East European Security after the First Round of NATO Enlargement

Executive summary

The end of the Cold War was not anticipated. It came before a vision of “the day after” was in place. Decisions had to be (and were) taken ad hoc, responding to the current needs and pressure of events. The momentum of old experience and institutional development was enormous creating established facts on the ground and quickly determining further choices.

The old security system collapsed because it lacked a clear rationale. Post-Second World War reality was providing such (“keeping America in, Russia out and Germany down”). The realities in the 1950s gradually introduced new proportions in this balance focusing on “keeping Russia out”. When the Cold War was over, this rationale vanished.

Today security no longer has only military and economic aspects. In the most general of terms, security means a capacity for independent development - political; economic, cultural and personal. The "human security" concept, where all three components are present, becomes increasingly popular.

Today it is not that important who owns the territory but who holds the power to control the resources and their movement. The more opportunities there are for control, the more guarantees (and respectively threats) for national security.

If territorial integrity should no longer be in the basis of the national security concepts, then control should be acquired through other instruments. These could be economic (financial instruments or economic affiliation such as the unilateral dependence on resource suppliers and markets), or political (through pressure within international organizations or democratically organized supporters and champions of a certain civilizational orientation). In any case the military potential (national or of the allies) meant to secure the territorial integrity is no longer the only, and is hardly the most efficient, guarantor for national security. This important fact was ignored in the early 1990s when the debate on security after the Cold War was picking up.
After a decade of debates, trials and errors one crucial question has been answered: the future European security architecture will be based on NATO’s political organization as the main security mechanism. The first wave of enlargement however was following the pattern of the old rationale. It was to a certain extent a kind of reward for historical injustice. Hence the problem still to be solved is how the Alliance will deal with its own transformation.

The new Security Concept is a good start in this direction. It envisages the multifaceted threats Europe is facing and opens the way to the Alliance’s evolution according to the requirements of the next Millennium. It the security structure in which along with NATO, the UN, the European Union, the Council of Europe and OSCE have their specific roles.

The basic problem of NATO enlargement is that it includes some countries and excludes others. The others remain in a “gray zone” or a “twilight zone” with no clear security guarantees. In order to avoid new dividing line in Europe – between the “members of the club” and the rest a kind of “partial membership” status for the applicant countries is necessary.

In this respect the consequences of Kosovo crisis are not just negative. The contribution of the Balkan countries made them informal “members of the club”, outlined the spheres of influence and definitely positioned them on Euro-Atlantic side of the continent. It means that we are witnessing the emergence of “associated status”, though not formalized, desired by those countries. They are already associated with the Alliance’s actions in the Balkans, which opens the way to their formal association. It also means that the future security architecture, which is just emerging, will be rather flexible and multilevel.

Relations with Russia will continue to be of crucial significance for European Security. Kosovo crisis proved that it is not important just how the new member-states and the applicants for accession perceive NATO enlargement. It is definitely a non-aggressive act towards But Russia's perception is not less important, even if it is biased by its "imperial" attitude. The future security architecture will depend on the possibility to incorporate Russia in the process.
of NATO transformation and also on the ability of its partners to speak its language without losing their own identity.

The war in Yugoslavia distorted the security environment in Europe creating a zone with high level of economic instability and unpredictability. The impact of the war was (is and will be) measured not just in military or security terms. It created budgetary gaps in all of the economies of the region and will decrease the expected dynamics of growth. The destroyed industrial potential in Serbia will have long-lasting economic and social impacts. Hence after the war, South-Eastern Europe can find itself stratificated again.

In security terms the weakest element of this “chain” is Yugoslavia. Obviously without normalized Yugoslavia no recovery of the region is possible with all its security impacts. Hence democratization of the country (for which a key role will play probably the EU, the Council of Europe and OSCE) is pending.

The role of United Europe will be crucial in this respect. Intensified accession negotiations can turn into a strong leverage for promoting democratic values and civilized behavior. They can provide the necessary “positive motive” for action in the Balkans. People tend to go to war with their neighbors when they are desperate, when they have nothing to lose but (hypothetically) can win at least the illusion of “historical glory”. Hence economic prosperity acquires strategic significance more than ever before.

The reconstruction of the region will be an opportunity – both in economic and in security terms. But participation in the reconstruction should be treated as potential motivation for cooperative approach and behavior. Countries which have made the direct and clear commitments for regional and European security (not just participating but also providing positive examples of how ethnic disputes can be solved, as is the case of Bulgaria) should have priority in these projects.

The future security architecture is linked to the issue of the future design, shape of functions of NATO. The new security concept adopted in Washington suggests also that in terms of security architecture development too little is being done too late. The Alliance is still under the momentum of its
traditional “collective defense” approach, although the new security concept has marked significant progress in this respect.

It means that the transformation of the alliance itself is even more important than its enlargement. During the years of the Cold War NATO was a military alliance with a political core. Given the changed nature of the security threats, NATO should evolve in the direction of a political alliance with a military core. The other direction of its evolution should also be from a collective defense structure towards collective security structure. Such an evolution is necessary for the Alliance itself if it is expected to be adequate to the challenges of the next Millennium.
Introduction
The topic of this research is East European security architecture after the first wave of NATO enlargement. However the dramatic events in the Balkans since April 1999 redefined (or reworded) the issue. It seems that the really significant event of 1999 was not the enlargement itself, not the admission of the three new members – it was the result of a long evolution of European relations, a kind of final point of a closed chapter. The really crucial event seems to be the war in Yugoslavia at least for one simple reason: the war, its consequences and impact on international relations may influence European security for decades ahead.

The analysis will focus on the security concerns of the countries of Eastern and Central Europe excluding former Soviet states and including the Baltic States. Such an approach seems to be reasonable for two reasons:

- those countries have similar security concerns;
- they have similar feasible options concerning relations with NATO;
- the rest still remain in the Russian “near abroad” sphere of interest.

Since most of the topics are fundamental they will be inevitably outlined without going in deep details. In fact each of the topic approached in this report deserves a separate study. In many cases such studies already exist – in these cases they are referred (where possible, the reference is given to the Internet version of the quoted publication).

Security debate after the end of the Cold War
The end of the Cold War was not anticipated. It came before a vision of “the day after” was in place. Decisions had to be (and were) taken ad hoc, responding to the current needs and pressure of events. The momentum of old experience and institutional development was enormous creating established facts on the ground and quickly determining further choices.

European security was a special case in this respect. The old security system collapsed because it lacked a clear rationale. Post-Second World War reality was providing such (“keeping America in, Russia out and Germany down”).
The realities in the 1950s gradually introduced new proportions in this balance focusing on “keeping Russia out”. When the Cold War was over, this rationale vanished. At the same time years after the end of the Cold War little attention was paid to the radical change in the parameters of security – the fact that the territorial paradigm was no longer valid.

The "national security" category is one of those obvious ones that are often perceived intuitively and everyone attaches his own meaning to it. The first things that come in mind is the association with territorial integrity and the existence of military and economic potential necessary to upkeep it. Such an approach however is the spirit of the Treaty of Westphalia of 351 years ago.

The truth is that security no longer has only military and economic aspects. In the most general of terms, security means a capacity for independent development - political; economic, cultural and personal. The "human security" concept, where all three components are present, becomes increasingly popular. But these are often reduced to one aspect of the notion: territorial integrity and the instruments necessary to preserve it and this territorial paradigm provides a groundwork for building the institutional structure of security.

