INTRODUCTION

NATO has several important post-Cold War roles. These roles include providing a hedge against a long-term revival of Russian expansionism, projecting stability eastward by taking in new members as well as by contributing to the establishment of a cooperative European security system, and helping to prevent the re-emergence of national rivalries in Europe. However, the latter two roles are largely non-military in nature. It is moreover unclear for how long they can provide a significant rationale for NATO's existence, much less for the maintaining of a large military organization.

The purely residual threat from Russia is also unlikely to prove sufficient over time to justify the preservation of anything resembling NATO's current military structure. By the time that Russia could again present a significant conventional military threat, support for NATO as a functioning military alliance may well have long since crumbled. With no Russian conventional threat to NATO territory possible for at least the next ten years, and more likely the next twenty, the Alliance's willingness and ability to undertake non-Article V missions constitutes the only real basis for NATO to remain an active military alliance.

There is, of course, broad agreement within the Alliance that NATO can and must undertake non-Article V military operations. The Alliance's new Strategic Concept, approved in April 1999 at the Washington summit meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), states that in order to enhance the security and stability of the "Euro-Atlantic area", the Alliance will "stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus... to
contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations”.  

Nonetheless, a dichotomy exists between European and American interests in conducting non-Article V military interventions. Europeans are primarily concerned with peace keeping and crisis management operations on their own continent. Americans, on the other hand, have been very reluctant participants in European peace support and crisis interventions, at least as far as the deployment of ground forces is concerned, and have been more focused on the means of achieving a greater European contribution to eventual U.S.-led interventions beyond Europe's borders, in particular the Middle East/Persian Gulf region. This U.S. objective resulted in frequent accusations during negotiations over the drafting of the new Strategic Concept that Washington was attempting to transform NATO into a "global policeman".

Western military interventions within Europe's borders are more likely to take place under the auspices of NATO than in the case of power projection operations beyond European territory. A NATO operation requires the agreement, or at least the non-opposition, of each one of the Alliance's now nineteen members, whereas a Western intervention undertaken outside the NATO framework will depend exclusively on decisions taken in the national capitals of the participating nations. Yet, both types of intervention are in a sense composed of "coalitions of the willing", since countries are also completely free to decide on the level and nature of their military contribution to a non-Article V NATO operation. As seen in Operation Allied Force in Kosovo during the spring of 1999, consensus at nineteen regarding the initiation of a non-Article V operation does not mean that all Allied countries will accept to participate militarily.

NATO is less likely to be institutionally involved in coalitions of the willing that intervene beyond Europe's borders. Nonetheless, it can still have an important role to play by serving to facilitate the kinds of military cooperation among allies needed to operate effectively together in these types of contingencies once national leaders have taken the political decision to intervene. The thrust of U.S. policy has been to push NATO in this direction rather than to seek having it assume some form of "global policeman" role.
Non-Article V Western military interventions, based on coalitions of the willing regardless of whether NATO is institutionally involved or not, have in reality become the Alliance's core military mission. In the U.S. view, force projection capabilities have largely become the new coin of Alliance burden-sharing. NATO's survival as an effective military alliance may well depend on its ability both to conduct force projection operations successfully itself, and to prepare member nations to do so on a multinational basis outside the formal Alliance framework. Enormous challenges confront the achievement of this objective:

- the reluctance of the United States to engage ground forces in European contingency operations, which in both Bosnia and Kosovo played a major role in leading NATO to the very edge of a precipice;
- doubts over U.S. and European ability to agree on the USE of force in crises that take place beyond Europe's borders;
- the continuing paucity of European capabilities for force projection operations; and
- concern that American and European armed forces will not be able to operate together in the future due to Europe's inability to keep pace with the military transformation the United States is attempting to implement, known as the "revolution in military affairs" (RMA).

The continued, if necessarily slow, development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) appears to constitute the key instrument for overcoming these challenges. ESDI has taken on a not undeserved reputation in American eyes as consisting of "mainly talk and little action", and optimism is hardly warranted regarding Western Europe's ability to translate ESDI into tangible policies and military capabilities. However, due in large part to events in Kosovo, Europeans at least now broadly agree that ESDI must be first of all about developing European military capabilities rather than new institutional mechanisms, although the latter can clearly play a role in helping to achieve the former.
While in principle supporting the development of ESDI, the United States has often opposed, or only very reluctantly accepted, initiatives designed to do so. One can question whether this U.S. ambivalence really matters. After all, only Europeans, not the United States, can build ESDI. Yet, U.S. policy can clearly help to create a "permissive environment" for ESDI's development. U.S. ambivalence towards ESDI has stemmed to a large extent from legitimate policy concerns. The time has come for Washington to address these concerns with its allies, and to lend unambiguous support for ESDI if Europeans start to show a seriousness of purpose that is capable of producing results. As argued herein, ESDI's success may well be the only means of resolving the dilemmas and challenges involved in the formation of Western coalitions of the willing to carry out force projection operations.

**FORCE PROJECTION OPERATIONS AND NATO'S FUTURE**

On both sides of the Atlantic, the potential appears to exist for a fatal undermining of public and political backing for the Alliance. This possibility is most clear in the case of the United States. There is now an asymmetry between U.S. and European interests in the Alliance that did not exist during the Cold War, and support for the Alliance under considerably greater challenge in the United States than in Europe throughout the 1990's. All European governments agree that their interests are best served by a continued U.S. role in European security affairs, and that NATO provides the fundamental vehicle for this U.S. involvement. On the other hand, the exact nature of the United States’ interest in maintaining its military commitment in NATO has come under considerable questioning among U.S. legislators and even security professionals.³

The broad support for NATO that exists in Europe is nonetheless not immune to adverse swings in perceptions of NATO’s utility. Such a shift in views is arguably most likely to occur if NATO were to prove incapable of preventing or bringing about a halt to ethnic and religious conflict within Europe. Washington, on the other hand, has manifested an ambivalent and contradictory outlook towards these conflicts.

**Peace Support and Crisis Management in Europe**
Europeans have two major interests in stopping ethnic and religious conflict within Europe. First, the huge refugee flows that they generate are domestically destabilizing for Western European states, and also create tensions between them as different countries assume unequal shares of the burden of taking in the hundreds of thousands of displaced people. NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept reflected this European concern in stating that «The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting the Alliance».

