SEGMENTAZATION MENACE IN POLAND AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR POLAND’S INTEGRATION WITH EUROPE

/Summary/

Szczecin 1999
1. Introduction

In 1989 Poland has regained complete sovereignty that had been limited by its including to the Soviet sphere of influence according to results of Yalta conference in 1945. New elites descending from opponents against Communism who seized power in Poland after 1989 and the most of Polish society have wished to include our country into the structures of European integration. That was impossible previously, because of division of Europe among political – military blocks based upon opposite ideologies.

The collapse of real socialism took place peacefully in Poland: communists were surrendering to democratic procedures voluntarily and transmet state power in hands of former anti – communist opposition. Nevertheless, clearly existing since 1980, i.e. origins of “Solidarność”, division of Polish society have not been disappeared, but has been more and more sharp in a lapse of time.

The main axis of this division has been an attitude against the Polish People’s Republic /Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa – PRL/ that had been ruled by the communists. The division has been between people who were connected with communist authorities and anticommunists. Cleavages about the role of Catholic Church in social and political life have been overlapped to this division.

The Catholic camp is characterised by a high degree of self-organisation that has become similar to a forming segment. Its striving to impose the Polish society its views and values might cause a birth of an anticlerical and secular segment.

The in statu nascendi Catholic segment is rather no sympathizer of integration process between Poland and Europe. It is afraid that the process will decrease the role of religious fundamentalism and will intensify indifference and tolerance.

The aim of my research is to analyse whether fragmentation of society will occur in Poland, which degree of influence are possessing tendencies of segmentization upon the
process of European integration inside Poland and for the European structures, especially for the European Union. In not so far time Poland will be a member of the European union and not so long ago is a member of NATO.

My work is based upon literature, mainly the Western one, but partly Polish, devoted to theoretical and practical problems that are occurring somewhere else, as segmentazation, domestic political stability, its role in foreign relations. There are investigated tendencies of segmentization in Polish society in ‘90s in the light of Polish documents including Polish press.

There are analysed views of Catholic Church after the II Vatican Council and more important statements of the Pope John Paul II concerning to the role of Catholic Church in social and political life. There is considered also a role of Catholic Church in selected countries of the European Union: Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Austria. There is analysed an attitude of the Pope John Paul II and the Roman curia towards European integration.

Against such background there are confronted views and activities of the Catholic segment in Poland, especially concerning to the role of Catholic Church in social and political life, as well towards integration of Poland with Europe. There is inquired in this aspect a behavior of hierarchy and clergy, as well leaders of parties and organisations strongly articulating their Catholicism, thus acting on behalf of or inside the Catholic segment.

On the basis of public opinion polls there is described an attitude of the Polish society and its component parts towards the European Union.

Thereafter follows estimation about a state of the tendencies towards segmentization of society in Poland and perspectives concerned with them, especially in an aspect, whether such tendencies will disturb the domestic political stability. It is made an assumption, if Poland is instead of a democratic state under the rule of law an ideologically Catholic and
nationalist state, there would suffer the process of European integration, because it would result in deterioration of relations with East – European countries and maybe cause ideological and xenophobic menace or at least hamper the process of integration deepening.

2. Domestic political stability and international position of a state

2.1. Terms and ideas of a political stability and domestic conflicts

According to Donald Morrison and Hugh Stevenson political in stability might be defined as a condition in national political systems in which the institutionalized patterns of authority break down, and the expected compliance to political authorities is replaced by violence intended by change the personnel, policies or sovereignty of the political authorities by injury to persons or property.

It may also be added further conditions to this definition:

A/ interruption in the regular flow of political succession,

B/ a system should be considered relatively unstable depending on the frequency or magnitude of particular disruptive events.

Political stability exists so long as individuals restrict themselves to the behavior patterns that fall within the limits imposed by political role expectations. Any act that deviates from these limits is an instance of political instability. The best example of this flow of political exchange might be associated with the continuity of governments, as indicated by the duration of terms of office or the turnover of personnel. That is, a system might be considered relatively stable or unstable depending on the rapidity of change of public officials. Political succession and continuity in office depend on the policies that the chief executives pursue and on related considerations /such as the personal qualities of the incumbent/.

There are following obstacles to orderly succession:

• The political authorities being confronted with different social groups and the articulation of different kinds of demands: it may happen that rewards for one group are punishments
for another. Under such circumstances, the political authorities are never free from criticism and opposition. Even the most differentiated approach to the production of public policies would still be insufficient in this case.

- Policy decisions not being the same as policy outcomes. The gap between policy decisions and policy effects raises the possibility of rewarding policies turning into punishment effects. Furthermore, there is an increasing tendency to blame the political authorities for any misfortune but to consider the production of profitable policies “natural”. This complicates the direct link between the political authorities and the population, the link that underlines the expectation of short – run political stability.

Some writers are inclined to define “conflict” in such a way that a conflict is a state of mutual antagonism or hostility between two /or more/ parties. Others tend to identify conflict with the very incompatibility of interest/values etc. which may in turn give rise to antagonism or hostile behaviour.

Thus a conflict of interest is a state of tension /antagonism, hostile behaviour/ the basis of which is an incompatibility of interest or a situation of scarcity.

For recent conflicts in Poland it would be the best passed a definition that the conflict is a situation of competition in which two parties are aware of the incompatibility of potential future positions and in which each party wishes to occupy a position that is incompatible with the wishes of other.

The conflicts may be eliminated/solved and/or suppressed. A conflict which is eliminated does not longer exist, whereas a conflict which is merely suppressed does still exist, even though it has somehow latent or is less likely to give rise to violence and hostility than it used to be. It may be also said that a conflict is suppressed if the parties have accepted to live with it. Thus, certain kinds of compromise represent suppression rather than elimination of conflict.
There are at least three main types of conflict elimination. The first is elimination of parties. A conflict between two parties is automatically eliminated as soon as one or both of them cease to exist. Second, there is elimination of incompatibility. Given a conflict in which the interests of the parties are neither logically nor empirically, it may happen that the barrier to their joint satisfaction breaks down or is removed so that they are no longer incompatible. The third form of conflict elimination is reconciliation. Unlike the other two forms, this presupposes a genuine change or modification of at least some of the interests in question. They have to be changed or modified in such a way that they are no longer incompatible.

2.2. Factors determining domestic political stability

According to Jonathan Lemco variables of the stability may be defined in the following manner:

- Executive effectiveness is the government’s ability to maintain a legislative majority 75 percent of the time.

- Regular executive transfers refer to those changes in the office of the national executive from one leader or ruling group to another but are accomplished through conventional legal or customary procedures and unaccompanied by actual or directly threatened physical violence.

- Irregular executive transfers are those changes in the office of national executive from one leader or ruling group to another that are accomplished outside the conventional legal or customary procedure.

- Unsuccessful irregular executive transfers are failed attempts by an organized group to remove and replace the incumbent national executive outside the conventional procedures for transferring formal power.
• Constitutional crises are major challenges to the existing constitution, that significantly alter the prerogative of the various branches of government. This variable is related to the severe decline of a political regime’s legitimacy.

• Major cabinet changes refer to the number of times in a year that a new prime minister is named and/or 50% the cabinet posts are occupied by new ministers.

Political violence results from an intolerable gap between what people want /expectations/ and what they get /gratifications/. Discrepancy between expectations and gratifications is a frustrating experience that, if sufficiently intense and focused on the government, results in either rebellion or revolution. The expectation – gratification discrepancy occurs when expectations and gratifications rise in tandem over a prolonged period, followed by a precipitous drop in gratifications, while expectations continue to increase.

The most obvious approach is to define political stability as absence of domestic conflict and violent behavior.

I don’t consider other meanings of political stability as longevity of governments and absence of structural change, because they aren’t helpful to my study.

