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## **NATO in Polish social perception: Overt and implicit hopes and fears**

### *(1) Introduction*

For years, Poles - as other nations of post-communist countries - have been barraged with intensive anti-NATO propaganda. Years of communist propaganda about the aggressive nature of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation have undoubtedly left their mark on Poles' consciousness. This propaganda described NATO as an imperial, enemy pact pursuing its own interest at the cost of non-member states, and particularly at the security expense of Central and East European countries which remained in the sphere of influence of the former Soviet Union.

After the political transformation, Poles are faced with an equally strong - albeit more rational - pro-NATO advocacy. Current Polish media accentuate the opportunities and advantages resulting from Poland's expected membership in the organisation.

However, this does not resolve a number of problems, including:

- (a) There are clear contradictions between the information provided earlier and being provided now.
- (b) In Polish social perception there is a dominant view that good relations with the West and with the East are contradictory, if not mutually exclusive.

(c) The overt and implicit components of attitudes on this issue by Poles (as well as by other nations aspiring to enter pan-European structures) are either contradictory or focus on other aspects of the issue

(d) Neither earlier nor present attitudes of Poles towards the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation are really well known.

As far as I know, up to the present, no one has really examined in detail what are the actual hopes, fears, superstitions and convictions about the Alliance which make up the substance of Polish social attitudes towards NATO, nor what are the implicit expectations or conditions of supporting Poland's membership in it. Actually, Poles' attitude towards the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is known only superficially; what is not known is its actual structure or its implicit unconscious elements. The goal of the research presented in this report was, therefore, two-fold:

- (a) to assess overt, conscious attitudes towards NATO; and
- (b) to reconstruct implicit, unconscious fears.

In particular, I was interested in the following issues:

- (a) Perception the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation as a factor of threat and security.
- (b) Stereotypes of NATO members-countries and NATO as a whole
- (c) The psychological sense of a pro-NATO stance
- (d) The role of public opinion-moulding institutions in creating overt and implicit components of these attitudes.

## *(2) NATO as a source of threat and as guarantor of security*

In the consciousness of Poles there is the conviction that at the beginning of World War II Poland was betrayed by its allies (despite military pacts with England and

France), and that at the end of the Second World War it was allowed to fall under the influence of the Soviet Union. Thus, despite a tremendous traditional pro-Western and pro-US sentiment in Poland, communist propaganda could and did take advantage of the argument that „Western guarantees of Polish security have not been effective”.

It is likely that the twentieth-century Polish history - and in particular the national sense of desolation when fighting back the Hitler army in 1939 - makes a serious source of distrust towards the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation security warranties. In spite of the bilateral military agreements which Poland had signed with both England and France, these countries remained militarily passive during Hitler invasion in Poland. Potentially, if used as propaganda by the forces opposed to the concept Poland's access into NATO structures, this historical fact can considerably affect the attitudes of the Polish people towards NATO, their trust in NATO as a guarantor of security, their belief whether Poland should join NATO at all, etc. However, the role of this episode is not that easy to predict in the case of young people, for whom the Second World War is merely a remote history.

For the purpose of this report, it is less important to try to reason out whether it would be in any way justified to discuss the beginning of the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War in the categories of the Western Europe's betrayal of Poland, or to consider hypothetically whether Hitler would have been defeated sooner, had France and England entered the war theatre in September 1939, or rather contrarily, Germans would have managed to occupy the whole territory of England within weeks. Similarly, it seems not relevant to try to assess hereby what were the real possibilities for the West to have any influence over Stalin, so uncompromising in his intentions. What truly matters is the fact that the rancour, disappointment, or grudge against the West lingers in the consciousness of the

majority of Polish people. This grudge is further multiplied by the awareness that during the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War a great deal of Polish soldiers were killed while taking part in the defence or liberation of some Western-European countries.

It is worth noting, however, that in the recent years these emotions have had no reflection in the Polish people's attitude to the idea of Poland's access to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The results of various social opinion polls are uniform: the majority of Polish people support the concept (see also point (3) of this report).

Because on the one hand the sense of the historical betrayal by the West is still present in the Polish people's consciousness, and on the other, there is so much of enthusiasm and support for the military liaison with the West, the simple question appears, how can possibly these two contrary opinions co-exist. One of the most probable explanations is that these opinions are isolated in the human cognitive system (see Lingle, Ostrom, 1981; Ostrom, Lingle, Pryor, Geva, 1980). However, another question occurs: what would happen if for some reason these two opinions are confronted.

In this place I would like to focus on one example of possible situations leading to such confrontation - the so-called *priming*.

A phenomenon called priming describes in social psychology the effects of prior context on the interpretation of currently attended information. Priming is specially a name for the fact that recently (or frequently) activated ideas come to mind more easily than ideas that have not been activated. As a research example, exposing people to positive or negative trait terms causes them soon afterward to interpret ambiguous behavior as correspondingly positive or negative because of the meaning that had been primed (see: Bargh et al., 1986 or Higgins 1989 for a review). Priming effects are

strongest when relevant meanings as well as positive or negative valences are primed. Usually, experimenters construct the priming and stimulus contexts such that subjects do not consciously connect the two. It is crucial in priming experiments that participants do not think that the primed interpretation comes to mind because it was previously provided to them, but instead the participants think the primed construct comes to their minds because of the stimulus itself. It has been shown that priming effects can even operate automatically, without one's conscious awareness of the initial prime (Bargh et al., 1986; Bargh and Pietromonaco, 1982).

In this context, a question arises whether *priming* in the form of the “historical disappointment” which the Polish nation shared in 1939 can have any impact on the way Polish people conceive both NATO itself and the question whether there is any point in their country's access to the Treaty today – nearly sixty years later.

## **Study 1**

### Overview

An experiment has been performed where the official – i.e. known to the participants - aim was to test the perception of time. One group of participants watched a short documentary about the first days of the War, presenting Poland's solitary fight against the fascist Germany; the other group – a documentary presenting famous health resorts in the mountains, also in the 1930's. Then the participants were asked to answer several questions dealing with the perception of time and afterwards - thanked for taking part in the research. While this experiment was still in progress, the participants were asked to take part in another short experiment, lead by another employee of the Institute

of Psychology. Within this “additional” survey , the participants answered some questions about Poland’s access to NATO.

### Participants

The participants of the experiment were 1<sup>st</sup> up to 3<sup>rd</sup> year students of the University of Wroc<sup>3</sup>aw (22 women and 20 men)), aged 18-23. They were randomly divided into two groups.

### Procedure

The students were invited to take part in the “time perception experiment”. The experiment was to be carried out in groups. The participants appeared in the laboratory of the Institute of Psychology at the University of Wroc<sup>3</sup>aw, and were asked to watch a short film about the past. Depending on group, they were shown either the scenes from the beginnings of the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War , accompanied by a spoken commentary (group 1), or scenes from mountain health resorts in the 1930’s, also accompanied by a commentary (group 2).

In the first group, the film rendered the atmosphere of a Warsaw street, reacting with enthusiasm to the promise announced by England and France on September 3, 1939, and then switched to war scenes showing the desperate fight of the Polish army against the Hitler invaders. The commentary informed that England and France gave only a verbal declaration of help, but in fact there was no armed attack on Germany from the West. Hence Poland was left to its ordeal. The international agreements had no reflection in the reality of the developing war. Only when Poland was already defeated and German attacks

first on France and then on England followed, these countries – now directly stricken by war – entered the war arena, this time not only with words but with real tanks and guns.