Second, the atrocities that ethnic and religious conflicts can generate constitute a very direct challenge to the values of European civilization. European leaders, in justifying the spring 1999 military campaign in Kosovo, all essentially stated that a «certain conception of Europe» was at stake in the conflict, and that to accept such a large scale violation of human rights on the doorstep of the European Union (EU) would have been an act of self-betrayal. Europeans have at times also feared that ethnic and religious conflict could spillover into additional countries and create wider instability in Europe, a concern that ebbed and flowed during the 1990's with regard to Kosovo.

European concern over religious and ethnic conflict within the boundaries of their continent immediately manifested itself in the willingness to deploy a significant number of ground troops, and to absorb significant casualties, within the UNPROFOR deployment in Bosnia. Although Western Europe was unable to stop the Bosnian conflict, the UNPROFOR operation served to place some limits on the level of violence and its human consequences, until this approach fell apart in the spring of 1995. As Western European nations became increasingly frustrated with its inability to halt the fighting in Bosnia, they turned to the United States and NATO to join the intervention. A senior French military officer stated in early 1993, «if the Americans would deploy even a single battalion to Sarajevo in the coming days, the situation on the ground would immediately take a completely different political direction». In February 1994, France led the United States into backing a NATO ultimatum designed to break the Serb siege of Sarajevo, the first time that Paris
attempted to use. NATO for a positive objective rather than simply reacting, and most often negatively, to the policies of other member states.

From a European standpoint, non-intervention in Kosovo was not an option, just as it had not been an option in Bosnia. Once Serbia accelerated its campaign of ethnic, if NATO had not first threatened, and then undertook military intervention in Kosovo following the failure of the Rambouillet negotiations, the Alliance would have suffered a devastating blow to its credibility in Europe. Not only a «hands-off» approach to Kosovo was inconceivable from a European standpoint; also unthinkable was reenacting in some form the UNPROFOR mission objective of seeking to contain the level of violence and human impact of Serbian ethnic cleansing. The UNPROFOR experience had demonstrated how unmanageable and demoralizing such an approach was ultimately likely to become.

In Western Europe’s three largest powers, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, it was necessary to go outside the mainstream of the political spectrum to find opposition to NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo, although criticism of course mounted regarding the way in which NATO was conducting the operation. Germany was of course engaged in its first military campaign since World War II, and against a country that had been the object of German aggression then. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer characterized Serbian actions as «a declaration of war against the policy of European integration. It’s not only a question of morality, of human rights. It’s a question of security and stability in Europe.»

Even in Italy, widely viewed as the most unsteady of the leading West European nations involved in the Kosovo operation, the government of Massimo D’Alema maintained the consistent support of a multi-party coalition for the NATO bombing campaign, including Italy’s direct participation in it as well as the critical USE. of NATO bases on Italian soil. It did so despite a strong pacifist strain in Italian politics. The Reconstructed Communists, who strongly opposed Italy’s participation in the Kosovo operation, lost substantial support in the June 1999 elections to the European parliament. On the other hand, the party of
former European Commissioner Emma Bonino, who had urged the sending of NATO ground forces into Kosovo, made sizeable gains.\textsuperscript{8}

Except for British Prime Minister Tony Blair, no Western European leader argued for a NATO ground invasion of Kosovo, although many non-governmental experts and political figures voiced considerable criticism of NATO's use of air power only. In early 1999, France and the UK hinted at a willingness to intervene on the ground in Kosovo even without U.S. participation, but France subsequently shied away from advocacy of a ground intervention. It did so, however, for reasons other than a view that the stakes involved in the Kosovo crisis did not warrant the deployment of French ground forces. France did not advocate a ground intervention in Kosovo because of four considerations:

- domestic politics (the presence of the Communist Party in the governing coalition);
- the political «cohabitation» arrangement at the top of the French executive branch between conservative President Jacques Chirac and socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, making it more difficult for France to undertake potentially controversial initiatives;
- the shaky legal basis for the NATO operation, which a ground intervention would have exacerbated; and
- the extremely hostile and embittered Russian reaction that would have followed the introduction of NATO ground forces into prior to the conclusion of a negotiated settlement.

The last two factors also deeply affected German policy, for which the forced insertion of ground units would have in any event been a step too far in its post-Cold War evolution.

Yet, given the view expressed of what was at stake in Kosovo by virtually all the mainstream political tendencies in the leading European powers, it is plausible to imagine a future ethnic and religious conflict in Europe, taking place under different political circumstances, in which those countries are all in agreement
regarding the need for a ground intervention in a potentially «non-permissive» environment. This prognosis is far less clear in the case of the United States.

The American Side of the Equation

U.S. political, expert, and public opinion is deeply divided over the USE. of American military power for the purpose of European peace support and crisis management operations. U.S. national security strategy proclaims European stability as vital to U.S. security, and makes the building of a Europe "that is truly integrated, democratic, prosperous and at peace" a U.S. strategic objective. On this basis, Washington should be ready to USE. military power, including ground forces in a combat environment, for the purpose of helping to ensure all of the above.

Yet, the Clinton administration refused during 1993 and 1994 to contemplate the sending of U.S. troops into Bosnia. It finally did agreed in 1995 to participate in an eventual NATO peace implementation force (IFOR) in Bosnia only because if it had not been willing to do so those troops would have gone into Bosnia anyway leading a NATO force to extract UNPROFOR, and the conditions would have probably been far more difficult than those that IFOR experienced. Washington also agreed to participate in the follow-on SFOR deployment because Europeans insisted on U.S. participation and U.S. prestige and credibility had become engaged in Bosnia, making a collapse of the peace process there an unpalatable outcome. Given this situation, refusal to participate in SFOR would have gravely undermined the U.S. leadership role within NATO. Nonetheless, the Congress in particular was extremely unhappy with the continuing U.S. ground involvement in Bosnia.