For solving a potential conflict situation these are indicated following manners:

• The rules of political games are known by all parties,

• The rules are clear, unambiguous, and consistent,

• The rules are perceived to be unbiased,

• There is confidence that others adhere to the rules,

• Violators can be quickly found out,

• There is social approval for adherence to the rules,

• Adherence to the rules has been rewarded in the past,

• The adversaries would like to employ rules in the future.
Conflicts are likely to develop in social units where there are rules applicable to disputes and where the above mentioned condition exist.

A situation of conflict exist when members of a social unit go beyond the rules and attempt to destroy, injure, thwart, or otherwise control another party or parties. Conflict arises from position and resource scarcity.

Political stability exists when striving for scarce positions and resources takes place according to these established rules that strictly limit what competitors can do to each other in the course of striving. Competition restricted to prescribed system of rules is a desirable state of affairs. It is only when relevant actors regularly engage in behavior falling outside the bounds of accepted rules that conflict, violence, and injury result for parties involved.

Peaceful resolution of disputes and maintenance of political stability requires trust and co-operation among the parties involved. Trust can be built by stressing goals common to those involved and by treating opponents with respect.

2.3. Domestic political stability of a state and its participation in international structures

For Kenneth Waltz a country capability includes its size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic stability, military strength, political stability and competence.

I consider only one factor of the country capability, i.e. political stability. In a long time political stability ought to be in a democratic society.

Among stable liberal democracies, reciprocal institutional constraints, shared values, and powerful norms against the use of force against fellow democracies significantly ameliorate the security dilemma and tame the struggle for positional goods. Conflicts will still occur among liberal democracies, but a less intense or frequent level and not on the battlefield.

There are in literature mentioned a lot of research defending the effects of democracy on foreign policy. It is defined a democratic foreign policy as one that reflects the preferences
of the national community it is meant to serve and argues that the resultant policy is likely to be stable and coherent.

A state that doesn’t possess the democratic political stability isn’t credible for other states and more for international structures and organizations. Of course, participation of such state in the international structures and organizations exerts an influence to stabilise its foreign policy. Still disturbance of the stability influences negatively upon position of the state towards other states.

3. **European Integration and Domestic Political Stability of its Member States**

3.1. **Domestic political stability and conditions of access to the European Union**

The European Council has stated following introductory conditions of ability to integration with applicant states:

1. Development of democracy, political stability, main conflicts in a political system. These include a state of political reforms process, government institutions, party system, groups of interest, social organizations, media’s system, policies in mass communication, reform of administrative structures.

2. Accommodation of legal system constitution and its implementation, human rights and protection of minorities, protection of law including against activities of administration, reforms of civil, commercial and economic law, assimilation of country law into the law of the European Union.

3. Foreign and security policy: main orientations of foreign and security policy, membership in international organizations, especially in the European Union, Western European Union and NATO, reform of army, regional co-operation, policy towards Russia and other members of the Community of Independent States.

4. Economic reform: a state of reforms to establish functioning market economy, a state of structural transformation, assimilation of datas and norms, microeconomic datas,
employment, monetary and fiscal policies, policy of competition and privatization, general conditions for foreign investors, policy of foreign trade, banking and credits, agricultural policy, infrastructure and energy policy.

5. Society: potential of social conflicts, social system and social policy, tiding over difficulties with past, attitude of people towards the European Union and NATO, perception of menaces, national identity and readiness to transmission of sovereignty, regional identity and regionalism.

6. A state and problems of accession into the European Union: implementation of accession treaty, economic and scientific co-operation, environmental policy, development of “structural dialogue”, co-operation in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and of Justice and Home Affairs, perspectives of accession process.

For my consideration there are especially important points 1 and 5, partly 3 of the above mentioned conditions.

Agenda 2000 defines them as following: “The Copenhagen European Council indicated that membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities.

In order to evaluate the extent to which applicants meet this condition for membership, the Commission /.../ went beyond a formal description of political institutions, and the relations among them to assess how democracy actually works in practice, in terms of a series of detailed criteria. It examined how various rights and freedoms, such as the freedom of expression, are exercised, through, for example, the role of political parties, nongovernmental organizations and the media.
Countries wishing to become members of the Union are expected not just to subscribe to the principles of democracy and the rule of law but actually to put them into practice in daily life”.

So the domestic political stability is one of the conditions to access into the European Union. Agenda 2000 links it with functioning of democracy as a primordial question in assessing the application of a country for membership of the Union.

3.2. Political stability of Member states and its influence upon the European Union

In principle all member states of the European Union are characterized by the domestic political stability and appearing there internal conflicts don’t threat stability of their political systems.

The Federal Republic of Germany being one of founder’s state of European communities has been a state after its reunification with the German Democratic Republic, in which there has been no menace of impairment of existing democratisation system in spite of attempts of its destabilization that Rote Armee Fraktion had undertaken.

Similarly France and Italy, where activities of antisystem leftist organizations, sometimes enough spectacular, weren’t able to shake foundations of their political systems. Separatist movement in Corse /France/ has been a marginal problem.

The Netherlands and Luxembourg are examples of political stability, where government crises or other political events have never been directed in existing there political systems directly.

Belgium has experienced changes of its state system linked with flamand – wallonian conflict. It has transmuted from an unitarian into a federal state. Still Flamands as well Wallons have perceived solving of existing between them conflict into the European integration process.
United Kingdom in spite of unsolved bloody conflict in Ulster and tendencies towards a larger autonomy in Scotland and Wales hasn’t had any important tensions.

Ireland, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Austria are countries without any important internal conflicts.

Portugal after the revolution of “red pinks” has been a stable state with any threat to democracy. It had been caused a.o. by a perspective of its integration with European Communities.

Spain in spite of bloody attempts of Basques separatists has been able to strengthen its democratic system and it seems that the ETA terrorism has died out step by step.

Greece has been able too before its entry to the European Union to gain internal stability and well functioning institutions of a democratic state under the rule of law.

Domestic stability of its member states has a repercussion upon stability of policies in the European Union, that not only in Europe but also in the world is occurring as a factor that stabilizes international conflicts.

3.3. Integration process in the European Union and internal stabilization of its member states

John Galtung defines integration as the process whereby two or more actors form a new actor. When the process is completed, the actors are said to be integrated. Conversely, disintegration is the process whereby one actor splits into two or more actors. When the process is completed the actor is said to be disintegrated. He distinguishes territorial, organizational and associational integration. Territorial integration yields to organizational integration, simply because of a demand for higher output. Territories do not produce: organizations do, and the more so the more people identify with them and the more people perceive them as sources of gratification.
Organizational integration yields to associational integration, because of a demand for equality and justice, and a highly felt need to be closer to people similar to oneself. Autonomy and dignity are derived from such memberships; visions of changes likewise – even realization of such visions. The focus of identification with the organization is gradually reduced; the focus of interest is on the association.

Associational integration yields to territorial integration, because of a need for some type of unification that can offer heterogeneity and variety again. Life in an association becomes too limited, too one-sided; it appeals to only a small segment of the personality. Territorial integration offers a possibility for renewed union, for sewing together what is kept apart or within bonds, behind the lines drawn around trade unions, classes, races, etc.

There are some indicators of political integration:

1. The legitimacy score, i.e. the extent to which the citizens of the state identify with the state as an embodiment of their interest and therefore concede that it deserves their loyalty and the authority to exercise certain powers over them.

2. Extraconstitutional behavior score, i.e. the frequency distribution of the preferences of political actors between constitutional and extraconstitutional actions. A political system in which political actors very frequently resort to extraconstitutional measures for pursuing their political goals is malintegrated. A high incidence of such extraconstitutional behavior indicates if not a lack of basic consensus about the ground rules of political competition, at least a lack of commitment to these rules.

3. Political violence score, i.e. the development of a normative culture is still in an embryonic stage or that the political actor’s commitment to the existing normative culture is ambivalent or both.

4. Secessionist demand score. Secessionism means an absence or withdrawal of commitment to the existing political system by members or secessionist movement.
5. Alignment pattern score, i.e. extent to which the major groups competing for control of the apparatus of government draw their support from a diversity of geographical areas and of ethnic, religious, social, and economic groups within the country.