The second group was shown some scenes from mountain resorts in the 1930's. The scenes presented people drinking mineral water, whether walking in park alleys or carried in cabs pulled by horses. The film was accompanied by the commentary stating that in the 1930's it became quite fashionable among the social elite to visit mountain health resorts. In the promenades of the mountain towns one could meet film and theatre stars as well as political celebrities. Though officially it was all about improving one's health, often the real reason was to have a good time in the picturesque mountain scenery, where handsome gentlemen appeared accompanied by ladies in their most beautiful attire. Each of the films lasted ca. 4.5 minutes.

Immediately after the films finished, the experiment leader ( man) asked the participants to fill in a short questionnaire about time perception. The questionnaire contained only a few questions:

1. How would you describe the time which divides us from the events presented in the film? Was it:

a) very long ago; b) long ago; c) quite long ago; d) not so long ago; e) not long ago at all.

[underline the chosen answer]

2. In your opinion, how many minutes lasted the presented film? [underline the chosen answer] a) 2 minutes; b) 3 minutes; c) 4 minutes; d) 5 minutes; e) 6 minutes

3. How fast in your opinion did the time flow for the people presented in the film? Did the time flow: a) much slower than nowadays; b) slower than nowadays; c) just like nowadays; d) faster than nowadays; e) much faster than nowadays [underline the chosen answer]





2) Should Poland join NATO ?

absolutely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 absolutely  
not yes

3) In case Poland's security is in threat, could Poland as NATO member rely on NATO military intervention for our defence?

absolutely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 absolutely  
not yes

Obviously, it was not the time perception questionnaire but the answers to the political items ( more precisely, only those dealing with NATO) which were the merit of the research, but it was important that the participants did not associate those questions with the films. They were to realise that only later, when it was to be explained during a special meeting organised several days after the experiment.

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<sup>1</sup>Those items were included in the questionnaire only to prevent group 1 from linking the film they watched with the questions about NATO.

## Results

The ANOVA 2 ( experimental conditions – watching a documentary about September 1939 vs. watching a documentary about the life of health resorts in the 1930's) x 2 ( participants' sex) was conducted with the answers to NATO items as dependant variables. Any main sex effect or interaction effects were not recorded in any

of the three cases. The main effect of the experiment conditions turned out to be unimportant for the evaluation of NATO [ $F(1,37) < 1$ ;  $M = 5.29$  in the conditions of the first documentary vs.  $M = 5.55$  in the conditions of the second film]. The difference of opinion on the point in Poland's access to NATO was close to the statistical relevance:  $F(1,37) = 3.015$ ,  $p. < 0.1$ . Those who watched the September 1939 documentary were less convinced whether Poland should enter NATO ( $M = 5.76$ ) than those who watched the mountain resort documentary ( $M = 6.30$ ). However, the opinions on whether Poland as the NATO member could rely on guarantees from the other member-states in case of armed attack on Poland turned out to be distinctly different [ $F(1,37) = 11.27$ ,  $p. < 0.002$ ] depending on which documentary was shown – average of 4.90 for those who watched the first film and 5.75 for those who were shown the second film.

### Discussion of results

The experiment results indicate that the *priming* by showing a film about Poland's solitude in the first days of the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War makes a relevant (in the categories of statistics) impact on participants' attitudes towards Poland's political situation today. Specifically, this type of priming reduces the assurance that in case of a military conflict, Poland as a NATO member could count on the allies to keep their liability.

It should be concluded that the historical events of the War (and probably also the experience of the direct post-war period) could be used by the propaganda against Poland's access to NATO. Such activity could prove effective even if it is not straightforwardly stated that Poland's historical experience indicates the futility of becoming a NATO member. However, it is worth stressing that even those participants who experienced the *priming* by the first documentary still demonstrated generally

positive and approving attitudes towards NATO. Hence propaganda drawing from the Polish people's historical experience would be probably effective enough to lower the level of enthusiasm towards NATO, but not as successful as to turn this enthusiasm into scepticism.

Above conclusions seem to be justified for the age of people participating in the research. The generation of the 20-25 years old did not directly experience the atrocities of the War and did not witness the hopeless fight of Polish soldiers against the Hitler invasion. The separate question is whether the *priming* effects would be analogous or stronger should the above experiment be carried out among the 80 years old. For them, pictures from the first days of war would probably trigger a series of different memory associations and evoke strong emotions. The question about possible generation differences in the reaction to *priming* as analysed in this work – makes a question for separate, future research.

### *(3) Stereotypes of NATO member-states' citizens*

The issue of stereotyping haunts our history and our present as human beings. Without stereotypes, there would be less need to hate, exclude, exterminate. On the other hand, however, stereotype makes our world simpler: it tells how most people in the group supposedly behave, what they allegedly prefer, and where their competence supposedly lies.

Over sixty years after Katz and Braly's (1933, 1935) famous work on racial and ethnic stereotypes, the field of stereotyping has far from settled fundamental issues of definition. What are stereotypes? Apparently, there are many answers and each definition

makes different theoretical statement about what makes stereotypes different from judgments and beliefs of another kind. For instance, a commonly accepted definition of the construct by Worchel, Cooper and Goethals (1991) claims that a stereotype is a "set of beliefs about the characteristics of the people in a group, generalized to nearly all group members" (p. 361). Because this definition proposes that stereotypes are characterization of groups, the descriptive content of stereotypes is of primary importance. Another theoretical attempt, however, emphasize that stereotypes involve perceptions of how groups differ from one another (for instance: Martin, 1987). Stereotypes of Blacks, for example, may implicitly include some conception of how Blacks differ from Whites (e.g., "Blacks are more lazy than Whites"). Finally, for some social psychologists the evaluative dimension of stereotyping (i.e. favourability of the characteristics on which individuals stereotype groups) is critical (e.g. Miller, 1982).

What causes group stereotypes is another important topic. We know that many stereotypes exist and that, once stereotypes are in place, various perpetuation processes make them disturbingly resistant to change. But what processes account for the formation of stereotypes in the first place? Apparently, stereotypes spring from several factors - economic, cultural, emotional and cognitive - because stereotypes, like other beliefs, serve several functions. Fifty and forty years ago social psychologist were focused primarily on the emotional sources of stereotyping. It has been shown, for instance, that individuals in negative states (like: frustration or anxiety) may derive some measure of relief or gratification by expressing their prejudices and stereotypes toward out-group (Adorno, et. all., 1950; Dollard, et. all., 1939). For the past quarter century, however, the study of stereotyping has been dominated by the social cognition approach,

by investigating the role of cognitive mechanism in biases in judgments of groups and individuals.

From the point of view of Poland's integration with NATO it is interesting to recognise the stereotypes of the citizens of NATO member-countries that are typical for Polish people, as well as the general stereotype of a NATO citizen. The latter would be something like e.g. a general stereotype of an Asian or of an European – and not an average stereotype of all nations in Europe or in Asia.

## **Study 2**

### Overview

The idea of the study was to present to subjects ten pairs of adjectives (ten traits and their opposites) designed to describe people, and subsequently to ask them to use them in order to describe a typical representative of various national groups as well as a typical representative of the NATO member-states' citizens.

### Participants

One hundred fifty eight students (83 female, 75 male) from high schools in Wrocław were participants in the study. The analysis took into account data from 152 students, since 6 persons filled out questionnaires incorrectly. The study was of a collective type and took place on the school premises.