In Operation Allied Force, the Clinton administration refused to consider the USE. of ground forces prior to a virtual Serb military collapse or agreement to withdraw until very late in the conflict. It is undoubtedly unfair to place the sole blame for this U.S. position on an unwillingness to accept the casualties that would have inevitably occurred in a ground combat operation. The impact on relations with Russia of a ground combat operation was no less a concern for U.S. policymakers than for European ones. The huge difficulties involved in achieving a NATO-wide consensus in support of a forced insertion of troops meant
that such an initiative within NATO might well have been successful only as a final act of desperation to avoid "losing" the war, when the Alliance had exhausted all other options. Nonetheless, until very late in the game the Clinton administration appeared to shirk from the task of building Alliance-wide acceptance of the need to prepare for a ground combat operation. Nor did it attempt to hasten the deployment to Kosovo of NATO ground units destined for the Kosovo peace enforcement operation (KFOR); many observers credit the decision taken in late May to mass approximately 50,000 NATO soldiers in Macedonia as weighing in Milosevic's agreement to withdraw Serb forces from the province. A perception exists within significant segments of European opinion that weak U.S. leadership "almost certainly prolonged the campaign" in Kosovo.\footnote{11}

The problem in the United States regarding the USE. of ground forces in European contingency operations goes deeper than an administration that tends to be reactive and unassertive in national security matters. Many American political leaders and experts view European crisis management and peace support operations as responding at best to third level U.S. security interests.\footnote{12} Prominent American opinion leaders were even more dismissive of the U.S. interest in Kosovo. Henry Kissinger argued that the United States had no national security interests at stake in Kosovo.\footnote{13} Robert Manning, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, similarly asserted, "In the Balkans, one must strain hard to get even in the parking lot of the ballpark of a vital American interest".\footnote{14} This viewpoint was very much present in the U.S. Congress, with the result that the House of Representatives produced a 213 to 213 tie vote on a resolution endorsing the bombing campaign.

To be sure, many other opinion leaders and elected representatives argued that the United States did have major security interests at stake in Kosovo, and more broadly in the Balkans. The Senate voted to support NATO's campaign of air strikes. U.S. public opinion was hardly insensitive to the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in Kosovo, and some polls, particularly during the first several weeks of the bombing campaign, suggested that a majority of Americans might have been willing to risk casualties in a ground operation.
Nonetheless, the deep divisions that exist in American opinion at all levels regarding the USE. of American military power in European contingency operations will ensure that when an administration decides to undertake such operations, it will probably be on a very fragile political basis, particularly if U.S. ground forces are involved in a combat environment. If these divisions endure, and there appears to be no reason to think that they will not, even a more confident and assertive administration than the one presided over by Bill Clinton may find it very difficult to play a leadership role within the Alliance concerning the deployment of ground forces for European crisis management purposes.

This American ambivalence concerning European crisis management operations stands in sharp contrast to the broad consensus U.S. surrounding the importance of U.S. military power to protect national security interests beyond Europe's borders. U.S. definition of allied burden-sharing has been increasingly focused on the ability of NATO's European members to make a significant military contribution to U.S.-led operations outside Europe, above all in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.

**The New Terms of Burden-sharing**

Americans initially reacted slowly to the Alliance's need after the Cold War to look for new roles beyond collective defense, and it was then NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner who became a first public advocate of a greater "out-of-area role for NATO." Nevertheless, as the 1990's progressed, a series of U.S. initiatives took place that were designed to expand NATO’s geographic and functional horizons.

In the aftermath of the January 1994 Brussels summit, enlargement, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and counterproliferation all came onto the NATO agenda as a result of U.S. policy. The U.S. military elaborated the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept primarily as an instrument to facilitate NATO's undertaking of non-Article V military missions, and only secondarily as a means of developing ESDI within NATO. In preparation for the 1999 50th anniversary summit, Washington unveiled new initiatives in the areas of WMD and promoted counter-terrorism as a NATO concern. With NATO's
potential involvement in European crisis management and peace support operations widely accepted, American policymakers sought to have the new strategic concept refer as explicitly as possible to NATO's potential interest in military intervention around Europe's periphery. This U.S. effort to keep pushing the NATO "bicycle" forward out of fear that it will otherwise fall over has stemmed in large part from a perceived need to make NATO more relevant to major U.S. security interests.

The United States undoubtedly retains a range of interests in NATO. The Senate resolution ratifying NATO enlargement declared U.S. membership in NATO a "vital national security interest", and stated:

NATO enhances the security of the United States by embedding European states in a process of cooperative security planning, by preventing the destabilizing renationalization of European military policies, and by ensuring an ongoing and direct leadership role for the United States in European security affairs.\textsuperscript{16}

After declining during the first five years following the fall of the Berlin wall, support for maintaining the current U.S. commitment to NATO increased during the second half of the 1990's, among U.S. public as well as elite opinion.\textsuperscript{17}

Nonetheless, it is arguably uncertain whether this broad European stabilization role by itself can sustain the current level of U.S. interest and commitment to NATO, including the deployment in Europe of some 100,000 troops. U.S. intelligence assessments do not foresee a potential Russian conventional military threat to NATO for at least another twenty years, even assuming of course that a Russian political intent to present such a threat emerges. The continuing use of NATO enlargement as a means to help stabilize Europe's newest democracies and relations between them may come to present diminishing or even negative security returns. As the European Union progresses in its own enlargement process it can arguably better undertake the stabilization role.
Moreover, many American defense analysts view potential Russian loss of control over nuclear weapons materials, technologies and systems as the most serious, current threat to American vital interests. NATO enlargement that undermines the United States' ability to work with Russia on this issue may well come up against increasing opposition. Economic, ethnic, and cultural ties may be declining as factors supporting U.S. NATO engagement, while generational change also works to weaken transatlantic security links.¹⁸

U.S. support for NATO as an effective military alliance may thus come to rest increasingly on the ability of the European allies to support the United States in meeting regional challenges to what Washington perceives to as vital Western security interests, particularly in the Middle East/Persian Gulf area. The United States, even though it is likely to retain the ability to conduct unilateral military interventions in most conceivable scenarios, will nonetheless attach great importance to having allied participation in such interventions.

The involvement of key NATO allies in regional military interventions allows the United States to share the political and military burdens of these costly power projection missions, and helps provide much needed domestic and international political legitimacy. American public opinion is strongly opposed to unilateral military intervention, with 72% judging that the United States should not take action alone if it does not have the support of its allies.¹⁹ U.S. leadership opinion is almost evenly divided on this issue, with 48% in favor of acting alone and 44% opposed, but there is clearly a very strong preference for going the coalition route.

Consequently, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, American security specialists very rapidly began to argue that NATO should become an instrument for facilitating the military cooperation needed to address security issues of common U.S.-European concern, whatever their origins.²⁰ The most ambitious proposal in this regard has emanated more recently from a number of RAND specialists, who propose transforming NATO into an institutionalized global partnership "to protect all common vital interests of the partners."²¹
The fact that neither Europe nor the United States are anywhere ready for such a far-reaching step should not obscure the basic point of how Americans are coming to perceive their core interest in NATO. Virtually every American authored discussion or analysis that supports continued U.S. engagement in NATO states in one form or another that:

The primary U.S. interest in Europe is reshaping the transatlantic core of countries that share strategic interests and values into a strategic partnership capable of assuming wider international security responsibilities. Key NATO allies, and the capabilities and cooperative arrangements formed in the Alliance, provide the foundation of this partnership.22

This shift in the United States' interest in NATO to viewing its most useful and vital role as an instrument to facilitate coalition military interventions beyond Europe's borders inevitably places new terms on the traditional burden sharing debate.