6. Bureaucratic ethos score, i.e. the extent to which loyalty of members of the political system is focused on the office rather than on the charismatic appeal of the holder of the office.

7. Authority score. The authority of the state is a function of legitimacy score and its effectiveness for carrying out its constitutionally prescribed duties. One essential condition for carrying out its duties is the availability of coercive resources. The evident incapacity of the state for carrying out its legitimate functions could quite easily lead to disrespect for its authority and subsequently to a general withdrawal of commitment to the political culture.

The European Union has been already a new actor though its forming actors /member states/ didn’t be becoming the actors as states. Its integration assumes all three forms: territorial, organizational and associational. Despite that the European Union can’t be recognized as a state. Even though a composed one, at least it is a political system, to which it is possible to apply the mentioned above indicators of the political integration. The indicators are in general bound with the political stability. The political stability of its component parties, i.e. member states. Disturbance of the European integration process might consequently appear because of decrease of the domestic political stability in some member states.

3.4. Factors of the internal stability of states that are applying for access to the European Union as conditions of enlarging and deepening
There is analysed the political stability in 10 states of East-Central Europe: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, The Czech Republic and Hungary.

Some of these states have had conflicts concerned with cleavages of society among groups articulating contradictory interests. Most of them have conflicts concerned with nationality cleavages: Estonia, Latvia, Romania and Slovakia. In Estonia and Latvia there is a question of the Russian speaking minority, that don’t integrate in the framework of a national – state. In Estonia such minority is about 1/3 of its population. More of the minority have chosen Russian than Estonian citizenship and the most are stateless.

In Romania and Slovakia is a problem of the Hungarian minority. In Romania the relations with Hungarians have been settled satisfactorily and now Slovakia has done the same also.

In general there is a question of tiding over with past, that caused to division into post- and anticommunists. This division that is strenghtened by a controversy about the role of Catholic Church in social and political life in Poland has an especially big importance for conflicts creating there.

The EU is intending to carry out institutional reforms in order to deepen its integration processes yet before its enlargement on new members. Lack of domestic political stability of the new members could disturb further integration process in the EU.

4. Segmentization of Society and Domestic Political Stability

4.1. Ideas about segmentization of society. Pillars questions

The existence of separate cultural groups with generally incompatible sets of values constitutes a necessary condition for a plural society. Thus, a society is plural if it is culturally diverse and if its cultural sections are organized into cohesive political sections.
Fragmented/segmented societies are characterized by the presence of many culturally distinct and the failure of any one of them, at the outset of independent status, to dominate the political process.

Segmentation can ran along cleavage lines, especially religious and ideological, but also as language, race, caste or social class. In my considerations the most important for segmentization are religious and ideological cleavages. The requirement for segmented pluralism would seem to be that the cleavage should be sufficiently intense and durable to give members of the respective groups a distinctive and persistent outlook or cultural orientation, that is different from that of other sectors, a raison d’être for maintaining organized segmentation. The respective segments each maintain their own distinctive generalized view of life, and this outlook serves as a rallying point for preserving segmentation in an organizational sense. It is possible for a person to pass most of his life among persons and associations of his own persuasion from the moment of his birth in a denominational hospital to his burial in a denominational cemetery. Along the way he/she may be educated in confessional schools, attend a denominational university, be hired by an employer of his/her persuasion, join a denominational trade union, buy provisions at a denominational co-operative, and patronize tradesman of his own political persuasion only. His/her associational activities, whether for music, sports, youth groups, charitable works, or whatever, may be similarly organized by his/her own segment, and his/her leisure time spent by preference with friends who share his/her beliefs. He/she will read denominational books and press, may even watch only denominationally produced TV programmes. And he/she will vote for a political party that makes a strong case for segment solidarity as a defence against opposing ideologies.

Segmented pluralism is the organization of social movements, educational and communication systems, voluntary associations, and political parties along the lines of
religious and ideological cleavages. It is pluralist in its recognition of diversity of religious, socio-economic, and political affiliations; it is “segmented” in its institutionalization of most other forms of association along the lines of political – religious cleavages.

A political system is one of segmented pluralism, when its cleavages have produced competing networks of schools, communications media, interest groups, leisure time associations, and political parties along segmented lines.

The segments are named differently. The most known is a Dutch term – zuilen /pillars/. The Dutch pillars have been comprehensively described in literature. Other names are familles spirituelles /in Belgium/, Weltanschauungsgruppen /in Austria/. Description of the segmentization concerns also Switzerland. However in Switzerland and Belgium an axis of division are ethnic – linguistic questions, whereas the religious – ideological ones occurred in Austria and have occurred further in the Netherlands.

4.2. Consociational democracy – idea and functioning

Consociationalism has been approached from three principal standpoints:

1. As a pattern of social structure, emphasizing the degree of religious ideological, cultural or linguistic segmentation in the society itself.

2. As a pattern of elite behavior and mass – elite relationships, emphasizing the process of decision – making and conflict regulation.

3. As an underlying characteristic of the political culture arising from historical circumstances that may antedate the period of mass politics.

The most vital area of concern among segments is the capacity and good will of their elites. According to Arendt Lijphart there are four requirements must be fulfilled of consociational democracy is to be successful. The elites must first of all be able to recognize the dangers of segmentation; secondly, they must have some commitment to maintaining the system; thirdly, they must be able to transcend subcultural cleavages at the elite level to work
with the elites of other subcultures; fourthly, they must have the ability to forget appropriate solution, that will accommodate the divergent interests and demands of the subcultures.

Deep, mutually reinforcing social cleavages do not form an insuperable obstacle to viable democracy. The crucial factor in the establishment and preservation of democratic norms and democratic stability is the quality of leadership. The politics of accommodation opens up the possibility of viable democracy even where the social conditions appear unpromising.

In existing consociational democracy, an investigation of the institutional arrangements and the operational code of inter – elite accommodation can throw light on the question of how through a commitment in co-operation they represent and how effective they have been in solving the problem caused by segmentization.

The length of time during it a consociational democracy has been in operation: as inter – elite co-operation becomes habitual and does not represent a deliberate departure from competitive responses to political challenges, consociational norms become more firmly established. These norms may become an important part of the political socialization of elites and thus acquire a strong degree of persistence through time.

4.3. Usefulness of consociational democracy to settle conflicts of segmented societies

In literature as examples of implementation of the consociational democracy are mentioned the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Austria.

Whereas the severest example of non-implementation of consociational democracy is Lebanon.

In the Netherlands mutual hostile segments – pillars: Catholic, Protestant, liberal and Socialist at maintenance of their separatism and autonomy have established the consociational democracy relatively the earliest. Since their origin The Netherlands as the Republic of United Provinces have adopted Calvinism as their national confession. Catholics because of
their support to the rule of Spanish Habsburgs, were treated as traitors of nation and fatherland. For about one and half century they were discriminated.

Ideas of the French Revolution and the French rule brought Liberals to government, who realized the division between state and church, carried out anticlerical policy, but they abolished the discrimination of the Catholics. Non – confessional pillar liberal at the beginning splitted according to class criteria into the liberal and socialist ones in the end of the XIX century. Each of the pillars was hostile towards others: protestants towards catholics and “godless” /i.e. liberals and socialists/, catholics toward their former oppressors – protestants and “godless”, liberals towards religious believers /i.e. catholics and protestants/ and socialists as instigators of social order, socialists toward other pillars/segments that were treated by them as their class enemies, striving to maintenance of exploitation of working masses. Despite that, preserving their internal compactness and isolation the segments in the form of pillars have borne all state construction in the framework of the consociational democracy.

In Belgium and Switzerland the ethnic – linguistic problems have become as axis of division.

In Belgium initially deprived Flemish majority began a struggle for equal rights in linguistic and cultural matters. The struggle caused transformation of Belgium from an unitarian into composed state, namely a flemish - wallonian union, where the structure of the political system gives a priority to component state parts and equal rights to them in Belgian federal structures.