If "security" has ever been synonymous with "strong army" or "strong allies", it was during the times when the geographic component of geo-political interests was paramount and the possession of territory was a strategic asset, hence the potential advantages of a possible territorial expansion outweighed the imminent costs for its achievement. It was the time before the beginning of the Cold War - a time when the strategic importance of the separate regions was determined by the geographic realities. In the case of the Balkans, it was associated with the straights and the possibility to control them.

Today we are witnessing in the world, and particularly the post-communist one, something of a territorial leasing. Today it is not that important who owns the territory but who holds the power to control the resources and their movement. The more opportunities there are for control, the more guarantees (and respectively threats) for national security. When there are no technological barriers for the transportation of a cargo, be it with space shuttle
(the question here comes to the economic aspects of the procedure), the
problem of security is shifted from the domain of territory to the domain of
interests and influence.

At the same time the purely military threats for a country do not vanish but are
just transformed\(^1\). And yet the territorial paradigm remains secondary when it
comes to possession. Territory ceases to be of interest as a possible object of
possession for external actors. But the threats to national security remain in
respect to integrity. The difference is that now these threats come from the
inside, not the outside as before, i.e. the problems with security have to do
with implosion, not explosion, of claims and aggression.

It is not a stylistic distinction. The emphasis on the aspiration to control rather
than possess changes tangibly their web of interests and, respectively, the list
of potential sources of threat and the options for neutralizing them. For this
reason the concept of national security based on the one-sided interpretation
of the "capacity for independent development" can prove imbalanced,
overplaying the importance of minor or at least secondary threats while
overlooking tangible ones.

If territorial integrity should no longer be in the basis of the national security
concepts, then control should be acquired through other instruments. These
could be economic (financial instruments or economic affiliation such as the
unilateral dependence on resource suppliers and markets), or political
(through pressure within international organizations or democratically
organized supporters and champions of a certain civilizational orientation). In
any case the military potential (national or of the allies) meant to secure the
territorial integrity is no longer the only, and is hardly the most efficient,
guarantor for national security.

This important fact was ignored in the early 1990s when the debate on
security after the Cold War was picking up. Gradually it evolved into a debate
on the future of NATO, which is only one of the aspects of the overall problem
of security. What happened in the long run was that the component came to
replace the whole, bringing its own parameters and presenting the solutions of
the partial problem (as is the eastward expansion) as a solution to the overall problem of security.

**The debate over the evolution of NATO**

NATO enlargement was a focal point in debates on security throughout the 1990s. From today’s perspective a peculiar evolution of this debate is obvious. On its first phase different options for the future of NATO were discussed (from dissolution of NATO following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact to an open-entry option, i.e. if the enlargement process should start, it should not stop and include all the interested parties). On the second phase the issue of the costs was dominating the debate (the idea that enlargement will be a fact already got grounds). Details such as who will be included in the first and who in the second round dominated the third phase. But all the time the debate was in fact about the alliance’s raison d’etre.

There were three basic concepts structuring the debate on the issue. The first (“No NATO”) was based on the assumption that after the end of the Cold War, there is no longer any reason for NATO to exist. Security solutions were to be sought by the whole of Europe, the United States and Canada, with the equal participation of all interested states.

The second approach (“Europeanized NATO”) considered the alliance’s raison d’etre and its role in the context of the transition from an “indivisible” to a “divisible” security model based on the intensification of the integration processes in Western Europe. This approach, on the one hand, was shifting the accent to the “European pillar” of security within NATO, resulting in a gradual withdrawal of the United States from Europe. On the other hand, within the “Europeanized NATO” approach the European Union defence component was envisaged on the basis of the common defence policy and common defence structure within the EU. The third approach – a “strong NATO” – is the one that emerged gradually and was endorsed within the new Strategic Concept in April 1999.

NATO’s raison d’etre, which will be an essential factor in the foreseeable future, is, on the one hand, Europe’s interest in having US presence on the
Old Continent and, on the other hand, the United States’ interest to use NATO as means to participate in, and to exert influence over, the processes in Europe. The first seems to have stronger relevance than the second. It can be argued that Europe’s interest in having US presence on the Old Continent was behind the strong pressure from the European leaders (voiced explicitly by Tony Blair at the Washington summit) for ground troops deployment in Kosovo. Hence, the end of the 1990s answered at least one crucial question: the future European security architecture will be based on NATO’s political organization as the main security mechanism. The problem still to be solved is how the Alliance will deal with its own transformation.

The enlargement - historically-driven?

As seen from today’s perspective, the debate was developing rather around practical dimensions (the issue of the enlargement) and on predetermined decisions (the countries of the first wave). This predetermination stems from the fact that the decision was rather historically oriented, and was not a part of pan-European vision of security for the future. It was a process comprised of many small steps without a clear vision. Even the problem of the new member-states was a residual value of different factors (constituency influence, old historical debts, PR campaigns etc.).

During the whole process history was behind the overall argumentation - both of the champions and of the opponents of enlargement. The now-new members were motivating their choice by two types of argumentation. The first being the “belonging to the Western civilization. Within this line of argumentation NATO was perceived as the other side of the same coin - Euro-Atlantic affiliation. The second argument was referring to Russia and the danger of its imperial revival after the possible decline of democratic reforms. The threat from Russia was augmented by the nationalistic renaissance which turned to be a common element for all east European countries with failed (or at least not sufficiently successful) economic transformation. Although the intensity of this perception of the Russian threat differed from region to region, it was of primary importance for Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic due to the historical experience with the former Soviet Union. The same was with the Baltic states.

This proves the fact that NATO membership in the case of all Eastern European countries is both positively and negatively motivated. The positive motivation refers to the civilizational choice, the willingness to be part of a certain community of values, ideas and political norms and practices. The negative motivation refers to the desire to avoid the threat from the East, the possible reincarnation of Russia’s imperial projects and dreams. These two types of motivation drive different countries in different proportions.

But in South-Eastern Europe and specifically in the Balkans things seemed a little different. Unlike Central Europe, the probability (and hence the threat) here of high-intensity local conflicts on ethnic or national basis was much higher. As for Russia, we can speak rather about spheres of interests biasing the local elite’s political attitudes. On the one hand this makes the threat indirect and less important in the short run. But on the other hand it turns into a starting point for a strategic choice with the dimensions of civilization belonging.

These were exactly the arguments against NATO voiced by the Russian political and military elite. The official Russian National Security Concept adopted in December 1997 was still regarding NATO as a source of threat and the enlargement of the alliance - as a veiled aggressive act. Problematic from the very beginning, relations within NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council virtually came to a standstill after the war in Yugoslavia. This means that the arguments of the alliance in favor of its enlargement were at least poorly communicated and were not perceived by the main adversary. It also means that the main problem with the enlargement - Russia and its possible hostility towards the process of enlargement - was not solved in a proper way. What remains (and is possible) to be done is rather to minimize the further damages for European security.

Hence the first wave of enlargement was following the pattern of the old rationale. It was to a certain extent a kind of reward for historical injustice. The first wave seemed to be motivated by the desire to “rewrite
history” skipping its Yalta chapter. It means that to a certain extent the enlargement strategy was historically driven. NATO enlargement was rather the last step of the Cold War than the first step in the post-Cold War era. But can a historical decision such as NATO enlargement be backward-oriented? The other conclusion is that the question of the shape and design of the post-Cold War era is still open.