How to define and achieve an appropriate balance between North American and West European contributions to transatlantic security has been the object of much debate during the fifty year history of the Atlantic Alliance. The original «transatlantic bargain» at the time of the Alliance’s formation entailed a U.S. commitment to participate in the defense of Western Europe as long as the Europeans assumed the major share of that responsibility. NATO’s subsequent shift to a military strategy based heavily upon the threat of U.S. nuclear use to deter a Soviet attack against Western Europe meant that Washington had to deploy a sizeable conventional force across the Atlantic in order to make its nuclear deterrent threat credible.23

During much of the 1960's and 1970's, both the U.S. Executive Branch and the Congress attempted to pressure the allies into «doing more» for the common defense. The goal of the Congress was generally to bring about a reduction in the United States’s share of the overall NATO effort, while the Executive Branch tended to focus more on the need to enhance overall Alliance military capabilities. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 brought the burden sharing issue to the forefront of Alliance debate, as Washington
promoted the concept that the European allies should assume more responsibility for defense in Europe in order to free up U.S. forces for potential deployment to the Persian Gulf.

Europeans could and did argue that their contribution to the common defense was greater than the level for which many Americans gave them credit. They formed the Eurogroup in 1968 in order to help highlight the extent of the European contribution to NATO. Yet, to a large extent, the impact of Cold War debates over burden sharing and European defense cooperation was circumscribed. The overwhelming U.S. interest in maintaining its NATO commitment during the Cold War was always likely to minimize the impact of European inability to assume a greater share of the collective defense effort. Nonetheless, the late 1960's and early 1980's witnessed serious congressional initiatives to reduce or limit the U.S. troop deployment in Europe, demonstrating that even a reflexively pro-Atlanticist U.S. body politic had limits to its tolerance of perceived inequities in transatlantic burden sharing.

The new post-Cold War asymmetry between U.S. and European interests in the Alliance arguably lends new acuity to the burden sharing issue. Over time, and depending on Russia’s evolution, there may be an increased potential for U.S. disengagement in NATO if the Alliance's European members are unable to satisfy U.S. perceptions of adequate burden sharing.

Allied ability to make an effective contribution to regional military operations may play an increasingly prominent role in U.S. defense policy.²⁴ If European governments do not have available the military instruments to enable them to make a significant contribution to a U.S. led regional military intervention once the political decision is taken to support the United States, a serious weakening of the transatlantic security relationship could very plausibly take place. The U.S. body politic is unlikely to be satisfied in the future with the limited overall military support the European allies provided in the 1991 Gulf War. U.S. origination of the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), as well as overall prodding of the European allies to follow the United States in attempting to exploit information technology to implement a revolution in military affairs (RMA), stems from the goals of wanting the allies to take on a much larger share of the burden of military

(14)
deployments within Europe and to provide much stronger military support for any U.S. led operations around Europe's periphery.

THE RMA - CAN EUROPE KEEP UP

The RMA Gap

Many statements have appeared in the media expressing concern over the perceived technology gap between US and European military capabilities. According to a leader in The Economist magazine, for the United States, "working with allies will probably become more bothersome: their low-tech armies may be incapable of plugging into American information networks." The Financial Times attributed the following view to unnamed military experts: "The ever-growing US lead in defense information technology means that fighting alongside allies is not merely unnecessary, it can be downright inconvenient." At the heart of these and other similar statements lies the conviction that the United States is well on the road to implementing the RMA Europe lags far behind.

The United States military published in 1996 a conceptual framework for conducting military operations, Joint Vision 2010, that defines new operational concepts designed to achieve significantly greater levels of efficiency in joint warfighting. The U.S. Army's Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE), also begun in 1996, will give birth to the world's first "digitized" ground force. A German defense official, viewing Force XXI exercises during March 1997, commented, "In 10 years' time, we definitely won't be able to talk to each other at the tactical level."26

A U.S. defense R&D budget three times larger than that of NATO Europe combined further underpins the judgment that the U.S. rush to exploit a potential RMA will leave its allies far behind in defense capability. While the gap in procurement spending is not as great, it remains significant, and European funds are of
course fragmented between different nations. Moreover, overall U.S. spending on defense acquisition is much more evenly balanced between R&D and procurement than is the case in Europe. Thus, there is a greater emphasis in Europe than in the United States on equipping current forces as opposed to developing new technologies for the future. Moreover, France, the European leader in defense R&D spending, has been increasingly forced to cut its efforts in that area in order to meet the heavy funding burden involved in finishing procurement of Cold War legacy systems.

How accurate do all of these perceptions appear to be? Is an RMA truly feasible? If an RMA is feasible, how quickly will the United States actually move to exploit its potential? To what extent do the military goals of European countries require them to participate in an RMA? If Europe wants to participate in the RMA, must it simply bow to dependence on the United States? This paper takes the view that the United States can plausibly achieve a radical transformation in the nature of warfare. However, advocates of rapid movement towards this new future have not prevailed within the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), and U.S. adoption of the weapon systems, operational concepts, and organizational structures needed to bring about the RMA is very likely to be a gradual, evolutionary process. Given this situation, the major European militaries do not appear to be in a hopeless position to pursue those elements of the RMA most critical to meeting core European military objectives.

The United States and the RMA

Defining the RMA

Broad agreement exists within the U.S. defense community that improvements in defense technologies, coupled with changes to military operational concepts and organizational structures, will enable America's armed forces to attain greater levels of efficiency and capability. Three areas of defense technology are key.

First, new intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems will allow U.S. forces to enhance situational awareness by providing accurate, comprehensive information regarding the location and
characteristics of both friendly and adversary forces. This "information dominance" will reduce the "fog of war" and enable U.S. forces to achieve dominant battlespace knowledge over any prospective adversary.