### Materials

Since participants were supposed to describe typical representatives of various nations by means of presented adjectives, in a sample test a list of 40 personality traits (20 adjectives and 20 opposites) was prepared following a set of the traits most often used by Polish youth to describe people (Lewicka, 1983). From among a number of traits that constitute Lewicka's list we chose only those which recur in descriptions of people and are definitely unequivocal and clearly interpretable. In a pilot study, we performed an analysis of frequency with which subjects chose particular adjectives for description of foreign people and on this basis we elaborated a list of 10 traits and their opposites used in the study presented here:

lazy-diligent; devoid of sense of humour - having a sense of humor; envious - kind;  
cultured - rude; honest - dishonest; courageous - cowardly; persevering - prone to resign;  
wealthy - poor;  
reliable - unreliable; mean - generous.

### Procedure

Subjects were asked to select from the above list traits (at least one) most characteristic of a typical: Belgian, Canadian, Dane, French, German, Greek, Icelander, Italian, Luxemburgian, Dutch, Norwegian, Portugueses, Spaniard, Turk, Britisher, American.  
and, additionally, NATO member-states' citizen.

### Results and discussion

The preliminary analysis did not reveal any differences between the results by women and men (apart from two questions, irrelevant in the received picture of results)<sup>2</sup>. Therefore in the analyses presented below the sex of the surveyed is disregarded. The average numbers of positive features, the numbers of negative features, and the differences between these values are presented in Table 1. It should be well noted that the biggest number of positive features was ascribed to Americans (2.75), UK citizens (2.41),

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<sup>2</sup> Unlike men taking part in the survey, women shared better stereotypes of the citizens of France and Italy.

Germans (2.37), Italians (2.30), Canadians ((2.29), and the French (2,29). The smallest number of positive features was ascribed to citizens of : Iceland (1.60), Portugal (1.67), and Luxembourg (1.69).

The statistical relevance of the differences between the 16 averages has been calculated by the t test for dependent variables. Precise results are presented in Table 2. The following features were ascribed to Americans most often: wealthy (85 choices) persevering (76 choices), and generous (58 choices). The citizens of the UK are most often perceived as: cultured (96 choices ) and having a sense of humour (77 choices). Germans were mainly: diligent (96 choices) and wealthy (85 choices).

When it comes to negative features, decidedly the most of them were ascribed to Germans (2.05), and then to Turks (1.88), Greeks (1.59), Italians (1.56), and UK citizens (1.56). The least of negative features was ascribed to citizens of : France (1.14) and Portugal (1.17).

The statistical relevance of the differences between the 16 averages has been calculated by the t test for dependent variables. Detailed results are presented in Table 3. Negative features most often ascribed to Germans: envious (77 choices), unreliable (76 choices). Turks were most often described as: dishonest (49 choices); Greeks: unreliable (57 choices); Italians: cowardly (63 choices); UK citizens: mean (72 choices).

The indicator of the difference between the numbers of ascribed negative and positive features indicates that the most positive of all Polish stereotypes is the stereotype of an American (+1.23). Evidently positive are also the stereotypes of citizens of: France (+1.15), Canada (+0.96), and the UK (+0.85). Attention should be paid to the fact that by the same indicator the stereotypes of all nationalities are positive, even though the stereotype of a Turk is hardly positive (+0.06). Quite interesting is the stereotype of a German, which consists of high indicators both for positive and negative features (global value of +0.32). It is possible to risk a conclusion that with the flow of time the Polish stereotype of a German gradually improves. While earlier the distinctly negative stereotype predominated, based on the painful 2<sup>nd</sup> World War experience (see e.g. Maci<sup>l</sup>tek, Kurcz, 1992), today the stereotype of a German is getting more positive.

The surveyed were asked in the questionnaire also about their opinion on the typical NATO member-states' citizen. Only 79 surveyed (ca. 52%) answered this point. Other participants left the question blank, or inserted a question mark or wrote that in their opinion NATO countries are diverse enough to make it impossible to find common features of their citizens. Those who answered this item used rather limited number of features. Hence the low average numbers of positive (1.44) and negative (0.88) features. Most popular of the positive features was: wealthy (53 choices); in case of negative



features, there was no dominant tendency. It can be justly concluded that a crystallised image of “a NATO member-states’ citizen” does not exist in Poland.

Generally, the research on stereotypes presented above can be concluded as follows:

- (1) Within the analysed population, the stereotypes of the NATO countries’ citizens are generally positive (perhaps with the exception of Turks, where the category of “affectively ambivalent stereotype” should more adequately be coined).
- (2) The most positive stereotypes are those of the citizens of the USA, France, Canada, and Great Britain – countries of considerable size, stable democracy, high living standards, and at the same time – with considerable number of Polish immigrants.
- (3) The stereotype of a German is most complex: it consists of several positive and negative features. In comparison with analyses carried out earlier in Poland, the tendency of gradual improvement of the Polish image of a German should be noted.

### **Study 3**

While the above experiment dealt mainly with descriptive aspects of Polish stereotypes of NATO countries’ citizens, the following experiment concentrated on the evaluative-behavioural aspect of stereotypes and prepossessions. In the social psychology, this aspect of the study of attitudes towards others is traditionally analysed by means of the Bogardus social distance scale (1933). The concept is based on the assumption that people are inclined to keep a specific distance from all sorts of “strangers”. In our experiment, the target was to establish the distance which Polish people would be

inclined to keep in relation to the representatives of different countries within NATO. Because the previous experiment did not reveal a clear stereotype of a NATO citizen, this category was ignored in the following experiment.

### Materials

The scale built according to the Bogardus social distance scale principle, accounted for the earlier research performed in Poland by Maci<sup>1</sup>tek and Kurcz (1992) on the one hand, and on the other – took into account the specific needs of the problem analysed within the NATO grant. According to above principles, each of the surveyed was to answer 5 questions about each of the 16 representatives of different nationalities (citizens of NATO member-states).

Therefore, the questionnaire consisted of 16 pages including the following questions:

Would you agree that a [ place for inserting one of the 16 nationalities ] :

1. Moved to Poland for good?    YES    NO
2. Worked together with you?    YES    NO
3. Became your direct superior?    YES    NO
4. Became your closest neighbour, so that mutual contacts would be inevitable?    YES  
NO
5. Became a member of your close family?    YES    NO

### Participants

54 high school students from Wroc<sup>3</sup>aw were asked to fill in the questionnaire. The questionnaire was anonymous and was carried out when normal school classes were

cancelled because of teacher's illness. Because of small number of the surveyed, their age and sex were ignored.

## Results

The distribution of the YES answers to the 5 questions for every of the 16 nationalities is presented in Table 4. Sporadically some of the surveyed did not answer all questions ( which accounts for the fact that some totals given in Table 4 are less than 54). The proportion comparison by means of the *chi-square* test has shown that

(1) The differences in the answers to the question about foreigners' permanent sojourn in Poland or work aside the surveyed are not ( in the sense of the statistical relevance of differences ) dependent on the foreigner's nationality.

(2) The surveyed were more likely to agree to work under the supervision of a Canadian (98%) than a German (87%) or a Turk (85%) [ $p < 0.05$ ]. The difference in the ability to accept as one's boss a German or a Turk on the one hand, and a citizen of the UK (96%), the USA (96%), France (96%), Denmark (96%), or Iceland (96%) on the other, is close to being statistically relevant [ $p < 0.10$ ].

(3) As a potential neighbour, a Turk (85%) is less accepted than the citizens of other countries (Only the difference in the acceptance of a Turk and a German [89%] is not statistically relevant).

(4) Also as a member of close family, it would be most difficult to accept a Turk (76% of acceptance). The difference in the acceptance of a Turk and a citizen of any other of the analysed countries is relevant on the level of at least 0.05. The differences in the acceptance of citizens of the other NATO member-states are of no statistical relevance.