The basic problem of NATO enlargement is that it includes some countries and excludes others. The others remain in a “gray zone” or a “twilight zone” with no clear security guarantees. For that reason NATO enlargement is establishing a new dividing line in Europe – between the “members of the club” and the rest. Unless it continues it will not be a comprehensive all-European solution. Both the logic and the politics of the situation require that, following the possible acceptance of the first three candidates, the United States do the next step and develop an approach to NATO enlargement that is comprehensive and covers all European states, including Russia⁶.

The new threats - the issue of nationalism

Kosovo crisis put nationalism on the security agenda not just of the Balkan countries but of Europe as well. Nationalism was “rediscovered” as an effective tool for social mobilization with potential fundamental impact on regional and European security. But it is not always understood why is it possible - at the end of the 20th century - to fight over names or identity.

Balkan nations lacked independence up to the beginning of 19th century. Since they are therefore new nations with strong primordial roots, and since historically national affiliation was not synonymous with a sense of belonging to a state, the relatively objective pre-state attributes such as language, ethnicity, tradition and culture were taken as a common denominator for social cohesion or inclusive/exclusive criteria. The sense of common destiny of Balkans ethnic and ethno-national groups was strengthened even further by oppressive empires. As a result nationalism was (in the case of all Balkan states) and often still is (for example in Serbian and Macedonian case) always a typical instrument for building a state-hood.
The other consequence of centuries-long foreign rule (and hence - of the liberation aspects of the Balkan nationalisms) was the shaping of different national identifications in the Balkans in terms, and within the framework, of the political dispute. Nationality was the basis of a political project such as constructing a state. Giving the priority to subjective aspirations (rather than available resources) was a profound step towards the assumption that national self-determination up to and including the formation of independent sovereign states applied not just to some nations which could demonstrate economic, political and cultural viability, but to any and all groups which claimed to be a “nation”. It opened the way to the assumption that national self-determination was feasible only in the form of full state independence. And this was the Balkan history of the 19th as well as of the 20th century especially its last decade (the Bosnian case being the vivid illustration).

The way the Balkan nations emerged - simultaneously with the nation-states or even preceding them - resulted however in the overlaying of two processes - nation-building and state-building. First, this overlaying made the new nationalisms more suspicious and aggressive. Second, as in the case of Bulgaria, the rebirth of independent states often preceded the accumulation of administrative experience by a significant part of the nation's elite so that those engaged in policy-making were often incompetent and state bureaucracies were extremely corrupt (a “phenomenon” known also from the experience of the post-colonial countries).

Foreign rule did, however, have a ambiguous impact. On the one hand, the absence of "state protection" hampered the nation-building process. But, on the other hand, the conquests stimulated the preservation of ethnic attachments and identity, insulating ethno-national groups from the threats of assimilation and providing the basis for a spurt of nation-building in the 18th and 19th century. The multi-ethnic environment of the empires was not "chosen," it was enforced and thus remained alien in the perception of the population. For that reason, it was a backdrop against which the basic elements of nationhood - the national language and a common religion - stood out. Since it is a relational ideology, i.e. definable only vis-à-vis a reference point, nationalism needs a backdrop to throw it into relief - and this was
provided by the oppressors. After 1945 the issue of foreign rule was “revisited” with the presence of the Soviet Union which inherited the traditional role of the “oppressor” with all the consequences for national self-determination.

And, last but not least, a discontinued national history turned out to be an ideal breeding ground for national historical myths which still play an extremely important role in the Balkans. All sources of national identity in the Balkan nations were and often still are rooted far back in history. That is why history in the Balkans was always divided and overlapping. The historical myths of different (opposing and conflicting) nations were often referring to the same facts, persons and, most important, territories.

On the level of current politics it meant that the nationalist ambitions of all ruling elites in the region were inevitably in conflict. Conflicting historical arguments could be (and were) easily converted into political ones, and the latter into military ones. In addition the Balkan nationalisms were militant and aggressive, which is rather typical of new re-emerged nations developing in the context of the “external threat” in which aggressive attitudes are an integral element of the self-defense approach. All this predetermined the constant desire to reshape existing borders, a desire which was always based on the assumption of “historical injustice” and which inevitably divided the Balkan states into two groups - the “satisfied” and the “dissatisfied”.

This short introduction into the specifics of the nation-building process in the Balkans was necessary for two reasons. First, to point out that the violent, ruthless, sometimes seemingly irrational minority conflicts in the Balkans have their grounds not in the existence of centuries-lasting hatreds, suppressed by the communist regimes and awaiting the right spark to set them off neither in the “barbarian nature” of the Slav nationalities. These conflicts have their rational explanation. Second, to point out that the rational elements of the minority conflicts still exist and have to be taken into account when managing minority nationalism. The result of these two elements is the high degree of exclusiveness of majority nationalism which perceives every symptom of minority nationalism as a threat. In fact, minority nationalism in the Balkans is perceived solely as exclusive majority nationalism in embryonic stage.
The Perceived Threat of Minority Nationalism and Regional Stability

Few preconditions are necessary for a minority nationalism-based conflict to develop and spread. One is the notion of “nationhood” obsessing certain group separated (or even capsulated) on ethnic or other basis. The second is the element of oppression (whether real or perceived). In this respect the Balkans has vast potential, both in terms of aggressive new nations (providing the notion of “nationhood”) which are at the same time split between different states leaving their kin around and outside the borders of the existing nation-states in the position of minorities (providing the element of “oppression”). That is why from the very beginning of the 20th century the minority issue and minority nationalisms in the Balkans were an integral part of inter-state (inter-majority nationalisms) relations. Hence minority issues and minority nationalism were perceived as having a strategic impact on regional stability.

Minorities and especially minority nationalism were traditionally viewed as a destabilizing element and, therefore, a source of the “strategic insecurity” which was always present in the region. This strategic insecurity, which was partly due to the fact that the independent Balkan nation-states had only been in existence for a short time, was further aggravated by the Great Powers' constant intervention in the internal affairs of these states, be it in the form of a Berlin congress or a Yalta agreement. To a great extent this "hysteria" was exaggerated by the minorities' intermingled distribution, which provided the "legitimate basis" for mutual territorial claims. In the pre-World War II period decisive steps were taken towards "national uniformity" in the Balkans but the result was negative. All countries host on their territory ethnic or national minorities and all still perceive them as a security threat, jeopardizing the integrity of the state.

Since policies towards minorities were based on the assumption of possible "treason", any practical manifestation of minority nationalism was and still is perceived with deep suspicion. The suspicion often led to one of the practiced "techniques" for managing minority nationalism - getting rid of them. In fact, this was usually the policy adopted in different periods by all governments in
the Balkans, and, as already mentioned, there was always some minority to
get rid of them. The fact that in many cases such an approach struck back as
self-fulfilling prophesies was perceived as an “objective evidence” that
minority nationalism is a real and proved source of threat.

Hence it is not correct, at least in the case of the Balkans, to perceive minority
nationalism as a new invention. Periods of "ethno-national harmony" in the
Balkans were brief and, as a rule, harmony was illusory, the temporary result
of previous violent "solutions" to national issues. All the local wars in the
Balkans in the 20th century were fought in the name of reuniting nations with
their minorities, reuniting territories or, at least, all contained an extremely
strong "nationalistic component." The same emotions were also motivating
the Balkan countries’ choice of sides in the both World Wars. The same
emotion provided the driving force for the last conflict in former Yugoslavia.