Second, digitized command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence processing systems (C4I) will enable realtime treatment and transmission of this operational and tactical data to commanders at all levels, and even to the individual soldier on the battlefield. These digitized C4I networks are referred to as battlefield management systems (BMS). Third, long-range precision strike weapons will allow U.S. forces to attack adversary targets from longer distances and with greater speed, accuracy, and destructive power. The technological component of the RMA would consist of linking these three capabilities, ISR, BMS, and precision strike, into a "system of systems" that would be able to track, identify, target and then instantaneously destroy adversary forces through real-time "sensor to shooter" links.27

In operational terms, the U.S. military is moving towards a force that will have greater mobility, be faster, and more dispersed. Military operations will become even more joint, or interservice in nature, and continued movement towards increasingly joint military structures will take place as well. However, there is considerable debate within the U.S. defense community over how far this operational and organizational shift should go, and whether far-reaching changes in these areas, when coupled with the system of systems described above, would be capable of producing a true revolution in warfare rather than continued, incremental improvement in force capability.

The RMA can be seen as fundamentally altering the nature of conflict by "producing a dramatic increase in the combat potential and military effectiveness of armed forces. The increase in military effectiveness from the old military regime to the new is typically an order of magnitude or greater."28 Thus, RMA advocates generally see it as leading to very new forms of warfare. The battlefield would be essentially emptied of soldiers to avoid presenting easy targets to the adversary, with long-range precision strike assets providing massed firepower. Small, dispersed ground units would largely fulfill a scouting function, and unmanned systems might even assume many battlefield tasks hitherto performed by ground forces. Stealthy, long-
range, unmanned systems would also dominate air warfare. Divisions, fleets, and air wings would probably disappear, replaced by less hierarchical, more interconnected units. In the view of RMA advocates, combining the system of systems with these types of innovative operational and organizational change could give the United States unparalleled military advantage over potential adversaries.

Achieving the RMA

Although the United States has already deployed or has under development advanced capabilities in all three of the key RMA related technology areas, achievement of this potential military revolution still requires overcoming significant technological hurdles. In particular, the extent to which advanced ISR and battle management systems can dissipate the fog of war remains unclear.

Current military technology does not yet appear capable of providing comprehensive battlespace knowledge against adversary force efforts to take cover or use concealment, a situation that may prevail for a considerable time yet. For example, the United States has just begun to explore development of a radar capable of penetrating foliage. RMA advocates acknowledge that the information superiority necessary to obtain a revolutionary boost to military force effectiveness will not be easy to achieve. The jury still appears to be out regarding how future competition between "finders" and "hiders" will evolve.

Even if the "hider-finder" competition is resolved in favor of the latter, a second major issue concerns whether centralized data processing and sorting will become sophisticated enough to filter through to units and soldiers only the information that is needed, thereby avoiding "information overload." At the present time, information gathering technology has outstripped the ability to manage it. Even if processing technology can overcome this problem and provide only information that is of practical use to commanders and soldiers, that information will still remain subject to interpretation, a task likely to remain as challenging as ever. In the view of one leading U.S. military analyst, the uncertainties of bomb-damage assessment alone mean that the fog of war will endure.
Long-range precision strike capabilities need further development as well in order to make the realization of a military revolution possible. The F-117 stealth fighter armed with laser guided bombs (LGBs) and other precision systems performed effectively in the 1991 Gulf War, but less so than indicated in the initial success rates that DoD reported after the conflict's termination. Weapons sensor systems became much less effective at higher altitudes or when attempting to penetrate cloud cover, smoke, dust, or high humidity. As is the case with sensor systems, deep strike weapons performance has not been nearly as impressive against covered or concealed targets as against those in open terrain. Thus, a significant close combat capability may remain necessary for many years to come in order to destroy adversary forces that take advantage of cover and concealment. The inability of precision strikes to destroy well concealed, dispersed Serb units in Kosovo during Operation Deliberate Force until attacks by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) forced them to mass illustrates this continued need. Because of this limitation of deep strike systems, some military analysts question the feasibility, at least against militarily skilled opponents, of one of the RMA's key elements, namely substituting massed firepower for massed ground units.

Despite these reservations, as well as the great complexity involved in integrating the three key RMA technology areas into an effective system of systems, trends appear to point towards the continued development of a technological basis for a military revolution. Task Force XXI has already demonstrated the ability of digital technology to increase the destructive power, survivability, and operating tempo of ground forces. Hardware, software, and operating procedures will continue to develop and mature. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) now undergoing deployment will provide significantly enhanced reconnaissance capabilities, and increasingly advanced sensor systems will place ever greater numbers of military targets at risk of attack. More sophisticated long-range precision strike systems will be able to use this improved sensor data to greater destructive effect. For example, next generation precision guided weapons, using the Global Positioning System (GPS) for munitions guidance, will offer high levels of accuracy regardless of weather conditions or visibility. While adversaries will attempt to blunt the efficient operation of U.S. information systems and undermine the information dominance on which the RMA depends, the United States should remain well-placed to win such a competition.
U.S. Exploitation of the RMA

The U.S. military has already taken a number of significant steps to exploit emerging RMA technologies, but with only a limited degree of innovation. The U.S. Army's Task Force XXI experiment maintains the current organizational structure based on heavy divisions, and is essentially built around existing types of weapons and vehicles. It sees digital technology as enhancing the efficiency of existing forces rather than as a basis for adopting innovative operational concepts and organizational structures. Force XXI thus represents a refinement rather than a radical departure.39

The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) suggests that Joint Vision 2010 constitutes the U.S. military's template for exploiting the RMA. However, Joint Vision 2010 is also cautious regarding the potential impact on the current force structure of the continued introduction of information technology. At the heart of Joint Vision 2010 is the elaboration of four new operational concepts that will allow U.S. armed forces to dominate an opponent across the entire spectrum of military operations, from humanitarian assistance to high intensity conflict. Information superiority provides the key enabling element for all four of the new operational concepts:40

- **Dominant Maneuver** - the employment of widely dispersed joint air, land, sea, and space forces that are capable of decisive speed and tempo and that can jointly apply overwhelming force at the point of attack.
- **Precision Engagement** - the USE of a system of systems that allows U.S. forces to locate targets, provide "responsive command and control," launch attacks, assess the level of successful engagement, and be able to re-engage with precision if necessary.
- **Full-Dimensional Protection** - control of the battlespace in order to allow U.S. forces to maintain freedom of action during deployment, maneuver, and engagement, while providing multi-layered defenses for forces and facilities at all levels.
- **Focused Logistics** - delivery of tailored logistics packages directly at the strategic, operational, and tactical level of operations in a period of hours or days rather than weeks, allowing joint forces to be more mobile, versatile, and projectable.