Generally it can be summarised that the analysed group was not inclined to keep the distance towards the “foreigners-strangers”. The majority of the respondents were open-minded, able to accept the “strangers” as citizens, employees, bosses, neighbours and family members. The relatively low acceptance of a Turk as a member of the family can be in connection with the religious diversity and the negative experience of European women visiting Islamic countries as young wives. In this specific case the received result does not seem to represent adequately the national prejudice towards Turks, although - on the other hand – other results also indicate that Turks do not belong to the nationalities most accepted in Poland.

The results of Study 3 are similar to the results of the survey diagnosing the descriptive aspects of stereotypes. Again it turned out that Poles are most approving when it comes to the citizens of countries of high living standards, long democratic traditions, and strong Polish immigration. Germans are an exception to the rule which seems to be justified by the painful historical experience for the last three centuries, and especially the years of the Hitler occupation of Poland.

At the same time it is worth while noting the certain asymmetry of the results obtained in the first and the in the second experiment. Poles seem to be much more prejudiced about foreigners in the light of the results of the experiment where stereotypes were treated descriptively (Study 2) than in the results of the research which focused on the behavioural aspect (Study 3). It seems to correspond with the thesis that Polish prejudices exist mainly in the verbal sphere, and are much less manifested as openly hostile behaviour towards strangers.

### *(3) Psychological sense of a pro-NATO stance*

The social opinion polls for a long time now have been presenting Polish people's high approval for the idea of Poland's access to NATO. The CBOS Bulletin of September 1998 presents the distribution of answers to the question: What political strategy is most advantageous to ensure Poland's security. The answer: "Access to NATO" was chosen by 35% of the surveyed in 1992. In June 1993, 57%, and in the following year – 61% of the surveyed chose this option. In May 1996 and in June 1997 this answer was chosen by 73% of adult Polish people. The distribution of answers to the question how would be the surveyed' vote in a potential referendum on Poland's access to NATO is still more advantageous. Already in June 1994 as much as 75% of Poles would have voted for our access to NATO, and in the period between May 1995 and June 1997, the percentage of those who would have supported the idea with their votes ranged between 78 and 83%, while the percentage of those who would have voted against ranged between 7 up to 10% (it was possible for the surveyed to have chosen the option "it is hard to say"). At the same time, other concepts of entering into alliance with other countries or military structures, from 1994 did not achieved more that several percent of approval. ( In May 1992, such idea was supported by 9% of the surveyed, and in June 1993 – 10%.)

Relatively high acceptance was gathered for the objectively unrealistic idea of Poland as a neutral country not tied by any military agreements. In 1992, this concept was supported by 35% of the surveyed and in June 1997 still 13% of respondents considered this option to be the optimum solution for Poland.

In another survey (OBOP, 1997), as much as 90% of adult Polish people expressed the opinion that Poland should aspire to be accepted to NATO, and 47%

agreed that their country should do everything to become a NATO member as soon as possible. 61% of the surveyed claimed that Poland should join NATO even by the cost of “considerable aggravation of our relationship with Russia”.

In the special social opinion inquiry performed on January 16-20, 1998, 44% of the surveyed recognised Poland’s access to NATO as an “historically crucial event”, and further 41% as an “important event”. 68% agreed with the opinion that this step would ensure security and peace in Poland (with 16% of those claiming that this would increase the risk of Poland’s engagement in military conflicts), and 66% agreed that the membership in NATO would strengthen the position of Poland in the world (with only 3% of those convinced that it would weaken our position).

In the conditions where the surveyed were to chose between the thesis that Poland’s access to NATO would mean the guarantee of independence or the thesis that it would mean a new form of subordination of Poland to another world-power, 56% of the surveyed chose the former option, and 30% the latter (14% chose the “hard to say” variant).

One should take into account, however, that above described public opinion polls have limited themselves to the formulation „I am for (against) Poland joining NATO”. It is not clear, however, if this enthusiasm covers also the acceptance of the surveyed for a number of specific aspects. The access to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation means not only advantages for Poland, like international security guarantees, but also various forms of material and psychological commitment of Poland and the Polish people. Because this general acceptance for the question ”Are you for Poland’s access to NATO?” has been received in surveys on representative general samples of adult Poles, one may assume that the acceptance for specific aspects should by analogy be examined

on a similarly representative and general sample of subjects (controlled demographic factors of age, sex, education, place of residence).

The support for the idea of Poland's access to NATO was considerably lower during the period when NATO membership was being associated with some of its implications. When in 1997 the surveyed were asked : " Would you support Poland's access to NATO if that would mean NATO supervision over the Polish army", 54% answered "yes" or "rather yes". When asked if they would support Poland's access to NATO on condition of having NATO military bases in Poland, 55% answered "yes" or "rather yes". However, for the question "Would you support Poland's access to NATO if that would mean the distribution of nuclear weapon in the Polish territory", only 1% of the surveyed answered "yes" or "rather yes". The condition that "Polish soldiers participate in military conflicts in other countries " turned out to be noticeably less controversial – 65% of the surveyed supported the idea of Poland joining NATO in spite of this condition. It is however interesting that Polish people were much more sceptical about this question when faced with a less abstract situation. 51% of the surveyed asked in October 1998 about the situation in Kosovo supported potential intervention of the NATO forces, but only 36% agreed that Polish soldiers should participate in this mission. In the same survey, only 36% supported the general idea of Polish soldiers participating in military conflicts outside Poland.

In the recent survey by CBOS (March 26-28,1999), after the commencement of air attacks on Serbian positions, 48% of the surveyed claimed that the intervention in Yugoslavia is justified ( while 36% were against and 15% chose the "hard to say" option). Simultaneously, only 32% agreed that Polish soldiers should participate in the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia ( 54% chose "no", 6% did not care, and 8% chose

“hard to say”). For comparison, the “Gazeta Wyborcza“ newspaper in the article entitled “The World about the War” quoted that at that very stage 2/3 of Americans supported the NATO bombings in Yugoslavia, while only 44% wanted that American soldiers are sent there. However, nearly 2/3 of Germans were against the military intervention on ground, but in case of such intervention, 47% of Germans supported the idea that Bundeswehra participates.

In our own research, we set out the question about Polish people’s attitude towards the problems which are immanently linked with the access to NATO, such as subordination of Polish soldiers to foreign leaders, the existence of military bases in Poland where foreign troops are stationed, and Polish soldiers participating in conflicts abroad. ( Both in our pilot surveys and in the public opinion polling performed on representative samples of the Polish nation, these were highly controversial questions). We assumed that when these questions were not presented as necessary conditions of Poland’s access to NATO, the obtained results would indicate low acceptance for these questions. It seemed very interesting how the acceptance for the very idea of Poland’s access to NATO would develop in this context. In such circumstances at least some of the surveyed should perceive the idea as the inevitable outcome of the conditions which they had just disapproved of.

#### **Study 4**

The questionnaire survey was performed by the IMAS agency on the representative sample of Polish people (N = 1043) in February, 1999.



### Characteristics of the sample

Among the surveyed, there were 491 men (47%) and 552 women (53%). 439 of the respondents originated from villages and towns of up to 50 000 inhabitants, 251 (24%) – from towns of 50 000 to 200 000 inhabitants, and 353 (34%) from towns of over 200 000 inhabitants. As far as age is concerned, the structure of the sample was as follows: 373 of the surveyed (36%) aged 16-34 years, 319 (31%) – 25- 49 years, and 351 (34%) were over 50 years old. Primary or secondary technical education – 641 of the surveyed (61%), 307 (43%) high school education, and 95 (9%) university degree holders. 447 of the surveyed (43%) earned less than PLN 1099 per month, 333 (32%) – PLN 1100 up to PLN 1999, and 151 (14%) – over PLN 2 000; 112 (11%) of the surveyed refused to answer the question about their salaries. There were 560 (54%) workers and farmers in the sample, 238 (23%) white-collar workers, and 245 (23%) managers or people running own businesses.