This has shaped one of the special characteristics of the Balkans - an
unusually high sensitivity to the national issue on the part of the people in the
region and their extraordinary susceptibility to nationalistic appeals from both
their "own" and "alien" leaders. The difference between the two was the
reversed perception: the “own” nationalistic appeals were a source of positive
and those of the “aliens” - of negative motivation. As a result, people in the
Balkans generally succumb easily to the temptation of "historical retaliation"
(claimed by their leaders) or vice versa, if there is the slightest possibility of an
"historical retaliation" vis-à-vis themselves (claimed by the “aliens”), they
immediately feel threatened.

In other words, peoples in the Balkans are potentially much more open to
manipulation on a nationalistic basis than are, say, peoples in Western
Europe in the last decades. The difference between the East and the West
lies in the different time-frame: the same processes of nation-building were
taking place in the West but several hundreds years ago. Then the price of
violent approach to the issue (as for example of ethnic cleansing) was
affordable - ethnic cleansing was not perceived to be a crime against
humanity. That is why in the West processes of nation-building were
completed centuries ago and the Western societies had the necessary time
for internal restructuring, were divided along many more cleavage lines than

ivanov.doc, page 15
purely ethnic ones. Those of them who completed this task later (for example Germany) were also subject of ethnic- or even racist-based mobilization also in the 20th century.

That is why political mobilization on nationalist grounds turned to be more significant in the Balkans at the end of the Millennium than in other countries in Eastern Europe (which were and are belonging toe the Western-type of civilization). Hence it was broadly used by the local elites in the Balkans than elsewhere Given the fact that "historical retaliation" is usually perceived as possible on behalf of national minorities, minority nationalism as such is perceived as a threat that in turn fuels majority nationalism. All these (often subtle) details were not taken into account. What is more, it was not able to take them into account given the old-style “perception mode” based on the peculiar “discrete encoding and decoding” of messages.

The new approach to security - from “discrete” to “analogue” encoding of messages

The brief “introduction” into the issue of nationalism is necessary in order to understand both the nature of the existing security threats in Europe and of the shortcomings of the approach to them so far. To use a term from electronics, the encoding of security-related messages was done in a discrete, not analogue, mode. A discrete mode presupposes a 0-1-0-1 stylistics. Applied to security, it has two polar options: “security - no security” or “threat - no threat”. It was the stylistics of the Cold War, where they could either be a conflict imminently escalating to nuclear one, or no conflict at all. Here all nuances are blurred while today it is the nuances rather than the big components, that make the difference. In this respect NATO is not even halfway through making the basic step in its evolution: bringing its huge resources in compliance with the nature of problems facing itself, Europe and the world.

The way the alliance was involved in Kosovo proves that the momentum of the old approaches is still a heavy burden. The “discrete encoding” inevitably
creates black and white picture blurring the details which are often (especially in the Balkans) more significant than the overall picture.

The black-and-white approach could not reveal the very nature of the conflict - that throughout the entire 20th century Kosovo was a point of Serbian-Albanian rivalry, where two nationalistic dreams clash. The difference lies only in their points of departure. The Serbian nationalistic dream was already realised in 1918 when the Great Powers allowed Serbia to take the Slav-inhabited territories of Croatia, Slovenia, Vojvodina, parts of Bulgaria and the Albanian-dominated Kosovo.

The Albanian nationalist project, on the other hand, is still underway. Albania emerged as an independent state after the Balkan wars in 1912-13 as part of an attempt by the Great Powers to create a check against the neighboring Slav states in the peninsula. In fact, the emergence of Albania as an independent state was the beginning, rather than the end, of the Albanian nationalist project. Thanks to a number of events (Italian occupation during the World War II, communist rule afterwards) this was delayed for decades and only reemerged on the political agenda at the end of 1980s.

That was why at the end of the 1980s the Serbs, who had a nation-state, treated the integrity of the state and non-violation of its borders as a priority. The Albanians, on the other hand, began to work for the unification of “all kin in one state”. Hence their priority was self-determination through secession, including revision of the existing borders.

These are two incompatible types of argument. Being part of different historical and political discourses, by definition they cannot meet. Both can be justified from their own points of view. Both are moral – though based on a different approach to morality. For some Serbs it is moral to kill civilians for the sake of the integrity of the State and Orthodox sanctuaries. For some Albanians it is moral to smuggle drugs in order to finance the fight of the Kosovo Liberation Army for self-determination through secession. And it is up to the external actors involved in the conflict, which approach to support.

Until the end of the “cold war” state integrity and non-violation of borders was a priority - and the Serbs could keep the province by using force. Things
changed in the early 1990s but the Serbs did not (could not!) grasp this fact. Being a dominant republic in the Yugoslav federation, most of them perceived the federation, rather than the republic, as “their state”.

National affiliation (in this case – belonging to the Serb nation) was one of the two criteria determining the pro-integrity and anti-integrity attitudes. The second one (of completely different type) was the political affiliation. The other group that perceived the federation as “their state” was the communists. Although both have very different types of affiliation criteria, at a certain point - in terms of determination – the two coincide. Most of the Serbs were for keeping the federation (no matter what their political affiliation was) – as well as most of the communists (no matter what their national affiliation was). When the representatives of the other nations (or those more liberally-minded, no matter what their national affiliation was) voted in favour of secession, these two (partially overlapping) groups – i.e. nationalist-minded Serbs and radical-minded communists - fought against it (frankly defending “their state”). Being better armed and no less motivated, they also committed more atrocities than their opponents and thus were doomed to find themselves represented as symbols of “universal evil”.

In general the result of the first phase of the dissolution of Yugoslavia was to divide it into perpetrators of good and evil. The Serbs were identified as neo-communists, aggressors, criminals against humanity whilst all the others were perceived to be completely innocent. This simplification was not just far from the truth - the Serbs really behaved like that. It upgraded the detail to the rank of overall framework. It also opened the way for the West’s moral relativism and double standards in its approach to the region. Thus a situation emerged in which expelling the Albanians from Kosovo deserved to be punished, while expelling the Kraina Serbs from Croatia did not (in 1995 over 200,000 Serbs were ‘cleansed’ in a few days).

This general context was not taken into consideration when the air strikes were planned. The plan itself was based on the fatally simplistic “good guys” versus “bad guys” version of reality which was largely painted by Western leaders keen to explain the conflict in easy terms, in the type of short catchy messages appropriate for the TV news. The complexity of the issue was
difficult to explain in 100 words and as a result Milosevic (together with the Serbs in general) got painted as the “boogie man”, whilst others (yesterday – Tudjman, today - the Kosovo Liberation Army) emerged painted “white”. Since their involvement was built around this simplistic interpretation, the approach adopted was inevitably wrong. The results of the involvement were far from those anticipated – both in terms of time (instead of few days the campaign lasted for two months and a half) and costs (direct and indirect). The most tragic outcome of the “discrete encoding” was the provision of Milosevic with additional arguments for barbarian policy which he used for keeping the power (no matter how long ago his ethnic cleansing operation was planned, he or his successor will always use the air strikes as an argument to justify this decision). The air strikes provided Milosevic with a personified external enemy, with a “plot-scenario”, with a reincarnation of the myth of the battle of Kosovo. Before the air strikes Milosevoch did not have internal support from the constituency for his “definitive solution” of the Kosovo case. After the air strikes the majority of society is on his side.