According to Joint Vision 2010, the combination of technology trends that makes these operational concepts possible will provide "an order of magnitude improvement in lethality."41 The document never once
uses the term "revolution in military affairs," but this assertion conforms to the goal of exploiting the RMA to bring about a dramatic increase in combat potential.

Nonetheless, the proposed operational concepts are evolutionary rather than revolutionary ones, and Joint Vision 2010 is very circumspect regarding their force structure implications. While noting that the application of new technologies should allow U.S. forces to "achieve the effects of mass - the necessary concentrations of combat power at the decisive time and place - with less need to mass forces physically than in the past," Joint Vision 2010 also states that "many military missions will require occupation of the ground, and intensive physical presence." RMA advocates note that the prospective discontinuity in warfare that the RMA can bring about "lies well beyond the changes in Joint Vision 2010 and the current plans of the Services."

The U.S. National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), which serves in part as a think tank for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has posited that the United States could take three potential paths towards the RMA: a recapitalized force, an accelerated RMA force, and a "full spectrum" force. Each of the U.S. military services will need to replace current equipment during the first decade of the next century. The recapitalized force would largely maintain the existing U.S. force structure while providing for a moderate rate of modernization through continued deployment of advanced information technologies, precision weapons, and new generations of traditional, major platforms. Some reductions in force as well as in readiness levels would take place in order to fund this modernization while taking into account defense budgetary constraints.

The accelerated RMA force option would potentially result in substantial reductions in force on the road to creating a radically different U.S. military in both operational and organizational terms. RMA related technologies would benefit from higher levels of funding, while traditional weapon platforms would receive less priority. For example, mobile offshore bases might replace at least part of the existing carrier fleet, while the air force would speed the introduction of large numbers of unmanned aircraft. This choice would be very
disruptive to the U.S. military, but would achieve the earliest possible deployment of dominant RMA capabilities.

The full spectrum force would constitute a hybrid of the first two options, recapitalizing the current force structure while still pursuing relatively rapid technology modernization, doctrinal innovation, and organizational reform. This alternative would greatly mitigate the near-term disruption and risks involved in the accelerated RMA force, while still moving quickly to exploit the RMA's superior combat potential. However, the full spectrum force would be the most expensive of the three, and its funding requirements go well beyond what the U.S. political system is willing to invest in defense.

Although the QDR's language stresses the goal of exploiting the RMA while preserving existing capabilities, and thus refers to the need for a "full spectrum" force, the specific decisions in the QDR report all point towards a recapitalized force. The Army would retain 10 active, combat ready divisions, the Navy 12 carrier battle groups, and the Air Force 20 fighter wing equivalents, albeit with somewhat reduced numbers of new aircraft acquisition. Although the QDR promises to free up sufficient resources through reductions in operations and support costs to allow the Army to deploy its first digitized corps one to two years ahead of the originally planned date of 2006, overall the review does not increase the focus or spending levels devoted to ISR and command, control, communications, and computers (C^4).

The QDR's choice in favor of maintaining existing force posture and readiness levels over more rapid technology modernization stems from its emphasis on meeting near-term threats to U.S. security, in particular the perceived need to be able to fight two, overlapping major theater conflicts. The National Defense Panel (NDP), a congressionally mandated body established to assess the results of the QDR, argued that this focus on fighting two, nearly simultaneous major theater wars is leading to an over concentration of U.S. defense resources on a "low-probability scenario" that current U.S. forces, with the support of allies, are capable of meeting. In the NDP's view, the two theater war construct is undermining
the United States' ability to develop the RMA type capabilities that it will need to meet security challenges after the year 2010.\textsuperscript{46}

The NDP concluded as well that the procurement budgets of the military services are primarily focused on modernizing current systems rather than on the development of an RMA type force. The panel recommended a more aggressive "transformation strategy" that would place greater emphasis on "experimenting with a variety of military systems, operational concepts, and force structures." The panel estimates that an annual "budget wedge" of $5 to 10 billion is required to fund this transformation strategy. Finding this budget wedge would be extremely difficult, however. Adequate resources simply for the QDR force posture is very much in doubt due to regular annual shortfalls in projected DoD procurement funding as well as to Congressional unwillingness to undertake measures, above all a further round of military base closures, that could free up additional funds for acquisition programs.\textsuperscript{47} Consequently, implementation of the NDP's transformation strategy would require a very substantial reduction in the force structure laid out in the QDR.

The unlikelihood of such a radical shift in acquisition focus was underscored in late 1997 when the Navy canceled its Arsenal Ship program due to the unavailability of funds. The Arsenal Ship, capable of carrying as many as 500 vertically launched missiles, represents the kind of potent, long-range precision strike asset required to help bring about the RMA.\textsuperscript{48}

In responding to the NDP's conclusions and recommendations, Secretary of Defense William Cohen already rejected a change in U.S. defense spending priorities.\textsuperscript{49} Although expressing agreement with much of the NDP report, Cohen refuted its central conclusion from which all of its recommendations stem, namely that the United States should not devote further resources to maintaining a force posture for conducting two, simultaneous major theater wars:

\begin{quote}
I believe that maintaining a capability, in concert with our allies, to fight and win two major theater wars in overlapping time frames remains central to credibly deterring opportunism
\end{quote}
and aggression in these critical regions. Moreover, this level of capability helps to ensure that the United States maintains sufficient military capabilities over the longer term to deter or defeat aggression by an adversary that proves to be more capable than current foes or under circumstances that prove to be more difficult than expected.\textsuperscript{50}

Cohen thus also rejected the NDP's key recommendation that the United States should accelerate its transformation activities to exploit the RMA. Cohen stated instead that "in the face of very real near-term demands to protect U.S. interests, and within the constraints of available resources, we must pursue this transformation prudently."\textsuperscript{61}

Some analysts assert that the United States cannot predict when it will face a major challenge from a "peer competitor," especially given the historical pattern suggesting that "competition among the great powers is the rule, rather than the exception."\textsuperscript{62} In this view, the potential for a major challenge to emerge is all the more real given that RMA related technologies "are broadly available to any nation willing to pay for them and integrate them into its military systems."\textsuperscript{63} This statement is probably overly pessimistic, as military systems integration has proven extremely difficult even for as technologically advanced a nation as Japan. Asia is the most frequently mentioned region where an RMA inspired competitor might emerge. However, one study of the RMA and Asia concludes that fundamental weaknesses in systems integration skills, combined with the need for major cultural change in Asian militaries, means that except for close U.S. allies Asian nations "will experience only a slow and partial evolution in the RMA."\textsuperscript{64}

A more serious threat would appear to stem from the possibility that a local power could develop the ability to deny U.S. and allied forces access into a regional theater. This "anti-access" capability would be centered around the acquisition of a ballistic and cruise missile force armed with nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) warheads.\textsuperscript{55} The risk of being denied access into a regional theater is particularly serious given that regional threats have become the United States' primary post-Cold War security concern. \textit{Joint Vision 2010} states that "power projection, enabled by overseas presence, will likely remain the fundamental strategic concept of our future forces."\textsuperscript{66} Moreover, U.S. military analysis emphasizes that future regional adversaries are unlikely to allow U.S. and allied forces six months to deploy into the theater, as Saddam
Hussein did in 1990-91. It may be necessary rapidly to deploy a small force possessing great destructive power in order to meet a future regional contingency.