### Questions to the Surveyed

The surveyed were asked 4 questions in the following order:

1) In your opinion, should Poland agree that Polish army is subordinated to NATO leaders (foreigners)?

The surveyed were to chose between : YES, RATHER YES, RATHER NOT, NO, HARD TO SAY.

2) In your opinion, should Poland agree that NATO forces are stationed for good in military bases within our country (foreign soldiers, not Poles) ?

Like in the previous item, the surveyed were to chose between : YES, RATHER YES, RATHER NOT, NO, HARD TO SAY.

3) Do you think that Poland should allow that Polish soldiers take part in military operations during conflicts in other countries?

Also in this case, the surveyed could chose one of the following answers : YES, RATHER YES, RATHER NOT, NO, HARD TO SAY.

4) If today in Poland a referendum was performed on the question of Poland's access to NATO, would you vote: for our access to NATO, against our access to NATO, or is it hard to say which you would choose?

## Results

The question dealing with the consent to Polish soldiers' subordinated to the NATO management, 348 of the surveyed (33%) answered with the "yes", and further 271 (26%) with the "rather yes" option. 155 of the surveyed (15%) chose the "rather not" option, and 149 (14%) chose "hard to say". If we add the "yes" and "rather yes" categories, we get the majority (59%) of those accepting the situation in question.

Looking for the demographic factors which are in connection with the acceptance for Polish army subordination to NATO management, a series of *chi-square* tests were performed. It turned out that men more often chose the "yes" or "rather yes" options (67%) than women (52%) –  $\chi^2(1) = 23.77, 0 < .0001$ . Also the surveyed' place of residence had an impact on the answers. Those coming from towns up to 200 thousand inhabitants were less likely to approve of the Polish army subordination to foreign management (56%) than those coming from towns of over 200 thousand inhabitants (67%). The  $\chi^2$  value equals 11.54,  $p < .0007$ . Also age proved to be a relevant

determinant of the chosen answers. People aged over 50 were less inclined to answer “yes” or “rather yes” (52%) than the younger surveyed (63%) – chi-square (1) = 10.52,  $p < .0012$ . As far as education is concerned, the surveyed with university background more often approved of Polish soldiers’ subordination to NATO (73%) than those with primary school, basic technical or high school education (58%), chi-square (1) = 7.64,  $p < .0057$ . Also the earnings factor was an important determinant. Those whose monthly salaries were lower than PLN 1099 were more reluctant to accept NATO supervision over Polish army (52%) than those who earned more (69%), chi-square (1) = 26.42,  $p < .00001$ . Relatively low was the percentage of the “yes” or “rather yes” choices among those who did not reveal their income (54%) – the difference to the group of monthly income exceeding PLN 1099 equals the chi-square value (1) = 16.56,  $p < .0001$ . The occupation of the surveyed also played an important role in choosing the answers. Workers and farmers less frequently (54%) approved of Polish army subordination to NATO than office employees, managers, or businessmen (66%), chi-square (1) = 13.77,  $p < .0002$ .

The question about the possibility of NATO forces being stationed in Poland was answered with a “yes” by 315 of the surveyed (30%), and with the “rather yes” option – by 243 (23%).

The “rather not” option was chosen by 179 (17%) of the surveyed, and the “no” option – by 193 (19%). For 113 (11%) of the surveyed it was “hard to say”. If we sum up the “yes” and “rather yes” categories, a narrow majority of 53% approves of the situation in question.

The search for important demographic determinants of the acceptance of NATO sovereignty over Polish army was performed by a series of chi-square tests. As in the

previous case, also here men (60%) were more likely to choose the “yes” or “rather yes” answer than women (47%) – chi-square (1) = 15.17,  $p < .0001$ . The place of residence also had an influence. Those coming from towns up to 200 000 of inhabitants would not accept the presence of foreign military forces in Poland as often (51%) as those living in towns of over 200 000 inhabitants (59%). The chi-square value (1) = 6.91,  $p < .0090$ . The age factor was not irrelevant. People older than 50 would not answer “yes” or “rather yes” as often (44%) as younger people (52%) – chi-square (1) = 19.70,  $p < .0001$ . Those educated at a university level more often approved of NATO forces to be stationed in Poland (72%) than those of primary school, basic technical or high school education (52%) – chi-square (1) = 13.73,  $p < .0002$ . The income factor also proved to be a strong determinant. Those who made less than PLN 1099 per month would not agree that foreign forces are stationed in Poland as often (47%) as those who earned more (61%) – chi-square (1) = 19.39,  $p < .00001$ . Relatively reluctant to choose the “yes” or “rather yes” option were those who refused to reveal their income (46%) – the difference to the group of those earning more than PLN 1099 per month is expressed by chi-square value of (1) = 9.38,  $p < .0022$ . Also the occupation of the surveyed was of importance. Workers and farmers less often (48%) accepted foreign soldiers in Poland than “the white collars”, managers or businessmen (60%) – chi-square (1) = 15.48,  $p < .0001$ .

The question of Polish soldiers participation in military missions abroad was answered with the “yes” option by 380 (36%) of the surveyed, and with the “rather yes” option – by the further 220 (21%) . The “rather not” category was chosen by 166 (16%) of the surveyed, and the “no” answer – by almost equal number of the surveyed – 171 (16%). 106 answered by “hard to say”. The majority of 57% approve of the situation in question, if we sum up the results for the “yes” and “rather yes” categories.

To find the demographic determinants of the acceptance for NATO sovereignty over Polish soldiers, a series of chi-square tests was performed. Again as in previous cases, the “yes” or “rather yes” options were chosen more often by men (69%) than by women (47%) – chi-square (1) = 48.59,  $p < .0001$ . The place of residence did not have any relevant influence on the choice of answer. However, the factor of age proved to be very important. Those older than 50 would not answer positively – by “yes” or “rather yes” – nearly as often (50%) as younger participants of the survey (61%) – chi-square (1) = 12.73,  $p < .0004$ . People with university education were more likely to accept sending Polish soldiers abroad (79%) than those of lower education levels (55%) – chi-square (1) = 19.63,  $p < .0001$ . Repeatedly, the factor of earnings proved to be important. Those who earned less than PLN 1099 per month would not agree with Polish soldiers’ participation in operations abroad nearly as often (52%) as those who earned more (65%) – chi-square (1) = 15.08,  $p < .0001$ . Also those of unrecognised incomes were rather reluctant to choose the “yes” or “rather yes” options (48%) – the difference to the group of those earning more than PLN 1099 per month is expressed by the chi-square value of (1) = 10.41,  $p < .0013$ . The occupation of the surveyed did also play a role. Workers and farmers less frequently (52%) approved of Polish army’s participation in foreign missions than office workers, managers and businessmen (63%) – chi-square (1) = 15.31,  $p < .0001$ .

After the three specific questions, a general question followed in the questionnaire, about how would have the surveyed voted had there been a referendum on the question of Poland’s access to NATO. 698 (67%) of the surveyed declared their votes “for” and only 160 (15%) – “against” the access to NATO. For 185 (18%) of the

surveyed it would be difficult to make the decision. Also in this case the demographic factors which had an influence on the results have been traced.

The factor of sex also here became an important determinant of the chosen answers. 75% of men and 59% of women declared their votes “for”. Statistically, this difference is highly relevant: chi-square (1) = 29.81,  $p < .00001$ .