It should be also taken into account that the air strikes supported an 18th century-type of policy, agenda and approach at the end of the 20th century. They have encouraged further a pre-modern type of affiliation based on primordial criteria (blood ties etc.). This will make the Balkan countries even more remote from Europe and common democratic values than they were before the war. After the strikes any Western-minded attitude and opposition in Serbia will hardly find broad support.

However the most problematic outcome of the way the Kosovo crisis was managed was its impact on international relations. On the one hand, Russia’s attitude towards NATO became definitely negative. It provided the NATO opponents with additional arguments for their hostility. It does not mean a new Cold War era but not for the reason the Russia understands NATO approach and rationale. We would have been plunged again in the atmosphere and politics of the Cold War if Russia could afford it economically. Which in fact leaves the question open - the frozen relations within NATO-Russia PJC will need much efforts to be brought to the level of really joint cooperation for the
sake of European security. The other negative impact concerning the role of UN Security Council in security issues was even more serious.

**International law and the role of international organizations**

Given the diverse types of the threats, any type of European security concept is expected to include different types of institutions (security, economic, political, even informal groupings and fora). After the Kosovo crisis this type of multifaceted approach seems to be even more indispensable.

The Kosovo crisis did not just put on the agenda the issue of international organisations’ presence in the security framework. It outlined a necessity of deep reform of the way these organisations operate and of their internal decision-making procedures. One peculiar event can serve as an illustration of the need to reform. At the beginning of June 1999 the G-8 Heads of State (some of them not being members of the UN Security Council) were drafting the text of a resolution supposed to be adopted by the Security Council. The resolution itself was aiming to stop a conflict in which NATO, and not UN, was formally involved.

This example is only an illustration of the general problem of the need to reform the existing system of international organizations so that they could fit into the realities of the next Millennium. The existing political and humanitarian organisations and international institutions with security impact include the United Nations, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe, the European Union and West European Union. The most “affected” by the challenge of the change (and by the consequences of the Kosovo crisis) are the UN, the Council of Europe and OSCE, and this is why the attention will be focused on them.

**The United Nations**

One of the dramatic consequences of the Kosovo crisis was its impact on the system of international relations. From a procedural point of view the air strikes were conflicting with the existing system of international relations and
replaced the rule of law with that of moral imperative. At a certain point this
gave grounds for speculations for “clinical death” of the UN Security Council⁹.

Its global character is both an asset and a drawback. It was designed as a
global security system but has recently become more and more engaged in
peace-keeping operations, including the deployment of troops. At the same
time, the UN has become highly bureaucratized. This in turn has become a
major obstacle to its efficient operation.

Within the UN, the geo-political identity of a country is generally expressed in
the way it votes at the annual session of the General Assembly. At the same
time, however small countries do not really have much say in decision
making. They are practically excluded from the discussions, even on high
priority issues. Moreover, they stand no chance of imposing their priority
demands, even well substantiated, if these are not in harmony with the stand
of the Security Council member states. The Security Council, in turn, is turning
more and more into arena in which the old Cold War approaches and
competition reemerge in post-Cold War reality. Hence **a radical reform of the
UN and its Security Council in terms of procedures and prerogatives
seems to be necessary if it has to meet the new security challenges at
the beginning of the next Millennium**¹⁰. All in all, the UN in its current
shape emerged as a response of completely different reality after the end of
the World War II with completely different division of interests, capabilities,
and even value systems. The (single so far) voices for canceling of Russia’s
vetoing power in the Security Council are just symptoms of the emerging
necessity of deep reform.

**The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)**

Comprised of 55 participating states, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) possesses serious potential in future security
architecture of Europe. Following the development of the Helsinki Process in
1990, this organisation has become a sort of a European version of the United
Nations with a single procedural difference, it observes the consensus rule. In
its present state the organisation is encumbered by its efforts to reconcile
broad membership and a decentralisation of interests while preserving the
consensus rule. For that reason OSCE has, to a great extent, lost ground as a forum for establishing the political, humanitarian, military and, to some extent, economic and environmental parameters of European security. Decentralisation of interests and the consensus rule within OSCE contributed to its rather inefficient participation in the resolution of the conflict in Bosnia. This also contributed to the adoption of an approach to the Kosovo crisis in 1999 based on single NATO involvement and neglecting at the first stage of the conflict other, supposed inefficient, international actors.

At the same time the “negatives” of OSCE (decentralisation of interests and consensus rule) can be turned into positives if the common European interests are clearly defined. These seem to be the idea of European identity (including security and defence identity) dependent on the continent’s indivisibility. In this framework the representative nature of OSCE (which also includes the United States and Canada) can turn into its greatest asset. The second (in terms of European security) could be its comprehensive but geographically specific approach to security issues. Third, it has developed both implementation mechanisms and mechanisms for conflict prevention (such as Conflict Prevention Centre). What is needed is more efficient mechanisms and resources for adequate intervention in serious crises.

**Council of Europe**

Being one of the oldest organizations in Western Europe, the Council is one of the most representative as well. Security and defense are not its focus: they are indirectly approached, mainly through the issue of human rights. However given the increasing significance of the “non-article 5” threats for security, mainly verging of minority and ethnicity-based conflicts, the role of the Council will increase. But the Council of Europe will have long-term impact on security – affecting attitudes, traditions and behavior (both personal and collective). A good illustration is the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. It is not expected to terminate ethnic conflicts and violence but will provide the necessary framework for its reduction through changes of “personal and institutional mentality”.
**New responses to the new threats**

The new strategic concept adopted at the Washington summit opened up the way to real change of the Alliance in keeping with the new requirements. Here attention is paid not so much on the territorial paradigm as to the community of interests. In future NATO will protect common interests rather than common territories. It is a fundamental change as it offers opportunities for overcoming the existing differences with Russia.

The new strategic concept also attaches the due importance to the institutional makeup of the new relations. The philosophy underpinning them is that of cooperation, which give more hopes that NATO will be in a capacity to meet the challenges of the new millennium.

The main idea underpinning the design of the future European security architecture is the “Triple Crown” approach. Within it NATO is perceived as “the jewel of the crown”. The EU is expected to take responsibilities for economic security issues and OSCE - for human rights and political democracy sphere. This approach is closer to the broader interpretation of “human security” and opens the way to efficient interlocking of institutions. This approach to security is envisaged in the new security concept: “The Alliance is committed to broad approach to security, which recognises the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors”\(^\text{11}\).

The issue of the common interests is the key to the puzzle - both of the future security architecture and the problem of Russia’s hostility. Security can be based only on common interests and creating common interests is the only sustainable way towards secure Europe. But it also means that Russia can find itself in the picture of the new - common - interests\(^\text{12}\).

Another fundamental change in the approach to security is the understanding of the dispersed, often blurred sources of insecurity threats. This understanding is in fact the first step towards the reasonable treatment of the ongoing local conflicts which can really jeopardize European security and stability. However there is a long way ahead before the practical actions become corresponding to the declared principles.
The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

NATO is indisputably the leading Western organization in the field of security. In the past few years, NATO has made a number of important decisions about Russia and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Some of these decisions apply to the neutral states as well. The most important of these are the:

- Creation of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council;
- Implementation of the Partnership for Peace program;
- Preparation and gradual entry into a structured dialogue with Russia;
- Decision in favour of future NATO expansion to the East and the accession of the three new members – former Warsaw Pact states.

As explicitly stated in the new Strategic Concept of the Alliance, "The EAPC will remain “the overarching framework for all aspects of NATO’s cooperation with its Partners”\(^{13}\)."

