irrespective of the fact, if they concern the tensions caused by the military incidents or by the economic decisions.

Both titles expressed the opinion that a basic difficulty in solving the Cypriot question resulted from the necessity of making a selection by the USA between the political-military and economic-humanitarian goals and values. The lack of the American univocal evaluations and decisions enabled the parties, i. e. Greece and Turkey, the game for realisation of their own goals in a wider and wider field (Balkans, Russia, Islamic world), reducing a possibility of the solution of the Cypriot question by international institutions and organisations to null.