An RMA type force would be tailor made for this type of requirement, as well as for successfully meeting the dangers presented by an adversary possessing an arsenal of missiles armed with NBC warheads. The NDP report stresses the need for "aggressive transformation" in order to carry out future power projection missions.57

Reducing casualties and minimizing collateral damage constitute a further U.S. motivation for pursuing the overwhelming military dominance that the RMA appears to offer. With little U.S. political consensus regarding the carrying out of operations other than war (OOTW), casualty avoidance has become an important consideration for maintaining political and public acceptance, if not support, for these types of operations. The ability to minimize damage and casualties among non-military targets has also come to constitute a major goal for the USE of force in OOTW.

Although these incentives for pursuing the RMA are real, they have nonetheless not proved sufficiently compelling to overcome the entrenched interests behind existing force posture as well as fear of rapid organizational and doctrinal change. Not having sufficient funding for the full spectrum force, and not wanting to take the risks associated with an accelerated RMA path, DoD has inevitably opted for the recapitalized force. As French defense analyst Yves Boyer has observed, although exploitation of the RMA has become DoD's official rhetorical goal, it has not yet been able to establish itself as the central organizing principle determining doctrinal evolution and acquisition investment.58 Consequently, while the U.S. military will continue to seek the RMA's vision of overwhelming military superiority, it will do so in a very cautious and gradual manner.

**Europe and the RMA**
Europeans do not generally hold an integrated conception of the RMA in the way that has become common in the United States, and there is little vocal advocacy in Europe in favor of reorienting defense policy specifically for the purpose of exploiting the RMA.\textsuperscript{59} Many Europeans view the revolution label as highly premature,\textsuperscript{60} or as representing a vision of warfare that is unlikely to apply to the real world to any meaningful extent.\textsuperscript{61}

Nonetheless, if one looks beyond the semantics surrounding the RMA, all of the major European powers are investing in at least several of the advanced technologies associated with the RMA, and are exploring as well some of the related organizational and operational concepts. As Lawrence Freedman puts it:

\begin{quote}
At issue here is not the relevance of many of the systems now associated with the RMA. It is hard to imagine any conflict in which Western forces are involved in which commanders will not want to acquire and exploit the best information, target their forces with precision and keep casualties to minimum.\textsuperscript{62}
\end{quote}

One French defense analyst has even argued that the RMA should provide the guiding principle for French military modernization, since the exponential development of information technologies will inevitably enhance military capabilities.\textsuperscript{63}

Most importantly, the major European powers all have underway significant battlefield digitization programs. France has successfully deployed a formation-level BMS, which supports units from brigade size and above, in Bosnia since 1995. France has already exported a battalion-level BMS to the United Arab Emirates, and has under development systems at regimental and dismounted soldier level. Germany is proceeding with development of a BMS for battalion level and below. While budgetary restrictions have slowed the pace of these programs, they are all nonetheless moving ahead.\textsuperscript{64} The UK has also used formation-level BMS within NATO’s Rapid Reaction Corps headquarters and with its forces deployed to Bosnia. British plans are to field a single battlefield information system by 2005 and an army-wide information system by 2010.\textsuperscript{65}
France has shown great interest in stand-off precision strike systems, and has placed them «among its highest equipment priorities.» The French have developed the Apache family of air-launched cruise missiles, and are planning to procure 500 Scalp missiles with a range of over 250 kilometers coupled with one meter accuracy, as well as varying numbers of other Apache derivatives. In 1995 Germany decided to acquire one such Apache derivative, a 140 kilometer range stealthy missile designed to destroy runways at enemy air bases. The United Kingdom announced in late 1995 that it would purchase 65 conventionally armed Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles from the United States, to be deployed on nuclear powered attack submarines. The UK MoD awarded as well a major, £600 million contract in the summer of 1996 for the acquisition of 900 Storm Shadow missiles, the British version of the Scalp. The relative paucity of French and British precision strike assets during Operation Allied Force was thus not due to a lack of awareness of the need for these systems, nor to the absence of a procurement program, but simply to the fact that initial deliveries remain some years away.

In the area of ISR capabilities, the UK, France, and Italy have national AGS programs. The larger European countries already have deployed or are acquiring a range of reconnaissance drones and observation missiles. France, with the participation of Italy and Spain, has launched the Hélios optical observation satellite, and is following that up with the more advanced Hélios II. European militaries have been exploring organizational and operational concepts that point in an RMA direction, in particular the promotion of greater inter-service cooperation and «jointness» in the conduct of operations. Operational concepts that are of considerable interest to the major European powers include information warfare, in terms of acquiring information, protecting one’s own information flows, and denying it to the enemy, and deep-strike targeting.

European militaries are consequently evolving in an RMA direction, albeit in a less comprehensive manner and with more limited means than the United States’ armed forces. Most defense experts agree that no other country in the world has the resources to match the United States in the acquisition of RMA
capabilities, and that indeed only the United States with its large defense budget has the potential fully to exploit the RMA. Based on the preceding discussion of European military missions, nor is there any real need for the major European powers to acquire a full panoply of RMA capabilities. Moreover, the gradual RMA path that the United States is currently pursuing places a considerably lower degree of stress on transatlantic coalition warfighting than would be the case of an aggressive U.S. attempt to exploit the RMA.

As long as the United States does not adopt revolutionary operational concepts, such as truly emptying the battlefield of soldiers, maintaining the ability to carry out coalition military interventions will depend on the difficult but certainly not impossible technical task of achieving interoperability in key battlefield systems. Even in the event of full American exploitation of the RMA, the United States could hypothetically preserve the capacity to carry out effective coalition operations by sharing dominant battlespace knowledge with its allies, providing an «information umbrella» akin to the nuclear one of the Cold War. However, this evolution could place the major European powers in the uncomfortable position of adapting their armed forces to RMA organizational and operational concepts, but then not being able to use those forces properly unless they were able to plug into American information systems.