Partnership for Peace

The Partnership for Peace initiative was not only intended to relieve the political pressure of potential new members to accede, and of Russia against their joining the organization. It had also three other objectives. The first was to establish the grounds for building “common codes of understanding” between the representatives of the security decision-making elites in the East and in the West. The second was to test the political and practical readiness of the separate countries for active cooperation and possible future membership. The third was to avoid rigidity either with a view to enlarging membership or to preserving the status quo into the distant future.

Until the admission of the first new members however the PfP was perceived rather as an “introduction” to full membership. After the 1999 Washington summit it seems to acquire more peagmatic dimension as a framework for developng of “common codes of understanding".

ivanov.doc, page 24
As seen from the list itself, there is no single hierarchical European or Euro-Atlantic system; instead there are “interlocking institutions”. But what is more important, organisations differ in scope, competence, membership and degree of integration, as well as in their relative significance in international relations and practical capabilities to tackle security issues. And here we face the first contradiction in the emerging security architecture of the continent – between inherited prerogatives and real capacities. NATO is obviously the best example being the only operational and efficient security structure capable of conducting military operations on wide scale.

**The next waves of enlargement - what the applicants can do while waiting?**

Once started, NATO enlargement should not stop. This is however just a statement. Turning into a policy agenda requires a driving force - a driving force inside the US administration. Hence the issue boils down to the question “Is anybody inside the American administration interested in having more waves of enlargement?”

Today the answer seems to be in the negative. In 1995-99 the main champions of enlargement were concrete persons from President Clinton’s administration with concrete background and concrete personal agenda. With the next president to be elected in 2000 no pro-extension coalition seems to be possible since it is highly improbable that further enlargement will be in anybody’s personal agenda. Hence the answer to the question “Who will push for a second wave?” remains open. The same is with the question “For what reasons will anybody be interested to push for further enlargement?” In electoral terms inclusion of the three new members of NATO in the enlargement process was strongly favored by significant segments of local constituencies (immigrants from Eastern Europe, mainly Poland and Czech Republic). The other East European states do not possess such a lobby among the electorate\(^\text{14}\).

Few years ago Charles Kupchan has proposed merging of NATO and the EU into an Atlantic Union that offers the prospect of inclusion of the Central
European countries and the countries of the former Soviet Union. Today this option is still realistic but in long-term perspective. Concerning the short-term perspective, the next waves of enlargement are not in the agenda.

Referring to the issue of enlargement usually the metaphor of the door which will “remain open” is broadly used. However it seems to be rather a diplomatic wording of a negative answer to the question “Will there be next waves in a feasible perspective?” Although not directly articulated, the negative answer to the question is “in the air” - both among experts’ and policy-making communities.

Hence the general question “How the enlargement will continue in the future?” should be redefined into a more specific one: “What the countries from the gray zone can and should do in order to avoid the security vacuum in a situation when a second wave of NATO enlargement seems to be highly improbable?”

What all of them have already done is commitment. But here we face one very significant problem: the value of each country’s commitment for the future security architecture is inevitably unequal in terms of contribution. Hence it is necessary to assess the real costs (or even burden) of each country’s contribution. Access to the air space of Bulgaria in the alliance’s operation against Yugoslavia is incomparably more expensive than the same access to any other country from the Eastern Europe – due to the fact that Bulgaria’s access to Europe is separated by Yugoslavia. The stakes are incomparably higher. The possible (and probable) Yugoslav long-term hostility towards, say, Hungary will affect to a lesser extent Hungarian economy and European integration than the possible (and probable) Yugoslav long-term hostility towards Bulgaria.

The next step to be done is to operationalize the consequences of Kosovo crisis and, where possible, to convert its negatives into positives. The fact that no new countries were invited to the alliance during the 1999 summit is the optimum solution for the countries from Eastern Europe (except probably Slovenia). Kosovo crisis was their ultimate chance – to have both the opportunity to go out of the “twilight zone” and to move towards NATO
according to their economic capabilities. Those countries in fact do not need “Article 5” guarantees. What they need is a clear message that they will not be left in Russia’s sphere of interests, that they will not be left to be treated as Russia’s “near abroad”\textsuperscript{17}. The nature of threats those countries are facing are not of a type which an old-style NATO can handle. The alliance cannot solve the problems of their internal stability and institutional fragility stemming from the insufficient progress of economic and political reforms or inherited ethnic hatreds.

And last but not least, the dialogue with Russia should continue. Kosovo crisis proved that it is not important just how the new member-states and the applicants for accession perceive NATO enlargement. It is definitely a non-aggressive act towards Russia which is motivated rather by the negative experience in dealing with the Soviet empire and its doctrine of “limited sovereignty”. But Russia’s perception is not less important, even if it is biased by its “imperial” attitude. The future security architecture will depend on the possibility to incorporate Russia in the process of NATO transformation and also on the ability of its partners to speak its language without losing their own identity. All the attempts on behalf of Russian radical representatives of the political elite to use the first wave of enlargement as a legitimate basis for "security guarantees actions" in Russia’s "near abroad" should be avoided by all means. Unfortunately it was not the case with the way the crisis in Kosovo was managed. NATO could not incorporate Russia in the solution-making process from the very beginning aggravating farther Russian perception of NATO as an aggressor against.

As for Russia, it finally found its role in NATO-dominated environment. The role seems to be that of an intermediary between the alliance and the uncontrolled, radicalized (no matter on what grounds – nationalistic, leftist, religious) participants in the process. When saying “Russia”, we mean the Russian modern-oriented, western-minded political elite. Hence upkeeping the reforms in Russia and enhancing its liberal evolution is of vital significance. That seems to be the only possibility to keep Russia in its new “intermediary” role. The future evolution of the Kosovo crisis (no doubts the end of its “hot” phase is not the end of the crisis itself) will show to what extent
Russia can play the role of intermediary in the Balkans and to what extent such a role is necessary.

NATO membership and possible options in this respect – to what extent a kind of associated status is possible

The issue of commitment, discussed above, is crucial not just in historical perspective (as assessment of their attitude towards the crisis in Kosovo) but in strategic perspective as well. In fact the shape of future relations of the countries from the gray zone will be built upon this commitment.

Already in 1996-97 concerns were expressed about the impact of expansion on the non-member states and the possibility to create an area of great instability. The region of South-Eastern Europe was viewed as particular fragile in terms of stability, mainly because of Russia’s likely attempt to enter the security vacuum there. One of the possible options discussed was NATO or the United States to make alternative arrangements with southern nations. These arrangements could turn nations not admitted to the alliance into "strategic partners" and grant them partial membership in NATO without the full security guarantee 18.

But after the commitment to the resolution of the conflict in Kosovo the countries in what used to be a security vacuum finally found themselves in a clearly defined though not directly articulated division of zones of influence. Countries supporting NATO actions in Yugoslavia (Albania, Macedonia, Romania, and Bulgaria) endorsed in this manner a civilizational choice they had already declared. The Alliance in its turn, approached them with the request for access to air space with the awareness that in this way it took certain discrete obligations.