Austria that divided into two hostile camps of catholics and socialists in the period of the I Republic between the I and II World Wars and where a conflict among them caused a bloodshed, after the II World War it have found through consociationalism a way of co-
operation between two camps in the framework of a national – state and to tide over their mutual hostility.

However consociationalism had rooted in Europe only. The attempts of its implementation were unsuccessful outside Europe.

5. Embryo of Segmentization in the Polish Society

5.1. Political cleavages of the Polish society between particular segments/pillars

Poland in defending of it against Nazi – Germany invasion began the II World War was included into a Soviet sphere of influence. Communists seized power there thanks for the Soviet support. Polish nation was deprived opportunities to decide about itself and its rulers. So there had been established the Polish People’s Republic /Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa – PRL/ that was a dependent and vassal state of the Soviet Union. Imposed communist authorities made a lot of transformations in Poland. Poland was moved westwards at the cost of German eastern territories. It had lost its historical eastern regions, but has become instead of a multinational /before the II World War at least 70 % of population were Poles/ a homogenous nationally state. It has transformed from an agrarian state, where the most of population had lived in country into an industrial state with domination of cities inhabitants. Illiteracy was annihilated and level of education of Poles was increased. Social rise had included formerly unprivileged social classes, mainly workers and peasants.

The transformation caused accommodation of most of people to existing conditions in after – war Poland. They acted in the framework of a system established by communists, because they didn’t perceive any other real alternative. Number of members of the communist party /PZPR/ amounted to 10 % of adult Poles. Among the worked ones there was usually more than 20 %. About 96 % of workers belonged to communist trade unions. There were based on the communist ideology mass youth, children, women, students etc. organizations.
The communist regime in Poland was confronted by more frequent protest expression than they took place in other countries of real socialism.

The main feature of PRL was domination of individual farms, because Poland was only one state in the Soviet sphere of influence where it was carried out no collectivization of the agriculture.

The only social force that had been independent from the communist authorities was Catholic Church.

Powerful resistance and opposition to communist rule were appeared in large at the end of ’70s. In spite of a small number of oppositionists to PRL, none the opposition was increasing when an independent from the communists trade union – NZSS “Solidarność” had been established on a surge of workers protests in 1980, whose leadership were overwhelmingly anticommunists.

Thank Gorbatchev’s “perestroyka” and “glasnost” policies communist authorities in Poland were able to become conscious of a need for reforms in Poland because of inefficiency of central planned command economy. The communist authorities weren’t able to realize the reforms without coming to an understanding with the anticommunist opposition because of high social costs of these reforms. Therefore in 1989 the communists made a compromise with the illegal “Solidarność” called “agreement of the round table”. This agreement opened way into free but under conditions fixes by the round table agreement election in June 1989. A result of this election was a complete defeat of the communists. So it was possible to create the first government in the Soviet sphere of influence which was not under communist domination. The government which prime – minister was Tadeusz Mazowiecki declared destruction of real socialism in Poland. Implosion of real socialism in other countries of Central – East Europe and especially in the Soviet Union and its disintegration made possible to Poland regaining its sovereignty and freedom.
5.2. Post – Communism and Post – Solidarności

Soon after regaining of freedom and sovereignty there has been occurred division of the Polish society in ideological and political aspects into post – communist and post – Solidarności camps.

Among victorious “Solidarności” that had seized state power have dominated feelings and tendencies of revenge on people, organizations and forces connected formerly with PRL authorities. “Solidarności” treated PRL as Soviet occupation and people connected with PRL as collaborationists and traitors of the Polish nation and state. Such people were removed from their posts. Any moral right to act in social and especially political scene was refused to them. They were in danger of a lot of discrimination and repression. An enormous hatred was expressed by people who in past didn’t demonstrate their antipathy towards the communist regime and existing order in PRL.

These feelings had collided with the ones of an important part of the Polish society who considered that they needn’t to feel shame for nothing in the time of PRL, because did their best in those conditions /any other conditions had not been in that time/, serving to Polish nation and fatherland in their various social roles. This part of the society considered accusation and blames as unjust and attempts of their discrimination. They haven’t felt their responsibility for establishment of the communist system in Poland that had been imposed outside by the Soviet Union and with an approval of all Western powers and states.

Victorious “Solidarności” elites after seizure of the state power appeared highly incompetent, greedy for scrambling of public property and money, arrogant and double – faced. Above all the “Solidarności” camp has splitted into a lot of groups that were fighting against themselves.

The scene of the Polish political life have splitted into the post – Solidarności and post – PRL camps. Controversies and conflicts about the role of Catholic Church in social and
political life have overlapped on this division. From one side there were coming out devotees of a conception of a state with dominant Christian values, realizing Catholic dogmas and social teaching of Catholic Church. According to them the role of Catholic Church in social and political life ought to be dominant. Among the “Solidarnoœæ” camp such views have been represented in general by AWS, ROP and catholic – nationalist rightists. Strong tendencies friendly to this orientation are among PSL from the post – PRL camp.

Most of adherents of separation between church and state are among SLD /the post – PRL camp/ who are keeping a distance from imposing a religious character on the state.

On a basis of the communist PZPR that had been dissolved at the beginning of 1990 there was established SdRP. SdRP collected soon parties and social organizations that had been their origins in PRL and had been connected with PZPR /for instance: trade unions, youth and women organizations etc./ in the framework of SLD /Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej/ as a political coalition. SLD in presidential election of 1990 and parliamentary ones 1991 won at first not more than 10 % votes /in the parliamentary election 1991 it allowed to occupy the second position in Sejm/, but already in the election of 1993 it won more than 20 % votes and became the strongest parliamentary fraction. In spite of defeat in election 1997 SLD has increased number of voters and now according to the opinion polls 38 % voters declare that they will vote for it. It gives an opportunity to create a homogenous government. SLD won the presidential election 1995 and a constitutional plebiscite 1997. Despite attempts made by the post – Solidarnoœæ camp to isolate it, SLD is gaining a large support and confidence of an important part of the society which is more and more unsatisfied of existing government led by an AWS prime-minister – Jerzy Buzek.

The second camp on the Polish political scene originated from PRL is PSL /Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe/. PSL is a transformed party originated from a licensed by the communists ZSL in the PRL time. New PSL has attached to traditions of the prewar Agrarian
movement. PSL has maintained important influence on Polish peasants and collected around itself surviving and originating from PRL peasant organizations. PSL is representing interests of the peasantry. It is underlining in its programme an attachment to Catholic confession and social teaching of Catholic Church. There is occurring often in its activities nationalist xenophobia that is caused by fears of a fate of underdeveloped Polish agriculture after its opening westwards. Above mentioned features of PSL cause that many of post – Solidarność parties and groups have perceived PSL as an ally and didn’t fill it with disgust for its ascendancy from PSL.

At the beginning an uniform “Solidarność” camp about Komitet Obywatelski przy Lechu Wałęsie soon splitted into a lot of groups. A core of them is NSZZ “Solidarność” that although is a trade union takes an active part in political life. On basis of NSZZ “Solidarność” there was created AWS /Akcja Wyборcza Solidarność/ before election 1997, which won the election. AWS has had a large support by workers of big state enterprises, who are anticomunist, less educated inhabitants of towns mainly in East and South Poland. In the framework of AWS have acted some separate rather influential parties. The most important of them are Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko – Narodowe /ZChN/ and Stronnictwo Konserwatywno-Ludowe /SKL/. AWS amasses more than 30 subjects. Now there is an attempt to establish parliamentary representation of NSZZ “Solidarność” as a political party following the example of Labour Party that had been created on the basis of trade unions. This is Ruch Społeczny AWS, which leader is the prime – minister – Jerzy Buzek.

ZChN is a nationalist – catholic party. It declares necessity of subordination of the Polish state to social teaching and principles of Catholic Church. It considers that a Polishmen shall be identified with a Catholic. ZChN is treating unfriendly even hostilely the process of Poland’s integration with the European Union and is expressing fears that Poland will lose its
national identity that is according to it the same: religious – nationalists attitudes of Poles. It is against limitation of sovereignty of Poland on behalf of the supranational structures too.