Slightly different than in the previous cases, the place of residence factor was not connected with the fact whether the surveyed came, respectively, from towns smaller or bigger than 200 000 inhabitants. This time the decisive determinant was the fact if the surveyed came from towns of less than 50 000 inhabitants (63% would vote “for”), or over 50 000 inhabitants (70% would vote “for”) – chi-square (1) = 5.62,  $p < .0177$ .

The factor of age plays here a role analogous to the cases analysed above. Those older than 50 did not declare their votes for Poland’s access to NATO as often (58%) as younger participants (71%) – chi-square (1) = 17.34,  $p < .0001$ . Also the factor of education acted similarly. The surveyed with university education chose the “for” option more often (81%) than those of primary school, secondary technical or high school education (66%) – chi-square (1) = 9.43,  $p < .0021$ . Also similar to the preceding cases was the influence of monthly income. Those who earned less than PLN 1099 a month as well as those who did not reveal their income less often declared their votes “for” (respectively, 59% and 60%) than those who earned not less than PLN 1100 (76%) – the chi-square values (1), respectively: 29.91,  $p < .0001$ , and 11.77,  $p < .0006$ .

When analysing the impact of responders’ occupation on their choices it turned out that the only statistically relevant difference is that between workers and farmers (63%) on the one hand and managers and businessmen on the other (75%) – chi-square (1) = 9.82,  $p < .0017$ . The group of office workers did not differ in their readiness to

support Poland's access to NATO (67%) from any of the other two groups to any statistically relevant degree.

### Discussion of the Results

When starting the research it was assumed that Poles would not be much inclined to accept the NATO sovereignty over the Polish army, permanent presence of foreign military forces in the Polish soil, and the necessity of sending Polish troops to participate in potential conflicts abroad. Although these questions indeed turned out to be quite controversial, in each case the percentage of those approving of the solutions (the "yes" and "rather yes" choices total), markedly exceeded 50%. In addition, the 10-14% indicator of the "hard to say" option put the opponents ( i.e. those choosing the "no" or "rather not" options) in minority.

In spite of that, the support in the three specific questions was much lower than the support for the very idea of Poland joining NATO – as established time after time in numerous other surveys carried out on general representative samples. This allows us to investigate to what extent the surveyed' specific focus on the negative aspects of Poland's entrance to NATO can change their general attitude to the concept itself. Let us remember that in our questionnaire after the three questions connected with the (potentially) controversial aspects that were immanently connected with Poland's access to NATO, the general question followed whether they would vote for or against our access to NATO in a national referendum on this question. It turned out that after the experience with the specific questions as much as 67% of the surveyed were ready to vote "for". Admittedly, this is less than the 78-83% achieved in recent standard surveys, and especially not the absolute record of 90% received in one of them – but it is still a

vast majority. What is interesting, some of the respondents were simultaneously “for” and “against” Poland’s access to NATO: for – in case of the last general question, and against – in the specific questions. This phenomenon embraces about 15% of the surveyed.

Another curiosity is the fact that both the readiness to accept different – expectedly – controversial consequences of Poland’s membership in NATO, as well as to declare support for the general idea with a vote “for” in a referendum were connected with different variables of the demographic nature. The pro-NATO attitude consistently remained in connection with being a male, living in big towns, the age under 50, university education, monthly salary of over PLN 1100, and occupation other than a worker or a farmer. It should however be underlined that even in configurations most disadvantageous from the point of view of Poland’s integration with NATO, the number of supporters of Poland’s access to NATO each time exceeded the number of opponents. (The fact that the percentage of supporters was sometimes under the threshold of 50% does not contradict above conclusion, as the surveyed often went for the “hard to say” option.)

#### *(4) Groups influencing public opinion*

Focus group interviews have been carried out within four groups of 10 up to 20 young people each. Each group embraced people of one of the following political orientations and outlooks on life:

- (a) pro-European political elite: members and supporters of the pro-integration political parties



- (b) supporters of extreme nationalistic movements
- (c) groups connected with the Catholic Church
- (d) young people who in the last parliamentary elections voted for the SLD party ( post-communist formation, the successor of the former PZPR) ;

To the first group, the supporters of the *Unia Wolności* (Union of Liberty) party were invited. This party declares a univocal support for Poland's integration with Western-European structures (especially with NATO and EEC). Those gathered in the second group were the members or supporters of the nationalistic-oriented political parties: Stronnictwo Narodowe (= National Party), Polska Wspólnota Narodowa (= Polish National Community), Polskie Stronnictwo Narodowe (= Polish National Party). The third group embraced people who participate in the activities of the Catholic movement called the Academic Priesthood. All three meetings took place in Wrocław in October and November 1998.

As might have been expected, the discussion in the first group revealed attitudes which beyond any doubt indicated that the integration of Poland with NATO is not only our historical opportunity, but also a historical necessity. ( This can be illustrated by the following quotations: "Poland has to take this opportunity", "Such an occasion might never happen again", "This is a necessity – the chances of final military security guarantee has never in our history been so high.")

It was also evident that in this group the access to NATO was perceived as the beginning of our integration with the West ("NATO is the first and probably easier step; more important, but also more difficult will be our way to the EEC", "NATO is the structure of the democratic West. We have to be there, just as we have to become present in other organisations of the Western democracy, and above all in the Common Market".) The

enthusiasm for the pro-NATO discussion in this group was so high that the participants practically could see no reasons for which Poland should hesitate at all. Especially when the discussion moderator asked whether Poland should join NATO even if that would worsen our relationship with Russia, the discussion participants answered positively making the restriction that aside our uncompromising aspiration to NATO “Poland should do a lot to uphold the best possible relationship with Russia”. It seemed that the discussion was dominated by the belief that the above two aims are perfectly reconcilable. The following expression is particularly characteristic of that: “Russia has its own interests. After some time Russia will accept Poland as a NATO member. It is both Poland’s and Russia’s business to remain in best possible relationship. Our economical links will prevail anyway.”

Generally, the discussion should be summarised with the conclusion that the Union of Liberty supporters univocally opted for Poland’s admittance to NATO. In this context it is worth while stressing that although the Union of Liberty is the third (sometimes even the fourth) power in the Polish political scene, it remains highly popular among high school and university students. Hence it can be stated that if we treat these groups of people as prospective environments public opinion formation, then a gradual increase in the support for our membership in NATO can be expected.

The discussion in the second group was quite different in character. The participants represented extremely nationalistic parties. The predominant opinions were those of: “ We have to build up our military potential by ourselves”, “What guarantee do we have that they won’t betray us?”, “Poland has always much of a loyal ally, but when it came to help us, our allies let us down”. It seems that the young people taking part in the discussion think about NATO in the same categories as one of Polish politicians, who is

their authority. Here is how Jan Łopuszański, during the Sejm session on November 20, 1998, explained why the deputies of “Our Circle” {the parliamentary club of nationalistic parties’ deputies} would not support the ratification of the Washington Treaty and Poland’s access to NATO:

“ This Chamber of our Parliament is overwhelmed by the conviction that once Poland becomes a NATO member, this organisation shall protect us from every possible external threat. The deputies within “Our Circle” do not share this belief. Maybe our disbelief is charged by history, also the history of betrayals by Poland’s former allies, who today constitute the core of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. We were left alone in September 1939, we were sold in Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam.”

Again, the conviction that in the history of 2<sup>nd</sup> World War the allies betrayed Poland appears to be dominating some Polish people’s way of thinking, as well as their attitudes towards NATO. During this discussion another belief appeared – this time strictly economical. “The access to NATO will ruin Poland”, “To join NATO means the same for Poland as to be sentenced to poverty” – the participants expressed their fears. They were convinced that the cost of our access to NATO would be high enough to pauper the nation.