It means that we are witnessing the emergence of “associated status", though not formalized, desired by those countries. They are already associated with the Alliance’s actions in the Balkans, which opens the way to their formal association. It also means that the future security architecture, which is just emerging, will be rather flexible and multilevel. Different levels will imply different responsibilities and, respectively, different levels of guarantees.
• Level 1: NATO as a collective defense system with full guarantees, including Article 5;

• Level 2: Informally associated states (Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, Albania, and Slovenia). They have contributed to the Kosovo campaign and continue to contribute (refusal of the corridor for Russia air-born units, approved corridor for NATO troops as most evident sign of involvement) but are not members. It gives them limited level of guarantees. They are perceived and unofficially respected as “associated member-states” without being formalized as such;

• Level 3: the Baltic States. They seem to be still out of the number of those informally associated but willing to enter the Alliance. In fact, the “twilight zone” has shrunk to these countries. The Baltic countries can turn into the real losers after the war in Kosovo. First, because the focus of attention has been moved from the Baltic region to the Balkans. Second, because Russia could treat the Baltic states as an object of “symbolical revenge”. In order to avoid this pessimistic scenario other institutional measures should be undertaken (described below).

• Level 4: PfP members. In this respect the PfP process will remain rather as a forum for dialogue and building common codes of understanding.

The borders between the second, third and fourth levels will be inevitably flexible. Certain countries will go in and go out, depending on the current political circumstances and the balance of powers. This uncertainty however seems to be more preferable than the hostile uncertainty of a second edition of the Cold War.

Regional groupings

In the context of the stratification of the future European security structure the issue of regional groupings of states - members and non-members in NATO - acquires growing significance. The regional groupings are one of the possible - short-term - approaches to the issue the “grey zone”. These are sets of sub-regional arrangements, creating a sub-regional security entities. They could
be based on a set of multilateral agreements codifying the common interests and possible pattern of relations between the member-states. Constituted by the non-admitted East European countries with the participation of NATO members, such structures may turn into flexible solutions for the “intermediate period”, until the next wave of enlargement. They can be oriented towards solving specific issues of regional dimension where local, regional focus (and expertise) are of increasing significance. These groupings can be also informal way to institutionalize the “partial membership” of the non-admitted states.

Of course, they will be associated with NATO without any bounding obligations to an automatic military commitment. The most important asset of this solution seems to be the direct contacts and the possibilities to build common codes of understanding, both on personal and institutional levels. The institutionalisation of these regional groupings within the overall process of NATO enlargement, could serve as the vehicle for erecting a pan-European security order. Another positive aspect of the regional groupings is the opportunity they provide to the “local voices” to be heard on security issues affecting the respective regions. One of the impediments of the approach to Kosovo crisis was the fact that the local voices were in many respects neglected. And, last but not least, the existing incompatibility of military structures, weapons systems and operational principles could be overcome through a gradual process of co-operation with NATO, enhancing the period during which the available equipment would be in use and thus postponing the necessarily heavy expenses on rearmament in accordance with the NATO standards.

A precedent in this respect already exists - in the most fragile in terms of security European region, the Balkans. This is the example of the Multinational Joint Forces South-East Europe (CEEBRIG). Including in joint cooperative effort NATO members and countries from the “waiting list”. This precedent can be efficiently introduced elsewhere, for example in the Baltic region. A possible solution there could include Poland as a new member-state and the Baltic states whose NATO membership Russia is opposing even more than that of Bulgaria or Romania.
Of course it is a compromise solution. But, to repeat once again, such a compromise is even desirable for countries which for the time-being simply cannot afford NATO membership. As every compromise this approach has also its hidden traps. The first is the threat of substitution - the regional grouping could be “sold” as a solution instead of membership. The second trap could be the asymmetrical contribution - the participants in such groupings could contribute to regional and European security not being able to participate on equal level in decision-making.

The increasing role of Europe after Kosovo

The war in Yugoslavia distorted the security environment in Europe creating a zone with high level of economic instability and unpredictability. The impact of the war was (is and will be) measured not just in military or security terms. It created budgetary gaps in all of the economies of the region and will decrease the expected dynamics of growth. The destroyed industrial potential in Serbia will have long-lasting economic and social impacts. The number of lost jobs only in Yugoslavia is assessed to be around 800,000 with no clear perspective for employment in recent future. The situation in Kosovo and Albania is even worse.

Hence after the war, South-Eastern Europe can find itself stratificated again. Along with the existing numerous classifications, the countries in the Balkans after the final disintegration of former Yugoslavia (i.e. after the end of the war in Kosovo) can be divided into three groups:

- privileged countries (Turkey and Greece). Being NATO members they enjoy security guarantees and increasing influence in this region. As a EU member Greece also enjoys substantial financial assistance, mainly through the structural funds of the Union.

- Front-line countries of the first level – Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro (assuming that in the long run Montenegro will secede from the Yugoslav federation);

- Front-line countries of the second level - Bulgaria and Romania
• Yugoslavia (or rather its Serbia segment) as a special case, the last neo-communist island in Europe.

In security terms the weakest element of this “chain” is Yugoslavia. Obviously without normalized Yugoslavia no recovery of the region is possible with all its security impacts. Hence democratization of the country (for which a key role will play probably the EU, the Council of Europe and OSCE) is pending.

The role of United Europe will be crucial in this respect. Intensified accession negotiations can turn into a strong leverage for promoting democratic values and civilized behavior. They can provide the necessary “positive motive” for action in the Balkans. People tend to go to war with their neighbors when they are desperate, when they have nothing to lose but (hypothetically) can win at least the illusion of “historical glory”. Hence economic prosperity acquires strategic significance more than ever before.

The conflict in Kosovo will also (possibly) undermine regional infrastructure projects. This in turn can affect negatively the new security architecture, make it more susceptible to high-intensity local conflicts. Hence the expected plan for economic revitalization of the region will not have just economic dimensions but will be of vital significance in security terms. The political choice combined with the partial military umbrella should be augmented by an economic pillar. But regional infrastructures can serve also as potential motivation for cooperative approach and behavior. The inclusion in these projects (in fact, in the rebuilding of the region) should be based on strict criteria. Countries which have made the direct and clear commitments for regional and European security (not just participating but also providing positive examples of how ethnic disputes can be solved, as is the case of Bulgaria) should have priority in these projects.

Instead of conclusion - looking beyond the Summit

The future security architecture is linked to the issue of the future design, shape of functions of NATO. The new security concept adopted in
Washington suggests also that in terms of security architecture development too little is being done too late. The Alliance is still under the momentum of its traditional “collective defense” approach, although the new security concept has market significant progress in this respect.

It means that the transformation of the alliance itself is even more important that its enlargement. During the years of the Cold War NATO was a military alliance with a political core. Given the changed nature of the security threats NATO should evolve in the direction of a political alliance with a military core. The other direction of its evolution should also be from a collective defense structure towards collective security structure. Such an evolution is necessary in order to not just avoid new demarcation lines in Europe and alienating Russia. It is necessary for the Alliance itself if it is expected to be adequate to the challenges of the next Millennium.

This perspective is crucial also for the applicant countries. They should bear in mind that applying today, they will be admitted into the alliance of tomorrow. This simple fact should become an indivisible part of the preparation strategies for membership of each applicant for membership.
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As stated in art. 20 of the new Strategic Concept, “the security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of military and non-military risks which are multi-national and often difficult to predict. These risks include uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and which could evolve rapidly… Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states can lead to local and even regional instability. The resulting tensions could lead to crisis affecting Euro-Atlantic stability” - The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999.