SKL is a liberal faction of AWS. It is trying to win influence on Polish peasantry and has treated peasants as its political basis. It is open for Poland’s integration process with Europe.

Opponents of Lech Wałęsa among “Solidarność” leaders when he had started to apply for an office of the state presidency formed a separate party – Unia Demokratyczna which after joining with liberals /Kongres Liberalny – Demokratyczny/ has been named Unia Wolności /UW/. Its leader is Leszek Balcerowicz. UW is a party that underlines neutral position towards the Church hierarchy, articulates necessity of secular state though some leaders are behaving conversely. UW bases upon neoliberalism and is an adherent of Poland’s integration with the EU and other supranational organizations. It has important influence upon intelligentsia and population of big towns.

On the extreme right side of the political scene there is Ruch Odbudowy Polski /ROP/. Its leader is Jan Olszewski. ROP is a xenophobic nationalist party and is against integration with the EU. It considers that Poland will be there subjugated and subordinated to richer countries, especially to Germany.

Some extreme Catholic nationalists who have considered politics of AWS as too liberal and moderate have splitted from AWS. Their support is a broadcasting station Radio Maryja. Radio Maryja is not supported by the Polish episcopate because it is breathing hatred of people who have had other views. It is exhorting to clericalize totally social life of Poland and expresses xenophobia to the EU. The chief of Radio Maryja is a pater /redemptorist/ Tadeusz Rydzyk.

5.3. The role of Catholic Church in an overthrow of real socialism in Poland

Catholic Church has always had immense importance in Polish national tradition. In
period of Poland’s partition its role especially in Russian and Austrian Poland was extremely high. Conversion of confession led there the most often to denationalization /i.e. russification or germanization/. Catholic Church represented patriotic attitudes during the II World War by its support to the struggle of Poles against German and Russian invaders.

When Poland after the II World War had been in the Soviet sphere of influence and the communists subordinated all legal social organizations, institutions and structures, Catholic Church remained an only social force independent from the communists. Attempts to its crushing and subordination made by the communists were unsuccessful. The struggle of the communists against Catholic Church did not depend its clergy from the state authorities in Poland like in Chechoslovakia and Hungary.

Forming in the second half of ‘70s opposition against the communist rule found help and support in Catholic Church. Since that time Catholic Church became an influential social partner towards the communist authorities that had ceased to treat it as an enemy and perceived it rather as a rival in exertions to influence upon the society.

The role of Catholic Church increased in time of the social conflict in August 1980 and in the period of legal activities of NSZZ “Solidarność” by December 1981. The communist authorities appealed to the Church for help in mediation between them and “Solidarność” and strived for its support during that mediation and for moderation of anticommunists. After putting the country under martial law Catholic Church became a main legal supporter for “Solidarność”, asylum for many pursued “Solidarność” activists. Catholic Church was an only opponent and critic towards the communists authorities acting legally. The authorities striving at the end of real socialism to conclude an agreement with illegal “Solidarność” opposition, recognized Catholic Church as a mediator. In 1989 an agreement of “the round table” was concluded in presence of representatives of Catholic hierarchy. Such a role of Catholic Church has been appeared in Poland after appointment of Karol Wojtyła to
the pope as John Paul II. In his time of office Catholic Church won hearts of Poles and stripped all nonentity of Marxism – Leninism, which believers had been even no more the highest party leadership. At the end of real socialism and at the beginning of the new III Polish Republic Catholic Church had the highest influence in Poland. It had contributed to the collapse of real socialism in Poland. Anyway many of Polish anticommunist leaders /ex. Lech Wa³êsa/ have thought that thank “Solidarnoœæ” there was possible implosion of communism in other countries of the Soviet sphere of influence and disintegration of Soviet Union might take place.

5.4. The role of Catholic segment

Soon after the downfall of real socialism Catholic Church began to demand realization of a lot of claims. One of the first ones there were introduction of religious instruction as an obligatory subject in public schools, and thereafter prohibition of abortion. In order to strengthen, articulate and press on behalf of such demands and religious principles of Catholic Church came into being by initiatives of church authorities the most often a lot of Catholic social organizations, institutions and movements. There have been created nonpublic Catholic schools, Catholic professional associations /lawyers, physicians etc./, social organizations /women, youth, children etc./, economic corporations /co-operative banks, insurances, entreprises etc./, press, TV and radio-broadcastings without including strictly linked with the Church organizations as “Opus Dei”, Revival in the Holy Ghost, beads cercles, acolytes associations etc. A lot of such organizations have acted to press for realization of their demands. There had been created groups who controlled whether in news-stands publications that they recognized as pornographic are sold and demanded to sellers for stopping to keep such journals or at least not to expose them. The groups did not hesitated to use physical or psychological coercion. Similar groups started to control pharmacies whether there are sold contraceptive devices and tried to stop or limit their scale.
Non-realization of such demands and claims have been treated by mentioned organizations as oppression and discrimination of Catholics in Poland. So has been preached by many priests, particularly by the church hierarchy. Even the pope John Paul II expressed such a view during his pilgrimage in Poland. A characteristic feature of Poland is that the Catholic segment doesn’t possess any political party as its representative. Even AWS that considers itself in general as belonging to the Catholic segment the church hierarchy don’t consider as a main political party that represents Polish catholicism. The core of the Catholic segment is the Polish church hierarchy and a part of Polish clergy that is expressing some independency from an attitude of the episcopate, especially when is considering the attitude as to moderate or imperfect. This part consists mainly of people around Radio Maryja, around the prelate Henryk Jankowski and others.

5.5. **Embryo of an anticlerical segment**

Contrary to the Catholic segment its secular anticlerical counterpart has not yet formed institutionally in Poland.

There are few secular organizations opposing to a clerical offensive in social life as women and for family planning associations. The organizations openly secular and anticlerical /ex. Stowarzyszenie im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego/ are very weak and their activities might be rarely to observe. In general, secular cercles are against clericalism which consists of a critical attitude toward intervention of clergy into political and social life and against attempts to impose on Polish society unpopular based on Catholic dogmas prohibitions /as in question of abortion, divorces, contraception, sunday shopping etc./. There are some anticlerical press mainly linked with left – ‘Nie’ and “Przegląd Tygodniowy” /weekly magazines/ and the newspaper “Trybuna”.

Among political parties supporting at least philosophical neutrality according to existing Polish constitution there is SLD and especially its ally – PPS /Polska Partia
Socjalistyczna/ among the posts – PRL parties and Unia Pracy among the post – “Solidarność” ones. These parties don’t contest symptoms of Church effects and influence that have found an approval by the most of the Polish society /religious instruction in public schools, equal rights for marriages contracted in church according to the canon law etc./.

Nevertheless a lot of excesses committed in order to impose a Catholic character on state organs and institutions /prohibition of prenatal examinations, attempts of censorship made by non-educated catechists in contents of school teaching, appointment of priests, monks and nuns to public schools managers etc./ meet resistance of a numerous part of public opinion. It may be stated that increasing aggressive activities of the Catholic segment will result in reaction of resistance that will form more organizational shape.

6. The Role of Catholic Church in Member States of the European Union

6.1. Priestly constitution “Gaudium et spes” passed by the II Vatican Council

Catholic Church was actively involved in political life before the II Vatican Council. It was a creator not only a lot of social organizations but also many political parties in European countries. “Zentrum” in Germany, Katholieke Volkspartij in the Netherlands, Christian – Democratic parties in Belgium and Italy were founded by local Catholic Churches and led by priests who acted on behalf of the Church. Generally in election campaigns local episcopates appealed to vote for Catholic candidates. Catholic believers were afraid that non-voting for the Catholic candidates is a sin. Such situation resulted in responsibility of Catholic Church for policies of Catholic parties, governments in eyes of public opinion.