The third group consisted of young people who very actively participate in the lives of different Catholic movements. They were recruited for the discussion from the Academic Catholic Priesthood. During the discussion it turned out that many of them are not interested in politics. The question of Poland’s access to NATO did not induce any stronger emotions. They claimed however that “generally, we’re for”. It was underlined that America and Europe are Christian, so Poland’s access to NATO “in a sense means to be united with the Christian world”. The point was made that the main

power of the Polish Sejm – the AWS formation – is dominated by the pro-Catholic parties which univocally support the idea of Poland's membership in NATO. Sporadically (two isolated voices) it was mentioned that as a NATO member Poland would lose a part of its independence. Generally it has to be concluded that within this very social environment the approving attitudes towards NATO are predominant, though it seems that the NATO question does not occupy an important place in the consciousness of those who belong to these social circles. Therefore it should not be expected that those people will in the future make any important impact on the attitude towards NATO as shared by wider social circles.

The participants of the fourth group were recruited from the Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej electorate. SLD (Allied Democratic Left) consists of post-communistic organisations and presently forms the main structure of opposition within the Polish parliament. Although only 10 years ago all the social-political forces present in today's SLD treated "the imperialistic" NATO with absolute contempt, nowadays they have adopted the pragmatic, highly pro-Western attitudes within the Polish parliament. The behaviour and the way of thinking of the young SLD supporters during the discussion was quite similar. They claimed that "The alliance with NATO is an obvious fact", "It is very advantageous for Poland to be within NATO", "America is a democratic world-power and it is within our interest to look for partnership.". At the same time some fears were expressed: "Won't it affect our military industry? Won't our weapon factories be closed down?" It was underlined that these fears do not mean an anti-NATO orientation; the point was made however that "during the negotiations our economical interests should be considered". Paradoxically, this group ignored "the Russian question" to even a greater extent than the Union of Liberty supporters. During the fourth discussion it was

claimed that “Russia will not attack us when we belong to NATO”, “We should not be afraid of Russia, but to use up the moment of its weakness “. So, Russia was perceived here not so much as a partner but rather as a power to be dodged and left aside.

Generally, this group represents strong pragmatism. In this moment of history, it is markedly pro-NATO oriented, and it can be justly expected that in the future this attitude will be spread in the group’s social environment, provided there is no radical change of the circumstances.

To sum up the conclusions of the four interviews it can be stated that the pro-NATO attitude generally prevails – with the exception of extreme nationalistic circles, which presently are in the margins of the political arena in Poland. Therefore it should be expected that young people represented by the interviewed groups will shortly become the social opinion makers and contribute to the consolidation of the positive attitude towards NATO in the Polish society.

### *(5) Conclusions and final remarks*

Although exposed to the soviet communism for nearly half a century, Poland remained quite proof against this ideology. The democratic opposition, though severely repressed, was relatively strong: the strikes and other forms of protest were relatively<sup>3</sup> frequent, and the Polish-speaking Western-European radio stations were popular, listened to, and trusted. All this brought about the univocally positive attitudes towards the West. This attraction to the Western World, for obvious reasons hardly ever revealed during the communistic period, has become evident in the free and democratic Poland. One of the most important aspects of this attraction has always been the attitude

towards the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The recent results of many a sociological research designs have univocally confirmed that vast majority of Poles support their country's access to NATO. This overt declaration of support might be accompanied by fears which are not always evident and perhaps not fully conscious. These fears might originate from the sense of desolation which Poland experienced in the first weeks of the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War, or from the presence of the immense military power of Russia – the neighbour which is not a NATO member, and whose imperialism complicated immensely the Polish history for the last two centuries. Other fears can be connected with the fact that the membership in NATO - apart from the obvious profits – means also certain kinds of inconvenience. It naturally implicates the resignation of a member-country's full sovereignty.

Polish soldiers and army leaders are to be now under the command of NATO leaders, and also will take part in military operations outside our country. And in Poland, we shall have military bases where foreign soldiers will be stationed, ...

A number of questions arises. Above all, will the above mentioned fears – in certain circumstances - be able to influence the declared attitudes towards NATO? Is it at all possible to speak about a generalised attitude towards the citizens of the NATO member-states, or is it rather that Polish people have only some individualised attitudes towards various nationalities? Can we call these stereotypes or prejudices? What consequences can we expect?

Which attitude towards NATO is represented by those who shall create the Polish public opinion in the nearest future?

The research work presented in this report was meant to provide answers to such questions. Research designs of different nature were carried out – experimental, opinion

polling (general Polish representative sample), questionnaire surveys, and qualitative focus group interviews. Whatever the nature of the research – in each case the results proved that in Poland the hopes connected with the membership in NATO are evidently stronger than the fears of being a NATO member.

In Study 1, the *priming* material leading to the activation of the grudge and disappointment which the Polish people shared in the beginning of the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War, only slightly reduced the enthusiastic attitude towards NATO. Study 2 has shown that the stereotypes of the NATO member-states' citizens are evidently positive in Poland (perhaps with the exception of Turks). Study 3 has proved that Polish people declared their full openness towards "strangers" on Polish soil, if these "strangers" came from the NATO countries. They would be well-accepted in Poland as co-workers, bosses, neighbours, and

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<sup>3</sup> i.e. as compared to other countries in the so-called communistic block.

members of own family (again with a certain restraint towards Turks).<sup>4</sup> Study 4 proved that even after the surveyed were purposely made "over-sensitive" about the inconveniences of the access to NATO, their acceptance for this historical step was not reduced in any considerable way. And finally, Study 5 has proven that the majority of those who will soon start creating the Polish reality and influence the public opinion in Poland, represent the decided pro-NATO orientation. It seems then that the prospective future looks even better than the present day. In general, the results of the above research work

on the Polish people's attitude towards NATO can be summarised as follows: The fears – once evoked – can reduce enthusiasm, but not to the extent of causing aversion or antipathy.

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<sup>4</sup> Because of the specific status of Turks, it might prove sensible to go for certain special solutions. Perhaps aside from the well-accepted Americans and UK citizens, also Turks should visit/sojourn in the military bases in Poland, to be able to shake the stereotypes that are alive in Poland.

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<b>Citizenship</b>	<b>Positive traits</b>	<b>Negative traits</b>	<b>Difference</b>
<b>Belgian</b>	1.80	1.33	+ 0.47
<b>Canadian</b>	2.29	1.33	+ 0.96
<b>Dane</b>	1.85	1.34	+ 0.51
<b>French</b>	2.29	1.14	+ 1.15
<b>German</b>	2.37	2.05	+ 0.32
<b>Greek</b>	2.00	1.59	+ 0.41
<b>Icelander</b>	1.60	1.36	+ 0.24
<b>Italian</b>	2.30	1.56	+ 0.74
<b>Luxemburgian</b>	1.69	1.32	+ 0.37
<b>Dutch</b>	2.07	1.34	+ 0.73
<b>Norwegian</b>	1.90	1.41	+ 0.49
<b>Portuguese</b>	1.67	1.17	+ 0.50
<b>Spaniard</b>	1.82	1.32	+ 0.50
<b>Turk</b>	1.94	1.88	+ 0.06
<b>Britisher</b>	2.41	1.56	+ 0.85
<b>American</b>	2.75	1.52	+ 1.23





<b>16. German</b>	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx
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Table 4