Interoperable C⁴I is the core requirement for maintaining transatlantic ability to conduct coalition military operations, allowing European forces to receive U.S. acquired and processed data. To some extent, this dissemination to the allies of U.S. acquired information has already been taking place in Bosnia. U.S. JSTARS aircraft, for example, have fed real-time radar information directly to French forces. The U.S. Bosnia Command and Control Augmentation System (BC²AS) has also provided allied forces in Bosnia with instant imagery from observation satellites and UAV’s.

Without an interoperable C⁴ framework, the European countries might be virtually forced to abstain from a U.S.-led combat operation, regardless of the other military assets they possessed. Achieving interoperability has never been easy, and is arguably becoming more difficult. The RMA’s focus on C⁴I
«entails a different, and tighter degree of interoperability than was the case when hardware, rather than software, was the main concern.» Already during NATO air operations over Bosnia in 1995, the British air force encountered problems in operating alongside its American counterpart as well as U.S. naval aviation due to superior U.S. command and control capabilities. Beyond C4I, European acquisition of long-range precision strike weapons will be critical for effective transatlantic coalition military operations, in order for the allies to possess adequate means of participating in attacks on designated targets.

With advanced BMS and long-range precision strike programs in progress, the major European powers are arguably already in the process of acquiring the two most important capability areas for keeping open effective options for coalition military operations with the United States. Here again, one can avoid becoming overly tied up in RMA semantics by noting that «It makes sense for those capabilities with the widest possible application, such as precision strike and C4I capabilities, to become the priority areas for future investment.»

The QDR notes that as the United States incorporates new technologies at a faster pace than the allies, meeting interoperability objectives will require careful design and collaboration. It will also require sufficient European investment in the key technology areas for maintaining coalition warfare capabilities, as well as European tracking of U.S. organizational and operational adaptations. None of these requirements appear beyond the realm of feasibility, and the allies have indeed begun various initiatives to promote C4I interoperability in particular.

European capabilities in RMA related technology areas appear reasonably solid, and the cautious pace at which the United States is proceeding with its military transformation should allow Europeans time to assess the real possibilities for the RMA, learn from US experiences, and choose the most fruitful areas for technology development and weapons acquisition. A British defense official has estimated that «Europe is trundling along two to three years behind the U.S.» in the area of battlefield digitization.» This gap is probably not an undesirable one from a European standpoint.

THE ROLE OF ESDI
To the extent that a European security and defense identity (ESDI) has genuine support in Washington, it is as a means to this end, certainly not as an end in itself, and not very much as a means to enable Europeans to undertake autonomous operations. Most of the U.S. defense community does not think that the European allies will undertake autonomous military operations, except for very limited types of contingencies. U.S. policy goals raise major challenges for Europeans, if they are to satisfy those goals while at the same time preserving a future option for conducting autonomous military interventions.

Europeans periodically promoted the resort to defense cooperation among themselves as a means of both organizing a greater contribution to NATO's military posture and of achieving increased influence over transatlantic security policy. While the United States in principle welcomed initiatives that held at least the promise of European assumption of a larger share of the defense burden, it viewed European political and defense cooperation with considerable ambivalence. Given the stakes of the East-West conflict and the central role of U.S. nuclear deterrence, Washington did not want to see its influence over Alliance decision-making diminished, and was always anxious that greater European cooperation could undermine Western cohesion under U.S. leadership.

Washington continues to manifest considerable misgivings and anxiety over ESDI. Clinton administration reaction to the St. Malo declaration was quite negative, and a senior administration official personally informed the French and British that they should not undertake such initiatives without prior consultation with Washington. Reflecting this U.S. reaction, the Washington Summit Communiqué only "acknowledged" rather than welcomed the "resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action..."

U.S. ambivalence towards ESDI stems from two major concerns. The first is that ESDI rhetoric has always been far ahead of its reality, and can create unrealistic expectations in the U.S. Congress of what the Europeans are actually capable of achieving. These expectations can then make it even more difficult to obtain congressional acceptance of U.S. ground participation in military deployments within Europe.
Moreover, American confidence in European ability to carry out successfully an autonomous military operation is low. The second U.S. concern over ESDI is that the United States will have to come in to rescue a failed European intervention, which is how Americans tend to interpret the 1995 events in Bosnia. Despite these U.S. misgivings, there is no alternative to the development of ESDI in order to meet the needs both of European crisis management and of more equitable allied burden sharing for interventions beyond Europe’s borders.
Endnotes


2. The North Atlantic Treaty in fact leaves considerable leeway for national decision-making even in the event of an attack that falls under Article V, but the prior designation of national forces for use by the integrated military command would weigh heavily on leaders' options.


18. This view is advanced strongly in S. M. Walt, *The Ties that Fray*.


31 See Andrew Krepinevich, "Transforming the American Military," *CSBA Backgrounder*, 26 September 1997, pp. 5-6. Krepinevich, one of the best known advocates of an accelerated U.S. military transition to an RMA future, writes that long-range, lethal and precise firepower "could be an instrument of decisive military advantage for the force which possesses it, especially if [emphasis added] the "hider-finder" competition is resolved in favor of the "finders."


35 According to a recent report by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), the F-117 bomb hit rate ranged between 41 and 60%, still considered highly effective but, less than the 80% rate reported after the war by DoD and the Air Force. The claim of "one target, one bomb" for LGBs was also overstated, as an average of four LGBs were U.S.ed against successfully destroyed targets. See United States General Accounting Office, *Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign*, GAO/NSIAD-97-134, June 1997, pp. 110-161.

36 Stephen Biddle, "Assessing Theories of Future Warfare," pp. 18-24. See also the comments of


49. Cohen's response is contained in a letter dated 15 December 1997 to Senator Strom Thurmond, the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. The letter is available on the DoD Internet site, DefenseLINK.

51. Ibid.


55 Cite NDU Counterproliferation Center studies.


60. This view is especially strong in France. Read David S. Yost, France and the Revolution in Military Affairs, Unpublished Manuscript, 31 March 1997, pp. 6-8.


62. Ibid., p. 75-76.


66. See Jean-Michel Boucheron, Rapport Fait au Nom de la Commission des Finances, de


73. Craig Covault, «Joint-STARS Patrols Bosnia,» p. 47.