The II Vatican council summoned by the pope John XXIII was held under the banner of “aggiornamiento”, i.e. accommodation of Catholic Church to present days. One of basic documents passed by the Council which explained an attitude of Catholic Church toward problems of social and political life has been a priestly constitution “Gaudium et spes”. This constitution declares that a true mission entrusted by Christ to its church has no political,
economic and social character: aims which were laid down by Christ to the church are not bound with any political, economic and social system. The church looks for all what is included in various institutions established by people with a high respect. The church wishes to support all of such institutions in their development according to its possibilities. Political communities and public authorities base on human nature and belong to the order determined by God, though a shape of the system and a choice of the authorities depend on free will of citizens. The political community and the church are themselves independent and autonomous in their spheres. The church doesn’t set its hopes on privileges offered by state authorities to it, even more, it renounces to use some rights legally acquired, if it seems that the use of them discredits sincerity of its testimony or if now conditions of life demand other order of relationship.

6.2. The Catholic Church and Christian Democratic Parties in the countries of the European Union

The II Vatican Council caused that the church had ceased to influence and intervene in questions of political parties that recognized themselves as Catholic.

6.2.1. In Germany

After the II World War a Christian – Democratic party has been created that bases on Catholics and Protestants /CDU/. Only a regional Christian – Democratic Party in Bavaria has maintained its Catholic character /CSU/.

Hierarchy of Catholic Church have not tried directly to intervene in problems of CDU/CSU nor have recommended this party as a realizer of goals and principles of Catholic Church in political life.

Though CDU/CSU is based on voters who are believers and church goers of Catholic Church, its hierarchy is keeping neutrality towards other political parties. It doesn’t condemn nor criticize them because of their different philosophical and political conceptions.
6.2.2. **In Austria**

Oesterreichische Volkspartei has been a Catholic party after the II World War. It ceased to fight sharply against social – democrats. Power struggles between both parties led to bloodshed in past. In view of immense influence of the social – democrats Catholic Church have not directed Austrian Christian – Democrats towards imposing a religious state. In last time the church hierarchy has met large demands of Catholic lays who are willing to influence upon principles and activities of the Church.

6.2.3. **In Belgium**

There is a legal separation of church from state called sometimes as “mitigee”. Priests of legal religious confessions /88 % of population are Catholics/ are provided by the state. Schools are organized by churches and subsidized by the state.

The Catholic political movement is divided into two Christian – Democratic parties according to national – linguistic criteria: the flemish Christelijke Volkspartij /CVP/ and wallonian Parti Social Chretien /PSC/. CVP has been not only the strongest party in Flanders but have won the first place in Belgian parliamentary elections. Belgian Christian – Democrats have taken part in government in the longest time after the II World War. The most often Flemish Christian – Democrats were Belgian prime –ministers.

Belgian Christian – Democrats have quoted the Gospel and social teaching of Catholic Church in their ideological and electoral programmes, but haven’t strived to impose a Catholic character on state institutions or organs and made no attempts to change existing order in this aspect. Belgian hierarchy haven’t intervened in electoral campaigns nor estimated electoral results as well activities of public authorities. Abortion is legal not long ago. Both Christian – Democratic parties haven’t claimed its prohibition. Belgian clergy in
spite of condemnation of abortion are appealing to believers not to do it, but not to the state to forbid it.

6.2.4. **In the Netherlands**

The Republic of United Provinces was established in XVI century as a state proclaiming Protestantism /Calvinism/ as its official dominant confession. It came into being as a result of the fight against Spanish Habsburgs rule, who in person of the king Philip II had tried to eradicate Protestantism in the Netherlands and to restore Catholic character there. After the overthrow of Spanish Habsburgs rule Catholics were considered as traitors of the Dutch fatherland, enemies of independent Dutch state. Against Catholics were introduced a lot of discrimination bills, a.o. prohibition to be appointed to many public posts. Such situation lasted for about 200 years and liberals under influence of ideas of the French Revolution 1789 have introduced equal rights of all citizens and abolished any discrimination a.o. in confessional matters. Such situation caused to creation and activities so called pillars.

The Catholic pillar was organized by the Church and its hierarchy. The founder and leader of long years was in the Catholic party a priest. The church hierarchy gave full support to the Catholic party and directions of its activities before the II Vatican Council. When the church had ceased to influence upon the party after the Council it caused big confusion in the Catholic pillar and in the church too, where many dogmas and traditional principles were contested. Ecumenical process have result in fusion of the Catholic party with the most important Protestant parties /Antirevolutionaire Partij, Christelijk – Historische Unie/ into an united Christian – Democratic party – Christelijk – Democratisch Appel /CDA/ and also Catholic trade unions with social – democratic trade unions in the united Nederlandse Vakverenigingen /FNV/.

Sphere of church activities was separated from secular activities of the pillar, particularly in political and social matters.
Catholics are the largest confessional part of population – about 38%. In spite of that the Netherlands have had the highest degree of non-believers – 35%.

6.2.5. **In Italy**

97% of population are Catholics.

Concluded in 1929 concordat between the Apostolic See and Italy states in art. 1 that the Catholic confession is an only Italian state confession. This norm was abolished in 1984 and since that time Italy considers itself as a secular state. Since that time also religious instruction is optional in public schools. Pupils have guaranteed freedom of choice to instruct religion or not. There are articulated necessities to forming tolerance and understanding with people of different confessions or atheists in programmes of Catholic instruction. Qualifications to instruct catechises need confirmation of a bishop, but school authorities decide about pedagogical qualifications. The state doesn’t approve that school courses were saturated with religious content.

The strongest party that had been in Italian governments almost always were Democrazia Christiana – DC. Not long ago this party is disintegrated thank to crisis in the Italian political scene. The similar party hasn’t yet been created.

6.3. **Attitude of the Catholic Church to integration process in member states of the European Union**

Christian – democratic parties have contributed seriously to the concepts and realization of European integration. Robert Schuman, Alcido de Gasperi, Konrad Adenauer are few among others who have became symbols of European unity that had expressed in establishment of European Communities. We cannot find demands to leave the EU in programmes of any Christian – Democratic party. European People’s Party acting in the framework of the European Parliament has been a factor of deepening of European integration. Such conclusion follows from an analysis of electoral programmes of more
important Christian – Democratic parties that are more closely bound with Catholicism: Oesterreichische Volkspartei, PSC, CDU, CSU, CDA.

John Paul II in his statements has strongly supported European integration and its deepening and enlargement. The Pope has directed Catholics to strive to impose on united Europe a character that follows from Christian values and social teaching of Catholic Church. As one goal of these demands is ecumenism, i.e. collaboration of all Christian confessions, in particular Catholics, Protestants and Orthodoxes.

7. **Attitude of the Polish Society to the European Union**

7.1. **Attitude of political parties to access to the European Union**

I analyse attitudes of more important Polish political parties to Poland’s entry into the EU.

AWS is a coalition of many groups that makes difficult for assuming common and clear attitude towards it.

The electoral programme of AWS 1997 declares support for “Europe of free nations as Europe of Fatherlands”. European integration ought to base upon “Christian roots of our civilisation”. The support for integration is at the same time reserved for conditions of maintenance of national identity. The top AWS leaders have underlined that Poland shall entry into Europe in order to restore there its Christian roots. There are so euroenthusiasts as eurosceptics in parties and organizations that are joined in AWS.

For instance SKL has appealed to immediate Poland’s entry into the EU and considers that European integration opens new perspectives for development of Poland. However other organizations / connected with Radio Maryja/ have accused the EU that it has treated Poland as a peripheral area that is provided to exploitation.

SLD in spite of fact that is a coalition of many groups like AWS assumes a decisively positive attitude towards European integration. SLD persuades Polish citizens in its electoral
campaigns and propaganda that is an only party that is able to guarantee implementation of European norms like secular character of a state and tolerance.

UW is competing with SLD for a title of the most euroenthusiastic Polish political party. Argumentation of UW is directed to people who haven’t any doubts whether Poland should become a member of the EU. It underlines especially that Poland shall be then in the best condition, particularly in a well functioning economy.