Social distance preferred for different nations

Citizenship	Moved to Poland for good	Worked together with you	Became your direct superior	Became your closest neighbour	Became a member of your close family
Belgian	53/54 (98%)	52/54 (96%)	51/54 (94%)	50/54 (93%)	49/54 (91%)
Canadian	53/54 (98%)	53/54 (98%)	53/54 (98%)	53/54 (98%)	50/54 (93%)
Dane	53/54 (98%)	53/54 (98%)	52/54 (96%)	52/54 (96%)	50/54 (93%)
French	53/54 (98%)	53/54 (98%)	52/54 (96%)	51/54 (94%)	50/53 (94%)
German	51/54 (94%)	48/53 (91%)	46/53 (87%)	47/53 (89%)	45/54 (83%)
Greek	53/54 (98%)	52/54 (96%)	50/53 (94%)	49/54 (91%)	48/54 (89%)
Icelander	53/54 (98%)	52/54 (96%)	52/54 (96%)	50/54 (93%)	48/53 (91%)
Italian	53/54 (98%)	53/54 (98%)	51/54 (94%)	51/54 (94%)	50/54 (93%)
Luxemburgian	52/53 (98%)	52/54 (96%)	51/54 (94%)	49/53 (93%)	48/53 (91%)

Dutch	53/54 (98%)	52/54 (96%)	51/54 (94%)	51/54 (94%)	49/54 (91%)
Norwegian	53/54 (98%)	52/54 (96%)	50/54 (93%)	50/54 (93%)	48/54 (89%)
Portuguese	53/54 (98%)	51/54 (94%)	49/53 (92%)	48/53 (91%)	46/53 (87%)
Spaniard	53/54 (98%)	51/53 (96%)	49/54 (91%)	49/54 (91%)	48/54 (89%)
Turk	52/54 (96%)	50/54 (93%)	45/53 (85%)	45/53 (85%)	41/54 (76%)
Britisher	53/54 (98%)	52/54 (96%)	52/54 (96%)	53/54 (98%)	51/54 (94%)
American	53/54 (98%)	52/54 (96%)	52/54 (96%)	53/54 (98%)	51/54 (94%)

Table 5

Should Poland agree that Polish army is subordinated to NATO leaders (foreigners)?

	YES		RATHER YES		RATHER NOT		NOT		DIFFICULT TO SAY	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
THE WHOLE SAMPLE	348	33	271	26	155	15	120	12	149	14
MALES	208	42	122	25	70	14	57	12	34	7

<b>FEMALES</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>149</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>21</b>
VILLAGES & TOWNS < 50 000 citizens	133	30	113	26	67	15	63	14	63	14
50 000 - 200 000	78	31	60	24	38	15	24	10	51	20
> 200 000	137	39	98	28	50	14	33	9	35	10
AGE 16-34	122	33	112	30	58	16	29	8	52	14
35-49	127	40	74	23	41	13	38	12	39	12
> 50	99	28	85	24	56	16	53	15	58	17
Education: Primary & sec	194	30	167	26	105	16	81	13	94	15
High school	105	34	84	27	41	13	27	9	50	16
Univ. degree	49	52	20	21	9	9	12	13	5	5
Income per month:										
< 1099 zl	116	26	117	26	74	17	65	15	75	17
1100-1999 zl	136	41	88	26	39	12	33	10	37	11
> 2000 zl	66	14	42	28	18	12	9	6	16	11
No answer	30	27	24	21	24	21	13	12	21	19
Workers & farmers	158	28	145	26	96	17	71	13	90	16
White collar workers	95	40	61	26	36	15	24	10	22	9
Managers & running own businesses	95	39	65	27	23	9	25	10	37	15

Table 6

Should Poland agree that NATO forces are stationed for good in military bases within our country (foriegn soldiers, not Poles) ?



	YES		RATHER YES		RATHER NOT		NOT		DIFFICULT TO SAY	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
THE WHOLE SAMPLE	315	30	243	23	179	17	193	19	113	11
MALES	202	41	92	19	75	15	104	21	18	4
FEMALES	113	20	151	27	104	19	89	16	95	17
VILLAGES & TOWNS < 50 000 citizens	119	27	101	23	77	18	98	22	44	10
50 000 - 200 000	77	31	53	21	18	44	43	17	34	14
> 200 000	119	34	89	25	58	16	52	15	35	10
AGE 16-34	124	33	98	26	61	16	52	14	38	10
35-49	111	35	71	22	52	16	58	18	27	8
> 50	80	23	74	21	66	19	83	24	48	14
Education:										
Primary & sec	170	27	143	22	121	19	135	21	72	11
High school	105	34	72	23	47	15	45	15	38	12
Univ. degree	40	42	28	29	11	12	13	14	3	3
Income per month:										
< 1099 zł	107	24	103	23	85	19	93	21	59	13
1100-1999 zł	115	35	82	25	56	17	60	18	20	6
> 2000 zł	68	45	32	21	20	13	15	10	16	11
No answer	25	22	26	23	18	16	25	22	18	16
Workers and farmers	142	25	126	22	103	18	123	22	66	12
White collar workers	74	31	64	27	41	17	35	15	24	10
Managers & running own businesses	99	40	53	22	35	14	35	14	23	9

Table 7

Should Poland allow that Polish soldiers take part in military operations during conflicts in other countries ?

	YES		RATHER YES		RATHER NOT		NOT		DIFFICULT TO SAY	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
THE WHOLE SAMPLE	380	36	220	21	166	16	171	16	106	10
MALES	243	49	95	19	62	13	67	14	24	5
FEMALES	137	25	125	23	104	19	104	19	82	15
VILLAGES & TOWNS < 50 000 citizens	162	37	82	19	73	17	87	20	35	8
50 000 - 200 000	82	33	60	24	40	16	36	14	33	13
> 200 000	136	39	78	22	53	15	48	14	38	11
AGE 16-34	163	44	85	23	57	15	40	11	28	8
35-49	115	36	62	19	57	18	53	17	32	10
> 50	102	29	73	21	52	15	78	22	46	13
Education:										
Primary & sec	211	33	136	21	109	17	117	18	68	11
High school	118	38	60	20	49	16	44	14	36	12
Univ. degree	51	54	24	25	8	8	10	11	2	2
Income per month:										
< 1099 zl	140	31	93	21	77	17	84	19	53	12
1100-1999 zl	138	41	82	25	40	12	53	16	20	6
> 2000 zl	66	44	27	18	24	16	18	12	16	11
No answer	36	32	18	16	25	22	16	14	17	15
Workers & farmers	176	31	115	21	102	18	103	18	64	11
White collar workers	96	40	53	22	38	16	32	13	19	8
Managers & running own businesses	108	44	52	21	26	11	36	15	23	9

Table 8

How would you vote if today in Poland a referendum was performed ?

	For NATO		Against NATO		Difficult to say	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
THE WHOLE SAMPLE	<b>698</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>160</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>185</b>	<b>18</b>
MALES	<b>370</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>8</b>
FEMALES	<b>328</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>26</b>
VILLAGES & TOWNS < 50 000 citizens	<b>276</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>19</b>
50 000 - 200 000	<b>171</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>19</b>
> 200 000	<b>251</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>16</b>
AGE 16-34	<b>275</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>16</b>
35-49	<b>218</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>15</b>
> 50	<b>205</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>22</b>
Education:						
Primary & sec. tech.	<b>413</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>109</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>19</b>
High school	<b>208</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>19</b>
University degree	<b>77</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>
Income per month:						
< 1099 zł	<b>264</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>22</b>
1100-1999 zł	<b>247</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>14</b>
> 2000 zł	<b>120</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>11</b>
No answer	<b>67</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>23</b>
Workers & farmers	<b>355</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>19</b>
White collar workers	<b>160</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>20</b>
Managers & running own businesses	<b>183</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>13</b>