“Keeping the U.S. in is now perhaps the top priority for NATO’s European members… A U.S. withdrawal of both forces and interest was expected by many Europeans, and that expectation was given momentum by the return to the U.S. of over 200,000 troops previously stationed in Europe; America’s willingness to see Bosnia as “a European problem,” and the Clinton Administration’s early statements on a turn toward Asia. As the wars in Bosnia dragged on through 1995, much of the boasting and euphoria dissipated from the ESDI project. In Bosnia, the Europeans realized the limits of their political consensus on foreign policy, the limits of their ability to project military power outside the NATO area without U.S. participation, and, perhaps most importantly, that the United States would actually let them fight a war in Europe without caring to become involved. Only through NATO could
American participation be ensured. The Western European alternatives to a NATO-centric European security system all fundamentally depend on the willingness of the United States to become involved in a crisis when Europe wants American involvement. Bosnia demonstrated the vulnerability of that assumption" - Kori Schake, “Europe After NATO Expansion: The Unfinished Security Agenda”, University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, Policy Paper 38 (http://www-igcc.ucsd.edu/igcc2/PolicyPapers/pp38.html)


5 Russia’s perception of the current security issues and NATO enlargement in particular based on historical experience can be summarized as follows: “For 200 years Russian leaders have regarded with apprehension the broad military avenues of approach stretching like an arrow from the North German Plain straight to Moscow. In that period their fears have been realized twice. In 1812 Napoleon burned Moscow before he was compelled to retreat, and 130 years later Hitler's forces killed 20 million Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians as the Nazis tried to seize Leningrad and Moscow. With this history of devastation from the West, is it any wonder that Russians are unsettled by the prospect that much of this same territory is to fall into the hands of their late 20th century adversary, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization?” Center for Defense Information — Washington, DC, Defense Monitor, Volume XXVII, Number 2, 1998 (http://www.cdi.org/dm/1998/issue2/index.html)


7 Of course, Croatia was a rather special case: for the Croats entering the new South Slav state represented a way to escape the Austro-Hungarian empire with the view that a Slav state would be easier to escape later. This they then attempted to do during the Second World War and later in 1970, during the "Croatian spring". However this does not change the fact that the Serbs’ main motivation was completion of their nationalic project.

8 NATO's success comes at a high price. The Alliance resorted to bombing for what President Clinton at the time said was a clear purpose: "to deter an even bloodier offensive against innocent civilians in Kosovo and, if necessary, to seriously damage the Serbian military's capacity to harm the people of Kosovo.” However, having ruled out the use of ground troops and prepared only for three days of bombing in the belief that Milosevic would cave, NATO had neither the strategy nor the means to prevent the mass expulsion of Kosovars. Rather than acceding to Allied demands that he accept the Rambouillet deal, Milosevic accelerated his campaign to defeat the armed rebels and radically alter Kosovo's ethnic balance. In this, Belgrade succeeded—1.4 million Albanians were expelled from their homes, and over 850,000 were driven across the border, shorn of their identities and their valuables; and tens of thousands were murdered, raped, and otherwise brutalized. Notwithstanding what Clinton called the "moral imperative" of acting on their behalf, NATO could do little but watch—and bomb from great heights—as Milosevic's henchmen did their dirty work. - Ivo H. Daalder, “What Holbrooke Wrought”, The Weekly Standard, June 28, 1999, p. 17

9 “One US argument for acting without a UN mandate is that the Alliance should not be subject to the veto of Russia and China in the UN Security Council. But would the Alliance accept a similar argument from other states carrying out military actions outside their own borders? This issue of legal authority for military intervention goes to the heart of global security in the next century. The impression given by US officials is that the Security Council can and should be ignored if necessary, in a manner that was not carried out during the Cold War”… - Juliane Smith and Martin Butcher, Editors, “A Risk Reduction Strategy for NATO”, section 1, BASIC Research Reports, Research Report 99.1, January 1999 1999 (www.basicint.org)

10 “Admittedly, supporting the primacy of the UN becomes difficult in the face of a humanitarian catastrophe (such as the Rwandan genocide). Should the international community stand by and fail to act when the UN Security Council is blocked for political reasons? Clearly, states should act. But the possibility of similar extreme situations arising, and how a state or group of states could acquire the necessary legitimacy to act, are questions that deserve very careful examination. In addition, policy makers should do more to heed the numerous early warnings that usually proceed such scenarios. The
Rwanda genocide, like virtually all other humanitarian catastrophes, was not something that surfaced without due warning. The UN, NATO, and other security organizations should be preparing for likely scenarios and work to achieve political support from the international community when they wish to act. NATO should be cautioned against acting as though authority for a peace support operation has been denied before any crisis has even arisen, thereby circumventing the UN from the beginning. Powerful nations cannot just pick and choose the causes they support. Firm criteria for action, which must be applied in every case, should be drawn up" - Julianne Smith and Martin Butcher, Op.Cit., BASIC Research Reports, Research Report 99.1, January 1999 (www.basicint.org).

11 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, approved by the Heads of State and Governmen participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999, article 24.

12 “NATO is not an end in itself. It exists as an expression of shared values and interests among its members and as a vehicle to facilitate their cooperation. The goal of the NATO members should be to create a system of cooperative security in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the transatlantic Alliance at its center, involving all European nations. The Euro-Atlantic community can be a cornerstone for the construction of peace, justice and stability in the wider international system” - Senator William V. Roth, Jr., President, North Atlantic Assembly, “NATO in the 21st Century”, 2 October 1998 1998 (http://www.senate.gov/~roth/press/nato.html ).

13 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, approved by the Heads of State and Governmen participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999, article 34.

14 For a comprehensive review of the three previous NATO enlargement precedents as well as of the pros and cons of the fourth one see James W. Morrison, “NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Security Alignments, NATO Expansion Questions, Chapter 2”, National Defense University (http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/macnair/m040cont.html).

15 Charles A. Kupchan, Reviving the West (Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No 3, May/June 1996)

16 At NATO's fiftieth anniversary party in 1999, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary will become new members. While the door to further enlargement remains theoretically open, it will in effect stay shut, at least for a while, and Partnership for Peace (PFP) will pick up the slack. - Gregory F. Treverton and Marten van Heuven, with Andrew Edward Manning, “Toward the 21st Century: Trends in Post-Cold War International Security”, 3rd International Security Forum and 1st Conference of the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes "Networking the Security Community in the Information Age” 19 – 21 October 1998, Kongresshaus Zurich, Switzerland


18 “Additional forms of association with NATO short of full membership, such as associate membership, could conceivably, provide provisions designed to enhance security. Such provisions could stop short of providing the Article 5 security guarantees (assist if attacked) available to parties to the Treaty. In section 8 of the PFP Framework Agreement, NATO has already come close to extending to PFP partners the benefits of Article 4 of the Treaty which promises consultation if a party believes it has been threatened” - James W. Morrison, “NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Security Alignments, Op.Cit., (http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/macnair/m040ch2a.html). The idea of partial membership was also discussed at the US Foreign Policy Conference Sponsored by The Stanley Foundation October 23-25, 1997. See “The Pros and Cons of NATO Expansion: Defining US Goals and Options; Report of the Thirty-Eighth Strategy for Peace, US Foreign Policy Conference” (http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/macnair/m040ch2a.html).


20 “NATO should reverse priorities and become a political alliance with a military foundation. The alliance’s principle must be to enlarge the community of democratic states throughout the Euro-Atlantic area while providing its members with the military foundation to undertake joint action in defense of their common territory, values and interests” - Ivo H. Daalder, “NATO at 50: The Summit and Beyond” (Brookings Policy Brief, April 1999, No. 48)