PSL assumes its attitude towards integration through its estimation of interest of Polish peasantry. This attitude is doublefaced. Recognizing necessity to entry into the EU PSL is considering that the entry should be based upon the best protection of peasants interests, i.e. Polish peasantry and agriculture shall feel their immediate improvement and deterioration of their situation shall not take place in any manner.

ROP is looking suspiciously for integration process of Poland with Europe. Strong influence of social-democrats in the EU estrange this party and ROP is afraid that Poland’s entry into the EU might cause the political domination of postcommunist left inside Poland.

UP /Unia Pracy/ though declares support for Poland’s entry into the EU is considering integration of states in a global scale as a greater value. It fears that united Europe will be indifferent to the fate of other countries as a club of the richest states.

Extreme right whose only some representatives are sitting in the Polish parliament thank support of AWS are condemning EU as a danger for “civilisation of love and peace”, for sovereignty of the Polish state. It would cause a downfall of the Polish state and nation, demoralization of Poles thank abortion, euthanasia, drugs and pornography.

**7.2. Politics of Polish governments towards the European Union and their striving that**

**Poland will become a member state of the European Union**

Since the beginning of transition processes Poland has given a task to closer
collaboration with the EEC and further for a full membership in this community. Therefore it
treated an European Treaty concluded in 1992 as an instrument to facilitate preparation for the
membership and not as a separate only goal. Jointly with Hungary and Czechoslovakia Poland
was cosignatory of a Wysehrad memorial of September 1992 where it has been stated that the
final goal is entry into the EU the latest at the end of XX century. Some weeks after coming in
force of the European Treaty on 8 April 1994 Polish government moved an official resolution
for membership in the EU.

Such aims have been undertaken by the existing cabinet whose head is Jerzy Buzek. In
his expose the new prime-minister still stated that regarding moral values would be Polish
contribution to uniting Europe. He added also that government would take care during
negotiations that the integration process would respect Polish identity. Marian Krzaklewski –
the AWS leader said that the only solid basis of the European communities is Christianity. For
an important part of AWS politicians is a typical statement by Michał Kamiński /ZChN/ that
“we are not for Europe of abortion, a continent of deviations legalization. We will never be
for such vision of integration”, but “we believe in power of the Polish nation who will
overcome the problem that is now called European integration”.

In general Jerzy Buzek government is not presenting a homogenous attitude towards
Poland’s entry into the EU. Representatives of UW in the government with their leader
Leszek Balcerowicz are unconditionally for Poland’s immediate entry into the EU and for
implementation of the EU conditions. Among AWS top leaders from one side is a dominant
view about “missionary” significance of the Poland’s entry in order to “convert a fallen
continent” and from other side an ambiguous agreement to entry into the EU that is understood
as a pure technical structure of the Common Market at maintenance of the Polish identity
including that natural law is above the normative one and Catholics would be not only one of
many social groups as philatelists, gays or breeder of canaries.
7.3. **Attitude of Polish Church hierarchy to Poland’s access to structures of the European Union**

A friendly attitude of the Pope John Paul II to support European integration caused that the same attitude has been assumed officially by the conference of Polish episcopate.

According to opinion polls Catholic priesters are characterised by a positive attitude towards Poland’s entry into the EU. They are estimating favourably results of Poland’s entry in economics and material conditions of citizens, international security, respect for law, development of democracy, reforms of the state, level of education and access to culture. They think that the integration process would influence negatively on moral and religious aspects of life, close family ties and also on religiousness of Polish people. A part of them is considering above mentioned factors as results of global processes of civilisation that seem inevitable. The priests approve European integration stronger than the rest of Polish society, but are perceiving more pessimistic problems of adjustment period. The EU is treated by them as a community of interests, but it should be a community of values. An important part of the priests are afraid changes of Polish identity in aspects of religiousness, patriotism and family ties. According to them all of the mentioned aspects would be able to be weakened.

The priests are declining federalist conception and are declaring for “Europe of fatherlands”, where shall be a respect for identity of particular nations and maintenance of full sovereignty of its member states.

Most of the priests are perceiving that in states of the EU prevails separation of church from state and at least an indifferent attitude of public authorities towards religion. They consider that relation between state and church should be based upon the Polish model. In opinion of the clergy Poland’s entry into the EU set new tasks, as evangelic mission in Poland and in Europe, as well strengthening of cultural and national identity of Poles.

7.4. **Attitude of Poles toward the European Union according to opinion polls**
In general, Poles are adherents to entry into the EU more than citizens of other applicant states.

Not long ago there is some decrease in support for integration with the EU. This concerns such social groups that are less favourable toward integration, but there is increase in high educated people.

Raise by nationalist – catholic groups fears before unrestricted purchase of land by foreigners aren’t rather interesting for the public opinion including peasants. Strong support for rights of Poles to free employment and residence in the EU is not linked directly with readiness to work abroad. Readiness to depart abroad is not bound with a degree of support for integration.

Division between two main inclinations to negotiations with the EU are visible in the Polish society. The first is represented by adherents of right, AWS and PSL that a goal of the negotiations should be defence of Polish status quo. The second inclination is represented mainly by adherents of UW and SLD that the negotiations give chances to further modernisation of the country through creating of new opportunities to develop it.

Peasants have been notable disposed against integration /25 % of them are declaring intention to vote against Poland’s integration with the EU, but 25 % will vote for the integration/. This attitude isn’t common for all population in the country – among them 53 % will support the integration/.

After a lapse of time perception of outcome of advantages/disadvantages for particular social groups has changed too: some years ago situation of peasants and workers had been perceived more optimistic, whenever now conviction is dominating that these groups will be disadvantaged thank the integration.

8. Political Causes of Cleavage between the Polish Society in Question of Catholic Church Role in Social and Political Life
8.1. Deepening polarization of society in question of religious, philosophical, ideological and political values

There are further sharp divisions about questions of past in the scene of political and social life in Poland into "komuchy" and ‘solidaruchy”, i.e. post-communists and post-Solidarność. In spite of fact that according to recent opinion polls SLD would win 38 % of voters /the most of them/ in the next parliamentary election it is treated by the most of ASW leaders as the dregs of society. AWS is trying to bring about the ruin of SLD and its activities by some means or other. It has prepared a draft of a bill about de-communisation. It has rejected to conclude with SLD any political agreements /even if it leads to paralysing of elected representative organs/. It has accused /the most often proofless/ SLD leaders of trading away themselves for Russian /Soviet/ money etc. So is acting the political party which popularity has been rapidly decreased at the last time /about 25 % will vote for AWS/. Any motions, claims, censure that are submitted by SLD have been rejected by AWS despite their rightness in a lot of cases.

On this division a new showing up one linked with controversies about the role of Catholic Church in political and social life is more clearly overlapping. Generally, the most of leaders and activists of AWS are proclaiming in favor of introducing elements of a confessional state in possibly the highest degree. SLD is opposed against that.

Now AWS and UW government is imposing prohibition of abortion, restriction to prenatal examinations, abolished teaching about sexual education in public schools. It is trying to restrict contraception, divorces etc. against views of the most of public opinion. There is considered prohibition of shopping on Sundays and holidays as well of pornography. Many leaders of AWS and priests are even estimating a lot of works of art as pornography in spite of granting to these works by higher awards abroad. The Catholic segment has created a
lot of organizations and social movements in order to impose its above mentioned and other claims.

Any different views and opinions have been rejected and even is contested their right to exist. Any declination of claims and demands is discrimination of the Catholic majority according to the leaders of the catholic segment.

Lack of tolerance of the Catholic segment is creating unfavourable to it “silent majority” that might try to organize themselves.

8.2. Rejection of legitimacy of democratic mechanisms established after 1989

The Catholic segment is bringing a claim about priority of natural law over the normative law. Principles of the natural law shall be determined by Catholic Church. Because the normative law if is incompatible with the natural law would be immoral and worthy of condemnation, it has not to be respected. Such views have been adopted a.o. by Constitutional Court /ex. in abortion case/, by reglaments and statuts of some dominated by Catholic activists associations and organizations /ex. physicians/. In matters of morality it is impossible to decide by “accidental society”.

From catholic – nationalist cercles are putting various conceptions to restrict influence of SLD and to consolidate rule of the Catholic segment. Some leaders, as Ludwik Dorn, are proposing concentration of state power in hands of few high – moral personages. Realization of these conceptions is now impossible and the leaders are aware of it. Therefore they have tried to place themselves in a lot of leading posts of social and economic life in manner that a probable defeat in the next election won’t be able to remove them from influencial posts. So they are passed bills that are determing long terms of office that are now occupied by AWS people in manner contrary to the sense of decorum /ex. the highest tribunals, Institute of National Memory, Security Police etc./ or there are concluded so called manager’s contracts that provide paying damages by public authorities in amount of 2 years salary for termination
of the contracts. Such regulations had been introduced soon after the communal elections, where one or two days before competency transmission in these questions to the self-government where SLD had won the elections AWS had nominated there their people for these posts and because of lack of money the self-government are not able to decide for expansive exchanges of AWS managers in spite of their often incompetence.

In Spite of electoral defeat such politics has to secure AWS opportunities to make impossible for SLD as secular winners any changes in already existing clericalization measures. There will be then possible announcement such decisions as contrary to law or constitution.

8.3. Lack of prerequisites to adoption of a model of consociational democracy

Now the Catholic segment aren’t wishing to conclude any agreement. It is striving to impose its goals and values.

During its last pilgrimage in Poland in June 1999 the Pope John Paul II appealed to reconciliation among Poles and to cease fighting mutually themselves. If such attitude is implemented by the Polish episcopate and priests, it seems probable that the Catholic segment would be more tolerant and reconsible. In such case it is doubtful if it come to being an anticlerical segment, because this part of the Polish society in spite of the lack of any important menaces would not be convinced to organize for defending themselves.

The recent situation is spite of behaviour of the Catholic segment don’t justify hopes that rules of consociational democracy would be able to be implemented in Poland because of the lack of their main prerequisite – tolerance. Without tolerance it is impossible to come to any more durable agreement.

9. Poland as Future Member State of the European Union and Possible Scenarios of Its Domestic Political Stability

9.1. Influence of society segmentization on Poland’s relations with neighbour countries
Many influential right leaders including AWS and ROP are seized by obsessions with a “missionary role of Poland” and antirussian phobias, what finds immense applauze and appreciation among their basis. Recent seizure of state power by the Catholic segment is causing support of Polish authorities for missionary activities of Catholic Church in Russia, Byelorussia and Ukraine. These activities are treated hostilely by local orthodox churches and priests. The unamical attitude towards Russia results in conflicts among Poland, Byelorussia and Russia. Support of Polish minority in Lithuania who is considering themselves as discriminated disturb good-neighbour relations among Poland and Lithuania and is conducive to accusations of Polish danger made by Lithuanian nationalists.

9.2. Acceleration of processes of deconfessionalization and religious indifference as influence of the processes of European integration

Incorporation of Poland into the EU will possibly result in the process of religious indifference of Poles that would consist of decreasing percentages of devout Catholics who would be ready to follow recommendations and advices made by priests in their life. Polish Catholic priests have been already prepared for such occurrences. It maybe increase a number of godless people. So a position of Catholic Church that it has won in Poland will be shaken or undermined and the church will probably be removed from there step by step. If the Polish church hierarchy is similar in aspect of its behaviour and attitudes to Catholic hierarchies in countries of the EU, what will certainly follow, the Catholic segment would lose its identity and therefore it will survive its usefulness. Menace of segmentization of society would vanish or at least it would be importantly weakened.

9.3. Prerequisites to revision of integrist views of the Polish hierarchy on the role of the Catholic Church

Withdrawal drom the Apostolic See by the Pope – John Paul II would follow sooner or later in spite of inevitable biological reasons.. It would weaken positions of Catholic Church
in Poland. Integration with countries of Western Europe will demonstrate Poles a role of Catholic Church there. This role is mainly in the religious sphere not in political nor social. It would cause pressure on the hierarchy and priesthood in order to become similar to the role that the Church is playing in other countries. Such role shall be example for Poland and Poles.

Hopes of some part of the Church hierarchy and of some leaders of the Catholic segment set on the mission to convert Western Europe won’t have any chances to realization. It is doubtful whether in Catholic West European countries would appear strong tendencies to impose on states a confessional character. Failure of such attempts would make them give up.

All mentioned would cause that integrism direction in the Polish episcopate and among priesthood will put the matter out of court. If after John Paul II as a pope is nominated a more decisive enemy of integrism all the more it would augment a blow against integrism in Poland.

9.4. Determinants of deepening conflicts of social segments and their results in domestic political stability and processes of Poland’s integration with Europe

If segmentation of society in Poland is deepened and bipolarity is prevailing in the political scene, then domestic political stability of the Polish political system would be disturbed. Changes made by one of the winner segment will be removed and replaced by others made by the following winner. It may cause trends to consolidation of introduced changes by rejection of democratic rules and mechanisms.

Such feelings and views may be found only in the Catholic segment. Victory there of options declaring on behalf of the missionary role of Poland in Europe would confront Polish authorities with a liberal majority of society in the EU. It maybe cause conflicts that will be awoken by Poland in organs of the EU /European Parliament, Council of the European Union, European Council/.
In the framework of Common Foreign and Security Police (CFSP) dominated by nationalist–catholic segment Polish authorities would make difficulties in conclusion of agreements with Russia and Byelorussia or maybe also with other states of Eastern Europe. It will result in worsening of relations with those countries.

If this segment was defeated in elections, it would be always a danger of its reversion to state power and then calling off agreements concluded by its political opponents.

10. Conclusion: Poland as a stable democratic member state of the European Union or as nationalist–catholic state

Finishing in statu nascendi processes of segmentization of society in Poland into Catholic—nationalist and liberal-anticlerical segments might cause to disturb stability of the Polish political system and appearance of political instability. Such scenario would be possible, if integrist tendencies prevail in the Catholic segment. These tendencies will express particularly in striving to impose on the state the confessional character, in lack of tolerance and in putting as a main aim the evangelic mission of Poland in Europe. Realization of this aim would be acted by Poland in the framework of the CFSP in regard to countries of Eastern Europe, especially Russia and in regard of many aspects in internal policies in the EU.

It is doubtful that the nationalist–catholic segment could be in such position that would be able to realize mentioned above aims.

Sooner or later it will be forced to compromise with other segment. It will result in internal stability of the political system and in Poland’s implementation to the rules and mechanisms of the EU. This process is inevitable in spite of its disturbance sometimes.
Abstract

SEGMENTIZATION MENACE IN POLAND AND ITS IMPLICATIONS TO POLAND’S INTEGRATION WITH EUROPEAN STRUCTURES

After downfall of real socialism a sharp division of Polish society have come to being. At first, along the lines linked with past: anticommunist and people connected with former communist regime. On this division more and more are overlapped cleavages about the role of Catholic Church in social and political life.

The main analysed question is whether the division would lead to forming segmentization of society.

There is appearance of an organized Catholic segment, but it is hardly to find the opposite one.

The Catholic segment will to impose on state a confessional character. It is uncompromised in their claims and demands. It don not try to reach any agreement with people who had had other views.

There is investigated realization of consociational democracy as the best way to solve conflicts connected with segmentization of society in some European states.

It is doubtful whether rules and principles of the consociational democracy would be implemented in Poland, because of lack of tolerance in ranks of the Catholic segment.

Therefore menace of segmentization in Poland might lead to sharp conflicts causing domestic political instability. Domination of the Catholic segment in Polish government would be able to disturb relations with East European countries and to cause a struggle with liberal, anticlerical and even religiously neutral political options in Western Europe.

Integration of Poland with the EU will strengthen tendencies to secular character of a state like to existing model in the EU and therefore to minimize above mentioned menace.